The paper studies redistributive choices and tests the trade-off between a meritocratic ideal and the willingness to reward cooperation. We design an online experiment that collects information on real redistribution in favor of subjects that differ in relative performance and cooperative levels. Cooperative behavior plays a major role in making people “deserve” redistribution; furthermore, redistribution to reward cooperation is influenced by the subjects’ income. To quantify the weight of cooperative behavior in redistribution, we present a model and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that a percentage between 37% and 56% of total redistribution is driven by cooperation-related concerns.

Meritocracy meets cooperative behavior in redistribution decisions / C. Cattaneo, D. Grieco, C. Daminato. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 120:(2026), pp. 1-15. [10.1016/j.socec.2025.102485]

Meritocracy meets cooperative behavior in redistribution decisions

D. Grieco
;
2026

Abstract

The paper studies redistributive choices and tests the trade-off between a meritocratic ideal and the willingness to reward cooperation. We design an online experiment that collects information on real redistribution in favor of subjects that differ in relative performance and cooperative levels. Cooperative behavior plays a major role in making people “deserve” redistribution; furthermore, redistribution to reward cooperation is influenced by the subjects’ income. To quantify the weight of cooperative behavior in redistribution, we present a model and structurally estimate its parameters. We find that a percentage between 37% and 56% of total redistribution is driven by cooperation-related concerns.
Survey experiment; Redistribution; Cooperation; Inequality
Settore ECON-01/A - Economia politica
Settore ECON-02/A - Politica economica
2026
nov-2025
Article (author)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1200982
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