Husserl y el origen de nuestro campo de interés

Interest has been one of the classic problems of aesthetics and the philosophy of emotions. Within this framework, phenomenology offers a description of interest in relation to its constitutive function of the horizon of our emotional and evaluative experience of the world. The issue of interest has been addressed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) over the course of four decades, between 1891 and 1938, and within the theoretical framework that has characterized phenomenology since its birth: the intentional interpretation of consciousness in its genesis and development. The work exposes the fundamental stages of the description of the phenomenon of interest from Husserl's first reflections on the field of attentional experience in the years of Halle, until the genesis of the so-called "field of interests" of late phenomenology is thematized. To achieve this objective, it is shown that at the base of the evolution of Husserl's interpretation of the affective nature of interest, there is an expansion of the concept of "act matter" and a deepening of his analyzes of the emotional sphere. This allows Husserl to make a novel interpretation of the experiential horizon in terms of a "field" or "horizon" of interests, according to which its origin goes back to affective and axiological experiences with objects and their constant sedimentation. Likewise, the work clarifies an aspect of the problem of the horizon of experience that has not yet been addressed by phenomenological criticism.