Ingiustizia epistemica = Epistemic Injustice

This article provides some insight into the non-ideal approach to testimony – an approach that focuses on how our social situatedness affects the ways in which we can participate in the practice of testimony and the sorts of contents we can successfully testify about. Scholars working within this approach have identified various forms of oppression falling under the umbrella category of epistemic injustice. In this article, we offer an opinionated survey of the philosophical discussions around two forms of epistemic injustice – i.e. what Miranda Fricker has called testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. After presenting Fricker’s view, we discuss some critical replies and explore some open questions in the contemporary debate. We conclude by claiming that testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice feed off each other in ways that the literature has not fully appreciated so far.