Lo spirito della separazione dei poteri tra sviluppo storico e trasformazioni costituzionali

As Giovanni Grottanelli de’ Santi has observed, the principle of the separation of powers is so deeply embedded in modern constitutional orders that its presence is often taken for granted, despite its enduring status as a cornerstone of liberal constitutionalism since Locke and Montesquieu. Originally conceived to safeguard liberty by allocating legislative, executive, and judicial functions to distinct institutions, it informed the development of U.S. checks and balances and various European constitutional models, albeit with divergent emphases. The historical transition from the liberal state to the democratic–social state expanded governmental functions, enhanced executive predominance, and facilitated the emergence of new “unelected branches,” including constitutional courts and independent administrative authorities. Processes of globalization and supranational integration have further destabilized traditional divisions through the diffusion of transnational legal standards, judicial interaction, and hybrid decision-making structures. Giovanni Bognetti’s historical–comparative analysis traces the transformation of the “Attic–Doric” architecture of classical separation into a more complex “Baroque” configuration, signalling a shift from rigid state–society separation to cooperative and interventionist governance. While some advocate abandoning Montesquieu’s tripartite schema, its core purpose—checking power to preserve freedom—remains normatively essential. Without adapting this principle to contemporary multi-level governance, constitutional systems risk allowing institutions to exercise power without meaningful restraint.