This paper examines the increasing role of fiscal welfare in Italy’s social protection system, highlighting how tax expenditures – such as deduc-tions, credits, and incentives – have become primary policy tools often operating outside public debate and under European fiscal constraints. Fiscal welfare is characterized as a «hidden welfare» that, over the past fifteen years, has experienced significant growth, with highly regressive distributional effects favoring the wealthy and resource concentration in a few key measures. In critical sectors like housing, family, health, and pensions, fiscal measures have reshaped traditional welfare models, promoting private actors and contributing to the multi-pillarization of social protection. However, these interventions frequently fall short in terms of equity, coverage, and effectiveness, often undermining univer-salist principles and increasing inequalities. The opacity of tax benefits makes fiscal welfare an appealing political instrument, as it allows go-vernments to bypass expenditure limits and influence social and indu-strial relations. Overall, the analysis reveals that fiscal welfare, while flexible and politically attractive, tends to reinforce existing disparities and fragment the social protection system, posing challenges for achieving equitable and comprehensive welfare outcomes.
Il saggio analizza il crescente ruolo del welfare fiscale nel sistema italiano di protezione sociale, evidenziando come le agevolazioni fiscali – come detrazioni, deduzioni e incentivi – sono diventate strumenti importanti, pur restando spesso al di fuori del dibattito pub-blico. Il welfare fiscale rappresenta un «welfare nascosto» che, rispetto alla spesa pubblica diretta, ha registrato un incremento notevole negli ultimi quindici anni, con impatti distri-buitivi altamente regressivi a favore dei più ricchi, e una sostanziale concentrazione di risorse in poche misure principali. In settori cruciali come casa, famiglia, sanità e pensioni, le misure fiscali hanno modificato il modello di protezione tradizionale, favorendo l’inter-vento di attori privati e contribuendo alla multipillarizzazione, con risultati spesso insod-disfacenti in termini di equità, efficacia e copertura universale. La natura opaca di queste agevolazioni rende però il welfare fiscale uno strumento particolarmente attrattivo per i decisori politici, poiché permette di aggirare i vincoli di spesa fungendo da formidabile catalizzatore di consenso politico immediato.
Welfare fiscale : Cui prodest? / M. Jessoula, E.P.. - In: LA RIVISTA DELLE POLITICHE SOCIALI. - ISSN 1724-5389. - 2026:1(2026), pp. 73-91.
Welfare fiscale : Cui prodest?
M. JessoulaPrimo
;E. Pavolini
2026
Abstract
This paper examines the increasing role of fiscal welfare in Italy’s social protection system, highlighting how tax expenditures – such as deduc-tions, credits, and incentives – have become primary policy tools often operating outside public debate and under European fiscal constraints. Fiscal welfare is characterized as a «hidden welfare» that, over the past fifteen years, has experienced significant growth, with highly regressive distributional effects favoring the wealthy and resource concentration in a few key measures. In critical sectors like housing, family, health, and pensions, fiscal measures have reshaped traditional welfare models, promoting private actors and contributing to the multi-pillarization of social protection. However, these interventions frequently fall short in terms of equity, coverage, and effectiveness, often undermining univer-salist principles and increasing inequalities. The opacity of tax benefits makes fiscal welfare an appealing political instrument, as it allows go-vernments to bypass expenditure limits and influence social and indu-strial relations. Overall, the analysis reveals that fiscal welfare, while flexible and politically attractive, tends to reinforce existing disparities and fragment the social protection system, posing challenges for achieving equitable and comprehensive welfare outcomes.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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