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Explaining citizen support for EU policy governance: the role of micro, meso, and macro  
determinants

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The PhD program Political Studies (POLS) (30<sup>th</sup> cohort) stems from the collaboration of four Universities, namely Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, Università degli Studi di Genova, Università degli Studi di Milano, Università degli Studi di Pavia. The University of Milan serves as the administrative headquarters and provides the facilities for most teaching activities.

## Abstract in English

This dissertation contributes to the debate on *Europeanization* of citizen policy preferences. This form of *Europeanization* is defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of strategic policy domains. Using survey data from the Intune 2009 project and Eurobarometer surveys, this work studies how citizen support for EU policy governance is structured. It distinguishes a generic preference for more EU policy governance from a specific support for EU governance of distinct policy sectors. Moreover, this thesis analyses what influences the development of these two types of support for EU policy governance.

Chapter 1 surveys the literature on macro theories of European integration and provides three alternative models of support for EU policy governance. These models are tested and debated in the proceeding of the dissertation to study the structure of support for EU policy governance.

Chapters 2 provides a conceptual definition of EU support grounded in earlier theoretical and empirical works. Four dimensions of EU support are identified:

- ‘Output legitimacy’: support as subjective utility of European integration;
- ‘EU governance legitimacy’: support as a generic preference for EU policy governance;
- ‘European identification’: support as identification (we-feeling) with the European political community;
- ‘EU democracy’: support as political representation at the EU level.

Chapter 3 measures these four dimensions of EU support, modelling them as latent dimensions using individual-level survey data. This chapter confirms that these dimensions are rather stable and invariant across EU member countries.

Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of these four dimensions. Results demonstrate that ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, and ‘political values’ exert a significant influence on the levels of EU support across Europe, but their effects vary across the four dimensions of EU support. Notably, only ‘exclusive national identification’ influences the generic support for EU policy governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’). This chapter also investigates the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support testing whether generic support for EU policy governance depends upon holding one of the other three forms of EU support, following some suggestions included in theories of European integration (mainly neo and post-functionalism) and in empirical studies on EU support. However, results demonstrate that ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ do not have consistent effects on ‘EU governance legitimacy’ across European countries.

Chapter 5 explores this result performing a policy by policy analysis. It emerges that ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ play a role in driving support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ are the most

important determinants, but their effects are strengthened (or weakened) by specific policy domain characteristics. ‘Output legitimacy’ has the greatest influence on support for EU governance of policies where the EU governance is more effective (*functional interdependence* explanation); whereas ‘European identification’ has the highest effect on policies that work as market-correcting policies (*social-model* explanation) that guarantee a EU level protection from market and globalisation failures.

Further analyses show that respondents tend to prefer high-expenditure policy to be governed at the national level, and, *ceteris paribus*, they are likely to oppose further EU integration in policy domains where EU governance is already high. This last mechanism is telling because it shows that EU governance does not lead to further integration (as argued by neo-functionalists), but on the contrary respondents favour a retrenchment from prior agreements on EU policy competencies.

The analyses with 2009 data do not confirm the influence of political representation (‘EU democracy’), but pooling data from November 2016 (Eurobarometer 86.2), respondents’ perception of political representation within the EU becomes a highly significant determinant of support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies. Moreover, the number of asylum seekers within each country contributes to explain individual-level support. These two findings confirm the idea that the recent European refugees and economic crises have profoundly modified how European citizens look to the EU, and why they support or reject EU policy governance.

Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the meanings of national and European identities and their influence on support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Using Intune 2009 data, national and European identities are unpacked in four constitutive components: ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. The results show that respondents who conceive their national identity as something rooted in national cultural traditions (‘National Civility’ component) are likely to reject EU policy governance. On the contrary, those who qualify European identity as a form of *banal* Europeanism where *Europeanness* is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans that forms a European way of life (‘European Civility’ component) are, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to support EU governance. Both pre-political (‘Ancestry’) and political (exercising ‘Citizenship’ rights) components do not have a consistent impact on this form of EU support. Overall, this corroborates the idea that the more the EU is present in ordinary experiences, the greater is support for EU policy governance. Conversely, a respondents’ strong emphasis on national cultural traditions - also embedded in national laws and political institutions - hampers support for EU governance, since a transfer of competencies to the EU affects national laws and institutions, and, indirectly, national identities.

## Abstract in italiano

Questa tesi contribuisce al dibattito sulla *Europeizzazione* delle preferenze di policy dei cittadini. Questa forma di *Europeizzazione* si sostanzia nel sostegno dei cittadini per una *governance* Europea in strategici settori di *policy*. Utilizzando dati di sondaggio provenienti dalla ricerca Intune 2009 e da Eurobarometro, questo lavoro studia la struttura del sostegno per una *governance* Europea, distinguendo tra una generica preferenza per una maggiore *governance* e una specifica preferenza che varia tra i diversi settori di *policy*. Inoltre, questa tesi analizza quali sono i fattori che influenzano lo sviluppo di questi due tipi di sostegno.

Nel Capitolo 1 attraverso uno studio della letteratura sulle macro teorie dell'integrazione Europea vengono presentati tre modelli alternativi che definiscono la struttura del sostegno per una *governance* politica Europea. Questi tre modelli sono in seguito testati e dibattuti nel prosieguo della tesi.

Il Capitolo 2 fornisce una definizione del concetto di 'EU support' basata su precedenti studi teorici e empirici. Questa definizione identifica quattro dimensioni che sottostanno al concetto di 'EU support':

- 'Output legitimacy': sostegno per gli *output* prodotti dall'Unione Europea;
- 'EU governance legitimacy': sostegno come generica propensione ad affidare le decisioni di *policy* all'Unione Europea;
- 'European identification': sostegno inteso come identificazione nella comunità politica europea;
- 'EU democracy': sostegno inteso come percezione di rappresentanza politica a livello europeo.

Il Capitolo 3 misura queste quattro dimensioni attraverso un modello a dimensioni latenti sui dati della ricerca Intune 2009, confermando che queste dimensioni sono sufficientemente stabili e invariati attraverso i diversi paesi dell'Unione Europea.

Il Capitolo 4 affronta l'analisi delle determinanti di queste quattro dimensioni del sostegno. I risultati dimostrano che quattro fattori influenzano in modo significativo il sostegno all'UE: 1) 'identificazione nazionale esclusiva' 2) 'attaccamento alla nazione' 3) 'fiducia nelle istituzioni nazionali' 4) 'valori politici'. Questi fattori influenzano il sostegno all'UE in tutti i paesi (quindici) oggetto dell'indagine, ma il loro effetto varia in base a quale dimensione del sostegno si considera: la propensione ad affidare le decisioni di *policy* all'UE ('EU governance legitimacy') viene influenzata solamente dal fattore 'identificazione nazionale esclusiva'. Inoltre, questo capitolo indaga anche la presenza di una gerarchia tra le quattro dimensioni del sostegno, derivando questa ipotesi dalle teorie neo e post-funzionaliste e da alcuni studi empirici. Tuttavia, i risultati provano che le dimensioni di 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification' e 'EU democracy' non influenzano in modo considerevole e diffuso quella di 'EU governance legitimacy'.

Partendo da questo risultato, il Capitolo 5 esplora un percorso diverso, facendo un'analisi *policy* per *policy*. Infatti si concentra sull'influenza di questi ed altri fattori sulla propensione ad affidare le

decisioni di *policy* all'Unione Europea in specifici settori politici. Da questa analisi emerge che fattori legati all'utilità soggettiva, all'identità europea e alla rappresentanza politica giocano un ruolo differente nei diversi settori: 'Output legitimacy' e 'European identification' sono le più importanti determinanti della propensione a sostenere una *governance* europea, ma i loro effetti sono rafforzati (o depotenziati) dalle specifiche caratteristiche delle diverse aree di *policy*. 'Output legitimacy' ha l'influenza maggiore nelle aree dove la *governance* europea è più efficiente rispetto ad una nazionale o locale (spiegazione *funzionale*), mentre 'European identification' ha l'effetto più consistente nelle aree politiche dove l'azione europea può correggere gli effetti della globalizzazione (spiegazione *modello sociale*).

Ulteriori analisi evidenziano come gli intervistati tendano a preferire il livello nazionale a quello europeo per le aree di *policy* che richiedono ingenti investimenti economici e per quelle in cui l'Unione Europea già possiede estese competenze. Questo ultimo meccanismo evidenzia come un maggiore livello di integrazione europea non porti di per sé ad una ulteriore richiesta di *governance* europea (come sostenuto dai neo-funzionalisti), ma, anzi, conduca alla richiesta di ridiscutere l'attuale allocazione delle competenze.

Utilizzando dati raccolti nel 2009, queste analisi non confermano l'influenza della dimensione di rappresentanza politica ('EU democracy'). Tuttavia, aggregando dati derivanti da Eurobarometro 86.2 e raccolti nel novembre del 2016 emerge come la percezione di rappresentanza politica diventi una importante e significativa determinante del sostegno per una *governance* europea delle politiche di immigrazione e della politica estera.

Inoltre, il sostegno per una *governance* europea di queste due aree di *policy* viene anche influenzato direttamente dal numero di richiedenti asilo ospitati da ciascun paese. Infatti, maggiore è il numero di richiedenti asilo, maggiore è la richiesta di un'iniziativa politica europea che affronti questo tema. Considerando insieme questi due risultati (aumento dell'influenza della rappresentanza politica e del numero dei richiedenti asilo) viene confermata l'idea che le recenti crisi Europee (economica e dei migranti) abbiano profondamente modificato il modo attraverso cui i cittadini guardano all'Unione europea, e i motivi per cui sostengano o rifiutino una (maggiore) *governance* europea.

In conclusione, il Capitolo 6 indaga i significati di identità nazionale ed europea per scoprire come questi influenzino il supporto per una *governance* europea di specifiche aree di *policy*. Utilizzando dati della ricerca Intune 2009, l'identità nazionale ed europea viene scomposta in quattro componenti costitutive: 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', e 'Citizenship'. I risultati dimostrano come gli intervistati che ricostruiscono la propria identità nazionale sulla base delle specifiche tradizioni culturali nazionali (componente di 'National Civility') siano portati a rifiutare una *governance* europea. All'opposto, il sostegno per una *governance* europea è più probabile per quelli

che qualificano l'identità europea come una forma di europeismo 'banale', dove il significato di europeismo discende dalla condivisione delle esperienze quotidiane ed ordinarie come cittadini dell'Europa (componente di 'European Civility'). Le analisi mostrano l'assenza di influenza sul sostegno da parte sia della componente pre-politica ('Ancestry') dell'identità nazionale ed europea, sia di quella politica ('Citizenship' intesa come esercitare i diritti di cittadinanza). Complessivamente, questi risultati corroborano l'idea che più l'Unione Europea è percepita come presente all'interno dell'ordinaria esperienza di vita dei cittadini, più probabile è il supporto per una maggiore integrazione politica. Tuttavia, a parità di condizioni, i significati di identità nazionale esercitano una decisa influenza sul sostegno. Infatti, maggiore è l'enfasi sulle tradizioni culturali nazionali e sul loro ruolo nella definizione di identità nazionale, minore è il sostegno per una *governance* europea. Questo è determinato dal fatto che le tradizioni culturali sono incorporate anche nelle leggi e nelle istituzioni politiche nazionali, ed un trasferimento di competenze all'Unione Europea ridurrebbe il ruolo e l'importanza di tali istituzioni, influenzando indirettamente l'identità nazionale.

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## INTRODUCTION

The economic crisis started in the US in late 2007 and severely hit the European economy leading to a huge Eurozone crisis. Many national economies within the EU faced extensive economic instability and implemented austerity measures - in some cases directly suggested by European institutions - to cope with the economic downturn. Several EU Member states (Ireland, Spain, and Greece) needed a bailout from the EU and international institutions, due to a rise in the cost of public borrowing. The condition and the managing of the Greek public debt crisis turned out far more complicated than those of Ireland and Spain. The Greek crisis has turned into a highly politicised debate about the underlying goals and meaning of European integration: what kind of union do the EU members governments and citizens want? What are the values for deciding EU policies? Is the EU legitimated to enact and dictate policies to national States, and are they required to comply? All these questions were not new to the academic debate (see for a review Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen 2009; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b), and after the passing of the Maastricht treaty (1992) national public opinions have also become more aware of the implications of European integration.

The successive crises in recent years have contributed to keeping Europe constantly on the agenda: when the Economic/Eurozone crisis was nearly over, the European refugee crisis started and had a great impact on the already weak economies of the southern European countries. In this case, the solidarity mechanism within the EU was questioned by those member states more affected by the flow of migrants from outside Europe. The opposition to share quotas of asylum seekers among EU countries led to a problematic implementation<sup>1</sup> of the program of voluntary relocation and resettlement started in 2015<sup>2</sup>.

While Europe was facing the migrant crisis, another event shook the stability of the Union: the UK voted for leaving the EU (also known as Brexit) in a popular referendum held in June 2016. As analyses of the campaign and surveys have shown, the 'Leave' vote was driven mostly by anti-immigration and anti-establishment feelings, by concerns about preserving national identity and by a perception of having been left behind by globalisation processes (Hobolt 2017). The 'Stay' side, instead, concentrated most on an economic cost-benefit analysis of Brexit, which, in the end, was not able to convince a dissatisfied and upset population (see Hobolt 2017; Goodwin et al. 2017).

The motives behind these crises summarise well what is at stake with the European Union. The European project is no longer just a trade regulation issue where an economic-instrumental rationale may drive integration, support, and legitimacy. From Maastricht onwards, a path towards a political

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<sup>1</sup> [europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-17-218\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-218_en.pdf) (checked 30/09/2017)

<sup>2</sup> <https://goo.gl/Y5sHvE> (checked 30/09/2017)

Union has started, since the EU policy prerogatives began to grow in other sectors than economic ones (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). European integration has become a highly-debated issue where parties, elites, and ordinary citizens have developed their positions (Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b; Best et al. 2012). Euroscepticism started to increase (Taggart 1998): some spoke about *post-Maastricht blues* (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), the end of *permissive consensus* and a new era of *constraining dissensus* (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

The term ‘Euroscepticism’ emerged first in the British media (Harmsen and Spiering 2004, cit. in Vasilopolou 2009) spreading into the common language of ordinary citizens via party competition. Since Taggart’s seminal definition of this term in 1998, the study of ‘Euroscepticism’ has gained a prominent role in the study of party politics. Yet, almost twenty years after his first publication, there is still a debate about what kind of scepticism exists among citizens and parties (e.g. Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b). There is a vast variety of possible objects of scepticism, as well as an assortment of policies, norms or constitutional values one may endorse. The rhetoric power of this label hides the real variety existing among parties and citizens.

Europeans are no longer passive with respect to integration. Many times, they claim a different Europe, since the EU-as-it-is-now is perceived as unable to meet citizen needs (Caiani and Guerra 2017). There is a division between proponents of a federal Europe and intergovernmentalists, as well as between those that reject European intromission into national-welfare management and those who endorse a social Europe (della Porta and Caiani 2009), and between supporters of free trade and free movement within the EU and those wanting protectionism and re-establishment of national state borders (Kriesi et al. 2012). Overall, these divisions are mostly among those supporting more political and policy integration, and those who do not or desire less integration than the current one. The recent Rome declaration<sup>3</sup> recognises the possibility – already included in the Lisbon Treaty – for a stronger integration in some policy areas for a subset of EU countries, and this is an indirect indicator that European countries are not inclined to follow the same path towards more integration.

### **The contents of this dissertation**

This thesis studies the public legitimacy of the ongoing process of European integration, with the final purpose of showing why European citizens support or reject a strengthening of the union, in terms of more EU policy governance, distinguishing a generic preference for more EU governance from a specific support for EU governance of distinct policy sectors. The literature on popular support towards the EU is quite vast (see for a review Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b; Hobolt and de Vries 2015), but there is a much smaller number of studies on popular support

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declaration/> (checked 30/09/2017)

for EU governance (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, 2007; Sinnott 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Hooghe 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; De Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, among these studies, those where the unit of analyses are individuals (and not aggregates) are only a few (see de Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). These studies analyse individual-level data - which is right for testing theory-based mechanisms without running the risk of an *ecological fallacy*<sup>4</sup> - but they concentrate only on a generic form of support for EU governance, disregarding the presence of a policy specific support. In other words, these studies address the question on why individuals (within European countries) support a strengthening of European policy governance, but they do not study why European citizens support, for instance, EU governance of Immigration policy, while rejecting EU governance of Agricultural policy. This thesis contributes to filling this gap, studying what determines a form of generic as well as specific support for EU governance.

In addition, this work contributes to conceptual clarification, identifying different - empirically grounded<sup>5</sup> - dimensions of mass support for the European project. Empirical research often conceptualises EU support<sup>6</sup> as a mono-dimensional concept, and this oversimplifies the concept. This thesis argues, on the contrary, that the concept of EU support is multidimensional, and its measurement needs to comply with the conceptual definition. Some scholars propose conceptualisations of EU support, but there is no common conceptual framework for studying this topic. Scholars differ both on the theoretical model they apply, as well as on the operationalisation of concepts and measurement strategies (e.g. Norris 1999; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b). Often, they concentrate just on one aspect of EU support (i.e. trust in the EU institutions, or general support of EU membership), limiting the scope of their exploration (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b; Carey 2002; McLaren 2004; Hobolt 2012). This thesis provides - drawing upon existing theoretical and empirical analyses - a comprehensive conceptual framework, which is suited to study popular support for EU governance. The conceptual definition is grounded in Scharpf's input-output legitimacy model (Scharpf 1999) and Easton's diffuse-specific model of support (Easton 1965, 1975). Four dimensions of EU support are identified: (1) one related to the outputs of the EU system, called 'Output legitimacy', which indicates

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<sup>4</sup> Ecological fallacy means inferring individual level mechanisms from aggregate data.

<sup>5</sup> These dimensions are based on previous theoretical and empirical analyses available in the literature, but this thesis investigates their empirical consistence much more in detail. A strong emphasis is thus posed on the measurement strategy and cross-country comparability of results. Indeed, valid conclusions about the nature of EU support inevitably pass through a rigorous application of an appropriate method.

<sup>6</sup> The term EU support defines a general favourable attitude towards the European Union. EU support is defined more precisely in the proceeding of this dissertation, since the concept of EU support is unpacked in four constitutive dimensions.

the perceived benefit of being a EU citizen; (2) one that taps the legitimacy of the EU governance and the scope of EU policy governance, labelled ‘EU governance legitimacy’; (3) another one that defines individual identification with the European political community<sup>7</sup>, named ‘European identification’; (4) and the last one corresponds to an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called ‘EU democracy’. These four dimensions cover ample spectrum of the concept of EU support:

- ‘Output legitimacy’ is a dimension where support is a matter of subjective utility;
- ‘EU governance legitimacy’ defines support as a generic preference for EU governance;
- ‘European identification’ conceives support as a we-feeling;
- ‘EU democracy’ considers support as trust in procedures and institutions that allow political representation at the EU level.

This conceptual definition is necessary because it improves the comprehension of the perceived weak point(s) of European integration, and allows studying why European citizens develop these different *forms* of EU support<sup>8</sup>. In the literature, there are studies that link EU support with its exogenous<sup>9</sup> determinants (i.e. political values and confidence in national institutions; see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011 for a review), but they often concentrate on one dimension per time (e.g. Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998b; Carey 2002; McLaren 2004; Hobolt 2012) or they infer conclusions without checking comparability of results across European countries (e.g. Dalton 1999; Norris 1999; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgarden et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b). This work integrates this literature proposing a model that estimates (latent) dimensions of EU support controlling for cross-country stability of the model (measurement invariance), and that concurrently measures the effect of exogenous determinants of the four dimensions of EU support.

Furthermore, defining four dimensions means distinguishing four *objects* (see Easton 1965, 1975) of EU support: outputs, EU competencies, community, and EU institutions, and this allows theorizing and testing a model where the generic support for EU governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’) depends upon the other three endogenous components of EU support. Indeed, current theories of European integration maintain that a path towards more European integration (increasing EU governance) is decisively influenced by issues of utility (for *intergovernmentalist*, and *neo-functional* scholars – see Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1993; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012), identity (for *post-functional* scholars – see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2017), and political representation (for *democratic deficit* scholars – see Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Schmidt

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<sup>7</sup> European political community simply indicates an imagined community (Anderson 1991) of people living within the borders of the European Union.

<sup>8</sup> I use *forms* and not *types* of EU support to indicate that these *forms* of EU support are not mutually exclusive, as the term *types* often indicates.

<sup>9</sup> The term ‘exogenous’ indicates a potential determinant of EU support: it is not an indicator the concept, but, on the contrary, it influences the development of EU support.

2013). However, none of the existing individual-level studies on support for EU policy governance investigates the relationship among the endogenous components of the concept (with the partial exclusion of McLaren 2007). This thesis answers the question on to what extent support for EU governance is determined by subjective utility ('Output legitimacy'), identity ('European identification'), and representation ('EU democracy').

However, there are two types of support for EU governance: generic or policy specific. Generic support is measured by the (latent) dimensions of 'EU governance legitimacy', and it indicates a latent attitude that cross-cuts policy domains. The specific support, instead, indicates a form of support for EU governance that varies across policy domains: it is contingent upon specific characteristics of the policy sectors. Moreover, endogenous ('Output legitimacy', 'European Identification', and 'EU democracy') as well as exogenous determinants of support for EU governance may have different effects across policies, since support may be driven, for instance, by 'Output legitimacy' in some sectors, and by 'European identification' in others. This work investigates both these two forms of generic and specific support for EU policy governance.

Finally, the role of national and European identities on specific support for EU governance is further analysed. National and European identities are unpacked in their constitutive components to address the influence of different identity meanings. Indeed, identity can be conceived in three ways: (1) as a self-categorisation as a group member; (2) as the strength of the attachment towards the group; or (3) as the set of attributes that discriminates between in-group and out-group (Citrin and Sides 2004). Whereas chapters 2 to 5 concentrate on the first and the second definition of these collective identities, Chapter 6 makes use of the third conceptualisation, and it investigates the relationship between meanings of national and European identities and support for EU governance of eight specific policy domains<sup>10</sup>.

### **The structure of this dissertation**

This dissertation contributes to the debate on *Europeanization* (Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2007), broadly defined as the way in which European integration influences national politics and societies, or, more precisely, as the process of:

*"[...] (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies."* (Radaelli 2003: 30)

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<sup>10</sup> Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies.

In detail, the thesis studies the *Europeanization* of citizen policy preferences, defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of strategic policy domains. It does so addressing the following five research questions:

*RQ<sub>1</sub> How is citizen support for EU policy governance structured?*

*RQ<sub>2</sub> What are the dimensions of EU support?*

*RQ<sub>3</sub> What are the determinants of these dimensions of EU support?*

*RQ<sub>4</sub> What are the determinants of support for EU governance of specific policy domains?*

*RQ<sub>5</sub> Do different meanings of national and European identity exert an influence on support for EU governance of specific policy domains?*

The dissertation is composed of six chapters, plus this introduction and a conclusive chapter that debates empirical results. Each chapter focuses mainly on one of the five research questions. This work relies on individual-level survey data from the Intune 2009 project (Cotta et al. 2009) and from the Eurobarometer 86.2 (November 2016) (European Commission 2017), in both cases with data on fifteen EU countries<sup>11</sup>, and on aggregate country-level data from the Eurobarometer website<sup>12</sup> about all the twenty-eight EU countries.

Chapter 1 surveys the literature on macro theories of European integration and provides three alternative models of support for EU policy governance. These models are tested and debated in the proceeding of the dissertation to address the first research question (RQ<sub>1</sub>) on the structure of support for EU policy governance.

Chapters 2 provides an answer to the second research question (RQ<sub>2</sub>), developing a conceptual definition of EU support grounded in earlier theoretical and empirical works. Four dimensions of EU support are identified: ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’. Moreover, Chapter 2 introduces the indicators used to measure these four dimensions and presents a selection of aggregate time-series data from Eurobarometer surveys (see note 12) to assess long-term tendencies. Although the analysis is limited to a few indicators of the four dimensions, it emerges that citizen evaluations of ‘EU democracy’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ profoundly vary through time, steadily decreasing after 2007. On the contrary, support for EU governance of specific policy domains<sup>13</sup> as well as levels of ‘European identification’ is (almost) time-invariant. These findings support the idea that the dimensions of EU support based on subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and political representation (‘EU democracy’) are those most affected by the European economic crisis.

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<sup>11</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.

<sup>12</sup> <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index> (checked 30/09/2017)

<sup>13</sup> Agricultural, Fighting crime, Environmental, Health care, Unemployment, Immigration, and Foreign policies.

Afterwards, Chapter 3 measures the theoretical constructs ('Output legitimacy', 'EU governance legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy'), modelling them as latent dimensions using individual-level survey data (Cotta et al. 2009). This measurement is rather stable and invariant across EU member countries, providing evidence supporting the presence of these four dimensions of EU support. In addition, in Appendix A different measuring methods are compared in order to validate the results further, and from these analyses it is evident that the separation between a political support ('EU governance legitimacy') and a utilitarian form of support ('Output legitimacy') is empirically tenable, and that the use of different statistical methods to measure these dimensions does not substantially influence the outcome.

Chapter 4 answers the third research question (RQ<sub>3</sub>), assessing the influence of exogenous individual-level determinants on the four dimensions of EU support across European countries. Results demonstrate that exclusive national identification<sup>14</sup>, confidence in national institutions, national attachment, and political values have a significant influence on EU support. However, among this set of exogenous determinants, only exclusive national identification is associated with lower scores on the dimension of 'EU governance legitimacy'. This means that holding exclusive national identity is what discriminates between supporters and rejecters of a generic EU policy governance.

Afterwards, following some suggestions included in theories of European integration (mainly *neo* and *post*-functionalism) and in empirical studies on EU support, the chapter investigates the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, where 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' come first in 'causal' chain, influencing 'EU governance legitimacy'. The result of a path model demonstrates that 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' do not have consistent effects on the dimension of 'EU governance legitimacy' across European countries. This influence emerges in some EU countries and not in others, without showing any clear pattern among States (i.e. geographic location or Eurozone membership). This contradicts the hypothesis and poses serious doubts on the predictive power of the dimensions of subjective utility ('Output legitimacy'), identity ('European identification'), and political representation ('EU democracy'). However, the reason for this result may rest on the fact that this dimension of 'EU governance legitimacy' taps a generic preference for EU policy governance. It follows that subjective utility, identity, and political representation may play a different role in driving support for EU governance of distinct policy domains.

Chapter 5 deals with this research question (RQ<sub>4</sub>), performing a policy by policy analysis. Looking at separate policies it emerges that subjective utility ('Output legitimacy') and identity (both self-identification and the strength of this identification) are the most important determinants of support

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<sup>14</sup> Exclusive national identification means self-categorising as a member of a national community without identifying also as European.

for EU governance of specific policy domains, but their effects are strengthened (or weakened) by policy specific characteristics. Analyses with 2009 data do not confirm the influence of political representation ('EU democracy'), but they corroborate the hypotheses that 'Output legitimacy' and 'European identification' are positively associated with support for EU policy governance of specific sectors.

Moreover, additional analyses show that large part of the cross-policy differences in the level of support for EU governance is explained by the attributes of the policy domains: respondents tend to prefer high-expenditure policy to be governed at the national level, and, *ceteris paribus*, they are likely to oppose further EU governance in policy domains where the EU governance is already high. This last mechanism is telling because it shows that EU integration does not lead to further integration (as argued by neo-functionalists), but on the contrary respondents endorse a 'spillback' (as opposed to spillover, see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior agreements on EU competencies.

Chapter 5 concludes showing that country-level explanations are scant predictors of support for EU policy governance, especially in 2009. Pooling data from November 2016 (EB 86.2)<sup>15</sup> (European Commission 2017) two issues become remarkably important. The first one regards the effects that the number of asylum seekers within EU countries exerts. It turns out to be a significant determinant of support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies, confirming the intuition that respondents look to the EU for solving national problems: the EU is seen as a powerful actor able to deal with adverse national contingency. The second important change corresponds to the increase of the effect of political representation at the EU level. Indeed, far more than in 2009, political representation is associated with support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies. Considered together, these findings confirm the idea that the recent European refugees and economic crises have profoundly modified how European citizens look to the EU, and why they support or rejects EU policy governance.

The issue of EU democracy becomes salient for EU citizens after the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008-2009, when the consensus for Eurosceptic parties increase (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2017). These parties combine identity and political representation claims with economic arguments to mobilise citizens against the European Union, seen as an illegitimate actor. Eurosceptic parties consider the EU as a threat to national cultural integrity (Usherwood and Startin 2013; Leconte 2015) and an open door to immigration (de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005), and they succeeded in mobilizing EU citizens who have exclusive national identification (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2017; Börzel and Risse 2017).

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<sup>15</sup> The choice of considering data from November 2016 depends on the fact that in the period 2009-2016 three events occurred: 1) Eurozone crises since early 2010; 2) Refugees crisis since 2015; 3) and Brexit in June 2016.

To investigate the effect of identity on EU support, Chapter 6 takes a different approach. Indeed, using Intune 2009 survey data (Cotta et al. 2009), national and European identities are unpacked in their constitutive components, to understand whether different meanings<sup>16</sup> of national and European identification are associated with support for EU governance of specific policy areas (RQ<sub>5</sub>). Drawing upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni's (2016) conceptualisation, four components of identity are defined and measured: 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', and 'Citizenship'. The results show that respondents who conceive their national identity as something rooted in national cultural traditions ('National Civility' component) are likely to reject EU governance. On the contrary, those who qualify European identification as a form of *banal* Europeanism (Cram 2001) where *Europeanness* is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans - besides national cultural differences - ('European Civility' component) are, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to support EU policy governance. Both a pre-political ('Ancestry') and a political (exercising 'Citizenship' rights) component do not have a consistent impact on this form of EU support. Overall, this corroborates the idea that the more the EU is present in ordinary experiences, the higher is the support for EU governance. On the contrary, a strong emphasis on national cultural traditions - also embedded in national laws and political institutions - hampers support for EU governance, since a transfer of competence affects national laws and institutions, and, indirectly, their national identities.

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<sup>16</sup> 'Meanings' of collective identity produce 'boundaries' that define members and non-members. In Chapter 6 these two terms are considered as synonymous, since they both refer to survey questions that ask the respondents to indicate the importance of some attributes to be proper nationals or Europeans.

## CHAPTER 1 - THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The role of theories in the social sciences is to provide credible accounts of why specific social phenomena happen. There are macro-level theories, where institutions and organised groups are at the core of the explanatory mechanism, and micro level theories, where, instead, individuals are the pillar of the explanation. European integration is undoubtedly a field for macro-level theories. Indeed, national governments, European institutions, and national and transnational elites are the key actors in this field. The process of integrating separate national states and communities within a common European polity started in 1957 with the Rome Treaty, which established an international organisation among few members that decided to share a small part of their sovereignty in a limited set of policy areas (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). In sixty years, what was an international agreement among few members has become now the European Union of twenty-eight member states whose institutions have competencies that range from economic to social policies. Macro-level theories of European integration account for how and why this process happened, and they provide different predictions on the future of EU governance.

However, this dissertation is not on macro theories, but it draws upon them to study the *Europeanization* (see Radaelli 2003) of citizen policy preferences. This form of *Europeanization* is defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of strategic policy domains. Macro theories of European integration do not deal with citizen support for EU governance unless it constrains political choices, but three different models of support can be identified looking at how macro theories defines, for instance, governments' support for EU governance. Indeed, these three models correspond to three different structure of preferences:

1. Liberal intergovernmentalism (see Moravcsik 1993) stresses that each of the key actors of integration has an inconsistent set of preferences for EU governance since support depends upon intrinsic characteristics of the policy domains;
2. Neo-functionalism (see Haas 1958), instead, maintains that actors' support for EU governance cross-cuts policy domains since functional spillover automatically produces further demand for integration of domains not yet integrated;
3. Post-functionalism (see Hooghe and Marks 2009) suggests that actors' support for EU governance is contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains and constrains public choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians.

Therefore, this chapter surveys the literature on European integration to retrieve these three models of support for EU governance. In the proceeding of this thesis, these models, that in macro theories are referred to collective actors, will be used in a context where the units of analysis are individuals. Indeed, this dissertation empirically tests whether these models represent how citizens structure their set of preferences for EU governance.

## **1 Three theories, two dichotomies, one European integration**

European integration is both a project of economic, social and political integration and a process that has evolved step by step during the past sixty years, facing many external and internal crises that shaped the current institutional architecture of the European Union. Indeed, the supranational European integration has resulted in a combination of elements drawn from politics within national states (e.g. European Parliament, Commission, and independence of European Courts) and from politics between states (e.g. the European Council, and the Council) (Pollack 2012).

Two dichotomies frame European integration theories: intergovernmental vs supranational modes of integration, and utilitarian vs ideational motivations. Although these are ideal-typical abstractions, they are helpful in classifying theories of European integration. Indeed, liberal intergovernmentalism tend to conceive European integration as a matter of intergovernmental mode of integration and utility, neo-functionalism as a matter of supranationalism and utility, and post-functionalism as a field of intergovernmental mode and value/ideational issues.

The most influential theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is that of Moravcsik (1993). It focuses on the interstate bargaining, and defines European Community/Union as a form of international organisation, “an international regime for policy co-ordination, the substantive and institutional development of which may be explained through the sequential analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction” (Moravcsik 1993: 480). The focus of Moravcsik’s theory is the instrumental rationality of national governments and the centrality of national state preferences, where European institutions are reactive agents of intergovernmental decisions (Diez and Wiener 2009b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012).

The main competing theory is neo-functionalism, which has its roots in Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) studies, and the recent influential contribution by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998). The core of this theory relies on the idea that European integration is a product of interdependence among transnational economic elites. When these elites (leaders, political parties, labour and industry associations) believe that pursuing their self-interest requires a delegation of power to supranational institutions, they put pressure on their national governments to enforce integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The essential difference between this approach and intergovernmentalism is that European institutions (mainly the EU Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank) are themselves actors of integration, and thus they are objects of lobbying from transnational actors. Again, here the focus is on the self-interest of actors but seen as supranational processes of preference formations.

The third strand of theorisation on European integration is the constructivist/post-functionalistic perspective. Following Risse (2009), this approach is not alternative to liberal intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism, but it is a rather complementary account of why actors (governments as well

as societal groups and elites) deviate from pure instrumental rationality when dealing with issues of European integration. The role of normative discourse (ideas of integration) has emerged since the initial process of integration, where the community building project was debated among intellectuals and political leaders (e.g. Deutsch, Haas, Spinelli, and Jean Monnet). The neo-functionalist expectations that growing transnational interactions would have increased economic interdependence, as well as common identification (Haas 1958) with an imagined European community (Anderson 1991), underestimated the persistence of national identities. Hooghe and Marks (2009) in their post-functionalistic theory remark upon the role of exclusive (national) identity in driving opposition towards the EU, limiting the room of manoeuvre of governments and elites.

The next paragraphs report in more details these theories, drawing extensively upon Diez and Wiener (2009b) and Jones (et al. 2009). These theories propose an account of how European integration proceeds concentrating on how governments and institutions take decisions, shedding light on some drivers of integration operating at the meso and macro-level. Indeed, from one side, European integration transcends the scope of individual actions, it is a matter of national executives, governing parties, or organised (trans)national groups. On the other side, individuals are voters, consumers, and workers, and their votes count for office-seeking politicians: it follows that citizen support towards the EU and EU governance enters the debate in case these issues are salient for the public opinion. These macro approaches configure a structure of actors' preferences for EU support that may not correspond with those of EU citizens. For this reason, it is necessary to link the macro and meso with the micro level, as suggested by post-functionalists (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The concepts that connect these levels are those of 'politicisation' (de Wilde 2011; Grande et al. 2016), and 'issue entrepreneurs' (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Grande and his colleagues (2016) - drawing upon Schattschneider (1975) - define politicisation as the transfer of societal conflicts into the party system, while Hobolt and de Vries maintain that "[i]ssue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream status quo" (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1161).

### ***1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism***

Liberal intergovernmentalism conceives European integration as "an international regime for policy co-ordination" (Moravcsik 1993: 480), which means that international relation paradigms are the most appropriate to study how and why supranational integration succeeds (Graziano and Vink 2007). In this theory, national governments are key actors of integration, since they first aggregate and articulate citizens' preferences, and then they bargain with other governments to reach national interests (Pollack 2012). The two phases in this model need two separate sub-theories (Moravcsik

1993), a theory of intra-state preference aggregation (demand side), and one regarding interstate bargaining on the choice for supranational institutions (supply side).

States are conceived as rational and unitary actors, which aim to maximise the national utility of integration (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). The unitary assumption needs particular attention because there are different types of preferences at stake (e.g. economic, geopolitical, and normative values) and many societal groups, which may hold different positions (e.g. producers and consumers). Moravcsik (1993) argues that economic interests tend to predominate over geopolitical ones and that normative values play a minor role. At the same time, Moravcsik (1993) sustains that national governments manage to articulate the mixture of intra-state preferences coming from different societal groups, balancing diverging interests. The author maintains that the primary interest of national governments is to retain their position, and the possible electoral sanction from dissatisfied citizens holds governments accountable for their behaviour.

However, what does this approach say about the structure of preferences for EU governance? Moravcsik (1993) maintains that state preferences for European integration are oriented towards managing globalisation, but the governments' response may vary across policy issues and time, resulting in an incoherent set of preferences. For this reason, Moravcsik suggests looking at issue and time concrete preferences, rather than overarching ideological preferences. This means that support for EU governance is not consistent across policy domains (1). Moreover, according to liberal intergovernmentalist theory, national governments are willing to cooperate in an international regime, thus constraining their governance capacity, when this is the most effective way to cope with policy externalities generated by international interdependence (Pollack 2012). Negative policy externalities occur when policies of one state (i.e. trade barriers and air pollution) affect directly or indirectly another state's community, economy or territory (Moravcsik 1993). Cooperation may reduce these externalities and increase the overall benefit, in a win-win logic. Hence, pooling sovereignty via majoritarian decision-making (in the Council), or delegating sovereignty to supranational institutions like Commission and the Court, is the way to provide credibility to mutual commitments (Pollack 2012), but EU governance is only supported when is more efficient than national or sub-national governance (2).

Finally, for this approach, national executives are the gate-keepers of access to EU politics (Börzel 1999) since they mediate the demands coming from domestic groups. In times of growing global interdependence, societal groups face new challenges, raising political demands that often require supranational responses. In this scenario, European institutions are designed – and limited – to reduce externalities and to provide a common answer to national demands.

## ***1.2 Neo-Functionalism***

Neo-functionalism is a theory initially elaborated by Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) to account for the first steps of European integration (European Coal and Steel Community, and European Economic Community) (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). It is a theory of political integration within a specific region, which is the reason why national states decide to integrate and transfer decision-making power from national governments to the EU (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). It assumes that integration is driven by growing international interdependence, and by the self-interest of national elites (e.g. parties and economic elites) who recognise that their political or economic goals can be pursued only via supranational actions and decisions (Haas 1958). National elites and groups may form cross-national coalitions to press their national governments to establish supranational integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).

Niemann and Schmitter (2009) maintain that the original theorization of the neo-functional account makes five assumptions: (1) Rational and self-interested actors look at supranational solutions to their national problems, and in the long run, driven by their interest, they will shift expectations and loyalties from the national arena towards the new political centre; (2) European institutions, once established, become agents of further integration; (3) Further integration mainly derives from marginal adjustments to the unintended consequences of former decisions; (4) European integration is not a zero-sum game but rather a positive sum game; (5) Further integration is a result of the interdependence of some policy domains, which leads to an automatic functional spillover from policy domain to another not yet integrated one. This spillover is not merely an increase of competencies in new sectors, but it is necessary to reach the initial policy purpose that would not be attained without further integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).

It follows that neo-functionalism, as liberal intergovernmentalism, believes that the growing international interdependence among national states drives support for EU governance (1), but this pressure for dealing with policy externalities automatically activates both the spillover effect and a shift of expectations and loyalties, resulting in a cross-policy support for EU governance (2).

Therefore, neo-functionalists consider integration to be a process, not an outcome, and it proceeds with incremental power delegation (Niemann and Schmitter 2009). It is undoubted that ‘supranational governance’ – that is the EU’s capacity to govern policy fields, requiring members’ compliance towards its binding decision – has deepened and expanded over time (Grande et al. 2016, Börzel and Risse 2017). However, in Haas’ theorization (1958) spillover is an automatic process, leading to complete policy integration (Niemann and Schmitter 2009). A federal and supranational Europe would have become a reality due to automatic spillover.

There are two remarkable critical reviews of Haas’ neo-functionalism. In one of them, Schmitter (2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009) rejects the assumption of automatic spillover, adding four

alternative mechanisms of integration, and remarking that intergovernmental politics have not ultimately left room to supranational governance. Schmitter (2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) postulates the following mechanisms:

- (1) *'spill-around'; the proliferation of functionally specialized independent, but strictly intergovernmental, institutions;*
- (2) *'build-up', the concession by member states of greater authority to the supranational organization without expanding the scope of its mandate;*
- (3) *'muddle-about', when national actors try to maintain regional cooperation without changing/adjusting institutions;*
- (4) *'spillback', which denotes withdrawal from previous commitments by member states.*

Therefore, the set of national governments' political answers is much more compounded than 'simple' functional spillover (Niemann and Ioannou 2015): political decisions to increase or reduce supranational governance may be limited by national constraints, be they economic or normative (e.g. popular or parliamentary consensus).

Finally, the second critical review comes from Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998). They propose to dismiss the assumption that interest-based integration would produce a shift of loyalty, expectations and political activities towards a new European centre (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998): according to them, whether this happens or not, it should not be part of a theory based on actors' instrumental rationality. Considered together, both Schmitter, and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet argue that national states are still at the core of the European politics, notwithstanding more than sixty years of European integration and the growing transnational interdependence produced by globalisation processes.

### ***1.3 Constructivism/Post-functionalism***

Ideas and value-based commitments are at the core of early attempts to establish a European community (Diez and Wiener 2009a; Schimmelfennig 2012). After the second world war, federalist movements mobilised for establishing European integration - basing their commitment on a political project of European unification - which culminated in 1954 in the proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) (Burgess 2009; Schimmelfennig et al. 2015). After the demise of those projects, and the establishment of economic-driven integration, values lose their prominence in European integration theorization: for neo-functionalistic accounts, a sense of loyalty and community is simply a (positive) by-product of socialization to supranational institutions, whereas for liberal intergovernmentalism the role of ideas and values is at most a limiting factor in European integration, but only when values modify economic or geopolitical utility functions (Schimmelfennig 2012). According to Diez and Wiener (2009a), only in the 1990s

constructivist approaches gained relevance in the field of European studies, integrating prior European integration theories.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) maintain that European governance may be a functional and rational response to global interdependence, but it often collides with a demand for self-rule coming from national (or regional) communities and anti-integration parties. The authors contest the overwhelming focus on economic factors of the other two theories, and the low importance given to public opinion. Hooghe and Marks (2009) see an upsurge of salience and political contestation of European integration after the enactment of the Maastricht treaty, which ended the *permissive consensus* that had sustained the European integration for four decades. They claim that EU is now a salient political issue both for parties and individuals, not just for (economic) elites. In a recent article (2017), they write about the emergence of a ‘transnational cleavage’ that structures the political space, merging European integration and immigration, resulting in a cultural as well as economic threat to the traditional way of life<sup>17</sup> (Hooghe et al. 2017). They argue that the increase of competence delegated to European institutions after the Maastricht Treaty has led to a growing politicisation of the *EU issue* (De Vries 2010) mainly driven by radical right parties mobilising against immigration flux and sovereignty loss (2009). Hooghe and Marks (2009: 13) remark that “[c]onnections between national identity, cultural and economic insecurity and issues such as EU enlargement cannot be induced directly from experience, but have to be constructed”, and they are constructed by parties that mainly compete along the GAL/TAN dimension<sup>18</sup> (Hooghe et al. 2017). TAN parties support a ‘spillback’ (see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior European commitments that constrain states sovereignty and impose accepting free movement and immigration. GAL parties, on the contrary, are open and supportive of more integration and European solidarity.

