In my doctoral thesis, I intended to start from the following observation: Heidegger's philosophy has shaped the dialectical rift in twentieth-century philosophy in a similar way as Hegel did from the previous century. Taking up the famous formulation used by Marx with regard to the Hegelian dialectic, what I have attempted to do is to separate the «rational core» of Heidegger's dialectic, namely the «general forms of movement» of experience described by it, from its «mystical rind», alluding by the latter term to the «grounds» on which Heidegger found these forms. These grounds, in Heidegger's work, are essentially two: first, the formal concept of «existence», in the phase of his meditation that culminates in Being and Time, and then the «history of being», following the so-called «turn». Similarly to how Marx intended to «make the Hegelian dialectic walk on its feet, rather than on its head», finding its forms not on the mystifying and superstructural level of consciousness and Idea but on the concrete and structural level of the socio-economic organisation of a form of life and the conflicts that run through it, I have considered, starting from the first season of French phenomenology, some of the concrete grounds on which the general forms of movement described by Heidegger have been traced, starting from the plane of corporeality. This «deformalisation» of Heidegger's ontology has served, by contrast, to highlight its extraordinary coherence from the point of view of its formal scheme, which contemporary philosophy has often inherited and maintained to the very extent that it has extended and applied it to theories of experience that intended to demystify both the existential and the historical-ontological planes explored by Heidegger. In my analysis of this formal scheme, I intended, first of all, to highlight its roots, which lie above all in the Heideggerian operation of «ontologizing» the categories of proto-Christian anthropology (Part I); then, its articulation, which defines a movement of «self-extraneation» of experience that differs from that described by the Hegel-Marxian dialectic (Part II). In this way, using an interpretation of Jan Patočka's mature philosophy, I was able to reflect on the limits of the «paradigm» that Heidegger's dialectic has imposed on contemporary philosophy (Part III). Dialoguing mostly with the «ontological-political» reading of the «Heideggerian paradigm» recently proposed by Roberto Esposito, I asked: doesn't the very adherence to the laws of movement described by Heidegger, however much it may be applied to different and more concrete planes than those to which he limited them, have in turn, and in themselves, decisive implications? And what are the risks of these implications, particularly at the level of praxis, of the meaning of action in history, of the posture to be adopted in the face of the question: «what is to be done»? To this question I then connected another: does the application of this form not have, perhaps, limits? Is there not a deeper plane of experience, beyond which it ceases to be valid? And, if so, what relationship does this outlook, this dimension that cannot be colonised by Heideggerian forms of movement, have to the inherent risks of this very form? Is it able to denounce them, mitigate them, dispel them? Or does it not rather risk deepening them?
UNA MISTERIOSA DIALETTICA. MOVIMENTO DELLA VITA E SENSO DELL'AZIONE STORICA, A PARTIRE DA HEIDEGGER E PATOČKA / M.a. Mollisi ; tutor: C. Di Martino; supervisori: T. Campbell, C. Palermo ; coordinatore: N. Guicciardini. Dipartimento di Filosofia Piero Martinetti, 2024 Sep 20. 36. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2022/2023.
UNA MISTERIOSA DIALETTICA. MOVIMENTO DELLA VITA E SENSO DELL'AZIONE STORICA, A PARTIRE DA HEIDEGGER E PATOČKA
M.A. Mollisi
2024
Abstract
In my doctoral thesis, I intended to start from the following observation: Heidegger's philosophy has shaped the dialectical rift in twentieth-century philosophy in a similar way as Hegel did from the previous century. Taking up the famous formulation used by Marx with regard to the Hegelian dialectic, what I have attempted to do is to separate the «rational core» of Heidegger's dialectic, namely the «general forms of movement» of experience described by it, from its «mystical rind», alluding by the latter term to the «grounds» on which Heidegger found these forms. These grounds, in Heidegger's work, are essentially two: first, the formal concept of «existence», in the phase of his meditation that culminates in Being and Time, and then the «history of being», following the so-called «turn». Similarly to how Marx intended to «make the Hegelian dialectic walk on its feet, rather than on its head», finding its forms not on the mystifying and superstructural level of consciousness and Idea but on the concrete and structural level of the socio-economic organisation of a form of life and the conflicts that run through it, I have considered, starting from the first season of French phenomenology, some of the concrete grounds on which the general forms of movement described by Heidegger have been traced, starting from the plane of corporeality. This «deformalisation» of Heidegger's ontology has served, by contrast, to highlight its extraordinary coherence from the point of view of its formal scheme, which contemporary philosophy has often inherited and maintained to the very extent that it has extended and applied it to theories of experience that intended to demystify both the existential and the historical-ontological planes explored by Heidegger. In my analysis of this formal scheme, I intended, first of all, to highlight its roots, which lie above all in the Heideggerian operation of «ontologizing» the categories of proto-Christian anthropology (Part I); then, its articulation, which defines a movement of «self-extraneation» of experience that differs from that described by the Hegel-Marxian dialectic (Part II). In this way, using an interpretation of Jan Patočka's mature philosophy, I was able to reflect on the limits of the «paradigm» that Heidegger's dialectic has imposed on contemporary philosophy (Part III). Dialoguing mostly with the «ontological-political» reading of the «Heideggerian paradigm» recently proposed by Roberto Esposito, I asked: doesn't the very adherence to the laws of movement described by Heidegger, however much it may be applied to different and more concrete planes than those to which he limited them, have in turn, and in themselves, decisive implications? And what are the risks of these implications, particularly at the level of praxis, of the meaning of action in history, of the posture to be adopted in the face of the question: «what is to be done»? To this question I then connected another: does the application of this form not have, perhaps, limits? Is there not a deeper plane of experience, beyond which it ceases to be valid? And, if so, what relationship does this outlook, this dimension that cannot be colonised by Heideggerian forms of movement, have to the inherent risks of this very form? Is it able to denounce them, mitigate them, dispel them? Or does it not rather risk deepening them?File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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