Mirroring and making sense of others

the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 11, 264–274 (2010))1, Giacomo Rizzolatti and I were aiming to highlight the functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror network in understanding the actions and intentions of others. Leonhard Schilbach has recently argued (A second-person approach to other minds. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 20 May 2010 (doi: 10.1038/nrn2805-c1))2 that, although “well balanced”, the Review does not take into account the enactive approach to social cognition and so overlooks the fundamental difference between being directly engaged in interaction with someone else (that is, having a second-person perspective) and merely observing others (assuming a third-person perspective). In this reply I argue that Schildbach''s criticism is misleading to characterize the mirror-based action and intention understanding as a pure third-person grasp of other individuals’ mental states that is performed in a mere observational — that is, detached — stance, as it fails to appreciate the full implications of the discovery of the mirror system.