CONTENTS—SOMMAIRE

DOSSIER: Business Relations, Identities, and Political Resources of the Italian Merchants in the Early-Modern Spanish Monarchy / Relations commerciales, identités et ressources politiques des marchands italiens dans la Monarchie espagnole à l’époque moderne

GUEST EDITORS: Catia Brilli and Manuel Herrero Sánchez

The business relations, identities and political resources of Italian merchants in the early-modern Spanish monarchy: some introductory remarks
Manuel Herrero Sánchez 335

Tuscan merchants in Andalusia: a historiographical debate
Angela Orlandi 347

A Genoese merchant and banker in the Kingdom of Naples: Ottavio Serra and his business network in the Spanish polycentric system, c.1590–1620
Yasmina Rocío Ben Yessef Garfía 367

Looking through the mirrors: materiality and intimacy at Domenico Grillo’s mansion in Baroque Madrid
Felipe Gaitán Ammann 400

Small but powerful: networking strategies and the trade business of Habsburg-Italian merchants in Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century
Klemens Kaps 427

Coping with Iberian monopolies: Genoese trade networks and formal institutions in Spain and Portugal during the second half of the eighteenth century
Catia Brilli 456

I. ARTICLES—ARTICLES

Politics of place: political representation and the culture of electioneering in the Netherlands, c.1848–1980s
Harm Kaal 486

A regionalisation or long-distance trade? Transformations and shifts in the role of Tana in the Black Sea trade in the first half of the fifteenth century
Evgeny Alexandrovitch Khvalkov 508

Political travel across the ‘Iron Curtain’ and Communist youth identities in West Germany and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s
Nikolaos Papadogiannis 526

The making of politics and trained intelligence in the Near East: Robert College of Istanbul
Ali Erken 554
The business relations, identities and political resources of 
Italian merchants in the early-modern Spanish monarchy: 
some introductory remarks

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ABSTRACT
This article offers a preliminary approach to the special volume entitled Business Relations, Identities, and Political Resources of the Italian Merchants in the Early-Modern Spanish Monarchy. It discusses the major issues and debates addressed in the five contributions collected here about the central role played by the Genoese, Florentine and Milanese commercial networks in the framework of a polycentric imperial structure as was the Spanish Monarchy.

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Commercial networks; Spanish monarchy; Italian merchants; polycentric empire

This monograph is the fruit of collaboration between different European research groups whose main interests lie in the study of Genoese, Florentine and Milanese merchant communities, as well as in the implications of the polycentric structure of the Spanish monarchy during the early-modern period. Contributions have been selected from five young researchers whose work offers a croisée perspective of different diasporas of Italian origin, with the idea being to move the focus away from any nationalist viewpoint to understand the complex realities of states and institutions under the ancien régime.

Overall, the case studies presented here constitute an attempt to reconsider the orthodox genealogy which underlines the leading role of northern European regions in the process of capitalist development during the first wave of globalisation. As Francesca Trivellato has recently argued, the classic Weberian model postulates that a basic prerequisite for the advance of the capitalist economy was the establishment of impersonal institutions removed from any corporate, ethnic or religious origin, something which allowed the emergence of a national market sustained by ever-more anonymous relationships. In contrast, this volume seeks to demonstrate that expatriated merchants played a crucial role in the integration of different commercial regions and spaces. As historians such as Ana Crespo and Catia Antunes have demonstrated, these were diasporas that, despite being ascribed to corporations based upon a national identity, had a marked transnational character and operated with great ease in highly heterogeneous political and social spaces that, in the case of the Spanish Monarchy, extended across the globe.
As Angela Orlandi shows in her assessment of the historiography of the evolution of the activities of Tuscan businessmen in Andalusia during the sixteenth century, emphasis continues to fall on the very piecemeal displacement of these operators by the more active merchant centres of north-western Europe which, during the course of the following century, would impose themselves upon the Mediterranean itself. What Oscar Gelderblom called ‘cities of commerce’ and Mary Lindemann referred to as ‘merchant republics’ have given us a major new theme in recent comparative studies. These works provide an astute analysis of the different and wide-ranging measures adopted by Hamburg and the cities of the Low Countries to attract capital and merchants from abroad. Interestingly, this interpretative framework leaves no room for the key role played by highly active Italian communities based in these north European entrepôts or, indeed, of the central position played by trading centres of the standing of Venice and Genoa in the overall volume of European transactions. In this regard the articles published here are the fruit of the numerous research projects that, taking as their basis the major contributions of Grendi, Ruiz Martín and Felloni, investigate the strategies employed by this formidable web of Genoese businessmen and aristocrats in connecting the large markets of the Spanish Monarchy in Europe and in the overseas territories. Yasmina Ben Yessef’s study of the Serra companies demonstrates how Genoese business houses played a leading role in binding together the Atlantic and the Mediterranean markets. As Ruth Pike, Vila Vilar and Álvarez Nogal have argued, a major part of the finances employed in the commerce with America through the Seville monopoly passed through Genoese hands. The Genoese proved themselves to be the merchant and financial community that was best equipped to operate in a polycentric political structure such as the Spanish monarchy, where they were able to employ any number of cultural and institutional advantages, not least of which were their proud Catholic pedigree and their unquestionable aristocratic ancestry, traits which meant that they enjoyed a much greater capacity for integration than did members of other commercial diasporas. Advantages drawn from the privileges granted by the crowns of Castile and Aragon from the thirteenth century and which were consolidated after the 1528 condotta between Charles V and Andrea Doria formed the basis of what Enrique Otte accurately described as the Hispano-Genoese imperial system and coincided with the Ligurian control over the markets of the Catholic Monarchy during its period of continental hegemony. This was a collaboration that, in spite of its relative displacement after 1630 and the arrival on the scene of more competitive rival merchant networks, would nevertheless remain solid into and throughout the eighteenth century. The study of Felipe Gaitán on the Grillo company and its control of the strategic contract or asiento for black slaves from 1662 makes it clear that the impact and role of the Genoese community and other southern European merchants in the process of globalisation was much greater than has been traditionally believed. The Grillo served as connectors between the Dutch and English and managed to provide the markets of Spanish America with consumer products, predominantly through contraband and thanks to their network based in the principal ports of the overseas territories.

Until the arrival of the Bourbons on the throne of Spain, the Genoese enjoyed numerous privileges which allowed them to work through their respective consulates. As Domínguez Ortiz pointed out in his often overlooked study on the processes of naturalisation undertaken to trade in the Indias during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Genoese resorted to the Spanish naturalization in very few cases, especially in comparison to other communities – such as north European merchants or Jewish-conversos – that, for different
reasons, were forced to opt for this solution. Yet, the political links between the Republic and the Spanish Monarchy having been weakened, they found themselves compelled to undertake a radical change of strategy, as Catia Brilli shows in her paper, which extends her analysis of the Genoese trade and migration in the Río de la Plata. The strong cultural bonds, allied to the networks of familial associations forged in the highest echelons of the societies in which they were trading, facilitated the process of integration and allowed them to achieve a relatively painless and rapid incorporation, either by settlement (and thus by becoming a *vecino*) or by obtaining patents of naturalisation allowing them to overcome the restrictions that the Castilian commercial monopoly with America theoretically imposed upon foreign businessmen. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Genoese continued to be one of the most deeply entrenched and widely dispersed foreign communities, being prominent in the principal cities of the Mediterranean as well as in Lisbon and Cadiz, the centre of the monarchy’s trading monopoly in the Atlantic world. This was achieved despite the growing influence of their French competitors, who took advantage of the close diplomatic and dynastic relations between Paris and Madrid. Making use of unpublished empirical research data, Klemens Kaps demonstrates the crucial role played by Genoese and Milanese businessmen in facilitating the integration of Central European markets with those of the Atlantic world through an alternative to the well-known Hamburg route. His work not only sets out the role of these trading networks in the channeling of textiles produced in southern Austria and Bohemia towards Cadiz, but also its important function in forging links between the port of Trieste and the attractive overseas markets of the Spanish monarchy.

The loss of their quasi-monopolistic position in the control of markets and, above all, the ending of their mastery over the finances of the Catholic monarch forced these Genoese associations to tighten their links with other communities of Italian businessmen, such as the Florentines (analysed by Orlandi), the Milanese (studied by Kaps) or the Venetians, who always maintained an active presence in these markets. In the same way, from the seventeenth century the growing importance of the Sephardic diaspora and the burgeoning presence of Dutch, British and French communities in the ports of the monarchy formed a process which Trivellato has accurately described as a ‘communitarian cosmopolitanism’, meaning the close collaboration of Sephardic networks and other merchant associations organised in national corporations or consulates, with whom they engaged in an array of business ventures and shared many common practices. The massive presence and economic influence of foreign merchants in the main hubs of the monarchy is indicative of the Spanish authorities’ difficulty of applying a mercantilist policy comparable to those implemented (with relative ease) in England and in France from the middle of the seventeenth century. The complex multi-territorial structure of the domains beneath the jurisdiction of the Catholic Monarch, in combination with the enormous influence of local interests and concerns in the decision-making process, prevented the adoption and implementation of protectionist measures in any one specific place, as such a policy would nearly always have eroded the interests of other subjects of the king. These constitutional limitations combined with concessions granted in successive peace treaties and commercial accords signed with foreign powers in the aftermath of military defeats. Successive diplomatic agreements forced the Spanish monarchy to recognise subjects of their European rivals, often granting them the status of ‘most favoured nation’: treaties with England in 1604, 1630, 1667, 1670 and 1713; with the Hanseatic League in 1607 and 1647; with the United Provinces in 1609, 1648, 1650 and 1713; with France in 1659 and 1697 (to which must be added the family compacts
of the eighteenth century); the accords between Madrid and Vienna of 1725; and the commercial agreement of 1752. All of these treaties ended up transforming the dominions of the Catholic King into an extremely fertile ground for the great European trading houses. The failure of the Bourbon attempts to improve supervision and policing was not simply the result of the concessions mentioned above nor of the dependence of the monarchy on overseas production and the intermediary activities of foreigners. To a large degree these reverses must also be understood as a result of the obstacles put in place by local authorities to the application of any kind of restrictive measures on account of the benefits which they themselves took from the activities of communities of *hommes d'affaires* who were taken to be an obvious source of prosperity. The examples cited in the following papers provide convincing evidence of the ease with which the various Italian companies active in the territories of the Catholic King were able to maintain their businesses; they also underline the strong bonds of confidence and collaboration that tied them to local populations and served to amplify and extend their interests, consolidate their trading systems and embed themselves into their host cities. The outcome was a genuine geography of trust that was manifested in mixed marriages or the joint founding of companies and businesses. The Italian merchant families, if only because of their age-old presence in the Spanish monarchy, were undoubtedly advantaged in these processes of adaptation and embedding.

