This paper investigates the role of Venture Capital (VC) in the likelihood of delisting via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for European companies listed in the 2004–2014 period, till 2020. Takeovers of listed companies are generally associated with underperformance, suggesting a need for a change in corporate control. In contrast, we show that VC-backed listed companies are more likely to be acquired when they exhibit higher growth rates compared to their peers. Moreover, this effect is driven by companies backed by low-reputation VCs. These VCs are known to rush their portfolio ventures to IPO and to have a limited post-IPO involvement. These conditions, combined with strong growth, may attract acquirers who perceive a need for change in corporate control. Conversely, we find no evidence of an increased likelihood of delisting by M&A in companies backed by highly reputed VCs, which tend to remain independent.

The delisting by M&A of venture capital-backed companies in Europe: a story of two tales / L. Anderloni, A. Quas, A. Tanda. - In: VENTURE CAPITAL. - ISSN 1369-1066. - 28:1(2026 Apr), pp. 1-30. [Epub ahead of print] [10.1080/13691066.2026.2652903]

The delisting by M&A of venture capital-backed companies in Europe: a story of two tales

L. Anderloni;A. Quas
;
A. Tanda
2026

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of Venture Capital (VC) in the likelihood of delisting via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for European companies listed in the 2004–2014 period, till 2020. Takeovers of listed companies are generally associated with underperformance, suggesting a need for a change in corporate control. In contrast, we show that VC-backed listed companies are more likely to be acquired when they exhibit higher growth rates compared to their peers. Moreover, this effect is driven by companies backed by low-reputation VCs. These VCs are known to rush their portfolio ventures to IPO and to have a limited post-IPO involvement. These conditions, combined with strong growth, may attract acquirers who perceive a need for change in corporate control. Conversely, we find no evidence of an increased likelihood of delisting by M&A in companies backed by highly reputed VCs, which tend to remain independent.
Venture capital; initial public offering; delisting; M&A; takeover; financial distress
Settore ECON-09/A - Finanza aziendale
Settore ECON-09/B - Economia degli intermediari finanziari
   Designing government intervention in entrepreneurial finance: impact on venture capital and entrepreneurial ecosystems (GovEntFin)
   GovEntFin
   MINISTERO DELL'UNIVERSITA' E DELLA RICERCA
   2022Y9WFNM_001
apr-2026
7-apr-2026
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1234318
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