The ability to think for cooperating is called Shared Intentionality. The advocates of the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis maintain that this is a distinctively human skill, for humans possess a foundational ability to ascribe distal intentions to conspecifics, and to share distal intentions courtesy of this capacity. Accordingly, humans appear to be provided with a specific capacity to coordinate joint actions and plans over time. I investigate to what extent such capacity can be observed to emerge in non-human animals as well.
Joint distal intentions : Who shares what? / A. Kaufmann (ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS IN PHILOSOPHY). - In: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind / [a cura di] J. Kiverstein. - [s.l] : Routledge, 2016. - ISBN 978-1-138-82769-1. - pp. 343-356
Joint distal intentions : Who shares what?
A. Kaufmann
2016
Abstract
The ability to think for cooperating is called Shared Intentionality. The advocates of the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis maintain that this is a distinctively human skill, for humans possess a foundational ability to ascribe distal intentions to conspecifics, and to share distal intentions courtesy of this capacity. Accordingly, humans appear to be provided with a specific capacity to coordinate joint actions and plans over time. I investigate to what extent such capacity can be observed to emerge in non-human animals as well.
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
RoutledgeSocialMindBook.pdf
accesso riservato
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Licenza:
Nessuna licenza
Dimensione
4.31 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
4.31 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
