The paper provides a critical discussion of the arguments proposed – with an increasing frequency in several countries – for adopting policies seeking to promote “national champions” which are currently. After providing a working definition of such policies, we show how neither economic theory, nor experience, support such arguments. On the theoretical side, proponents of such policies neglect to consider their costs, which arise both from the failures they induce in several markets, and by regulatory failures, as the managers of these companies face a distorted set of incentives. The failure of such policies in practice is analysed considering the extensive failure of the French policies based on “high-tech Colbertisme” which sought, from the 1980s, to promote aggregation among large domestic industrial companies, in order to help them become successful abroad. We conclude that there is no sound basis for such policies, and thus that countries should certainly abstain to try and create national champions by design: large, profitable companies in competitive sectors have historically grown through successful business strategies, not through government intervention.
|Titolo:||La politica dei campioni nazionali : tra rinascita e crisi|
PROSPERETTI, LUIGI (Primo)
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2006|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1434/23361|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|