Post-functionalism is promising because it links three strands of research (European integration theory, party politics, and political sociology) into a coherent set of propositions that describes how politicisation (see de Wilde 2011; Grande et al. 2016) may affect integration decisions. Börzel and Risse (2017) argue that identity claims about community boundaries prevented an effective European response to the migrant crisis. They maintain that political decisions that affect identity and citizenship are highly salient for large parts of national societies, and “Eurosceptic populist parties and movements, particularly on the right [...] have increasingly succeeded in mobilizing those citizens with exclusive national identities along the TAN/GAL cultural cleavage” (Börzel and Risse 2017: 15). Börzel and Risse (2017) report that holders of exclusive identities have not increased

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<sup>17</sup> It is debatable whether their theorized “transnational cleavage” satisfies the requirements for being conceived a proper ‘cleavage’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bornschieer 2009), since it misses specification regarding the links between self-identification, social location, and interest representation.

<sup>18</sup> ‘GAL’ stands for Green-Alternative-Libertarian and ‘TAN’ for Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (Hooghe et al. 2002).

through time, but the central point is that politicisation has been strategically enacted (Grande et al. 2016) by political entrepreneurs (Hobolt and De Vries 2016), who activated latent attitudes among societal segments (Börzel and Risse 2017). Therefore, post-functionalism suggests that support for EU governance of the key actors of integration (national executives and governing parties) is contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains, and it constrains public choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians. Hence, from a post-functional perspective, TAN political parties are those who activate popular resentments against EU governance among citizens with exclusive national identities. For those with exclusive national identities in the context of high politicisation of the EU issue (De Vries 2010) support for EU governance is extremely unlikely. However, Cederman (2001) suggests that increasing EU governance modifies identity-boundaries among national groups. The extent to which this happens varies across policy domains since some sectors are more associated with identity issues and have a greater impact on the way of life of citizens (i.e. welfare), with the result that the integration of these sectors is seen as more problematic. Therefore, opposition to further EU governance, as well as a preference for a ‘spillback’ from earlier competence transfer, is expected to: (1) vary across policy depending on the characteristics of the policy domains given their different association with identity issues; (2) be contingent upon the level of politicisation of the EU issue within national politics.

The central point in the post-functional thesis, then, is the concept of politicisation. In liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist accounts, governments and elites are assumed to be unitary actors. On the contrary, post-functionalism deliberately dismisses the ‘unitary’ assumption, introducing party politics in the field of European integration theories. On this, a brief review of the literature on ‘politicisation’ is provided in the next section.

## **2. Politicisation**

De Wilde defines the concept of politicisation as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (de Wilde 2011: 560). A recent contribute by Grande and his colleagues (Grande et al. 2016) investigates politicisation of the *EU issue* (De Vries 2010) in six European countries during the period 1970-2016. Their theoretical puzzle is how and when politicisation occurs. They identified three sets of drivers of politicisation: conflicts over (a) national sovereignty, (b) national identity, and (c) transnational solidarity.

Analysing the content of newspaper articles of the period 1970-2012, they argue that (a) “[c]onflicts over national sovereignty have been the most persistent in the history of European integration” (Grande et al. 2016: 13). A political conflict between supporters of supranational integration and defenders of national sovereignty recurred at every major step of integration and dramatically contributed to slowing down political integration (Grande et al. 2016).

(b) The enlargement of the EU to include Central and East European (CEE) countries contributed to increasing the perception of cultural differences within the European polity. Intra-EU migration raised the salience of the cultural dimension, turned into identity politics by many political parties, which claimed to preserve national specific identities (Grande et al. 2016).

(c) The more European integration departs from the original policy co-ordination framework towards a semi-federal polity, expanding its governance and including new member states, the more EU politics is involved in redistributive policies. The divides between the so-called debtor countries and creditor countries and between net receivers and net givers of European funds summarise this inter-state conflict. Moreover, the recent sovereignty debt crisis exacerbates this divide (Grande 2016).

The authors (Grande et al. 2016) demonstrate that these conflicts come with three different justification strategies: a cultural discourse (benefit from cultural diversity vs negative consequences on national identity), an economic cost-benefit analysis of EU integration, and a ‘utilitarian’ pragmatic reasoning (non-economic consequences). The third is specially employed to underline the increasing (or reducing) efficacy in pursuing non-economic policy goals (i.e. environmental protection and borders control).

However, rather than politicising current policy decisions, focusing on how EU institutions make use of their power, political parties extensively concentrate their commitments on polity or constitutional issues regarding terms of membership and EU competencies (see Braun et al. 2016, 2017). For this reason, it is still debated whether politicisation leads towards something like a healthy political debate between different legitimate positions, as required by normative liberal democracy theory (Grande et al. 2016), or results in a negative turn for the system itself.

Early neo-functionalists (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) believed that politicisation would have fostered support for more integration, due to societal pressure for a more efficient welfare provision. On the same side, yet with different reasons, there are the proponents of the democratic deficit thesis (e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), which recommend politicisation of European elections as a solution for solving this deficit, arguing that any democracy is ‘substantial’ and not just ‘procedural’ if “there is open competition for executive office and over the direction of the policy agenda” (Hix 2008: 8). The last attempt to positively politicise European politics may be found in the 2014 European Parliamentary (EP) elections, where the major Eurogroups in the EP nominated their leading candidates for the European Commission presidency, thus personalising the campaign and strengthening the link between election results and executive formation (Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015).

On the other side, proponents of the post-functionalistic perspective (Hooghe and Marks 2009) argue that politicisation reduces the availability of political choices since national governments are

constrained by lack of EU legitimacy and support for a European choice. Politicisation of polity related issues, the main set of conflicts, seems to confirm that conflicts are still about the rules of the game (who decides what, and for whom) and less about the contents. Hooghe and Marks (2009) maintain that Eurosceptic parties drive politicisation, with these parties contesting the legitimacy or the ‘nature’ of the EU polity (de Wilde and Trezn 2012)<sup>19</sup>.

Party based-Euroscepticism (Taggart 1998) has been the object of a growing literature. Usherwood and Startin (2013: 6) remark that there are four party-families that directly address the EU issue: (1) Single-issue pro-sovereignty parties; (2) radical right parties that merge anti-immigrant discourse and Euroscepticism; (3) extreme left-wing parties that oppose the neo-liberal market integration; and (4) mainstream parties, mostly from the right side, that criticize the present and future integration on issues like the EU budget, the future of the euro and further enlargement. Euroscepticism was a peripheral phenomenon, but now has spread into mainstream politics, at least since the 2009 EP elections (see Usherwood and Startin 2013; Leconte 2015).

However, the meaning of the term Euroscepticism is still vague. The earliest studies in this field speak about support or opposition towards European integration, but since the Taggart’s seminal description of Euroscepticism as a “contingent or qualified opposition, as well as [... an] unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart 1998: 366) this term have become popular. The work of Taggart (1998, see also Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a and 2008b) aim to analyse party-based Euroscepticism, and proposes a distinction between *hard* and *soft* Euroscepticism, where the *hard* type refers to a principled opposition to any idea of transferring powers to a supranational institution, and the *soft* type defines a qualified opposition to the current EU core policies or an aversion towards further extension of EU competencies (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b).

Flood and Usherwood (2005) propose to consider hard and soft Euroscepticism as two poles of a continuum, while Conti (2003) remarks the importance of also considering neutral and positive commitments in party attitudes towards the EU, including ‘no commitment’, ‘functional Europeanism’ (based on cost-benefit analysis), and ‘identity Europeanism’ (emotional commitment). Conti’s typology follows a path opened by Kopecky and Mudde (2002), who propose to combine two dimensions to identify party positions: *Diffuse* support - an approval of the general idea of European integration - and *specific* support for the EU’s current structure and for the planned future evolution of the European integration (Kopecky and Mudde 2002).

As it is evident, research efforts are dedicated to map and understand party support or opposition towards the EU, in terms of their evaluation of EU political legitimacy as well as its efficacy. The

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<sup>19</sup> This mimic the conceptual division between regime support and policy support (see Hobolt e De Vries 2015).

more politicised EU legitimacy and efficacy are, the more these issues become a matter of mass politics.

### 3. Discussion

This chapter reviewed three macro theories of European integration: liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and post-functionalism. They provide accounts of why European integration occurs (or not occurs), and they do so defining how preferences for EU governance are structured:

1. liberal intergovernmentalism (see Moravcsik 1993) stresses that each of the key actors of integration has an inconsistent set of preferences for EU governance since support depends upon intrinsic characteristics of the policy domains;
2. neo-functionalism (see Haas 1958) maintains that actors' support for EU governance cross-cuts policy domains since functional spillover automatically produces further demand for integration of domains not yet integrated;
3. post-functionalism (see Hooghe and Marks 2009) suggests that actors' support for EU governance is contingent upon public opinion, which can vary across policy domains and constrains public choices limiting the room of manoeuvre of office-seeking politicians.

These alternative structures of preferences are referred to collective actors (i.e. governments, actors, and organised elites) and not to individuals. However, they configure three models of support for EU governance that can easily be applied to individuals<sup>20</sup>:

#### *Model 1 (liberal intergovernmentalism)*

- support for EU governance varies across policy domains: support is not a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains;
- support for EU governance is influenced by characteristics of the policy domains: is more likely in domains characterised by policy externalities generated by international interdependence;

#### *Model 2 (neo-functionalism):*

- support for EU governance is a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains;
- support is not contingent upon characteristics of the policy domains since EU governance is always more effective than national or sub-national governance;

#### *Model 3 (post-functionalism):*

- support for EU governance varies across policy domains: support is not a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains;
- support for EU governance is contingent upon:

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<sup>20</sup> It follows that I assume each EU citizen has a set of (negative, neutral, or positive) preferences for EU governance.

- the characteristics of the policy domains given their different association with identity issues;
- the politicisation of the EU issue within national politics.

It follows that these three models can be compared with empirical findings to assess the structure of citizens support for EU governance. This is important because this form of EU support is an indicator of the degree of *Europeanization* (see Radaelli 2003) of citizen policy preferences. Since the ‘Single European Act’ (1986), the EU has acquired policy competences - formerly held by national states - that exceed economic regulations (see Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 2005; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012), and this process has moved the European integration towards a political union. Yet, the more the EU moves away from being “an international regime for policy co-ordination” (Moravcsik 1993: 480) to become a political union, the more issues of political legitimacy (see Chapter 2) and democratic representation (see Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008) enters the debate.

Moreover, post-functional accounts (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Börzel and Risse 2017) emphasise that the current era of European integration is characterised by the so-called *constraining dissensus* regarding the European project. The legitimacy of the EU is questioned by Eurosceptic parties that mobilize citizens who are worried about globalization and *Europeanization* processes (Kriesi et al. 2012), and the effect of these Eurosceptic claims is that European integration has become a matter of mass-politics, a result of politicisation of the EU issue (Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Vries 2010; Hooghe et al. 2017). In some cases, Eurosceptic parties endorse a complete withdrawal from the EU, while in others they campaign for a different form of integration, characterised by a downturn of supranational governance (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b)<sup>21</sup>.

To conclude, this dissertation studies citizen support for EU governance, but it does so with clear in mind that the concept of EU support is more complex than what presented in this chapter: it is composed of more dimensions - this work identifies four dimensions of EU support - and the one tapping citizen preferences for a EU level governance is only one of them. This issue is introduced and debated in the next chapter.

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<sup>21</sup> In the proceeding of this dissertation (Chapter 5), the influence of this politicisation on mass EU support is tested.

## CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUALISING EU SUPPORT

This chapter addresses the concept of support towards the European Union (EU support). In the Introduction is reported that the main goal of this dissertation is to study the *Europeanization* of citizen policy preferences - defined as a process that has altered the citizen support for a generic and/or specific EU governance. However, being in favour of EU policy governance is not the only form of political support that can be related to the EU. In fact, the concept of EU support can be better defined and understood when decomposed in its constitutive dimensions. It follows that this chapter surveys the literature on political legitimacy and system support to define theory as well as empirically grounded dimensions of EU support. Four dimensions are defined in Section 1: one related to the outputs of the EU system, called ‘Output legitimacy’, that indicates the perceived benefit of being a EU citizen; one that taps the legitimacy of EU governance and the scope of EU policy integration, labelled ‘EU governance legitimacy’; one that defines the strength of individual identification with the European political community<sup>22</sup>, named ‘European identification’; and the last one that corresponds to an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called ‘EU democracy’.

Decomposing the concept of EU support in more defined dimensions is important since this has two implications: first, it allows differentiating among different forms of EU support that correspond to different ways of supporting the EU; and second, these different forms of EU support can indicate distinct pathways for the future development of the EU, since they show the perceived weak points of the current European integration. Section 2 defines the indicators of these four dimensions of EU support, drawing from the two data sources used in this dissertation: Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2017) and Intune project data (Cotta et al. 2009). Section 3 makes use of the available indicators included in Eurobarometer trend data<sup>23</sup> to provide a longitudinal analysis of the long-term evolution of the four different forms of EU support. Using as proxies a limited set of indicators, it emerges a decline across time of two forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as a matter of utility) and ‘EU democracy’ (support as political representation at the EU level). Whereas, the proxy variables for the dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (support as a preference for EU policy governance) and ‘European identification’ (support as we-feeling) show, instead, greater stability across time. Yet, support for EU governance deeply varies across policy domains. In addition, for all the four dimensions of EU support, there is a remarkable cross-country variability.

This chapter adopts a longitudinal perspective on the study of EU support, and it should be read in combination with the next chapter, where the empirical consistency of the four dimensions of EU support is tested. These two chapters together form the analytical toolkit used to study the concept of EU support.

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<sup>22</sup> See note 7 at page 4.

<sup>23</sup> See note 12 at page 6.

## 1. What the literature says

The concept of EU support is strongly related to that of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is a central concept in the debate about EU institutional structure and democratic process. On the one side, in the dispute between intergovernmental and supranational mode of governance, the issue of legitimacy is a normative debate about the power of technocratic bodies (EU Commission, ECB, and Court of Justice) over political institutions (the Council and the EP), and this also involves how citizens are represented via national governments and members of the European Parliament (MEP). Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) maintain that this normative debate taps what they label *objective legitimacy*: normative standards are elaborated, and once they are met, a political system is legitimate. On the other side, some approaches study the EU *subjective legitimacy*, that is the citizens' belief that "it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime [... because] he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere." (Easton 1965: 278). It is here that the concept of political support and that of political legitimacy overlaps. In the literature, there are two main conceptual frameworks of support and legitimacy for a political system: the Eastonian political system support, and Scharpf's input-output legitimacy model (1999).

It is hard to find a concept in the field of political science more employed than the Eastonian diffuse-specific support. From its seminal definition in 1965, it has been used for fifty years with several different operationalisations and refinements (e.g. Niedermayer and Westle 1995; Dalton 1999; Norris 1999; Westle and Segatti 2016), and it is still the starting point for theorizing about system support. Following Easton (1975: 436) support is either a positive or negative attitude towards one of three political objects that compose any political system: (a) *political community*, (b) *regime*, and (c) *authorities*. Westle and Segatti (2016), adapting this framework to their study, define (a) *political community* as the citizens belonging to the same political entity and living together on a territory. Institutions within a political community constitute the political (b) *regime*, besides norms, values, rules and system of government. The third object of support defined by Easton is that of (c) *political authorities*, which encompasses both the power of authorities as defined by law and its use made by political incumbents.

Political support is thus based on evaluations of the object, and, depending on how this process of assessment is conducted, two alternative modes of support are defined: *specific*, and *diffuse* support. Easton states that people distinguish between the object itself and how it is working in that moment, by the fact that it is embodied or ruled by a specific group of people in a certain period. He talks about specific support when the focus is about what an object is doing and producing, and of diffuse support, in case the focus is on what the object is or represents (Easton 1965, 1975). Quoting Easton, diffuse support is a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate

outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1975: 444). Diffuse support is assumed to be independent of outputs and performances, at least in the short run (ibidem). Diffuse support is an underlying disposition, rather than an opinion on a specific policy outcome, and it is directed to regime and community, as well as political authorities. Conversely, Easton claims that specific support applies only to the political authorities, whose decisions are evaluated on the outcomes they produced.

If specific support may be easily understood as the perceived rewards of short-term outputs (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011), diffuse support encompasses at least three sources of support: (a) *Trust*, (b) *Legitimacy*, and (c) *Identification*. Easton (1975) defines (a) *Trust* as a positive support for regime’s goals, rules and structure (in terms of arrangements of authority roles). It is a generalised evaluation of the performance of a regime in providing outcomes that are effective in pursuing regime’s goals (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011). *Trust* is mainly associated with the action of the authorities since *Trust* implies a deep confidence that the interests of the political community “would be attended to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny.” (Easton 1975: 447) The central point in the Eastonian framework is that *Trust* is an element of the system, not a property attached to any specific incumbent of an authority role. If the latter is the case, this support takes the form of a specific support for the performance of the incumbent.

The second source of system support is (b) (subjective) *Legitimacy*, already introduced, as a deep-rooted acceptance of the norms, procedures, and values of a regime, as well as of authoritative decisions of incumbents of political roles. As for political community, *Legitimacy* reflects agreement with the criteria for inclusion (and exclusion) in a polity (Easton 1975). As studies on social identity have undoubtedly demonstrated (see Huddy 2001 for a review), boundaries are necessary to start the process of (c) *Identification* in a political community, which is the last source of diffuse support described by Easton (1975). He deploys a broad definition of *Identification*, as a ‘sense of community’ and ‘we feeling’, both in terms of affective feelings and cognitive elements. An alternative version of this framework is the one proposed more than forty years ago by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), who suggest talking about utilitarian and affective support, rather than specific and diffuse support, where utilitarian support is based on a cost-benefit analysis, and affective support represents an emotional response.

Various scholars (e.g. Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b) that studies the legitimacy of the European Union make use of another conceptualisation introduced initially by Fritz Scharpf (1999). He conceptualises two types of system legitimacy: the first one is based on the outputs produced by the EU decision-making process, and the second one on the input side, namely citizens’ participation via elections, identification with the polity, and support for norms and values that sustain the institutional system. The lack of a truly European demos grounded on a common (European)

identity has been one of the main complications for complying with the normative requirement of input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) besides institutional mechanism for translating citizens' demands in policy outcome via representative actors (Hix 2008). The latter has been labelled the 'democratic deficit' and addressed recently with more politicisation of European elections and an increase in the power of European Parliament, whereas the former is still in need of successful strategies to cope with it. Recently, Schmidt (2013) integrated the model of input-output legitimacy including the so-called 'Throughput' legitimacy, where she states that EU democratic process must respect some criteria of efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness to be considered fully legitimate (Schmidt 2013). Her concept is similar to what Easton (1975) calls *Trust* in the system, and Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) call *Effectiveness*, although Schmidt's account is normative (objective-legitimacy) while the others refer to citizen perceptions (subjective-legitimacy, in Fuchs and Klingemann (2011) terms).

From these broad theorizations, an important number of studies address their empirical validity. Among them, Norris (1999) suggests considering the Eastonian diffuse-specific dichotomy as two poles of a continuum, where different dimensions of support can take place. Starting from the diffuse pole, she places (i) identification with and attachment towards the political community; (ii) support for principles of the EU regime; (iii) satisfaction with the policy process; (iv) confidence in regime institutions; and (v) support for political authorities. Fuchs and Klingemann (2011), and Dalton (2004) apply very similar conceptualisations, supported by empirical findings. Boomgarden and his colleagues (Boomgarden et al. 2011), analysing Dutch citizens, propose to distinguish between 'affection towards the EU' from 'identification with the European polity' and to consider also a political dimension of support, that taps preference for Europeanizing policy decisions. They find the latter to be a distinct dimension from that of 'general affection', contrary to what Gabel (1998a) sustains in his influential study. Similarly, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) - working with Eurobarometer data - demonstrated that instrumental assessments of EU membership and preferences for policy Europeanization are two distinct dimensions of support.

Finally, the Intune series on elite and mass EU support (Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b; Best et al. 2012) uses a dimensional definition of EU attitudes drawn from Benhabib's concept of 'citizenship' (Benhabib 2002). The authors define three dimensions of European citizenship: (1) Identity - the sense of belongingness towards Europe; (2) Representation - the extent to which the EU represents citizens' preferences; (3) Scope of governance - the degree of support for a EU level policy governance of strategic policy domains.

To clarify this, all these studies stress that support towards the EU is multidimensional, and it is misleading to concentrate on only one of them. Second, although there is no common framework of analysis, a minimal conceptualisation can be derived from these studies. This minimal definition

requires at least four dimensions: one related to the outputs of the EU system, labelled ‘Output legitimacy’; one concerning the scope of a European policy governance, labelled ‘EU governance legitimacy’; one regarding identification with the European political community, named ‘European identification’; and the last one that taps an evaluation of the EU democratic process, called ‘EU democracy’.

Table 1 - Dimensions of EU support

<b>Author</b> <b>Dim.</b>	<b>Easton</b>	<b>Scharpf</b>	<b>Norris</b>	<b>Boomgarden et all.</b>	<b>Lubbers &amp; Scheepers</b>	<b>Intune series</b>
<b>Output legitimacy</b>	Specific support/Trust	Output legitimacy	-	Utilitarianism and idealism	Instrumental Euroscepticism	Representation
<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	Legitimacy	Input legitimacy	-	Strengthening	Political Euroscepticism	Scope of governance
<b>European identification</b>	Political community	Input legitimacy	Political community	Identity	-	Identity
<b>EU democracy</b>	Trust	Output legitimacy	Regime processes	Performance	-	Representation

These four dimensions compose the concept of EU support but they should be considered independently since - in theory - each dimension is autonomous: in order to support the EU it is not necessary holding positive feelings/attitudes on every dimension, but at least on one of them. The relation among these dimensions and the concept of EU support is a family resemblance structure (Goertz 2005), where the logical “OR” defines the model. Hence, a formal modelling of this relation is the following:

*EU support = Output legitimacy or EU governance legitimacy or European identification or EU democracy.*  
However, whether these four dimensions exist in citizen minds and whether they are really distinguished is a matter of empirical analysis, and not of theory.

Finally, before proceeding with the operationalisation of these dimensions, it must be noted that this thesis uses a definition of the concept of ‘European identification’ that corresponds with the second of the three possible conceptualisations of political identity provided by Citrin and Sides 2004 (see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): they maintain that political identity can be defined and measured 1) as the self-categorization as group member (a cognitive element), 2) as the strength of the attachment towards the group (an affective element), and 3) in terms of the meanings associated with group membership (a normative element). In this dissertation, the first and the third conceptualisations of political identity are considered, instead, as determinants of the strength of ‘European identification’, and their effects will be assessed in chapters 4 and 6.

## 2. Defining indicators of the four dimensions of EU support

The previous section concluded with a conceptual definition of EU support. This concept is unpacked in four theoretical dimensions that correspond to different forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as benefit), ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy governance), ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation).

The current section reports the strategy used for measuring these four dimensions, defining specific indicators of these dimensions among those available in the datasets used in this work. The thesis makes use of three sources of data to analyse citizen EU support: individual-level survey data from the Intune 2009 project (Cotta et al. 2009) and from the Eurobarometer 86.2 (November 2016) (European Commission 2017), and time-series aggregate country-level data from the Eurobarometer website<sup>24</sup> that pool together Eurobarometer survey data since early ’70 (Eurobarometer 86.2 is one of those surveys).

However, most of the analyses in this dissertation are based on Intune 2009 data. This depends on the fact that many indicators, necessary to measure the four dimensions of EU support, are not available on Eurobarometer data, as it is evident looking at Table 2. This table displays the difference between the Intune and the Eurobarometer data (time-series and Eurobarometer 86.2 data) concerning the available indicators of the four dimensions.

Table 2 - Operationalisation of EU support: Intune 2009 and Eurobarometer data

Concept	Indicator	Intune 2009	Eurobarometer data
<i>Output legitimacy</i>	Overall EU membership evaluation	x	x
	National benefit from EU membership	x	-
	Personal benefit from EU membership	x	-
<i>EU governance legitimacy</i>	Unemployment policy	x	-
	Environmental policy	x	-
	Fighting crime policy	x	-
	Health care policy	x	-
	Agricultural policy	x	-
	Unified tax system policy	x	-
	Immigration policy	x	x
<i>European identification</i>	Attachment towards Europe	x	x
	Cognitive identification: psychological centrality	x	-
	Cognitive identification: interdependence	x	-
<i>EU democracy</i>	Satisfaction with EU democracy	x	x
	Trust in the EU Commission	x	x
	Trust in the EU Parliament	x	x
	Trust in EU policy-makers	x	-

<sup>24</sup> See note 11-12 at page 6.

‘Output legitimacy’ is a dimension that taps a cost-benefit analysis. With the Intune data, it is measured with three indicators: ‘Overall evaluation of country EU membership’, ‘Perceived national benefit derived from country EU membership’, and ‘Perceived personal benefit derived from country EU membership’<sup>25</sup>. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer data consistently measures only the first of these indicators across time, limiting the degree of comparability.

‘EU governance legitimacy’ refers to the preference for a European policy governance. In the Intune dataset, there are eight indicators of this dimension, since each of them measures the respondents’ support for EU governance of a specific policy domain: ‘Unemployment’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, ‘Health care’, ‘Agricultural’, ‘Tax’, ‘Immigration’, and ‘Foreign’ policies. However, Eurobarometer data provide only comparable measurements of support for EU governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies.

As for the dimension of ‘European identification’ (support as a we-feeling) three indicators of this dimension are defined: ‘Degree of attachment towards Europe’, ‘Cognitive identification in terms of psychological centrality of being European’, and ‘Cognitive identification as perception of interdependence among Europeans’. All of them are included in the Intune data, while Eurobarometer data measure only the first one.

The last dimension is ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation), and it is measured with four indicators: ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’, ‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in the EU Commission’, and ‘Trust in the EU policy-makers’. However, Eurobarometer data do not include a measure of the last indicator.

It is clear that the Intune dataset offers more choice and it allows a more ‘precise’ measurement. Eurobarometer data are used in Section 3 to assess the long-term variability of some indicators of EU support, albeit with some limitations due to the limited number of variables. In fact, it must be noted that EU support is a rather complex concept, and its measurement should be carefully operated. With more indicators per dimension, it is possible to reduce the impact of measurement errors, and the choice of this dissertation is to measure the four dimensions of EU support as latent dimensions, as carried out in the next chapter using the Intune 2009 data.

### **3. Aggregate level analysis (Eurobarometer trend data)**

The Eurobarometer trend series is a reliable source of survey data on EU citizen attitudes. These data cover the last forty years and provide individual as well as aggregate level data. This section relies on aggregate country-level data from 2002 onwards to analyse long-term tendencies in EU support across European countries. The last time-point of this Eurobarometer series is November 2016 with the survey EB 86.2 (European Commission 2017), and all the variables of interest included in that

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<sup>25</sup> The wording of these survey questions is reported in Table 7 in Appendix B.

survey are also available for time span 2002-2003/2016 (see Table 2 at page 27). The following analyses make use of these variables as proxies to study the variability of the four dimensions of EU support across time. In detail, these variables are: ‘Overall EU membership evaluation’ (for ‘Output legitimacy’); support for ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies (for ‘EU governance legitimacy’); ‘Attachment towards Europe’ (for ‘European identification’); ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’, ‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in the EU Commission’ (for ‘EU democracy’). In addition, there are some indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ such as ‘Unemployment’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, ‘Health care’, and ‘Agricultural’ policies that are available in the Eurobarometer trend series, but their time-series data end in 2010-2011. Hence, for these indicators, the time span is 2002/2010-2011.

This longitudinal analysis shows the presence of an important cross-country variability in the levels of EU support (considering any of the four dimensions). Moreover, it shows a decline through time of two forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as a matter of utility) and ‘EU democracy’ (support as political representation at the EU level). Whereas the proxy variables for the dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (support as a preference for EU policy governance) and ‘European identification’ (support as we-feeling) show, instead, greater stability.

### **3.1 Output legitimacy**

At first, the European Union is a matter of benefit. The European project has been established to make European countries steadily recover from the ruins of the second world war. National states decided to agree on a common production of mineral resources, and gradually chose to integrate their separate national markets, and European integration has helped to preserve a peaceful relationship among national states. This peaceful relationship implies that EU country members are satisfied enough by the way European institutions manage common issues.

According to Scharpf (1999), the legitimacy of the European Union resides mostly in its capacity to provide satisfying outcomes for its citizens. This is precisely what the concept-dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’ represents. As a proxy, in the Eurobarometer trend data there is one question on the perceived benefit of being an EU member. The wording of this question had remained stable until 2012 when it was changed. The original formulation (2002-2011) is:

*Q1: Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the EU is ...*

*Answers: A good thing, A bad thing, or Neither good nor bad.*


From 2012 onwards, this question was revised and turned into a Likert-like scale, where respondents state their accordancy with the proposed sentence:

*Q2: Please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU*

*Answers: Totally Agree, Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, or Totally disagree.*

To compare results coming from the two versions, a European aggregate net index per year is computed, subtracting the yearly average of anti-EU answers (Q1: ‘Bad thing’, or Q2: ‘Totally Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’) to that of pro-EU answers (Q1: ‘Good thing’, or Q2: ‘Totally disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’). The net index ranks from -1 (minimum output satisfaction) to +1 (maximum output satisfaction). Figure 1 reports this European aggregate net index with the dashed line. Afterwards, country-level net indexes per year (same scale [-1,+1]) are calculated and plotted as black points.

Figure 1 - Overall EU membership evaluation (good vs bad difference): source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing.



Looking at the European average, it reaches its maximum in 2007, and steadily decreases through the crisis period, reaching its lowest values in 2013 and 2016. The big ‘X’ in 2009 data indicates the average net index for those fifteen countries<sup>26</sup> that were surveyed in 2009 by the Intune research (Cotta et al. 2009). In this case, the net index is about 15 percentage points higher. Considering the black dots, which are the yearly country averages of each of the 28 EU member states, it is evident that there is an important variation in the country net index. The range of variation does not seem to change across time, and the difference between the minimum and the maximum value within every year is always the same (about 0.7). Table 3 reports the average net index for each country in four

<sup>26</sup> See note 11 at page 6.

time-period (2002-2005; 2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2017). It emerges that the decline of EU support across time is more evident in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, and Slovenia. Even though there is a decrease of support also in the other countries, here the magnitude is greater. Moreover, although there is a variation across time, the countries in which EU support in 2002-2005 was higher (for instance Belgium and Germany) tend to maintain greater EU support, and vice-versa.

Table 3 - Overall Evaluation of EU Membership. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>2002-2005</b>	<b>2006-2009</b>	<b>2010-2013</b>	<b>2014-2017</b>
<i>Austria</i>	+	=	=	=
<i>Belgium</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Bulgaria</i>		++	++	+
<i>Croatia</i>			=	=
<i>Cyprus</i>	++	+	=	-
<i>Czech Republic</i>	++	++	=	=
<i>Denmark</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Estonia</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Finland</i>	+	+	+	++
<i>France</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Germany</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Greece</i>	++	++	+	+
<i>Hungary</i>	++	+	+	+
<i>Ireland</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Italy</i>	++	++	+	=
<i>Latvia</i>	+	+	+	+
<i>Lithuania</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Luxembourg</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Malta</i>	+	++	++	++
<i>Netherlands</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Poland</i>	++	++	+	+
<i>Portugal</i>	++	++	+	+
<i>Romania</i>		++	++	+
<i>Slovakia</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Slovenia</i>	++	++	+	-
<i>Spain</i>	++	++	++	++
<i>Sweden</i>	=	++	+	++
<i>United Kingdom</i>	=	=	-	-

LEGEND: "++" indicates net index  $\geq 0.3$ ; "+" indicates  $\geq 0.15$ ; "=" indicates = 0; "-" indicates  $< 0$ ;

Therefore, from these figures, it is evident that the perceived ‘Output legitimacy’ of the EU highly vary from country to country, and that the succeeding European crises have decreased this form of

EU support if compared to the pre-crisis peak in 2007, where no EU countries had a negative net index values<sup>27</sup>.

### 3.2 EU governance legitimacy

‘EU governance legitimacy’ is the counter side of ‘Output legitimacy’, since it taps the legitimacy of the power structure of the EU, which Scharpf calls Input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). The more the EU moves towards a political union, the more it acquires policy prerogatives formerly held by national states (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). It is a process that proceeds through waves of competence transfers, which coincide with the signing of new treaties.

Currently, the EU has variegated policy competences. In some policy sectors, the EU has strong and exclusive powers (i.e. in monetary policy within Eurozone), while in others it has shared competencies with EU member states (i.e. agricultural policy), and only supporting competences in some areas (i.e. health protection). Hence, from an institutional perspective, the EU policy prerogatives are not equal across policy areas, but also citizen support for EU governance varies as well across sectors.

In the Eurobarometer trend data, there are many questions on support for EU governance of specific policy sectors. Unfortunately, only for two policy sectors there are comparable data until 2016: these are ‘Immigration’, and ‘Foreign’ policies. Whereas, for ‘Agricultural’, ‘Fighting crime’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Health care’, and ‘Unemployment’ policies there are only data until 2010-2011, and they will be commented taking into account this limitation.

For ‘Immigration’ policy, the question wording had remained stable from 2006 until 2011, and in 2014 it was changed. In addition, between 2011 and 2014, as well as for the year 2009, there are no data. The original formulation (2006-2011) was:

*Q1: For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? Immigration policy.*

*Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.*

From 2014 onwards, this question was revised and respondents are requested to state their accordance with the proposed sentence:

*Q2: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: ‘A common European policy on migration’*

*Answers: For, or Against.*

To partially fill the gap between missing years, Intune data on fifteen EU countries are used to measure 2009 support. The question wording is similar, but not exactly the same:

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<sup>27</sup> This means that before 2009 in every EU country there were more satisfied than unsatisfied people.

*Q26: In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union.*

*In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas?*


- *Immigration policy.*

*Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.*

To compare data, the answering options ‘Jointly with the EU’, ‘For (a common European policy on migration)’ and ‘European level’ are considered as a preference for EU governance. Figure 2 shows that most of the Europeans support EU integration of this policy sector (dashed line). The average support for a European governance of immigration has increased through time, from barely 60% of supporters in 2006 to more than 70% in 2016. The average support in the Intune 2009 dataset (fifteen EU countries) is about 10 percentage points smaller (big ‘X’ in 2009) than the yearly average in 2008 and 2010, most likely due to different answering options proposed to respondents: in the Intune data a preference for EU governance means favouring an exclusive EU policy competence, while in EB data the pro-integration option is ‘Jointly with the EU’ – which does not mean exclusive EU competence in that policy sector.

Moreover, at each time point, there is an important cross-country variation (Figure 2 black points), since the range of variation between the most and the least supportive country is constantly about 50-60 percentage points (except in 2014 when it is 30 points).

Figure 2 Support for EU governance of Immigration policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing.



The second policy domain with comparable data is ‘Foreign’ policy. In this case, the question wording has remained stable during years, and respondents are asked to state their agreement with this proposed sentence:

*Q1: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: ‘A common foreign policy of all Member States of the EU’*  
*Answers: For, or Against.*

As for ‘Immigration’ policy, to partially fill the lack of information for the year 2009, the Intune data are used:


*Q27 Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following?*

- *A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries.*

*Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, Somewhat against, or Strongly against.*

Even in this case, support is rather high in most of the EU countries (Figure 3). The European average (dashed line) is between 70% and 80% in the time-period 2003-2016. The peak is in 2007, but after the upsurge of the economic and Eurozone crises it has continued to be higher than 70%. In 2009 the fifteen-country average is 74%. Yet, in all the time span the yearly variation across countries is remarkable (black dots), and the range of variation is about 40-50 percentage points.

Figure 3 Support for EU governance of Foreign policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing



Overall, most of the European respondents are in favour of more EU governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies. As for within-country variation, Table 4 summarises country trajectories across time for these two policy domains. To increase readability, data are aggregated in four time-period (2002-2005; 2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2016) and for each country is reported with the sign ‘+’ when the country average support is greater than the European mean, and with the sign ‘-’ when it is smaller.

Table 4 - Support for Eu governance. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>POLICY DOMAIN</b>	<b>2003-2005</b>	<b>2006-2009</b>	<b>2010-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
<i>Austria</i>	Immigration		-	-	-
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Belgium</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Bulgaria</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Croatia</i>	Immigration		+		-
	Foreign policy	+	+	-	+
<i>Cyprus</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Czech Republic</i>	Immigration		+	-	-
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Denmark</i>	Immigration		-	-	-
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Estonia</i>	Immigration		-	-	-
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Finland</i>	Immigration		-	-	-
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>France</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Germany</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Greece</i>	Immigration		-	-	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Hungary</i>	Immigration		+	+	-
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	-
<i>Ireland</i>	Immigration		-	-	+
	Foreign policy	-	-	+	+
<i>Italy</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Latvia</i>	Immigration		+	+	-
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Lithuania</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Luxembourg</i>	Immigration		-	-	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Malta</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Netherlands</i>	Immigration		+	-	+
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>Poland</i>	Immigration		+	+	-
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Portugal</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	-	+
<i>Romania</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Slovakia</i>	Immigration		+	+	-
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Slovenia</i>	Immigration		+	+	=
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Spain</i>	Immigration		+	+	+
	Foreign policy	+	+	+	+
<i>Sweden</i>	Immigration		-	-	+
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-
<i>UK</i>	Immigration		-	-	-
	Foreign policy	-	-	-	-

LEGEND: "+" indicates percentage of support greater than European mean; "-" indicates percentage of support lower than European mean; "=" indicates percentage of support equals the European mean.

Overall, for both policy domains, those countries that were the most (or the least) supportive at the beginning of the surveyed period maintain their higher (or lower) level of support compared to the European mean. Some exceptions emerge for ‘Immigration’ policy. Eastern European countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland) were among the highest supporters of common immigration policy in 2006-2009, but they have not increased their support with the same extent as the others did. For this reason, in the period 2014-2016 their support for EU immigration policy is lower than the European mean. On the other side, Greece, Luxemburg, and Sweden reach the group of the most supportive countries.

A brief analysis of the other policy domains for which data coverage end in 2010/2011<sup>28</sup> (‘Agricultural’, ‘Fighting Crime’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Health Care’, and ‘Unemployment’ policies) shows specific results. A common EU governance of ‘Environmental’ (Figure 4), ‘Fighting Crime’ (Figure 5), and ‘Agricultural’ policies (Figure 6) tend to be consistently supported by most of the respondents across time, although for ‘Fighting Crime’ and ‘Agricultural’ policies respondents are almost equally divided into supporters and rejecters of EU governance. In addition, as soon as the survey question is about supporting exclusive EU prerogatives (cf. Intune 2009<sup>29</sup>), the percentage of supporters drops down below 50%. This means that for EU citizens sharing policy competencies is not the same as transferring policy prerogatives.

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<sup>28</sup> The question wording is the same as the one for Immigration policy, since it is drawn from the item battery. EB trend data cover the period (2003-2008, and the year 2010), and Intune data the year 2009.

<sup>29</sup> See previous note.

Figure 4 Support for EU governance of Environmental policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing




Figure 5 Support for EU governance of Fighting Crime policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing





Figure 6 Support for EU governance of Agricultural policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing



Furthermore, support for EU social policies like ‘Health Care’ (Figure 7), and ‘Unemployment’ policies (Figure 8) is far lower than in the other policy domains, since the majority tends to reject any shared or exclusive (in 2009) EU governance. This dissertation will return to this issue in Chapter 5, where the influence of policy-specific characteristics on support for their EU governance is addressed.

Figure 7 Support for EU governance of Health care policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing





Figure 8 Support for EU governance of Unemployment policy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing



From the analyses provided above, it emerges that support for EU policy governance does not vary intensely through time (except for ‘Immigration’ policy), but there is an important variation across countries and policies. When considering policy sectors like ‘Health care’, and ‘Unemployment’ policies European respondents are much less keen to legitimate EU governance, while the contrary is true for ‘Immigration’, ‘Foreign’, ‘Environmental’, ‘Fighting crime’, and ‘Agricultural’ policies. Finally, Europeans seem to prefer a joint-decision method rather than an exclusive EU governance. This shows that an intergovernmental system of EU governance is still preferred by European respondents over a supranational governance.

### ***3.3 European identification***

The third dimension of EU support involves the identity issue. The EU is a political system that, like any other, ultimately draws its legitimacy from citizen support. Earlier in the text, *Input* and *Output* legitimacy are argued to be the two pillars of EU public legitimacy. According to Scharpf (1999), to fulfil the normative requirement of Input legitimacy, Europeans should identify with the European community (see Section 1). Indeed, identification is a leading source of EU support: identity exerts its power driving a type of legitimacy that is (in the short term) detached from outputs (Easton 1965, 1975).

In the Eurobarometer trend data, there is only one indicator of the extent of identification with the European community<sup>30</sup>. This is the product of the following question (the same wording is used in the Intune survey):

*Q1 People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe*

*Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached*

On average, from 2003 onwards, more than 55% of the European citizens declare that they are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ attached to Europe (Figure 9). The average European value is highly stable, and no evident trends emerge since the percentage in 2016 is nearly the same as in 2003. However, substantial cross-country differences are still present.

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<sup>30</sup> See note 7 at page 4.

Figure 9 Attachment towards Europe: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing. Percentages as sum of 'very' and 'fairly' attached to Europe.




Table 5 shows the average percentage of respondents 'very' or 'fairly' attached to Europe in two time-periods (2003-2009 and 2014-2016). The table is ordered from the highest to the smallest percentage in 2014-2016. It is evident that from the first to the second period there is some variability, but only for Italy one may speak about a dramatic decrease in the attachment. Indeed, less than 50% of Italian respondents report a strong level of attachment to Europe, almost reaching the level of Greeks. This indicates an emotional distance from the European community, and I suppose this result is influenced by the European crises (Eurozone and refugee crises), that profoundly affected Italian (and Greek) society in that period of time.

Table 5 - Attachment towards Europe. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>2003-2009</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
<i>Luxembourg</i>	79%	81%
<i>Sweden</i>	76%	76%
<i>Denmark</i>	73%	74%
<i>Hungary</i>	87%	72%
<i>Poland</i>	81%	68%
<i>Finland</i>	69%	68%
<i>Germany</i>	68%	67%
<i>Latvia</i>	53%	67%
<i>Malta</i>	60%	67%
<i>Romania</i>	81%	62%
<i>Slovakia</i>	65%	61%
<i>Belgium</i>	69%	61%
<i>France</i>	61%	60%
<i>Netherlands</i>	50%	59%
<i>Spain</i>	62%	57%
<i>Austria</i>	64%	56%
<i>Czech Republic</i>	74%	56%
<i>Ireland</i>	65%	56%
<i>Lithuania</i>	43%	55%
<i>Bulgaria</i>	70%	54%
<i>Estonia</i>	46%	52%
<i>Slovenia</i>	69%	52%
<i>Croatia</i>	58%	51%
<i>Portugal</i>	60%	51%
<i>United Kingdom</i>	47%	51%
<i>Italy</i>	73%	46%
<i>Greece</i>	47%	38%
<i>Cyprus</i>	31%	31%


LEGEND: Percentage of 'very' and 'fairly' attached. Sorted in descending order by 2014-2016 values.

