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From leaders to leadership
Urban planning, strategic exchanges and policy leadership in Turin (1993-2011)

0. Abstract

The social sciences have often used leadership as a concept to describe the role of agency in change. Nonetheless, what leadership is and does may not always be clear, especially in the loose networks of local governance. On taking a policy analysis perspective, policy leadership in cities can be seen as coordinated action to achieve a shared goal taken by more than one leader, each endowed with different resources that may suddenly become strategic during the policy process.

This paper thus proposes a theoretical reflection on policy leadership and uses a case study in urban planning to unpack power relationships involved in policy change at the municipal level. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it clarifies the conception of leadership in different social sciences and proposes an original application to analysis of the policy process in local governments based on a typology of styles of policy leadership and a classification of strategic resources. Second, it argues for the existence of a policy leadership in the process of urban planning in Turin (1993-2011) as a key component of the complexity of urban governance, by focusing on the situated and strategic nature of exchange relationships.

Keywords (5)
Leadership; policy change; urban politics; urban planning; governance.

1. Introduction

A renewed interest in the public and academic debate paves the way for reflection on leadership as a driver of change in public policies (Capano 2009). Indeed, the concept of leadership is not easy to grasp, and it is often used as a residual variable when structural or institutional variables at the macro level of analysis are unable to account for change. Nonetheless, turning the concept of leadership into a useful analytic tool for research on politics is still a primary task. Whilst empirical research has already spread on personalization, with particular regard to forms of government (Blondel 1987; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Karvonen 2010; Fabbrini 2011), elections (Garzia 2011; Garzia 2013), and political parties (Calise 2000), less attention has been paid to the role of leadership in policy-making.

This role is particularly interesting in the case of local governments (Borraz and John 2004; Haus, Heinelt and Stewart 2005), where the crisis of legitimacy of parties and reforms have profoundly changed modes of interaction while giving more importance to personal relations and networks in the making and implementing of decisions (Lippi 2011). In the Italian 'New Deal for cities', where traditional mechanisms of coordination mingle and proximity to citizens emphasizes the role of networks of relationships, not only personalization (Calise 2000, 61-62) but also policy leadership and strategic exchanges may emerge as key aspects of local policy-making.

In Italy, the institutional and administrative reforms of the early 1990s gave stability to governing coalitions and power to directly elected mayors, and they also weakened local councils and parties (Fabbrini 2001). The crisis of political parties and interests groups as coalitions of shared objectives has given rise to a complex and fragmented system of political actors acting as political entrepreneurs with careers paths

intertwined with institutions at different territorial levels, from regional to provincial and municipal (Burroni and Ramella 2012, 26).

Moreover, local bureaucracies have undergone decentralization and contractualization, and new governance arrangements have been introduced, as in the various forms of public-private partnership or of intergovernmental cooperation (Bobbio 2005, 41, 37; Cristofoli et al 2011), thus increasing the complexity of the stakes and vested interests in the policy-making.

Notwithstanding the reforms, the innovation of local policy-making has proved difficult to achieve, and conflicts have often been provoked by the complexity of the new governance settings (Burroni and Ramella 2012). The proximity between principals-citizens and agents-politicians at the local level emphasizes the importance of the micro level of analysis, while at the same time government is brought back into policy implementation (Davies 2005, 325) and a real space for leadership at the political and administrative levels emerges (Ramella 2012, 32; Orazi and Turrini 2013; Bussu and Bartels 2013).

Empirical research in the field may show that what matters is not an extraordinary or charismatic leader, but rather a combination of resources with which to overcome resistances and a set of interactions that, by their nature, cannot be controlled by a single leader. The case of urban planning as a policy in Turin (1993-2011) has been selected because of the significance of the changes brought about, and because of the role that leadership has played in this transformation. In particular, the role of leadership will be apparent in the definition of new coalitions of interests at the local level. My hypothesis is that policy leadership clarifies policy goals and enhances change by steering exchanges of strategic resources in order to overcome stakeholders' resistances to modification of policy instruments and, thus, of the *status quo* (Le Bourhis

and Lascoumes 2014, 495). Policy leadership can thus be an analytical tool with which to shed new light on conditions that favor or hamper effectiveness and policy change.

This paper will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will discuss how the literature on the management and personalization of politics treats the concept of leadership, looking for similarities and differences. In the following section, I will challenge previous definitions of leadership by referring to the literature on policy change. This will induce me to define policy leadership as a driver of change at the local level (where proximity is a key feature of governance) and to propose a typology of different leadership styles according to the features of actors involved in strategic exchanges, and to the nature of the resources needed to overcome resistances. I will then present urban planning in Turin (1993-2011) as a case in point to show the role of policy leadership. Finally, I will address some deficiencies and some further developments of policy leadership as an element of a combinative causality for policy change.

2. Varieties of leadership and the relevance of the concept to the analysis of public policies

The concept of leadership is widely used in social science. I concentrate on more recent accounts in management, organizational theory, psychology, and political science to search for common dimensions of the concept.

The first evidence concerns the popularity of numerous 'leadership with adjectives' concepts and the variety of analytical methods (Bryman 2011; Avolio et al. 2009). Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, scholars have gradually moved away from the idea of leadership as embodied in a 'Great Man' often with supernatural powers (Haslam, Reicher, Platow 2013, 97) and towards the view of a collective

distributed leadership also in the administrative process whereby resources and coordinative capacities are distributed to common people (Lawler 2008).

To account for the different meanings of the concept, Grint (2011, 13) connects popular notions and discourses about leadership to specific historical and political events. After the fascination with entrepreneurs and the 'self-made man' during the industrial revolution, and after the charismatic leaders with divine features described by Weber (Conger 2011, 88), visions of leadership during the Cold War and in the Thatcher era were tailored on a more individualistic view of transformational leadership. In 1978 James McGregor Burns focused on the idea of leadership as an exchange activity, and defined two different relationships between leaders and followers: 'transformational' and 'transactional' leadership. While the latter term denoted an instrumental exchange of resources (e.g. jobs for votes), the former described a process of "mutual stimulation and elevation" (Burns 1978, 4) whereby the leader offered a transcendent purpose to transform both himself and the followers (ibid., 88). This was due to a strong emotional attachment combined with the leader's ability to establish a clear vision of the followers' future (Diaz-Saez 2011, 300).

