Baxter on Dreams and Imagination: More than a Critic of Locke and Berkeley

Andrew Baxter is a largely overlooked philosopher of the first half of the eighteenth century, known almost exclusively for his critique of Berkeleyan idealism. In this paper, I argue that he was much more than a critic of his immediate predecessors, by setting out his undeservedly neglected theory of dreaming and demonstrating its depth, originality, and potential to challenge his peers. I begin by highlighting the unprecedented richness of his account, focusing on the passivity, uniqueness, and epistemic significance of dreams. Underpinned by an idiosyncratic causal explanation, Baxter’s theory is not only original, but also allows him to clearly distinguish dreaming from related but importantly different phenomena, especially imagination. Moreover, Baxter’s account of dreaming also points to the difficulties, generally glossed over in scholarship, in Locke and Berkeley’s attempt to lump dreaming and imagination together. In particular, their apparent view that dreams are caused in the same way as ideas of imagination threatens to undermine their commitment to mental transparency and the validity of self-consciousness. Finally, I consider some possible Berkeleyan responses that draw—rather ironically—on Baxterian considerations and distinctions.