The definition of 'European identification' employed in this dissertation coincides with the strength of the attachment towards the European political community (see page 26). However, Eurobarometer data allow studying the long-term evolution of the percentage of those with 'exclusive national identification'. Later in the dissertation, this self-categorisation as exclusive national (see Citrin and Sides 2004) is considered as a determinant of the extent of 'we-feeling' with other group members. To allow comparing the results coming from the two conceptualisations of 'European identification', Figure 10 below provides the percentages of those with 'exclusive national identification' in the period 2002/2016. As a methodological note, the question wording is the same both in Eurobarometer surveys and in the Intune survey, and 2009 data – missing in Eurobarometer trend data – are filled with the Intune data:

*Q2 In the near future, do you see yourself as...*

Answers: (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY), European only.

Figure 10 Exclusive national identification: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing. Percentage of only national identification.



In line with the findings of Börzel and Risse (2017), holders of exclusive identities have not increased through time, and, on average, about 40% of European respondents consider themselves ‘exclusive’ nationals. However, these percentages deeply vary across countries, from the highest percentage of the UK to the lowest percentage of Luxembourg.

### 3.4 EU democracy

The concluding of this section presents indicators of attitudes towards the current European democracy. This dimension is theoretically distinguished from the others because it involves what Schmidt (2013) calls ‘Throughput’ legitimacy and Easton (1975) names ‘Trust’ in the political system. In the Eurobarometer data, three indicators tap this dimension: ‘Satisfaction with European democracy’, ‘Trust in the European Parliament’, and ‘Trust in the European Commission’:

*Q1 On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?*

*Answers: Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, or Not at all satisfied.*

*Q2 Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?*

- *The European Parliament*

Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust.

Q3 Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?

- The European Commission

Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust.

These questions have remained the same through time, but there are no data for ‘Satisfaction with the EU democracy’ in 2008 and 2009. As usual for the year 2009, this gap is filled with Intune data. The question wording and answering options are similar to those of Eurobarometer:


Q25 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?

Are you...?

Answers: Very satisfied, Somewhat satisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, or Very dissatisfied.

Looking at Figure 11, the average percentage of Europeans that ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ endorse European democracy varies between 50 and 60 percent in the period 2002-2016, with higher values between 2005 and 2010. After 2010, this satisfaction has decreased by 10 percentage points, but - more important - is the fact that cross-country differences have increased.


Figure 11 Satisfaction with the European democracy: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing.



Moreover, when moving from a general assessment of EU democracy to a more specific evaluation of EU institutions, like the European Parliament (Figure 12) and the European Commission (Figure 13), it clearly emerges that citizen trust in the fundamental institutions of the European political

system has steadily decreased after the year 2007. Indeed, in 2007 about 65% of Europeans trust these institutions, while in 2016 these percentages drop down to approximately 45%. The two figures show that the deterioration of trust has stopped in 2014, but is still far from the pre-crisis value. The averages measured in 2009 by the Intune survey (big X in both figures) show good accordance with the Eurobarometer yearly mean<sup>31</sup>.

Figure 12 Trust in the EU Parliament: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing.



<sup>31</sup> Question wording is reported in Table 45a-b-c-d in Appendix B. In these figures, trusts from the Intune data are dichotomized as follows: answers 0-4 are considered as 0, answers 5-10 as 1.

Figure 13 Trust in the EU Commission: source Eurobarometer data and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009); Data rescaled without missing.




Table 6 reports the country trajectories across years for these three variables. As for the overall evaluation of EU membership (see section 3.1), data are aggregated in four time-periods (2002-2005; 2006-2009; 2010-2013; 2014-2016) and the sign '+' indicates that the average country support is greater than the European mean, and the sign '-' when it is smaller.

Table 6 - Indicators of EU democracy. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>VARIABLE</b>	<b>2003-2005</b>	<b>2006-2009</b>	<b>2010-2013</b>	<b>2014-2016</b>
<i><b>Austria</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	-
<i><b>Belgium</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<i><b>Bulgaria</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<i><b>Croatia</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	+
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	+
<i><b>Cyprus</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	-	-
<i><b>Czech Republic</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	-
<i><b>Denmark</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	+	+	+
<i><b>Estonia</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<i><b>Finland</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	+
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	+	+
<i><b>France</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	-
<i><b>Germany</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	-
<i><b>Greece</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	-	-	-
<i><b>Hungary</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<i><b>Ireland</b></i>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	-	+

<b>Italy</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	+	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	-	-
<b>Latvia</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	+
<b>Lithuania</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<b>Luxembourg</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<b>Malta</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<b>Netherlands</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	+	+
<b>Poland</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<b>Portugal</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	-	-
<b>Romania</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	+
<b>Slovakia</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	+	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	+	-
<b>Slovenia</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	-	-	-
<b>Spain</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	+	+	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	+	+	-	-
<b>Sweden</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	+	+
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	+	+
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Satisfaction EU democracy	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Commission	-	-	-	-
	Trust EU Parliament	-	-	-	-

LEGEND: "+" indicates a value greater than European mean; "-" indicates a value lower than European mean; "=" indicates a value equals European mean.

Most of the countries do not exhibit particular trends in their level of support. This means that they follow the general pattern of decrease shown in figures 11-12-13. However, some exceptions need to be commented. Most of the southern European countries (Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and also Slovenia decreased their satisfaction and trust in European institutions more than the other European countries. Indeed, before 2010 the levels of support were greater than the European mean, but after that year distrust and dissatisfaction started to increase. Finland and Sweden, instead, begin to register higher levels of support from 2010, reaching the group of most supportive countries.

### ***3.5 Drawing conclusions from longitudinal aggregate data***

Overall, this overview of the long-term evolution helps in understanding the broad context of this analysis, and some elements need to be commented. First, indicators of ‘Output legitimacy’, and ‘EU democracy’ decline through time much more than indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, and ‘European identification’. The reason for this difference depends on the fact the first two are much more linked to both the representation of political interest and the results provided by the European system of governance, two aspects profoundly affected by the European crises. Indeed, citizen expectation in time of crisis may not fit with political answers (Caiani and Guerra 2017). Second, there is an important cross-country variability. European countries exhibit different levels of EU support, and some countries show a steeper decrease in their support after the begin of the economic crisis in 2008-2009 (mostly southern and eastern European countries). Notably, the decline of a utility-based support (‘Output legitimacy’) is more prominent in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, and Slovenia, whereas a form of support grounded in political representation (‘EU democracy’) deeply decreases in southern European countries (Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). As already reported, attachment to Europe (‘European identification’) remains everywhere rather stable, except in Italy where it dramatically drops down after 2009. Lastly, support for EU governance is contingent upon what policy domains one considers. Indeed, European respondents report different ideas when it comes to supporting the EU integration of specific policy sectors. They favour EU governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies, and recent data show that support for EU governance of these policy domains was not negatively influenced by the economic and refugee crises. However, eastern European countries exhibit lower level of support for EU governance of ‘Immigration’ and ‘Foreign’ policies, even though the majority of their citizens still prefer the EU level governance in these fields.

Finally, although data coverage ends in 2010-2011, it emerges that European respondents are far less likely to support EU governance of social policies (‘Unemployment’ and ‘Health care’ policies), compared to other sectors like ‘Agriculture’, ‘Environment’, and ‘Fighting crime’. These results support the idea that the characteristics of the policy domain profoundly influence support for EU governance (see Chapter 5 for an empirical test of this hypothesis), suggesting that the first and the

third model of EU support introduced in Chapter 1 (see page 20) may well represent the structure of support.

This concludes the overview of the longitudinal data provided by the Eurobarometer surveys. In the next chapter, using the Intune 2009 data, the latent structure of individual attitudes towards the EU is measured, assessing whether theorized conceptual dimensions result in distinguished empirical dimensions that fit the theoretical framework and that are invariant across countries. This means testing whether the different components of the concepts are merely the product of a single latent preference for a EU level politics, or, instead, each dimension has its own consistency. Anticipating the results, analyses demonstrate that the four dimensions are invariant across European countries, meaning that European respondents distinguish the same different forms of EU support.

### CHAPTER 3 MEASURING FOUR LATENT DIMENSIONS OF EU SUPPORT

The previous chapter introduced the conceptualisation of the four dimensions of EU support, and it presented long-term tendencies of some indicators of these dimensions. However, an aggregate level analysis cannot tell whether this set of items tapping attitudes towards the EU does measure different dimensions of EU support. To do this is necessary to look at individual-level data. Indeed, up to here the dimensionality of the concept is only sustained by referring to earlier theoretical or empirical studies (see Chapter 2 Section 1).

This chapter, instead, analyses the structure of individual-level attitudes using latent variable modelling (see Bollen and Long 1993). This approach is helpful to measure complex concepts like that of EU support since latent modelling makes use of more indicators per dimension to reduce the impact of measurement errors, reaching a more ‘precise’ measurement of the multidimensional concept of EU support. Hence, two hypotheses are tested: 1) that the four dimension of EU support are empirically distinct; 2) that their measurement is invariant across countries. This second issue is important because the lack of measurement invariance does not allow comparability of measures across countries since the same dimension would be differently measured in each country.

To address these issues, Intune data referring to the year 2009 are used, and Table 7 reports the indicators - available in this dataset - that are employed to measure the dimensions of EU support.

Table 7 - Operationalisation of EU support 2009

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Intune 2009</b>
<i>Output legitimacy</i>	Overall EU membership evaluation	x
	National benefit from EU membership	x
	Personal benefit from EU membership	x
<i>EU governance legitimacy</i>	Unemployment policy	x
	Environmental policy	x
	Fighting crime policy	x
	Health care policy	x
	Agricultural policy	x
	Unified tax system policy	x
	Immigration policy	x
	Foreign policy	x
<i>European identification</i>	Attachment towards Europe	x
	Cognitive identification: psychological centrality	x
	Cognitive identification: interdependence	x
<i>EU democracy</i>	Satisfaction with EU democracy	x
	Trust in the EU Commission	x
	Trust in the EU Parliament	x
	Trust in EU policy-makers	x

Each indicator corresponds to one survey question, and some of them have already been presented in the previous chapter<sup>32</sup>. There are still a few indicators for which it has not been reported the relative survey question yet. They are, respectively, ‘National benefit from the EU membership’, ‘Personal benefit from EU membership’, ‘A unified tax system for the EU’, ‘Cognitive identification: psychological centrality’, ‘Cognitive identification: interdependence’, ‘Trust in the EU Commission’, ‘Trust in the EU Parliament’, and ‘Trust in EU policy-makers’. The wording of all these survey questions can be found in Table 45a-b-c-d in Appendix B, while Table 8 displays how the variables are measured and, if necessary, recoded from original values. The range of variation of each variable is ‘0-1’. Missing data are excluded from the analysis, except for ‘National’ and ‘Personal benefit from EU membership’, where the answer ‘Don’t know’ is considered as a neutral position between the two poles, mimicking in this way the measurement strategy - already in the original coding - for the ‘Overall EU membership evaluation’. Items regarding policy competences are dichotomized in two categories: ‘European’ vs ‘National or sub-national’ level<sup>33</sup>.

In order to empirically measure the components of EU support, I employ a strategy that consists of using, in sequence, two different statistical techniques to assess a theorized data latent structure: first Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA), and then Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA). Moreover, Appendix A reports two additional analyses performed with Item Response Theory (IRT), and Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA). These four techniques differ from each other in their assumption about the nature of the data to which they are applied, as well as for their statistical procedures, their outcomes, and their analytical purpose. Each of them has some pros that make it prefers to the other, but also some cons that limit their application (Table 40 in Appendix A summarises these features).

PCFA is the most used exploratory method for identifying dimensions that explain the associations among a set of variables. It is widely employed because its use is rather straightforward, its results are easy to be interpreted, and sociological literature provides acknowledged rules of thumb for assessing dimensionality and factor meaning. However, the simplicity of this technique contrasts with its limit. First, it considers every variable as a perfect indicator of these dimensions: it means that there is not an error term associated with each indicator. Second, PCFA is not a suitable method for testing confirmatory factor models (each variable measures all the dimensions), nor for assessing the invariance of a measurement model across groups. Third, it assumes that indicators and latent factor(s) are continuous, and biased outcomes may result when this assumption is not respected. To

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<sup>32</sup> They are ‘Overall EU membership evaluation’, ‘Unemployment policy’, ‘Environmental policy’, ‘Fighting crime policy’, ‘Health care policy’, ‘Agricultural policy’, ‘Immigration policy’, ‘Foreign policy’, ‘Attachment towards Europe’, and ‘Satisfaction with EU democracy’.

<sup>33</sup> Table 46a-b-c-d in Appendix B reports country averages for all the indicators.

overcome the first two issues (measuring proper latent dimensions, and testing a confirmatory model as well as assessing the measurement equivalence across countries, it is necessary to use MGCFA.

Table 8 - Descriptive statistics indicators of EU support. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>Output legitimacy</b>				
<u>Indicator-variable</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
Overall EU membership evaluation (Q7a)	0=Bad thing; .5=Neither good nor bad; 1=Good thing	.77 (.37)	14705	385
National benefit from EU membership (Q8a)	0=Has not benefited; .5=Neutral; 1=Has benefited;	.73 (.43)	15050	40
Personal benefit from EU membership (Q9a)	0=Have not benefited; .5=Neutral; 1=Have benefited;	.51 (.48)	15061	29
<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>				
<u>Indicator-variable</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
Unemployment (Q26a_1)	0=National or sub-national level; 1=European level	.27 (.44)	13974	1116
Immigration policy (Q26a_2)		.47 (.5)	13922	1168
Environmental policy (Q26a_3)		.48 (.5)	13803	1287
Fight against crime (Q26a_4)		0.41 (.49)	13797	1293
Health care policy (Q26a_5)		0.2 (.4)	14174	916
Agricultural policy (Q26a_6)		0.3 (.46)	13973	1117
A unified tax system for the EU (Q27_1)	0=Strongly+Somewhat against; 1=Strongly+Somewhat in favour	0.61 (.49)	13582	1508
Common foreign policy (Q27_3)	0=Strongly+Somewhat against; 1=Strongly+Somewhat in favour	0.77 (.42)	13683	1407
<b>European identification</b>				
<u>Indicator-variable</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
Attachment towards Europe (Q11_4)	0=Not at all; .33= Not very; .66= Fairly; 1=Very attached;	.59 (.3)	14857	233
Cognitive identification: psychological centrality (Q10)	0=Not at all; .33= Not very much; .66= Somewhat; 1=A great deal;	.47 (.33)	14785	305
Cognitive identification: interdependence (Q17)	0=Not at all; .33= Not very much; .66= Somewhat; 1=A great deal;	.67 (.28)	14761	329
<b>EU democracy</b>				
<u>Indicator-variable</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
Satisfaction with EU democracy (Q25)	0=Very dissatisfied; .33=Somewhat dissatisfied; 0.66=Somewhat satisfied; 1=Very satisfied;	.53 (.24)	14088	1002
Trust in EU Parliament (Q5_2)	Scale of trust from 0='No trust' to 1='Full trust'	.48 (.25)	14114	976
Trust in EU Commission (Q5_4)		.48 (.25)	13792	1298
Trust in EU policy-makers (Q24_3)	0=Strongly disagree; .33= Somewhat disagree; .66= Somewhat agree; 1=Strongly agree;	.59 (.32)	13921	1169

MGCFA still assumes continuous variables and factors, but it has the advantage to be easy to run and interpret, providing widely recognised statistical goodness of fit indexes of the latent structure stability and its invariance. Despite its widespread employment in socio-political research, a recent simulation-study (van der Eijk and Rose 2015) suggests that Factor Analysis often over-produces latent dimensions. For this reason, in Appendix A the result of MGCFA is the object of further validation using a parametric IRT model, and a nonparametric IRT model such as LCFA. These methods handle any type of indicator variables, then not assuming continuous indicators. They estimate, respective, continuous latent dimensions (IRT), and ordinal latent dimensions (LCFA).

However, they are computationally expensive, and current statistical software limit their application to a few latent factors. For this reason, given that the emphasis of this dissertation is on ‘EU governance legitimacy’, only the empirical division between this dimension and the one of ‘Output legitimacy’ is examined with IRT and LCFA techniques. These analyses confirm MGCFA results, further corroborating Scharpf’s (1999) input-output legitimacy model.

### 1 Principal component factor analysis

A principal component factor analysis is an exploratory technique that analyses how the variance and covariance matrix of a set of items can be explained by a lower number of factors (Jolliffe 2002, Acock 2013). Table 9 displays the results of a PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset of fifteen countries<sup>34</sup>.

Table 9 - PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset. Data source Intune 2009 (cotta et al. 2009)


ITEM	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5
Overall EU membership evaluation	0.775				
National benefit from EU membership	0.873				
Personal benefit from EU membership	0.774				
Unemployment policy		0.675			
Immigration policy		0.584			
Environmental policy		0.667			
Fighting crime policy		0.669			
Health care policy		0.677			
Agricultural policy		0.655			
A unified tax system for the EU					0.801
Foreign policy					0.746
Attachment towards Europe			0.506		
Cognitive identification: psychological centrality			0.601		
Cognitive identification: interdependence			0.810		
Satisfaction with EU democracy				0.496	
Trust in the EU Parliament				0.906	
Trust in the EU Commission				0.901	
Trust in EU policy-makers				0.615	

<sup>34</sup> PCFAs are performed using SPSS 24, with PAIRWISE deletion. Syntax is reported in Appendix C.

Total explained variance		
Component	Eigenvalue	
	Total	% of variance
<b>F1</b>	4.326	24.036
<b>F2</b>	1.111	6.174
<b>F3</b>	1.187	6.594
<b>F4</b>	2.372	13.178
<b>F5</b>	1.050	5.834

Five factors have eigenvalue greater than 1, which is commonly accepted as a minimal threshold for analytical importance (Acock 2013). Four of them correspond to the theoretical dimensions, but a fifth factor emerges because the items corresponding to support for a ‘Unified tax system’ and for a common ‘Foreign policy’ are not explained by the same factor that explains the variation of the other policy areas (F2). This result does not surprise much for two orders of reasons: first, a similar analysis using PCFA with Intune 2009 data is already presented by Sanders and his colleagues (Sanders et al. 2012b), who report analogous results; second, when looking at levels of support for EU governance of the different policy sectors (Figure 14), it is evident that these two items clearly differ from the others. Indeed, 77% of respondents endorse a common ‘Foreign policy’, and 61% support a ‘Unified tax system’<sup>35</sup>. On the contrary, EU governance of ‘Environmental’, ‘Immigration’, and ‘Fighting crime’ policies is approved by less than 50% of respondents, and that of ‘Agricultural’, ‘Unemployment’, and ‘Health care’ policies by 30% or less.

Figure 14 - Support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)



<sup>35</sup> In every country in the dataset the highest support for integration is found for ‘Foreign policy’, and the second highest is ‘Unified tax system’, except in Denmark where it is ‘Agriculture’.

Taken into account these findings, dropping these items away from the analysis and running again a PCFA, the theorized four dimensions of EU support emerge as expected (Table 10 below). The correlation among the factors is provided in Table 11: F1 ('Output legitimacy') is very weakly correlated with F2 ('EU governance legitimacy'), highly correlated with F4 ('EU democracy'), and modestly correlated with F3 ('European identification'); F2 ('EU governance legitimacy') is very weakly correlated with any other factor; and F4 ('EU democracy') and F3 ('European identification') are modestly correlated between each other.

Table 10 - PCFA with oblimin rotation using the pooled dataset - 6 policy items. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

ITEM	F1	F2	F3	F4
Overall EU membership evaluation	0.798			
National benefit from EU membership	0.881			
Personal benefit from EU membership	0.759			
Unemployment policy		0.683		
Immigration policy		0.614		
Environmental policy		0.653		
Fighting crime policy		0.685		
Health care policy		0.674		
Agricultural policy		0.643		
Attachment towards Europe			0.519	
Cognitive identification: psychological centrality			0.601	
Cognitive identification: interdependence			0.811	
Satisfaction with EU democracy				0.506
Trust in the EU Parliament				0.902
Trust in the EU Commission				0.898
Trust in EU policy-makers				0.631

Total explained variance		
Component	Eigenvalue	
	Total	% of variance
<b>F1</b>	4.141	25.882
<b>F2</b>	1.051	6.567
<b>F3</b>	1.174	7.337
<b>F4</b>	2.351	14.696

Table 11 - Components correlation. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

COMPONENTS CORRELATION				
Component	F1	F2	F3	F4
<b>1</b>	1	0.176	0.461	0.239
<b>2</b>	-	1	0.131	0.129
<b>3</b>	-	-	1	0.216
<b>4</b>	-	-	-	1

All the correlations are significant:  $p \leq 0.01$

Finally, the exploratory nature of PCFA does not provide any further information regarding how the items are related to the latent factor, since no constraints are posed to the relationship between indicators and latent components. Indeed, every item is a perfect indicator (no error term associated with each item) of all the dimensions (each item measures all the dimensions). In addition, it is impossible to assess measurement invariance across countries since PCFA implicitly assumes it without testing it: for all these tasks is necessary to move to MGCFA.

## **2 Multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA)**

Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) is a technique that allows testing the presence of a latent structure behind individual responses to survey questions (Davidov et al. 2012; Acock 2013): these items may be indicators of one or more latent dimensions that explains the associations among survey items. Compared with PCFA, CFA is a more flexible tool, since some items may tap some and not all latent dimensions, and with less assumptions, since PCFA assumes that each item is a perfect indicator of the latent factors (Acock 2013). This means that each indicator is associated to one or more dimensions, and that each indicator has a specific error term, which represents the item uniqueness, the part of variance that is not explained by latent factors.

Multi-group CFA (MGCFA) is an extension of CFA, helpful when different cultural groups or countries are pooled into a single sample. When this occurs, it is necessary testing the measurement invariance across countries, otherwise the latent measuring might lead to biased results (Davidov et al. 2012). In this case, having biased results means that the relationships between the four dimensions of EU support and their indicators are assumed to be the same in every country when this is not true. If this happens, one might misinterpret, for instance, that the latent dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’ has the same meaning in every country.

For this reason, Davidov and his colleagues (Davidov et al. 2012) recommend testing whether the association between items and factors is the same across countries. Three types of invariance or equivalence (in Davidov and his colleagues’ terms) may be established, and they are hierarchically ordered: *Scalar*, *Metric*, and *Configural* equivalence. *Scalar* equivalence means that the latent dimensions have the same meaning in every country, and it requires the same relationships item-factor in every country, which means that the same set of items indicates the same factors, and item intercepts, as well as factor loadings, are invariant across countries. *Metric* equivalence means that respondents interpret the items in the same way, but differences among the respondents are partially explained by their country’s membership that consistently influences their answers. *Metric* equivalence requires only the item-factor configuration and the factor loadings to be equal, while item intercepts may differ across countries. Lastly, *Configural* equivalence requires only the same item-factor configuration to be established, and this indicates that the same dimensional structure is present, but it does not guarantee that respondents interpret the items consistently across countries.

Therefore, Table 12 below reports the design of the final measuring model, where ‘Foreign policy’ and ‘Unified tax system’ are excluded from the model, following the results of PCFA. Figure 15 visually displays it, and in the figure the double-headed arrows between F1-F3; F1-F4, and F3-F4 mean that correlation between these latent factors is freely estimated. Since the result of PCFA shows a very low correlation between F2-‘EU governance legitimacy’ and the other factors, correlation is not explicitly modelled<sup>36</sup>.


Table 12 - Measuring model of EU support

<b>CONCEPTS</b>	<b>INDICATOR</b>
<b><i>F1-Output legitimacy</i></b>	Overall EU membership evaluation
	National benefit from EU membership
	Personal benefit from EU membership
<b><i>F2-EU governance legitimacy</i></b>	Unemployment policy
	Immigration policy
	Environmental policy
	Fight against crime
	Health care policy
	Agricultural policy
<b><i>F3-European identification</i></b>	Attachment towards Europe
	Cognitive identification: psychological centrality
	Cognitive identification: interdependence
<b><i>F4-EU democracy</i></b>	Satisfaction with EU democracy
	Trust in EU Parliament
	Trust in EU Commission
	Trust in EU policy-makers

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<sup>36</sup> I have tested also a model where correlation among all the latent factors is estimated: despite model fit improves, substantial results do not change. Moreover, when computing latent factor scores of the same latent dimension measured with these two models, the measure of associations is 0.99 (Pearson correlation coefficient).

Figure 15 Measurement Model EU Support (MGCFA).



Using this model-configuration, four models are tested<sup>37</sup>: the first one is simply a CFA using the pooled dataset of fifteen EU countries<sup>38</sup>; the second one is a MGCFA with *configural* equivalence; the third one is a MGCFA with *metric* equivalence; and the fourth one is a MGCFA with *scalar* equivalence. Table 13 reports the results of these models. Except for the *scalar* equivalence model, the other models have acceptable goodness of fit indexes: CFI  $\geq 0.90$ , RMSEA  $\leq 0.08$ , and SRMR  $\leq 0.08$  (see Hu and Bentler 1999; Acock 2013). Among these models with acceptable indexes, the *metric* equivalence model turns out to be the best model, namely the one with the lowest loss of information, according to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)<sup>39</sup>.

Table 13 - Fit indexes models of Figure 15 (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

MODEL	X2	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	BIC	DF
POOLED	2916	0.94	0.05	0.07	93230	101
CONFIGURAL	4860	0.92	0.06	0.08	87880	1515
METRIC	5928	0.9	0.06	0.08	87397	1683
SCALAR	12192	0.77	0.09	0.09	91593	1907

*Metric* equivalence is fundamental because this result corroborates the hypotheses that the four dimension of EU support are empirically distinct and that their measurement is sufficiently invariant

<sup>37</sup> MGCFA's are performed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) and listwise deletion. Correlation matrix of the sixteen indicators is reported in Table 48 in Appendix B.

<sup>38</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria

<sup>39</sup> Group-level fit statistics are reported in Table 49 in Appendix B.

across countries: this allows using latent scores as independent or dependent variables as performed in chapters 4-5-6.

*Metric* equivalence guarantees that the relationship between the indicators and the four latent dimensions of EU support is the same across countries, and that a unitary increase of the latent variable has the same meaning in every country (Davidov et al. 2012): although differences between individuals are partially explained by their country’s membership, which creates an offset in the scale of the groups (Davidov et al. 2012), the influence of individual latent dispositions on item responses is held constant across countries. This means that the discrimination power (slope) of each item is invariant, while the difficulty (intercept) varies across countries since in some countries EU support is more widespread than in others.

Because the item difficulty is not invariant, a comparison of latent means across countries is not possible (Davidov et al. 2012). However, it is possible to compare the correlation matrix of these four dimensions across European countries (see Table 14). Results confirm that ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is weakly correlated with the other dimensions of EU support, whereas there is an important structure of correlation among the other three dimensions of support. This result suggests that the dimension of support of EU policy governance has not yet integrated into the structure of beliefs towards the EU.

Table 14 - Correlation matrix of the MGCFA model of Figure 15. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>DIM 1</b>	<b>Output legitimacy</b>	<b>Output legitimacy</b>	<b>Output legitimacy</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	<b>European identification</b>
<b>DIM 2</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	<b>European identification</b>	<b>EU democracy</b>	<b>European identification</b>	<b>EU democracy</b>	<b>EU democracy</b>
<b>COUNTRY</b>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>	<i>Pearson correlation</i>
Pooled	0.19	0.75	0.58	0.18	0.13	0.62
Belgium	0.24	0.76	0.63	0.24	0.13	0.57
Denmark	0.27	0.53	0.65	0.24	0.17	0.55
Germany	0.22	0.79	0.63	0.21	0.14	0.65
Greece	0.18	0.81	0.64	0.20	0.19	0.72
Spain	0.16	0.82	0.46	0.17	0.07	0.74
France	0.32	0.86	0.67	0.34	0.19	0.72
Italy	0.25	0.76	0.50	0.26	0.10	0.63
Portugal	0.12	0.72	0.56	0.13	0.07	0.63
UK	0.30	0.81	0.60	0.28	0.25	0.64
Estonia	0.08 <sup>^</sup>	0.93	0.53	0.07 <sup>^</sup>	0.06 <sup>^</sup>	0.52
Hungary	0.11	0.64	0.46	0.09	0.10	0.42
Poland	0.26	0.63	0.69	0.19	0.21	0.55
Slovakia	0.18	0.77	0.43	0.13	0.13	0.58
Slovenia	0.14	0.81	0.67	0.12	0.11	0.75
Bulgaria	0.06 <sup>^</sup>	0.87	0.67	0.03 <sup>^</sup>	0.07 <sup>^</sup>	0.67

Note: all the correlations are significant ( $p \leq 0.05$ ) excepts those indicated with sign <sup>^</sup>

To further investigate ‘EU governance legitimacy’, a focus on the relationship between this latent dimension and its six indicators is provided. The purpose is to assess the extent to which support for EU governance of specific policy domains is explained by a latent and generic preference for more EU governance. The six indicators are manifest variables and each indicates support for EU governance of a specific policy domain. The relationship between the latent dimension and each of the manifest variables is the following:

$$\text{Manifest variable} = \text{score on the latent dimension} + \text{policy specificity} + \text{error}$$

It follows that there is part of the variance that is not accounted for by the simple score on the latent dimensions. Table 15 reports the percentage of variance of the six items that is explained by the latent dimension ( $R^2$ )<sup>40</sup>.

Table 15 - Predictive power of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>Policy sector</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>
Unemployment policy	0.45
Immigration policy	0.32
Environmental policy	0.39
Fighting crime	0.37
Health care policy	0.41
Agricultural policy	0.40

Among the six policy areas, ‘Unemployment’ has the maximum amount of explained variance ( $R^2=.45$ ), whereas ‘Immigration’ has the least ( $R^2=.32$ ). The  $R^2$  of the other four policy domains vary between these two values. Overall, in every policy sectors, more than 55% of the item variance is not explained the latent dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. This result either suggests that, besides a latent generic disposition for EU policy governance, individual preferences for EU governance are also influenced by other drivers, or that the measurement technique employed (MGCFA) has led biased results because it assumes interval level variables. The former hypothesis is addressed in the next chapter, while the latter is examined in Appendix A, where two alternative statistical techniques - IRT and LCFA - are used to analyse ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’. However, the results of IRT and LCFA confirm that of MGCFA. This is evident also looking at the degree of correlation between the three different measures.

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<sup>40</sup> Since the item intercepts are country-specific (vary across countries), item explained variances vary as well. Here, for sake of simplicity, is reported the average  $R^2$ , calculated regressing separately each policy item on the ‘EU governance legitimacy’ factor score regardless data clustering.

Table 16 - Correlation across measuring methods. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>OUTPUT LEGITIMACY</b>	<b>MGCFA</b>	<b>IRT</b>	<b>LCFA</b>
Output legitimacy MGCFA	1.00	-	-
Output legitimacy IRT	0.82	1.00	-
Output legitimacy LCFA	0.90	0.82	1.00

<b>EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY</b>	<b>MGCFA</b>	<b>IRT</b>	<b>LCFA</b>
EU governance legitimacy MGCFA	1.00	-	-
EU governance legitimacy IRT	0.87	1.00	-
EU governance legitimacy LCFA	0.93	0.94	1.00

Table 16 shows the correlations among the three latent scores computed with the three methods (MGCFA, IRT, and LCFA): for ‘Output legitimacy’, the correlation between LCFA scores and those from MGCFA is .90, and with IRT is .82; for ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is .93 with MGCFA, and .94 with IRT: all the correlations are extremely high<sup>41</sup>, and the choice of one of the three methods does not substantially affect latent scores. Therefore, given the minimal difference between methods, and since the other latent dimensions that compose the spectrum of attitudes towards the EU, namely ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’, have already been measured in MGCFA concurrently with those of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’, I decided to continue the analysis using MGCFA results and scores<sup>42</sup>.

To conclude, the low predictive power of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ dimension seems not to be a matter of method, but a matter of theory. A latent disposition only explains part of the individual level preferences, and other drivers may influence the choice. This issue will be addressed in the next chapters, where the effects of theory-driven micro and macro level determinants of support for EU governance are tested.

### 3 Discussion

The reason for studying empirically the dimensionality of EU support lies in the compounded nature of European integration: from one side, it is still an intergovernmental issue where integration efforts are explained by member states’ benefit derived from a common regulated market; from the other side, European citizens must cope with a Union that enlarged its competences in many policy fields, increasing its presence in national politics and in their citizens daily life. For this reason, support towards the EU, as a socio-political phenomenon, needs to be analysed side by side, dimension by dimension. Chapter 2 defined four dimensions of EU support drawing upon Easton’s political system theory (1965, 1975) and Scharpf’s (1999) input-output legitimacy framework. These dimensions

<sup>41</sup> Performing this analysis country by country, correlation is even higher than 0.90 for each pair of method (results not shown, available by request).

<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, indicators of ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are ordinal variable, measured with Likert-like scales, and this poses less concerns on employing Factor Analysis based on correlation matrixes.

represent four different forms of EU support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as benefit), ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy governance), ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation).

This conceptual definition of EU support is central in this dissertation, because the empirical literature often studies EU support either using only one proxy variable, supporting this choice with the argument of studying the Eastonian diffuse support but implicitly turning the concept of EU support in what measured by that variable, or it only concentrates on a specific dimension of EU support, disregarding the relationships that one dimension has with the others. Indeed, on this latter point, it is important to analyse the structural relationship among these dimensions, theorizing and testing whether one form (dimension) of EU support influences the development of another form EU support (on this see Chapters 4 and 5).

In addition, defining the dimensions of EU support allows interpreting the deterioration through time of citizen attitudes towards the EU as the decline of two specific forms of EU support (see Chapters 2 Section 3): even though for some dimensions the long-term analysis is limited to one indicator only, support as utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and support as political representation at the EU level (‘EU democracy’) profoundly vary through time, steadily decreasing after the economic crisis in 2008-2009. However, support as we-feeling (‘European identification’) has not changed much through time, and support for EU policy governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’) has remained stable. These results included in Chapter 2 showed that the dimensions that are closer to the instrumental pole - ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’ - are those most affected by the recent European crises (refugee and Economic crises). Indeed, these crises weakened the idea that Europe is a land of prosperity and that the European integration is the best democratic way for accessing this prosperity. Conversely, the ideas of Europe closer to the pole of values - ‘European identification’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’ - do not seem to be influenced by these events.

However, longitudinal analysis with aggregate data cannot tell the full story. Analyses included in this chapter empirically corroborates the four theorized dimensions of EU support, and they demonstrate that this latent structure of attitudes towards the EU is the same across European countries. This means that respondents across Europe distinguish the same four different forms of EU support, and the only difference among countries rests on the fact that individuals live in context with higher or lower levels of EU support, and this influences their level of support (*Metric* equivalence).

Other two findings emerge in this chapter, and they regard the dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Among the four dimensions of EU support, that of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is very modestly correlated with the other dimensions of EU support, while the others, even though theoretically and empirically distinct, exhibit an important structure of correlation among themselves.

This result suggests that support for a generic EU policy governance is not integrated into a consistent (positive or negative) system of beliefs towards the EU. In other words, support for EU policy governance is not deeply associated with the other forms of EU support, while EU support as utility ('Output legitimacy'), as we-feeling ('European identification'), and as political representation ('EU democracy') tend to emerge concurrently in the set of individual attitudes.

Support for EU governance ('EU governance legitimacy'), of course, is more likely when one individual holds the other forms of support, but this association is weak. More on this will be provided in the next chapter, where the predictive power of 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' on 'EU governance legitimacy' is tested as well as those of exogenous determinants of these latent dimensions.

Finally, Chapter 1 introduced three models of support for EU governance: in Model 1 and 3 this support varies across policy domains (they differ in the causes of this), while in Model 2 support for EU governance is a unitary dimension that cross-cuts policy domains. The analyses included in this chapter provide evidence supporting Model 2, since there is an individual latent and generic disposition of EU support. Yet, this generic latent attitude does not explain preferences for EU governance of two policy domains ('Foreign policy' and 'Unified tax system'). Moreover, even though a unitary latent dimension explains part of the variability of support for EU governance of the indicators of 'EU governance legitimacy'<sup>43</sup> at least more than 55% of the variance still remains unexplained. Therefore, there is something more than just a latent preference, and further analyses provided in Chapter 5 test the role of micro (individual), macro (contextual), and meso (policy domain) determinants on support for EU policy governance of distinct policy domains.

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<sup>43</sup> 'Unemployment', 'Environmental', 'Fighting crime', 'Health care', 'Agricultural', and 'Immigration' policies.

## CHAPTER 4 – EXPLAINING EU SUPPORT

This chapter addresses the question<sup>44</sup> of what are the determinants of the four dimensions of EU support defined and measured in chapters 2 and 3, and it has a twofold purpose: first, it tests whether the four dimensions are explained by a common set of traditional<sup>45</sup> exogenous determinants of EU support. In case results confirm earlier findings already in the literature, this analysis can also be interpreted as a proof of the external validity (Leviton 2001) of the measurement of EU support. Second, this chapter studies a potential hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, testing whether the generic support for EU policy governance depends upon holding one or more of the other three forms of EU support.

The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 analyses the literature on exogenous determinants of support towards the EU, focussing on theory-based explanatory mechanisms, and empirical results. Earlier in this dissertation, the concept of EU support has been unpacked in four empirical dimensions that account for different aspects of this concept and different forms of support: ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as benefit), ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU policy governance), ‘European identification’ (EU support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation). Drawing upon previous studies, Section 2 provides working hypotheses and describes the method used for testing the influence of traditional exogenous determinants on each of the four dimensions of EU support. Section 3 presents the empirical results and compares their effects across the four dimensions. Results are debated in Section 4. Afterwards, Section 5 argues on the presence of a hierarchy among the four endogenous components of EU support, and it tests whether ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ directly influence ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Finally, Section 6 comments and interprets the empirical findings.

All these analyses are performed country by country, using structural equation modelling (Bollen and Long 1993). Results confirm the influence of four exogenous determinants: ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, ‘national attachment’, and ‘political values’. This corroborates the external validity (Leviton 2001) of the measurement of EU support. However, these determinants exert different effects, depending on the dimension considered, and only ‘exclusive national identification’ has a consistent influence on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

Moreover, despite the literature suggests a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, where ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is explained by ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’, only weak findings suggest that these endogenous determinants influence ‘EU governance legitimacy’ in a consistent way across European countries. This leaves open room for

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<sup>44</sup> RQ<sub>3</sub> in the Introduction at page 6.

<sup>45</sup> ‘Traditional’ means that there is a well-established literature on these determinants of EU support.

further research that explains why support for EU policy governance does not regularly covary with the other three dimensions of EU support.

## **1. The debate on support for European integration and Euroscepticism**

For more than 30 years the speed and logic of European integration had been decided by European elites and accepted with limited interest by citizens (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). After the enactment of the Maastricht treaty, popular support for the EU has started to decrease (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), closing the era of the so-called *permissive consensus* and opening a new era of *constraining dissensus* (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

In more cases than the past, EU citizens have expressed their opposition towards the elite project, either in referendum on EU constitution (in France and The Netherlands in 2005) or in supporting Eurosceptic parties (Cramme and Hobolt 2014), and survey studies demonstrated that trust in EU institutions and support for European integration have declined over time (Ciftci 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Guerra and Serricchio 2014; see also Chapter 3). Moreover, during the Eurozone and the migrant crises (Börzel and Risse 2017), EU citizens have experienced that what European institutions decide (mainly the Commission and the Council) deeply affects their daily life, especially in EU countries that received economic bailouts (Ireland, Spain, and Greece).

Despite these findings, the concept of EU support is still in need of qualification. This concept has many faces, and often scholars simply concentrate on one of them (with few exceptions: Norris 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Sanders et al. 2012a, 2012b). This thesis distinguishes four dimensions of EU support (see Chapter 2 and 3), and this section surveys the literature on individual-level exogenous determinants of EU support. The term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU support, and they are considered as antecedents of EU support<sup>46</sup>.

In the literature, EU support is explained by four sets of individual-level exogenous determinants: (1) Instrumental reasoning, (2) Confidence in national institutions, (3) National identification and attachment, and (4) Social-location and political values. These sets of determinants are, respectively, reviewed in the next pages, and some hypotheses on how these determinants relate to the four dimensions of EU support are also provided.

### ***1.1 Instrumental reasoning***

For four decades, European integration had been focused on economic and market regulation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Hence it is natural that the main explanation

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<sup>46</sup> Whereas endogenous determinants are elements that constitute the concept of EU support and that are conceived as antecedents in the development of specific forms of EU support. Section 5 analyses whether ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ influence the development of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Hence, in Section 5 ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ are considered as endogenous determinants.

of support for the European project was based on a cost-benefit analysis. The instrumental rational choice perspective assumes that pro-European attitudes are the result of instrumental self-interest (e.g. Anderson 1998; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a; Gabel and Whitten 1997; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007) since European integration produced a gap between winners and losers of integration (Kriesi et al. 2012). For this reason, those who are on the winning side - better economic or social condition after the European integration - are more supportive of the EU than those on the losing side (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a; Kriesi et al. 2012).

People who have higher skills are expected to be better able to deal with an integrated advanced market economy and European marketplace (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011), whereas those with lower skill levels run a much higher risk to lose their job due to a relocation of production across national borders (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). An indicator of this divide is the educational level: as Hakhverdian and his colleagues demonstrated (Hakhverdian et al. 2013), the impact of education on EU support has increased, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Income is another relevant indicator of this divide: higher income earners benefit from EU integration because it creates more investment opportunities, while lower income earners must face a diminished welfare provision due to increased capital liberalization (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011; see also Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998a; Hobolt and de Vries 2016).

This divide between winners and losers should emerge on both of the two dimensions of utility: *objective* and *subjective* utility. *Subjective* utility indicates a perceived utility that passes through personal assessment of the benefits of EU integration. However, it is straightforward that the *objective* utility is expected to directly influence the *subjective* one. Earlier in the thesis, *subjective* utility is argued to represent the concept of ‘Output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999), a pillar of the multidimensional concept of EU support (see Chapters 2 and 3). For this reason, *objective* utility should be positively associated with ‘Output legitimacy’.

As for the relationship between *objective* utility and the other three dimensions of EU support, it is expected that those in the winning side support EU policy governance, measured by the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, since further EU policy integration can extend their privileges. Conversely, those from the losing side want to reduce EU policy governance to recover a better socio-economic condition within their national state borders via protectionist measures (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). *Objective* utility should be as well associated with higher levels of ‘European identification’ since a correspondence between individual interests and political outcomes can activate identification in the supranational political community (following a neo-functional intuition, see Haas 1958). Finally, it is evident that being in the winning side is expected to influence the perception of good

political representation within European institutions, resulting in a positive association between *objective* utility and the dimension of ‘EU democracy’.