A more specific focus on effectiveness came in the 1990s with organizational theory (Pfeffer 1992). Leaders' psychological profiles and socio-economic backgrounds were studied to understand their capacity to transmit incentives and motivations to other members of the organization. The concepts of strategic leadership and shared leadership concerned the persuasion in day-by-day work by which leaders solve complexity and ambiguity by acting as bridges between the internal and external environment, and by mobilizing power resources in a context of competing interests (Denis 2011, 78; Bolden 2011, 257).

Focusing on the diffusion of information and tasks, management studies imported the concept of distributive leadership (DL) from high education studies

conducted in 2000 (Gronn 2002). DL is the collective exercise of influence which produces joint action despite hierarchical coordination (Thorpe et al. 2011; Spillane 2006).

Transactional and transformational skills became important for the public sector as well (Currie et al. 2011; Van Wart 2013), especially in regard to the ethics of administrative leaders in the implementation of reforms (Cristofoli et al 2011, 262; Orazi, Turrini and Valotti 2013, 502).

A similar pattern emerges in political science, where leadership derives mainly from formal authority. In his book *Political Leadership*, Blondel described the features of, and the institutional constraints on, the action of elected leaders in mature democracies. To operationalize the concept, Blondel proposed concentrating on both the personal and structural factors affecting leaders' behaviors (Blondel 1987, 179-181), thus opening the way for studies on the personalization of politics (Caprara and Zimbardo 2004) and partisan identification from a leader-follower perspective (Garzia 2011, 706).

The attention to followers emphasizes the relational character of leadership based on reciprocal but asymmetric powers and pursuing a common goal (Regalia 2012, 394). Ideas of 'hard' and 'soft' power (Nye 2008) show how coercion and persuasion can be used to build a shared goal that legitimates this relation of influence.

Despite this relational focus, political science maintains an interest in styles of leadership as determined by political structures and forms of government. This is particularly the case of studies on local government. This is particularly true of studies on local government, where leadership is a rather popular topic (Haus and Heinelt 2005, 26). With the city viewed as a place for the promotion of urban common goods and political legitimacy (Le Galès 2002), urban leadership and mayors regained attention as key actors in strengthening links with civil society in new governance arrangements (Bagnasco and Le Galès 2000).

In both the USA and Europe, the emergence of networked governance as a means to involve civil society required the building of mutually supportive relationships (Cooke and Morgan 1993, 543-544) and a search for autonomy from the national government (Judd 2000, 956-957) that involved both mayors and public sector managers (Stoker 2006, 42).

In Europe in particular, scholars' attention has focused on the political leadership of mayors since the decentralization reforms that empowered local governments in several European countries and changed the distribution of competences between local councils and local executives (for a review of the different forms of local government, see Bäck et al. 2006).

Mayors thus became the key to understanding local reactions to national reforms of local governments. Following Selznick (1957) and Sharpe (1995), Leach and Wilson (2002) showed how the functions of local leaders had become complex, transformational, and more resistant to external pressures in the UK, by balancing four different leadership tasks (maintaining the administration's cohesion, developing strategic policy directions, representing the authority in the external world, and ensuring task accomplishment) (Leach and Wilson 2002, 667, 685).

Similarly, Greasley and Stoker (2008, 722) studied the impact of different institutional designs and forms of local government (such as those involving the direct election of the mayor, or the council-leader model where there is no direct election of the executive) on leadership practices by focusing on the variation of four features of leadership (partnership skills, accessibility, low partisanship, and decision-making capacity) (Greasley and Stoker 2008, 724). Politicians were seen, following Svara's work on effective mayors in council-managers forms of government (1994, 2009), as facilitative leaders who promote positive interactions among officials and with the public, who secure a shared vision of goals, and who seek allies in loose networks of

supporters. Thus, facilitative leadership was seen as a different way to exercise political influence that made urban leaders potential regime builders by enabling the blend of resources in local networks (Svara 2009, 4-9; Bussu and Bartels 2013).

Though rich with empirical insights, the latter studies focused mostly on mayors' and councilors' relational styles and on their attitudes towards democracy. They gave less consideration to the policy process and to the role of other important but less 'political' actors in local governance, such as city managers, bureaucrats, experts and civic leaders. Haus and Heinelt go in this direction, defining urban leaders in institutional terms but emphasizing the complementarity of power sources and urban leaders' public visibility and accountability to distinguish them from community leaders from the civil society (Haus and Heinelt 2005, 27-28).

Instead, the analysis of public policy relied on the situational character of leadership in policy-making. In a process whereby multiple individuals act to achieve a shared policy goal also through the use of power resources (Capano 2009a, 8-12), the guidance provided by leaders needs to be tailored to potential followers: it is thus contingent, and it depends on the decisional situation, on policy legacies and on cultural aspects (ibid., 14).

A first attempt in this direction can be found in empirical studies on climate change. After elaborating on ideational leadership as a key communicative function of executives (Stiller 2009, 177-179), Meijerink and Stiller propose a description of leadership functions (political administrative, connective, adaptive, enabling and dissemination) linked to the specific challenges of climate adaptation policies. They thus go beyond a general characterization of the leader/follower relationship (Meijerink and Stiller, 2013, 251-253).

Hence, interactions among actors lie at the core of the concept. Leadership as a social relationship strongly depends on a plurality of resources and expectations of individuals within groups, where some of them lead and some of them follow.

The real challenge for a more restricted and rigorous use of the concept is to identify a social mechanism where leaders and leadership are at play. This can be attempted by defining policy change as a modification of the distribution of resources, and by concentrating on strategic exchanges in the policy process.

3. Leadership as a driver of policy change: an analytical proposal

The proposal of leadership as an analytical tool for the study of policy change does not entail building a new interpretative framework. Rather, it suggests focusing not on the action of a single leader but on the collective phenomenon deriving from a plurality of relationships at the micro level of analysis. This multitude of actors and relationships can be seen as part of a causal mechanism (Panebianco 2009, 27) that can account for directions of policy change while avoiding fallacies at the level of analysis (Radaelli, Dente and Dossi 2012, 539).

Since the two actions of 'puzzling' and 'powering' are often intertwined, policies can be seen as both intentional processes and as arenas of power (Lowi 1964) where multiple self-oriented actors with different interests act strategically to preserve or augment their influence. In this setting, the choices made concerning policy goals and related policy tools produce a distribution of resources of influence, creating a sort of equilibrium. In this paper the focus is on the opportunities and constraints that may foster change in the equilibrium among a plurality of actors engaged in problem solving, and on the role that leadership can play in steering them by overcoming resistances.

When it comes to conceiving change in arenas of this type, the notion of strategy is crucial. Strategic action implies that the behavior of actors is dependent on the behavior of others, and that mutual expectations influence the structure and the type of relationships within a policy domain (ibid., 688). Strategic action can thus be seen as an important dimension of policy change, in a perspective where multiple drivers of change are involved.

Indeed, how leadership matters for strategy and for the redistribution of resources needs more thorough consideration. Drawing on theories of policy change, the role of ideational and coalition-building activities emerges with stark clarity for local policy-making.

On the one hand, the renewed interest in meanings and symbolic actions in a new institutionalist perspective (March and Olsen 1984, 738) has led to a less instrumental consideration of the role of ideas and identity as endogenous drivers of institutional change (Schmidt 2010). In particular, while Historical Institutionalism accounts for the embeddedness of actors in multiple relationships (Hall and Taylor 1996), Discursive Institutionalism (DI) seems better able to capture the connections among agency, ideas and change because it considers not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive process of discourse and the connection between ideas and power. In fact, in order to understand if and how institutional change occurs, DI considers discourse as an interactive exchange of ideas that may eventually lead to a collective action, especially in the public sphere of deliberative democracy often cited at the local level (Dryzek 2000). Discourse thus implies a reconstruction of meanings and frames: in turn, this interaction may produce change in actor's interests through the capacity for persuasion of leaders (Schmidt 2010, 17-18). This creational feature may also be useful in distinguishing leadership from policy entrepreneurship.

On the other hand, strategic coalition-building is the core activity for leaders understood as a particular sub-type of entrepreneurs in Giuliani's analysis of the functions (ideational or strategic) and resources (formal/public or informal/private legitimacy) of policy entrepreneurship (Giuliani 1998, 364-365). Ideas and coalition-building are thus important for policy entrepreneurs themselves (Kingdon 1984) because they sell ideas, identify problems, assemble networks of people, and manipulate technology (Mintrom and Vergari 1996, 426; Zaharidis 2007, 74).

If ideational and coalitional activities are not sufficient to distinguish between policy entrepreneurs and policy leadership, other relational dimensions must be emphasized. My proposition is that it is the collective steering of the policy process by multiple leaders through the use of strategy that differentiates between policy leaders and entrepreneurs.

Policy leaders resolve ambiguity by choosing among a variety of alternative policy instruments (including non-decisions), techniques and tools (as in Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007, 4). They thus structure social relationships and the distribution of resources among actors in the implementation phase. Although this choice may be more 'contingent' than 'consistent', and although it is likely to lead to unintended consequences (Capano and Lippi 2013), leaders are actors able to select priorities and modalities of change into a theory of effectiveness of change (Vedung 1997, 52), and to evaluate policy instruments and the related strategic issues.

Hence, whether a politician, a bureaucrat or a private citizen, a policy actor may become a leader if he or she guides change by managing strategic resources in order to obtain support and overcome resistances, as a precondition for modifying the resource distribution implied in the policy design. 'Steering' thus means 'translating' the innovations introduced by a policy entrepreneur into resources. In other words, the

policy leader acts strategically because she or he identifies the modifications in the distribution of resources and anticipates the reactions of other actors, in the case of both the promoters and blockers of change.

Resources are thus strategic in the sense that they make it possible to overcome vetoes in a specific situation. They can thus be defined only in a specific situation, and they may vary greatly in their features: from electoral consent to active support, from parliamentary vote to compliance with administrative procedures.

As a 'master of strategic resources', the leader establishes an exchange relationship with other actors so as to guide them towards a shared goal. This is only partially similar to the role of the policy fixer or pivot (Dente 2011, 87). In the decision-making process, the fixer is an actor that drives the process by resolving deadlocks through enhancement of positive interactions among actors. The fixer is not necessarily interested in the content of the change proposed, for its motivation can also be a simple 'process objective' as for the mediator (ibid. 89).

Instead, policy leadership implies the involvement of several actors in the building of new relationships that produce consequences on resources and tighter links between the leader and others (being peers or followers), as in the DI interactional perspective. In the exchange relationship, the leader searches for resources with which to persuade opponents or followers to trigger the desired change. The relationship thus entails a bi-directional exchange between leaders and peers/followers with strategic roles: for example, an exchange of power for consent, or an exchange of incentives for utility or reputation.

Here the collective and situational character of the concept of policy leadership emerges. There are as many policy leaders as there are strategic resources needed to

overcome resistances (Bourhis and Lascoumes 2014), to rearrange relationships within the policy subsystem, and to implement the designed policy tools. Policy leadership is empirically present when the strategic exchanges are performed by a plurality of actors at different institutional levels and in different phases of the policy process.

The exchanges operate at the micro-level of analysis and they influence actors' behaviors. For example, when change involves definition of a policy problem to foster the innovation of policy instruments, one of the main strategic resources is press coverage. The leader will consequently obtain media attention to the new problem definition if he or she is able to offer 'a good story to be told' to journalists, or even the presence of politicians on talk shows or interviews in order to capture the journalists' readers. Similarly, when a new calibration of policy tools is set, or new policy mechanisms are promoted (Howlett 2009, 74-75), the leaders will search for bureaucratic compliance and efficiency by promising the expansion of a bureaucratic division or by introducing a system of individual incentives based on performance-related pay.

Synchronizing time can also be a strategic activity of leadership, especially in legislative activity. Whilst the policy entrepreneur uses the window of opportunity to access the political agenda, the policy leader must know and control the procedures of political institutions so as to assure approval of a bill or delay its implementation (Pressman and Wildavski 1973).

Also the type of consent can differ substantially among situations. The consent needed to obtain electoral victory may be general and diffused, while more active and specific support may be necessary to achieve bureaucratic compliance in instrument implementation.

In light of the foregoing discussion, policy leadership can be defined as the combination of strategic exchanges. These exchanges:

    i.   produce a redistribution of material and immaterial resources within a policy arena;

    ii.   are performed by a plurality of policy leaders that act to solve ambiguity, to overcome resistances, and to enhance support for a shared and clearly-defined policy goal;

    iii.   may occur in all the phases of a policy process (but especially in the implementation phase).

Policy leadership can thus be studied according to the resources used to manage strategic issues in the policy change. A classification of strategic resources can help in conducting study of policy leadership in practice.

Each resource structures the exchange between leaders and peers/followers in the change process. The strategic resources may be:

•   *Communicative*: when it is strategic to communicate a new interpretation of a problem and to furnish a vision of its future development.

•   *Political*: when it is strategic to allocate political resources, such as appointments, designations, formal responsibilities and offices at different levels, also in non-governmental institutions in order to overcome resistances and build consent around a new coalition.

•   *Economic*: when it is strategic to use material (and often individual) incentives to overcome the resistance to change raised by single individuals or organizations.

- *Relational or networking:* when it is strategic to circulate information outside the policy subsystem, to bridge resources and innovation from other arenas of public policy.[1]

These resources combine differently according to the features of the strategic exchange at stake. For each exchange relationship, it is possible to imagine a different leadership style. Each leadership style identifies the prevalent resources exchanged and the modes of interaction, which resemble the logics of different governance modes or coordination.

In light of the argument on strategic exchanges, I propose a typology that connects two features of the exchange relationship with a particular leadership style. For each exchange relationship, I consider (a) the relationship between the actors involved in the implementation and (b) the means of the exchange.

As regards (a), I distinguish between symmetric peer-to-peer exchanges, where actors have equal power, and asymmetric superior-to-inferior relationships, where one actor has more resources than the other. In regard to (b), I distinguish between situations where material or immaterial incentives are instead needed to perform the exchange.

Cross-referencing these dimensions produces four types of exchange and four types of leadership. A contractual leadership (1) occurs between peers, produces utility for both of them, and is often performed with a contract. This mode involves the use of

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[1] The attentive reader will have noted the absence of knowledge as a resource for the policy process. This absence is necessary? in order better to distinguish leadership from entrepreneurship. In fact, a leader does not need to be an innovator him/herself, or to have professional knowledge. The technical skills that s/he needs related to the policy process and to administrative procedures. Instead, entrepreneurship requires innovation and technical knowledge as a condition *sine qua non*. Steering innovation, and not innovation in itself, is at the core of leadership.

economic resources, such as in PPP or in other management options that imply a contract.

When immaterial resources like flows of information and knowledge are at stake and the medium of exchange is esteem among peers, reputation will be the product of the exchange, and the suitable type of leadership will be relational (2). Here the networking capacity of leaders will be used to obtain strategic information and to foster reciprocal recognition (Pizzorno 2008, 162).

Trust has a key role as an immaterial resource, especially when the exchange requires support and is performed between a politician and groups of citizens. Here we have the typical leader/follower situation, where a person rich with communicative resources appeals to a group of people to obtain the votes or popular support needed to achieve a policy goal. In this situation, the exchange produces identification between the followers and the leader, so that identitarian leadership (3) is the preferred style.

Finally, bureaucratic leadership (4) will be at stake when exchange is performed in an asymmetric relationship between actors with different power resources (e.g. a hierarchical relationship), and authority and command are the political material resources with which to obtain obedience and compliance.[2]

- Here - Fig. 1 - Styles of policy leadership in exchange relationships according to actors and strategic resources: a typology

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[2] Each style of leadership is meant to downgrade to micro level the coordination mechanisms of the different governance modes at a higher level of abstraction, respectively market for (1), networks for (2), community for (3), and state for (4).

Obviously, the pros of the typology in terms of parsimony are counter-balanced by its cons in terms of over-simplification. In real relationships, each strategic exchange corresponds to a style of leadership that often combines different types of resources. Similarly, the number of strategic exchanges and the type of resources needed to trigger change at the micro level can vary according to the origin of change (exogenous vs endogenous), its object (policy goal vs policy instrument), its scope (high vs. low level of abstraction), and its intensity (incremental vs radical).

Moreover, while seeking strategic issues, the analyst should remember that actors' choices are often not driven by a rational will. Moreover, not only isomorphism but also chaos can play a role in leadership dynamics (Lanzalaco 2011).

4. Policy leadership in urban planning: the case of Turin, Italy, 1993-2011

The transformation of urban planning in the city of Turin since the beginning of the 1990s can be considered a crucial case for evaluating the usefulness of the notion of policy leadership as a driver of policy change. From a policy analysis perspective, urban planning is *per se* an interesting phenomenon. As "[a] normative effort (…) on the hows, whys and ways of place making" (Weber and Crane 2012, 4), strongly influenced by national and regional planning cultures and administrative traditions empirically visible at the local level (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009, xxiv), urban planning can be more narrowly defined as the setting of public activities concerning the transformation of territories by both public authorities and private actors, in a perspective of coordination and planning (Crosta 1989, 260).