Apart from assessing changes and continuities within the strategies of the Italian merchants, the articles presented here give us new elements to draw a comparative analysis of the customs, behaviour and methods adopted by other foreign businessmen who operated in the Iberian and overseas markets. This line of research has generated a variety of works on the different corporative organisms used by foreign business communities to guard the interests of their respective ‘nations’ and guarantee that the authorities in their place of settlement respect their privileges and perks. The recent publication of a number of studies examining the consulate as an institution has posed a series of questions about the degree of reciprocity implicit in the actions of an organism that was far from being under the iron control of the respective states and whose agents did not blindly follow the will of their sovereign but, rather, paid heed to all manner of private interests, including those of the corporations which met their costs. For these reasons the consular institution represents one of the best ways of analysing a number of different themes and developments: the transformations experienced by the many and varied forms of the state during the early-modern period; the coexistence of different models of sovereignty; and the different means of regulating relationships between private individuals, the numerous corporations and the state. The extension of state control, as analysed by Marcella Aglietti, began at the end of the seventeenth century and culminated in the 1800s; yet it perhaps did not bring about clear advantages for the businessmen who placed themselves under the protection of their respective consulates. It is worthwhile asking if the fact of being able to call upon the support of a powerful state, such as the French or British, brought about more guarantees or privileges to the expatriated merchants or if, to the contrary, it limited their chances of competing with rivals capable of compensating the lack of political support with a greater flexibility in terms of identity and social relations. The existence of a consulate in a given port or city did not necessarily mean that there was an active merchant community belonging to that particular nation in it. On the contrary, as Klemens Kaps argues, in certain cases its dynamism ran in parallel with the absence of a genuine national community for it to represent. In reality the more numerous and prosperous communities with relatively
modest political standing, such as the Genoese, appear to have drawn greater benefits from the institutional pathways offered by the host society and the business relations which its members informally wove with local intermediaries. As a rule they merged these resources with those derived from belonging to a ‘nation’ only when it proved profitable, as was the case in Lisbon.

These papers also underline the crucial importance of other private corporations (hospitals, chapels and confraternities) that acted as undoubted spaces of solidarity. Catia Brilli’s article offers insights into how communities of Italian origin employed a variety of different strategies, adapting them with considerable flexibility to conditions and opportunities wherever they might be operating. During the course of the eighteenth century, the Genoese of Cadiz neglected their nation’s chapel in the Cathedral and other few privileges they traditionally enjoyed in the city to engage in a more worthwhile process of integration into the local merchant elite. In contrast, their counterparts in Lisbon continued to exercise an almost monopolistic control of the church of Loreto, which (as was the hospital of San Pedro in Madrid) officially admitted all ‘Italians’. This constituted evidence of their position of strength as well as their role as intermediaries for the other subalpine nations based in the Portuguese capital.

This multiplicity of strategies can also be found in the mechanisms employed by the different communities established in the Spanish monarchy to achieve their full integration into the host society, thus allowing us to gain greater insight into the various means of naturalisation or settlement. The political culture of the Spanish monarchy, which might be viewed as veritable monarchy of urban republics, did not produce an identification between the national community and kingdom of the kind that was emerging at this time in France and England. In the Spanish kingdoms, as happened in the Italian states, in the Low Countries, and in the domains of the Holy Roman Empire, the possibility of an immigrant to convert himself into a full citizen did not depend upon the mere will of the sovereign but, rather, on the consensus of the local community. Studies by Curtin, Cohen and Barth on merchant diasporas have placed emphasis on the different models of integration, endogamy and association with the community of origin, generally through an analysis of matrimonial policy. In this sense some of the studies presented here try to provide an answer to the question of whether this sort of network had an eminently transnational character, if they were rather identified with a specific commercial ‘nation’ – or, indeed, if they employed both methods simultaneously. The cases of the Serra, the Grillo and the Greppi as set out in the following pages provide fine examples of the variety of strategies implemented, emphasizing the importance of the geographical context as well as of political circumstances in orienting the traders’ choices.

The impact of material culture in framing the social life of these groups was clearly important. The study of the objects that surrounded this type of merchant also constitutes a crucial element in understanding their influence in the societies in which they were active, their on-going contacts with their places of origin and the mechanisms of adaptation and self-camouflage deployed in their new habitat. Questions of this sort are addressed in all of the articles; however, they constitute the focus of the work of Felipe Gaitán and are strongly linked to the study of new patterns of consumption and the desire to fit in with the great trends of baroque culture – the collection of objets d’art, the encyclopaedic culture or the configuration of cabinets of curiosities. Here it is worth underlining the role of the slave trader, Domingo Grillo, who served as a conduit for a wide range of cultural goods and
high-status objects which reflected the impact, first felt at the end of the fifteenth century, of Italian communities in the transformation of the behavioural norms, fashions and tastes of both the high aristocracy and the leading urban elites in Castile, Naples, Flanders and Aragon. This development was demonstrated by the aesthetic transformation of the cities, houses and everyday objects of these social groups. Traditional historiography has placed a great deal of emphasis on the abandonment of productive activities by these trading communities and their propensity to seek ennoblement or the acquisition of feudal titles and fiefs. This view rather overlooks the fact these same businessmen, while clearly engaged in a policy of forging matrimonial ties with the aristocracy and the urban patricians, not only served as the vanguard of new cultural trends but also introduced innovations in the management of property or seigniorial estates. By making use of their ability to wield influence in the very highest echelons of power, Genoese trading networks also provided valuable services of mediation. Ottavio Serra, as Ben Y essef shows, promoted the interests of certain members of the aristocracy or the noblesse de robe in the courts of Madrid and Naples. Similar services were provided by the Spinola family or by Grillo who, as Gaitán notes, was able to escape from successive accusations of fraud related to the slave asiento thanks to the support of his powerful web of relationships as well as to his capacity to bribe and bend wills.

Control over the distribution of certain products (such as chocolate or precious stones such as bezoar, which were in great demand as status symbols) was highly significant in advancing the interests of these trading networks. The persisting intermediary role played by cities such as Genoa, Venice and Florence, indeed, allowed these businessmen to play a major part in the diffusion of a wide number of cultural forms, many of them overtly cosmopolitan in character, which resulted from the fusion of fashion and consumption trends of different territories in Italy and in the rest of Europe. Such a hybrid spirit was the result of a high level of internationalization and geographical mobility that characterised both the communities of merchants and the noble families. It should not be forgotten that the aristocracy of the Catholic monarchy also benefited from the circulation of elites within the Spanish imperial system, which facilitated the incorporation of a number of the leading Genoese families such as the Centurione, the Spinola, the Serra or the Grillo. In this way the work of Ben Y essef also demonstrates how the Genoese merchant groups, like their Sephardic counterparts, proved adept at managing the flow of news and information, a vital skill in securing the support of a monarchy which depended upon services of this type to deal efficiently with the numerous initiatives and campaigns of its imperial policy. This was clearly seen in the use of navíos de permiso with America, the correspondence between Madrid and the rest of Europe, or – especially important – the communication between the different Italian territories beneath the jurisdiction of the Spanish Monarchy; closely tied to these activities was their role in the transfer of credit, soldiers, equipment, news and all manner of other goods and products between the subalpine regions, the Low Countries and the diplomatic delegations sent by the crown to capitals in northern Europe. The major attention traditionally reserved by scholars to the role of the court of Madrid in the administration of the empire should not lead us to forget that the Spanish monarchy was a multi-territorial and polycentric structure with many different interlinked centres that interacted not only with the king but also among themselves, thus actively participating in forging the polity. In such a variety of dispersed territories, Naples and Genoa were two of the most strategic hubs, where decisions were often taken with little regard to the instructions passed down from Madrid. This type of behaviour, it
should be said, was not confined to the Italian communities, although they clearly counted upon a greater scope to integrate themselves into the ranks of local elites and thus to rise socially. Recent studies on Amsterdam have underlined the intricate relationship between the world of business, the diffusion of new fashions and cultural norms and the control of information by the Sephardic diaspora that continued to collaborate closely with the Italian merchant networks, such as those of the Grillo or Ferroni, without whose help they would not have been able to assume control of the asiento for black slaves.  

These studies also take forward the analysis of the different models of sovereignty and institutional organisation in early-modern Europe. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, state and sovereignty were both shaped by the existence of an imposing tapestry of urban groups, whose vigour explains the persistence of local interests and the predominance of the polycentric models in the most highly urbanised zones of the continent. In place of a model of sovereignty characterised by the decisive role of a central authority leading inevitably through a process of aggregation to the triumph of the homogeneous nation-state – in other words, the model found in France and England and, indeed, the one which the Bourbons attempted to impose on their arrival on the Spanish throne – in Europe the polycentric models of political and institutional organisation remained dominant: these were characterised by multiple levels of jurisdiction and by a high degree of territorial fragmentation.

This was a political and institutional domain characterised by enormous variety and flexibility, whose fragmentation facilitated the involvement – and, indeed, even the inclusion in their very heart – of different transnational merchant diasporas capable of operating with very little difficulty in a wide number of juridical and monetary systems. The success of these trading associations, and of the Italian communities in particular, can largely be attributed to their role as connectors between dispersed territories and their ability to offer a range of resources that were fundamental to the better working of the system as a whole. Far from presenting a barrier to economic development, these conditions may in fact explain the commercial and financial vitality of those territories marked by this model of dispersed sovereignty.

