In this paper we revisit Tullock"s paradox (Tullock, 1980) and consider a rent-seeking game in which parties face increasing returns to effort. We allow parties to randomize their strategies and give them an exit option. Given the mixed participation strategies of the parties, valuable rents may occasionally remain unexploited. We consider such a lost-treasure effect as an additional cost of rent seeking and examine how the expected value of such a lost rent varies with changes in the parameters of the problem.
Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock’s Paradox / Francesco Parisi, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci. - In: PUBLIC CHOICE. - ISSN 0048-5829. - 124:3-4(2005), pp. 411-422. [10.1007/s11127-005-2056-0]
Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock’s Paradox
F. Parisi;
2005
Abstract
In this paper we revisit Tullock"s paradox (Tullock, 1980) and consider a rent-seeking game in which parties face increasing returns to effort. We allow parties to randomize their strategies and give them an exit option. Given the mixed participation strategies of the parties, valuable rents may occasionally remain unexploited. We consider such a lost-treasure effect as an additional cost of rent seeking and examine how the expected value of such a lost rent varies with changes in the parameters of the problem.
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
