ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A MILITANT DEMOCRACY AGENT: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The thesis examines the conditions under which the European Union (EU) can act as an effective militant democracy in its external relations amid renewed, heterogeneous autocratization across Europe and its neighbourhood. It challenges linear narratives of democratic advance or uniform recession, arguing instead that democratic erosion varies in trajectory, scope, and timing, and that EU responses differ across member states, enlargement countries, and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partners. Building on research on democratization and autocratization, external democracy promotion, and militant democracy, the study conceptualizes and evaluates the EU’s external democratic militancy ambition. Empirically, the project asks under what conditions the EU improves democratic quality in partner countries. It tests two EU-related conditions – membership incentives and partnership investments – using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) for 22 country partners that meet explicit EU scope conditions on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The outcome, Quality of Democracy, is calibrated as directional trajectories from V-Dem indices (polyarchy, rule of law, women’s empowerment). Explanatory conditions include structural factors (development, inequality, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, freedom from autocratic influence) and proximate factors (power-sharing, government effectiveness), alongside the two hypothesis conditions: EU membership and EU partnership. Three sufficient pathways to democratic improvement emerge. First, in low- and middle-income contexts, either high levels of equality or robust EU partnership investments can offset low levels of development promoting democracy. Second, where accession prospects are credible, membership incentives, combined with limited power-sharing, are associated with gains in democratic quality. Third, positive outcomes are also visible in settings without membership prospects but with extensive power-sharing. Within-case studies of Georgia (low development plus high EU investment) and Albania (accession-driven reforms under concentrated executive authority) were conducted to complement configurational evidence with context-sensitive analysis, probing mechanisms and scope conditions.