It is perhaps worthwhile remembering that two of the most dynamic economic zones in Europe, the duchy of Milan and the southern Low Countries, both of which were at the forefront of the process of industrialisation on the continent, remained after the War of Spanish Succession under the jurisdiction of the Habsburgs of Vienna; this ensured the conservation of a high degree of urban autonomy as well as of an active rivalry among the different cities, which, in turn, attracted new capital and guaranteed the permanence of inclusive institutions.

Any reader of these studies will also come across a series of crucial questions touching on the relationship between the functioning of these merchant communities and their forms of organisation. What corporate structures were used by each one of these communities? Why did they choose one commercial agent ahead of another? Was priority given to a ‘national’ component or to a familial, religious or cultural one? Or, alternatively, did they make use of several strategies, combining or adapting them on the basis of the market conditions? This does not imply, of course, that it is necessary to return to a series of familiar questions concerning the greater or lesser degree of modernity discernible in patterns of behaviour or the economic rationality of the solutions adopted by these commercial agents. In the same way, the intention here has not
been to enter into the wide-ranging debates about the meaning of the concept of the network. Rather, it is to assess the nature of the business relations at the root of the persisting success of small, but still dynamic merchant groups. Through this lens, the authors aim to understand how merchants dealt with conflicts and established patterns of collaboration; what types of interrelation existed between the various vertices of the network and its distant members and partners; what role trust, the reputation of its members or the relative degree of flexibility played in these highly complex commercial mechanisms. The study of the Florentine, Milanese and Genoese networks that operated within the very bosom of the Spanish Monarchy confirms the suggestions recently made by Regina Grafe for the Spanish Atlantic world: it is inadequate to propose any rigid antagonism between the weak bonds of these commercial networks and the rigidity of the imperial institutions. And this is not simply because if networks can be considered as institutions then so these imperial institutions must sometimes be viewed as networks. These perspectives are also important because, as mentioned above, the polycentric nature of the Spanish imperial system did not conform to the mercantilist and coercive caricature which is so often used to describe it; on the contrary, it was characterised by a high degree of adaptability to the needs of the merchant networks that operated within it. In this sense the importance of the networks of Italian hommes d'affaires lies in the fact that, in spite of not counting upon the support of powerful governments capable of guarding, through the use of force, their networks and interests, they still managed to find the ways necessary to maintain a strong presence in Spanish markets. Only through the study of the different trading houses and the crosslinking and overlapping of their respective histories, can a truly global vision of the formation, working, breakdown, diversification and continuity of this type of merchant web be understood.

The studies presented here, all of them underpinned by an extraordinary number and range of unpublished archival sources, incorporate new theatres and actors into the comparative analysis of the complex trading systems of the various Italian nations that operated within the heartlands of the complex, multinational structure that was the Spanish monarchy. Their history opens up a more nuanced, sophisticated and wide-ranging panorama on international commerce in the era of the first globalisation.

Notes
1. “With feeble standardization and homogenization of international markets, trading diasporas and religious and ethnic networks played a major role in favoring market integration. In turn, their success was not simply the result of their internal interdependence, but also a measure of their ability to cooperate with outsiders.” Trivellato, “A Republic of Merchants?,” 137.
3. Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce; Lindemann, Merchant Republics.
4. Maddalena and Kellenbenz, Repubblica internazionale; Neri, Uomini d'affari; Ruiz Martín, Pequeño capitalismo; Grendi, Repubblica aristocratica.
5. A recent overview with an up-to-date bibliography on this theme with a global focus which takes the analysis beyond their well-known role as financiers and asentistas can be found in Herrero Sánchez, Ben Yessef, Bitossi, and Puncuh, Génova y la Monarquía.
6. Pike, Enterprise and Adventure; Vila Vilar, Los Corzo y los Mañara; Álvarez Nogal, Sevilla y la Monarquía.

8. In this it confirms recent research by García Montón, “Génova y el Atlántico;” García Montón, “Trayectorias individuales;” Lo Basso, “De Curaçao a Esmirna.”


10. Domínguez Ortiz, “Concesión de naturalezas.”


12. Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*. For their part Carmen Sanz Ayán and Claudio Marsilio have documented a considerable number of mixed companies run by operators of Jewish-*converso* origin and Genoese businessmen, Sanz Ayán, *Banqueros y la crisis*; Marsilio, “Genoese and Portuguese.”


15. The French, Flemish, Dutch and British communities in particular, along with the Sephardim or Armenians, have catalysed the attention of historians in recent years. For the case of Cadiz, see Bustos Rodríguez, *Cádiz en el sistema atlántico*. For the Dutch community, see Crespo, *Entre Cádiz y los Países Bajos*; for the French community, see Bartolomei, “Naturalización de los mercaderes.”

16. Two recent overviews of the consular institution can be found in Ulbert and Gérard Bouëdec, *La fonction consulaire*, and Aglietti, Herrero, and Zamora, *Cónsules de extranjeros*.


19. In America, for example, the protectionist legislation required foreign merchants to integrate themselves in local communities, as the creation of any sort of private national corporation was clearly forbidden. Herrero Sánchez, “Foreign Communities.”


21. Herrero Sánchez, “Génova y el sistema imperial.”

22. Herrero Sánchez, “Génova y el sistema imperial.”

23. On Genoa’s role as a corridor transmitting cultural trends across Europe, see Boccardo, Di Fabio, and Colomer, *Genova e la Spagna*.

24. Yun Casalilla, *Redes del Imperio*.


28. A considerable corpus of literature has sprung up around the concept of *network* and the different approaches to it. A suggestive overview of this theme is provided by Hancock, “Trouble with Networks.” On the failure of this type of association, see Schrank and Whitford, “Anatomy of Network Failure.”

29. On the role of families in providing cohesion and confidence to merchant associations, see Haggerty, *British-Atlantic*. The crucial role of trust in facing risks is addressed in Lamikiz, *Trade and Trust* or Baskes, *Staying Afloat*.


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Tuscan merchants in Andalusia: a historiographical debate

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ABSTRACT
This study intervenes in the debate concerning the crisis of the Mediterranean world and its merchant bankers following the European expansion, shedding new light on the presence and role of Tuscan merchants in Andalusia during the sixteenth century. Their business strategy was more successful than previously thought: this assumption comes from comparisons between quantitative data and the descriptions offered by Tuscan sources, as well as the written documentation held by Spanish archives. Their networks, which included the main economic hubs of Europe, as well as the financial instruments they would use, allowed the Tuscan merchants to play a role of paramount importance in the Andalusian market. In addition, they invested money in the transatlantic trade, in the manufacturing activities of the West Indies and, in general, in other financial and insurance enterprises.

KEYWORDS
International trade; Tuscan merchants; Andalusia; sixteenth century; America

A few introductory considerations

The first concrete consequences of the discovery of America started becoming apparent in the early sixteenth century. Together with news of different peoples and cultures, gold, silver and other previously unknown products began arriving from the New World. These extraordinary events were the result of a long historical process which had involved much of Europe. First, the development of navigation techniques and the creation of new links between the Mediterranean and the North Sea, followed by curiosity about undiscovered lands, the musings of geographers and navigators on the shape of the earth, and difficulties in accessing Eastern markets were the main stimuli for such voyages of discovery.

The urge to find lands where raw materials and precious metal could readily be found had always been the driving force behind European and Italian mercantile instincts. There is nothing accidental about the fact that Colomus’ voyages were supported and funded by merchant bankers, always eager to take advantage of great opportunities. Powerful Genoese families such as the Doria, Spinola, Cattaneo and Centurione, which had deep roots in the most important Andalusian markets, as well as Florentine entrepreneurs, such as Giannotto
Berardi, Simone Verde and Amerigo Vespucci, were very aware of the potential of these adventures, and actively supported them, in some cases even taking part directly.

A great deal has been written about the presence of Florentine merchants in Andalusia and the role they played in trade with the West, after the discovery of America made Cádiz and Seville cosmopolitan marketplaces. The historiographical debate on this issue is framed by the wider debate on the decline of the Mediterranean, the Italian peninsula and its businessmen. The somewhat premature hypothesis of the decline was based on the premise of a close cause–effect relationship between the economic outcome of the geographical discoveries and the political situation in Italy after the arrival of Charles VIII and the Italian Wars. According to these interpretations, the discovery of America, the French–Spanish wars and the waves of plague and hunger which followed had a powerfully negative impact on the economic role of the Mediterranean and the Italian peninsula. Such an approach appears to be still under the influence of the belief that the crises triggered by the fourteenth-century epidemics were not short-period cycles, but rather the early signs of inevitable gradual decline.

