We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.
|Titolo:||With a Little Help from my Enemy : Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality|
GARELLA, PAOLO (Secondo)
|Parole Chiave:||Advertising ; quality ; signalling ; entry ; competition|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||dic-2009|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00238.x|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su periodico|