We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.
Monopsony and Rent Sharing: Evidence from Italian Hiring Subsidies / L. Pacelli, F. Passerini. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 244:(2024 Nov), pp. 112002.1-112002.8. [10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112002]
Monopsony and Rent Sharing: Evidence from Italian Hiring Subsidies
F. Passerini
2024
Abstract
We estimate that hiring subsidies reduce concentration in labor markets where both small and large firms coexist. Wages increase only when HSs are in place and firms keep 96% of the subsidy amount, indicating that even small firms have relevant wage-setting power.
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