

The Vote of Muslims in Europe: Assessing the Impact of Political Opportunities and Discourse

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Abstract

This paper explores the hypothesis that, besides the impact of institutional opportunities, the vote of Muslims varies according to the prevailing discourse conveyed in the public domain, and hence, the opportunities stemming in terms of public visibility and political legitimacy of certain actors, identities, and issues. We do so by assessing the impact of a number of institutional dimensions and one discursive dimension of political opportunities on the electoral participation of Muslims in four European countries. As expected, the results show that the dimension of political representation has the greatest impact. The two cultural dimensions also have a significant effect on voting. However, contrary to our expectation, we find that discursive opportunities are less crucial for Muslims' voting than they are for Muslims' claim making in the public space. A number of broader implications of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: Muslims, vote, political opportunities, discourse, citizenship

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Introduction

The idea that the political context sets the parameters within which political participation and mobilizations occur has by now been established in the scholarly field of migration and ethnic relations. In this paper we assess the extent to which this idea holds as well for the vote of Muslims in Europe. Drawing upon our previous work on the political participation of Muslims (Cinalli and Giugni 2013a), we stress the impact of the institutionalized political system side by side with more cultural and symbolic contextual aspects. We engage in a contextual political analysis to explain the electoral participation of Muslims across countries. In particular, we explore the general hypothesis that, besides the impact of institutional opportunities, the vote of Muslims varies according to the prevailing discourse conveyed in the public domain and hence the opportunities stemming in terms of public visibility and political legitimacy of certain actors, identities, and issues. In so doing, we acknowledge the plurality of political scenarios where Muslims leave and participate politically. The empirical analysis, based on data collected in an international research project, deals with the following countries: Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Our measure of voting activities relies on a survey conducted in these countries on representative samples of Muslims from different national origins. Our contextual analysis of political opportunities draws upon data on institutional indicators based on secondary sources (to measure institutional opportunities) as well as claim making (to measure discursive opportunities).

Political Opportunities, Discourse, and the Vote of European Muslims

Political opportunities (see Kriesi 2004 and Meyer 2004 for reviews) have stood out as a major *explanans* of levels, forms, and outcomes of political participation in the field of migration and ethnic relations. Of particular interest for this article are those works that focus on the assessment of citizenship regimes influencing migrants and cultural minorities. The main argument is that migrants and minorities often lack basic citizenship rights allowing them to exert some leverage on the host society institutions. Hence, the aspects of the political context that affect their mobilization are to be found not primarily in the overall institutionalized political system, but rather in the political opportunities that open or close their access to the citizenry (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans et al. 2005). These opportunities are not only field specific (Cinalli 2004, 2007) but they may also vary across the national and the sub-national level (Cinalli and El Hariri 2010; Morales and Giugni 2011).

Yet the concept of structure of political opportunities (POS), as well as its concrete applications, face in our view a major shortcoming and two main challenges. The major shortcoming lies in the fact that the study of the POS is often approached as having only an institutional component. Yet, as the body of works on framing processes in the field of social movement studies has shown (see Snow 2004 and Benford and Snow 2000 for reviews), discourse matters as well. Only very recently, research in the field of migration and ethnic relations has started to engage in full with the idea that political participation follows the assessment of discourses in the public domain.

As regards the two main challenges, the first is to go beyond abstract and anecdotic operationalizations of political opportunities so as to pay systematic attention to empirical measures of political opportunities themselves. In so doing we build upon recent work being conducted on comparative sets of institutional and discursive indicators (Carol et al. 2009; Cinalli and Giugni 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). So we pick up from where this research has

left, in a way to improve the number, scope, and level of political indicators to be measured when dealing with the voting of Muslims in Europe. The second challenge is to apply institutional and discursive opportunities so as to explain the political voting of individual Muslims at the micro-level, beyond the broader focus on collective mobilization that is usually kept by scholars of contentious politics. While these scholars have at times focused on the relationship between contentious and electoral politics, they have limited their analyses at the meso-level perspective to examine interactions between social movements and election campaigns (Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam and Tarrow 2010).