### ***1.2 Confidence in national institutions***

In the literature, there are traditional explanations of EU support that look at attitudes towards national institutions to identify patterns of EU support. Two competing mechanisms are reported. The first relates positive evaluation of national institutions to favourable attitudes towards the EU (‘Transfer’ hypothesis) (see McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007; Ray 2003a, 2003b). Many authors (e.g. Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007; Rohrschneider 2002; Ray 2003a, 2003b) demonstrate that people often use heuristics when they must deal with political opinions, especially when they should develop opinions on a distant political institution such as the EU (Sanders et al. 2012b). The underlying logic is that they use information about something they know, that is national politics and the national institutional system, to make a judgment regarding something they know less. If they positively evaluate their national environment, they positively assess the EU, transferring their opinion from one domain to the other.

However, for the case of central and east European countries, the opposite mechanism has also been theorized and validated empirically: people who perceive their own national-level political institutions as corrupted or inefficient are likely to see the EU positively, since the EU can limit the power of such national institutions (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). It follows that when national institutions satisfy the demands of their citizens, those citizens are expected to be loyal to their nation rejecting EU integration (‘Substitution’ hypothesis) (see Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Therefore, both these two alternative mechanisms can - potentially - influence the four dimensions of EU support.

### ***1.3 National identification and attachment***

A post-functional turn in this field of research has started (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Börzel and Risse 2017; Hooghe et al. 2017). The more the EU moves towards more integration, the more identity claims become prominent: Börzel and Risse (2017) maintain that an effective European policy in reaction to the migrant crisis was substantially weakened by identity claims coming from some EU countries. Indeed, a common European policy on migration would have implied delegating sovereignty to the EU institutions in a highly salient issue, resulting in a common policy that would have further increased short-term immigration due to relocation and resettlement. Hobolt and de Vries (2016: 420) maintain that “European integration is not only, or even primarily, about a single-market, but also about a pooling of sovereignty that potentially erodes national self-determination and blurs boundaries between distinct national communities”.

However, some studies demonstrate that levels of national attachment are positively associated with European identification (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016), as effects of ‘nested identities’: “European and other identities pertaining to territorially defined entities can be nested into each other

so that ‘Europe’ forms the outer boundary, while one’s region or nation-state constitute the core” (Risse 2004: 250). Yet, exclusive national identification is, on the contrary, a factor that leads to contrasting the Europeanization of the national polity, seen as a threat to national cultural integrity (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008) and an open door to immigration (de Vreese and Boomgarden 2005). Hooghe and Marks (2004) theorize and provide findings that people who conceptualise their identities exclusively in terms of national identity are likely to be against the EU project, whereas who have either multiple identities that include the European dimension or a full European identity<sup>47</sup> are likely to support the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004; see also McLaren 2007). This is particularly important since national and European identities are not expected to compete, but they can compenentrate in different mixtures (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016).

Hence, national identification plays its influence on EU support in a composite way. This chapter conceives national identification both in terms of self-categorisation as exclusive national and as the strength of the attachment towards the nation. They correspond to two of the three conceptualisations of political identities provided by Citrin and Sides 2004 (see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): they maintain that the first one is cognitive, and it regards self-categorisation as group member; the second one is affective, and it defines the strength of the attachment towards the group; and the third one is normative, and it outlines the in-group boundaries - in terms of criteria for inclusion in the group<sup>48</sup>.

As for the first definition, exclusive national identification is an undisputed driver of opposition against EU integration and European identification (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008; Westle and Segatti 2016). It follows that exclusive national identification should be negatively associated with every one of the four dimensions of EU support. With regards to the second definition of political identity, Carey (2002) and McLaren (2006) find that the strength of the attachment towards the nation negatively influences EU support, while the literature on national and European identity shows that a strong national attachment is, instead, associated with greater European identification (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016). For this reason, the strength of national identification is expected to be negatively associated with the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’ and ‘EU democracy’, while being positively associated with ‘European identification’.

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<sup>47</sup> Self-categorisation as only European.

<sup>48</sup> A recent strand of research looks at the underlying meaning of national and European identities, proposing to disentangle them to understand how European citizens conceptualise identity boundaries, and how this influences European identification (see Bruter 2005; Segatti and Guglielmi 2016). Chapter 6 studies how identity-meanings influence EU support.

#### ***1.4 Social location and political values***

Within the label of *social location* are placed some theories about how social characteristics shape individual attitudes towards the EU (see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). The most known is the *cognitive mobilization* hypothesis, which is elaborated by Inglehart as part of his theory of the Silent Revolution (Inglehart 1977). This hypothesis maintains that attitudes towards the European integration are highly influenced by levels of political sophistication and awareness of the European political system, which are a function of education – that enhances sophistication - and information (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Rabier 1978). The theory argues that due to the high level of abstraction of the European political system, only citizens with high level of political skills can deal with the complexity of those processes, understanding political discourses about it and developing personal thoughts (Inglehart 1977). Inglehart argues that having political skills is the antecedent needed to produce positive attitudes towards Europe, since to higher skilled people the European dimension is more familiar and less threatening than for poorer skilled ones (Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Jassen 1991). On the contrary, those who do not have such skills should be more worried by European integration, since they are unaware of what the EU actually is, which entails opposition to the membership (Jassen 1991).

Empirical analyses have demonstrated that those who are better educated and frequently involved in political discussions, as indicators of *cognitive mobilization*, are more aware of and have more positive stances on the integration project (Jassen 1991). Similar results emerge for European identity (Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Bellucci et al. 2012; Conti and Memoli 2015). Therefore, *cognitive mobilization* is expected to positively influence EU support on each of the four dimensions.

In addition, a divide is found in the literature between ‘centrists’ and ‘extremists’ individuals (Steenbergen et al. 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2014). These authors maintain that the relation between left/right self-placement and EU support draws an inverted U-curve, where centrists are more supportive than both extreme leftists and rightists (Hooghe et al. 2002). The two poles have different reasons for opposing the EU (Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009): as long as European integration was mainly economic, the extreme left opposed European integration because integration would have enhanced the market-driven (neo-liberal) character of their societies. On the contrary, for the extreme right integration would have meant an increase in the regulatory activity of political institutions, thus limiting the free market (Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009). Once the European integration has become something more than just an integrated market, the extreme right has started arguing at preserving national sovereignty and identity (de Vries and Edwards 2009). It follows that the relationship between political values (‘left/right self-placement’) and EU support is expected to produce an inverted-U curve on each of the four dimensions of EU support.

## 2. Data and method

The previous section surveyed the literature on EU support to identify theory-based and individual-level exogenous determinants of the four different forms of EU support. These exogenous determinants are ‘objective utility’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘cognitive mobilization’, and ‘political values’. As reported earlier, the term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU support, and they are treated here as antecedents of EU support.

Table 17 reports their expected influence on the four dimensions of EU support, summarising the arguments of Section 1 and listing seven hypotheses regarding the direction of these effects. As shown in the table, the direction of the effect is consistent across the four dimensions (always negative or positive) for all the determinants, but for ‘national attachment’. In this case, it is expected a positive influence on the dimension of ‘European identification’ and a negative effect on the other three dimensions (Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016)<sup>49</sup>.

Table 17 - Direction of the expected influence of micro determinants

	<b>Output legitimacy</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	<b>European identification</b>	<b>EU democracy</b>
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
<i><b>EXOGENOUS Micro Determinant</b></i>	<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Expected effect</i>
Hp <sub>1</sub> Objective utility	+	+	+	+
Hp <sub>2</sub> Confidence in national institutions (Transfer)	+	+	+	+
Hp <sub>3</sub> Confidence in national institutions (Substitution)	-	-	-	-
Hp <sub>4</sub> Exclusive national identification	-	-	-	-
Hp <sub>5</sub> National attachment	-	-	+	-
Hp <sub>6</sub> Cognitive mobilization	+	+	+	+
Hp <sub>7</sub> Political values	extreme left and right: -	extreme left and right: -	extreme left and right: -	extreme left and right: -
	centrists: +	centrists: +	centrists: +	centrists: +

To analyse the influence of these exogenous determinants a full structural equation model (full SEM) (Bollen and Long 1993) is used, with data on fifteen EU countries<sup>50</sup> collected in 2009 by the Intune project (Cotta et al. 2009). Full SEM is an extension of MGCFA (see Chapter 3) that allows testing the linkages among latent factors and among latent factors and exogenous variables (Bollen and Long 1993).

<sup>49</sup> See Section 1.3.

<sup>50</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.

Hence, the four latent dimensions of EU support ('Output legitimacy', 'EU governance legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy') are the dependent variables of this analysis. The building block of this model resides in Chapter 3 analyses, where the presence of the four latent dimensions of EU support is empirically established. These latent dimensions are stable across countries, and metric invariance is confirmed: this means that latent dimensions have the same meanings<sup>51</sup> in different countries (Davidov et al. 2012). Ten variables are used to test the hypotheses on the influence of the exogenous determinants:

- 'Objective utility' is measured via two proxy variables: 'Socio-economic status (SES)' and 'Education';
- 'Confidence in national institutions' via the proxy variable: 'Trust in the national government';
- 'Exclusive national identification' via with a dummy variable that detects those with 'Exclusive national identification';
- 'National attachment' is measured with a variable 'National attachment';
- 'Cognitive mobilization' is measured via two proxy variables: 'Knowledge of the EU'<sup>52</sup> and 'Education';
- 'Political values' are measured with a variable tapping 'Left/right self-placement' plus the variable squared 'Left/right squared' since this is the instrument to test the supposed curvilinear relationship between Left/right and EU support;
- Finally, two control variables are included in the analysis: 'Gender female' and 'Age'.

Figure 16 graphically displays the model that is tested, where these independent variables influence each of the four latent dimensions of EU support<sup>53</sup>. Table 18 displays descriptive statistics of these variables<sup>54</sup>, which are rescaled from original coding to vary between zero and one<sup>55</sup> to facilitate comparison.

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<sup>51</sup> The term 'meaning' is here used to intend that the relationship between indicators and latent factors is constant at the metric level across countries.


<sup>52</sup> EU knowledge is an additive index that is created using four items that test respondent's real knowledge about how many and what states compose the EU. See Table 50 in Appendix B.

<sup>53</sup> There is a minor difference between the design of the measurement part of this model and the one employed in Chapter 2. In the model of Chapter 3, the latent dimensions of 'EU governance legitimacy' is assumed to be independent from the other three (assumptions of no correlation with the other dimensions). Conversely, in the following analysis all the latent dimensions are correlated. In this case, assuming and estimating correlations do not create problems of comparability of results between methods, differently from the former case.

<sup>54</sup> Corresponding survey questions are reported in Table 50 in Appendix B.

<sup>55</sup> Table 51 in Appendix B reports country averages for the exogenous variables.

Figure 16 - SEM model micro determinants of EU support



\*Each latent dimension is correlated with the other three dimensions: for simplicity, correlational structure is not graphically represented.

Table 18 - Descriptive statistics of micro determinants - Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>Exogenous determinants</b>	<b>Variable name</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>	<b>N. Cases</b>	<b>N. Missing</b>
<i>Instrumental reasoning</i>	Socio-economic status (SES)	0=Working class; .33=Lower middle class; .66=Upper middle class; 1=Upper class;	.31 (.27)	14026	1064
<i>Confidence in national institutions</i>	Trust in the national Government	Scale of trust from 0='No trust' to 1='Full trust'	.42 (.28)	14917	173
<i>National identification and affectivity</i>	Exclusive national identification	0=Also European identification; 1=Only national identification;	.40 (.49)	14700	390
	National attachment	0=Not at all; .33= Not very; .66= Somewhat; 1=Very attached;	.82(.24)	15029	61
<i>Social location and political values</i>	Education	0=Middle school or lower; .5=Secondary education; 1=University or higher;	.51 (.37)	14412	678
	Knowledge of the EU	Index of knowledge created with four testing questions: every right answer scores .25. 0=No right answer; 1=Four right answers;	.46 (.27)	15090	0
	Left/right self-placement	Scale of political placement from 0='Extreme left' to 1='Extreme right'	.50 (.25)	13891	1199
<i>Controls</i>	Gender female	0=Male; 1=Female;	.46 (.50)	15090	0
	Age	0= lower than 26; .125= 26-35; .25= 36-45; .375= 46-55; .5= 56-65; .625= 66-75; .75= 76-85; .875= 86-95; 1= 96-105;	.35 (.22)	14953	137

Therefore, these variables are proxies of the exogenous determinants of EU support and are included in the full SEM model as independent variables, while ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are the dependent (latent) variables. Notably, fifteen models - one for each country - are tested concurrently. The measurement of the dimensions of EU support is fixed across countries (*Metric invariance*), while the influence of the exogenous determinants is country specific, meaning that their effects can vary from country to country. This is important to understand whether the hypotheses hold in different countries<sup>56</sup>.

### 3. Results

The results of the full SEM model are shown in Table 19, which reports standardised regression coefficients<sup>57</sup>. Overall, these results draw a picture where only two independent variables are significant predictors<sup>58</sup> of EU support in most of the countries: these are ‘exclusive national identification’ and ‘trust in the national government’, but the most consistent predictor of the four dimension of EU support is ‘exclusive national identification’. This dichotomic variable influences EU support in all the countries and for all the dimensions, except in two countries<sup>59</sup> where this effect is not significant on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’. This confirms the hypothesis on the role of ‘exclusive national identification’ in leading opposition towards the EU (Hp<sub>4</sub>).

‘Trust in the national government’ is the second variable that constantly influences EU support: it has a significant positive influence on three of the four dimensions of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’) in almost all the countries, without showing any divide between eastern and western European countries<sup>60</sup>. This corroborates the ‘transfer’ hypothesis (Hp<sub>2</sub>) on the positive association between ‘confidence in national institutions’ and EU support, and it falsifies the ‘substitution’ hypothesis (Hp<sub>3</sub>) on the negative association between them. However, concerning ‘EU governance legitimacy’, there are no findings supporting neither the ‘transfer’ (Hp<sub>2</sub>) nor the ‘substitution’ (Hp<sub>3</sub>) hypotheses.

The other independent variables are either only significant in few countries, or they only influence some specific dimensions of EU support. ‘National attachment’ falls into this latter group: it exerts a positive influence on ‘European identification’ in all the countries – confirming that a strong national attachment is not in competition with European identification, and supporting the idea of ‘nested

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<sup>56</sup> For the perspective of this chapter, the focus is on the effect that each determinant exerts on the latent dimension of EU support across countries. Analyses are computed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) and listwise deletion.

<sup>57</sup> Goodness of fit indexes are reported in Table 52 and group level indexes in Table 53 in Appendix B.

<sup>58</sup> In this chapter ‘predictor’ is employed as synonymous of ‘determinant’.

<sup>59</sup> These countries are Slovakia and Bulgaria.

<sup>60</sup> ‘Trust in the national government’ does not influence ‘Output legitimacy’ in Italy and Slovakia, and it does not affect ‘European identification’ in Italy, Hungary and Slovenia.

identities' (see Risse 2004; Westle and Segatti 2016) (Hp<sub>5</sub>). However, 'national attachment' does not have a consistent cross-country effect on the other dimensions of EU support<sup>61</sup>.

Conversely, 'Socio-economic status (SES)', 'Education' and 'Knowledge of the EU' - proxies of 'objective utility' and 'cognitive mobilization' - have only a sparse influence. They were expected to be positively associated with all the four dimensions of EU support, but they have a significant effect just in a few countries. Hence, these data do not confirm a diffuse effect of 'objective utility' (Hp<sub>1</sub>) and 'cognitive mobilization' (Hp<sub>6</sub>) across European countries.

Finally, the influence of 'political values' on EU support needs to be carefully analysed. 'Political values' are tapped with respondents' 'left/right self-placement', and drawing from previous research (e.g. Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009) the effect of 'left/right' on EU support was expected to be curvilinear (Hp<sub>8</sub>): more extremist respondents were expected to be less EU supportive. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the analyses, which shows that this curvilinear relationship is present only in a very limited number of countries. This result casts doubts on the hypothesis that both extremes of the political spectrum tend to oppose the EU.

To further check the influence of 'political values' on EU support, the former full SEM model is computed excluding the squared term ('Left/right squared'). This tests whether the association between the two is, instead, simply linear. Table 54 in Appendix B reports the full result, but here is important to note that the effects of all the other independent variables remain largely similar to those already commented. Table 20 shows that 'Left/right self-placement' is now a significant predictor of 'Output legitimacy' and 'EU democracy' in nine countries (barely two third of the total number), whereas it still does not have a consistent influence on 'EU governance legitimacy' and 'European identification'. Moreover, the direction of these effects varies across countries: in most of the eastern European countries, respondents locating themselves on the right tend to be positively associated with higher scores on the dimensions of 'Output legitimacy' and 'EU democracy', whereas in western Europe this association tend to be negative.

These findings support the idea that 'political values' matter in defining respondents' perceptions of political representation ('EU democracy') and subjective benefit ('Output legitimacy'), but their influence is country-specific. This result is in line with previous studies in the literature, which demonstrate that the effect of political values on EU support differ across European countries depending on institutional and economic contexts (Brinegar et al. 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005).

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<sup>61</sup> 'National attachment' influences 'Output legitimacy' only in seven out of fifteen countries, and the magnitude of the effect is also limited.

Table 19 - Total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA	
SES ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.10*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	0.04	0.05	0.02	<b>0.09*</b>	0.06	0.01	0.05	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	-0.06	0.08	<b>0.14*</b>	0.07	
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.02	<b>0.12*</b>	-0.09	0.06	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	0.05	<b>-0.33*</b>	
SES ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.08	0.07	<b>0.23*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	<b>0.18*</b>	0.03	0.09	<b>0.19*</b>	
SES ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0.03	0.07	0	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	<b>0.11*</b>	0.04	0.1	0.03	0.01	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	-0.02	
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.23*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.05	<b>0.3*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	0.09	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.02	-0.05	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.05	<b>-0.13*</b>	0	<b>0.1*</b>	0	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03	-0.01	
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.19*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	0	<b>0.26*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	0.03	<b>0.15*</b>	
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>0.67*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>	<b>0.64*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.53*</b>	<b>0.58*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.31*</b>	<b>-0.38*</b>	<b>-0.45*</b>	<b>-0.31*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.11*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.36*</b>	
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.2*</b>	-0.05	
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>-0.47*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.43*</b>	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>-0.41*</b>	<b>-0.48*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.31*</b>	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	<b>-0.35*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>-0.51*</b>	
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>-0.14*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.02	0.01	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.04	0.08	<b>0.16*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.19*</b>	0.07	0.02	<b>0.1*</b>	0.04	0.09	
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.02	-0.04	<b>-0.13*</b>	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	0	-0.04	<b>-0.15*</b>	0.02	0	-0.02	0.03	0.09	
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>0.63*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.54*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0.02	-0.04	0.06	-0.01	<b>0.09*</b>	0.03	0	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	-0.04	0.03	0.06	
EDUCATION ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.06	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	0.04	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	0.09	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	0.04	0.06	0.02	0	-0.01	<b>0.12*</b>	
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	<b>0.11*</b>	0.09	0.08	0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.01	<b>0.16*</b>	
EDUCATION ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.03	0.07	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05	<b>0.07*</b>	0.07	<b>0.09*</b>	-0.02	0.07	-0.09	-0.01	0.07	-0.04	0.08	
EDUCATION ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	0.05	
FEMALE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.1*</b>	0	0.06	0	-0.01	0.03	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	-0.02	0.08	-0.06	-0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02	
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.14*</b>	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.06	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	0	0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.04	-0.1	-0.01	
FEMALE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	-0.06	-0.04	<b>-0.16*</b>	0	0	-0.06	<b>-0.15*</b>	0.05	-0.05	0.06	-0.08	-0.02	0	0.02	0.04	
FEMALE ON: EU DEMOCRACY	-0.03	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.02	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.07*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	-0.05	<b>-0.12*</b>	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	
KNOW. OF EU ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.07	-0.03	<b>0.12*</b>	0.03	<b>0.11*</b>	0.04	0.05	<b>0.14*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.16*</b>	-0.01	0.01	<b>0.16*</b>	<b>0.2*</b>	0	
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.04	0.1	-0.08	0.09	<b>0.15*</b>	0.08	0.01	-0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	0	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05	
KNOW. OF EU ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.05	-0.04	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.01	0.06	0.06	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	0.07	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.05	0	
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU DEMOCRACY	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0	<b>-0.06*</b>	-0.07	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.06	0.06	0.04	0.05	
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.14	<b>0.3*</b>	-0.11	<b>0.78*</b>	-0.06	-0.06	-0.25	0.06	-0.07	0.04	-0.14	<b>0.68*</b>	0.04	0.12	-0.24	
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.13	0.07	-0.21	0.17	0.05	-0.09	-0.27	0.16	<b>-0.46*</b>	-0.16	-0.06	0.26	<b>-0.44*</b>	0.06	-0.26	
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	-0.11	-0.03	-0.11	<b>0.37*</b>	-0.03	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.35*</b>	0.02	-0.1	-0.11	<b>-0.54*</b>	<b>0.36*</b>	-0.13	-0.03	-0.21	
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>0.22*</b>	-0.04	0.05	<b>0.45*</b>	0.14	-0.02	-0.24	<b>0.19*</b>	-0.01	<b>0.34*</b>	-0.04	<b>0.41*</b>	-0.06	0.11	-0.08	
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	-0.17	<b>-0.29*</b>	0.03	<b>-0.68*</b>	-0.04	0	0.08	0.05	-0.05	-0.07	0.03	<b>-0.81*</b>	0.07	0.01	<b>0.41*</b>	
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.15	-0.01	0.1	-0.21	-0.16	0.01	0.22	-0.22	<b>0.43*</b>	0.19	-0.04	-0.29	0.31	-0.12	0.27	
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.07	0.05	0.11	<b>-0.31*</b>	-0.02	0.05	0.25	0.06	0.01	0.13	<b>0.51*</b>	-0.34	0.14	0.18	0.31	
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>-0.23*</b>	-0.02	-0.1	<b>-0.39*</b>	-0.01	-0.09	-0.01	-0.1	-0.07	<b>-0.36*</b>	-0.22	<b>-0.44*</b>	0.13	0.1	<b>0.35*</b>	
AGE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.14*</b>	-0.05	0	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.07	-0.01	<b>-0.16*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.05	-0.08	-0.06	0.08	-0.09	
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.06	0.1	-0.02	-0.05	<b>0.13*</b>	0.03	-0.03	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	-0.05	-0.01	0	0.01	-0.03	
AGE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.07	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	0.01	0.09	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04	<b>0.13*</b>	-0.06	
AGE ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>-0.07*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.07*</b>	0	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.04	<b>-0.1*</b>	0.01	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.03	
	<i>N. cases</i>	729	698	687	542	705	773	494	626	579	350	544	327	580	535	405

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 20 - Left/Right linear - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	-0.02	0.03	-0.08	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	-0.03	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.09	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.01	0.06	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.02	-0.1	-0.08	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	<b>-0.1*</b>	-0.02	<b>-0.14*</b>	-0.05	0
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	-0.05	0.02	0	0.1	-0.05	-0.09	<b>-0.12*</b>	0.07	<b>-0.09*</b>	0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.01	<b>0.14*</b>	0.09
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0	-0.06	-0.04	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>-0.11*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>-0.08*</b>	-0.01	<b>-0.25*</b>	-0.01	0.07	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

#### 4. Discussion

With many countries and with four dimensions of EU support, it is not easy to interpret the results of these analyses, since the effects of some exogenous determinants ('exclusive national identification' and 'confidence in national institutions') emerge as theorized in most of the countries and for most of the dimensions, while others ('national attachment' and 'political values') are active only on some dimensions, or even do not work at all ('objective utility' and 'cognitive mobilization'). To organise these results, the following list provides results separately for each dimension of EU support:

- **Output Legitimacy:** 'exclusive national identification', 'confidence in national institutions' and 'political values' exert their influence on this dimension across (almost) all the countries;
- **EU governance legitimacy:** among the set of exogenous determinants, only 'exclusive national identification' influences this dimension consistently across countries. The other determinants are not significant predictors of this dimension of EU support;
- **European identification:** 'exclusive national identification', 'confidence in national institutions' and 'national attachment' have significant cross-country effects on this dimension;
- **EU democracy:** 'exclusive national identification', 'confidence in national institutions' and 'political values' are significant predictors of this latent dimension.

This analysis demonstrated that four traditional determinants of EU support influence one or more of the dimensions of EU support, and this can be considered an indicator of the external validity (Leviton 2001) of the measurement of EU support.

However, only one mechanism works across Europe for all the four dimensions. In all the countries, the 'exclusiveness' of respondents' national identity inhibits EU support. This confirms the post-functional account about the role of exclusive national identification in driving opposing to EU integration (see Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008). European integration blurs national boundaries (Hobolt and de Vries 2016), weakening the (perception) of cultural homogeneity within European countries. This activates the mechanism of opposition among those that see Europe as something outside of their personal (national) identity.

Furthermore, this analysis provides additional proofs that support towards the EU passes through confidence in national democratic institutions (see also Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998a; Rohrschneider 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2007) and that this relationship is positive, confirming the transfer hypothesis. This association is positive also in eastern Europe, differently from what argued by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000). EU support, then, is an extension of positive feeling towards national

institutions, and it can be interpreted as the result of a positive personal disposition toward authorities. However, this mechanism does not apply on the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

These findings are important since this analysis controlled for some alternative determinants of EU support, and, in particular, it controls for the effect of political values, a potential confounding variable. The role of political values is telling since it demonstrates that European integration is not the same thing for people living in different cultural and institutional contexts (see also Brinegar et al. 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Despite a general influence of political values, they do not manifest the same effects across Europe: in some countries being on the right side of the political spectrum is associated with higher scores on the dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’ (high perceived benefit of EU membership) and ‘EU democracy’ (high perceived political representation), while in other countries with lower scores (low perceived benefit or political representation). Moreover, the ‘inverted-U curve’ hypothesis on the shape of the relationship between left/right and EU support is not confirmed, differently from previous studies (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2014). From this analysis, extreme left and extreme right do not converge in the opposition towards the EU for any of the four different forms of EU support: EU support as benefit (‘Output legitimacy’), as preference for EU governance (‘EU governance legitimacy’), as we-feeling (‘European identification’), and as political representation (‘EU democracy’).

Finally, it is surprising that ‘exclusive national identification’ is the only driver of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, while none of the other exogenous determinants exerts a consistent influence across countries. ‘Confidence in national institutions’ is not converted in support for a generic EU policy governance, and even ‘political values’ are not associated with this form of support. This raises questions about a potential structure of dependency among the four dimensions of EU support, where ‘EU governance legitimacy’ can derive from ‘Output legitimacy,’ ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’. Indeed, there are theories in the literature that directly or indirectly suggests the presence of this structure of dependency where ‘Output legitimacy,’ ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are located at the same and first hierarchical level, and they concurrently influence ‘EU governance legitimacy’, which is placed at a lower hierarchical level. Hence, they all concur to define the concept of EU support, but *within this concept* they are hierarchically conceived. The next section reviews the literature and tests this hypothesis.

## **5. Testing the influence of endogenous determinants on ‘EU governance legitimacy’**

‘EU governance legitimacy’ taps individual support for a generic form of EU policy governance. This form of EU support is the final consequence of the process of ‘political integration’ defined by Haas as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their

loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas 1958: 16).

Undoubtedly, after the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the EU has acquired more competences, moving from a purely market-oriented integration. Indeed, before 1992, the purpose was deepening the economic integration to develop an integrated European market. Having reached that goal, this has opened space for a new phase of political integration. This integration requires a loyalty shift from the national community towards a ‘new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas 1958: 16). A broad range of policy competences has ultimately been transferred to the EU, and it is clear then that the legitimacy of the EU as-it-is-now rests on support for a European system of governance (Sinnott 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b). This does not mean that the only way to support a European integration is to endorse the current or even further policy and political integration. Yet, the EU is currently structured as a multi-level system of governance, where many decisions are taken at the European level. Hence, to support ‘another’ EU is necessary to reject ‘this’ EU.

Easton (1965, 1975) maintains that *diffuse* support (see Chapter 2 Section 1) is fuelled by citizens perceptions of political legitimacy, and that in the short run specific support for the outcomes of the system does not interfere with the perception of system legitimacy (Easton 1965, 1975). However, he acknowledges that in the long run discontent with performance may gradually erode trust in and legitimacy of the system, lessening *diffuse* support (Easton, 1975). On the same line, Haas’ neo-functionalism theorizes that support for more European integration is driven by actors’ self-interest to pursue their economic goal (Haas 1958), which results in pro-European attitudes for those who recognise their benefits deriving from EU integration.

As long as the integration was economic, opposition towards the EU was mainly based on concerns about the dominance of a market-capitalistic logic reducing national level protectionist measures (from an economic-leftist perspective), or arguing that the regulatory activity of European institutions was limiting the free market (from an economic-rightist perspective) (Hix and Goetz 2000; de Vries and Edwards 2009)<sup>62</sup>. The logic behind deciding the level of integration was based on instrumental reasoning. Both in neo-functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts of international cooperation, actors (states or elites) involved in the agreement are oriented towards supranational solutions to pursue their economic interest (Risse 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009). The goal of a European community was to provide a European environment of peace and cooperation among states, which would have fostered economic growth and prosperity. The success of this operation was the

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<sup>62</sup> However, a contextual effect of the countries’ economic system on citizen support for European integration should be considered, since the kind of capitalism that each state has followed deeply influences the perception of whether the integration leads toward a more regulated or unregulated system, given the harmonization process (Brinegar et. al 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005).

criterion for assessing the European project. Scharpf (1999) calls this Output legitimacy, to indicate that support for European integration is driven by evaluation of the outcomes of the system. Yet, the process of centre formation (Bartolini 2005) requires loyalty and compliance by member states as well as by those individuals subjected to its power. A reservoir of goodwill (Easton 1975) is required to make the system workable, giving legitimacy and effectiveness to a political system that has institutions and boundaries, without the possibility to use physical coercion (Bartolini 2005). Cross-national individual-level analyses on support for EU policy governance are only a few (see de Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b), and in only one of them the effect of *subjective* utility is tested: McLaren (2007) finds that people who perceive individual benefits from EU integration are much more likely to support EU policy governance. Since the concept of *subjective* utility is measured by the latent dimension of ‘Output legitimacy’, it is expected that this dimension directly influences ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

However, the literature suggests that the greater the political integration in a multi-level governance (Marks et al. 1996), the less a cost-benefit analysis of the performances of the European integration drives popular consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that an approach stressing economic calculation is more appropriate for the first age of European integration, from the late 1950s to late 1980s, where EU integration was not politicised yet (Hooghe and Marks 2009; see also the debate in Chapter 1). Collective identification is one the element that Easton, as well as Scharpf, consider as a fundamental element of political support (Easton 1965, 1975) and political legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). Linz and Stepan (1996) remark that people within a state are unlikely to accept the regime as legitimate without sharing some kind and degree of collective identification. This individual identification with the demos helps in accepting or tolerating “[...] outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1975: 444), especially in a democracy where policy decisions are made by majority voting. In this case, since the EU policy-making has moved from requiring a unanimous consensus of EU member states towards a majoritarian turn in many policy areas in the policy-making within the Council (Wallace et al. 2015), this seems to be even more important than in the past. Empirical studies confirm the influence of European identification on support for EU policy governance (Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). For this reason, the expectation is that the dimension of ‘European identification’ directly influences that of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

Finally, from the seminal work of Easton (1965, 1975), confidence in the political system is a leading source of popular support. However, EU institutions have been changed since their creation. Their norms and procedures, as well as their underlying principles, have been profoundly transformed

during the phases of enlargement and constitutional change. From a purely intergovernmental system to a multi-level system of governance, the very nature of this object has evolved step by step. Despite these changes, EU institutions still have the original sin of being technocratic bodies, where democratic control can be exercised only indirectly. At the national level, the accountability of political authorities is guaranteed by the possibility to sanction – via elections – incumbents that do not provide the required outputs. There is a direct tie between outputs, authoritative decisions/incumbents, and citizens. At the European level this tie is not direct but mediated by national Governments, and to a lesser extent by parties in the European Parliament. Changes in the EU constitutional treaties have led to an increase in the role of citizens’ representatives in EU decisions, but the EU democratic deficit is still a debated issue, and the beginning of the economic crisis raised its salience in the public sphere<sup>63</sup>. The term ‘democratic deficit’ indicates a lack of democratic accountability of decision makers (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008). The EU decision-making process is said to be ‘blurred’, run by national governments and unelected technocrats in closed-door meetings. The EU produces binding decisions for its citizens, but these policies are not legitimised in the same way as national policies are. According to Follesdal and Hix (2006), this point is indeed the first element of the ‘standard’ thesis on the EU democratic deficit. At the national level, government is held accountable to the voters via the Parliament, but in the EU institutions, national ministers and government appointees are beyond the control of citizens’ representatives (Follesdal and Hix 2006). This means a decrease in the control power of (national) parliaments and an increase in the power of executives. Indeed, traditional channels of citizens’ representation are less effective than in the national environment, and this may lead to frustration and alienation.

A minimal definition of democracy maintains a democratic system must give citizens the right to replace incumbents. Due to the EU’s multilevel structure of institutional arrangement this democratic accountability is not present, and even if EP elections are held, they are contested on national concerns, and as referenda on incumbent national governments (Schmitt and Teperoglou 2015). Hix (2008) remarks the lack of competition for control of political authority at the European level, and that there is an important difference between procedural democracy and substantial democracy: “it is substantively democratic only if there is open competition for executive office and over the direction of the policy agenda” (Hix 2008: 4). Although in 2014 EP elections political parties tried to solve this problem, still people perceive elections as second order (Van der Brug et al. 2016).

Rohrschneider (2002) finds that people who think that there is something wrong with the EU democracy, no matter their personal interests or political preferences, tend to oppose the EU. This is in line with the democratic deficit thesis (see Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008). Along with the

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<sup>63</sup> Chapter 2 analyses show that dissatisfaction with EU democracy and institutions has deeply increased after the upsurge of the economic and Eurozone crises.

evaluation of the EU democracy, confidence in EU institutions is one of the undisputed drivers of EU support, since empirical findings suggest that the lower the confidence in European institutions, the lower the support for EU policy governance (McLaren 2007; de Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012b). However, as Loveless and Rohrschneider (2011) remark, when in survey question respondents are asked to evaluate EU institutional performance (i.e. ‘satisfaction with how the EU democracy works’) this question taps “[...] both the input component, that the EU government is both selected by popular sanction and institutions are sufficiently democratic in their process, and the output component, which is the ability of the EU to deliver on policy and enforcement” (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011: 14). Hence, satisfaction with the EU democratic procedures and confidence in the EU institutions go side by side: analyses presented in Chapter 3 empirically demonstrates that satisfaction and confidence identify a single latent dimension, called ‘EU democracy’. Hence, the hypothesis is that ‘EU democracy’ influences the development of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

To test the hypotheses that the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are endogenous determinants<sup>64</sup> of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, it necessary to modify the model tested earlier. Figure 17 shows the new path model<sup>65</sup>. Due to the model specification, the total effects of the other exogenous variables already included in the model<sup>66</sup> remain the same as in the previous analysis, but it is now decomposed in direct and indirect effects (see Table 21): the former is the part of the total effect coming from the direct link between exogenous variables and ‘EU governance legitimacy’, while the latter indicates the effect of the exogenous variables that passes through the other three dimensions of EU support. The total effect is the arithmetic sum of direct and indirect effects. Studying how the total effect is composed is important because it allows understanding the mechanism that links ‘exclusive national identification’ - the only significant exogenous determinant - and ‘EU governance legitimacy’.


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<sup>64</sup> Endogenous determinants are elements that constitute the concept of EU support and that are conceived as antecedents in the development of specific forms of EU support.

<sup>65</sup> This path model is computed using STATA 14, with the SEM command (syntax in Appendix C) and listwise deletion.

<sup>66</sup> The exogenous variables are ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’, ‘Education’, ‘Trust in the national government’, ‘Exclusive national identification’, ‘National attachment’, ‘Knowledge of the EU’, ‘Left/right self-placement’, ‘Left/right squared’, ‘Gender female’ and ‘Age’.

Figure 17- Hierarchical SEM Model



*\*For simplicity, the correlational structure among F1-F3-F4 is not graphically represented.*

Table 55 in Appendix B reports that the model fits data well, and Tables 21 e 22 show the results, that can be summarised as follows:

- ‘Output legitimacy’ only exerts influence in five countries. Three of them are northern European countries (Denmark, Germany, and the UK) and two are eastern European countries (Poland, and Slovakia);
- ‘European identification’ drives attitudes for EU policy governance in five countries. Two of them are northern European countries (Belgium, and Denmark) and three are southern European countries (Spain, France, and Italy);
- ‘EU democracy’ only influences ‘EU governance legitimacy’ in two countries (Greece and the UK);
- Much of the influence of ‘exclusive national identification’ is an indirect effect, and this effect passes mainly through the dimension of ‘European identification’ in two third of the countries: ‘exclusive national identification’ influences ‘European identification’ and this, in turn, affects ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

Table 21 - Hierarchical SEM model - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.15	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0.12	-0.09	0.09	0.03	0.04	<b>0.23*</b>	0.07	0.11	<b>0.26*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	0.05	0.13
IDENTIFICATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.18*</b>	0.24	0.09	<b>0.72*</b>	<b>0.50*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	0.07	-0.04	0.07	-0.04	-0.15	-0.23	-0.13	-0.19
EU DEMOCRACY ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.03	0.00	0.02	<b>0.18*</b>	-0.23	0.00	-0.05	-0.06	<b>0.23*</b>	0.01	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.11
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.02	<b>0.12*</b>	-0.09	0.06	<b>0.10*</b>	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	0.05	<b>-0.33*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	35%	35%	6%	17%	42%	45%	30%	5%	22%	45%	30%	57%	28%	43%	11%
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.02	-0.05	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.05	<b>-0.13*</b>	0.00	<b>0.10*</b>	0.00	<b>0.12*</b>	0.09	0.01	0.03	-0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	66%	38%	81%	58%	32%	62%	14%	54%	68%	48%	44%	100%	56%	61%	48%
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.20*</b>	-0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	53%	69%	80%	92%	70%	97%	73%	10%	36%	42%	7%	2%	54%	7%	27%
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.02	-0.04	<b>-0.13*</b>	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	0.00	-0.04	<b>-0.15*</b>	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.09
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	44%	36%	32%	36%	49%	39%	38%	54%	7%	18%	36%	54%	55%	37%	21%
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.14	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	<b>0.11*</b>	0.09	0.08	0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.01	<b>0.16*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	9%	70%	89%	78%	73%	42%	32%	10%	70%	9%	15%	36%	37%	16%	5%
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.14*</b>	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.06	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.04	-0.10	-0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	2%	8%	25%	4%	26%	17%	18%	44%	35%	27%	13%	37%	16%	7%	32%
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.04	0.10	-0.08	0.09	<b>0.15*</b>	0.08	0.01	-0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.00	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	37%	22%	51%	3%	36%	20%	59%	70%	32%	31%	10%	32%	51%	6%	12%
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.13	0.07	-0.21	0.17	0.05	-0.09	-0.27	0.16	<b>-0.46*</b>	-0.16	-0.06	0.26	<b>-0.44*</b>	0.06	-0.26
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	6%	86%	24%	85%	49%	80%	52%	4%	4%	1%	10%	57%	8%	37%	0%
LEFT/RIGHT SQUARED ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.15	-0.01	0.10	-0.21	-0.16	0.01	0.22	-0.22	<b>0.43*</b>	0.19	-0.04	-0.29	0.31	-0.12	0.27
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	3%	50%	31%	83%	6%	70%	47%	6%	7%	0%	71%	64%	1%	7%	14%
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.06	0.10	-0.02	-0.05	<b>0.13*</b>	0.03	-0.03	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.20*</b>	-0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	8%	22%	9%	22%	35%	6%	78%	8%	52%	2%	1%	95%	51%	37%	4%

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 22 - Hierarchical SEM model - Endogenous determinants - total & indirect effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
EXCL. NAT. IDENTIF. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.20*</b>	-0.05
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect*	53%	69%	80%	92%	70%	97%	73%	10%	36%	42%	7%	2%	54%	7%	27%
% of the indirect effect via OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	34%	48%	40%	26%	9%	13%	0%	25%	54%	44%	46%	40%	51%	17%	30%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	66%	51%	59%	36%	78%	86%	100%	50%	14%	53%	32%	52%	42%	56%	59%
% of the indirect effect via EU DEMOCRACY	1%	1%	1%	38%	13%	1%	0%	25%	32%	3%	22%	8%	7%	27%	11%

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Overall, ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ are endogenous determinants of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ only in one-third of the countries. Hence, in most of the cases, they do not significantly influence support for a generic EU policy governance. Notably, they are concurrently significant only in Denmark. This means that (often) when one mechanism is working, the other one is not: this can be due to the way political parties frame public discourse on European integration (see Grande et al. 2016), resulting in the activation of different mechanisms at the individual level.

However, these results do not strongly support the hypotheses on the diffuse effect of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ across Europe. The result is even worse with respect to ‘EU democracy’, and it contrasts with the growing emphasis on the supposed democratic deficit of the EU. The most consistent result coming from this analysis is that the exclusiveness of national identifications tends to influence ‘EU governance legitimacy’ indirectly<sup>67</sup> via ‘European identification’, indicating that ‘European identification’ mediates the effect.

The next and concluding section comments the findings provided in this chapter, arguing that the weak predictive power of both exogenous and endogenous determinants of this form of EU support can depend upon the fact that ‘EU governance legitimacy’ measures a generic support for EU policy governance, instead of specific support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. Indeed, these determinants can exert different effects on different policies, but as long as the dependent variable is a latent generic support for EU governance, their real effects might not emerge.

## **6. Conclusions and further research**

This chapter analysed the determinants of the four dimensions of EU support in order to understand whether the development of these forms of EU support is explained by a common set of micro-level determinants. Results showed that four traditional exogenous determinants of EU support influence one or more dimensions, corroborating the external validity of the measurement. However, there is a core of two exogenous determinants that explain support for all (in case of ‘exclusive national identification’) or almost all (in case of ‘confidence in national institutions’) the dimensions of EU support.

The exclusiveness of respondents’ national identification strongly inhibits the development of all the forms of EU support, whereas a transfer effect from ‘confidence in national institutions’ to EU support is found for the dimensions of ‘Output legitimacy’ (support as subjective utility), ‘European identification’ (support as we-feeling), and ‘EU democracy’ (support as political representation). In addition, the strength of ‘national attachment’ is positively associated with the strength of ‘European identification’, confirming the ‘nested identity’ intuition (Risse 2004) that see European identity strongly compatible with national identity.

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<sup>67</sup> However, no evidence of this trend is found for Portugal, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.

The role of political values is also interesting because it introduces country variability in the relationship between exogenous determinants and EU support. Indeed, political values influence subjective utility ('Output legitimacy') and political representation ('EU democracy'), but the direction of the effect varies across countries and this variation seems to be partially accounted for by the respondents' geographical location: in eastern Europe respondents locating themselves on the right tend to have more positive attitudes than respondents on the left, while in western Europe this association is the opposite.

Cross-country variability also emerges when the four dimensions are placed in a specific hierarchical order: it is tested whether 'EU governance legitimacy' is directly influenced not only by exogenous determinants, but also by the other three endogenous components of EU support ('Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy'). It follows that, when a hierarchy is applied, support for a generic EU governance is considered as a consequence of the other three forms of EU support. Although the literature suggests that this form of support is contingent upon subjective utility ('Output legitimacy'), we-feelings ('European identification'), and political representation ('EU democracy'), only weak findings confirm that these endogenous determinants do influence 'EU governance legitimacy' in a consistent way across European countries. In some countries 'Output legitimacy' and 'European identification' have a significant effect, but in others they do not. Moreover, the influences of 'EU democracy' is rather absent.

How can these findings be interpreted? Some possible interpretations can be found both in Chapter 1 and 2. In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are provided. Model 1 maintains that support is contingent upon the characteristics of the policy domains and it is likely when one domain involves strong international interdependence; Model 2 conceives support for EU governance as an attitude that cross-cuts policy domains; Model 3 holds that support for EU governance is influenced by the way each policy domain is related to collective identities. Hence, in two of these models, support varies across policy domains according to the characteristics of the domain itself.

Chapter 3 confirms the presence of a unitary dimension of individual support for EU governance, proving evidence that Model 2 is useful to describe respondents' structure of opinions. However, large part of the variability of support for EU governance of specific policy domains is not explained by this generic dimension of support. For this reason, Model 1 and 3 can still correctly explain the variability of support across policy domains. The same reasoning can be applied here to the findings of this chapter. 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' can have a specific influence on the support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. This can explain why they have such a weak association with the latent dimension of 'EU governance legitimacy'. Indeed, it might be the case that a pattern of support is hidden by the fact that this latent dimension pools six

policy domains. It follows that this hypothesis needs to be tested: this is the purpose of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 5 – EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EU GOVERNANCE OF SPECIFIC AREAS

Policy-making at the EU level “can be characterized as policy without politics, which in turn makes for national politics without policy” (Schmidt 2013). This quotation by Vivien Schimdt remarks that European policy-making has gained such a prominent role in current European integration since it involves many more policy sectors than in the first thirty years of integration. Since the ‘Single European Act’ (1986), many policy areas have been gradually integrated, and the EU has acquired policy prerogatives that exceed economic regulations (Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 2005; Magalhaes 2012a, 2012b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). This chapter studies citizen support for EU governance of specific policy domains, and it does so analysing survey data about eight policy domains and testing the influence of micro (individual), meso (policy), and macro (country) level determinants on this form of EU support. At the end of the previous chapter is argued that a generic disposition towards the EU policy governance<sup>68</sup> is not consistently accounted for by micro level exogenous and endogenous determinants, except by the ‘exclusiveness’ of national identification, and that these unexpected findings can derive from the fact that these determinants can have different effects across policy sectors (i.e. subjective utility can influence support for EU governance of Immigration policy and have no influence on that for Unemployment policy). If this is the case, the effects of exogenous and endogenous determinants need to be analysed policy by policy.

In the literature, there are three possible pathways for studying the allocation of policy competences in the multilevel European system of governance. The first one focusses on States or elites’ preferences for EU governance of a policy domain. Well established theories of European integration like liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993), and neo-functionalism (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012) look at how preferences of pivotal actors (elites and institutions) are elaborated, and they account for how bargaining processes evolve to combine variegated preferences. Units of analysis are States, national Governments, national and transnational interest groups, and European institutions.

The second pathway is a normative account of whether EU governance of a policy sector corresponds to normative criteria of, for instance, effectiveness and functionality (e.g. Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; Alesina et al. 2005). Units of analysis are policy domains per se, which have some intrinsic characteristics like producing cross-country externalities or involving major budget redistributions. Cederman (2001) suggests that transferring policy prerogatives to the EU modifies national social boundaries influencing collective identities, and policy domains differ among themselves in their degree of association with the aspects of identity. A transfer of policy competences

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<sup>68</sup> Generic support for EU governance is measured as a latent dimension (‘EU governance legitimacy’) using six policy sectors as indicators of this latent disposition (see Chapters 3).

to the EU level is recommended when this produces better (according to normative criteria) policy governance and when EU policy governance does not alter dramatically citizens political identification.

The third perspective looks at the subjective legitimacy (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011) of EU governance of specific policy domains. This strand of research makes use of survey data, aggregated at country level, to assess levels of support for EU policy governance across countries, looking at macro explanations of country differences (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and studying how policy specific characteristics (meso level) influence mass attitudes towards EU policy governance (Hooghe 2003; Magalhaes 2012a).

This chapter follows the third strand of research. However, instead of looking at aggregate data, it analyses individual-level data. The purpose is to assess whether and how individual determinants, as well as national contexts and policy specific characteristics, influence approval of EU governance of eight policy sectors: Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies. In order to do so, survey data about respondents of fifteen EU countries in 2009 (Intune data: Cotta et al. 2009) and 2016 (Eurobarometer data: European Commission 2017) are analysed<sup>69</sup>.

To test hypotheses on the determinants of support for EU policy governance, a three-step approach is used. First, micro-level determinants are examined and their effects compared across policy areas. Second, the influence of policy domain characteristics is tested controlling for micro-level determinants. And third, macro-level determinants are assessed for all the eight policy areas using 2009 data (Intune data), and for Immigration and Foreign policies also with 2016 data (Eurobarometer 86.2), in both cases controlling for micro determinants. This multilevel approach is necessary because individual support for EU governance can be contingent upon policy domain attributes (individual support is nested within policy domains) and upon national contexts (individual support is nested within countries).

To accomplish this three-step approach, this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 reviews the literature on EU governance and frames the research questions. Section 2 comments cross-national differences on the level of support for EU governance of the eight domains, suggesting that differences might be explained by policy characteristics (meso level). Section 3 draws upon the literature on micro determinants of EU support and analyses their influence on support for EU governance, providing comparable results for all the eight policy areas. Section 4 adds meso level determinants and tests their effects on support for EU governance. Section 5 introduces macro level determinants to the models of Section 3 and analyses their influence, whereas Section 6 assesses

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<sup>69</sup> Comparable data for 2016 are limited to Immigration, and Foreign policies.

whether micro and macro effects vary across time, comparing effects in 2009 and in the period 2009-2016 for two policy domains (Immigration, and Foreign policy). To conclude, section 7 debates the empirical results.

Analysing 2009 data, results confirm the hypotheses on the influence of subjective utility ('Output legitimacy') and identity ('European identification', and also 'exclusive national identification') on the probability to support EU governance of specific policy domains. However, the influence of micro-level determinants varies across policy sectors according to the characteristics of the policy fields. Moreover, policy-level attributes have also a direct effect on support for EU policy governance, while macro-level determinants, instead, have a marginal role in determining this form of support. Finally, pooling survey data from 2016 with those from 2009, the analyses show that support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies is also positively influenced by the respondents' perception of political representation within EU institution (a micro-level determinant), and by the number of asylum seekers claiming international protection within each country (a macro-level determinant).

### **1. Literature on support for EU governance of specific policy domains**

The EU is currently a multi-level system of governance (Marks et al. 1996) where policy decisions are taken at different territorial levels (local, national, and European). Some policy domains are fully governed by EU institutions<sup>70</sup>, while for others the EU has shared<sup>71</sup> or supportive<sup>72</sup> competencies. Magalhaes (2012b) recalls the sequence of the transfer of competences from EU member states to the EU. The first integrated sectors were trade and agricultural policies in the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957. Then the Single European Act (1986) integrated policies regarding regional cohesion, scientific research, workers' rights and environmental protection (Magalhaes 2012b), whereas the subsequent treaties (Maastricht in 1992, Amsterdam in 1997, and Lisbon in 2007) did the same for political asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters, and foreign and security policy (Magalhaes 2012b).

However, the EU is a system of differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015), where differentiation is *horizontal* - since many policies are not uniformly integrated across the EU's

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<sup>70</sup> The EU has exclusive competence in policy sectors like customs union, competition rule for internal market, common commercial policy, monetary policy for Eurozone countries, and policy for conservation of marine biological resources (Article 3 Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007)

<sup>71</sup> The EU has shared competence with member States principally for policies regarding internal market, social policy (limited to regulatory issues on employment, and labour law and working conditions), economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and fisheries, environment, consumer protection, area of freedom, security and justice (internal border controls and common policy on asylum, immigration, and external border control), and transport (Article 4 Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007).

<sup>72</sup> The EU has supportive competences on protection and improvement of human health, industry, culture, tourism, and education. Moreover, the EU has competence to “define and implement a common foreign and security policy” (Article 2 Treaty of Lisbon – European Union 2007), although most of the decisions require unanimity among all the EU countries (see <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq?lg=en#q1> - checked 30/09/2017).

member states - and *vertical* - because integration varies across policy domains. Indeed, Alesina and his colleagues (2005) find empirical evidence that the amount of EU legislation varies considerably across policy areas. Moreover, they argue (Alesina et al. 2005) on a discrepancy between normative and actual allocation of power between EU institutions and the Member States. Their normative criteria draw upon theories of fiscal federalism (see Oates 1999), and Alesina and his colleagues maintain that “[The EU] should focus on policy areas where economies of scale are large, and internalizing externalities is important, and delegate to national or even sub-national levels of government the policy prerogatives where heterogeneity of preferences is predominant relative to the benefit of scale” (Alesina et al. 2005: 277). They show that Agriculture and International Relations are the policy sectors that diverge most from normative expectations: too much EU involvement in the former and not enough in the latter (Alesina et al. 2005).

Hooghe (2003) also underlines there is a discrepancy between elites and public attitudes towards EU policy governance, where elites are, on average, more supportive than European public on the EU integration of ‘high’ politics sectors (currency, humanitarian aid, foreign, defense, and immigration and asylum policies), while the reverse is true for social inclusion policies (Hooghe 2003).

Furthermore, Hooghe (2003) demonstrates that the level of support for EU policy governance is affected by specific characteristics of the policy domain. For elites, support is higher for policy sectors where EU governance is more effective (*functional* explanation). For the European public support, instead, is higher for policies that work as market-correcting policies (*social-model* explanation), namely policies that guarantee a EU level protection from detrimental effects of globalization (Magalhaes 2012b) and that “would distinguish ‘Europe’s social model’ from Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism” (Delors 1992 cit. in Hooghe 2003: 4, see also Börzel 2005).

However, Hooghe (2003) shows that for elites as well as for European citizens support for EU governance varies according to levels of national public expenditure on that policy field, since the higher budget allocation, the less support for EU governance (*spending* logic). The rationale is that integrating high-expenditure policies would require a different distribution of resources within and across-countries, destabilising the status quo. This would re-open political conflicts with influential social and political actors claiming back their rights (Hooghe 2003), once guaranteed by national authorities.

Magalhaes (2012b) remarks the presence of another mechanism that links policy characteristics and support for integrating its governance. He finds that support for EU policy governance depends on the degree of involvement the EU actually has in that policy field since people become habituated to EU governance where the EU has more competences (Magalhaes 2012b) (*habituation* mechanism). In his analysis (Magalhaes 2012b), the author almost entirely confirms Hooghe’s (2003) results, with the difference that Magalhaes does not find evidence supporting the *spending* logic hypothesis.

Moreover, his analysis confirms earlier findings (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) on the decreasing support for EU integration of social policies (Unemployment, Health/Welfare, and Education) in the post-Maastricht era (2012b).

The shortcomings of Hooghe (2003) and Magalhaes (2012b) analyses reside in the choice of the unit of analysis. Both make use of survey data, but they aggregate data to compute country averages, which become their units of analysis. They test whether these averages vary according to country or policy characteristics, disregarding citizen level effects. However, a long-standing literature demonstrates that attitudes towards the EU are profoundly influenced by EU citizens' interests and values (see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011 for a review), and some studies empirically show that individual opinions and characteristics also influence support for a generic form of EU policy governance (De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Lubbers and Scheepers 2005, 2010; McLaren 2007; De Winter et al. 2009; Magalhaes 2012a; see Chapter 4).

This chapter draws together these two strands of research, studying how individual (micro), as well as country (macro) determinants and policy (meso) level attributes influence support for EU governance of eight specific policy domains: Unemployment, Health care, Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Foreign, and Tax policies. However, before moving to analyse individual-level data, the next section provides an overview of country differences in the 2009 aggregate-level support for EU governance of these domains, where it emerges that support deeply varies across countries. Moreover, this analysis shows that support also varies across policies and that policy domain characteristics might explain this variation.

## **2. Aggregate level analysis**

Table 23 shows the country average support for EU governance of each of the eight policy sectors measured in 2009 by the Intune project, earlier analysed in Chapter 3<sup>73</sup>.

Policies are sorted according to their average level of support, from the lowest to the highest. Considering respondents of fifteen EU countries<sup>74</sup>, it emerges that the percentage of people who support EU policy governance is:

- Equal or less than thirty percent for Health care, Unemployment, and Agricultural policies;
- Between thirty and fifty percent for Fighting crime, Immigration, and Environmental policies;
- More than fifty percent for Tax, and Foreign policies.

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<sup>73</sup> For operationalisation of the variables see Table 8 at page 54.

<sup>74</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.

Table 23 - Country average support for EU governance. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Health</u>	<u>Unemployment</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Crime</u>	<u>Immigration</u>	<u>Environment</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Average percentage</u>
BELGIUM	33%	34%	43%	52%	56%	56%	66%	72%	52%
DENMARK	13%	19%	40%	37%	30%	54%	25%	68%	36%
GERMANY	21%	27%	45%	61%	48%	69%	63%	83%	52%
GREECE	22%	28%	24%	25%	42%	39%	67%	77%	41%
SPAIN	19%	34%	28%	57%	61%	57%	72%	82%	51%
FRANCE	28%	29%	40%	44%	59%	59%	66%	72%	50%
ITALIA	18%	30%	20%	32%	54%	40%	77%	79%	44%
PORTUGAL	27%	44%	30%	45%	57%	49%	62%	74%	49%
UK	9%	10%	16%	9%	25%	32%	33%	51%	23%
ESTONIA	10%	13%	14%	16%	21%	18%	46%	86%	28%
HUNGARY	21%	30%	28%	51%	52%	58%	70%	82%	49%
POLAND	24%	28%	29%	43%	52%	41%	75%	84%	47%
SLOVAKIA	25%	32%	37%	66%	58%	44%	71%	87%	53%
SLOVENIA	20%	29%	26%	41%	40%	44%	60%	72%	41%
BULGARIA	16%	16%	25%	35%	54%	47%	65%	85%	43%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>44%</b>
<i>Min</i>	<i>9%</i>	<i>10%</i>	<i>14%</i>	<i>9%</i>	<i>21%</i>	<i>18%</i>	<i>25%</i>	<i>51%</i>	
<i>Max</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>44%</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>66%</i>	<i>61%</i>	<i>69%</i>	<i>77%</i>	<i>87%</i>	
<i>N. Cases</i>	<i>14174</i>	<i>13974</i>	<i>13973</i>	<i>13797</i>	<i>13922</i>	<i>13803</i>	<i>13582</i>	<i>13683</i>	
<i>N. Missing</i>	<i>916</i>	<i>1116</i>	<i>1117</i>	<i>1293</i>	<i>1168</i>	<i>1287</i>	<i>1508</i>	<i>1407</i>	

There is an important variation across countries, and the UK, Estonia, and Denmark exhibit the highest opposition towards EU policy governance<sup>75</sup>. Estonia supports only a common Foreign policy, whereas UK citizens are (almost) equally split among supporters and rejecters of EU governance of this domain. Besides supporting Foreign policy governance, Denmark also favours a common European policy on Environment. The other countries do not display remarkable patterns, except Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Spain, where support is consistently above the European average.

Drawing upon the studies presented above (Hooghe 2003; Magalhaes 2012b; for *functional interdependence* see also Schimmelfennig et al. 2015), support for EU governance is expected to be influenced by the characteristics of the policy domains. As a first assessment of this hypothesis, the eight policy domains are aggregated according to four criteria: *functional interdependence*, *social-model*, *spending*, and *EU competences*. Table 24 displays policy aggregation on these criteria<sup>76</sup>.

Table 24 - Characteristics of the policy domains. Source Magalhaes (2012b) and author's coding for Tax policy

POLICY	POLICY ATTRIBUTES			
	Interdependence [1 = YES, 0 = NO]	Social-model [1 = YES, 0 = NO]	Gov. Spending [from 0 = None, to 1 = Very high]	EU Competences [from 0 = None, to 1 = Very high]
<u>Health</u>	0	1	1	0
<u>Unemployment</u>	0	1	0.75	0.5
<u>Agriculture</u>	0	0	0.5	1
<u>Crime</u>	1	0	0.5	0.5
<u>Immigration</u>	1	0	0.25	0.5
<u>Environment</u>	1	1	0.5	0.5
<u>Tax</u>	0	1	0	0
<u>Foreign</u>	1	0	0	0

Four hypotheses are proposed to account for the influence of these policy characteristics: support for EU governance is expected to be higher for sectors either with *functional interdependence* ( $H_{pinterdependence}$ ), that define a EU *social-model* ( $H_{psocial-model}$ ), or already deeply integrated ( $H_{pEU-competences}$ ), whereas it should be lower for large-expenditure sectors ( $H_{psgiving}$ ). Here, these hypotheses are investigated pooling sectors according to the four criteria (*functional interdependence*, *social-model*, *spending*, *EU competences*), and then analysing the variation of the average support.

Figure 18 shows that policy domains with *functional interdependence* exhibit higher support in all the fifteen countries ( $H_{pinterdependence}$ ). Figure 19 shows, instead, the absence of strong evidence supporting the *social-model* hypothesis ( $H_{psocial-model}$ ). Figure 20 suggests that national budget allocation is particularly telling for how support for EU governance works, sustaining the *spending*

<sup>75</sup> As methodological note, missing data are excluded from the analyses.

<sup>76</sup> Coding for all the policy domain except for Tax policies is taken by Magalhaes (2012b). A common tax policy is coded as a 'market-correcting' policy (*social-model* type).

hypothesis ( $H_{p_{spending}}$ ). Finally, Figure 21 does not confirm the expected positive relationship between actual EU competences and support for EU policy governance ( $H_{p_{EU-competences}}$ ). On the contrary, it shows the presence of the opposite effect: the greater EU competences in a policy field and the less public support.

Figure 18 - Functional interdependence. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)




Figure 19 - Social-model. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)




Figure 20 - Spending. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)





Figure 21 - EU competences. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)



This preliminary analysis should be taken with a grain of salt since it is simply a bivariate association with aggregate data. In Section 4 these hypotheses are re-assessed using a multivariate analysis on individual-level data, controlling for theory-based micro-level determinants of EU support. The literature on micro-level determinants was already been introduced in Chapter 4, and the next section briefly recalls it, testing also whether micro determinants influence the support for EU governance of the eight policy domains.

### 3. Micro-level determinants

In order to integrate results presented above, it is necessary to move to the micro-foundations of this form of EU support. In Chapter 4 two types of micro-level determinants are discussed: exogenous and endogenous determinants. The term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition and measurement of the concept of EU support, and they are considered as antecedents of all the four different forms of EU support identified in Chapter 2. Endogenous determinants are, instead, dimensions of the concept of EU support that are conceived as antecedents in the development of specific forms of EU support. In Chapter 4, ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’ are considered as endogenous determinants of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, a dimension of EU support that defines a generic support for a EU-level policy governance. In this chapter, instead, they are considered as endogenous determinants of support for EU governance of each of the eight

policy domains<sup>77</sup>. The argument reported in Chapter 4 about a potential influence of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ on generic support for EU policy governance holds as well for this form of policy-specific support.

Therefore, there are six exogenous determinants (‘objective utility’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, ‘exclusive national identification’, ‘national attachment’, ‘cognitive mobilization’, and ‘political values’) and three endogenous determinants (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’ and ‘EU democracy’) (see Sections 1 and 5 of Chapter 4). Table 25 reports the direction of the expected influence of these micro determinants on support for EU governance as it emerges from the literature on EU support. Ten hypotheses on their effects are provided. ‘Objective utility’ (Hp<sub>1</sub>), ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Hp<sub>6</sub>), ‘Output legitimacy’ (Hp<sub>8</sub>), ‘European identification’ (Hp<sub>9</sub>), and ‘EU democracy’ (Hp<sub>10</sub>) are expected to be positively associated with support for EU policy governance; while ‘exclusive national identification’ (Hp<sub>4</sub>) and ‘national attachment’ (Hp<sub>5</sub>) are expected to have a negative influence. As for ‘political values’, extremist (both on the left and the right) are supposed to reject EU policy governance, whereas centrists are expected to support it (Hp<sub>7</sub>). Finally, the role of ‘confidence in national institutions’ is still debated in the literature: some argue on a transfer mechanism from the national to the European institutions (Hp<sub>2</sub>), while others on a substitution mechanism (Hp<sub>3</sub>), where EU governance is preferred by those who see their national institutions as corrupted.

Table 25 - Direction of the expected influence of micro determinants

<b>DETERMINANTS</b>	<b>EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY</b>
<b><i>EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT</i></b>	
Hp <sub>1</sub> - Objective utility	+
Hp <sub>2</sub> - Confidence in national institutions (Transfer)	+
Hp <sub>3</sub> - Confidence in national institutions (Substitution)	-
Hp <sub>4</sub> - Exclusive national identification	-
Hp <sub>5</sub> - National attachment	-
Hp <sub>6</sub> - Cognitive mobilization	+
Hp <sub>7</sub> - Political values	extreme left and right: - for centre: +
<b><i>ENDOGENOUS DETERMINANT</i></b>	
Hp <sub>8</sub> - Output legitimacy	+
Hp <sub>9</sub> - European identification	+
Hp <sub>10</sub> - EU democracy	+

<sup>77</sup> In chapters 3 and 4 the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ is measured using six of these eight policy domains as indicators.

Following the design already employed in Chapter 4, nine (plus one squared term) individual-level variables<sup>78</sup> are used as proxies of the exogenous determinants, while the three endogenous determinants are tapped with three latent dimensions of EU support:

- ‘Objective utility’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’ and ‘Education’;
- ‘Confidence in national institutions’ via the proxy variable: ‘Trust in the national government’;
- ‘Exclusive national identification’ via the dummy variable that detects those with ‘Exclusive national identification’;
- The strength of ‘national attachment’ is measured with the variable ‘National attachment’;
- ‘Cognitive mobilization’ is measured via two proxy variables: ‘Knowledge of the EU’ and ‘Education’;
- ‘Political values’ are measured with a variable tapping ‘Left/right self-placement’ plus the variable squared ‘Left/right squared’, since this is the instrument to test the supposed curvilinear relationship between Left/right and EU support;
- ‘Gender female’ and ‘Age’ are included in the model as controls;
- ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are measured as latent dimensions using the MGCFA model of Chapter 3<sup>79</sup> (see Figure 15 at page 60);

Eight multilevel logit regressions with dichotomic dependent variable are performed (one for each policy) with the pooled dataset of fifteen countries, and for taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data country fixed effects are included<sup>80</sup>. Table 26 displays results for all the policy sectors<sup>81</sup>. Effects are expressed in logit coefficients and are comparable, since all the variables are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1. What emerges is that ‘Output legitimacy’ (Hp<sub>8</sub>) and ‘European identification’ (Hp<sub>9</sub>) have a consistent significant effect across policy areas (except for Environmental policy, where ‘European identification’ does not have a significant influence). In three sectors (Unemployment, Health care, and Tax) the effect of ‘European identification’ is two times that of ‘Output legitimacy’. This means that ‘European identification’ highly discriminates between supporters and rejecters of integration in three out of the four policy sectors that defines a European *social-model* (see Table 24

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<sup>78</sup> For operationalization and descriptive statistics see Chapter 4.

<sup>79</sup> ‘Output Legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ are factor scores measured in Chapter 3 using MGCFA. Since these latent variables are not measured with a bounded scale, they are rescaled to vary from 0 to 1 using this formula:  $(\text{value} - \text{minimum}) / (\text{maximum} - \text{minimum})$ .

<sup>80</sup> Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using xtlogit command. Syntax in appendix C.

<sup>81</sup> In order to check stability of results and considering the theorized difference between Catholic/Orthodox and Protestant/mixed religion countries (see Section 5), results are contrasted between the two groups. Analyses are reported in Table 56a-b-c in Appendix B. However, there are no remarkable differences between the two groups.

at page 95). On the other hand, ‘Output legitimacy’ is the first driver of support for common Environmental, Immigration, and Foreign policies – all domains characterized by *functional interdependence* (see Table 24 at page 95) – showing that an instrumental logic plays a leading part in supporting integration.

Table 26 - Fixed effect logit model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009). Logit coefficients are reported.

MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANT	<u>Health</u>	<u>Unemploy.</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Crime</u>	<u>Immigrat.</u>	<u>Environm.</u>	<u>Tax</u>	<u>Foreign</u>
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>1.2*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>0.93*</b>	<b>1.1*</b>	<b>0.67*</b>	<b>1.63*</b>
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICAT.	<b>1.13*</b>	<b>1.27*</b>	<b>0.9*</b>	<b>0.68*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	0.22	<b>1.34*</b>	<b>0.96*</b>
EU DEMOCRACY	0.33	0.11	<b>0.42*</b>	0.10	0.21	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>
Gender female	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0.06	0.02	<b>0.17*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>
Age	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.36*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>-0.28*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>	<b>0.77*</b>
SES: Socio-economic status	<b>-0.38*</b>	-0.16	-0.09	<b>-0.19*</b>	0.01	-0.04	<b>-0.31*</b>	-0.13
Knowledge of the EU	-0.15	0.03	<b>0.2*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	0.02	<b>0.41*</b>
Education	<b>-0.26*</b>	-0.02	<b>0.19*</b>	0.13	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.58*</b>	-0.12	<b>0.32*</b>
Exclusive national identification	-0.10	<b>-0.14*</b>	<b>-0.28*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>
Trust in the national Government	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	-0.02	-0.07	-0.09	<b>-0.25*</b>	0.05
National attachment	<b>-0.64*</b>	<b>-0.36*</b>	<b>-0.46*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	-0.12	<b>-0.44*</b>	-0.15
Left/right self-placement	<b>-0.79*</b>	<b>-0.91*</b>	-0.35	0.06	-0.29	-0.47	-0.27	<b>1.07*</b>
Left/right self-placement squared	<b>0.61*</b>	<b>0.69*</b>	0.10	-0.29	-0.13	0.06	0.10	<b>-1.15*</b>

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p < 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

However, with regards to ‘objective utility’ ( $H_{p1}$ ), ‘Socio-economic status (SES)’ is not positively associated with EU governance in any policy areas, and it is negatively associated in three of them (Fighting crime, Health care, and Tax policies). The other proxy of ‘objective utility’, namely ‘Education’, has a positive effect on support for EU governance of four policy sectors (Agricultural, Environment, Immigration, and Foreign policies), but a negative effect on Health care policy. Combining these findings, it emerges that an instrumental logic passes through subjective (‘Output legitimacy’) rather than objective utility.

Compared to ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’, ‘EU democracy’ (Hp<sub>10</sub>) has only a minor role in four areas (Agriculture, Environment, Tax, and Foreign policies), a sign of a relatively lower salience of this issue (at least in 2009). Considering the emphasis on this issue in the literature (see e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Schmidt 2013) perceived ‘democratic deficit’ was expected to have a higher discriminatory power, and this result does not fully confirm earlier empirical studies (McLaren 2007; Magalhaes 2012b)<sup>82</sup>.

The effect of ‘trust in the national government’ shows that a ‘substitution’ mechanisms is active in four policy domains (Hp<sub>3</sub>). Indeed, for social (Unemployment and Health care), Agricultural, and Tax policies, EU citizens tend to support a transfer of competencies to the EU when they distrust their national government. This confirms the findings of Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), although his object of study was not support for EU policy governance. This result should be read in combination with the findings of Chapter 4 since in those analyses ‘Trust in the national government’ was positively – and not negatively – associated with the other dimensions of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’).

In addition, ‘national attachment’ is another example of an attitude that has different effects when changing the object of support. Indeed, it is negatively associated with preferences for EU governance in six policy areas (Hp<sub>5</sub>), while it was a leading driver of ‘European identification’ (see Chapter 4). This means that two mechanisms are working concurrently, one favouring a European community building project, and the other one opposing a European policy governance. Considered together, it is evident that EU governance is (correctly) perceived as a substitute of national governance, and this contrasts with the preferences of those attached to their national level. As for the role played by ‘exclusive national identification’, it confirms being a source of opposition towards EU governance (Hp<sub>4</sub>), since it decreases the probability to support EU governance for seven policy domains.

The hypothesis on the influence of ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Hp<sub>6</sub>) involved two proxies: ‘Education’ and ‘Knowledge of the EU’. As already reported, ‘Education’ is positively associated with support for EU governance of four policy sectors, and negatively for one sector, while ‘Knowledge of the EU’ has a positive effect on five sectors (Fighting crime, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, and Foreign policies). Hence, this hypothesis can be accepted.

Finally, the hypothesised curvilinear relationship between left/right self-placement and support for EU policy governance is confirmed only for Foreign policy (Hp<sub>7</sub>). Some specifications should be provided. It is true that a curvilinear relationship fits data well for three policy areas (Unemployment, Health care, and Foreign policies) (see Table 26), but in two out of the three cases respondents on the two extremes are more supportive than centrists, and this contradicts the hypothesis. Computing

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<sup>82</sup> More on this in Section 6.

predicted probabilities<sup>83</sup>, it emerges that most of the curvilinearity is due to the left side, where people are more supportive than in the centre and on the right side. Running the model again without the squared term, a significant linear relationship appears for all the policy areas but Foreign policy (Table 27), with the result that the more respondent is right wing, the more it opposes EU policy governance.

Table 27 - Left/Right linear. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANT</b>	<b><u>Health</u></b>	<b><u>Unemploy.</u></b>	<b><u>Agriculture</u></b>	<b><u>Crime</u></b>	<b><u>Immigrat.</u></b>	<b><u>Environm.</u></b>	<b><u>Tax</u></b>	<b><u>Foreign</u></b>
Left/right self-placement linear effect	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.41*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.07

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Overall, the effect of micro-level determinants is not the same in all the policy areas. ‘European identification’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ are the predominant drivers of EU support. The latter is more influential in policy areas where *functional interdependence* is present, while the former leads support in domains that constitute a European *social-model*. The other determinants have certainly a role, but their magnitude is lower. It is important to note that ‘confidence in national institutions’ and political representation within the EU (‘EU democracy’) have an influence in some but not all policy domains, meaning that the overall salience of these factors is lower. Finally, as noted in Chapter 4, the relationship with political left/right is largely linear, and right-wing respondents exhibit lower support than left-wing. These findings contradict prior studies (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers 2010; Van Elsas and Van der Brug 2014), showing the two extremes do not converge in opposing European policy governance. To conclude, these analyses suggest that the characteristics of the policy domains modify the effect of micro-level determinants (especially ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’), but it does not analyse their direct influence on support for EU governance: this issue is addressed in the next section, where policy-level attributes enter the model.

#### 4. Testing policy-level hypotheses

This section focusses on the four policy-level hypotheses proposed in Section 2. They maintain that support for EU governance of specific policy domains is more likely when EU governance is more effective ( $H_{pinterdependence}$ ), or it guarantees a EU level protection from detrimental effects of globalisation ( $H_{psocial-model}$ ) (Magalhaes 2012b), or the EU has already strong competences in that field ( $H_{pEU-competences}$ ); conversely, support for EU governance is less likely for policy domains that are extensively financed by the national government ( $H_{p_spending}$ ).

<sup>83</sup> Not shown, available by request.

In order to test these hypotheses controlling for alternative micro-level explanations, the dataset is restructured as a stacked dataset, using the following procedure: N respondents were asked about eight policy domains, and, thus, there are eight dichotomous variables (support for EU vs national or sub-national governance) and N respondents. To create the stacked format, each respondent is included eight times in the dataset, one time for each policy domains. This brings the total number of cases to N\*8. Instead of having eight separated policy variables, a new variable is computed: it contains the value of the first policy variable for case 1 to case N, the value of the second policy variable from case N+1 to case 2\*N, and so on for the remaining six policy variables. Afterwards, this new variable becomes the dependent variable of a logit regression, and the same micro-level variables of Section 3 are included as determinants of its outcomes. As well, policy level characteristics introduced in Section 2 and reported in Table 24 at page 95 (*functional interdependence, social-model, government spending, and EU competences*) are included in the model<sup>84</sup>.

Sixteen models are tested: one for each country, and one for the pooled dataset where country-level differences are accounted for by country dummies. Table 28 displays the effects<sup>85</sup> of the policy level determinants<sup>86</sup> in these sixteen models. Starting from the pooled model, all the four effects are significant. The highest effect is given by level of governmental spending on a policy field: the higher the budget allocation that a policy field requires, the lower the support for EU policy governance (*H<sub>p<sub>spending</sub></sub>*). This confirms earlier findings (Hooghe 2003), showing that when the cost in terms of national redistribution of resources is large, support for a policy level shift substantially decreases. Looking at the country models, in every country the direction of the effect is the same, providing even more support to this argument. This suggest that a wider EU governance is unlikely to be legitimate if this would involve policy domains deeply financed with national taxes.

The second in order of magnitude is the effect of actual EU competences. Magalhaes (2012b) provides findings supporting a positive relationship between actual competences and support for EU governance, but results of this analysis do not confirm this hypothesis (*H<sub>pEU-competences</sub>*), and proves that, controlling for the other three characteristics, the more competences the EU has in one field, the lower is support for EU governance of that policy field<sup>87</sup>. The supposed *habituation* mechanism is, instead, a *disaffection* mechanism. When the EU is responsible for policy governance, its decisions are not fully approved by citizens: this is shown by the fact that experiencing EU governance

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<sup>84</sup> To account for the fact that policies are clustered within respondents, a panel data correction procedure is employed (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) (see Appendix C for Stata syntax).

<sup>85</sup> The effect is expressed in logit coefficient.

<sup>86</sup> Since the focus of this section is on policy level determinants, individual level parameters are not shown in the text. Full results are available by request.

<sup>87</sup> This result confirms what already suggested by aggregate level analysis in the concluding of Section 2.

decreases individual support for EU policy governance. However, Denmark, and to some extent Germany, are outliers. Indeed, evidence of the *habituation* mechanism is found in Denmark, where EU competences have a positive influence, while in Germany none of the two mechanisms (*habituation* vs *disaffection*) drives individual-level support. Within the framework of this thesis, no explanation accounting for Denmark are provided, and further researches should replicate these findings for taking this result as confirmed.

Table 28 - Random intercepts policy model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

MODEL	POLICY ATTRIBUTES			
	Interdependence [1 = YES, 0 = NO]	Gov. Spending [from 0 = None, to 1 = Very high]	Social-model [1 = YES, 0 = NO]	EU Competences [from 0 = None, to 1 = Very high]
Country dummy	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>-2.38*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>-0.68*</b>
Belgium	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>-1.76*</b>	0.06	<b>-0.36*</b>
Denmark	<b>1.53*</b>	<b>-2.16*</b>	0.09	<b>0.95*</b>
Germany	<b>1.41*</b>	<b>-3.11*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	0.05
Greece	0.09	<b>-2.6*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	<b>-1.32*</b>
Spain	<b>0.93*</b>	<b>-2.75*</b>	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>-0.78*</b>
France	<b>0.73*</b>	<b>-2.93*</b>	<b>0.3*</b>	<b>-0.61*</b>
Italy	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>-3.63*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>-1.45*</b>
Portugal	<b>0.57*</b>	<b>-1.73*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>-0.69*</b>
UK	<b>1.25*</b>	<b>-4.49*</b>	<b>0.69*</b>	<b>-1.18*</b>
Estonia	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>-3.05*</b>	<b>-0.6*</b>	<b>-2.02*</b>
Hungary	<b>0.78*</b>	<b>-2.47*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>-0.84*</b>
Poland	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>-3.44*</b>	-0.01	<b>-1.47*</b>
Slovakia	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>-2.75*</b>	<b>-0.36*</b>	<b>-0.78*</b>
Slovenia	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>-2.18*</b>	<b>0.26*</b>	<b>-0.76*</b>
Bulgaria	<b>0.74*</b>	<b>-3.38*</b>	0.01	<b>-0.93*</b>

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

The third effect is that of *functional interdependence*. Higher support for EU governance is expected for policies that should - normatively speaking - be decided at the supranational level. This hypothesis is confirmed ( $H_{p_{Interdependence}}$ ) by the pooled model (country dummies) as well as by separated country models (but the effect is not significant in Greece). This support the idea that citizens are receptive to normative arguments, and favour EU governance when it is necessary to effectively pursue policy goals.

The last policy characteristic is the one with the smallest effect and where the country level variation is remarkable. The *social-model* hypothesis ( $H_{p_{social-model}}$ ) prescribes that support is higher when policy integration would produce a social Europe that corrects market and globalisation failures with European level policies. The pooled model supports this hypothesis, although the effect is

decisively low. Decomposing global effect in country effects, it emerges that in nine out of fifteen countries this effect is small but positive and significant. In four countries (Belgium, Denmark, Poland, and Bulgaria) is not significant, and in the remaining two (Estonia, and Slovakia) the direction is even negative, contrasting with the expectations. Therefore, in eastern Europe, this hypothesis is much less convincing than in western Europe. This might depend on the different meaning that EU integration has in western and eastern Europe (adapting an intuition of Medrano 2003).

Overall, these results shed light on the influence of policy characteristics on support for their integration. As shown, most of the influence derives from a simple spending logic: respondents want governance of high-spending policy remains within their national state borders. Hooghe (2003) maintains that this opposition originates from a willingness to preserve the status quo, which has its roots in societal conflicts already solved. I propose another explanation of why people do not support the integration of high-spending policies. My idea is in line with the subsidiarity principle. People are likely to prefer policy governance to be as close as possible to them. This is even more important in the case of large expenditure policies. People may want to change the status quo, but they can do it easily if policies are governed at the national or subnational level. In some policy areas, there is a trade-off between effectiveness and the national (or local) governance, and this generates higher (but not full) support for EU governance, but not in all of them. In the absence of this trade-off, the most rational choice is the national (or local) level.

## **5. Testing macro-level hypotheses**

In the previous sections, micro and policy-level determinants were tested. At the micro level, ‘European identification’ and ‘Output legitimacy’ drive support for EU governance of specific policy domains, while other citizens’ attitudes and characteristics have a secondary role. At the meso-level, respondents mainly support EU governance of policy sectors that have a low impact on country’s budget and for which the EU has, currently, low powers. This section surveys the literature on macro determinants, providing hypotheses and testing the effect of macro determinants on support for EU governance of the eight policy domains. The measurement strategy for each of the macro determinants included in the analysis is reported in the text footnotes.

Macro-level mechanisms are more complex and less straightforward than micro-level. For instance, some studies demonstrate that macro determinants do not directly influence EU support (Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998b), and recent studies show that more than having a direct effect, national contexts change the effect of individual-level determinants (Hobolt and de Vries 2017; see also Brinegar et al. 2004; Garry and Tilley 2009).

However, Magalhaes (2012a) shows that the quality of national governance influences the support towards a generic EU policy governance, both directly – better national governance decreases respondent willingness to transfer policy competences to the EU – and indirectly – effects of micro-

level attitudes vary according to the quality of the national governance. Unfortunately, the limited number of countries (fifteen) in the dataset here employed (Intune 2009) does not allow testing cross-level effects for all the eight policy domains separately (see Stegmueller 2013), and for this reason, in relation to all these eight policies, only a direct effect of quality of governance<sup>88</sup> will be tested ( $Hp_{govquality}$ ).

Furthermore, in the literature, a highly relevant contextual determinant is *politicisation* (de Wilde 2011; Grande et al. 2016). The concept of politicisation is defined by Grande and his colleagues (2016) as the transfer of societal conflicts into the party system, and by de Wilde as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (de Wilde 2011: 560).

There are two opposite beliefs about the effects of politicisation: some see it as a fundamental driver of EU legitimacy (e.g. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), otherwise EU governance is simply “policy without politics” (Schmidt 2013); while others see politicisation as a product of Eurosceptic claims leaning to open room for further opposition (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hooghe et al. 2017).

The results of the process of politicisation are visible in the party positions regarding the EU and its policy competences. In this chapter, three proxies are used to tap this party support in the fifteen national party systems: (1) the party system average of party support for European integration, (2) the party system average of party evaluation of benefit from EU membership, and (3) the party system average on party support of transferring competencies to the EU. The first two are measured using the Chapel hill expert survey 2010 (Bakker et al. 2015)<sup>89</sup>, and the third one with data from the 2009 Euromanifesto study (Braun et al. 2010)<sup>90</sup>. It is expected a positive influence on support for EU governance of all three measures of party system positions, where the more is the party system support, the more likely is the respondents support for EU policy governance ( $Hp_{partysystem}$ ).

Besides differences between party systems, national religious culture is within the set of macro-level explanations that account for cross-country differences. Boomgaarden and Freire (2009) empirically test whether different religious traditions play a role in influencing support towards the

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<sup>88</sup> The measure of quality of national governance is taken from *The Quality of Government OECD dataset* and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017).

<sup>89</sup> Each party position is weighted for the relative salience of European integration for that party (adapting an intuition provided by Grande et al. 2016), and for the percentage of votes received in 2009 European Elections, or last general election when missing.

<sup>90</sup> An index of party system support for EU power is computed as follows: (1) for each party, I aggregate positive statements for competences delegated to the EU in general, the European Parliament, and the Commission; (2) I aggregate negative statements of the same categories; (3) following Lowe (et al. 2011) formula I compute the difference between natural logarithm of [total positive + 0.5], and natural logarithm of [total negative + 0.5]; (3) I weight party position for the percentage of party votes in 2009 European Elections, or last general election when missing; (4) I calculate the country average summing these weighted party polarizations separately for each country, and, then, dividing for the sum of votes for each national party.

EU. They find that Protestant and mixed religion countries are more Eurosceptic than Catholic and Orthodox. According to Boomgaarden and Freire (2009), this confirms that religious context and religious tradition influence attitudes on the EU and a supranational centralised authority. Their principal argument for this division resides in the fact that “[...] the project of European unification is based on Christian values such as charity, peace and social justice (see Madeley 2007)” (Boomgaarden and Freire 2009). Then, the hypothesis accounts for this difference in EU support between Protestant/mixed religion countries and Catholic/Orthodox countries<sup>91</sup> (*H<sub>p</sub>religion*).

Furthermore, there are six other hypotheses that are policy specific. The first one links country unemployment rate<sup>92</sup> with preferences for EU governance of this policy field. The idea is that in case of high unemployment rate, EU citizens may support a transfer of competences towards the EU, expecting the EU to increase social security measure financing high spending policies (*H<sub>p</sub>unemployment*).

A similar mechanism is supposed for the case of Environmental policy. When environmental protection<sup>93</sup> is loosely guaranteed by national governments, citizens can look to the EU for dealing with this issue (*H<sub>p</sub>environmental*).

Moreover, one can argue that when in a member country there is an important number of migrants claiming international protection (asylum seekers<sup>94</sup>), citizens are likely to ask the EU to manage (or finance the management of) this migration. Indeed, the Dublin regulation<sup>95</sup> establishes that the Member States are responsible for examining migrants’ applications for international protection. Hence, EU rules oblige arrival countries to manage immigration, and when this becomes problematic, citizens can require more EU governance of this issue (*H<sub>p</sub>immigration*). In addition, the number of asylum seekers may have an impact on citizens’ support for a EU Foreign policy. Since the EU may collaborate with third states (i.e. Turkey, Libya or Egypt) to manage the immigration influx, citizens can support more EU competences to easily arrange this kind of agreements (*H<sub>p</sub>foreign*).

Furthermore, national public health care system has a valuable variability across EU countries, and, as part of the welfare state, it has already been related to EU support (see Brinegar and Jolly 2005). In this analysis, it is supposed that when public expenditure for health care system<sup>96</sup> is high, support for a EU governance of this domain is unlikely (*H<sub>p</sub>health*). Indeed, there are no incentives for

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<sup>91</sup> Country religious context is defined following Boomgaarden and Freire (2009). Germany and Estonia are mixed religion countries, Denmark and the UK are Protestant, Greece and Bulgaria are Orthodox, and the others are Catholic.

