Judging science in the post-truth era

In the post-truth era, trust in official sources of knowledge, including science and experts, is increasingly challenged by alternative narratives. Epistemologists have coined the term ‘post enquiry’ to describe the incorrect application of epistemic rules in conspiracy theories and pseudoscience. This term refers to the existence of an anomaly in reasoning that involves, for example, the use of epistemic filters, such as epistemically vicious methods of data collection and analysis, and generalized distrust for traditional epistemic authorities. Can the notion of post-inquiry be usefully employed to analyze the longstanding problem of junk science in courts? This essay tackles this question by exploring two different but interconnected aspects of the issue. On one side, the paper aims to understand how the communicative interaction between judges and experts changes if the bond of trust that characterizes this relationship is broken. On the other hand, it seeks to analyze how judges maintain their role as gatekeepers and effectively draw the line between good and junk science in an era when traditional epistemic filters are being challenged.