Imagination, belief, and regarding-as-true

Propositional imagination and belief are both cognitive attitudes, which regard their contents as true, differently from conative attitudes – such as desires or intentions – which regard their contents as to-be-made-true, or from aversive attitudes – such as negative emotions – which regard their contents as to-be-prevented-from-becoming-true. Talking in terms of “regarding as true” is, of course, metaphorical. The aim of this chapter is to clarify this metaphor, unpacking the notion of regarding-as-true as it has not been done before. After having distinguished this notion from other neighbouring notions, I argue that regarding-as-true is characterised by two key aspects. The first is a phenomenal aspect: insofar as I regard p as true, I am disposed to undergo emotions that would be appropriate if p were true – such emotions include also a peculiar feeling of conviction about p, which has often (mistakenly) been taken to be an exclusive feature of belief. The second is a cognitive aspect: insofar as I regard p as true, I am disposed to treat p as true in my reasoning, drawing theoretical inferences from it.