The paper addresses the issue of excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by drawing inspiration from a recent stream of cases (developed first at the national and then at the EU level) involving pharmaceutical companies marketing offpatent drugs. In particular, the two ‘most advanced’ cases are analysed: Aspen in Italy and Pfizer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. This new-found attention towards exploitative practices in the form of excessive and unfair pricing by dominant undertakings that have traditionally been subject to a cautious antitrust scrutiny seems worth exploring for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the paper. Ultimately, it is argued that this further ‘interference’ of competition law into the realms of regulation may be actually justified, albeit subject to precise conditions for enforcement, and may pursue policy objectives in the wider context of EU health law.

Excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical industry: adding another string to the bow of EU competition law / D. Danieli. - In: HEALTH ECONOMICS, POLICY AND LAW. - ISSN 1744-1331. - (2020). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1017/S1744133120000109]

Excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical industry: adding another string to the bow of EU competition law

D. Danieli
2020

Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by drawing inspiration from a recent stream of cases (developed first at the national and then at the EU level) involving pharmaceutical companies marketing offpatent drugs. In particular, the two ‘most advanced’ cases are analysed: Aspen in Italy and Pfizer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. This new-found attention towards exploitative practices in the form of excessive and unfair pricing by dominant undertakings that have traditionally been subject to a cautious antitrust scrutiny seems worth exploring for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the paper. Ultimately, it is argued that this further ‘interference’ of competition law into the realms of regulation may be actually justified, albeit subject to precise conditions for enforcement, and may pursue policy objectives in the wider context of EU health law.
Abuse of dominance; EU competition law; excessive prices; pharmaceutical pricing regulation
Settore IUS/14 - Diritto dell'Unione Europea
2020
21-mag-2920
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/764490
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