Based on this body of literature, we expect that political opportunities influence the chances that Muslims participate in voting activities. We focus in particular on five main dimensions of the institutional context supposed to favor participation in elections. The first two comes from Koopmans et al.' (2005) study of claims-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics. They have shown how the combination of individual citizenship rights and of cultural group rights might either encourage or discourage migrants to enter the public domain and engage in collective action. Given that a large number of the Muslims in Europe are migrant or of migrant origins, we hypothesize that the same should be observed at the individual level of electoral participation.

In addition, we wish to test for the role of the POS in terms of another distinction: that between cultural and political rights. This distinction overlaps in part that by Koopmans et al. (2005), but it is more focused on distinguishing between culture and politics. By distinguishing between these two aspects, we wish to ascertain whether culture is an important factor for political behavior or, conversely, whether the latter remains confined with the political sphere. This will be done additionally by looking more specifically at political representation rights, which thus stand out as our main *explanans* for voting.

Finally, in addition to these five institutional dimensions of POS, we also investigate the role of discourse. The latter is often said to affect in important ways individual behaviors. Of particular interest for our topic, previous research has stressed the importance of discursive opportunities for both the collective claim-making (Koopmans et al. 2005) and individual participation (Cinalli and Giugni 2011) of migrants.

As said, the specific dimension of political representation rights can be taken as our main predictor of voting owing to intuitive channel linking the act of voting to the entitlement for doing so. We hypothesize, however, that all six dimensions of POS will increase the likelihood that Muslims engage in voting activities when they are in a context of open opportunities. Even cultural rights may have a strong (positive) effect for voting if we take in the multiculturalist argument linking group recognition with political integration and full citizenry (Modood 2007; Parekh 2008; Sackman et al. 2003). As regards the shape of the relationship between our independent and dependent variables, some works in the field of social movements and contentious politics have pointed to a curvilinear relationship between political opportunities and protest: both very closed and very open opportunities constrain protest, while in-between levels encourage the rise of protest actions (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978). Here, however, we do follow the standard approach of assuming a linear model, without tackling directly the potential U-curve shape of the relationship between opportunities and voting..

Through our analysis, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap between scholars working on individual variables at the micro-level and those who deal with the context of political institutions and public policies at the macro-level (Anduiza 2001). While the role of individual characteristics is uncontroversial in the scholarly literature (van Deth et al. 2007; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978; see also Jacobs et al. 2004 for a specific application in the migration field), there is a pressing need to address more thoroughly the impact of the

political context. The idea that the individuals vote in a *vacuum* can hardly be held in the real world, where actions, decisions, and discourses of various stakeholders across the public and the policy domain must inevitably concur to inform citizenry's political behavior. Here we engage in full with idea to put Muslims back into their context, so as to test whether this latter plays in fact an important role for explaining their electoral participation.

Having computed our measures of institutional and discursive opportunities, we can take them as additional explanatory variables side by side with the other usual suspects of voting such as age, gender, and education. Given our focus on Muslims, we also include additional variables such as religiosity and perceived discrimination. Since the seminal work by Huntington (1993), the common place in the media debate that Islamic religious beliefs are hardly reconcilable with the basic tenets of western democracy, political autonomy *in primis*, has also gained increasing scholarly visibility (Gurfinkiel 1997; Huntington 2004). As regards perceived discrimination, some scholars have considered it to be a key variable for analysis, in fact a better predictor than simple socio-economic difficulties that Muslims may find within their impoverished and religious-based milieus (Maxwell 2006). We also pay attention to membership in associations. The notion of social integration has been put at the core of a number of analyses that focus on membership in political, social, and cultural associations (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995) as well as social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993 and 2000). More crucially for this article, scholars of "ethnic capital," have argued that diffuse membership in associations can especially foster the political participation of migrants and cultural minorities (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Togeby 2004). Accordingly, our analysis enables us to examine the impact of political opportunities and discourse vis-à-vis a large volume of individual variables referring to the condition of Muslims. themselves. At the same time, we can assess the predicting power of these same

individual variables while controlling for cross-national differences on key indicators of political opportunities.

