Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag's main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare's main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods.

Coordination in stag hunt games / R. Silva. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 113:(2024 Dec), pp. 102290.1-102290.9. [10.1016/j.socec.2024.102290]

Coordination in stag hunt games

R. Silva
2024

Abstract

Stag hunt games display a tension between a payoff superior option (stag) and a less risky but payoff inferior alternative (hare). We explore that tension by proposing a selection criterion (which we denote as relative salience) where subjects choose to coordinate in one option by comparing the salience of stag's main aspect (its payoff) to the salience of hare's main aspect (its risk) by accounting for both payoff-relevant factors and unobservable individual-specific (idiosyncratic) preferences. Using data from 10 experiments, we find that this criterion is a significant determinant of individual choices in stag-hunt games, outperforming other selection methods.
Coordination; Equilibrium selection; Payoff dominance; Relative salience; Risk dominance; Stag hunt game
Settore ECON-01/A - Economia politica
dic-2024
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1142975
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