On silencing, authority, and the act of refusal

The notion of'illocutionary silencing' has been given a key role in defining the harms of pornography by several feminist philosophers. Though the literature on silencing focuses almost exclusively on the speech act of sexual refusal, oddly enough, it lacks a thorough analysis of that very acr. My first aim is to fill this theoretical gap. I claim that refusals are "second-Turn illocutions": They cannot be accomplished in absence of a previous interrogative (or open) call by the hearer. Furthermore, I maintain that refusals constitute authoritative illocutions only when preceded by requests for permission. Hie secondary goal of my paper is to assess Mary Kate McGowan's (2009) account of silencing as authority denial. Despite its virtues, 1 argue that ultimately it should be rejected on two grounds: (i) it entails an objecrification of female sexuality; (ii) if sexual advances are requests for permission (as McGowan implies), a man who asks a woman for sex cannot fail to ratify her authority over her own body. 1 conclude by sketching an alternative explanation for the failure of women's refusals, according to which women may be unable to refuse sex for their interlocutors' advances are intended as imperative (or closed) calls.