In this paper, we studied the spillover effects of cooperative and competitive incentive schemes on subsequent decisions involving altruism and cooperation. We collected data with a laboratory experiment where subjects were asked to perform Mini Dictator games and a Public Good game after playing an incentivized real effort task. We found that cooperative incentives foster higher subsequent altruism and cooperation as compared with competitive or individual incentives. By contrast, competitive incentives induced more envy towards competitor peers and more spiteful behaviour when giving implies a larger payoff for the recipient. The effect of incentives on altruism and cooperation was moderated by relative rank in the incentivized effort task and by individual level of impulsivity.

Incentive-Induced Social Tie and Subsequent Altruism and Cooperation / F. Gioia. - In: THE B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY. - ISSN 1935-1682. - 24:3(2024 Apr 04), pp. 751-797. [10.1515/bejeap-2023-0138]

Incentive-Induced Social Tie and Subsequent Altruism and Cooperation

F. Gioia
2024

Abstract

In this paper, we studied the spillover effects of cooperative and competitive incentive schemes on subsequent decisions involving altruism and cooperation. We collected data with a laboratory experiment where subjects were asked to perform Mini Dictator games and a Public Good game after playing an incentivized real effort task. We found that cooperative incentives foster higher subsequent altruism and cooperation as compared with competitive or individual incentives. By contrast, competitive incentives induced more envy towards competitor peers and more spiteful behaviour when giving implies a larger payoff for the recipient. The effect of incentives on altruism and cooperation was moderated by relative rank in the incentivized effort task and by individual level of impulsivity.
incentive schemes; altruism; cooperation; competition;
Settore ECON-01/A - Economia politica
Settore ECON-02/A - Politica economica
4-apr-2024
Article (author)
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
10.1515_bejeap-2023-0138.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione 4.69 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
4.69 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/1106430
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact