We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possible loss of previous information, which later might turn out to be correct when new information becomes available. To this aim, we propose a framework for changing the agent's mind without erasing forever previous information, thus allowing its recovery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In this new framework, a piece of information is represented as an argument which can be more or less accepted depending on the trustworthiness of the agent who proposes it. We adopt possibility theory to represent uncertainty about the information, and to model the fact that information sources can be only partially trusted. The originality of the proposed framework lies in the following two points: (i) argument reinstatement is mirrored in belief reinstatement in order to avoid the loss of previous information; (ii) new incoming information is represented under the form of arguments and it is associated with a plausibility degree depending on the trustworthiness of the information source.
Changing one's mind : erase or rewind? Possibilistic belief revision with fuzzy argumentation based on trust / C. da Costa Pereira, A.G.B. Tettamanzi, S. Villata - In: Proceedings of the twenty second International joint conference on artificial intelligence / [a cura di] T. Walsh. - Menlo Park : AAAI Press, 2011. - ISBN 9781577355120. - pp. 164-171 (( Intervento presentato al 22. convegno International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) tenutosi a Barcelona nel 2011 [10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-039].
Changing one's mind : erase or rewind? Possibilistic belief revision with fuzzy argumentation based on trust
A.G.B. Tettamanzi;
2011
Abstract
We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possible loss of previous information, which later might turn out to be correct when new information becomes available. To this aim, we propose a framework for changing the agent's mind without erasing forever previous information, thus allowing its recovery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In this new framework, a piece of information is represented as an argument which can be more or less accepted depending on the trustworthiness of the agent who proposes it. We adopt possibility theory to represent uncertainty about the information, and to model the fact that information sources can be only partially trusted. The originality of the proposed framework lies in the following two points: (i) argument reinstatement is mirrored in belief reinstatement in order to avoid the loss of previous information; (ii) new incoming information is represented under the form of arguments and it is associated with a plausibility degree depending on the trustworthiness of the information source.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
039.pdf
accesso riservato
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione
706.46 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
706.46 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.