The article briefly outlines how the two major structural causes of the financial crisis have been a massive underestimation of the negative externalities potentially arising from malfunctioning of financial markets, and the policy decision to assign the production of an eminently public good, financial stability, to private parties. Both ideas have been a tenet of the so-called Greenspan doctrine. The crisis also shows that all regulators tend to be captured in the end, and thus any new legislation should contain bright-line rules, that might look inefficient when assessed with reference to the market they regulate, but are socially efficient, because it would be politically costly to alter them. Criminal sanctions, which after all are a social form of regulation, should also be strengthened.
Some regulatory lessons to be drawn from the financial crisis / L. Prosperetti. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1865-1704. - 56:56(2009), pp. 265-273. [10.1007/s12232-009-0077-6]
Some regulatory lessons to be drawn from the financial crisis
L. ProsperettiPrimo
2009
Abstract
The article briefly outlines how the two major structural causes of the financial crisis have been a massive underestimation of the negative externalities potentially arising from malfunctioning of financial markets, and the policy decision to assign the production of an eminently public good, financial stability, to private parties. Both ideas have been a tenet of the so-called Greenspan doctrine. The crisis also shows that all regulators tend to be captured in the end, and thus any new legislation should contain bright-line rules, that might look inefficient when assessed with reference to the market they regulate, but are socially efficient, because it would be politically costly to alter them. Criminal sanctions, which after all are a social form of regulation, should also be strengthened.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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