Contextual Frameworks in Ontological Presuppositions for Categorization

A recent and promising approach in contemporary ontology is an improved accounting of the often-hidden metaphysical background presuppositions of taxonomies and categorizations in our sciences. This approach aims to disclose the a priori but contextual assumptions that give sense to the formal frameworks of our theories. The set of background a priori presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the effect of selection preferences in building the correct classes of objects. The impact of intentions and goals when we organize a plurality of data in genera and species seems confirmed by recent research in experimental psychology on the effects of previous beliefs on categorization tasks. Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of the relativity of categories risks underestimating the relevance of the set of a priori principles and categories that are not included in our data and are an indispensable component of human reason. The approach we are testing echoes the fundamental Kantian intuition presented in The Critique of Judgment, according to which aims and purposes play an essential role in discovering similarity in a given set of data. Locality of reason can be read in light of such a relativity and can be considered an acknowledgment of the contextual character of the principles of our understanding of patterns and of our reasoning in general.