Although it is beneficial to scientific development, data sharing is still uncommon in many research areas. Various organisations, including funding agencies that endorse open science, are working to increase uptake. However, it is difficult to estimate the large-scale implications of different policy interventions on data sharing by funding agencies, especially in the context of intense competition among academics. In this study, we developed an agent-based simulation model to examine the impact of different funding schemes (e.g., highly competitive large grants versus distributive small grants), and the intensity of incentives on the uptake of data sharing by academic teams that adapt their strategy according to the context. Our results show that, in the short term, more competitive funding schemes may lead to higher rates of data sharing, but lower rates in the long term because the uncertainty associated with competitive funding negatively affects the cost/benefit ratio of data sharing. Conversely, more distributive grants imply a drastic reduction in initial uptake compared to more competitive funding schemes because they do not allow academic teams to cover the costs and time required for data sharing. However, they ensure higher long term uptake. Our findings suggest that any attempt to reform reward and recognition systems in line with open science principles must carefully consider the potential impact and longterm side effects of their proposed policies.

The paradox of competition: How funding models could undermine the uptake of data sharing practices / T. Klebel, F. Bianchi, T. Ross-Hellauer, F. Squazzoni. - In: RESEARCH POLICY. - ISSN 0048-7333. - 54:10(2025 Dec), pp. 105340.1-105340.10. [10.1016/j.respol.2025.105340]

The paradox of competition: How funding models could undermine the uptake of data sharing practices

F. Squazzoni
Ultimo
2025

Abstract

Although it is beneficial to scientific development, data sharing is still uncommon in many research areas. Various organisations, including funding agencies that endorse open science, are working to increase uptake. However, it is difficult to estimate the large-scale implications of different policy interventions on data sharing by funding agencies, especially in the context of intense competition among academics. In this study, we developed an agent-based simulation model to examine the impact of different funding schemes (e.g., highly competitive large grants versus distributive small grants), and the intensity of incentives on the uptake of data sharing by academic teams that adapt their strategy according to the context. Our results show that, in the short term, more competitive funding schemes may lead to higher rates of data sharing, but lower rates in the long term because the uncertainty associated with competitive funding negatively affects the cost/benefit ratio of data sharing. Conversely, more distributive grants imply a drastic reduction in initial uptake compared to more competitive funding schemes because they do not allow academic teams to cover the costs and time required for data sharing. However, they ensure higher long term uptake. Our findings suggest that any attempt to reform reward and recognition systems in line with open science principles must carefully consider the potential impact and longterm side effects of their proposed policies.
data sharing; funding; science; academic community; agent-based modelling
Settore GSPS-05/A - Sociologia generale
   Observing and Negating Matthew Effects in Responsible Research and Innovation Transition
   ON-MERRIT
   European Commission
   Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
   824612

   TIER2: ENHANCING TRUST, INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY IN RESEARCH THROUGH NEXT-LEVEL REPRODUCIBILITY IMPACT PATHWAYS
   TIER2
   European Commission
   Horizon Europe Framework Programme
   101094817

   ALGOLIT: Understanding and boosting algorithmic literacy
   ALGOLIT
   MINISTERO DELL'UNIVERSITA' E DELLA RICERCA
   202297CKET_002
dic-2025
https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1102849
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1186684
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