Freer when constrained? : Italy and transatlantic relations during the Cold War

Since the end of WWII Atlanticism has always been one of the most enduring lodestars of Italian Foreign Policy. However, although the attachment to NATO and the US have never been disputed, the degree of autonomy from (and approaches to) the Transatlantic partnership changed over the years. The paper delves into such changes starting from a counter-intuitive analytical to the structural understanding of international politics, bipolar and multipolar systems entail different constraints on the states' behavior. A bipolar distribution of power leads to rigidity of alignment and flexibility of strategy (while a multipolar system is marked by flexibility of alignment and rigidity of strategy). The exceptional gap between the two superpowers and minor allies unequivocally spells out who is the enemy of whom - i.e. the alignments are fixed - and offers states a greater room of maneuver in choosing their strategies. Indeed, the two superpowers are less constrained by minor allies in their strategic options. The neorealist analytical framework can be useful to shed some light on the Italian foreign policy during the Cold War. More precisely it can help explaining some counterintuitive attitudes of Italy in the context of Transatlantic relations in certain periods. The paper argues that in periods in which the bipolar confrontation was more intense and the rigidity of alignment stronger, paradoxically, Italy appeared freer in its strategic options. In this view, the paper re-examines two historical events: (1) The elusive conduct toward the ratification of the Non Proliferation Treaty, which in the first half of the Seventies caused some major frictions with the United States while prompting a fruitless and temporary convergence with the Federal Germany; (2) the case of AchilleLauro hijacking and the crisis of Sigonella (1985).