Data and Operationalization

We base our analysis on two different datasets generated within the EU-funded project “Finding a Place for Islam in Europe” (EURISLAM), a research aimed to investigate cultural patterns and relations of Muslims in six European countries (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands). In this paper we had to drop the case of France due to missing information about voting activities. We also dropped the case of Belgium as in this country voting is compulsory, which might introduce a bias in the analysis.

The individual-level data come from a survey conducted between 2010 and 2011 on random samples of Muslims from four national origins (Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia).¹ Our main dependent variable is a measure of voting based on a question asking respondents whether they had voted in the last national elections. Only respondents eligible to vote were asked this question, so that we could avoid to blur under the “no” responses those who have not voted because they were not allowed to and those who have not done so because of other reasons. The individual-level data also provide the following control variables for our models: age (in years), gender (male), education (ISCED 5-point scale), associational membership, religiosity, and perceived discrimination. Associational membership has been measured through the following question: “Do you join any associations such as sports clubs, religious organizations, labor unions, parents associations etc. in <Germany/the Netherlands/Switzerland/the United Kingdom> where you meet other people?” Religiosity is a scale made of four items: frequency of prayer, frequency of attending a place of worship for religious reasons, self-definition as a Muslim, and expression or display of religious beliefs (Cronbach’s Alpha for the sample included in the analyses =

.81). As regards perceived discrimination, we rely on the following question: “Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment towards you by people in <Germany/the Netherlands/Switzerland/the United Kingdom>. Finally, in one of the models we control for the country (categorical variable), while in the others the institutional context is measured through five main aspects of POS. We start with the consideration of the two comprehensive dimensions of individual citizenship rights and cultural group rights in line with the ongoing scholarly debate on citizenship regimes between those who favor multiculturalism and those who oppose it (Koopmans 2010; Parekh 2008). We then add up three further institutional aspects that may explain the vote of European Muslims, namely, political representation rights, political rights, and cultural rights.

Each of the five aspects of the institutional context has been operationalized through a set of indicators that have been consolidated within a dedicated dataset of the EURISLAM project.² All these indicators have been measured along a five-point scale, but also more qualitatively through the production of extensive commentaries discussing each assigned score. The measures have been computed by attributing a score to each indicator: -1 corresponds to restrictive policies vis-à-vis Muslims (and therefore closed opportunities) and +1 to liberal policies (and therefore open opportunities), with -0.5, 0, and +0.5 reflecting different degrees of intermediate situations. We then summed up the scores of various indicators and calculated averages for each national case so as to use them in the regression analysis. Data on the institutional indicators is available for four years, namely, 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2008. All scores here refer to the situation of policies and institutional arrangements in each country for the year 2002 so as to measure them before the last election referred to in the survey across the four countries. The relatively long time gap with the responses to the survey should not be too problematic insofar as time is needed for the institutional context to have an effect on political behavior (Cinalli and Giugni 2013a).

As regards the operationalization of the discourse in the public domain, we rely on another EURISLAM dataset built following a method known as political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999). This method has recently proved useful to measure and analyze public interventions of collective actors as well as deliberation in the field of Islam (Cinalli and Giugni 2013b; Cinalli and O’Flynn 2014). We have thus analyzed all claims over Islam by any kind of actors. These claims were coded by random sampling articles selected from five newspapers in each country and covering the period from 1999 to 2008. The choice of newspapers has followed from the need to insure as much as possible a representative and unbiased sample. We have included both quality newspapers and more tabloid-oriented newspapers. Furthermore, we have considered newspapers from different political orientations as well as more “neutral” newspapers.³ Sampling was based on the following keywords: Islam, Muslim, Moslem, mosque, imam, Qur’an (Quran, Qur’ān, Koran, Alcoran or Al-Qur’ān), headscarf, burqa (burkha, burka or burqua), and minaret. Since the EURISLAM project included 13 different researchers for the whole coding, we run reliability tests so as to check for intercoder consistency.⁴