4.1 Urban planning in Italy and policy change

In fact, urban planning is also a contentious activity and an important arena of power in cities (Dierwechter and Thorley 2012, 63), especially since globalization and governance have blurred the boundaries between public and private actors and given rise to innovative forms of coordination and experimentation across a variety of stakeholders who struggle for decision-making influence (Weber and Crane 2012, 14). From this perspective, reconstruction of the policy process using a policy analysis approach may also be fruitful for planners, and for scholars who study change in world cities, because it makes it possible to reveal power dynamics in the use of supposedly 'technical' policy instruments (Rondinelli 1973; Thornley and Newman 2005; Weber and Crane 2012, 3).

More specifically, urban planning history and culture in Italy seems particularly promising for the study of leadership as a collective and plural phenomenon at the local level. It is so for two main reasons.

First, the objectives and tools of urban planning in Italy have always been very difficult to change. They consequently provide an ideal setting in which to observe resistances at play in the policy process (Crosta 1989). This was even more the case when the process of urban transformation came about in Turin: indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s the fragmentation of planning cultures in Italy was still matched by strongly legalistic and rigid bureaucratic practices, with the outcome of largely ineffective plans very difficult to substitute or to reform (Vettoretto 2009, 190). A paradigmatic example is provided by implementation of the principal planning instrument at the municipal level: the master or land-use plan (formerly called *Piano Regolatore Generale* and now given different names after specific regional legislation). This plan sets objectives and lays down guidelines concerning new development and conservation through a rigid zoning of land use [3] (Newman and Thorley 1996, 50-51).

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[3] Notwithstanding recent legislative reforms at the regional level on spatial and

Second, despite all resistances, economic and political changes – such as de-industrialization and Europeanization – have produced (especially in cities rich with social and economic capital) pressure for innovation. This has been due to a significant reframing of ordinary planning practices intended to foster a more process-directed, dynamic and participative planning style (Vettoretto 2009, 192). The activation of ordinary citizens, associations, and professionals with different expertises in a policy process render the role of political and bureaucratic institutions no longer unique but still crucial. Hence, because of the plural and potentially conflictual nature of urban planning, consensus-building through the redefinition of problems and the rearrangement of interests[4] (Crosta 1990, 268-273) paves the way for the emergence of collective leadership.

4.2 Urban planning in Turin as a case of policy leadership

Turin is an interesting case for understanding change in urban planning and the role that leadership may have played in it, again for various reasons.

Firstly, the severity of the crisis that hit the city, and the blocked political situation caused by the corruption scandals that erupted in 1983, constituted an opportunity for radical policy interventions (Bobbio 1990, 156). One of the main cities in the Centre-North of Italy, Turin underwent a period of deep economic and political crisis from the 1980s onwards. Before that time, the city was totally identified with its largest company, the Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino (FIAT) controlled by a powerful group of Italian capitalism centered around the Agnelli family and champion

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urban planning, ambiguity and uncertainty still prevail in the devising of these type of plans (Vettoretto 2009, 201).

[4] Interview, councillor, commission on urban planning, 20/6/2011.

of the Fordist model (Bagnasco 1986). In the 1980s, the progressive decrease in the labour force led to the loss of roughly 150,000 industrial jobs until 1996 (Rosso, 2004). Thus, while FIAT was able to survive thanks to state intervention, in Turin the company's decline progressively translated into an economic and social crisis, with increasing levels of social protest (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012, 30-37).

A frequently studied case, Turin is a city that has experienced great transformation over the past twenty years in both physical aspects and governance arrangements (Pinson 2002, 483). Urban planning as a process has played a major role in these transformations: apart from the more traditional land-use plan, a variety of different instruments have been used, including some very innovative ones, such as strategic planning intended as an interactive process to build urban collective action[5] (Pinson 2002, 482), and the competition for a mega-event like the Winter Olympics (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012, 7; Barbera and Pacetti 2009, 67; Müller 2012, 693-694).

In particular, although strategic planning has been widely considered to be the most innovative instrument with which to create mutual trust and build new governance arrangements (Pinson 2002, Dente and Mellone 2005, Barberis 2008, Florio 2010), also the procedure followed for approval of the new *Piano Regolatore Generale* between 1993 and 1996 (see below) was considered innovative in the national debate (Vettoretto 2009, 197). Symbol of a 'blocked political situation' at the end of the 1980s (Bobbio 1990, 106) when "political municipal authorities had never been able to frame and manage the town-planning and social impacts" (Pinson 2002, 483), the project was developed through negotiations between private developers and local government. Although

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[5] The strategic plan was built as a planning activity on several intervestions to pursue different objectives: to promote Turin's internationalisation and develop its organizational capacity, "by building a shared vision of its future" (Pinson 2002, 482).

criticized by 'orthodox reformist planners', it helped to reframe planning and to include a wider public sphere in it (Vettoretto 2009, 198).

Mayors and elected politicians at different territorial levels were crucial, even though they were not exclusive actors in this transformation (Pinson 2002). Nonetheless, studies conducted from the urban regime perspective dispute the extent of the influence of local politics on definition of the political agenda, thus questioning the autonomy of the political leadership (Belligni Ravazzi and Salerno 2009; Belligni and Ravazzi 2012, 193-195).

More in-depth empirical observation of decisions in the domain of urban planning between 1993 and 2011 can thus shed light on the role of not only politicians but also other non-political actors in steering that process, as I shall discuss in the next session. The analysis will rely on semi-structured interviews, official documents of the Municipality and other secondary sources, existing literature on the case of Turin, and press releases of local newspapers (La Repubblica, edizione Torino, 1985-2011).

4.3 Seize the moment – Opposing coalition of ideas and windows of opportunity in urban planning in the 1993 elections

After the corruption scandals, Turin local politics entered a period of deep crisis. In 1992 the municipal government was placed under compulsory administration by the central state for budgetary reasons. This further delegitimized the five-party governing coalition, in a situation where political parties distributed selected incentives to elite groups on clientelistic bases also through planning regulation.[6].

Suddenly, in 1993 local government reforms changed the rules of the game and created a brand-new array of incentives and opportunities. The direct election of the

mayor with a double ballot and the connected majority premium in municipal assemblies obliged political actors to present government coalitions and programs before the election of representatives, thus forcing local parties to face the electoral competition of 'civic' lists.

