The contribution of epigraphy to the understanding of amnesty in ancient Greece

Amnesty in the Greek world has always been unilaterally identified with the well-known provision of 403/2 BCE. After the violent tyranny of the Thirty, the democrats and oligarchs were reconciled by the Spartan king Pausanias II and a group of arbitrators; among the terms of the reconciliation agreement was an amnesty, expressed by the formula μὴ μνησικακεῖν (“not to recall past wrongs”). But what does this prescription specifically mean? The comparison with the epigraphic attestations helps us give new answers to an old question. The modern notion of amnesty does not correspond to how ancient Greeks understood it. Ancient amnesty is to be distinguished into two types: (1) the cancellation of past judgments and (2) the prohibition to bring new lawsuits for past crimes (μὴ μνησικακεῖν). I intend to show that the Greeks had a perception of the two measures as distinct from each other, even though they sometimes occurred jointly in the same decree. In fact, invalidation of past judgments does not prevent new actions from being initiated in connection with other crimes committed by the same individual or others; conversely, the prohibition to bring new cases does not invalidate past sentences at all. I also assume that the occurrence of type 1 without type 2 may be indicative of a situation favourable to the beneficiaries of the invalidation, who would then have had no limitations in bringing actions against their rivals. Based on the analysis of the inscriptions IG XII, 8 262 and IPArk 5 (= RO 101), it can be argued, therefore, that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was granted only if there was an external power imposing it or if the party granting it is somehow compelled to do so because of the beneficiary party's position of strength. Scholars have traditionally argued that μὴ μνησικακεῖν is applicable to crimes committed during periods of civil wars or external wars; it can be postulated, however, that the prohibition against initiating new cases extends far beyond the chronological limits of the conflicts, affecting all possible offenses committed by the beneficiaries of the measure prior to its approval. We can further clarify the meaning of μὴ μνησικακεῖν based on the analysis of the inscription SEG 57, 576. In this epigraph, three different types of amnesty can be traced: one expressed by the formula μὴ μνησικακεῖν in the oath and two concerning crimes already prosecuted but not yet adjudicated that would have become ἀπόκλε(ι)τα (“excluded from judgment”). In the latter two cases, there is no question of invalidation of verdicts, since the indictment charge was filed for these crimes but a trial with verdict was not undertaken. It can be concluded, therefore, that μὴ μνησικακεῖν concerned only those crimes for which the arraignment had not yet taken place. It must be imagined, then, that under normal conditions actions already filed before the amnesty was granted would have run their course in court, unless limitations were explicitly provided.