SALSANO, FRANCESCO
SALSANO, FRANCESCO
Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche Cesare Beccaria
Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable
2022 F. Salsano
Monetary Policy Capture and Political Stabilization
2020 F. Salsano
Institutions and Civil Society Relations in Migori County (Kenya): A Social Network Analysis of Weak and Strong Ties
2020 T. Erika Uberti, F. Salsano
Italian Spending on Education: a Long-Term Perspective
2020 B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano
Electoral systems and immigration
2019 G. Russo, F. Salsano
La spesa pubblica in Italia : una crescita senza limiti?
2018 F. Salsano, B. Pistoresi, A. Rinaldi.
Political Stabilization by an Independent Central Bank
2018 F. Salsano
Electoral Systems and Immigration
2017 G. Russo, F. Salsano
Government spending and its components in Italy, 1862-2009: drivers and policy implications
2017 F. Salsano, B. Pistoresi, A. Rinaldi
Government expenditure and economic development: evidence from Italy 1862-2009
2015 B. Pistoresi, A. Rinaldi, F. Salsano
Electoral systems and immigration
2012 G. Russo, F. Salsano
Political institutions and central bank independence revisited
2011 B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano, D. Ferrari
Economies of scale and scope in the European banking sector
2010 G. Goisis, M.L. Giorgetti, P. Parravicini, F. Salsano, G. Tagliabue
Political institutions and central bank independence revisited
2009 D. Ferrari, B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano
Economies of scale and scope in the European banking sector
2009 G. Goisis, M.L. Giorgetti, P. Parravicini, F. Salsano, G. Tagliabue
On the determinants of central bank independence in open economies
2009 M. D’Amato, B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano
I sistemi elettorali e la politica fiscale : il caso italiano dal 1861 ai giorni nostri
2008 F. Salsano, T.E. Uberti
Monetary policy in the presence of imperfect observability of the objectives of central bankers
2005 F. Salsano
On the determinants of central bank independence in open economies
2005 M. D’Amato, B. Pistoresi, F. Salsano
La politica monetaria in presenza di non perfetta osservabilità degli obiettivi del banchiere centrale
2004 F. Salsano