In particular, our measure of discursive opportunities relies on a specific variable, namely the position of claims towards the object. This measure allows us to assess whether claims stand in favor of or against Muslims. All claims whose realization implies deterioration in the rights or position of Muslims receive code -1 , no matter if the reduction is minor or large. The -1 also goes to claims which express a negative attitude with regard to Muslims (both verbal and physical) or a positive attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. All claims whose realization implies an improvement in the rights and position of Muslims (minor or major) receive code $+1$. This code also goes to claims expressing (verbally or physically) a positive attitude with regard to Muslims, or a negative attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. Neutral or

ambivalent claims which are not necessarily related to any deterioration or improvement in Muslims' position or rights and do not express a clear attitude with regard to migrants and minorities or their opponents receive code 0. By averaging the scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtain a raw yet helpful indicator of the discursive context in this field: the closer the score of this indicator is to -1 the less favorable are the discursive opportunities, and vice versa. Given that we want isolate the impact of discursive opportunities on the vote of Muslims, claims by the latter have been excluded from the sample so as to reduce risks to blur independent and dependent variables.⁵

Since we have a binary dependent variable, we test our hypotheses by means of logistic regression analysis. Due to the clustered structure of our data, with individual observations nested into contextual observations, we estimate the effects of our POS variables with standard errors adjusted for the clusters represented by the four countries. In a first step we examine the effect of the context in general terms by including country dummies in a logistic regression predicting voting by Muslims. Next we examine the effects of each aspect of the POS in six separate models. We cannot include all five variables of institutional POS in the same models owing to their limited variation. Finally, we look at the results in terms of predicted probabilities, first by showing the average marginal effects of each POS variable,⁶ then by providing a more detailed look based on predicted probabilities for voting at the observed values of each variable. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities are based on models that do not estimate adjusted standard errors in order to avoid too large confidence intervals. Appendix 3 describes the variables included in the analyses. The analyses were performed with Stata 12.

Findings

As a first step of our analysis we show the share of Muslims who have engaged in voting activities – as measured through participation in the last national elections – across the four countries included in our study. As we can see in table 1, there are important differences across countries. Specifically, Muslims in the Netherlands are much more likely to vote than their Swiss counterparts, with nearly 8 respondents out of 10 who said that they took part in the last national election. The other two countries lie somewhere in between, with the share of electoral participation being more or less the same in both Britain and Germany.⁷

Table 1

In line with our previous work on political claim making over Islam (Cinalli and Giugni 2013a), we do not observe a coherent pattern reflecting those found for example by Koopmans et al. (2005), namely that more open citizenship regimes – both in terms of individual and group rights – favor increases in terms of political participation. So the connection that has previously been found between opportunities in the field of migration on the one hand, and the political participation of migrants on the other, does not seem to apply to the voting of Muslims, or it does so only to some extent. Muslims in the Netherlands, for example, vote more than in Switzerland, but also more than in the Britain (although Britain and the Netherlands have a similarly open POS). In addition, these findings are crucial since they indicate that voting may follow a distinct pattern compared to forms of political participation at the meso-level by organized publics. The fact that voting activities of Muslim individuals in Britain are as low as they are in Germany (and in fact even lower) is thus in contrast with the strong presence of Muslim collective actors and their claims in the British public sphere (Cinalli and Giugni 2013a: 157).

The next step of our analysis consists in assessing whether the context plays a role in general terms. To do so, we ran a logistic regression with the country variable among the covariates, along with all the individual-level controls. The results, displayed in table 2,

obviously reflect the distributions shown in the previous table and clearly attest to the important impact of the context for the electoral participation of Muslims, just as this has been found for voters in general (Franklin 1996). Specifically, Muslims have more chances to vote if they live in one of the three countries other than Switzerland (the reference category). The effect is particularly strong for the Netherland: the odds of voting for a Dutch Muslim are about three and a half times as high as for a Swiss Muslim.

