The relationship between information and rationality of the electoral behaviour is an open question. Rational choice assumptions are not very plausible and empirically too much demanding. Complete knowledge and information are involved to make "rational" the electoral behaviour. That is taking knowledge and information themselves like a data. On the contrary, understanding the electoral behaviour means to find out the conditions under which candidates and voters take knowledge and information like a shared symbolic frame of choice. A simple game theory model - describing the Principal/Agent relationship beewteen candidate and voter under double contingency conditions (uncertainty of meanings) - shows how voting depends on symbolic and cultural factors, which are necessary to make sense to the electoral behaviour. As a result, this model explains the conditions under which identification mechanisms make up for bounded rationality of voting.
Informazione e comportamento elettorale. Le condizioni del voto fra doppia contingenza e teoria dei giochi / L.M. Fasano - In: Giovani sociologi 2003 / AIS - Associazione Italiana di Sociologia. - Milano : Franco Angeli, 2004. - ISBN 88-464-6210-6. - pp. 101-115
Informazione e comportamento elettorale. Le condizioni del voto fra doppia contingenza e teoria dei giochi
L.M. FasanoPrimo
2004
Abstract
The relationship between information and rationality of the electoral behaviour is an open question. Rational choice assumptions are not very plausible and empirically too much demanding. Complete knowledge and information are involved to make "rational" the electoral behaviour. That is taking knowledge and information themselves like a data. On the contrary, understanding the electoral behaviour means to find out the conditions under which candidates and voters take knowledge and information like a shared symbolic frame of choice. A simple game theory model - describing the Principal/Agent relationship beewteen candidate and voter under double contingency conditions (uncertainty of meanings) - shows how voting depends on symbolic and cultural factors, which are necessary to make sense to the electoral behaviour. As a result, this model explains the conditions under which identification mechanisms make up for bounded rationality of voting.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Informazione e comportamento elettorale.pdf
accesso riservato
Tipologia:
Publisher's version/PDF
Dimensione
4.47 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
4.47 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.