This is not the place for an analysis of the lengthy debate set in motion by Henri Pirenne, developed by Roberto Sabatino Lopez and taken forward by Armando Sapori and others. I will restrict myself to recalling that, according to these authors, the economic development of the thirteenth century was followed by a decline which began in the latter half of the fourteenth century and culminated in the sixteenth century with the exclusion of Italy from the great international trading networks. As is well known, this theory first came under revision in the 1940s, when Fernand Braudel, Federigo Melis and Carlo Maria Cipolla claimed that the ascent of the Atlantic and the French–Spanish Wars did not bring the economic primacy of Italy and its sea to an end, but rather that the shift of the great trading routes away from the Mediterranean had been a very slow process. Although the source of the crisis tended to move away from the historiographical focus over time, in the 1970s and 1980s Ruggero Romano, Philips Jones and Miskimin revisited the idea that the crisis triggered by the Black Death was not a short-period phenomenon, but the first signs of a gradual and inevitable decline. In this historiographical context, a number of studies published in the late 1980s focused specifically on the presence of Tuscan merchants in Andalusian markets and the role they played in them in the sixteenth century. According to these researchers, the crisis in Toscana and Florence was so intense that it was forcing the Florentines to emigrate. The presence of a number of Florentine families in sixteenth-century southern Andalusia was no longer seen as evidence of their work in expanding their bases and trading networks, but rather as the consequence and proof of their irrelevance to the economy of the day. Thus, for certain authors, such as Consuelo Varela, Juan Gil and Francisco Núñez Roldán, the activity of Florentine merchant bankers in Cádiz and Seville was extremely limited. Whilst their numbers had increased, their economic profile was low in terms both of quantity and trade value, as well as in terms of innovative practices. This perspective follows a traditional approach, and its theories are based on research carried out mainly in Spanish public sources and on the low number of notarial contracts signed by Florentine merchants thereof. On the basis of this low number, then, in what looks almost as a cause–effect relationship, it was concluded that Tuscan merchants had played a modest role in these marketplaces. And all of this despite the fact that Tuscan merchants had been avoiding the use of notaries for commercial transactions whenever possible for quite some time. The best-informed specialists have rejected the possibility that Florence could have been in crisis at the turn of the sixteenth
century; in fact, Florence remained a fundamental point of reference for European trading networks for virtually the entire sixteenth century. Florentine trading wealth was not simply a matter of classic trade-offs between goods from the various areas of the Mediterranean, Europe and America; it had now expanded into internal manufacturing of top-quality wool cloth and auroserico fabrics, which were made of yarn refined with gold or silver, and other luxury products for the courts, clergy and upper middle classes of every country in the world.\textsuperscript{9} The reasons for this excellence are to be looked for in a successful combination of Humanist thinking, Renaissance aesthetic values and a strong drive towards innovation in Tuscan merchant circles.\textsuperscript{10}

In this article, my intention is to bring a long chapter in my research trajectory, which is concerned with the Tuscan presence in Lower Andalusia, to an end. Prompted by the terms of the historiographical debate mentioned above, I shall try to propose further considerations, above all of the role played by Florentine merchants in the region and their intense trading and financial activity. Their trade was sustained by Florence-based manufactures; in the late sixteenth century, the wool and silk industries were still considered the city’s ‘\textit{i dua begli occhi}’ (‘two beautiful eyes’)\textsuperscript{11}, and Florentine woollen cloth, like \textit{rasce}, and precious silk drapes, like damask, reached as far as the distant coasts of the New World. As far as their intense financial activity is concerned I shall limit myself to noting their dominant role in the Lyon fairs, where they speculated in foreign currency and played an extremely important role for the French public debt. There is nothing accidental about the fact that the Florentine nation was numerous in Lyon and that its power was not only economic but also social and political.\textsuperscript{12} The Florentines’ specialised skills had been perfected since the fourteenth century and were certainly not wasted in Andalusia, a region flooded with precious metal. As we shall see, the Tuscons knew how to use their expertise and wealth to fund transatlantic travel and profit from commercial insurance. Thus a critical and integrated analysis of the Andalusia and Tuscan archives will show that the role played by Florentine traders was important and certainly not a matter of mediocre routine.

The Spanish documentation consulted includes the Archivo General de Indias (Contratación, Indiferente, Justicia, Pasajeros collections), Archivo de Protocolos de Seville (Offices I and XV), Archivo Historico Provincial de Cadiz and Archivo de la Casa de Medina Sidonia. The published works, on the other hand, include an in-depth examination of the \textit{Catálogo de los Fondos Americanos del Archivo de Protocolos} in Seville. The Tuscan documents used are the records and papers of private scribes operating within the framework of merchant and manufacturing companies, rather than public sources. This material is kept at the Florence Archivio di Stato, and especially in the Acquisti e Doni, Carte Strozziane V Serie, Galli Tassi, Libri di commercio e di famiglia and the Miscellanea Medicea collections.

Account books recording the movement of goods and money were intended to monitor trends in the companies’ wealth. Whilst difficulties in interpretation exist, these records allow for the quantitative reconstruction of a number of factors, especially the extent of business transactions and the relative weight of the various activities in which companies took part. They also give an insight into transaction methods and commercial and financial techniques. In contrast to account ledgers, which are made up of purely quantitative data, the letters convey, describe and analyse events. Florentines paid great attention to letter-writing, and these have become a source of information on internal matters, the type of business being transacted between the correspondents and the specific context of their work. The reliability of the material is corroborated by the letters’ own \textit{raison d’être},
which was to communicate information on economic and market events promptly, so the information could be effectively used to forecast trends and take equally prompt business decisions. Therefore, the critical use of correspondence can be wide-ranging, as long as due consideration is given to the fact that the information contained in each document can only reliably refer to the sphere in which the merchant writing the letter worked.  

**Tuscans in Andalusia, market penetration and local reaction**

In the sixteenth century, the largest Tuscan mercantile and banking houses were present in Andalusia, ready to exploit the opportunities offered by the West Indies and the new riches that were flooding into the Iberian Peninsula. The available data indicates that, between 1480 and 1600, 173 Tuscan merchants resided in Cádiz and Seville. Of these, 133 were Florentine and 22 Sienese along with seven from Lucca, three from Pisa and eight which are generically referred to as ‘Tuscan’, so Tuscans were certainly not alone in this. Apart from merchants from other parts of Italy, there were also Germans, Flemings and English, among others. The Italian merchant colony mostly came from Genoa, Siena, Piacenza and Venice. That the Iberian Peninsula was the base of Genoese riches and international prominence in the sixteenth century is well known. In Andalusia, and above all in the emerging Seville marketplace, the Ligurians gradually succeeded in establishing a solid position as bankers, skilled traders and financial operators. In Seville, consuls and merchants, including some of the greatest Genoese families, aristocratic or otherwise, worked together towards the construction of an active nation in both economic and social terms. The numbers involved are difficult to estimate: in 1474 more than 100 Ligurian merchants are mentioned as living in the city, who by 1503 had allegedly founded 300 companies. These are undoubtedly generic figures, but they give an idea of the importance of the Ligurian component in the city. Other studies show that 437 Genoese merchants were active in Seville between 1489 and 1515; they worked together with a further 106 fellow Genoese in Cadiz. These figures are, clearly, closer to the mark and faithfully reflect the important role played by the Ligurians in Andalusia.

It is impossible to estimate the number of merchants from Piacenza who worked in Andalusia but that it was an important community is confirmed by the fact that since 1479, the Piacenza and Milan merchants owned a loggia next to Seville’s cathedral. The Lombard community also included the Cremona-based Affaitadi company, which played an important role in the sale of bills of exchange on the Seville marketplace. The Venetian community was a small one; being strongly oriented towards trade with the Orient, the Venetians arrived in the city later than other Italian merchants. Between 1475 and 1501, there were 10 Venetians working in Seville, but none who would have seemingly qualified as an international trader. We do, however, know of Florentine merchants in Seville who conducted transactions, sometimes on a large scale, on their behalf. If these were the best organised among the Italian merchant communities, we must also highlight the presence of individuals from Puglia, Naples and Sicily, expert seafarers who had arrived in Andalusia with the intention of boarding ships bound for the Americas.

Non-Italian merchant groups in Seville included businessmen from the rich south of Germany. German banking families, such as the Welser and, above all, the Fugger, competed with the Genoese and occupied a prominent position in Spanish finance in the first half of the sixteenth century. Their Seville-based companies were accompanied by many more, as the analysis of the documents in the Seville archives demonstrate. The German colony
included such important names as Nürnberger, Cromberger and Schetz, all of whom were important financiers of Charles V, and active participants in the colonisation of, and trade with, the New World.\textsuperscript{20}

In the 1540s Seville was also frequented by English merchants, who specialised in buying oil, wine and kermes, as well as in exporting British cloth, tin, lead and alum. There were around 174 of these between 1516 and 1580. The Flemish community was smaller, with 84 individuals in Seville from 1519 to 1581, most of whom were merchants, but also a few artisans, such as the expert goldsmith Isbran de Broc. Flemish merchants imported linen, Brussels tapestries and Dutch canvases and bought kermes, oil and leather goods.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, the comparison of the Tuscan community in Seville to those of other nations reveals not only a numerically important group, but also one which, as we shall see, was economically vibrant.

Some of its members had started trading in Andalusia acting as partners and representatives of commandite companies: straightforward limited responsibility partnerships. The Libri delle Accomandite\textsuperscript{22}, kept in the Florence Archivio di Stato, shows that, between 1492 and 1529, 459 commandite companies (with an aggregate worth of 624,505 florins) were created. Of these, 12 were set up ‘to trade in Spain’, and 23 Florentines invested the large sum of 100,000 florins on their behalf, almost 16\% of the total\textsuperscript{23}; this percentage becomes even more significant if we remember that not all notarial contracts were recorded. The Botti group\textsuperscript{24}, for example, set up a commandite company with the Capponi family in 1519, and this was not documented in the public register. The commandite partner was Iacopo Botti and at the end of the partnership, in 1521, Botti decided to set up two companies linked with the Florence-based, family company, one in Cádiz (along with Zanobi Guidacci) and the other one in Seville (along with Giovanni Morelli). The company structure, which limited the responsibility of the commandite partner to the initial capital share, and left management to the general partner, demonstrates to what extent Florentine merchants entrusted their capital to general partners in highly risky business contexts. In this case, the choice was not dictated by a sudden aversion to risk\textsuperscript{25} but was still the most rational and pragmatic choice in a relatively uncharted economic environment, such as Andalusia.

Twenty-two Florentine, three Lucca and two Siene companies were set up in the two main cities in lower Andalusia in those years. A look at their company names reveals an interesting phenomenon. Tuscan set up, closed down and relaunched companies on the basis of trading requirements and strategies, modifying their company names to accommodate new partners and leave others out. The Gualterotti, Ricasoli and Bellacci family companies’ activities are cases in point here. In June 1525, Iacopo Gualterotti and Luigi Ricasoli wound up their Cádiz company and Gualterotti soon went into partnership with Pandolfo Bellacci in Seville. This company changed structure in 1526, when Daniello degli Alberti joined it. The Ricasoli family set up a new company in Seville with Giovambattista Ridolfi, another Florentine merchant, a company which lasted for at least 10 years, between 1531 and 1541. For their part, suffice it to say that the structure of the Botti brothers’ Cádiz company changed eight times\textsuperscript{26}, and that of their Seville company six times\textsuperscript{27}, between 1521 and 1562.