Table 2

This first regression model gives us the opportunity to discuss the role of the control variables. Not surprisingly, age and education have a statistically significant effect on voting. These are variables – especially education – that have often been found as strong predictors of political participation, including electoral participation. Yet the effects are not very strong, especially so in the case of age. Being a member of associations such as sports clubs, religious organizations, labor unions, and other associations is also a strong predictor of participation, thus confirming the strand of literature that has stressed the role of associational involvement for political engagement. Here the effect is stronger, suggesting that, in the case of Muslims, relational resources are more important than personal ones for getting involved in politics.⁸ In contrast, sex, religiosity, as well as generation (second and in-between as opposed to first generation), are not statistically significant. In the analyses below using cluster-robust standard errors, however, most of these variables will display a significant effect. The only single variable which is consistently not significant is religiosity. The latter might be associated with certain cultural trait of Muslims or even certain political attitudes, but apparently it does not affect their voting behavior. Contrary to the commonsensical idea, often also conveyed by the media, the political behavior of Muslims is not dictated by their religious beliefs or practices.

Showing that the country has an impact does not tell us much about our main contention that political opportunities – both in their institutional and discursive dimensions – play a crucial role in the explanation of voting activities by European Muslims. What we need is a way to show whether some POS aspects, and which ones, matter. Therefore, table 3 gives the results of six logistic regressions predicting voting activities as a function of each of the six aspects of POS discussed earlier, plus the controls. Here we only summarize the findings by focusing on the contextual variables.⁹

Table 3

The first model deals with the effect of individual citizenship rights (model 1). The coefficient is not statistically significant (but it is so at the 10% level), although its magnitude is fairly high and in the expected direction: the odds of voting of Muslims living in countries with open rules regarding individual rights are more than double those of Muslims who are in more closed contexts. The effect of cultural group rights, in contrast, is statistically significant and has a higher magnitude (model 2). Thus, among the two dimensions at the core of the conceptualization of “citizenship regimes” (Koopmans et al. 2005) only the second one seems to matter if we consider statistical significance using the standard 5% level in the social sciences. However, both point to the same direction, showing a strong consistency with each other. The third dimension is the one displaying the largest effect: as we expected, the presence of political representation rights increases substantially the chances that a Muslim has to take part in in voting activities, precisely so by nearly a factor three (model 3). As regards the two additional institutional aspects of POS, we find similar significant effects. The odds of voting are more than twice higher for Muslims living in an open context than for those in a closed context, whether we consider the impact of political POS (model 4) or the impact of cultural POS (model 5). However, only the cultural dimension is statistically significant (the political one is so at the 10% level).

Finally, contrary to our expectation, discursive opportunities do not seem to matter, at least to the extent that we consider the statistical significance of the effect (model 6). This is a crucial finding vis-à-vis previous results that have stressed the importance of discourse to explain variations of political claim making in the field of Islam (Cinalli and Giugni 2013a). The established argument about the diversification of political repertoires, including a large range of activities from voting to protest (Dalton 2008; Norris 2002; Stolle and Hooghe 2005), does not hold for European Muslims. These latter, by contrast, have succeeded in advancing their claims in countries where their participation through vote is low, thereby showing that contentious and electoral politics do not necessarily overlap with each other, at least at the individual level (Rüdig 2010).

