This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545-564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1-37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion / M. Alderighi. - In: TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY. - ISSN 0308-5961. - 32:6(2008), pp. 381-387. [10.1016/j.telpol.2008.04.002]
Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion
M. Alderighi
Primo
2008
Abstract
This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545-564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1-37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Alderighi2008.pdf
accesso riservato
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione
167.35 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
167.35 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