In this context, urban planning moved to the top of the agenda in the campaign for the administrative elections of 1993. The two candidates presented two opposing interpretations of the causes of the crisis and its solution, but both relied on the urban planning process as the political response to the city's industrial decline. This was particularly relevant to policy leadership dynamics because there was real competition between two different coalitions promoting quite different ideas and frames about the change to be pursued.

For the sake of clarity, I shall refer to the rival ideas on change by calling them interpretation A and interpretation B. On the one hand, interpretation A connected the city's development to the fortunes of the automobile industry, and thus to the behavior of its main player, FIAT. The only reasonable response to the city's decline was to wait for the end of the FIAT era and the birth of a 'brand-new society' generated by the system of municipal welfare introduced since the end of the 1970s. The preliminary project for the urban masterplan issued by the architect Raffaele Radicioni in 1980 can be considered an example of the transformation envisaged. To increase social welfare, Radicioni proposed the regeneration of peripheral areas and the integration of public services between uptown and downtown, with stricter urban regulation to damage existing properties (Radicioni 2011, 18). This interpretation was supported by the radical left electoral cartel, by trade unions, and by several members of the Turin intellectual elite.

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[6] Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of urban planning, 05-05-2011.

On the other hand, the rival interpretation B attributed the crisis not only to the automobile company but also to the local society as a whole, which could not "conceive itself without FIAT" [7]. The causes of the crisis were rooted in an excessively simplistic society unable to act autonomously to differentiate itself and to overcome typical class cleavages (Bagnasco 1986). The relation with FIAT was perceived in a more complex and nuanced way, because the future of Turin had to be 'beyond', not 'against', the company, given that FIAT still controlled a large amount of resources for development of the city. This interpretation adopted an alternative view of the city's future, moving from the idea of the 'one-company town' towards a model of a plural city developed around culture and scientific research, especially in Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The theory of change was thus articulated around this core idea: using urban planning to foster a different kind of economic development for the city.

Needed for this purpose were financial resources and a larger political coalition. First and foremost, in order to gain renewed legitimacy and perform a pivotal role in the change process, politics should take a step back and find allies in civil society. This was the strategy of the new centre-left electoral coalition headed by a civic leader, Valentino Castellani, and created by the reformists of the PCI-PDS, Sergio Chiamparino and Domenico Carpanini. The components of this unprecedented coalition agreed with other important interests groups like firms' associations and the Politecnico on the transformation of the urban landscape proposed by the project produced by the architects Gregotti and Cagnardi, and discussed from 1986 onwards. With regeneration of former industrial areas and transformation of the railway system from surface to underground, the aim of the project was to promote new economic development for the service industry and growth of the real estate and residential sectors.

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[7] Interview, mayor of Turin 1993-2001, member of the Organizing Committee for the 2009 Olympic Games, 11/4/2011; interview, provincial secretary Partito dei Democratici della Sinistra 1993 and mayor

4.4 Does policy leadership matter? Policy tools, strategic exchanges and drivers of change

Electoral competition in 1993 was very close, and in the end it was the 'strange' centre-left coalition that won in Turin. This was the moment when changes in urban planning policy began.

Taking a policy analysis perspective, some clarifications are needed to describe the change and the role of leadership in it. The political earthquake of Tangentopoli and the local government reforms can be considered two different exogenous drivers of change. Hence, the process of change triggered by the external shocks developed through a combination of explanatory factors and drivers of change, among which policy leadership played a fundamental role.

Following its electoral success in 1993, the coalition around interpretation B sought to implement its plan. Whereas decisions on urban planning regulation before that time had corresponded to a distribution of selected incentives according to partisan affiliations,[8] a design for "the plural city of culture, technology and *loisir*" according to three different agendas (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012, 49) also constituted a change in the objectives of urban policy and in policy instruments (Howlett 2009).

The change in urban planning developed around the implementation of two different policy tools – the land-use plan and strategic planning – each involving more than one strategic exchange. Whilst the land-use plan was the tool to stimulate the construction sector, strategic planning on the model of Barcelona was the innovative

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of Turin 2001-2011, 20/4/2011.

[8] Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of urban planning, 05-05-2011

instrument with which to create trust among various groups and to build support around the pivotal and guiding role of the local government.[9]

Moreover, it was in the implementation of these two policy tools that other important instruments were introduced to adjust the change process as examples of "policy tool calibration" (Howlett 2009, 75). On the one hand, various projects for the regeneration of peripheral areas were launched from 1997 onwards as partial emendations of the land-use plan eventually approved in 1995. On the other hand, in the context of strategic planning, in 1998 Turin presented its candidature for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. With the award of the games, the city earned a great amount of visibility and money to attract further investments, and to implement other initiatives related to strategic planning.

The figure below arranges these events on a timeline.

- Here - Fig. Timeline of events in urban planning in Turin.

Source: Adaptation from Winkler 2007, 52. -

In driving the process, the role of leadership was multi-faceted. Multiple leaders shaped ideas and powers in the urban policy subsystem, and they acted to coordinate objectives, resources and policy tools. Policy leadership as a collection of leaders' initiatives was also crucial in overcoming the main resistances to change, by promoting the policy tool calibrations described above.

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[9] Interview, mayor of Turin 1993-2001, member of the Organizing Committee for the 2009 Olympic Games, 11/4/2011

The first resistances to overcome were linked to the adoption of the project for the master plan, a process which, as said, began in the mid-1980s. While the first project for the master plan was being drawn up, various local politicians announced their opposition to it, and local bureaucracies were not equipped to develop a really innovative plan.[10] Thus, different strategic exchanges were at stake from the outset.

In the elaboration of the plan both material and immaterial resources were required for the project. The mayors and the architects acted as leaders towards their political majority and civil servants, because they engaged in exchange with some of the plan's potential enemies, merging relational and bureaucratic styles of leadership. The exchange implied that potential opponents were actively involved in the decision-making, and in the implementation phase and appointments. The final result was that local politicians supported the project and municipal top managers assured compliance in the administrative process, as I will explain below.