Odds ratios can hardly be compared across models, although in this case the six POS variables have been standardized as 0-1 scales and all other variables in the models are the same. Therefore we go a step further by looking at predicted probabilities, which can be compared and are easier to interpret. Table 4 gives the average marginal effects of the six POS variables, keeping all other variables at their observed values.¹⁰ Quite unsurprisingly, the results point in the same direction as the odds ratios in the previous analysis, although they are based on the models estimated without taking into account the clustered structure of the data. The most important effect is observed for the dimension of political representation: going from the lowest to the highest value of the POS score leads to a 22% increase in the predicted probabilities of voting. The next largest effect is that of cultural group rights (18%), followed by individual citizenship rights (15%), the variable of general political opportunities (15%), the specific variable of cultural opportunities (14%), and lastly, far behind, the variable of discursive opportunities (8%). Put simply, both the political and cultural aspects of POS make a difference in predicting the probability that Muslims have to be involved in voting activities, but political representation plays a particularly important role in this respect. Thus, we can see

that the difference in the average marginal effects of our six measures of POS varies from a low 8% to a high 22%, with political representation and cultural group rights having more predicting power than other dimensions, especially the discursive opportunities.

Table 4

Figure 1 gives us a more detailed picture by showing predicted probabilities for voting activities for each POS variable at their observed values, based again on estimates from logistic models that do not take into account the clustered structure of the data. The percentages can be compared to the baseline represented by the overall predictive margins for voting activities in the sample (66%). Without going into the details, we can see that the predicted probabilities of voting increase when we go from a more closed to a more open POS, and this holds across all six contextual variables. The cut-off point separating predictions below and above the average is located between the second and third level of POS scores. Except for discursive opportunities, this is also where the largest increase in predicted probabilities occurs. This finding suggests that living in open or closed contexts makes a key difference, and so may favor the vote of European Muslims.

Figure 1

Conclusion

In this paper we have built upon recent scholarly work in the field of Islam with the specific aim to appraise the impact of institutional and discursive opportunities on the electoral participation of Muslims in four European countries. The main challenge for us has been to implement a research design that has included variables at the contextual and individual levels. Our main expectation was that, besides the impact of institutional opportunities, and in particular political representation rights, the vote of European Muslims would vary according to the impact of the prevailing discourse in the public domain. Overall, our analysis has

showed that the institutional context matters, with political representation being in fact the most important of all. Yet contrary to our main expectation, we have found that discursive opportunities are well less crucial for Muslims' voting. This finding is in contrast with what we found in previous research on Muslims' claim making in the public space. At the same time, we have emphasized that there are still crucial differences across countries when considering their performances in terms of Muslims' voting. So Muslims living in the Netherlands are much more likely to vote than their Swiss counterparts, while Muslims in the other countries lie somewhere in between. Looking at the micro-level variables, age and education are significant, yet with not very strong effects. Other individual variables are not significant statistically. By contrast, associational membership is a good predictor of participation, thus showing that relational resources are more important than personal ones for the voting of Muslims.

Along the way we have also put emphasis on a number of broader implications of our results. To begin with, we have hinted at the possibility that European Muslims bypass the core channel of democracy, namely, voting, through a prevalent engagement in organized action within the public space. The implication is that we need to know a lot more about how Muslims, and the other European citizens more broadly, shape their own baskets of participatory strategies. Given that discursive opportunities seem to play a very different role for electoral and non-electoral participation, scholars are called to go beyond simple work on the same determinants to explain voting and contentious action, often showing that more of the same determinants is just necessary to prompt more costly action such as protest (but see Pattie et al. 2003; Teorell et al. 2007; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). At the same time, we have shown the need to distinguish more clearly between the politics of migration and ethnic relations, on the one hand, and the politics of a comprehensive European citizenship on the other. So we urge scholars not to assume a strong substantive continuity between migrants

and the cultural minorities that often spring out of them. The explanation of political behavior of European Muslims may be out of reach for scholars using only conceptual and operational tools drawn from the migration field.

Lastly, our results can be referred to a specific theoretical debate of contentious politics that deserves further space of discussion in the analysis of individual voting. So we have showed that the probabilities of voting increase when moving from a more closed to a more open POS, often with strongest growth for low levels of POS scores. This indicates that, in line with early curvilinear conceptualizations of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978), small openings of the political context may already be sufficient to stimulate political participation, including voting. This is no doubt good news for mindful European policy makers: an encouragement that every little helps in their striving for reforms to promote more political integration and institutional legitimacy. Many ongoing disputes focus on potential reforms that may stimulate the political participation of Muslims and other cultural minorities. So hopefully more room is now opened for European elites and governors to understand what must be done to strengthen European democracy.

