Why Particulars "Play Both Sides" (Resp. 479b10)? Uniform and Multiform Entities in Plato's Two-World Theory

In the present chapter, I argue for an anti-developmental interpretation of Plato’s understanding of particular things. I connect it to a strongly bottom-up interpretation of the “Two-Worlds Theory”, according to which the Theory of Forms is the theoretical outcome of a precise interpretation of concrete objects, namely that they are πολυειδές-entities because they show various and contradictory characteristics due to their perpetual change. In contrast, Forms are μονοειδές-entities, which are properly F and have a non-mereological relationship with concrete objects. This distinction largely depends on Plato’s comparison with Anaxagoras’ ontology. Plato in particular rejects the participation as a μοῖραν μετέχει, whereby what is properly F is a physical part of the compound that manifests F. The distinction between uniformity and multiformity enlightens two fundamental passages: (i) Resp. V.523c–524d, where Plato distinguishes the “recognition” of concrete objects from the “discernment” of their characteristics; (ii) Ti. 49b2–50a4, which, according to the “traditional translation”, confirms that what is not properly F is not a τόδε, but still has sufficient stability to be F-named. In conclusion, I claim that a sequentialist ontology (as defended by some scholars) is a more plausible explanation of Plato’s understanding of particular things than the Bundle Theory, although it is inadvisable to resort to anachronistic theories to decipher Plato, particularly a text such as the Timaeus.