As well as the companies mentioned above, it is also worth noting that Bernardo Mellini, Claudio Dei and Rinieri Buonguglieli also owned Cádiz-based companies between 1531 and 1540. Similarly, the famous Strozzi and Lapi companies (1534 and 1546), Luigi Sostegni and Cosimo Martelli (1550–3) and Giacomo Bardi and Ippolito Affaitati (1562–71), all owned companies in the Andalusian capital.
Those companies whose partners were not related to each other were obviously the most common. This could hardly be avoided when companies operated abroad, but it is worth emphasising that this company framework was also very popular in Florence where this, more modern type of company, developed alongside the traditional family-run company until the mid-fourteenth century. Progressively, merchants, entrepreneurs and artisans who knew each other well and could reciprocally monitor each other’s solvency and business practice, began forming partnerships on the basis of mutually recognised competence and abilities in order to increase the availability of capital and to expand their spheres of action. The existence of family ties – still an important element in aristocratic and illustrious families – became almost irrelevant for the business middle classes, among which, at least in Tuscany in the turn of the fourteenth century, an entrepreneurial spirit prevailed.

Lucca and Siena merchants used similar methods. Among Lucca-based companies, a case in point is Giovanni Orsucci, who created partnerships with Andrea Bernardi and Cristofano Franceschini in Seville. For their part, in 1526 Sienese merchants Cesare and Galvano Boni set up a business with fellow Siena-born Antonio di Luigi and Perugia-born Francesco Esbotti in Seville, while Giovan Antonio Piccolomini and Scipione Pecci joined Milan-born Luigi da Lampugnano’s pearl fishing company in the island of Cubagua between 1527 and 1530. It is worth pointing out that out of the 22 Sienese merchants who passed through Cádiz or Seville during this period, as many as nine moved on to the New World and travelled to Chile, Cubagua, Guatemala and New Spain.

Not all of these merchants, however, were the owners of Andalusia-based firms. Some of them were there on behalf of important mercantile companies who preferred to work with their own agents rather than through independent companies. These included Giovanni Monaldi, who, along with Francesco Gucci, acted as a representative of the Montauti family, a Rome-based Florentine family who operated in Cádiz and Seville. For some time their representative was a member of the family – Giovanni da Montauto. Nerozzo del Nero, another Florentine expert in trade and finance, travelled to Andalusia in 1559 on behalf of the Salviati family. There were others who only visited in order to finalise a deal, returning to Tuscany immediately thereafter. This was the case with Ninfa Cavalcanti and Chimenti Grassi, who travelled to Spain to sell wheat, and with an individual named Alderotti, whose goal was to acquire sugar. This variety demonstrates the pragmatism of Tuscan merchants. Obviously, the choice on how to operate in every case depended on the scale and nature of the operation at hand – short-, medium- or long-term, one-offs or extended over time, and so on. The ability to choose the most appropriate strategy in each economic context contributed to increasing the chances of success. It is certainly not a coincidence that the contractual agreements contained in fourteenth-century Tuscan merchant account books and correspondence describe economic activities which are heavily reminiscent of those followed by travelling salespeople and business agents today.

A last element that is worth mentioning is the fact that Tuscans rarely travelled on their own and, if they did so, they often sent for their families once they had set up their business. This is what Iacopo Botti did when he called for Giovambattista and Francesco, as well as Bernardo Peri with Giovanni, Andrea, Perozzo and Lorenzo. Brothers Iacopo and Gualterotti were reunited in the same way, as were the three Ricasoli and the two Vigna brothers. And if this were true for the Florentines it was equally so for Pisans, for example, Francesco and Leonardo del Testa in Cádiz in the 1540s, and the Sienese Scipione and
Marcello Pecci, who were respectively a partner and labour master in the Lampugnano company.

Differences in structure notwithstanding, all these merchants worked closely with the parent company and the other units which made up the company’s network, which in the sixteenth century constituted strong webs that were present on the most important markets. There were Florentine branches in Seville, Cádiz, and, often, Valladolid, with strong ties to other branches and companies based in Lyon, the financial capital of the day. The parent company – which was at the centre of the network – was always in Florence, and its central role was based on the accumulation of commercial and financial know-how. These were the characteristics of the Tuscan model working internationally everywhere. These groups, apart from offering standard financial and insurance services, worked primarily as trading intermediaries, either for third parties or on their own behalf, selling goods acquired or even manufactured by their own firms in Florence in the Andalusian markets. These goods included wool, silk and high-quality *auroserico*, a type of cloth refined with gold or silver, which was produced in specialised workshops set up and integrated into the group.  

In addition to the family companies mentioned above there were other equally well-known firms, such as the Capponi family, who opened their own company in Seville in the 1530s after gaining commandite company experience with the Botti family. The renowned Ridolfi have also left evidence of their determined business drive. In 1539, Giovambattista embarked on an American adventure and moved to Santo Domingo with Galeotto Cei. Another example is presented by the Pecori family, who took a lease on tuna fishing from the dukes of Medina Sidonia in the mid-1440s and set up a ‘drapers’ company’ in Granada, a rare example of economic outsourcing, perhaps motivated by the ready availability of this raw material in the area of Granada.

These merchants seem to have integrated without difficulty into southern Andalusia. The region’s social and economic fabric accepted their presence with no significant hostility. There were certainly difficult times, above all in the period during which imperial policy was decidedly anti-Florentine or in the years of the Republic, when tensions between Florence and the empire reached their peak. Florentine merchants had their wealth confiscated on more than one occasion. At such times, trade with Italy and Florence increased in complexity and the dangers multiplied, but it remained an attractive proposition. In order to reduce the risks of confiscation, merchants tried to obtain safe conducts or to send goods under the name of less visible friends. In any event, even in less propitious times, the Andalusian authorities were never excessively harsh and Florentine mercantile activities were never blocked to an excessive extent. ‘They are great gentlemen and do not have a high opinion of us merchants,’ an ironic comment from Florence noted.

If we move now from their business activity to their private lives it emerges that Florentines successfully fitted into the multi-ethnic Andalusian society of the day. In contrast to the Genoese, who demonstrated a greater tendency to marry within their own group, the Florentines showed themselves willing to marry local young women. Anna Francisca Font, Iacopo Botti’s wife, for example, was Catalonia-born and lived in Andalusia, and Belgara, Francesco Lapi’s ‘woman’ and the mother of his son, was probably from Seville. Andrea Peri’s wife was born in the Canary Islands. Other forms of cohabitation also took place. Zanobi Guidacci had a daughter in Spain, and Francesco Botti two children, all out of wedlock; Iacopo Fantoni lived with the Portuguese Antonia Gonçales, with whom he had six children, all of whom were legally recognised, without marrying her.
Marriage undoubtedly contributed significantly to prolonging the time spent abroad or even to making it a permanent condition. In fact, in the course of my research I have noticed that the majority of Florentines who married or cohabited with local women did not return to Florence while those who did not form such relationships seem to have returned to Tuscany four years later on average. In any event, emotional and marriage ties in such economic and cultural contexts notwithstanding, Tuscan merchants encountered unknown or high-value foreign products which they immediately tried to trade in and often also chose for their own personal use. By the late thirteenth century, their long-term trading activity in the most important European markets had already set in motion what we might call a full-blown inter-cultural trade. These processes took on characteristically Florentine and Renaissance features in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—Tuscans were sophisticated and became the most authoritative exponents of good taste and fashion, influencing the lifestyle at different courts and amongst the European middle classes.

These considerations are essentially a summary overview of the characteristics and features of the Tuscan presence in Andalusia between 1480 and 1600, the evolution of which can also be analysed from a quantitative perspective.

An analysis of the comings and goings of the 173 Tuscan merchants who worked in the Cádiz and Seville marketplaces indicates that numbers started to increase towards the end of the fifteenth century. As the opportunities offered by these markets became better known, the average numbers of Florentine and Tuscan merchants grew rapidly between 1510 and 1529; this trend intensified even further in the following decade, with an average of 23 individuals. The main cause for this was the significant growth of the American trade that took place a few decades after the discovery of the New World. The number of galleons plying the seas increased, and the demand for capital also grew, as did the very substantial profits that could be reaped from such expeditions. Although there were Florentines in Andalusia in the second half of the century, their numbers declined significantly between 1550 and 1559, only to sink in the period that followed.

Matteo Botti himself provides the most accurate commentary on the negative trends that are illustrated in Figure 1. A careful observer of international events, by 1541 Botti was aware of what was happening, but continued to consider Andalusia an interesting market in a letter that he wrote to his brothers in April: ‘As you are the only one of our nation to stay, we think that you will manage to make some profit.’ It was, in fact, from this period onwards that a number of bankruptcies took place: ‘There are a great many bankruptcies in Flanders, Seville, Zaragoza and Burgos.’ The first shipments of precious metals to arrive to the European markets, which were essentially the result of plunder, were now coming to an end, heralding the beginning of the mining phase, which brought steadier flows of gold and silver, but was also subject to more effective and tighter imperial control. This transition period probably caught some less cautious traders by surprise—especially those used to speculating on the irregularity of the supply of precious metal and the difficulties faced by the authorities in taxing silver supplies. The market as a whole was highly profitable, but it exposed traders to significant losses too, especially during periods of excessive monetary instability; unwarranted ‘largess’ or ‘restrictiveness’, could affect trade and large quantities of goods in the warehouses.

If this specific economic environment prompted a reduction in the numbers of Tuscan merchants in Spain, it should not be forgotten that our main source of information disappears with the end of the operations of Botti in Andalusia. Iacopo, the only brother who had stayed in
Spain, fell ill and died in 1562 without leaving a male heir to take over his commercial and banking business. The 1560s, however, witnessed the arrival of a number of new companies in Seville. Nerozzo del Nero and Francesco de’ Santis took over the previous role of the Botti and set up a new company in Cádiz. In 1566, Vincenzo Ambrogi’s Madrid-based company decided once more to send an agent to Seville. Finally, Giuliano Galli moved from Florence in 1581 precisely in order to found an enterprise which we know was very successful.