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Table 1: Voting by Muslims across countries (percentages)

	Germany	Switzerland	Britain	Netherlands
Has voted in last national election	65.08	49.64	63.65	78.25
Has not voted in last national election	34.92	50.36	36.35	21.75
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	524	411	762	708

Table 2: Effect of country on voting by Muslims (odds ratios)

	Model 1
Age	1.041***
Male	1.081
Education	1.243***
Religiosity	1.077
Generation (ref.: first)	
In-between	1.167
Second	1.236
Associational membership	1.503***
Country (ref.: Switzerland)	
Britain	1.888***
Netherlands	3.595***
Germany	1.812***
Constant	.107***
Log-likelihood	-1369.800
Pseudo R squared	.008
N	2321

* p≤.05; ** p≤.01; *** p≤.001

Table 3: Effect of POS dimensions on voting by Muslims (odds ratios)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>POS dimensions</i>						
Individual citizenship rights	2.047	-	-	-	-	-
Cultural group rights	-	2.374**	-	-	-	-
Political representation	-	-	2.905***	-	-	-
Political POS	-	-	-	2.074	-	-
Cultural POS	-	-	-	-	2.015*	-
Discursive POS	-	-	-	-	-	1.443
<i>Controls</i>						
Age	1.041***	1.041***	1.041***	1.042***	1.042***	1.044***
Male	1.059**	1.070***	1.080***	1.066**	1.067***	1.042
Education	1.257***	1.255***	1.253***	1.262***	1.260***	1.266***
Religiosity	1.094	1.088	1.083	1.098	1.095	1.114
Generation (ref.: first)						
In-between	1.224	1.193	1.175	1.223	1.215	1.298
Second	1.188**	1.188**	1.223**	1.251*	1.225*	1.301*
Associational membership	1.786***	1.726***	1.619***	1.715***	1.732***	1.747***
Constant	.130***	.121***	.118***	.129***	.134***	.151***
Log pseudolikelihood	-1390.476	-1382.426	-1375.562	-1389.603	-1387.801	-1406.602
Pseudo R squared	.064	.070	.074	.065	.066	.053
N	2321	2321	2321	2321	2321	2321

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$

Notes: All POS indicators have been standardized on a 0-1 scale. Standard errors adjusted for 4 clusters in country.


Table 4: Average marginal effects of POS dimensions on voting by Muslims (percentages)

	Average marginal effect	95% confidence interval lower bound	95% confidence interval upper bound
Individual citizenship rights	15***	10	19
Cultural group rights	18***	13	22
Political representation	22***	17	27
Political POS	15***	11	19
Cultural POS	14***	10	18
Discursive POS	8***	3	13

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$

Notes: Based on logistic regressions with non-adjusted standard errors.

Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of voting by Muslims at observed POS scores (predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals)



Notes: Based on logistic regressions with non-adjusted standard errors.

Appendix 1: Raw POS scores

	Britain	Germany	Netherlands	Switzerland
Individual citizenship rights	.63	-.04	.53	-.22
Cultural group rights	.45	-.23	.60	-.46
Political representation	-.17	-.50	.17	-.67
Political POS	.12	-.23	.21	-.16
Cultural POS	.60	-.22	.74	-.19
Discursive POS	.14	-.37	.00	-.16

Appendix 2: Sample sizes

	Germany	Switzerland	Britain	Netherlands	Total
Former Yugoslavians	255	250	200	151	856
Moroccans	256	182	200	250	888
Pakistani	162	150	350	152	814
Turks	355	281	350	250	1236
Total	1028	863	1100	803	3794

