One important dimension in the work of José Luis Bermúdez concerns broadening our ideal of deliberational rationality beyond the narrow confines of standard rational decision theory. In this vein, he (2022) presents two bold claims: (i) there are ‘quasi-cyclical preferences’. (ii) Quasi-cyclical preferences can be rational. These claims contradict received wisdom in decision theory. I shall critically discuss both claims, expressing doubts as to whether there are quasi-cyclical preferences, and whether they can be rational.
Can quasi-cyclical preferences be rational? / D. Dohrn. - In: THEORIA. - ISSN 0495-4548. - (2025), pp. 1-16. [Epub ahead of print] [10.1387/theoria.26006]
Can quasi-cyclical preferences be rational?
D. Dohrn
2025
Abstract
One important dimension in the work of José Luis Bermúdez concerns broadening our ideal of deliberational rationality beyond the narrow confines of standard rational decision theory. In this vein, he (2022) presents two bold claims: (i) there are ‘quasi-cyclical preferences’. (ii) Quasi-cyclical preferences can be rational. These claims contradict received wisdom in decision theory. I shall critically discuss both claims, expressing doubts as to whether there are quasi-cyclical preferences, and whether they can be rational.
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