The very first strategic exchange at the end of the 1980s fostered the creation of broader political support. Because the project involved profound transformations of the urban landscape, the architects struggled against the resistance of local politicians by cultivating the support of politicians belonging to the main national parties (PSI and PCI in particular). The architect Cagnardi used both his personal skills and professional network to obtain both reputation and recognition. The strategic resources used were mainly relational (to access professionals and national politicians), but also economic[11] (to involve other technicians as consultants).

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[10] Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of urban planning, 05-05-2011.
[11] Here the reason for the absence of knowledge as a resource for leaders in strategic exchanges should be clarified. Cagnardi's ability as a leader consisted not in a brilliant idea for design of the city, but in stubborn cultivation of a project for policy change.

A more important strategic exchange involved the relationship with local bureaucracies at different administrative levels. To perform this exchange, the project's political sponsors deployed crucial political resources to appoint young public officials to work on the master plan. After the elections of 1993, approval of the project by the municipal assembly proved "neither easy nor automatic"[12]. The municipal government elected in spring 1993 was forced to steer the administrative procedure and to create support for Gregotti and Cagnardi's project in the brief time span of four months. In order to present the project of the master plan formally, and to obtain the vote of the majority of the council in due time, mayor Castellani and his delegate for urban planning, Franco Corsico, set up a number of public audits and commission hearings. The strategic aspect involved was an exchange of participation for support, fostered with communicative resources. The municipal executive used the December deadline and the involvement of citizens in preliminary discussion of the plan as strategic resources to secure the project's approval. Moreover, in order to safeguard the plan during the implementation phase, the architects pre-committed in elaboration of the project a number of young municipal officials who eventually became the "guardians of the master plan in the implementation phase"[13] during the 1990s.

Thereafter, a contractual style of leadership was used in negotiations with landowners at the onset of the implementation phase for construction of the *Spina centrale*, a north-to-south 15 km urban boulevard built on the old railway track, and transformation of the underground railway link, also known as *Il Passante*. The local administrators continued to have a guiding role, using economic and relational resources

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[12] Interview, mayor of Turin 1993-2001, member of the Organizing Committee for the 2009 Olympic Games, 11/4/2011; interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of welfare, 19/4/2011.
[13] Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of urban planning, 05-05-2011.

to negotiate with a powerful national actor also involved in the transformation of transport infrastructures: the Ferrovie dello Stato.[14]

Nonetheless, other factors were important in driving the change in urban planning. Governmental stability induced by the local government reforms played a major role in the implementation phase. Moreover, since the 1980s various policy entrepreneurs had developed and diffused a different vision of the problem of urban development: Arnaldo Bagnasco was one of the intellectuals involved in definition of this ideational turn. The architects Gregotti and Cagnardi can be considered policy entrepreneurs and policy leaders at the same time, given their active role in the project and later in the public debate on implementation of the planning instruments. Finally, collaboration with the Piedmont Region was fundamental for obtaining final approval of the master plan and implementing it.

Policy leadership was also evident in calibration of the policy tool with the activation of several initiatives for the regeneration of peripheral areas (also known as "neighborhood projects for social inclusion" or in Italian as "Progetto periferie") starting in 1997. In this example of exchange, a specific policy tool was introduced to benefit the peripheral zones of the city that had not gained advantages from the first transformations, while experiencing growing urban degeneration. This required combining economic incentives for the regeneration projects with a constant communicative effort by the municipality, where participation in policy-making was exchanged for support by the neighborhood (Winkler 2007, 36-41). The exchange was performed by two leaders endowed with communicative and political resources: a

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[14] Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of urban planning, 05-05-2011; Interview, mayor of Turin 1993-2001, member of the Organizing Committee for the 2009 Olympic Games, 11/4/2011; Interview, member of the municipal executive with in charge of the budget, 28-4-2011, 27-4-2011.

member of the executive, Eleonora Artesio, and a former regional officer enrolled by the Municipality as project manager and involved in the day-to-day implementation of the project[15], who were able to foster a more identitarian style of leadership.

Similarly, communicative and political resources were strategic also for the effectiveness of the second policy tool, which involved local politicians and the citizenship at large: strategic planning (Pinson 2002, 486-487). With the involvement of firms and associations in projects and interaction in thematic groups, trust was created between these actors, the Municipality and other stakeholders such as cultural institutions. Members of the executive and the two mayors of Turin, first Castellani and then Chiamparino from 2001 onwards, devoted a great deal of time and resources to communicating the new vision for development of the city, thus making efforts to create a sharing of belief and motivation around the strategic planning process.[16] Political resources were also crucial for creating commitment to the initiatives through the establishment of a brand-new association, Torino Internazionale (2000), which became an institutional actor and a point of reference for urban marketing (Dente and Mellone 2005). Thus, the strategic resources involved inclusion in the planning process of several associations in exchange for trust in the municipal institutions. The leaders in this case were the mayors, several members of the executive, professionals participating in the development of the planning project, and the local bank foundations[17] which also financed part of the projects.

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[15] Interview, municipal officer "Progetto Periferie" and urban planning 12/4/2011, 12/5/2011; Interview, member of the municipal executive in charge of peripheral areas 1997-2001, 29-04-2011
[16] Interview, former director of Associazione Torino Internazionale, 8/4/2011.
[17] Interview, general secretary of a bank foundation, 20-06-2011; Interview, deputy mayor, 2006-2011, 14/4/2011 and 21/4/2011; Interview, Associazione Torino Internazionale official, 08-04-11.

Instead, a similar identitarian leadership was lacking for the second strategic plan. Left to simple administrative compliance with a bureaucratic style of leadership, the plan was not realized.

A fundamental policy instrument to recalibrate urban planning derived from the first strategic planning: the award in 1998 of the Winter Olympic Games for the year 2006. After a stalemate in implementation of the transformations included in both the urban master plan and the first strategic plan, the Olympic Games brought an amount of material and immaterial resources to the Municipality. These resources were used to launch infrastructural projects such as the underground facilities (begun in 2006) and the construction of travel infrastructure in the mountains and in other areas of the province of Turin.