<sup>92</sup> Unemployment rate is taken from *The Quality of Government OECD dataset* and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017).

<sup>93</sup> Index of environmental protection is taken from *The Quality of Government OECD dataset* and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017).

<sup>94</sup> Number of asylum seeker per country is taken from Eurostat data and refers to the year 2008: [http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr\\_asydcfsta&lang=en](http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asydcfsta&lang=en). (checked 30/09/2017)

<sup>95</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN-IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&fromTab=ALL&from=EN> (checked 30/09/2017)

<sup>96</sup> Percentage of yearly public expenditure on health care system relative to government budget is taken from *The Quality of Government OECD dataset* and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017).

demanding a shift of authority. Conversely, when public investment is low, citizens can advocate an EU intervention in the field.

Finally, the last hypothesis considers Agricultural policy. This field is one of the most integrated domains in the EU, and the EU devotes about 45% of its budget to the common Agricultural policy<sup>97</sup>. For this reason, it is expected that the more important is the Agricultural sector for the national GDP<sup>98</sup>, the higher is support for EU governance of this domain ( $Hp_{agriculture}$ ).

Table 29 below reports the list of these hypotheses with the expected influence on support for EU policy governance.

Table 29 - Direction of the expected influence of macro determinants

<b>MACRO EXOGENOUS DETERMINANTS</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b> <i>Expected effect</i>
HP <sub>govquality</sub> : Quality of national governance	+ (for all the eight policies)
HP <sub>partysystem</sub> : Party system EU support	+ (for all the eight policies)
HP <sub>religion</sub> : Catholic/Orthodox countries	+ (for all the eight policies)
HP <sub>unemployment</sub> : Unemployment rate	+ (for Unemployment policy)
HP <sub>environment</sub> : Environmental protection	- (for Environmental policy)
HP <sub>immigration</sub> : Number of asylum seekers	+ (for Immigration policy)
HP <sub>foreign</sub> : Number of asylum seekers	+ (for Foreign policy)
HP <sub>health</sub> : National public expenditure for health care system	- (for Health care policy)
HP <sub>agriculture</sub> : Importance of agricultural sector for the national GDP	+ (for Agricultural policy)

Ten macro-level variables are used to test these hypotheses, and four additional control variables are included as well in the model: one that accounts for length of country EU membership, one for geographic location (northern, eastern, or southern Europe), one for GDP pro-capita, and another one that accounts for horizontal differentiation among countries (Schimmelfennig et al. 2015) dividing countries in Eurozone and not Eurozone members.

The analysis proceeds as follows: this section tests the effects of macro determinants on support for EU governance of eight policy areas using data from the 2009 dataset; afterwards, in the next section pooling data from the 2016 EB survey, these effects are tested again for two policy areas (Immigration, and Foreign policies). Table 30a-b provides country values of macro variables for the years 2008 and 2015 - except data from Chapel hill expert surveys that refer to years 2010 (Bakker et al. 2015) and 2014 (Polk et al. 2017), and those from Euromanifesto study that refer to years 2009 (Braun et al. 2010) and 2014 (Schmitt 2016). Variables that initially do not range between 0 and 1 are rescaled to vary between this range<sup>99</sup>. Unfortunately, many macro data are missing for Bulgaria.

<sup>97</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf) (checked 30/09/2017)

<sup>98</sup> Percentage of agriculture on country GDP is taken from *The Quality of Government OECD dataset* and refers to the year 2008 (Teorell et al. 2017).

<sup>99</sup> When variables are not dichotomic, or they do not have been measured with a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, variables are rescaled using this formula:  $(\text{value} - \text{minimum}) / (\text{maximum} - \text{minimum})$ . Index of party system support for EU

To limit this problem, and to deal with another potential bias that comes from the limited number of countries (see Stegmueller 2013) I decided to divide macro variables in three blocks: (1) party system ('EU support', 'EU benefit', and 'EU powers'), (2) history and culture ('length of membership', 'location', 'Eurozone membership', and 'Catholic or Orthodox country'), and (3) society and economy ('quality of governance', 'GDP pro-capita', 'unemployment rate', 'public health expenditure', 'GDP from agriculture', 'environmental protection', and 'asylum seekers'). Therefore, for each policy domain, three multilevel logit models with random intercept (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) are run. For each model, the same micro-level exogenous and endogenous determinants are included (see Section 3), and only country-level variables differ. This design limits at most any variation of individual-level parameters, since they remain rather stable across the three different models, but allows testing all the hypotheses, which otherwise would not be possible.

Table 31 displays the results for all the eight policy sectors in 2009<sup>100</sup>. Individual-level variables do not vary their effects from previous results (see Section 3), remaining stable when moving from fixed country intercepts to random intercepts modelling<sup>101</sup>. Focussing on macro effects, looking at this table it emerges a very poor influence of country-level determinants, with a few, policy specific, exceptions.

Within the cluster of history and culture, only religious traditions confirm their relevance in influencing support for European integration: support for EU policy governance is more likely in Catholic or Orthodox countries with regards to common Unemployment, Health care, Immigration, and Tax policies. Hence,  $H_{p_{religion}}$  is partly verified, although it is not valid for all the policy domains.

Furthermore, the not significant effects of party system characteristics demonstrate that national party systems do not consistently influence policy governance preferences. It is true that party system position matters for Unemployment and Foreign policies, however, this effect is either modest (for Unemployment policy) or unclear (for Foreign policy). In this latter case, two indicators of party system position manifest divergent effects, resulting in an unclear pattern<sup>102</sup>. Moreover, for Tax policy, the effect of the party system is the opposite of what expected. All things considered, these results do not confirm the party system hypothesis ( $H_{p_{partysystem}}$ ).

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power, length of membership, absolute number of asylum seekers, and GDP pro capita are all rescaled in this way. Therefore, the lowest value among the fifteen countries equals 0 and the highest value is 1. Unemployment rate, percentage of budget for public health system, percentage of GDP from agriculture, and index of environmental protection have a scale that ranges from 0 to 100 (%), and so their values are divided by 100.

<sup>100</sup> Effects are expressed in logit coefficients.

<sup>101</sup> Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using xtlogit command. Syntax in Appendix C.

<sup>102</sup> Since for this policy there are data available for both 2009 and 2016, I will return on this later.

Table 30a - Country values of macro variables

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Scale party system - EU support [0-1]</b>		<b>Scale party system - EU benefit [0-1]</b>		<b>GDP PRO CAPITA *normalized [0-1]</b>		<b>Lenght of membership *normalized [0,1]</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>UNEMPL. RATE [0-1]</b>	<b>BUDGET PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM [0-1]</b>
	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2009-2016</i>	<i>2009-2016</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2008</i>
BELGIUM	0.81	0.79	0.87	0.86	0.87	0.72	1.00	1 = North	0.07	0.15
DENMARK	0.55	0.45	0.64	0.50	1.00	1.00	0.68	1 = North	0.03	0.17
GERMANY	0.79	0.75	0.93	0.84	0.89	0.74	1.00	1 = North	0.08	0.19
GREECE	0.66	0.60	0.83	0.63	0.56	0.24	0.52	2 = South	0.08	0.12
SPAIN	0.86	0.87	0.92	0.87	0.69	0.41	0.42	2 = South	0.12	0.16
FRANCE	0.72	0.48	0.77	0.54	0.75	0.64	1.00	1 = North	0.07	0.16
ITALY	0.73	0.52	0.81	0.53	0.75	0.50	1.00	2 = South	0.07	0.14
PORTUGAL	0.84	0.75	0.86	0.80	0.35	0.27	0.42	2 = South	0.08	0.15
UK	0.31	0.36	0.41	0.43	0.87	0.80	0.68	1 = North	0.05	0.15
ESTONIA	0.86	0.89	0.88	0.95	0.20	0.22	0.06	3 =East	0.06	0.12
HUNGARY	0.72	0.44	0.73	0.61	0.12	0.12	0.06	3 =East	0.08	0.10
POLAND	0.75	0.69	0.82	0.81	0.00	0.12	0.06	3 =East	0.07	0.11
SLOVAKIA	0.72	0.70	0.89	0.85	0.25	0.20	0.06	3 =East	0.10	0.16
SLOVENIA	0.82	0.87	0.85	0.87	0.51	0.30	0.06	3 =East	0.04	0.14
BULGARIA	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.86	0.00	-	0.00	3 = East	-	-

Table 30b - Country values of macro variables

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Scale party system - EU powers normalized [0-1]</b>		<b>QUALITY OF GOV INDEX [0-1]</b>		<b>ABS NUMB OF ASYLUM SEEKERS rescaled [0,1]</b>		<b>Eurozone</b>	<b>Catholic or Orthodox country</b>	<b>GDP FROM AGRICULT. 2008 [0-1]</b>	<b>INDEX OF ENVIROMENT PROTECTION 2008 [0-1]</b>
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2009-2016</i>	<i>2009-2016</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2008</i>
BELGIUM	0.79	0.96	0.81	0.86	0.41	0.08	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.01	0.90
DENMARK	0.46	0.30	0.97	0.97	0.04	0.05	0 = No	0 = No	0.01	0.98
GERMANY	0.54	0.47	0.89	0.89	0.61	1.00	1 = Yes	0 = No	0.01	0.93
GREECE	0.93	0.44	0.61	0.64	0.93	0.04	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.03	0.91
SPAIN	1.00	0.52	0.75	0.72	0.16	0.01	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.02	0.97
FRANCE	0.34	0.20	0.81	0.78	1.00	0.31	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.02	0.95
ITALY	0.52	1.00	0.57	0.57	0.64	0.29	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.02	0.82
PORTUGAL	0.81	0.27	0.75	0.75	0.00	0.00	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.02	0.96
UK	0.00	0.00	0.86	0.89	0.75	0.15	0 = No	0 = No	0.01	0.97
ESTONIA	0.40	0.77	0.60	0.65	0.00	0.00	0 = No	0 = No	0.03	0.86
HUNGARY	0.42	0.22	0.64	0.64	0.03	0.01	0 = No	1 = Yes	0.04	0.88
POLAND	0.55	0.22	0.64	0.69	0.13	0.01	0 = No	1 = Yes	0.03	0.76
SLOVAKIA	0.37	0.65	0.61	0.64	0.01	0.00	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.04	0.88
SLOVENIA	0.63	0.62	0.66	0.69	0.00	0.00	1 = Yes	1 = Yes	0.02	0.93
BULGARIA	0.32	0.30	-	-	0.02	0.02	0 = No	0 = Yes	-	-

Table 31 - Random intercepts macro model. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>	<b>Health</b>	<b>Unemploy.</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Crime</b>	<b>Immigrat.</b>	<b>Environm.</b>	<b>Tax</b>	<b>Foreign</b>
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>	<b>1.2*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>0.93*</b>	<b>1.1*</b>	<b>0.67*</b>	<b>1.64*</b>
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>1.14*</b>	<b>1.26*</b>	<b>0.89*</b>	<b>0.69*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	0.22	<b>1.33*</b>	<b>0.97*</b>
EU DEMOCRACY	0.33	0.1	<b>0.42*</b>	0.09	0.22	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>
Gender female	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0.06	0.02	<b>0.17*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>
Age	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.36*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>-0.28*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>	<b>0.76*</b>
SES: Socio-economic status	<b>-0.37*</b>	-0.15	-0.08	<b>-0.19*</b>	0.01	-0.03	<b>-0.31*</b>	-0.15
Knowledge of the EU	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.04	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	0.02	<b>0.39*</b>
Education	<b>-0.26*</b>	-0.02	<b>0.19*</b>	0.12	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.57*</b>	-0.12	<b>0.32*</b>
Exclusive national identification	-0.1	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>
Trust in the national Government	-0.26	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	-0.02	-0.08	-0.09	<b>-0.27*</b>	0.03
National attachment	<b>-0.64*</b>	<b>-0.36*</b>	<b>-0.46*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	-0.12	<b>-0.44*</b>	-0.14
Left/right self-placement	<b>-0.79*</b>	<b>-0.9*</b>	-0.34	0.06	-0.30	-0.47	-0.28	<b>1.07*</b>
Left/right self-placement squared	<b>0.61*</b>	<b>0.68*</b>	0.10	-0.29	-0.12	0.06	0.11	<b>-1.14*</b>
<b>MACRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>								
Scale party sytem EU support	-0.55	-0.17	-1.96	-1.44	0.80	-0.71	<b>-0.31*</b>	-0.36
Scale of party system eval.of EU memb. benefit	1.98	1.37	3.19	5.60	0.94	1.00	3.60	<b>4.58*</b>
Index of party system support for EU power	0.39	<b>1.02*</b>	0.30	-0.13	0.23	0.47	-0.09	<b>-0.91*</b>
-								
Lenght of membership	0.10	-0.09	-0.38	-0.48	0.27	-0.54	<b>1.69*</b>	0.87
Location (ref= north)								
<i>South</i>	-0.51	-0.01	-0.97	-0.77	-0.05	-0.78	<b>0.76*</b>	<b>0.85*</b>
<i>East</i>	-0.19	-0.09	-0.75	-0.18	-0.02	-0.98	<b>1.74*</b>	<b>1.72*</b>
Eurozone member	0.37	0.48	0.41	<b>0.92*</b>	-0.04	0.15	0.15	0.15
Catholic or Ortodox country	<b>0.67*</b>	<b>0.55*</b>	0.37	0.52	<b>1.11*</b>	0.62	<b>0.71*</b>	-0.22
QUALITY OF GOV INDEX 2008	-0.28	-0.06	<b>3.52*</b>	1.64	-0.55	2.61	<b>-3.68*</b>	-1.58
GDP PRO CAPITA 2008	-0.40	-0.19	0.19	-0.82	-0.41	-0.15	0	-0.58
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 2008	-	11.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
% OF GDP FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM	5.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
% OF GDP FROM AGRICULTURE 2008	-	-	30.08	-	-	-	-	-
INDEX OF ENVIROMENT PROTECTION	-	-	-	-	-	-0.5	-	-
NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 2008	-	-	-	-	0.23	-	-	-0.24
Rho null model	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.06

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

The quality of governance is the only determinant within the cluster of society and economy drivers that exerts a significant effect at least in two policy domains: Agricultural, and Tax policies.  $H_{p_{govquality}}$  sustains that the higher the quality of country democracy, the less likely is the support for EU governance. This mechanism is active only for Tax policy, showing that support for fiscal integration derives from a poor quality of national institutions. This is particularly interesting since this is an area where the EU has very limited competences, and there is no pressure for integration from normative prescription (no *functional interdependence*). Hence, when national governance is ineffective, a common EU tax governance is welcome. However, the relation between quality of national democracy and support for EU governance is the opposite for Agricultural policy, and support is higher where national institutions perform better. Therefore, no ultimate answers are found, and further researches on these policy domains should be carried on.

Overall, the influence of country-level determinants is far from being clear. Only religious tradition exerts a consistent effect, at least across four policy areas. The other determinants have policy-specific effects, but even in those cases, findings are sometimes counter-intuitive (see ‘quality of democracy’ for Agricultural policy, and party system indicators for Foreign policy and Tax policy). To conclude, these results do not provide support for most of the macro level hypotheses provided above. This poor performance may originate from many sources of bias, at the theoretical as well as at the methodological level. In the next section, pooling data from the year 2016, two sources of bias are addressed: limited time span, and limited variation among macro variables.

## **6. From 2009 to 2016: different explanations?**

Up to here, we concentrated on data from the year 2009. This focus depended on data availability. However, for two policy sectors, there are highly comparable data collected in November 2016 (Eurobarometer 86.2: European Commission 2017). To make them fully compatible, measurement of ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ must be changed, since there are not enough indicators to measure them as latent dimensions of EU support. For this reason, one proxy variable is used for ‘Output legitimacy’, one for ‘European identification’, and an index of three variables is created for ‘EU democracy’. The operationalisation is reported in Table 57 in Appendix B.

The analytical strategy is the same of Section 5: thirty country-year samples are pooled together<sup>103</sup>, and three sets of macro determinants<sup>104</sup> are tested with three separate models using multilevel logit models with random country intercepts<sup>105</sup>. One dummy variable corresponding to 2016 is included in

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<sup>103</sup> There are two surveys for each of the fifteen countries included in the Intune 2009 data.

<sup>104</sup> For macro level data regarding the year 2015, the data sources are the same as for 2008 data, except for party system data: to measure 2015 party system average Chapel Hill expert survey 2014 (Polk et al. 2017) and Euromanifesto study 2014 (Schmitt et al. 2016) are used.

<sup>105</sup> Analyses are performed with Stata 14 using `melogit` command. Syntax in appendix C.

the model, and it accounts for a time effect. Micro-level variables are included as well<sup>106</sup>. This strategy gives comparability of results between 2009 and 2009-2016 data: column 2 and 4 of Table 32 reports results for 2009-2016 pooled dataset, while column 1 and 3 displays 2009 data only (already provided in Table 31 of Section 5).

Table 32 - Random intercepts macro model 2009/2016. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009) and EB 86.2 (European Commission 2017)

MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
	2009 immigration	2009-2016 immigration	2009 foreign	2009-2016 foreign
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY (model 1)   OVERALL EU MEMBERSHIP EVALUATION (model 2)	<b>0.93*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>1.64*</b>	<b>0.63*</b>
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION (model 1)   ATTACHMENT TOWARDS EUROPE (model 2)	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.97*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>
EU DEMOCRACY factor (model 1)   INDEX OF EVAL. EU DEMOCRACY (model 2)	0.22	<b>1.00*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>1.36**</b>
Gender female	0.02	0.01	<b>0.15*</b>	0.06
Age	<b>-0.28*</b>	0.00	<b>0.76*</b>	<b>0.68*</b>
SES: Socio-economic status	0.01	0.13	-0.15	-0.02
Knowledge of the EU	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>
Education	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.2*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>
Exclusive national identification	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>
Trust in the national Government	-0.08	-0.08	0.03	-0.01
National attachment	<b>-0.3*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	-0.14	-0.08
Left/right self-placement	-0.30	-0.20	<b>1.07*</b>	<b>0.99*</b>
Left/right self-placement squared	-0.12	-0.25	<b>-1.14*</b>	<b>-1.04*</b>
<b>MACRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>				
Scale party system EU support	0.80	<b>2.21*</b>	-0.36	0.81
Scale of party system evaluation of EU memb. benefit	0.94	-1.69	<b>4.58*</b>	0.50
Index of party system support for EU power transfer	0.23	-0.04	<b>-0.91*</b>	-0.32
Dummy year [0=2009 1=2016]	-	<b>1.08*</b>		-0.13
Length of membership	0.27	-0.17	0.87	0.46
Location (ref= north)				
<i>South</i>	-0.05	0.39	<b>0.85*</b>	<b>0.57*</b>
<i>East</i>	-0.02	-0.06	<b>1.72*</b>	<b>1.00*</b>
Eurozone member	-0.04	0.10	0.15	0.33
Catholic or Orthodox country	<b>1.11*</b>	0.28	-0.22	-0.13
QUALITY OF GOV INDEX 2008	-0.55	-0.93	-1.58	-0.87
GDP PRO CAPITA 2008	-0.41	0.06	-0.58	<b>-1.38*</b>
NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS	0.23	<b>1.2*</b>	-0.24	<b>1.31*</b>
Rho null model	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.06

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

<sup>106</sup> Micro-level effects remain stable across the three models.

Two fundamental findings emerge. First, from 2009 to 2016 the effect of evaluation of ‘EU democracy’ becomes five times higher than in 2009 for Immigration policy, and almost three times for Foreign policy. Concurrently, those of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ decrease substantially. These results are important because they can be interpreted as a profound change in the drivers of support for EU governance. After nine years from the beginning of the economic crisis, the role played by the issue of political representation within the EU dramatically increased. This gives more importance to the debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ within the EU (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008), since this perceived ‘deficit’ hampers support for more EU policy governance, blocking the path towards a political Union.

The second element that emerges from this analysis is that macro variables have a different impact on EU support compared with 2009. National party systems become significant determinants of attitudes towards a common Immigration policy: as national political parties become pro-EU, citizens within that nation increase their support as well. However, this mechanism does not hold for support for EU governance of Foreign policy. Indeed, party system effects disappear when pooling 2016 data. Moreover, comparing 2016 to 2009 level of support (by way of the year-dummy variable), respondents have significantly increased their support for EU governance of Immigration policy, but not that of Foreign policy.

Furthermore, there is another difference between 2009 and 2016, which can be related to the so-called Refugees crisis. For both policy domains, there is a positive influence of the number of asylum seekers on the probability to support EU governance. This proves that controlling for individual-level variability support for EU policy governance is more likely in countries that received a large number of immigrants from outside Europe asking international protection. The rationale for this is that the EU is expected to manage this issue, helping European countries to face growing immigration influx. Indeed, the EU is seen as a powerful actor able to deal with adverse national contingency, and citizens are likely to claim EU protection when managing this issue with national financial and institutional resources becomes problematic.

## **7. Conclusions**

This chapter analysed support for EU governance of eight policy domains. Results show that support for EU governance is accounted for by individual-level mechanisms and policy domain characteristics, while macro level determinants exhibit a very limited influence (only religious traditions show a consistent cross-country effect). At the micro level, subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and identity drivers (‘European identification’, and also ‘exclusive national identification’ even though its effect is smaller) are the most important determinants of support for EU policy governance, where ‘Output legitimacy’ mostly discriminates between supporters and rejecters of EU governance for policies with *functional interdependence*, while ‘European

identification' for *market-correcting (social-model)* policies. These results suggest that these different mechanisms are strengthened or weakened by policy specific characteristics.

A direct effect of policy attributes is tested in Section 4, and it emerges that large part of the cross-policy variability is explained by the *spending logic*: EU citizens want high-expenditure policies to remain within their national states. In addition, they oppose EU governance in policy domains where the EU is already present holding vast competences: this means that EU citizens prefer a 'spillback' (see Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from former competence transfers, rather than further spillover. This is a problem if the argument of those supporting more policy integration is based on the alleged (public) consensus for the current EU policy governance.

Moreover, comparing data from 2009 with those of 2009-2016 it becomes evident that the salience of two issues has dramatically increased: (1) political representation within the EU, and (2) the number of asylum seekers. Indeed, much more than in 2009 these issues lead support towards a common EU governance of Immigration, and Foreign policies. The EU must provide political representation solving the perceived 'democratic deficit', and it must deliver effective policies able to solve national problems. This confirms that the recent European crises have modified how European citizens view the EU, and why they support or reject policy integration: EU governance is supported when it can effectively provide answers to citizens' needs.

The findings of this chapter can also be read jointly with those of chapters 3 and 4. In those chapters, a unitary dimension of support for EU policy governance is found ('EU governance legitimacy') but the association between this dimension and the other three endogenous components of EU support ('Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy') was very weak. Findings of this chapter, instead, shows that there is a strong association between 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification' and 'EU democracy', and support for EU governance of specific policy domains. This indicates that pooling together these policies undermines the comprehension of the relationships among the dimensions of EU support. It is, thus, necessary to decompose generic support in policy specific support. This reveals that the influence of 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification' and 'EU democracy' varies across policies, and it is relevant for the understanding of support for EU governance. Moreover, this variability is explained by the characteristics of the policy domains.

In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are introduced. This chapter demonstrates that Model 1 is right in arguing that support for EU governance is likely for policies that involve strong international interdependence, even though is not the principal meso determinant of this form of EU support. While Model 2 does not provide meso and macro-level explanations, Model 3 maintains that support for EU governance is influenced by the *politicisation* of the EU issue: from the analyses included in this chapter there is no ultimate evidence of this influence, and further

analyses with more recent data may report different results. Indeed, analyses with data from the period 2009-2016 show contrasting results on the role of party systems.

To conclude, this chapter showed that citizens differentiate among different policy domains and that studies on support for EU governance should address this fact, investigating what influences the policy by policy support.

## **CHAPTER 6 – MEANINGS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

This thesis focusses on the role that national and European identities play in influencing EU support. Identity is an ‘umbrella’ term that can indicate either identification with a group or the meanings associated with a specific identity. Up to here, this work concentrated on identification, defined as a sense of belongingness to the national or European political community.

National identification exerts a central influence on the four dimensions of EU support (‘Output legitimacy’, ‘EU governance legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’), but, in some cases, its influence is rather different across dimensions: a strong sense of ‘national attachment’ is positively associated with ‘European identification’, but at the same time holding a strong ‘national attachment’ decreases support for EU governance of specific policy domains (see chapters 4 and 5). This two-sided effect shows the importance of distinguishing separate objects of EU support.

Furthermore, earlier analyses confirmed that - considering any of the four dimensions - ‘exclusive national identification’ hampers EU support, whereas the strength of ‘European identification’ is positively associated with support for EU governance of specific policy sectors.

What still remains unclear is what it exactly means being national or European for EU citizens. What constitutes a national or European identity? Can these identities be decomposed in more precise identity-meanings? And can these meanings be measured and compared?

There are studies in the literature that attempt to answer these questions, and this analysis starts with them. However, the purpose of this chapter is to relate these identity components to support for EU governance of specific policy domains, studying the influence of identity-meanings in the support for a competence transfer from national to European institutions.

The analytical strategy involves three hierarchical and logical steps: the first defines identity components, drawing upon earlier theories and empirical studies (Section 1); the second measures these components using survey data for fifteen EU countries (Intune 2009 data); and the third step is hypotheses testing, where the relationships between identity components and support for specific EU policy governance is tested using SEM modelling (Bollen and Long 1993). The influence of identity components is expected to be mediated (Baron and Kenny 1986) by the strength of ‘national attachment’, and by ‘European identification’, as reported in Figure 22 at page 127.

Results show that identity-meanings matter in driving support for EU policy governance, especially the components called ‘Civility’, that qualifies national and European identities as something embedded in ordinary social practices and traditional ways of life. On the contrary, identity-meanings deriving from ascribed (‘Ancestry’) or civic-political (‘Citizenship’) attributes have a marginal role in determining this form of EU support.

## 1. Identity components

Studies on EU support often conceptualise identity as either a dichotomic construct (presence vs absence of identification) or a continuous construct (low to high identification) (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2007; Lubbers 2008). These constructs reduce identity to identification and correspond to two of the three conceptualisations of political identity provided by Citrin and Sides (2004) (see also Brewer 2001; Citrin et al. 2001): they maintain that the first one is cognitive, and it regards self-categorisation as group member; the second one is affective, and it defines the strength of the attachment towards the group; and the third one is normative, and it outlines the in-group boundaries - in terms of criteria for inclusion in the group.

This last conceptualisation is mainly employed in studies that look at group boundaries per se – thus mapping identity-meanings or components – or when the dependent variable is one of the other two conceptualisation (cognitive or affective identifications) and the research question is what ideas on group-qualities ‘activate’ self-identification (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Bruter 2003; Kunovich 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016; Segatti and Guglielmi 2016).

The group-qualities differentiate between members and non-members, but they can have different ‘discrimination powers’: i.e. physical traits may discriminate between members and non-members more than cultural traits, or vice-versa. Discrimination power is a function of the salience of a group-quality, and this salience may vary across different groups and different individuals. Indeed, although group-qualities are collectively defined, group members can consider some group-qualities more salient among those available (Kunovich 2009).

In the literature, there are micro-level studies that test macro-level theories (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Bruter 2003; Kunovich 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). The dichotomy between civic and ethnic identity is often the background for this approach. Kohn (1944) introduces this dichotomy more than seventy years ago. He maintains that in western Europe the identity-glue that unifies national citizens is a common political history, which produced laws and constitutions that are based on liberal values, while in eastern Europe identification is led by pre-political sources: culture and ancestry define the boundary of national identity. Following this dichotomy, there is a fundamental division between an inclusive, liberal, and universalistic civic identity, and an exclusive, ethnocultural, and essentialist ethnic identity. There are no in-between categories, and these concepts are fixed and mutually exclusive.

This classification theory is contested, among the others, by Kymlicka (2001), who suggests dividing cultural from ethnic characteristics, by Brubaker (1992, 2004), who argues that these types are not mutually exclusive providing evidence of ethnic identity also in Germany, and by many individual-level research that analysing survey data show that the civic-ethnic distinction does not

fully match empirical findings (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001; Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Kunovich 2009).

An alternative typological model for comparative analysis of collective identity - not only national identities - is the one proposed by Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995). This model draws upon socio-psychological insights (see Huddy 2001 for a review) on the constructed nature of identity. In their study, Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) stress that identity is socially constructed and reconstructed by the interaction between in-group members and non-members. The authors maintain that identity boundaries are based on three symbolic codes ('primordial', 'civil', and 'religious'<sup>107</sup>), and these codes convey messages in both directions, towards the in-group and the out-groups.

The primordial code creates social distinction via physical (unchangeable) differences like gender, age, ethnicity, etc. The civil code is embedded in routines, traditions, constitutional order and institutional arrangements that govern the group life, and it generates self-identification via sharing common experiences: in this case, group-boundaries are the consequence of social practices. The third and last symbolic code is the 'religious' one. This code promotes in-group solidarity among people that trust in and commit to the religion of the group. Depending on social groups, religion may be substituted with other fundamental values or moral commitment that the group respects and consider as universally true (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995).

In a recent book edited by Westle and Segatti (2016), Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016) investigate the *Europeanization* of national identity looking at how survey respondents define both the boundaries of their national identity and those of European identity. Their interest was understanding to what extent these identity-boundaries overlap, as a result of the *Europeanization* processes (Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2007). Their approach compares the empirical grounding of two models: one based on a revised version of Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995), and another one based on the achieved/ascribed dichotomy (see Jones and Smith 2001; Wright 2011) which maintains that group-qualities are perceived either as achievable through socialization processes, or as ascribed and fixed.

Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016) find that the Eisenstadt and Giesen's (1995) (revised) model is more supported by the analysis of cross-national data. Their result unveils the presence of four symbolic codes labelled 'Civility' (identification via sharing routines, traditions, language, and law compliance), 'Ancestry' (identification via *ius soli* or *sanguinis*), 'Christianity' (via common religion), and 'Citizenship' (via exercising citizenship rights). The importance of each code varies across countries and respondents, but their presence is confirmed in all the national samples.

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<sup>107</sup> Eisenstadt and Giesen do not provide a consistent label for the third code of their typology. For sake of simplicity, I use the label 'religious' to indicate it.

These symbolic codes combine in defining meanings of national and European identity, and their study evidences that, to a large extent, a group-quality that is important in defining national identity often draws the boundaries of the European identity. This is the case for ‘Ancestry’, ‘Religion’, and ‘Citizenship’ codes. This means that the normative requirements for being a national citizen or a European one are not so different. This supports the so-called ‘marble cake’ metaphor in which “the various components constituting the dual identity (national and European) blend together” (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016: 144. See also Risse 2004).

Conversely, the ‘Civility’ code has a different ‘behaviour’. The authors (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016) report that respondents differentiate between a national and a European ‘Civility’ code: the former code results from daily and banal (see Billig 1995) national experiences that differ across European countries, whereas the latter code comes from sharing common experiences as Europeans. This means these two dimensions define a *banal* nationalism and a *banal* Europeanism (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016), as something rooted in the ordinary way of life (Billig 1995; Cram 2001; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016), drawing upon Cram (2001), defines *banal* Europeanism as a form of implicit, contingent, and contextual identification “based on everyday low-involvement encounters with Europe’s procedures and symbols (flags, coins, free moving, etc.) that evoke and reinforce the feeling of belonging to a larger European community” (Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016: 142). Moreover, within this “larger European community”, national cultural peculiarity may flourish without colliding with this form of *banal* Europeanism (Cram 2001).

Following Guglielmi and Vezzoni (2016), Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) analyse how the identity-components (or symbolic codes) relates to European identification. As already remarked, the importance of these components may vary across individuals, since these components are a collective ‘raw material’ upon which individuals may base their identification. Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) find that those who emphasise the ‘Citizenship’ and ‘European Civility’ codes are likely to identify with Europe, whereas those who place great importance on ‘Ancestry’ and ‘National Civility’ codes tend to dismiss European identification<sup>108</sup>. This result demonstrates that identity-meanings matter in generating identification and might also matter in driving support for EU policy governance.

Indeed, the hypothesis that guides this chapter is that opposition or support to transfer policy governance at the EU level depends on which meaning of identity is used to define national and European identities. Drawing upon Segatti and Guglielmi’s (2016) findings, support of EU governance is expected for those conceptualising identity in terms of democratic participation (‘Citizenship’ code) or sharing European cultural traditions and respecting EU institutions (‘European Civility’ code), since they already stress the political side of European identity (for the ‘Citizenship’

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<sup>108</sup> Results for ‘Christianity’ are less clear-cut, since cross-country variability emerges.

component) or they recognize Europe as a plural cultural community whose values are embodied by EU institutions (for ‘European Civility’). On the contrary, those who conceptualise identity as simply a matter of *ius soli* or *ius sanguinis* (‘Ancestry’ code), or as a form of *banal* nationalism (Billig 1995) (‘National Civility’ code) are likely to reject EU governance. In the former case, for those who stress the ‘Ancestry’ code Europe is simply a pre-political and pre-cultural territory where European people live, and not a political project: Europe already exists, and there is no need to turn it into a political entity. In the latter case, opposition is driven by the importance placed on the national way of life and national culture (‘National Civility’ code), that would be altered by further European integration.

Indeed, following Cederman (2001), increasing EU governance modifies identity-boundaries between national groups. Yet, the extent to which this happens varies across policy domains, since some sectors have greater impact on the way of life of citizens (i.e. welfare), and the integration of these sectors is seen as more problematic, while others are far from the day to day experiences of respondents (i.e. foreign policy). For this reason, it is expected that the influence of identity-meanings varies across policy domains.

To conclude, five hypotheses are tested in the remaining of this chapter:

*Hp1: The more important is the ‘European Civility’ component, the more likely is support for EU governance.*

*Hp2: The more important is the ‘National Civility’ component, the less likely is support for EU governance.*

*Hp3: The more important is the ‘Ancestry’ component, the less likely is support for EU governance.*

*Hp4: The more important is the ‘Citizenship’ component, the more likely is support for EU governance.*

*Hp5: The influence of identity-components varies across policy domains.*

## **2. Data and method**

This chapter answers the question whether different meanings of national and European identities influence support for EU governance of specific policy domains. To address this question, the Intune 2009 data (Cotta et al. 2009) are analysed using a path model within the framework of structural equation modelling (Bollen and Long 1993). This technique allows decomposing the influence of identity meanings in direct and indirect effects (I will return on this).

Four components of identity are conceptualised drawing upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni’s study (2016): ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. Guglielmi and Vezzoni also defines the ‘Christianity’ component, but since there are no hypotheses concerning the influence of this component on support for EU governance, it is not considered here. These components are measured asking respondents to rate the importance of eight attributes for being considered a group member. Two item batteries are employed, one for national identity and the other one for European identity:

*Q.1 People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, how important is each of the following to be (NATIONALITY)?*

[Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not at all important]

1. *to be a Christian;*
2. *to share (nationality) cultural traditions;*
3. *to be born in (our country);*
4. *to have (nationality) parents;*
5. *to respect (nationality) laws and institutions;*
6. *to feel (nationality);*
7. *to master (nationality) language or one of the official languages of (our country);*
8. *to exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of (our country).*

*Q.2 And for being European, how important do you think each of the following is...?*

[Very important; Somewhat important; Not very important; Not at all important]

1. *to be a Christian;*
2. *to share European cultural traditions;*
3. *to be born in Europe;*
4. *to have European parents;*
5. *to respect European laws and institutions;*
6. *to feel European;*
7. *to master any European language;*
8. *to exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of the European Union.*

The four components are measured defining some a-priori indicators of these constructs. 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', and 'Citizenship' are, respectively, measured as follows:

- **European Civility (4 indicators):** 'to share European cultural traditions', 'to respect European laws and institutions', 'to feel European', and 'to master any European language'.
- **National Civility (4 indicators):** 'to share (nationality) cultural traditions', 'to respect (nationality) laws and institutions', 'to feel (nationality)', and 'to master (nationality) language or one of the official languages of (our country)'.
- **Ancestry (4 indicators):** 'to be born in (our country)', 'to be born in Europe', 'to have (nationality) parents', and 'to exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of (our country)'.
- **Citizenship (2 indicators):** 'to exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of the European Union', and 'to have European parents'.

Table 33 reports these indicators and provides their descriptive statistics. Each indicator is a battery-item, and it ranges from 0 to 1<sup>109</sup>. In terms of salience for respondents (measured by the mean score), the items that constitute 'National Civility' and 'European Civility' are those with higher importance for survey respondents<sup>110</sup>, and this emerges also looking at Table 34, where four indexes are computed

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<sup>109</sup> These ordinary variables are treated as continuous for simplicity and each answering-option is weighted as reported in the table. Missing data are excluded from the analyses.

<sup>110</sup> There are no remarkable country differences (see Table 58a-b in Appendix B)

averaging<sup>111</sup> the indicator-scores<sup>112</sup>. Considering the pooled data, the order of importance is first ‘National’ and ‘European’ Civilities, then ‘Citizenship’, and lastly ‘Ancestry’. This order is stable across western European countries (with a marginal variation in the UK), whereas in eastern Europe ‘Ancestry’ tends to be slightly more important than ‘Citizenship’ (see Table 60 in Appendix B).

Table 33 - Descriptive statistics of indicators of identity-components. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

### European civility

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
To share European cultural traditions	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.66 (.28)	14730	360
To respect European Union’s laws and institutions	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.80 (.25)	14803	287
To feel European	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.70 (.29)	14773	317
To master any European language	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.80 (.26)	14880	210

### National civility

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
To share national cultural traditions	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.79 (.26)	14966	124
To respect national laws and institutions	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.89 (.20)	14978	112
To feel (nationality)	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.83 (.25)	14945	145
To master (country language)	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.89 (.20)	15034	56

### Ancestry

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
To be born in (OUR COUNTRY)	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.66 (.34)	14957	133
To have (NATIONALITY) parents	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.66 (.34)	14920	170
To be born in Europe	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.59 (.33)	14758	332
To have European parents	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.56 (.33)	14698	392

### Citizenship

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Coding</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>N. Cases</u>	<u>N. Missing</u>
To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of (OUR COUNTRY)	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.69 (.30)	14841	249
To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in politics of the European Union	0=Not at all; 0.33= Not very; 0.66= Somewhat; 1=Very important;	0.63 (.30)	14682	408

<sup>111</sup> Chrombach alpha for these indexes is, respectively, 0.70 for ‘European Civility’, 0.64 for ‘National Civility’, 0.83 for ‘Ancestry’, and 0.67 for ‘Citizenship’.

<sup>112</sup> The structure of correlation among these component is reported in the Table 59 in Appendix B.

Table 34 - Identity-component indexes. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b><u>Component</u></b>	<b><u>Indicator [measurement scale]</u></b>	<b><u>Mean (SD)</u></b>	<b><u>N. Cases</u></b>	<b><u>N. Missing</u></b>
European civility	To share European cultural traditions [0-1]	0.74 (0.19)	14419	671
	To respect European Union's laws and institutions [0-1]			
	To feel European [0-1]			
	To master any European language [0-1]			
National civility	To share national cultural traditions [0-1]	0.85 (0.16)	14769	321
	To respect national laws and institutions [0-1]			
	To feel (nationality) [0-1]			
	To master (country language) [0-1]			
Ancestry	To be born in (OUR COUNTRY) [0-1]	0.62 (0.27)	14425	665
	To have (NATIONALITY) parents [0-1]			
	To be born in Europe [0-1]			
	To have European parents [0-1]			
Citizenship	To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of (OUR COUNTRY) [0-1]	0.66 (0.26)	14532	558
	To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in politics of the European Union [0-1]			

Having measured these components, they are included in eight path models<sup>113</sup> (Blalock 1967) to assess their influence on support for EU governance of eight policy areas<sup>114</sup>: Unemployment, Fighting crime, Health care, Agricultural, Environmental, Immigration, Tax, and Foreign policies.

Figure 22 displays the model where the four identity-components are all antecedents of support for EU governance, and their effect is expected to be mediated by respondent's strength of 'national attachment'<sup>115</sup> and 'European identification'<sup>116</sup>. Indeed, Segatti and Guglielmi (2016) demonstrate that 'national attachment' mediates the effects of identity-components on European identification, and I suppose a similar mechanism be operating on support for EU policy governance.

Hence, the four components have a direct effect on 'national attachment' and 'European identification', and an indirect effect on 'support for EU governance' via 'national attachment' and 'European identification'. 'National attachment' has only a direct effect on 'European identification'

<sup>113</sup> The author is aware of the fact that path modelling within the SEM framework considers all the variables as continuous, and it performs OLS analysis. This might be a problem when estimating dichotomic dependent variables, as in this case. However, since the research interest is to assess the influence of identity-components on support for EU governance testing the mediation of 'national attachment' and 'European identification' (see later in the text), I decided to rely on linear modelling.


<sup>114</sup> See Chapter 5 for operationalization and descriptive statistics. They are dichotomic variables where '0' means a preference for a 'National or sub-national' policy governance, while '1' means support for EU policy governance of that specific policy domain.

<sup>115</sup> See Chapter 4 for operationalization and descriptive statistics.

<sup>116</sup> 'European identification' is measured in Chapter 3 using MGCFA. Since this latent variable is not measured with a bounded scale, it is normalized to vary from 0 to 1 using this formula: (value – minimum) / (maximum – minimum).

and an indirect effect on ‘support for EU governance’ via ‘European identification’. Lastly, ‘European identification’ has a direct effect on ‘support for EU governance’.

Figure 22 - Path model of support for EU governance: eight models for eight policy domains



### 3. Results

The eight models tested<sup>117</sup> (one for each policy domains) fit data well (see Table 61 in Appendix B; for cut-off criteria see Bollen and Long 1993). Tables 35-36-37-38 report unstandardized total effects of the four identity components<sup>118</sup>, which are not constrained to be equal across countries.

Given the fact that every independent variable varies between ‘0’ and ‘1’, regression coefficients are comparable. In addition, since the dependent variables are all dichotomic, coefficients can be immediately interpreted as the expected modification in the predicted probability of ‘supporting EU governance’ when moving from the lowest to the highest value of the independent variable.

Moreover, when the total effect is significant, these tables also report the percentage of the total effect that is mediated by ‘national attachment’ and by ‘European identification’ (raw “% of the indirect effect out of the total effect” in the tables).

<sup>117</sup> Syntax in Appendix C.

<sup>118</sup> Since the focus of this chapter is on the influence of the four identity components, in the text are only reported tables showing these effects. The total effects of ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’ are reported in Table 62 in Appendix B.