**Trade with the Old and the New Worlds**

Their capital, their technical and economic know-how, and their penchant for risk drove the Florentine towards Cádiz and Seville, not only in order to get involved in the American trade, but also to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the growing purchasing power of the Andalusian aristocracy and business class.

As previously noted, the Tuscan merchants were also involved in both European and trans-oceanic trading networks as merchants, bankers and insurance brokers. Their financial activities were very innovative and up to date while their commercial interests concerned a wide variety of products. They bought anchovies, sardines and tuna fish in Portuguese and Andalusian coastal waters, wheat, silk from Granada and Almeria, leather from the coastal regions of Spain and Barbary, sugar from Cádiz, Madeira, the Canary islands, São Tomé and the East Indies, kermes from the New World and much more.

A few examples will help to reach a clearer understanding of the dimensions of this trade. In the 1524/8 period, the Botti group alone shipped nearly 17,000 barrels of tuna fish, which was sold at an average price of 14.13 lire per barrel, which means an overall value of 237,384 lire. The main supplier was the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the owner of the Záhara and Conil tuna fisheries. The fish was sold in multiple markets, which included Tuscany, Naples, Cagliari and Rome. To this, we may add the 1500/2000 barrels of anchovies sent to the Italian markets in 1525.
The fertile plains of Andalusia were a rich source of wheat. Wheat was a subsistence product and Spanish and Sicilian grain was indispensable owing to the general low productivity levels and the considerably large demand posed by the Italian cities. The 1527 wheat harvest in Tuscany was poor and the situation was exacerbated by an estimated total of 3000 Landsknechts, Spanish and French soldiers passing through the region on their way to Rome. It was this which prompted the Florentine government to seek wheat supplies all over Europe and offer special incentives to those who brought wheat into the cities. It was a great opportunity for the Tuscan merchants in Cádiz and Seville to make a guaranteed profit, because a rapid and consistent price increase was expected. Indeed, the forecast soon proved true and substantial profits were made. In some cases, bushels of wheat that had been bought for 60 soldi were sold for 100 soldi.49

In contrast with wheat, silk was ‘very safe merchandise’50 and silk from Almeria, Granada and Valencia sold very well in Florence, in Venice and also in some French towns. In addition, the discovery of the Americas created new opportunities, because the galleons returning from overseas carried growing quantities of New World silk into Seville. Although of inferior quality, this silk proved to be a good source of income.51

Local leathers, above all from Cordoba and other Spanish regions, were also available at the Andalusia markets52. Leather from the Barbary Coast, Alexandria, Normandy, Ireland and America also arrived in Seville, and Tuscan merchants often acquired large quantities of it, sometimes in association with other Tuscan and Spanish traders. Some of these merchants showed a clear preference for Irish leather. In January 1532, for example, Florentine merchants operating from Andalusia organised the delivery of 73,000 pieces of Irish leather in Livorno.

The ‘unexpected and priceless gift from the heavens’52 that was sugar cane created yet another opportunity for profit. The experienced trader Giovanni Morelli, for instance, organised significant purchases of sugar cane for himself and other Tuscan traders.53 All the varieties of sugar known at the time could be found in the Andalusia markets alongside the local products. Sugar cane came in from the Canary Islands, Madeira, the Barbary Coast and Sao Tomé as well as from the New World, especially Mexico and Hispaniola. The Tuscan traders of Cádiz and Seville were extremely interested in this product, and my data indicates that between 1524 and 1533 almost 12,000 crates of sugar found their way to the Tuscan marketplaces, Flanders, Venice, Rome and Naples. Also worthy of mention is a truly extraordinary operation in which a Portuguese hidalgo by the name of Luis d’Attoglia bought, working along with the Botti family and another Florentine trader in Cádiz, Leo di Bonomo, purchased 340,540 pounds of Madeira sugar, to sell in the Venetian market. The operation involved one of the Botti brothers moving to the Serenissima for two years and earned net profits of nearly 20%.54

In exchange, the Tuscan and above all Florentine merchants working in Seville and Cádiz brought goods which were not only aimed at the local market but also at the colonies in the New World. The lion’s share of these went to luxury goods: items and products that met the refined tastes of Renaissance Florence and Italy, which were taking the princely courts, the upper echelons of the clergy and the richest European upper-middle-class families by storm, something which was made possible by the European-wide trading network set up by Tuscan merchants. Together with wool cloth and silk and gold fabrics, other Italian crafts found their markers, for example mirrors, fans, Venetian glass, Milanese sword blades, Tuscan majolica and wonderful prayer books illuminated by Venetian and French craftsmen.55
On top of this, Florentine merchants considered Spanish marketplaces as important end markets for their wool and silk cloth goods. Recent studies have confirmed that the Florence wool guild was manufacturing almost 8000 pieces of wool cloth in the mid-sixteenth century. These pieces were distributed to markets all over Europe, including Andalusia. There are countless examples of this but I will restrict myself to two, which are particularly interesting. The first relates to an unusual type of cloth, *rascia*, originally conceived as a coarse cloth but one which a series of innovations rendered lightweight and extremely fine in the sixteenth century. It was ideal for ‘female garments’ and ‘Spanish style caps’ and became a must-wear in very hot climates, such as those found in Andalusia and Castille. *Rasce* made with Spanish wool in an attractive deep black were, in fact, much sought after in Seville and Valladolid as my data demonstrates. In 1561 alone, Botti sent 96 pieces – more than 1500 metres of cloth – worth more than 42,000 lire on average to these markets.

My second example relates to silk production at the Por Santa Maria workshops, which was worth 400,000 ducats in 1527 and a considerable part of which was sold in Seville and other Spanish markets. This was top-quality cloth for the upper echelons of society. On one occasion, Tuscan merchants supplied the canons of Seville Cathedral with fine sacred vestments worth 1500 ducats while making a bid to gain an eminent client, the vicar of the archbishop, who was presented with a cloth sample worth 80–100 ducats, because the churches that were under the archbishop’s jurisdiction were obliged to follow the vicar’s decisions. This concerned the import–export framework in the New World, but the Florentines also played an important role in in trans-oceanic commercial networks. *Rasce* and wool cloth, Rouen cloth, taffeta from Granada and Toledo, Flanders canvas, camlet, damask and satin which, if it were black was used for ‘the land’ and if it was ‘coloured [it was] for the Indies’, spun silk, steel, wine, quince cheese, spices and small goods were some of the goods that were loaded onto ships in Seville. When the opportunity arose, Florentines also traded in slaves. In 1548, Lorenzo del Rosso and Francisco ‘Ruco’ were granted a licence to transfer 35 black slaves to the Indies at a cost of 280 ducats, and we also know that the Florentine Lorenzo Peri had become one of the richest merchants in the Canaries following his participation in the slave trade. When the galleons returned from the Indies, the Tuscan merchants collected their returns in the shape of precious metals, skins, sugar, dyestuffs, raw silk, pearls, emeralds and many other products.

**Financial and insurance activities**

As previously noted, the Tuscans did not simply limit themselves to trade, but also acted as insurance brokers and financiers. In these sectors, the experience accumulated since the fourteenth century and their innovative practices were particularly important. As expert insurance brokers, they co-ordinated operations between Florence, Cádiz and Seville in order to take advantage of the most expedient market for their policies. Based on the accounts of insurance broker Lazzaro Raggi, Federigo Melis has demonstrated that the Botti brothers drew up 89 contracts in the 1524–6 period, worth a total of 6292 florins. In 1524, they succeeded in selling 19 insurance policies worth 1092 florins, 46 in 1525, worth 3100 florins, and 24 in 1526, worth 2100 florins. In Andalusia, their busiest period as far as insurance is concerned, began in the 1540s when they occupied an important position in the trans-Atlantic insurance market. In order to reduce risks, they often acted in partnership with other Florentine companies in Florence and Lyon, such as the Capponi, the Bini and
the Strozzi companies. An account statement dating to 1544–5 presents our merchants insuring voyages all over the world – from Seville to Nombre de Dios, from São Tomé to Flanders, from Ayamonte to London, from Cádiz to Rouen, from Sicily to Andalusia, from Venice to Candia. In the period covered by the documents, the Botti brothers paid out for damages relating to 94 contracts, in which goods were insured to a value of 29,005 ducats. Of these 94 contracts, 25 concerned goods on the route to and from the New World, to a total value of 5750 ducats. Other Tuscan brokers also insured for large sums. Cosimo Martelli, for instance, along with Luigi Sostegni, paid 400 ducats to Bartolomé de Vizcarra, Alcalde of Castillo de Triana, in Seville, for the loss of the galleon San Juan, which they had jointly insured for its voyage from Havana to Seville in 1551. In Valladolid, the Martelli brothers reduced their risks by partnering with the Mannelli company of Lyon. In merely four months, 14 insurance contracts were drawn up, two of which covered New World-bound voyages, worth a total of 300 ducats.

With regards to lending, Tuscan merchants were distinctly entrepreneurial in spirit. It was this which enabled them to take control of the Lyon exchange market and play a key role in financing French and Papal public debt. The main players here were often the same houses that we have seen operating in Cádiz and Seville.