Appendix 3: Descriptives

	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Voting	2405	.659	.474	0	1
Age	3767	38.226	13.162	17	79
Male	3794	.536	.499	0	1
Education	3653	2.754	1.004	0	4
Religiosity	3770	.174	.746	-1.375	1.850
In-between generation	3793	.270	.444	0	1
Second generation	3793	.231	.421	0	1
Associational membership	3771	.309	.462	0	1
Individual citizenship rights	3794	.533	.426	0	1
Cultural group rights	3794	.521	.410	0	1
Political representation	3794	.440	.365	0	1
Political POS	3794	.480	.416	0	1
Cultural POS	3794	.465	.453	0	1
Discursive POS	3794	.538	.390	0	1

Notes

¹ Respondents were left the choice between the language of the host country and their native language. Appendix 2 gives the sample sizes in terms of country and national origins.

² These indicators refer to “nationality acquisition” (number of years’ residence before naturalization can be requested; welfare and social security dependence as obstacle to naturalization; automatic attribution or facilitated naturalization for second generation; allowance of dual nationality; actual naturalization rates), “citizenship rights for foreign nationals” (conditions for family reunification of third country nationals; conditions for expulsion; voting rights for foreigners; rights of non-citizens to work in government or civil service), “antidiscrimination rights” (ICERD provisions in criminal law; antidiscrimination in civil law; state-established antidiscrimination bodies and legal mandate), “cultural requirements” (requirements for residence permit; requirements for naturalization), “religious practice rights outside public institutions” (allowance of Islamic ritual slaughter; allowance of Islamic call to prayer; number of mosques with appropriate architecture relative to size of Muslim population; provision for burial according to Islamic rite), “religious rights in the public space” (state recognition and funding of Islamic schools; Islamic classes in state schools as direct alternative to religious education; right of female teachers to wear headscarf in schools; right of female students to wear headscarf in schools; public broadcasting in major immigrant languages; Islamic religious programs in public broadcasting; mother-tongue teaching in schools; state-paid imams in army / prison), “political representation rights” (migrant consultative bodies; Muslim consultative bodies) as well as “affirmative action in the public sector” (quota or other schemes for ensuring minority representation in public sector jobs). See Carol et al. (2009) for more details about the indicators and their scoring. See also Koopmans et al. (2012) for the use of the same data in a larger number of countries.

³ The following newspapers have been used as a source for the coding: De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, De Telegraaf, and Het Parool in the Netherlands; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick, Tagesanzeiger, Le Matin, and Le Temps in Switzerland; Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, and Tagesspiegel in Germany; Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Sun, and The Times in Britain; Het Laatste Nieuws, Le Soir, Gazet Van Antwerpen, La Dernière Heure, and De Standaard in Belgium.

⁴ These tests have yielded a strong consistency both with regard to the selection of claims and their description. The Cronbach alpha for selection bias (computed on a sample of 15 articles) is 0.91. The Cronbach alpha for description bias (computed on a sample of 4 articles) is, respectively, 0.97, 0.98, 0.98, and 0.98, for an average of 0.98 (see Cinalli and Giugni 2013b for further methodological remarks).

⁵ Appendix 1 gives the raw POS scores. These have then been standardized for the analyses by making them range from 0 to 1.

⁶ For this first step we keep all other variables at their observed values.

⁷ These figures are quite high. As is known, questions about voting are subject to responses dictated by social responsibility as people tend to overestimate their own participation so as to convey the image of good citizens. In our case, however, this is not a problem as far as we assume that this effect is constant across respondents.

⁸ It should be stressed that the relationship between associational membership and voting is subject to a strong risk of reverse causality. One is therefore only observing a correlation between these two variables rather than causality. In our case, however, this is not so problematic as we are only using associational membership as a control variable.

⁹ We should stress that here, beyond statistical significance, we are especially interested in the magnitude of the effects (as measured through odd ratios, average marginal effects, and predicted probabilities).

¹⁰ The observed values here refer to the standardized POS scores.