Table 35 - Total effect - Unstandardized coefficients of path models: European civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

IDENTITY COMPONENT	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
European civility on Unemployment	<b>0.2*</b>	0.15	<b>0.28*</b>	0.17	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.43*</b>	0.18	<b>0.17*</b>	-0.01	0.02	0.22	0.09	0.06	0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	30%		16%		30%	62%	34%		58%						
European civility on Fighting crime	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.14	<b>0.25*</b>	0.12	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	0.07	0.01	0.08	<b>0.53*</b>	0.17	0.05	<b>0.4*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	25%	38%	4%		14%		13%	24%				30%			4%
European civility on Health care	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.2*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	0.05	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	0.11	-0.07	<b>0.29*</b>	0.12	-0.04	0.02
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	24%	31%	0%		9%	41%	3%	13%	63%			50%			
European civility on Agriculture	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.12	0.08	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.23*</b>	0.03	-0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	56%	55%	32%	51%	47%	53%	37%	22%	77%			52%	54%		
European civility on Environment	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	0.02	0.06	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0.21
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	41%	37%	40%	44%	38%	50%	41%	26%	57%			34%	13%	81%	
European civility on Immigration	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	0.18	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	0.12	<b>0.33*</b>	0.05	0.18	<b>0.27*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	43%	32%	59%	64%		49%	30%	19%	64%	13%		47%			3%
European civility on Foreign	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.55*</b>	0.08	<b>0.61*</b>	0.11	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	54%	51%	59%	62%	35%	93%	35%		47%		6%	39%	39%	31%	7%
European civility on Tax	<b>0.43*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	-0.04	0.16	<b>0.29*</b>	-0.04	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	36%	49%	45%	51%	35%	57%	26%	21%	46%			16%		33%	41%

<sup>^</sup>the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 36 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: National Civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

IDENTITY COMPONENT	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
National civility on Unemployment	<b>-0.28*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	-0.12	<b>-0.3*</b>	-0.11	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.43*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.27*</b>	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.07	0.07
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	0%	19%		7%		28%	12%		21%						
National civility on Fighting crime	-0.14	0.22	0.18	<b>-0.22*</b>	-0.13	0.08	<b>-0.36*</b>	-0.26	<b>-0.28*</b>	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.14	-0.05	-0.26
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^				7%			4%		7%						
National civility on Health care	-0.17	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	-0.17	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.45*</b>	<b>-0.39*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	-0.15	-0.19	-0.07	<b>-0.24*</b>	0.03	-0.08
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^		11%	0%	8%		17%	1%	0%	11%				3%		
National civility on Agriculture	<b>-0.28*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.56*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.35*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.43*</b>	-0.11	<b>-0.35*</b>	0.06	-0.22	-0.21	-0.21	0.06	0.14
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	1%	31%	6%	9%	9%	31%	11%		28%	73%					
National civility on Environment	-0.18	<b>-0.29*</b>	-0.19	<b>-0.51*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	-0.10	<b>-0.32*</b>	-0.18	<b>-0.43*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	0.24	0.20	0.04	-0.13	<b>-0.31*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^		25%		4%	12%	76%	18%		30%	-24%					1%
National civility on Immigration	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.5*</b>	<b>-0.53*</b>	-0.22	-0.13	<b>-0.43*</b>	<b>-0.37*</b>	-0.18	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	-0.13	<b>0.32*</b>	0.06	-0.13	-0.21
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	0%	9%	12%			19%	15%		18%	-13%		6%			
National civility on Foreign	-0.04	-0.03	-0.09	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	-0.21	<b>-0.43*</b>	0.00	<b>-0.31*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	0.01	-0.06	-0.04	0.14	0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^				21%	14%		15%		48%	32%					
National civility on Tax	-0.14	<b>-0.32*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	-0.05	<b>-0.43*</b>	-0.24	<b>-0.5*</b>	-0.13	0.04	0.07	-0.17	0.11	-0.12
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^		18%	9%	14%	11%		7%		24%						

^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 37 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: Ancestry. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

IDENTITY COMPONENT	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
Ancestry on Unemployment	-0.08	0.04	<b>-0.12*</b>	0.01	-0.11	0.01	<b>-0.17*</b>	<b>-0.16*</b>	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.06	-0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>			0%				13%	2%							
Ancestry on Fighting crime	-0.11	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.00	0.09	-0.09	-0.07	-0.13	-0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.06	-0.16	-0.07	-0.09	0.00
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>		2%													
Ancestry on Health care	-0.08	0.03	0.01	0.07	-0.07	-0.08	-0.04	-0.11	0.03	0.03	<b>0.13*</b>	0.10	-0.09	-0.03	0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>											3%				
Ancestry on Agriculture	<b>-0.16*</b>	<b>-0.14*</b>	<b>-0.02*</b>	-0.06	-0.02	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.16*</b>	-0.04	-0.02	0.09	0.01	0.02	-0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	36%	5%	7%			27%	17%		13%						
Ancestry on Environment	<b>-0.3*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	-0.01	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	-0.02	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.16*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	-0.10
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	15%	3%	1%		8%	12%	13%	4%	15%		2%	24%	1%	5%	
Ancestry on Immigration	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	-0.11	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.14*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	-0.11	-0.16	-0.11	-0.07	-0.11	<b>0.17*</b>	<b>-0.16*</b>	0.04
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>	13%	2%	0%		10%	28%	7%						4%	-6%	
Ancestry on Foreign	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.03	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.07	0.10	-0.10	0.01	<b>-0.16*</b>	0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>						36%					1%				
Ancestry on Tax	-0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.10	<b>-0.14*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	0.02	0.04	<b>0.17*</b>	0.00	-0.14	<b>0.26*</b>	0.01	-0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect <sup>^</sup>						29%	12%			2%			2%		

<sup>^</sup>the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 38 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: Citizenship. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

IDENTITY COMPONENT	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
Citizenship on Unemployment	<b>0.14*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.06	0.12	0.05	-0.02	0.02	<b>0.13*</b>	0.00	0.07	0.01	-0.03
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	12%	11%									17%				
Citizenship on Fighting crime	0.00	-0.03	-0.08	0.02	0.03	0.15	<b>0.17*</b>	0.01	0.03	<b>0.17*</b>	0.08	-0.16	0.04	-0.08	-0.09
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^							6%			3%					
Citizenship on Health care	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	<b>0.16*</b>	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.10	0.09	-0.02	0.11
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^						29%									
Citizenship on Agriculture	<b>0.13*</b>	0.01	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.10	<b>0.18*</b>	0.04	0.01	0.09	0.03	-0.05	0.04	-0.07	0.01
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	50%						18%								
Citizenship on Environment	0.06	-0.02	0.10	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.09	-0.02	0.03	0.00	0.05	-0.07	-0.07	<b>-0.18*</b>	0.14
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^														8%	
Citizenship on Immigration	<b>0.16*</b>	0.11	0.10	-0.06	0.05	0.05	0.12	-0.02	0.05	<b>0.19*</b>	-0.07	-0.12	-0.10	0.06	0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	22%									4%					
Citizenship on Foreign	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>0.19*</b>	0.03	0.05	<b>0.15*</b>	0.02	0.07	0.10	0.10	<b>0.11*</b>	0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.00
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	38%	-26%	19%			68%					9%				
Citizenship on Tax	0.09	-0.07	<b>0.17*</b>	0.09	<b>0.15*</b>	0.11	0.02	-0.05	0.10	0.03	0.07	-0.05	<b>0.14*</b>	0.00	0.12
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^			10%		34%								9%		

^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

The first hypothesis under investigation regards the total effect of ‘European Civility’. A positive relationship with ‘support for EU governance’ was expected, and this positive relation is found across policy areas and countries, confirming Hp<sub>1</sub>. However, some further specifications are necessary.

(1) In eastern Europe (except in Polonia) this component is less determinant than in western Europe since the effect is often not statistically significant: two remarkable cases of this divide are Estonia and Hungary, where the effect is only significant in one policy domain.


(2) The ‘European Civility’ component tends to discriminate rejecters and supporters of EU governance more in the fields of Environmental and Foreign policies (greater average effects), and less in the fields of Health care and Unemployment policies (lower average effects). This indicates the existence of a cross-level effect between components of individual identities and characteristics of the policy domain – or, in other words, that the effect varies across policy areas (Hp<sub>5</sub>). Indeed, the former two are sectors characterised by a European *functional interdependence* (see Chapter 5), whereas the latter are policy domains extensively financed by national state budgets (see again Chapter 5). With these data and this modelling, it is not possible to test these cross-level effects, but these findings support this hypothesis. What is certain is that the effects differ when looking at various policy areas.

(3) As last remark, it is evident that large part of the effect of the ‘European Civility’ component is an indirect effect that passes through ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’. As shown in Figure 23, ‘European Civility’ has a positive effect on ‘national attachment’ and ‘European identification’ (F1-F2), ‘national attachment’ has a positive influence on ‘European identification’ (F3) (see Chapter 4 for an explanation of this relationship), and ‘European identification’ has a positive effect on ‘support for EU governance’ (F4). It follows that the direction of the full indirect effect is positive<sup>119</sup>. In addition, Table 39 at page 135 demonstrates that this indirect effect is almost fully determined by ‘European identification’, which means that emphasising ‘European Civility’ increases ‘European identification’ which in turn enhances support for EU governance of these specific policy domains.

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<sup>119</sup> The formula for computing the full indirect effect is:  $(F1 * F3 * F4) + (F2 * F4)$ . Because all the effects are positive (+), the resulting full indirect effect is positive as well.

Figure 23 - Indirect effect of European civility via National Attachment & European Identification



The second hypothesis regards the ‘National Civility’ component, and it argues that the importance placed on this component by survey respondents is negatively associated with support for EU governance, since this would alter the traditional ways of life. In this case too, this hypothesis hold (Hp<sub>2</sub>), but the influence of this component is less diffuse across policies and countries than that of ‘European Civility’ (Table 36). Three aspects need to be commented.

(1) The divide east-west emerges to a larger extent, since in eastern countries (plus Portugal) there is no effect of this component. Yet, even within western countries this effect deeply varies, and only in the UK, Italy, and Greece the influence is significant in all (or almost all) the policy domains.

(2) As for cross-policy difference, the maximum effect is found in Immigration, Health care, and Agricultural policies. Comparing the magnitude of these effects with those of ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’ has a weaker influence in all the policy domains (except in Health care).

(3) Another point of divergence from ‘European Civility’ resides in the fact that when ‘National Civility’ exerts a significant influence, in most of the cases the effect is almost fully direct. This means ‘European identification’ and ‘national attachment’ play a minor role in the association between ‘National Civility’ and ‘support for EU governance’, and increasing EU competences directly contrast with the preferences of those that place great importance on the national culture and traditions. Overall, this component is surely essential in determining EU support, but its effect is limited to western European countries and it is relatively smaller than that of ‘European Civility’.

The third hypothesis provided in Section 1 regards the effect of ‘Ancestry’. A negative influence on ‘support for EU governance’ was expected, and Table 37 shows that this hypothesis holds only in the cases of Environmental and Immigration policies. Indeed, in all the other policy domains the effect tends to be not significant. When the influence is statistically significant, the effect is mainly

direct. Overall, Hp<sub>3</sub> is not confirmed since there is not a diffuse-European or cross-policy effect of this component: it is present only in a few policy domains.

With regards to the fourth hypothesis (Hp<sub>4</sub>), the effect of the ‘Citizenship’ component is rather absent across policies and countries (Table 38). This undermines the idea that a political component of collective identities drives support towards EU policy governance. This is important because it shows that this dimension of EU support does not rest upon a civic involvement in the socio-political sphere (it is not a side effect of active citizenship). Reading this result in conjunction with the findings on ‘European Civility’, it gives the idea that support for EU governance is the result of a form of *banal* Europeanism (see also Westle and Segatti 2016 for similar findings on European identity). When people think of Europe as something embedded in social practices that represent common European values (i.e. respecting cultural plurality), then they are likely to support a political Union (more EU policy governance). On the other side, when individuals strongly conceive their national identities in terms of national idiosyncratic cultural elements, then – *ceteris paribus* – their support for EU governance is less likely since this competence transfer would affect national laws and institutions, and, in turns, their national identities.

Table 39 - Focus on European Civility. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

IDENTITY-COMPONENT	Belgium	Denmark	Germany	Greece	Spain	France	Italy	Portugal	UK	Estonia	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia	Bulgaria
European civility on Unemployment	<b>0.2*</b>	0.15	<b>0.28*</b>	0.17	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.43*</b>	0.18	<b>0.17*</b>	-0.01	0.02	0.22	0.09	0.06	0.15
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	30%		16%		30%	62%	34%		58%						
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>95%</u>	-	<u>95%</u>	-	<u>100%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	-	<u>97%</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-
European civility on Fighting crime	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.14	<b>0.25*</b>	0.12	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	0.07	0.01	0.08	<b>0.53*</b>	0.17	0.05	<b>0.4*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	25%	38%	4%		14%		13%	24%				30%			4%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>95%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>95%</u>	-	<u>100%</u>	-	<u>99%</u>	<u>96%</u>	-	-	-	<u>97%</u>	-	-	<u>96%</u>
European civility on Health care	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.2*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	0.05	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	0.11	-0.07	<b>0.29*</b>	0.12	-0.04	0.02
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	24%	31%	0%		9%	41%	3%	13%	63%			50%			
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>95%</u>	-	<u>99%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>97%</u>	-	-	<u>98%</u>	-	-	-
European civility on Agriculture	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.12	0.08	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.23*</b>	0.03	-0.06
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	56%	55%	32%	51%	47%	53%	37%	22%	77%			52%	54%		
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>97%</u>	-	-	<u>97%</u>	<u>99%</u>	-	-
European civility on Environment	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	0.02	0.06	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0.21
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	41%	37%	40%	44%	38%	50%	41%	26%	57%			34%	13%	81%	
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>95%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>97%</u>	-	-	<u>97%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>95%</u>	-
European civility on Immigration	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	0.18	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	0.12	<b>0.33*</b>	0.05	0.18	<b>0.27*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	43%	32%	59%	64%	77%	49%	30%	19%	64%	13%		47%	172%	63%	-3%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>91%</u>	-	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>96%</u>
European civility on Foreign	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.55*</b>	0.08	<b>0.61*</b>	0.11	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	54%	51%	59%	62%	35%	93%	35%	113%	47%		6%	39%	39%	31%	7%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>94%</u>	<u>98%</u>	-	<u>88%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>94%</u>
European civility on Tax	<b>0.43*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	-0.04	0.16	<b>0.29*</b>	-0.04	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>
% of the indirect effect out of the total effect^	36%	49%	45%	51%	35%	57%	26%	21%	46%			16%		33%	41%
% of the indirect effect via EUROPEAN ID.	<u>96%</u>	<u>98%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>96%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>95%</u>	<u>97%</u>	-	-	<u>97%</u>	-	<u>97%</u>	<u>96%</u>

^the percentage of indirect effect is shown only for significant effects

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p < 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter addressed the question of whether and which components of national and European identities play a role in influencing the support for further European integration, in terms of support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Drawing upon Guglielmi and Vezzoni's (2016) conceptualisation, four components (in their study called symbolic codes) of identity are defined and measured: 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', and 'Citizenship'.

Using eight path models, their effects on eight policy domains are investigated, also looking at the mediating effect of 'national attachment' and 'European identification'. The results of these analyses corroborate the hypothesis that identity-meanings matter in determining support for deepening and strengthening European policy governance. Indeed, transferring competencies to the EU is not a reasonable choice for people that conceive their national identity as something rooted in national cultural traditions, embedded in daily social practices as well as in laws and institutions ('National Civility' code).

This component is distinguished from a 'European Civility' code, which refers to attributes that qualify a form of banal Europeanism (Cram 2001; Guglielmi and Vezzoni 2016). Similar to the concept of banal nationalism (Billig 1995), the 'European Civility' component defines 'European identification' as a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans, which forms a European way of life. When people emphasise this component, 'support for EU governance' is far more likely. The remaining two components ('Ancestry' and 'Citizenship') are less relevant for respondents (lower general importance) as well as their influence on EU support is weaker. These findings evidence that both pre-political ('Ancestry') and political (exercising 'Citizenship' rights) identity-meanings do not discriminate between supporters and rejecters of EU governance (except in a limited number of cases and policy domains).

Chapter 2 argues that support for EU governance is a form of what Scharpf (1999) calls input legitimacy, that means legitimising the EU for what it represents for its citizens. Input legitimacy emerges when the EU is respectful of the 'will of the people'. I believe that the EU has proper input legitimacy when EU citizens support its policy prerogatives. Subjective (input) legitimacy may overlap or not with normative legitimacy (Fuchs and Klingemann 2011), but the concept of the 'will of the people' is more linked with the subjective side. This chapter adds to this some empirical evidence, showing that in order to develop support for EU governance (current or future, depending on policy domains) is necessary holding an idea of Europeanness of something rather ordinary and traditional, very close to day to day life. On the contrary, conceiving Europeanness either as the act of voting every five years for the (distant) European Parliament (an example of the 'Citizenship' symbolic code) or as some inherited at birth do not lead to support EU governance.

Furthermore, this chapter suggests that policy domains vary in their association with the four components of national and European identities. This is in line with the third model of support for EU governance introduced in Chapter 1. This model maintains that policy domains have different linkages with collective identity, and this influences citizen support for EU level governance. The analyses included in this chapter do not provide clear findings that explain these linkages between respondent national and European identities and specific policy domain characteristics – further study with more policy domains are required to model cross-level effects between micro and meso level determinants (see Chapter 5 Section 4) – but they show that this is a promising field of research that may complement more normative studies (see Cederman 2001).

## CONCLUSIONS

Support towards the European Union has been declining over the last ten years in which severe crises (economic, public debt, and refugee) shattered attitudes and behaviours of many Europeans. This dissertation deals with mass support towards the EU, but it does not address the change through time, except in very limited sense. What it aims to provide is a detailed account of the structure of EU support in fifteen EU countries in 2009, comparing some aspects of this structure with support for EU policy governance in 2016. I do not claim that the structure has remained the same over the years, but I believe that variations of mass support are compatible in principle with a certain temporal resilience of the structure through which EU support is expressed.

Approaching the structure of EU support has meant to start with an overarching research question: how many dimensions compose the concept of EU support according to prior studies? The literature remarks that the concept of EU support needs to be carefully analysed because it encapsulates different *forms* of support. Indeed, the concept of support towards the EU is multidimensional, and a minimal definition requires at least four dimensions that correspond to different forms of EU support (see Chapter 2): ‘Output legitimacy’ (EU support as subjective utility); ‘EU governance legitimacy’ (EU support as a preference for EU governance); ‘European identification’ (EU support as well-being); and ‘EU democracy’ (EU support as political representation at the EU level).

From the analyses included in this dissertation, it emerged that the four theorised dimensions of EU support are empirically tenable across fifteen European countries in 2009, and their measurement is also stable across different statistical methods (see Chapter 3 and Appendix A). Using as proxies a limited set of indicators, longitudinal findings suggest that the dimensions of EU support based on subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’) and political representation (‘EU democracy’) are those most affected by the European crises (Economic, Eurozone, and refugee crises), since there is a general decrease of these forms of EU support after 2007.

Having defined the dimensions of EU support, this thesis investigated what influences the development of these different forms of EU support. In the literature, EU support is explained by four sets of individual-level exogenous determinants: (1) Instrumental reasoning, (2) Confidence in national institutions, (3) National identification and attachment, and (4) Social-location and political values. The term exogenous indicates that they are external to the definition of the concept of EU support, and they are considered as its antecedents. Analyses with 2009 data included in Chapter 4 demonstrated that among these sets of micro-level determinants, only ‘exclusive national identification’, strength of ‘national attachment’, ‘confidence in national institutions’, and ‘political values’ influence the different forms of EU support in a consistent way across EU countries.

These results confirm some of the findings already in the literature, and this analysis can also be interpreted as a proof of the external validity of the measurement of EU support. However, the effects

of these determinants vary across the four dimensions, showing that results (and interpretation) differ when moving from one dimension of EU support to another. Moreover, only ‘exclusive national identification’ consistently influences a generic preference for EU governance, measured by the dimension of ‘EU governance legitimacy’.

Further analyses tested the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support, where ‘Output legitimacy’, ‘European identification’, and ‘EU democracy’ come first in ‘causal’ chain, influencing ‘EU governance legitimacy’. Although the literature (mainly neo and post-functionalism, and some empirical studies) suggests that this form of support is contingent upon subjective utility (‘Output legitimacy’), we-feelings (‘European identification’), and political representation (‘EU democracy’), findings do not confirm this hierarchical structure. However, as soon as the object of analysis is specific support for EU governance of distinct policy domains - rather than a generic preference for EU governance measured by ‘EU governance legitimacy’ - ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’ turn out to be significant determinants of this form of support. This also corroborates the hypothesis that there are two types of support for EU governance: a generic preference for more EU governance and a specific support for EU governance that varies across policy sectors.

Furthermore, there is a cross-policy variation in the influence of ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘European identification’, and this variation is accounted for by policy domain characteristics: ‘Output legitimacy’ is more influential for policies where EU policy governance is more effective according to normative criteria, while ‘European identification’ is more discriminant for market-correcting (*social-model*) policies.

Policy attributes also directly influence the probability to support EU policy governance. Indeed, controlling for individual-level variability, survey respondents tend to dismiss EU governance of high-expenditure policy as well as for domains where the EU has already acquired extensive competencies. This last outcome casts serious doubt on the neo-functional spillover mechanism (see Haas 1958) since what emerges is, instead, a ‘spillback’ (Schmitter 2004, cit. in Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 55) from prior agreements on EU competencies. However, the analyses included in this dissertation do not corroborate the hypothesis that the determinant of this ‘spillback’ is the politicisation of the EU. In 2009 data, there is no evidence of the influence of different party systems on support for EU policy governance. Overall, country-level variables are very scant determinants of specific support for EU policy governance, and from this dissertation emerges that this specific support is mostly influenced by policy (meso) and individual (micro)-level characteristics.

Finally, the strength of individual European and national identifications are undoubtedly within the set of traditional drivers of EU support, and some studies in the literature address the influence of identity-meanings on European identification, but there are no studies that relate identity-meanings

to support for EU policy governance. This was performed in Chapter 6, where European and national identities are unpacked in their constitutive components to investigate their influence on support for EU governance of eight distinct policy domains. Four components are defined: ‘European Civility’, ‘National Civility’, ‘Ancestry’, and ‘Citizenship’. The analyses corroborated the hypothesis that the different meanings of national and European identity influence EU support. Indeed, those that strongly conceive their national identity as a matter of sharing national cultural tradition (‘National Civility’) are less likely to endorse EU governance, since these national values are also embedded in national laws and institutions, which would be affected by a competence transfer to the EU. At the same time, those who believe that the essence of being European (*Europeanness*) is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans tend to be more supportive of EU policy governance. The importance placed on a pre-political (‘Ancestry’) and a political (‘Citizenship’) component does not influence this form of EU support.

To conclude, what do these findings say about the structure of citizen support for EU policy governance? In Chapter 1 three models of support for EU governance are provided. Model 1 maintains that this form of support is not a unitary dimension and support varies across policy domains: it is more likely in domains characterised by policy externalities generated by international interdependence; Model 2 conceives support for EU governance as an attitude that cross-cuts policy domains: it is a unitary dimension that is not influenced by the characteristics of the policy domains; Model 3 holds that support for EU governance is not a unitary dimension, and it is influenced by the way each policy domain is related to political identities and by the degree of politicisation of the EU within national politics. The analyses included in this dissertation tested the elements that compose these models. In details, these elements are:

- HP1. Model 2: the assumption that support for EU policy governance is a unitary dimension (see Chapter 3);
- HP2. Model 2: support for EU policy governance is not contingent upon characteristics of the policy domains (see Chapter 5);
- HP3. Model 1: support for EU governance is more likely in policy domains characterised by *functional interdependence* (see Chapter 5);
- HP4. Model 3: the influence of political identities on support for EU governance varies across policy domains due to the different characteristics of the policy domains (see chapters 5 and 6);
- HP5. Model 3: support for EU policy governance is influenced by the degree of politicisation of the EU within national politics (Chapter 5).

The analyses of Chapter 3 provided evidence supporting the presence of a unitary dimension of support for EU policy governance (HP<sub>1</sub>), namely an individual latent and generic disposition.

However, this generic latent attitude does not explain respondents' preferences for EU governance of two policy domains (Foreign and Tax policies), and large part of the variability in the support for EU governance of other six policy domains is not accounted for by this latent dimension. There is something more, and this is found in the characteristics of the policy domains (and in other individual-level determinants).

Chapter 5 showed that policy attributes have a direct influence on support for EU governance. It follows that Model 2 is wrong (HP<sub>2</sub>), whereas Model 1 is right (HP<sub>3</sub>) in saying that support for EU governance is more likely in policy domains characterised by policy externalities generated by international interdependence. Moreover, chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that the influence of political identities on support for EU governance differ across policy domains, suggesting that political identities are more determinant in some policy sectors and less in others (HP<sub>4</sub>). This can depend on the fact that some sectors are more important in defining and demarcating political identities than others.

Lastly, there are not enough findings to accept the hypothesis (HP<sub>4</sub>) that politicisation is a determinant of support for EU policy governance, even though further research should be undertaken on this issue since 2016 data suggest that there might be an influence.

To conclude, this thesis proposes a fourth model of support for EU policy governance, which combines the findings just presented. Hence, support for EU policy governance is structured with a core that consists of a generic disposition towards EU policy governance. However, this generic disposition is either activated or deactivated by the attributes of the policy sectors themselves. Moreover, political identities interact with the characteristics of the policy sectors and have a different influence across policy domains. This last point should be the object of further studies, with more policy domains, allowing modelling cross-level effects between political identities (a micro-level determinant) and meso-level determinants. This is a promising field of research that can complement more normative studies on the scope of EU policy governance. Indeed, this thesis demonstrated the importance of looking at the meaning of national and European identities to understand why European citizens support or reject EU policy governance.

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## APPENDIX A

Table 40: Method Comparison

Method	Pros	Cons	Type of indicators	Type of latent factor(s)
PCFA	Easy to run and interpret	Each indicator freely loads to each factor	Continuous	Continuous
	Rule of thumb in choosing latent factor	No statistical test for latent structure stability		
	Role of thumb in identifying factor meaning	No statistical test for cross-group invariance		
		Assume indicators and latent factors as continuous		
MGCFA	Easy to run and no limit to number of factors	Assume indicators and latent factors as continuous	Continuous	Continuous
	Test confirmatory factor solution	Risk of over-dimensionalising		
	Statistical index of latent structure validity (goodness of fit)			
	Statistical test for cross-group invariance			
IRT	Test confirmatory factor solution	Computationally expensive	Any	Continuous
	Estimate latent factor for any type of indicators	Limited number of latent factor in current statistical software		
	Statistical index of latent structure validity (goodness of fit)	Limited number of indicator per factor in current statistical software		
	Statistical test for cross-group invariance	Limited number of ready to use goodness of fit indexes		
LCFA	Test confirmatory factor solution	Computationally expensive	Any	Ordinal
	Estimate latent factor for any type of indicators	Limited number of latent factors		
	Statistical index of latent structure validity (goodness of fit)	Limited number of indicator per factor		
	Statistical test for cross-group invariance	Limited number of ready to use goodness of fit index		


### Item response theory (IRT)

Item response theory is a family of statistical techniques employed for measuring a continuous latent dimension - called latent trait or ability - using survey items as indicators of this dimension (see van der Linden 2016). Compared with CFA, IRT does not assume that variables are interval level: IRT was developed for measuring latent trait of discrete variables, managing them according to their type (dichotomic, categorical, or ordinal) (Vermunt and Magidson 2016a). This means that normality is

not assumed, and analysts can model the relationship between the latent dimension and its indicators using the functional model that best fits theoretical assumption on the nature of the data: dichotomous data can be modelled with Rasch, 2-PL, or 3-PL models; ordinal data with, for instance, generalized partial credit, or rating scale models; and nominal data with nominal response model (Muraki 1992; de Ayala 2009). In most of the IRT models, the form of the function is always a variation of the logistic distribution (see de Ayala 2009).

Here a parametric IRT model is used (de Ayala 2009; van der Linden 2016) to measure the dimensions of ‘EU governance legitimacy’, and ‘Output legitimacy’. Figure 24 graphically displays the measurement model, where the concept-indicator relationships remain the same as in MGCFA (see Chapter 3 Section 2): six policy areas define the F2 – ‘EU governance legitimacy’ latent trait, and three indicators of benefits define ‘Output legitimacy’.

Figure 24 - Measurement model EU support (IRT and LCFA)



Modelling an IRT parametric model means defining the types of indicators (either ordinal, nominal, or continuous) as well as the function that links the continuous latent factor with the manifest items. Indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ are dichotomic variables<sup>120</sup>, the function employed is a simple logistic, and the IRT model is a 2PL (de Ayala 2009; van der Linden 2016); indicators of ‘EU governance legitimacy’ are ordinal variables, the function chosen is the adjacent-category logistic, and the IRT model is a generalized partial credit model (see Muraki 1992; de Ayala 2009; van der

<sup>120</sup> A dichotomic variables can be defined as ordinal or nominal without any theoretical or practical difference.

Linden 2016). Since the two dimensions are uncorrelated, the unidimensionality assumption of IRT modelling (van der Linden 2016) still holds.

Following the same analytical strategy employed for MGCFA, four models are compared: a simple model, run without controlling for the data clustered structure (Pooled model); one that places constraints on the configural invariance across countries (Configural model); a third one that constrains also equal slopes (Metric model); and the last one that adds a constraint for equal intercepts (Scalar model). The results of these IRT models are reported in Table 41<sup>121</sup>. According to p-values, the Pooled model, and the Scalar model do not fit data well. Conversely, Configural, as well as Metric equivalence models, have a good fit, and the value of their Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) suggests that the Metric equivalence model performs better than the Configural one. Hence, this analysis confirms that cross-country comparison is possible once controlling for the offset created in the scale of groups by the fact that they reside in different countries (Davidov et al. 2012).

Table 41 - Fit indexes IRT model of Figure 24. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MODEL</b>	<b>LL</b>	<b>BIC(LL)</b>	<b>Npar</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>p-value</b>
<i>Pooled</i>	-64572	129361	23	1704	0.00
<i>Configural</i>	-61674	126177	301	11819	1.00
<i>Metric</i>	-62016	125941	203	11917	0.34
<i>Scalar</i>	-63165	127054	77	12043	0.00

However, also using parametric IRT modelling, the problem of weak prediction power still remains (Table 42). Indeed, for each policy sector<sup>122</sup> less than one-third of the total item variance is explained by the latent dimension, a result that is even worse than what emerges from MGCFA (see Chapter 3 Section 2).

Table 42 - Predictive power of 'EU governance legitimacy' (IRT). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>Policy sector</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>
Unemployment policy	0.33
Immigration policy	0.26
Environmental policy	0.31
Fighting crime	0.27
Health care policy	0.32
Agricultural policy	0.31

<sup>121</sup> IRT models are computed using Latent Gold 5.1. Syntax is provided in Appendix C. Listwise deletion.

<sup>122</sup> For ordinal and dichotomic variables the percentage of explained variance is computed by Latent Gold 5.1 using a linear approximation as described in Magidson and Vermunt (2004) and Vermunt and Magidson (2005, 2016b).

In this case too, this result may be driven by the statistical method used to measure latent dimensions. As the last checking, the next section measures ‘Output legitimacy’ and ‘EU governance legitimacy’ using a non-parametric IRT such as LCFA.

### Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA)

Latent Class Factor Analysis (LCFA) is a measuring technique that models one or more latent ordinal dimensions using a set of indicators. The ordinal nature of the latent dimension allows speaking of a discretised latent trait (Heinen 1996; Vermunt 2001; Vermunt and Magidson 2005; Vermunt and Magidson 2016a) since the latent variable that summarises individuals’ latent ability has a limited number of levels. Moreover, it can be considered a nonparametric IRT, because the relationship between a latent dimension and its indicators is not defined by a specific parametric function (van Onna 2004), like in parametric IRT where this function is one of the logistic family. In parametric IRT for every value of the continuous latent trait, there is a corresponding probability of choosing each item-level category, and individuals vary in their latent trait position or value. As well, in LCFA each discrete latent trait level is associated to a fixed probability of choosing each item-level category, but, in this case, individuals vary in the probability to be assigned to each specific (discrete) latent trait level.

Beside statistical differences, the analytical strategy is the same as for IRT modelling, and four models (Pooled, Configural, Metric, and Scalar equivalence) are compared to assess measurement equivalence of ‘Output legitimacy’, and ‘EU governance legitimacy’<sup>123</sup>. Every latent dimension is modelled as a latent ordinal variable with three levels (Low, Medium, High legitimacy). Table 43 displays the goodness of fit indexes for the four models<sup>124</sup>, where is clear that combining p-value statistics and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the Metric equivalence model is the best fitting model.

Table 43 - Fit indexes LCFA model of Figure 24. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

MODEL	LL	BIC(LL)	Npar	df	p-value	Class.Err.
<i>Pooled</i>	-64459	129153	25	1702	0.00	0.1498
<i>Configural</i>	-61262	126050	375	11745	1.00	0.1378
<i>Metric</i>	-61440	125220	249	11871	1.00	0.1716
<i>Scalar</i>	-63145	127051	81	12039	0.00	0.1227

<sup>123</sup> For the indicator-concept relations see Figure 24 at page 154.

<sup>124</sup> LCFAs are performed using Latent Gold 5.1 Syntax in Appendix C. Listwise deletion.

The fraction of explained variance is still limited, and about two-third of the item-level variance is not explained by an ordinal latent trait (Table 44).

Table 44 - Predictive power of 'EU governance legitimacy' (LCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>Policy sector</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>
Unemployment	0.35
Immigration policy	0.29
Environmental policy	0.37
Fighting crime	0.34
Health care policy	0.35
Agricultural policy	0.32

As articulated above, every respondent has a probability to be classified 'Low', 'Medium', and 'High' on a latent dimension. For instance, for the latent dimension of 'Output Legitimacy' respondent with ID = 1 has a probability of 12% of holding 'Low' legitimacy, 87% 'Medium', and 1% 'High'; And for 'EU governance Legitimacy', it has 57% probability of 'Low' Legitimacy, 43% of 'Medium', and 0% of 'High'. From these variable categories, it is possible to compute an interval-level variable, which summarises the individual probability distribution, assigning to each category an equal distance score between 0 and 1 (Vermunt and Magidson 2016a). In this case, the first level ('Low') is equal to 0, the second ('Medium') is 0.5, and the last category ('High') is 1. The average score is calculated using this formula:  $(0 \times \text{percentage of 'Low'} + 0.5 \times \text{percentage of 'Medium'} + 1 \times \text{percentage of 'High'}) / 100$ . Hence, the score for ID = 1 is 0.55 for 'Output Legitimacy', and 0.21 for 'EU governance legitimacy'. This individual score mimics a parametric IRT latent trait ability, as well as a MGCFA latent factor score. These values are used to analyse the correlation between these scores and those resulting from MGCFA and IRT modelling (see Chapter 3 Section 2).

## APPENDIX B

Table 45a - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

Concepts	Indicator	Intune (April-June) 2009	Eurobarometer
<i>Output legitimacy</i>	Overall EU membership evaluation	Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the EU is ... <i>Answers: A good thing, A bad thing, or Neither good nor bad.</i>	<u>Until 2012</u> Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the EU is ... <i>Answers: A good thing, A bad thing, or Neither good nor bad.</i> <u>After 2012</u> Please tell me whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU... <i>Answers: Totally Agree, Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, or Totally disagree.</i>
	National benefit from EU membership	Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? <i>Answers: Has benefited, or Has not benefited.</i>	
	Personal benefit from EU membership	And what about of people like you? Have people like you on balance benefited or not from (OUR COUNTRY)'s EU membership? <i>Answers: Have benefited, or Have not benefited.</i>	

Table 45b - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>	Unemployment	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Fighting unemployment.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2011</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>The fight against unemployment.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
	Environmental policy	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Environmental policy.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2011</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>Protection of the environment.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
	Fighting crime	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Fight against crime.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2011</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>The fight against organised crime.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
	Health care policy	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Health care policy.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2011</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>Health and social welfare.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
	Agricultural policy	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Agricultural policy.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2011</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>Agriculture and fishing policy.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
	Unified tax system	Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following? <u>A unified tax system for the EU.</u> <i>Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, Somewhat against, or Strongly against.</i>	
	Immigration policy	In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? <u>Immigration policy.</u> <i>Answers: Regional level, National level, or European Union level.</i>	<u>Before 2014</u> For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU? <u>Immigration policy.</u> <i>Answers: (NATIONALITY) Government, or Jointly with the EU.</i>
			<u>After 2014</u> What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: 'A common European policy on migration' <i>Answers: For, or Against.</i>
	Foreign policy	Thinking about the European Union over the next ten years or so, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following? A single EU foreign policy toward outside countries. <i>Answers: Strongly in favour, Somewhat in favour, Somewhat against, or Strongly against.</i>	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it: 'A common foreign policy of all Member States of the EU' <i>Answers: For, or Against.</i>

Table 45c - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>European identification</b>	Attachment towards Europe	People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe <i>Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached</i>	People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to Europe <i>Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached</i>
	Cognitive identification: psychological centrality	How much does being a European have to do with how you feel about yourself in your day to day life? <i>Answers: A great deal, Somewhat, Not very much, or Not at all.</i>	
	Cognitive identification: interdependence	How far do you feel that what happens to Europe in general has important consequences for people like you? <i>Answers: A great deal, Somewhat, Not very much, or Not at all.</i>	

Table 45d - Question wording. Source Eurobarometer data, and Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>EU democracy</b>	Satisfaction with EU democracy	On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union? Are you...? <i>Answers: Very satisfied, Somewhat satisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, or Very dissatisfied.</i>	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? <i>Answers: Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, or Not at all satisfied.</i>
	Trust in the EU Commission	Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. '0' means that "you do not trust an institution at all" and '10' means "you have complete trust": <i>The European Commission</i>	Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? <i>The European Commission...</i> <i>Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust.</i>
	Trust in the EU Parliament	Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. '0' means that "you do not trust an institution at all" and '10' means "you have complete trust": <i>The European Parliament</i>	Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? <i>The European Parliament.</i> <i>Answers: Tend to trust, Tend not to trust.</i>
	Trust in EU policy-makers	Those who make decisions in the European Union are competent people who know what they are doing? <i>Answers: Strongly Agree, Somewhat agree, Somewhat disagree, or Strongly disagree</i>	

Table 46a - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Output legitimacy</b>		
	Overall Evaluation	National benefit	Personal benefit
BELGIUM	0.83	0.79	0.55
DENMARK	0.75	0.79	0.61
GERMANY	0.84	0.67	0.56
GREECE	0.85	0.83	0.61
SPAIN	0.88	0.83	0.67
FRANCE	0.75	0.72	0.43
ITALY	0.84	0.76	0.56
PORTUGAL	0.79	0.79	0.57
UK	0.56	0.48	0.36
ESTONIA	0.81	0.82	0.61
HUNGARY	0.56	0.42	0.32
POLAND	0.82	0.78	0.46
SLOVAKIA	0.80	0.83	0.59
SLOVENIA	0.78	0.75	0.45
BULGARIA	0.73	0.59	0.32

Table 46b - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>EU governance legitimacy</b>					
	Fighting unemployment	Immigration policy	Environmental policy	Fight against crime	Health care policy	Agricultural policy
BELGIUM	0.34	0.56	0.56	0.52	0.33	0.43
DENMARK	0.19	0.30	0.54	0.37	0.13	0.40
GERMANY	0.27	0.48	0.69	0.61	0.21	0.45
GREECE	0.28	0.42	0.39	0.25	0.22	0.24
SPAIN	0.34	0.61	0.57	0.57	0.19	0.28
FRANCE	0.29	0.59	0.59	0.44	0.28	0.40
ITALY	0.30	0.54	0.40	0.32	0.18	0.20
PORTUGAL	0.44	0.57	0.49	0.45	0.27	0.30
UK	0.10	0.25	0.32	0.09	0.09	0.16
ESTONIA	0.13	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.10	0.14
HUNGARY	0.30	0.52	0.58	0.51	0.21	0.28
POLAND	0.28	0.52	0.41	0.43	0.24	0.29
SLOVAKIA	0.32	0.58	0.44	0.66	0.25	0.37
SLOVENIA	0.29	0.40	0.44	0.41	0.20	0.26
BULGARIA	0.16	0.54	0.47	0.35	0.16	0.25

Table 46c - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>European identification</b>		
	Attachment towards Europe	Psychological Centrality	Interdependence
BELGIUM	0.58	0.55	0.66
DENMARK	0.64	0.53	0.65
GERMANY	0.66	0.53	0.60
GREECE	0.48	0.42	0.74
SPAIN	0.53	0.54	0.71
FRANCE	0.56	0.46	0.67
ITALY	0.66	0.48	0.72
PORTUGAL	0.60	0.59	0.78
UK	0.45	0.34	0.70
ESTONIA	0.52	0.47	0.67
HUNGARY	0.73	0.43	0.73
POLAND	0.63	0.48	0.54
SLOVAKIA	0.59	0.46	0.67
SLOVENIA	0.62	0.46	0.67
BULGARIA	0.64	0.30	0.61

Table 46d - Country-averages of indicators of EU support. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>EU democracy</b>			
	Satisfaction with EU democracy	Trust in EU Parliament	Trust in EU Commission	Trust in EU policy-makers
BELGIUM	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.60
DENMARK	0.56	0.54	0.53	0.62
GERMANY	0.50	0.45	0.44	0.50
GREECE	0.49	0.47	0.46	0.55
SPAIN	0.60	0.51	0.52	0.62
FRANCE	0.49	0.46	0.46	0.52
ITALY	0.56	0.53	0.54	0.56
PORTUGAL	0.55	0.49	0.50	0.61
UK	0.46	0.39	0.40	0.41
ESTONIA	0.62	0.53	0.54	0.68
HUNGARY	0.49	0.33	0.33	0.58
POLAND	0.54	0.43	0.44	0.55
SLOVAKIA	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.62
SLOVENIA	0.58	0.50	0.51	0.60
BULGARIA	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.76

Table 47 - Items correlation. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
<b>A - Overall EU membership evaluation</b>	1	.633**	.480**	.097**	.150**	.137**	.089**	.069**	.146**	.318**	.282**	.090**	.369**	.385**	.391**	.283**
<b>B - National benefit from EU membership</b>		1	.539**	.100**	.126**	.122**	.080**	.073**	.133**	.275**	.276**	.095**	.341**	.356**	.354**	.245**
<b>C - Personal benefit from EU membership</b>			1	.082**	.117**	.145**	.080**	.053**	.139**	.282**	.332**	.184**	.303**	.332**	.322**	.208**
<b>D - Unemployment policy</b>				1	.330**	.287**	.348**	.382**	.319**	.091**	.094**	.073**	.064**	.067**	.060**	.037**
<b>E - Immigration policy</b>					1	.342**	.322**	.249**	.275**	.114**	.088**	.064**	.061**	.096**	.092**	.062**
<b>F - Environmental policy</b>						1	.360**	.283**	.368**	.133**	.091**	.072**	.079**	.101**	.098**	.069**
<b>G - Fighting crime policy</b>							1	.328**	.302**	.097**	.091**	.044**	.053**	.058**	.059**	.043**
<b>H - Health care policy</b>								1	.342**	.061**	.066**	.039**	.038**	.058**	.052**	.032**
<b>I - Agricultural policy</b>									1	.125**	.111**	.057**	.068**	.103**	.102**	.072**
<b>L - Attachment towards Europe</b>										1	.374**	.175**	.255**	.283**	.284**	.240**
<b>M - Cognitive identification: psychological centrality</b>											1	.202**	.243**	.256**	.256**	.169**
<b>N - Cognitive identification: interdependence</b>												1	.105**	.107**	.109**	.084**
<b>O - Satisfaction with EU democracy</b>													1	.403**	.399**	.343**
<b>P - Trust in EU Parliament</b>														1	.827**	.359**
<b>Q - Trust in EU Commission</b>															1	.365**
<b>R- Trust in EU policy-makers</b>																1

\*\* : Correlation is significant at  $p \leq 0.01$  (two-tails)

Table 48 - Group-level fit statistics model of Figure 15 (MGCFA). Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>N. OF CASES</b>	<b>SRMR</b>
Belgium	809	0.06
Denmark	777	0.07
Germany	793	0.05
Greece	605	0.06
Spain	799	0.06
France	861	0.07
Italy	582	0.06
Portugal	728	0.06
UK	747	0.09
Estonia	431	0.05
Hungary	689	0.06
Poland	483	0.06
Slovakia	736	0.07
Slovenia	635	0.06
Bulgaria	516	0.07

Table 49 - Survey question for micro determinants. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

VARIABLE	QUESTION WORDING
Socio-economic status (SES)	To which of the following categories do you feel you belong? <i>Answers: The upper class, the middle class, lower middle class, the working class.</i>
Trust in the national Government	Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following institutions. <i>'0' means that "you do not trust an institution at all" and '10' means "you have complete trust": The (nationality) government</i>
Exclusive national identification	Do you see yourself as...? <i>(Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only.</i>
National attachment	People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (OUR COUNTRY) <i>Answers: Very attached, Fairly attached, Not very attached, Not at all attached</i>
Knowledge of the EU (1)	Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? <i>The Netherlands</i>
Knowledge of the EU (2)	Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? <i>Malta</i>
Knowledge of the EU (3)	Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union (European Community)? <i>Croatia</i>
Knowledge of the EU (4)	How many member states are there in the European Union nowadays?
Education	Which of the following best describes your level of education: <i>Did not go to school, Completed primary (elementary) education, Completed basic secondary education (middle school), Completed secondary education with vocational qualifications, Completed secondary education with A-level qualifications 5, College, university or other degree, Still a student.</i>
Left/right self-placement	In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". <i>Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where '0' means "the left" and '10' means "the right", and '5' means "neither left nor right"?</i>
Gender female	Gender: Male or Female.
Age	Could you please tell me the year in which you were born?

