I limiti dell’autonomia nel fine vita: sulla differenza tra uccidere e lasciar morire

In contemporary bioethical debate, the different moral judgements on active and passive euthanasia are often justified on the basis of the distinction between killing and letting die, which is a special case of the more general distinction between doing harm and allowing harm. The aim of this essay is to criticise this argument. Firstly, I will examine the main ways in which the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm has been drawn and argue that it is not clear what this distinction consists of or what its moral relevance is. Subsequently, I will argue that even if one does not accept the previous conclusions, the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm cannot ground the different value judgement on active and passive euthanasia, since the latter also includes cases of doing harm. Finally, I shall show how the doctrine of double effect is not applicable to passive euthanasia.