Naturalism, Normativity, and Reasons

Marko Jurjako’s recent monograph, Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View (University of Rijeka, 2024), is an engaging defence of a naturalistic meta-ethics. The book’s specific focus is on normative reasons, which it understands along subjectivist lines. In my contribution to this symposium my primary aim is to clarify some of the positions taken by Jurjako and to point out possible problems with them with an eye on further developing these positions. This does not mean I agree with his naturalistic meta-ethics; nonetheless, I do see it as a major contender in today’s meta-ethical landscape. I interpret Jurjako as being a naturalist in meta-ethics, not only methodologically, but also substantively. However, as I try to show, this does not come clearly forward from the book even though the book explicitly endorses naturalism. Along the way I also make some critical remarks about Jurjako’s treatment of Enoch’s idealization challenge and his use of Street’s evolutionary debunking argument.