This chapter aims to clarify the moral status of AI systems by applying to them the notion of moral mediator developed by P. P. Verbeek in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). More precisely, we propose to define artificial intelligent systems as moral mediators of a particular kind, i. e. as possessing technological intentionality linked to composite intentionality. To this end, it is first necessary to show that the common view of technology held by various forms of instrumental theories is insufficient for the purpose of understanding the agency of AI systems. We then analyse some paradigmatic positions that assign a certain moral status to technological artefacts, such as those of D. G. Johnson and J. Sullins, in order to compare them with Verbeek's postphenomenological approach. Finally, we illustrate how this latter approach overcomes certain limitations that can be ascribed to these other positions and offers a contribution to the process of understanding the moral significance of artificial intelligence.
From tool to mediator. A postphenomenological approach to artificial intelligence / R. Redaelli - In: Humanizing Artificial Intelligence : Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Control / [a cura di] L.M. Possati. - [s.l] : De Gruyter, 2023. - ISBN 9783111007564. - pp. 95-110 [10.1515/9783111007564-006]
From tool to mediator. A postphenomenological approach to artificial intelligence
R. Redaelli
2023
Abstract
This chapter aims to clarify the moral status of AI systems by applying to them the notion of moral mediator developed by P. P. Verbeek in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). More precisely, we propose to define artificial intelligent systems as moral mediators of a particular kind, i. e. as possessing technological intentionality linked to composite intentionality. To this end, it is first necessary to show that the common view of technology held by various forms of instrumental theories is insufficient for the purpose of understanding the agency of AI systems. We then analyse some paradigmatic positions that assign a certain moral status to technological artefacts, such as those of D. G. Johnson and J. Sullins, in order to compare them with Verbeek's postphenomenological approach. Finally, we illustrate how this latter approach overcomes certain limitations that can be ascribed to these other positions and offers a contribution to the process of understanding the moral significance of artificial intelligence.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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