La costituzionalizzazione della supremazia del Presidente e il suo (circoscritto) rifiuto nello spazio post sovietico [The constitutionalization of the “presidential supremacy” and its (limited) rejection in the post-Soviet space]

Following the 2020 revision of the Russian Constitution, the constitutions of other post-soviet republics were affected by relevant amendments concerning, inter alia, the relations between the executive, legislative and juridical powers. Therefore this article – taking into consideration the different transnational legal orders that influence constitution-making processes in the aforementioned geopolitical area – attempts to explore through the comparative method the elements which have been introduced into these constitutions that may require us to reconsider the previous tentative categorisation of each one. On the basis of the conducted analysis it can be firstly inferred that the recent reforms confirm the divide between the forms of government of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia on the one hand, and the relations between the organs of state established by the revised constitutions of the other post-soviet republics on the other. Moreover, at least formally, the adopted constitutional amendments also introduced several variations among the latter, increasing their respective differences. Nevertheless, these variations are all directed towards maintaining the presidential supremacy with respect to the other public authorities and to legitimising the concentration of power in his hands, avoiding the implementation of a properly functioning multi-party system. Finally, the article considers the challenges that Ukraine has to face in order to meet the provisions of the Association Agreement of 2014 and the seven criteria for the start of EU membership negotiations.