Table 50 - Average value of micro determinants per country. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Instrumental reasoning</b>	<b>Confidence in national institutions</b>	<b>National identification and affectivity</b>		<b>Social location and political values</b>			<b>Controls</b>	
	Ses (0-1)	Trust nat. Gov. (0-1)	Excl. Nat. Id (0-1)	Nat. Attachment (0-1)	Eu knowledge (0-1)	Education (0-1)	Left/right (0-1)	Female (0-1)	Age (0-1)
BELGIUM	0.40	0.49	0.31	0.69	0.54	0.59	0.51	0.46	0.36
DENMARK	0.40	0.62	0.33	0.91	0.50	0.56	0.53	0.52	0.37
GERMANY	0.39	0.50	0.26	0.81	0.52	0.55	0.47	0.50	0.37
GREECE	0.38	0.32	0.43	0.85	0.44	0.49	0.52	0.43	0.37
SPAIN	0.24	0.45	0.24	0.71	0.40	0.47	0.44	0.53	0.33
FRANCE	0.40	0.43	0.27	0.81	0.54	0.65	0.46	0.47	0.35
ITALY	0.37	0.45	0.18	0.84	0.40	0.44	0.52	0.45	0.36
PORTUGAL	0.28	0.35	0.35	0.82	0.43	0.38	0.48	0.45	0.35
UK	0.22	0.42	0.70	0.78	0.40	0.62	0.52	0.46	0.34
ESTONIA	0.29	0.43	0.46	0.86	0.42	0.59	0.53	0.43	0.33
HUNGARY	0.17	0.34	0.57	0.86	0.39	0.42	0.58	0.41	0.36
POLAND	0.27	0.33	0.46	0.86	0.38	0.47	0.57	0.47	0.36
SLOVAKIA	0.30	0.50	0.43	0.78	0.54	0.37	0.48	0.38	0.34
SLOVENIA	0.35	0.45	0.38	0.87	0.67	0.64	0.46	0.48	0.35
BULGARIA	0.18	0.23	0.61	0.91	0.33	0.50	0.47	0.45	0.38

Table 51 - Fit indexes models of Figure 16. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MODEL</b>	<b>X2</b>	<b>CFI</b>	<b>RMSEA</b>	<b>SRMR</b>	<b>BIC</b>	<b>DF</b>
<i>METRIC INVARIANCE</i>	7915	0.9	0.05	0.05	82054	3438

Table 52 - Group-level fit statistics model of Figure 16. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>N. OF CASES</b>	<b>SRMR</b>
Belgium	729	0.05
Denmark	698	0.05
Germany	687	0.05
Greece	542	0.05
Spain	705	0.05
France	773	0.05
Italy	494	0.05
Portugal	626	0.05
UK	579	0.07
Estonia	350	0.05
Hungary	544	0.05
Poland	327	0.05
Slovakia	580	0.06
Slovenia	535	0.04
Bulgaria	405	0.06

Table 53 - Left/Right linear - total effect - standardized coefficients. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

EXOGENOUS DETERMINANT ON DIMENSIONS	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
SES ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	0.04	0.04	0.02	<b>0.09*</b>	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.18	0.15	-0.07	0.08	0.14	0.06
SES ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.03	<b>0.12*</b>	-0.08	0.06	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.01	-0.01	0	-0.04	0	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	0.05	<b>-0.33*</b>
SES ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.03	<b>0.08*</b>	0.07	<b>0.23*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	<b>0.18*</b>	0.04	0.09	<b>0.18*</b>
SES ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0.02	0.07	0	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	<b>0.11*</b>	0.04	0.09	0.03	0	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	-0.03
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.05	<b>0.3*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.03	-0.05	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.05	<b>-0.13*</b>	0	0.08	0	<b>0.12*</b>	0.1	0.02	0.03	0.01
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.16*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	0	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	0	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	0.03	<b>0.16*</b>
TRUST NAT. GOV. ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>0.67*</b>	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.59*</b>	<b>0.64*</b>	<b>0.58*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.58*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.32*</b>	<b>-0.38*</b>	<b>-0.45*</b>	<b>-0.31*</b>	<b>-0.24*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	<b>-0.16*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.36*</b>
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.27*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.26*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.2*</b>	-0.05
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>-0.47*</b>	<b>-0.4*</b>	<b>-0.43*</b>	<b>-0.35*</b>	<b>-0.41*</b>	<b>-0.48*</b>	<b>-0.33*</b>	<b>-0.3*</b>	<b>-0.53*</b>	<b>-0.39*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.35*</b>	<b>-0.34*</b>	<b>-0.54*</b>	<b>-0.51*</b>
EXCL. NAT. ID ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.22*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	<b>-0.29*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.23*</b>	<b>-0.2*</b>	<b>-0.21*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.02	0.01	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.04	0.08	<b>0.16*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.19*</b>	0.07	0.02	<b>0.11*</b>	0.04	0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.02	-0.04	<b>-0.13*</b>	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	0	-0.05	<b>-0.15*</b>	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.09
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.22*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>0.64*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	<b>0.54*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>
NAT. ATTACHMENT ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0.02	-0.04	0.06	-0.01	<b>0.09</b>	0.02	0	<b>0.11</b>	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.07	-0.04	0.03	0.06
EDUCATION ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.08	<b>0.09*</b>	0.06	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	0.09	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	0.04	0.06	0.04	0	-0.01	<b>0.12*</b>
EDUCATION ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	<b>0.11*</b>	0.09	0.08	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	0	0.03	0.01	<b>0.16*</b>
EDUCATION ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.02	0.07	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	0.05	0.07	0.07	<b>0.09*</b>	-0.02	0.07	-0.09	0	0.07	-0.04	0.07
EDUCATION ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>0.06</b>	0.06	0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.05
FEMALE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.09*</b>	0	0.06	0	-0.01	0.03	<b>0.15*</b>	<b>0.14*</b>	-0.02	0.08	-0.05	-0.08	0.02	0.02	0.01
FEMALE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	<b>0.14*</b>	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.06	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.05	-0.04	0.05	-0.09	-0.01
FEMALE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	-0.06	-0.04	<b>-0.16*</b>	0	0	-0.06	<b>-0.15*</b>	0.05	-0.05	0.07	-0.08	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04
FEMALE ON: EU DEMOCRACY	-0.04	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.02	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.17*</b>	<b>-0.13*</b>	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	-0.07	<b>-0.12*</b>	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	0.02
KNOW. OF EU ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	0.07	-0.03	<b>0.12*</b>	0.03	<b>0.12*</b>	0.04	0.05	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	<b>0.16*</b>	-0.01	0	<b>0.16*</b>	<b>0.2*</b>	0
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.05	0.04	0.1	-0.08	0.09	<b>0.15*</b>	0.09	0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0	<b>0.14*</b>	0.05
KNOW. OF EU ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	0.05	-0.04	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.01	0.06	0.06	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.01
KNOW. OF EU ON: EU DEMOCRACY	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0	<b>-0.06*</b>	-0.07	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.07	0.06	0.04	0.06
LEFT/RIGHT ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	-0.02	0.03	-0.08	<b>0.18*</b>	<b>-0.1*</b>	-0.06	<b>-0.18*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>-0.12*</b>	-0.03	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.09	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	-0.01	0.06	<b>-0.11*</b>	-0.02	-0.1	-0.08	-0.06	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	<b>-0.1*</b>	-0.02	<b>-0.14*</b>	-0.05	0
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	-0.05	0.02	0	0.1	-0.05	-0.09	<b>-0.12*</b>	0.07	<b>-0.09*</b>	0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.01	<b>0.14*</b>	0.09
LEFT/RIGHT ON: EU DEMOCRACY	0	-0.06	-0.04	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.13*</b>	<b>-0.11*</b>	<b>-0.25*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>-0.08*</b>	-0.01	<b>-0.25*</b>	-0.01	0.07	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>
AGE ON: OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>-0.09*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	-0.05	-0.02	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.07	-0.01	<b>-0.16*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.05	-0.11	-0.06	0.08	-0.07
AGE ON: EU GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY	0.06	0.06	<b>0.1*</b>	-0.03	-0.05	<b>0.13*</b>	0.03	-0.04	<b>-0.12*</b>	<b>-0.19*</b>	-0.05	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.02
AGE ON: EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.12*</b>	0.01	0.1	-0.02	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	<b>0.14*</b>	-0.04
AGE ON: EU DEMOCRACY	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.15*</b>	<b>-0.08*</b>	-0.01	<b>0.11*</b>	-0.05	<b>-0.1*</b>	0	<b>-0.14*</b>	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.05
<i>N. cases</i>	729	698	687	542	705	773	494	626	579	350	544	327	580	535	405

Note: Coefficients significant at  $p \leq 0.05$  (two-tails) are marked in bold type and with the sign \*

Table 54 - Fit indexes models of Figure 17. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

MODEL	X2	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	BIC	DF
<i>METRIC INVARIANCE</i>	7915	0.901	0.048	0.051	117712	3438

Table 55a - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>	<b><u>Health</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed	<b><u>Unemployment</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed	<b><u>Agriculture</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.50</b>	0.33	1.19	<b>0.49</b>	0.44	0.72	<b>1.20</b>	1.02	1.46
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>1.13</b>	1.10	1.25	<b>1.27</b>	1.16	1.56	<b>0.90</b>	0.93	0.96
EU DEMOCRACY	0.33	0.37	0.18	0.11	0.10	0.33	<b>0.42</b>	0.30	1.02
Gender female	<b>0.15</b>	0.16	0.13	<b>0.15</b>	0.16	0.13	<b>0.21</b>	0.18	0.32
Age	<b>-0.53</b>	-0.51	-0.52	<b>0.22</b>	0.18	0.43	<b>0.36</b>	0.44	0.17
SES: Socio-economic status	<b>-0.38</b>	-0.30	-0.77	-0.16	-0.13	-0.30	-0.09	-0.16	0.13
Knowledge of the EU	-0.15	-0.10	-0.44	0.03	0.07	-0.21	<b>0.20</b>	0.24	0.09
Education	<b>-0.26</b>	-0.16	-0.71	-0.02	0.11	-0.13	<b>0.19</b>	0.19	0.23
Exclusive national identification	-0.10	-0.10	-0.15	<b>-0.14</b>	-0.15	-0.14	<b>-0.28</b>	-0.28	-0.27
Trust in the national Government	<b>-0.25</b>	-0.21	-0.39	<b>-0.21</b>	-0.17	-0.54	<b>-0.26</b>	-0.23	-0.47
National attachment	<b>-0.64</b>	-0.54	-1.02	<b>-0.36</b>	-0.28	-0.63	<b>-0.46</b>	-0.33	-0.89
Left/right self-placement	<b>-0.79</b>	-0.50	-2.33	<b>-0.91</b>	-0.77	-1.61	-0.35	-0.24	-0.66
Left/right self-placement squared	<b>0.61</b>	0.27	2.46	<b>0.69</b>	0.47	1.87	0.10	-0.03	0.56

Table 56b - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>	<b><u>Crime</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed	<b><u>Immigration</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed	<b><u>Environment</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.40</b>	0.18	1.05	<b>0.93</b>	0.89	0.97	<b>1.10</b>	0.96	1.30
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>0.68</b>	0.79	0.45	<b>0.44</b>	0.25	1.01	0.22	0.18	0.46
EU DEMOCRACY	0.10	0.20	-0.30	0.21	0.16	0.72	<b>0.45</b>	0.45	0.48
Gender female	0.06	0.02	0.23	0.02	-0.03	0.21	<b>0.17</b>	0.18	0.16
Age	<b>0.49</b>	0.31	1.16	<b>-0.28</b>	-0.16	-0.70	<b>-0.29</b>	-0.10	-0.94
SES: Socio-economic status	<b>-0.19</b>	-0.21	-0.17	0.01	0.04	-0.07	-0.04	-0.08	0.08
Knowledge of the EU	<b>0.25</b>	0.27	0.16	<b>0.29</b>	0.31	0.24	<b>0.44</b>	0.38	0.77
Education	0.13	0.15	-0.01	<b>0.33</b>	0.33	0.37	<b>0.58</b>	0.65	0.36
Exclusive national identification	<b>-0.20</b>	-0.17	-0.28	<b>-0.33</b>	-0.32	-0.37	<b>-0.24</b>	-0.19	-0.38
Trust in the national Government	-0.02	-0.01	-0.10	-0.07	0.02	-0.64	-0.09	-0.13	0.08
National attachment	<b>-0.24</b>	-0.15	-0.63	<b>-0.30</b>	-0.13	-0.79	-0.12	0.01	-0.54
Left/right self-placement	0.06	0.00	0.34	-0.29	-0.13	-0.69	-0.47	-0.28	-1.26
Left/right self-placement squared	-0.29	-0.30	-0.27	-0.13	-0.30	0.47	0.06	-0.13	0.86

Table 56c - Fixed effect logit model religion. Source of data Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>MICRO LEVEL DETERMINANTS</b>	<b><u>Tax</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed	<b><u>Foreign</u></b>	Catholic or orthodox	Protestant or Mixed
OUTPUT LEGITIMACY	<b>0.67</b>	0.72	0.55	<b>1.63</b>	1.40	1.90
EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	<b>1.34</b>	1.29	1.48	<b>0.96</b>	1.20	0.66
EU DEMOCRACY	<b>0.44</b>	0.26	1.11	<b>0.48</b>	0.26	1.24
Gender female	<b>0.15</b>	0.16	0.14	<b>0.15</b>	0.15	0.13
Age	<b>0.66</b>	0.67	0.66	<b>0.77</b>	0.90	0.50
SES: Socio-economic status	<b>-0.31</b>	-0.36	-0.13	-0.13	-0.12	-0.22
Knowledge of the EU	0.02	0.04	-0.02	<b>0.41</b>	0.36	0.58
Education	-0.12	-0.10	-0.13	<b>0.32</b>	0.36	0.22
Exclusive national identification	<b>-0.21</b>	-0.21	-0.19	<b>-0.22</b>	-0.25	-0.21
Trust in the national Government	<b>-0.25</b>	-0.12	-0.77	0.05	0.00	0.14
National attachment	<b>-0.44</b>	-0.16	-1.14	-0.15	-0.21	0.03
Left/right self-placement	-0.27	-0.01	-0.96	<b>1.07</b>	1.17	0.58
Left/right self-placement squared	0.10	-0.13	0.74	<b>-1.15</b>	-1.36	-0.24

Table 56- Operationalisation of EU support 2016

<b>CONCEPT</b>	<b>INDICATOR</b>	<b>Intune (April-June) 2009</b>	<b>EB 86.2 (November) 2016</b>
Output legitimacy	<i>Overall EU membership evaluation</i>	x	x
European identification	<i>Attachment towards Europe</i>	x	x
EU democracy (INDEX OF:)	<i>Satisfaction with EU democracy</i>	x	x
	<i>Trust in the EU Commission</i>	x	x
	<i>Trust in the EU Parliament</i>	x	x

Table 57a - Country-averages of indicators of identity-components. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Identity meaning</b>				<b>Identity meaning</b>			
	European civility				National civility			
	To share European cultural traditions	To respect European Union's laws and institutions	To feel European	To master any European language	To share national cultural traditions	To respect national laws and institutions	To feel (nationality)	To master (country language)
BELGIUM	0.65	0.79	0.64	0.83	0.69	0.86	0.71	0.89
DENMARK	0.61	0.81	0.68	0.83	0.76	0.89	0.83	0.88
GERMANY	0.65	0.78	0.64	0.85	0.70	0.87	0.64	0.94
GREECE	0.62	0.76	0.65	0.73	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.83
SPAIN	0.57	0.78	0.65	0.78	0.68	0.87	0.76	0.78
FRANCE	0.56	0.79	0.66	0.77	0.69	0.91	0.80	0.87
ITALY	0.71	0.86	0.76	0.86	0.84	0.94	0.88	0.87
PORTUGAL	0.74	0.84	0.75	0.86	0.87	0.91	0.90	0.93
UK	0.59	0.74	0.54	0.68	0.77	0.94	0.81	0.90
ESTONIA	0.73	0.84	0.67	0.82	0.86	0.92	0.86	0.92
HUNGARY	0.74	0.86	0.82	0.80	0.84	0.91	0.92	0.89
POLAND	0.67	0.73	0.72	0.73	0.82	0.81	0.87	0.89
SLOVAKIA	0.61	0.76	0.73	0.79	0.71	0.83	0.82	0.89
SLOVENIA	0.73	0.82	0.71	0.85	0.89	0.90	0.87	0.94
BULGARIA	0.75	0.85	0.82	0.78	0.86	0.91	0.92	0.93

Table 58b - Country-averages of indicators of identity-components. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Identity meaning</b>				<b>Identity meaning</b>	
	<b>Ancestry</b>				<b>Citizenship</b>	
	To be born in (OUR COUNTRY)	To have (NATIONALITY) parents	To be born in Europe	To have European parents	To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in the politics of (OUR COUNTRY)	To exercise citizens' rights, like being active in politics of the European Union
BELGIUM	0.54	0.52	0.54	0.51	0.58	0.55
DENMARK	0.56	0.54	0.51	0.50	0.65	0.53
GERMANY	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.74	0.62
GREECE	0.69	0.76	0.54	0.51	0.75	0.69
SPAIN	0.68	0.63	0.62	0.56	0.73	0.68
FRANCE	0.52	0.48	0.50	0.47	0.73	0.61
ITALY	0.76	0.74	0.69	0.65	0.79	0.75
PORTUGAL	0.78	0.77	0.70	0.64	0.76	0.75
UK	0.65	0.57	0.51	0.45	0.73	0.56
ESTONIA	0.62	0.65	0.53	0.50	0.67	0.59
HUNGARY	0.69	0.75	0.66	0.66	0.63	0.59
POLAND	0.71	0.74	0.63	0.60	0.63	0.63
SLOVAKIA	0.71	0.69	0.63	0.61	0.59	0.56
SLOVENIA	0.64	0.64	0.57	0.53	0.63	0.60
BULGARIA	0.85	0.84	0.72	0.70	0.78	0.72

Table 58 - Correlation among the four identity-components. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

	<b>European civility [0-1]</b>	<b>National civility [0-1]</b>	<b>Ancestry [0-1]</b>	<b>Citizenship [0-1]</b>
<b>European civility [0-1]</b>	-	-	-	-
<b>National civility [0-1]</b>	0.42	-	-	-
<b>Ancestry [0-1]</b>	0.37	0.44	-	-
<b>Citizenship [0-1]</b>	0.34	0.28	0.21	-

\*\* : Correlations are all significant at  $p \leq 0.01$  (two-tails)

Table 59 - Identity-component indexes per country. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>Identity meaning</b>			
	European civility [0-1]	National civility [0-1]	Ancestry [0-1]	Citizenship [0-1]
BELGIUM	0.73	0.79	0.53	0.57
DENMARK	0.74	0.84	0.53	0.59
GERMANY	0.73	0.79	0.50	0.68
GREECE	0.69	0.85	0.62	0.72
SPAIN	0.69	0.77	0.62	0.70
FRANCE	0.69	0.82	0.49	0.67
ITALY	0.80	0.88	0.71	0.77
PORTUGAL	0.80	0.90	0.72	0.75
UK	0.64	0.86	0.54	0.65
ESTONIA	0.77	0.89	0.57	0.63
HUNGARY	0.81	0.89	0.69	0.61
POLAND	0.72	0.85	0.67	0.63
SLOVAKIA	0.72	0.81	0.66	0.57
SLOVENIA	0.78	0.90	0.59	0.61
BULGARIA	0.80	0.91	0.78	0.75

Table 60 - Fit indexes models of Figure 22. Source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

Policy	$\chi^2$	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	BIC	DF
Health	38	0.996	0.04	0.01	-26861	15
Unemployment	29	0.998	0.03	0.01	-23922	15
Agriculture	22	0.999	0.02	0.01	-23184	15
Fighting crime	19	0.999	0.02	0.01	-21937	15
Immigration	28	0.998	0.03	0.01	-21433	15
Environment	24	0.999	0.03	0.01	-21075	15
Tax	47	0.995	0.05	0.01	-21476	15
Foreign	16	1.000	0.01	0.01	-26074	15

Table 61 - Total effect - unstandardized coefficients of path models: National Attachment & European id. Data source Intune 2009 (Cotta et al. 2009)

DETERMINANT	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	ITALY	PORTUGAL	UK	ESTONIA	HUNGARY	POLAND	SLOVAKIA	SLOVENIA	BULGARIA
National att. on Unemployment	0.03	<b>0.05*</b>	0.02	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	0.02	<b>0.04*</b>	0.03	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	0.02	0.01
National att. on Fighting crime	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	0.00	0.03	0.02	<b>0.04*</b>	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.00	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	0.03	-0.01
National att. on Health care	0.03	0.03	0.00	<b>0.03*</b>	-0.01	<b>0.04*</b>	0.00	0.01	<b>0.02*</b>	0.01	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	0.02	-0.01
National att. on Agriculture	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	0.02	<b>0.07*</b>	0.03	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	0.01
National att. on Environment	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	0.04	<b>0.06*</b>	0.04	<b>0.07*</b>	0.00
National att. on Immigration	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.05*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	0.02	<b>0.06*</b>	0.02	<b>0.06*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	0.00
National att. on Foreign	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.11*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	0.02	<b>0.1*</b>	<b>0.09*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	0.02
National att. on Tax	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>	0.04	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	0.03	<b>0.08*</b>	0.02	0.03	0.03	<b>0.07*</b>	<b>0.04*</b>	<b>0.06*</b>
European ID. on Unemployment	0.15	<b>0.22*</b>	0.10	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.39*</b>	0.12	<b>0.26*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.34*</b>	0.18	0.06
European ID. on Fighting crime	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.25*</b>	-0.02	<b>0.22*</b>	0.11	<b>0.33*</b>	0.13	0.18	0.09	0.10	0.01	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	0.24	-0.10
European ID. on Health care	0.17	<b>0.14*</b>	0.00	<b>0.25*</b>	-0.08	<b>0.35*</b>	0.02	0.09	<b>0.16*</b>	0.08	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.24*</b>	0.14	-0.07
European ID. on Agriculture	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>0.55*</b>	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	<b>0.47*</b>	<b>0.64*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	0.11	<b>0.48*</b>	0.20	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.52*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	0.11
European ID. on Environment	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.46*</b>	<b>0.46*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>	<b>0.33*</b>	<b>0.62*</b>	<b>0.31*</b>	0.36	<b>0.31*</b>	0.19	<b>0.61*</b>	0.04
European ID. on Immigration	<b>0.32*</b>	<b>0.26*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.51*</b>	<b>0.43*</b>	0.11	<b>0.47*</b>	0.18	<b>0.54*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>0.38*</b>	<b>0.41*</b>	-0.06
European ID. on Foreign	<b>0.45*</b>	<b>0.55*</b>	<b>0.43*</b>	<b>0.69*</b>	<b>0.48*</b>	<b>0.77*</b>	<b>0.5*</b>	<b>0.21*</b>	<b>0.74*</b>	<b>0.51*</b>	0.21	<b>0.44*</b>	<b>0.42*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.23*</b>
European ID. on Tax	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	0.20	<b>0.49*</b>	<b>0.4*</b>	<b>0.56*</b>	<b>0.27*</b>	0.19	<b>0.55*</b>	0.16	0.33	0.13	<b>0.35*</b>	<b>0.37*</b>	<b>0.66*</b>

## APPENDIX C

### Syntax PCFA (SPSS) (TABLE 9 page 55)

FACTOR

*/VARIABLES unemployment\_2l immigration\_2l environment\_2l crime\_2l health\_2l agriculture\_2l unifiedtax\_2lnom foreignpolicy\_2lnom trusteeaparliament trusteeucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent\_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU\_attach EUconseq*

*/MISSING PAIRWISE*

*/ANALYSIS unemployment\_2l immigration\_2l environment\_2l crime\_2l health\_2l agriculture\_2l unifiedtax\_2lnom foreignpolicy\_2lnom trusteeaparliament trusteeucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent\_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU\_attach EUconseq*

*/SELECT=filter\_15(1)*

*/PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION*

*/PLOT EIGEN*

*/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) NOKAISER*

*/EXTRACTION PC*

*/CRITERIA ITERATE(25) DELTA(0)*

*/ROTATION OBLIMIN*

*/METHOD=CORRELATION.*

### Syntax PCFA (SPSS) (TABLE 10 page 57)

FACTOR

*/VARIABLES unemployment\_2l immigration\_2l environment\_2l crime\_2l health\_2l agriculture\_2l trusteeaparliament trusteeucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent\_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU\_attach EUconseq*

*/MISSING PAIRWISE*

*/ANALYSIS unemployment\_2l immigration\_2l environment\_2l crime\_2l health\_2l agriculture\_2l trusteeaparliament trusteeucommission sateudemoc eupolmakcompetent\_nom eugood eunatben3l eupersben3l Euday EU\_attach EUconseq*

*/SELECT=filter\_15(1)*

*/PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION*

*/PLOT EIGEN*

*/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) NOKAISER*

*/EXTRACTION PC*

*/CRITERIA ITERATE(25) DELTA(0)*

*/ROTATION OBLIMIN*

*/METHOD=CORRELATION.*

### Syntax MGCFA (STATA) (TABLE 13 page 60)

**\*POOLED**

*sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment\_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration\_2l, ) (L2 -> environment\_2l, ) (L2 -> crime\_2l, ) (L2 -> health\_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture\_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU\_attach, ) (L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeaparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteeucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent\_nom, ) (L4 ->*

sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(\_lexogenous, diagonal) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) cov( L1\*L3 L1\*L4 L3\*L4)  
nocapslatent

### **\*CONFIGURAL**

sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment\_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration\_2l, ) (L2  
-> environment\_2l, ) (L2 -> crime\_2l, ) (L2 -> health\_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture\_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU\_attach, )  
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteecommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent\_nom, ) (L4 ->  
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(\_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(none) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 )  
cov( L1\*L3 L1\*L4 L3\*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0)

### **\*METRIC**

sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment\_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration\_2l, ) (L2  
-> environment\_2l, ) (L2 -> crime\_2l, ) (L2 -> health\_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture\_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU\_attach, )  
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteecommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent\_nom, ) (L4 ->  
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(\_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 )  
cov( L1\*L3 L1\*L4 L3\*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0)

### **\*SCALAR**

sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment\_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration\_2l, ) (L2  
-> environment\_2l, ) (L2 -> crime\_2l, ) (L2 -> health\_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture\_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU\_attach, )  
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteecommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent\_nom, ) (L4 ->  
sateudemoc, ) if country < 16, covstruct(\_lexogenous, diagonal) group(country) ginvariant(mcoef mcons) latent(L1 L2  
L3 L4 ) cov( L1\*L3 L1\*L4 L3\*L4) nocapslatent means(L1@0 L2@0 L3@0 L4@0)

## **Syntax IRT (LATENT GOLD) (TABLE 41 page 155)**

### **\*POOLED**

options

maxthreads=4;

algorithm

tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;

startvalues

seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;

bayes

categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;

montecarlo

seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;

quadrature nodes=10;

missing excludeall;

output

parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior

bivariate residuals estimatedvalues=model loadings;

variables

select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;

*dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment\_2l, immigration\_2l,  
environment\_2l, crime\_2l, health\_2l, agriculture\_2l;*

*latent*

*DFactor1 continuous,  
DFactor2 continuous;*

*equations*

*DFactor1 ;  
DFactor2 ;*

*DFactor1 <- 1;*

*DFactor2 <- 1;*

*eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1;*

*eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1;*

*eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1;*

*unemployment\_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2;*

*immigration\_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;*

*environment\_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;*

*crime\_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;*

*health\_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;*

*agriculture\_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;*

**\*CONFIGURAL**

*options*

*maxthreads=4;*

*algorithm*

*tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;*

*startvalues*

*seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;*

*bayes*

*categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;*

*montecarlo*

*seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;*

*quadrature nodes=10;*

*missing excludeall;*

*output*

*parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior*

*bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model;*

*variables*

*select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;*

*independent country nominal;*

*dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment\_2l, immigration\_2l,  
environment\_2l, crime\_2l, health\_2l, agriculture\_2l;*

*latent*

*DFactor1 continuous,*

```

    DFactor2 continuous;
equations
    DFactor1 | country;
    DFactor2 | country;
DFactor1 <- country;
    DFactor2 <- country;
    eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1;
    eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country ;
    eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country ;
    unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1) DFactor2;
    immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country ;
    environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country ;
    crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country ;
    health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country ;
    agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country ;
*METRIC
options
    maxthreads=4;
    algorithm
        tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
    startvalues
        seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
    bayes
        categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
    montecarlo
        seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
    quadrature nodes=10;
    missing excludeall;
    output
        parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
        bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model loadings;
variables
    select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
    independent country nominal;
    dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
        environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
    latent
        DFactor1 continuous,
        DFactor2 continuous;
equations
    DFactor1 | country;
    DFactor2 | country;

```

```

DFactor1 <- country;
DFactor2 <- country;
eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1;
eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1;
eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1;
unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2;
immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2;
environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2;
crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2;
health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2;
agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2;
*SCALAR
options
  maxthreads=4;
  algorithm
    tolerance=1e-005 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
  startvalues
    seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
  bayes
    categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
  montecarlo
    seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
  quadrature nodes=10;
  missing excludeall;
  output
    parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
    bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model loadings;
variables
  select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
  independent country nominal;
  dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
    environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
  latent
    DFactor1 continuous,
    DFactor2 continuous;
equations
  DFactor1 | country;
  DFactor2 | country;
DFactor1 <- country;
DFactor2 <- country;
eugood <- 1 + (1) DFactor1;
eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1;

```

```
eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1;
unemployment_2l <- 1 + (1)DFactor2;
immigration_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;
environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;
crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;
health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;
agriculture_2l <- 1 + DFactor2;
```

## Syntax LCFA (LATENT GOLD) (TABLE 43 page 156)

### **\*POOLED**

#### options

```
maxthreads=4;
algorithm
  tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
startvalues
  seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
bayes
  categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
montecarlo
  seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
quadrature nodes=10;
missing excludeall;
output
  parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
  bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model;
```

#### variables

```
select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
  environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
latent
  DFactor1 ordinal 3,
  DFactor2 ordinal 3;
```

#### equations

```
DFactor1 <- 1;
DFactor2 <- 1;
eugood <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
unemployment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
immigration_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
```

```
health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
agriculture_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
```

### **\*CONFIGURAL**

options

```
maxthreads=4;
```

algorithm

```
tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
```

startvalues

```
seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
```

bayes

```
categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
```

montecarlo

```
seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
```

quadrature nodes=10;

missing excludeall;

output

```
parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
```

```
bivariateposteriors estimatedvalues=model;
```

variables

```
select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
```

independent country nominal;

```
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
```

```
environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
```

latent

```
DFactor1 ordinal 3,
```

```
DFactor2 ordinal 3;
```

equations

```
DFactor1 <- 1 | country;
```

```
DFactor2 <- 1 | country;
```

```
eugood <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country;
```

```
eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country;
```

```
eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 | country;
```

```
unemployment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

```
immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

```
environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

```
crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

```
health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

```
agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 | country;
```

### **\*METRIC**

options

```
maxthreads=4;
```

algorithm

```

tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
startvalues
  seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
bayes
  categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
montecarlo
  seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
quadrature nodes=10;
missing excludeall;
output
  parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
  bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model;
variables
  select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
independent country nominal;
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
  environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
latent
  DFactor1 ordinal 3,
  DFactor2 ordinal 3;
equations
  DFactor1 <- 1 | country;
  DFactor2 <- 1 | country;
  eugood <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ;
  eunatben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ;
  eupersben3l <- 1 | country + DFactor1 ;
  unemployment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
  immigration_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
  environment_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
  crime_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
  health_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
  agriculture_2l <- 1 | country + DFactor2 ;
*SCALAR
options
  maxthreads=4;
algorithm
  tolerance=1e-008 emtolerance=0,01 emiterations=250 nriterations=50 ;
startvalues
  seed=0 sets=16 tolerance=1e-005 iterations=50;
bayes
  categorical=1 variances=1 latent=1 poisson=1;
montecarlo

```

```

    seed=0 sets=0 replicates=500 tolerance=1e-008;
quadrature nodes=10;
missing excludeall;
output
    parameters=effect betaopts=wl standarderrors profile probmeans=posterior
    bivariateresiduals estimatedvalues=model;
variables
    select country = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15;
independent country nominal;
dependent eugood, eunatben3l, eupersben3l, unemployment_2l, immigration_2l,
    environment_2l, crime_2l, health_2l, agriculture_2l;
latent
    DFactor1 ordinal 3,
    DFactor2 ordinal 3;
equations
    DFactor1 <- 1 | country;
    DFactor2 <- 1 | country;
    eugood <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
    eunatben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
    eupersben3l <- 1 + DFactor1 ;
    unemployment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
    immigration_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
    environment_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
    crime_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
    health_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;
    agriculture_2l <- 1 + DFactor2 ;

```

## Syntax FULL SEM (STATA) (TABLE 19 page 77)

### \*METRIC INVARIANCE

```

sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration_2l, ) (L2
-> environment_2l, ) (L2 -> crime_2l, ) (L2 -> health_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU_attach, )
(L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteecommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent_nom, ) (L4 ->
sateudemoc, ) (female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L1) (female
age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L2) (female age_ordinal_n ses
EU_know education trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2-> L3)(female age_ordinal_n ses EU_know education
trust_nat_gov excl_id nat_attachment lr lr2 -> L4) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3
L4 ) cov(e.L1*e.L2 e.L1*e.L3 e.L1*e.L4 e.L2*e.L3 e.L2*e.L4 e.L3*e.L4 female*age_ordinal_n female*ses
female*EU_know female*education female*trust_nat_gov female*excl_id female*nat_attachment female*lr
age_ordinal_n*ses age_ordinal_n*EU_know age_ordinal_n*education age_ordinal_n*trust_nat_gov
age_ordinal_n*excl_id age_ordinal_n*nat_attachment EU_know*ses education*ses education*EU_know
trust_nat_gov*ses trust_nat_gov*EU_know trust_nat_gov*education excl_id*ses excl_id*EU_know excl_id*education
excl_id*trust_nat_gov nat_attachment*ses nat_attachment*EU_know nat_attachment*education

```

*nat\_attachment\*trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment\*excl\_id lr\*age\_ordinal\_n lr\*ses lr\*EU\_know lr\*education lr\*trust\_nat\_gov lr\*excl\_id lr\*nat\_attachment lr2\*female lr2\*age\_ordinal\_n lr2\*ses lr2\*EU\_know lr2\*education lr2\*trust\_nat\_gov lr2\*excl\_id lr2\*nat\_attachment) nocapslatent standardize*

## **Syntax PATH MODEL (STATA) (TABLE 21 page 85)**

### **\*METRIC INVARIANCE**

*sem (L1 -> eunatben3l, ) (L1 -> eupersben3l, ) (L1 -> eugood, ) (L2 -> unemployment\_2l, ) (L2 -> immigration\_2l, ) (L2 -> environment\_2l, ) (L2 -> crime\_2l, ) (L2 -> health\_2l, ) (L2 -> agriculture\_2l, ) (L3 -> Euday, ) (L3 -> EU\_attach, ) (L3 -> EUconseq, ) (L4 -> trusteeparliament, ) (L4 -> trusteeucommission, ) (L4 -> eupolmakcompetent\_nom, ) (L4 -> sateudemoc, ) (female age\_ordinal ses EU\_know education trust\_nat\_gov excl\_id nat\_attachment lr lr2 -> L1) (L1 L3 L4-> L2) (female age\_ordinal ses EU\_know education trust\_nat\_gov excl\_id nat\_attachment lr lr2 -> L2)(female age\_ordinal ses EU\_know education trust\_nat\_gov excl\_id nat\_attachment lr lr2 -> L3)(female age\_ordinal ses EU\_know education trust\_nat\_gov excl\_id nat\_attachment lr lr2 -> L4) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(mcoef) latent(L1 L2 L3 L4 ) cov(e.L1\*e.L3 e.L1\*e.L4 e.L3\*e.L4 female\*age\_ordinal female\*ses female\*EU\_know female\*education female\*trust\_nat\_gov female\*excl\_id female\*nat\_attachment female\*lr age\_ordinal\*ses age\_ordinal\*EU\_know age\_ordinal\*education age\_ordinal\*trust\_nat\_gov age\_ordinal\*excl\_id age\_ordinal\*nat\_attachment EU\_know\*ses education\*ses education\*EU\_know trust\_nat\_gov\*ses trust\_nat\_gov\*EU\_know trust\_nat\_gov\*education excl\_id\*ses excl\_id\*EU\_know excl\_id\*education excl\_id\*trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment\*ses nat\_attachment\*EU\_know nat\_attachment\*education nat\_attachment\*trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment\*excl\_id lr\*age\_ordinal lr\*ses lr\*EU\_know lr\*education lr\*trust\_nat\_gov lr\*excl\_id lr\*nat\_attachment lr2\*female lr2\*age\_ordinal lr2\*ses lr2\*EU\_know lr2\*education lr2\*trust\_nat\_gov lr2\*excl\_id lr2\*nat\_attachment) nocapslatent standardize*

## **Syntax FIXED EFFECTS MODEL (STATA) (TABLE 26 page 101)**

- *clogit unemployment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit crime\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit health\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit agriculture\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit environment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit immigration\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit foreignpolicy\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*
- *clogit unifiedtax\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr, group(country)*



## Syntax MACRO 2009 (STATA) (TABLE 31 page 113)

- xtlogit unemployment\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unemployment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr position\_p\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unemployment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration\_EU\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unemployment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_unemp wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
  
- xtlogit crime\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit crime\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr position\_p\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit crime\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration\_EU\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit crime\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
  
- xtlogit health\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit health\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr position\_p\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit health\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration\_EU\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit health\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_exhpuge wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
  
- xtlogit agriculture\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit agriculture\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr position\_p\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit agriculture\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration\_EU\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit agriculture\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr icrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_gdpagr wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
  
- xtlogit environment\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit environment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr position\_p\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit environment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lr duration\_EU\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)

- xtlogit environment\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm epi\_eh wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit immigration\_2l if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit immigration\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit immigration\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit immigration\_2l fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm asylum2008\_absolute wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit foreignpolicy\_2lnom if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit foreignpolicy\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit foreignpolicy\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit foreignpolicy\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unifiedtax\_2lnom if country < 16, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unifiedtax\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm eu\_benefit\_p\_norm\_p EU\_powers\_norm, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unifiedtax\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm i.location euro, i(country) re intpoints(30)
- xtlogit unifiedtax\_2lnom fscore1\_output\_norm fscore3\_id\_norm fscore4\_trust\_norm female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov nat\_attachment c.lr##c.lrcrg\_qog\_norm wdi\_gdpcappppcur, i(country) re intpoints(30)

### **Syntax MACRO 2009-2016 (STATA) (TABLE 32 page 115)**

- melogit immigration\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 position\_p\_n eu\_benefit\_p\_n\_p EU\_powers\_n dyear || country\_year:, intpoints(30)
- melogit immigration\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 duration\_EU\_n i.location euro mreligion\_cat dyear|| country\_year:, intpoints(30)
- melogit immigration\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 icrg\_qog totasylum\_abs\_n wdi\_gdpcappppcur\_n dyear || country\_year:, intpoints(30)
- melogit foreignpolicy\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 position\_p\_n eu\_benefit\_p\_n\_p EU\_powers\_n dyear || country\_year:, intpoints(30)

- melogit foreignpolicy\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 duration\_EU\_n i.location euro mreligion\_cat dyear|| country\_year:, intpoints(30)
- melogit foreignpolicy\_2l eugood EU\_attach ev\_eu\_dem female age\_ordinal\_n ses EU\_know education excl\_id trust\_nat\_gov\_3l nat\_attachment lr lr2 icrg\_qog totasyllum\_abs\_n wdi\_gdpcapppcur\_n dyear || country\_year:, intpoints(30)

## Syntax IDENTITY-MEANINGS (STATA) (TABLES 35-36-37-38 pages 128-131)

- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore2\_policy\_norm, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> fscore2\_policy\_norm, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> fscore2\_policy\_norm, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> fscore2\_policy\_norm, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> unemployment\_2l, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> unemployment\_2l, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> unemployment\_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> unemployment\_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> crime\_2l, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> crime\_2l, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> crime\_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> crime\_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> health\_2l, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> health\_2l, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> health\_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> health\_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> agriculture\_2l, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> agriculture\_2l, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> agriculture\_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> agriculture\_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> environment\_2l, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> environment\_2l, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> environment\_2l, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> environment\_2l, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> foreignpolicy\_2lnom, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> foreignpolicy\_2lnom, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> foreignpolicy\_2lnom, ) (ancestry -> nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> foreignpolicy\_2lnom, ) if country < 16, group(country) ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent
- sem (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> nat\_attachment, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (civility\_eur civility\_nat -> unifiedtax\_2lnom, ) (nat\_attachment -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> nat\_attachment, ) (rights ->

fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (rights -> unifiedtax\_2lnom, ) (fscore3\_id\_norm -> unifiedtax\_2lnom, ) (ancestry ->  
nat\_attachment, ) (ancestry -> fscore3\_id\_norm, ) (ancestry -> unifiedtax\_2lnom, ) if country < 16, group(country)  
ginvariant(none) cov( civility\_eur\*ancestry rights\*civility\_eur rights\*ancestry civility\_nat\*ancestry  
civility\_nat\*civility\_eur civility\_nat\*rights) nocapslatent