In Andalusia, their financial activity focused in providing capital for galleons en route to the New World. I will leave the Botti brothers to one side here in order to concentrate on the experiences of other Florentines. Pietro Rondinelli, for instance, lent Giovanni Vespucci 25 gold ducats, probably in 1514, for his voyage to the ‘Terra Ferma’. In the 1520s, Iacopo Fantoni, Zanobi Guidacci, Iacopo Gualterotti and Andrea Velluti funded a voyage led by Sebastiano Caboto with different sums. These are only a few examples of the most traditional, frequent and direct funding method, but the Florentines seem to have preferred supplying funds in the form of working capital; this involved providing the capital to load a ship with goods, to be repaid on the ship’s return from the Indies. These methods were chiefly used by traders who were not authorised to sell directly across the Ocean and had to resort to notarial contracts in which they handed over certain products to ship owners at prices that exceeded the prevailing market prices. These notarial documents specified that goods had been purchased at multiple prices in order to better conceal the mark-up. It was an ingenious technique. On the one hand, Florentines reduced the risk of being accused of selling on commission – which would have led to confiscation of the precious metals earned in the New World – and, on the other, ship owners could count on a full shipload without handing over a single maravedi in payment. This was the mechanism chosen by Cosimo Martelli and Luigi Sostegni in two separate contracts. In the first, two Segovia cloth pieces worth 150 ducats were handed over to Diego de la Serma, who was fitting out the Doña Juana, a 300-ton galleon, and in the second they contributed 1500 ducats, the cost of 25 Segovia cloth pieces to be loaded onto the San Juan on its voyage, once again, to the Caribbean port.

Conclusions

The Tuscan and, in particular, the Florentine encounter with Andalusia and its markets was motivated by rational decisions linked to a business logic which was certainly not small-scale. The study of the evidence provided by Seville and Cadiz has highlighted the fact that the partnerships and entrepreneurial models adopted, however modest in size, were a direct
expression of large companies based in Florence and present in the main European towns of the day. These merchants took full advantage of the competitive edge which this operational model, characteristic also of individual or small-scale firms, gave them for long-distance transactions. Their strategy was not only based on their knowledge of commercial and financial techniques. Indeed, the effectiveness of Tuscan merchants relied on the always up-to-date nature of their expertise, their curiosity and their ability to read the contexts they worked in, but these had to be nourished by a constant flow of information. Merchants wrote constantly, supplying and receiving information in the context of a network which included their own partners and a huge number of other correspondents.

They successfully seized the opportunities offered by the discovery of the Americas and used any method that ensured them a profit. Aware of the economic potential of towns on the crossroads between the New and the Old Worlds, they arrived in Cadiz and Seville with the intention of finding a place for themselves in the wider commercial and financial networks. They were well aware of the importance of this trade and referred to the Andalusian market in their letters in the following terms: ‘I wouldn’t want to lose this place and I think I’ll stay a few years.’ Just a few years, because the attractions and business potential of this area remained alive for nearly the whole of the sixteenth century.

And this was not all. They also succeeded in integrating the American market into their business networks and tried their hand directly in these unknown and fascinating lands. Whilst their numbers were not huge, my data shows that there were certainly more than 50 of them in the sixteenth century. Most of them, moreover, showed a high degree of dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit; some even invested in mining or sugar, while others continued to operate in the commercial sphere.

This article has demonstrated that there was a considerable number of Florentines in Andalusia, but it is much more difficult to quantify the importance of this trade for the Florentine economy. It certainly was not negligible. In order to quantify this partially, we would need to analyse the large number of Florentine company account registers which are kept in the Florence State Archive. The documents studied to date have yielded only partial information. We have seen that commandites amounted to 16% of Spanish business in the period under consideration, and that significant quantities of Florentine woollen cloth and silk and auroserico fabrics were sent to the Spanish markets. Concerning imports, leather, sugar, tuna and kermes, among other products, seem to have played a significant part. This is partial, fragmentary data but still of some importance. These are expressions of micro-events which were nonetheless capable of shifting secular equilibriums, indispensable pieces in the wider puzzle to be added to or re-interpreted.

Their activities on other European and Mediterranean marketplaces were no different. On each of the important markets in which these merchants operated – such as Lisbon, Bruges, Antwerp, London, Lyon, Tunis and Constantinople – with their own dynamics and commercial opportunities, the essential characteristics of their activities remained the same: reduction of transaction costs and a penchant for investment and financial speculation. Naturally, such similarities notwithstanding – and these similarities were reinforced and influenced by their close ties to the home country – the types of commercial operations in which these merchants participated were in constant evolution.

From the narrow point of view of actual numbers and their economic relevance it is reasonable to assert that the Florentine community in Andalusia was second only to that in Lyon. While around 20 Tuscan companies worked in Cadiz and Seville, there were at least 44
such companies on the banks of the Saône and Rhône rivers in the first half of the sixteenth century; their activity largely revolved around Lyon’s trading and financial markets, above all concerning currency exchange and financial speculation. Their position of strength and authority may also have benefitted from the huge role they played in financing the French public debt. These were the main differences in the activities of the Florentine and Tuscan communities that operated in the new transatlantic markets and those that transacted in the traditional Lyon fairs.

Notes


2. The debate began in the 1930s when Henri Pirenne’s Histoire économique et sociale du Moyen Âge identified a check on European development for the first time.


5. Miskimin, L’economia.


8. Orlandi, Mercanzie e denaro.


11. Malanima, La decadenza. The author argues that in 1580 the wool sector employed more than 20,000 people, a considerable proportion of the total population (65,000). For rasce- making see Ammannati, “L’Arte della Lana a Firenze nel Cinquecento.” See also Chorley, “The Volume of Cloth production in Florence” a more general overview on production and trade.


13. For this methodological matters see Orlandi, Mercanzie e denaro; Ibid., “Networks.”

14. I have created a database which cannot be reproduced here for obvious space considerations. The database’s main fields are: the name and surname of each trader, town of origin, the place and the date when they first appear in the records in an Andalusian town and the date and place when they are last mentioned in such records. In compiling this database, I took into account the signing, testimony and contents of notarial acts, as well as the evidence from private sources. Unless otherwise specified, traders passing through Seville or Cádiz on their way to America were noted down as present for one year. The offspring of the members of the Tuscan trading colony are considered only if they also participated in trade. The database also includes names referred to in the work of Enrique Otte, Juan Gil, Francisco Núñez Roldán,
Consuelo Varela and others. In this case I selected only those whose surnames are sufficient evidence of Tuscan origins, and who were present in Cádiz and Seville after 1492 whatever the actual date of their arrival in Andalusia.

15. There are many studies on the Genoese presence in Andalusia and Seville in particular. For an overview see Petti Balbi, *Negoziare fuori patria*. D’Ascenzo, “Siviglia e gli italiani.” Rafael M. Girón Pascual has recently carried out some on the presence and activities of Genoese merchants in the region of Granada.


18. D’Esposito, “Presenza italiana.”

19. Kellenbenz, *Oberdeutsche*. Jörg Stecher, Christoph Raiser and Thomas Miller were Fugger labour-masters from 1525 to 1560.


22. The Libri delle Accomandite were public registers held at the “Curia della mercatantia e università de’ mercantanti” in which such business partnerships were registered.


24. The Botti was a Florentine commercial company with branches in Italy (Florence and Pisa) and Spain (Cádiz, Seville and Valladolid) in the first half of the sixteenth century. There were nine Botti brothers, and five of them carried on with their father’s business and set up a trading group which played a very active role in the commercial links between America, Spain and Italy. Matteo and Simone stayed in Florence while Iacopo, Giovambattista and Francesco divided their time between Tuscany and Spain; Iacopo alone stayed in Spain permanently. Orlandi, *La compagnia dei Botti*; Orlandi, *Le Grand Parti*; Orlandi, “Mercanti toscani;” Otte, “Los Botti y los Lugos;” Point Waquet, “Les Botti.”

25. This is Maurice Carmona’s argument in “Aspects,” 81–108.


31. The gold-beating companies that specialised in manufacturing gold and silver thread for auroserico cloth were often managed by large silk guild companies in order to control production and product innovation processes. Dini, “Una manufactura di battiloro.”

32. Giovambattista Ridolfi left Seville together with Galeotto Cei and reached Santo Domingo on 22 October 1539. Cei, *Viaggio e relazione delle Indie*, 5.


34. ASF, Libri di commercio, 711, 14th July 1526, c. 111v.; ibid., 712, 14 March 1528, c. 14v.

35. “Siate costà tanti gran cavalieri che non estimate nos otro mercaderes.” ASF, *Libri di commercio*, 716, 1 February 1563, c. 42r.


37. ASF, Miscellanea, 107/2, 2 April 1546, c. 198v.


39. I have calculated the length of the visit’s stay by excluding all merchants who remained in Spain for the rest of their lives after marrying or moving in with local women, and also their children, from my calculations. Cases for which calculations could not be made with any degree of precision were also excluded. Overall, my estimations are based on 114 individuals.

40. Nigro, “Alle origini.”

41. “da che voi sarete soli, si può dire, di nostra natione, pensiamo che vi riuscirà qualche profittto.” ASF, Miscellanea, 107/1, 9 April 1541, c. 76v.