The award of the Olympic Games was the result of relational leadership by the leaders (especially the mayors and the councillor for culture) active in the Torino Internazionale association.[18] These leaders devoted their networking resources to the International Organizing Committee and to other institutional actors, such as the national and the regional governments. In this peer-to-peer relationship, the national government allocated financial transfers and the Piedmont Region recognized the Olympics as a priority also for its own political agenda, notwithstanding the different orientation of the governing coalition (centre-right). Nonetheless, the investments planned for the Olympic Games were also among the causes of the main unintended consequence of the urban change: the increased public debt of the Municipality[19].

- here – Tab. 2 - Strategic exchanges, leadership and alternative drivers of change in urban planning: a summary -

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[18] Interview, Associazione Torino Internazionale official, 08-04-11.

Table 2 summarizes the foregoing reconstruction of strategic exchanges in urban planning in Turin. The main argument is that urban policy change in Turin has been driven not only by governmental stability, external shocks, policy entrepreneurs and strong mayors, as highlighted by previous studies, but also by a plural policy leadership (including not only mayors but also other members of the executive and other stakeholders, such as the university, cultural institutions, and bank foundations) that rearranged power relationships. Local partisan organizations gradually disappeared in both the decision-making and implementation phases, thereby enabling individual politicians to build their own constituencies.

5. Critical aspects and directions for further research

Taking inspiration from different branches of social sciences, the paper has tried to make sense of the literature on leadership to study a concrete process of change. What makes Turin a case of policy leadership is not only the commitment of strategic actors to a shared vision of the city (and thus to a shared policy goal), but also the ability to activate a variety of resources to pursue that vision, sometimes at the expense of the relationship with local politicians and the council itself.[20]

The proposal for the study of policy leadership as a driver of policy change has some potentially serious drawbacks. A first concern is conceptual: in order to avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), policy leadership should be distinguished from similar concepts regarding agency in the policy process. I have tried to deal with this problem by emphasizing the strategic side of the concept, while confining innovation to

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[19] Interview, city manager munipality of Turin 1997-2012, 6/4/11.

the concept of policy entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the fact that the same person can be both a leader and an entrepreneur is an analytical difficulty for empirical analysis.

From a methodological point of view, the focus on strategic resources and on exchange between leaders and peers or followers requires the in-depth knowledge typical of case studies. Because these research strategies are not always feasible, an additional effort in classification and indicator selection for comparative research is needed. Moreover, the interpretative nature of judgments on exchange relationships may represent a problem for generalization. The classification of strategic resources is a first step in the direction of replicability of analysis.

Nonetheless, the proposed concept of policy leadership can be fruitful in other respects. First, the focus on leaders from a policy analysis perspective may help actors to unpack power dynamics intertwined within an ideational turn. Moreover, this approach makes it possible to go beyond structural and positional characterization to see leaders and networks in action. In fact, the focus on policy instruments and strategic resources introduces an alternative way to study power in policy dynamics.

Despite the consistency of actors' theories and motivations, what is more important for the analyst is understanding the conditions that make leadership decisive for change, as suggested by the literature on enactment of leadership at the local level (Haus, Heinelt and Stewart 2005, 3; Haus and Heinelt 2005, 30). The way in which policy legacies, policy networks and institutional fragmentation structure leadership dynamics should be explored in more detail.

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[20] Interview, councilman, commission on urban planning, 20/6/2011.

Indeed, although analysis of 'leaders in action' is empirically difficult, it can help uncover causal mechanisms and suggest elements of combinative causality able to link the micro, meso and macro levels of analysis.

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Tables and figures

Table 1 - Styles of policy leadership in exchange relationships according to the actors and strategic resources at stake: a typology

		Type of strategic resource at stake:	
		Material Resources	*Immaterial resources*
Type of relationship between actors:	*'Peer-to-peer' symmetric relationship*	(1) Contractual leadership Exchange of economic resources produces utility	(2) Relational leadership Exchange of networking resources produces reputation
	'Superior-to-inferior' asymmetric relationship	(4) Bureaucratic leadership Exchange of political resources produces obedience	(3) Identitarian leadership Exchange of communicative resources produces trust

Fig. 1 - Timeline of events in urban planning in Turin.

Source: Adaptation from Winkler 2007, 52.

Tab. 2 – Strategic exchanges, leadership and alternative drivers of change in urban planning: a summary

	Examples of strategic exchanges					
	I	**II**	**III**	**IV**	**V**	**VI**
Content of change	Elaboration of a new urban masterplan	Approval of the new urban masterplan	Implementation of "Spina centrale" and "Passante"	Implementation of "Progetto periferie"	Implementation of first strategic plan	Award of the Winter Olympic Games
Stakeholders (potential opponents or sponsors)	Local politicians	Local public bureaucracies	Selected landowners	Inhabitants	Local firms, associations, cultural institutions	Other levels of government
Exchanges involved	Involvement for reputation	Appointments and deadlines for compliance	Contracts for agreements	Participation for trust	Participation for trust, appointments for compliance	Recognition for reputation and financial transfers
Type of leadership	Relational leadership	Bureaucratic leadership	Contractual leadership	Identitarian leadership	Identitarian leadership	Relational leadership
Strategic resources	Networking, political	Political, communicative	Economic, Relational	Communicative	Communicative, political	Networking, economic
Leaders	Architects, mayors	Mayors and members of the executive	Members of the executive	Members of the executive, municipal officials	Mayors, members of the executive, Torino Internazionale, bank foundations	Mayors, Torino Internazionale, city manager.
Other drivers of change	Intellectuals and architects as policy entrepreneurs	External shocks (1993 elections) and governmental stability	Governmental stability	External shock (1997 elections), stability of governing coalition.	Intellectuals as policy entrepreneurs. Learning (by the mayors).	Support by public opinion and administrative culture.