42. “et va atorno una gran somma di falliti in Fiandra, a Sibilia ad Siraghoza et Burghos.” ASF, Miscellanea, 107/1, 1 January 1543, c. 221v.
44. The concepts of restrictiveness and largess refer to the greater or smaller availability of metals in the market.
45. On these economic activities see Yun Casalilla, “El siglo,” 51–89. Marcos Martín, España.
46. ASF, Libri di commercio, 727, 30 June 1566, c. 34v.
47. ASF, Libri di commercio, 711, 14 July 1525, c. 54v.; ibid., 711, 18 March 1527, c. 141r.
48. ASF, Libri di commercio, 711, 12 March 1525, c. 41r.; ibid., 711, 6 February 1525, c. 37v.
49. ASF, Libri di commercio, 711, 30 October 1526, c. 119v; ibid., 18 July 1527, c. 161r.
50. ASF, Libri di commercio, 712, 15 March 1531, c. 83v.
52. Verlinden, Le origini, 204.
53. ASF, Miscellanea, 107/2, 24 July 1545, c. 114r.
54. Orlandi, La compagnia dei Botti, 223.
56. Ammannati, “L’Arte della Lana a Firenze nel Cinquecento” see also Chorley, “The Volume of Cloth Production in Florence.”
57. Hoshino, L’industria laniera, 4.
58. ASF, Miscellanea, 107/1, 11 February 1542, c. 165v.
59. ASF, Miscellanea, 107/1, 9 January 1542, c. 151r.
60. ASF, Miscellanea, 107/1, 16 September 1541, c. 120r.
61. ASF, Libri di commercio, 715, 29 December 1559, c. 39v.; ibid., 715, 15 April 1561, c. 89v.; ibid., Miscellanea, 107/3, 28 January 1548, cc. 164v.–165r.
63. Dini, “L’industria serica.”
64. Dini, “Una manufactura di battiloro.”
65. Orlandi, “Note su affari e devozione,” 326.
67. ASF, Galli Tassi, 56, 20 December 1585, cc. 85r. and v.
68. ASF, Galli Tassi, 56, 6 May 1585, c. 67r.
69. The slaves came from the Spanish colonies, the Kingdom of Portugal, the Cape Verde islands and Guinea. AGI, Indiferente, 424, L. 21, F. 241v.-242v. (IM. 493–494), 14 September 1548.
   We know that the role played by Tuscan merchants in the slave trade was quite marginal; the sector was controlled by the Genoese.
70. Lobo Carrera, “Los mercaderes,” 75.
71. On the subject of dyes and kermes in particular, see Orlandi, “Zucchero e cocciniglia.”
73. On the subject of trans-Atlantic insurance see Bernal, “Sobre los seguros.”
76. ASF, CSVS, 1506, Copy of a note sent to Niccolò and Paulantonio Mannelli in Lyon, 14 August 1556, c. 15s.
78. Gil, “Los armadores de Sebastian Caboto.”
79. AHSP, Leg. 9167, Oficio XV, Libro II, Scrivania di Juan Franco, 30 June 1550, fols. 576v.–579v.; leg. 9167, Oficio XV, Libro II, Scrivania di Juan Franco, 13 November 1550, fols. 559v.–561; leg. 9167, Oficio XV, Libro II, Scrivania di Juan Franco, 30th June 1550, fols. 576v.–579v. A summary of these two acts have been published in Catálogo de los Fondos Americanos del
Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla, Tomo IV, Siglo XVI, Instituto Hispano Cubano de Historia de América, Seville, 2002, documents 1123 and 1126, pp. 296–7. Nicolás de Jerez and Diego de Escobar used the same method, committing themselves to pay Piero Rondinelli 5959 maravedis for 85 crates of quince cheese, which the latter had supplied for them to take to Hispaniola on the Santa Maria de Gracia captained by Cristóbal Camacho. Leg. 9105, Oficio XV, Scrivania di Bernal González de Vallesillo, 30 August 1507, fol. 422. A summary of the act has been published in Catálogo de los Fondos Americanos del Archivo de Protocolos de Sevilla, Tomo VIII, Siglos XV y XVI, Instituto Hispano Cubano de Historia de América, Seville, 2000, p. 104. See also Orlandi, “Al soffio degli Alisei,” 501.

80. Orlandi, Mercanzie e denaro, 11–16.
82. Masi, Statuti.

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A Genoese merchant and banker in the Kingdom of Naples: Ottavio Serra and his business network in the Spanish polycentric system, c.1590–1620

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ABSTRACT
The dense Genoese commercial networks – which were present in all territories under Spanish rule, fairs, commercial emporia and battlefields – were an essential factor for the survival of the crown. This raises some doubts about the dominating influence posed, according to traditional accounts, by the court in Madrid; the court was, indeed, a point of reference for the Genoese merchant families but by no means the only one. In fact, the Genoese always took care to be present in important harbours and markets, such as Naples, where they often had correspondents to look after the family’s multiple interests. This article revolves around the crucial role played by Ottavio Serra (1570–1639), son of Giovanbattista Serra, ‘signore’ of Carovigno and an active merchant and moneychanger in the viceroyalty of Naples during the first two decades of the seventeenth century. The importance of Ottavio was not limited to his participation in the economic life of Naples. The analysis of Ottavio’s activity as financial agent for his relatives and partners in Madrid, Genoa and Piacenza, among other locations, as well as the examination of his links with a great variety of economic centres in the Mezzogiorno, presents early-modern Naples as a highly ‘internationalised’ centre in the context of the polycentric Hispanic imperial system.

KEYWORDS
Genoese merchant-bankers; networks; polycentric system; Hispanic monarchy; Naples; cities

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parallel line of thinking has promoted research into networks and their capacity to operate
in and across different jurisdictions and has greatly advanced the development of the study
of relationships and their social dimension within the context of the institutions and states
of the ancien régime. In turn this process has been reciprocated with the exploration of
trading networks allowing scholars to integrate the institutional element into definitions
of complex trade patterns and the strategies employed to achieve social promotion; it has
also revealed how networks and the institutional apparatus complemented one another and,
in the final analysis, improved and deepened our knowledge of the relationship between
public and private spheres.

Diaspora was a defining feature of the Genoese nobility in the early-modern period. This
was especially true for the older lineages, as E. Grendi has shown. In 1575 Giulio Pallavicino
had good reason to claim that half of the ‘old’ aristocrats (nobili vecchi) and one-third or
one-quarter of the ‘new’ ones (nobili nuovi) lived outside Genoa. The intensity of this wave
of migration seems to have abated a little by the early seventeenth century. Still, a document
from 1608 suggests that one-fifth of Genoese nobles resided outside the Republic.

One of the most popular destinations for Ligurian businessmen was the Kingdom of
Naples. The Serra family, on whom this article is based, made continuous forays into Naples
from the second half of the sixteenth century. The Serras, like the De Maris, belonged to
a sector of the old aristocracy that in 1528, when the introduction of the Reformationes
Novae laws brought about a major institutional overhaul of the Republic, did not have
more than six open houses in the city. These reforms coincided with the signing of the
Condotta agreement between Andrea Doria and Charles V, which sealed an enduring col-
laboration between Genoa and the Spanish Monarchy. The 1528 laws made it obligatory
for the Genoese patricians to belong to one of the 28 alberghi that guaranteed access to the
principal political and administrative offices of the Republic of Genoa. The relatively small
size of the Serra family, which did not possess the number of houses required by the laws,
prevented them from establishing themselves as an albergo and meant their aggregation
to the Lercari house.

Given this background, it seems highly possible that the late arrival of the Serras in
Naples was the result of a strategic decision to concentrate their adult youngsters in Genoa
during the 1530s and 1540s, a period in which other Genoese lineages acquired consid-
erable prominence in the Mezzogiorno. These constraints seem not to have affected the
actions of other families who, like the De Maris, were unable to establish themselves as an
albergo: in the 1530s Giovan Battista De Mari, the founder of a branch of the family in the
Mezzogiorno, and his brother Raffaele already presided over a bank in Naples, which they
ran with another Genoese, Uberto Squarciafico. The De Mari would go on to become one
of the most prominent of the Ligurian families active in the southern kingdom. However
the genealogy of the Serras demonstrates that in these years they did not have enough male
members to allow them to send family members to the South without abandoning their
interests in their city of origin.

Not until the 1560s would the Serras establish themselves in Naples. Three brothers made
the leap: Antonio, Gio. Battista (father of Ottavio, the subject of this paper) and Girolamo
q Paolo. They were active in the southern wheat trade and also represented the Republic in
various matters. Their presence in Naples was never taken to be definitive or permanent
in this first stage: we lose track of Gio. Battista Serra in 1596; Antonio Serra appears as a
member of the expedition of old Genoese nobles sent to the governor of Milan during the
civil war between vecchi and nuovi of 1575 and 1576; Girolamo Serra, one of the founders of the famous Ravaschieri bank that collapsed in Naples in 1573, was in Genoa at the beginning of the next decade, where he began his political rise in the Republic’s institutions and his involvement in the negotiations for the Flemish contracts or asientos de dineros.

This tendency to make a temporary withdrawal or retirement from Naples can also be found in the biographies of a number of members of the De Mari family in the 1570s and 1580s. This confirms the idea that two separate factors were vital in the establishment of commercial networks: first, the basic circumstances in the very heart of a family group; second, the specific circumstances in the place of destination that might either promote or prejudice the interests of the foreign commercial communities settled in it. In Genoa the Leges Novae approved in 1576 gave rise to a new institutional order that brought an end to the civil conflicts of 1575 and suppressed the alberghi, thus allowing the emergence of a new political panorama. The new institutional arrangement in Genoa succeeded in removing the undercurrent of violence and conflict. Instead the vecchi and nuovi now took it in turns to discharge the leading offices of the Republic. In Naples from the 1580s the authorities attempted to take control of the finances of the city. This initiative was based on the consolidation of a system of public banks that ended up absorbing the functions of the Genoese private banks, which had been badly hit by the various bankruptcies caused by the unstable economic circumstances of the Mediterranean area of this time.

A number of Genoese families temporarily abandoned Naples during the 1570s and 1580s, although some of the businesses they left behind them were not established on the firmest footing. The De Maris, for example, continued to count upon a number of active members in the peripheral regions of Naples, and their high level of involvement in the society of the Mezzogiorno was demonstrated by the breadth of their activities and interests: the number of incomes and rents that they collected; their role as asentistas de dineros (lenders, currency exchangers and financiers arranging money transfers across political borders) and asentistas de galeras (galley contractors) for the Catholic monarch; their matrimonial alliances with families active in the Naples banking world and with scions of the Genoese nobility; their investment in land and in feudal dues in the kingdom and their purchase of governmental offices. During these years, the role and level of integration of the Serras in the Kingdom of Naples was very different to that of the De Maris. Although Gio. Battista Serra acted as a representative of his brother Girolamo in a number of business deals with the viceroy, the involvement of the Serras was predominantly based in the asientos signed in Genoa and generally directed towards Antwerp after the capture of that city by Alejandro Farnese in 1585. This situation would remain largely unchanged until the end of the 1590s and the first years of the seventeenth century: hereafter a fundamental change occurred in the strategy of the Serra family in Naples and, indeed, in the workings of the Spanish imperial system.

The Serras made considerable efforts to extend their influence and interests in the Kingdom of Naples from the end of sixteenth century and above all in the first three decades of the seventeenth century: in this they reacted to the changed international panorama and to the economic and political evolution of what has often been termed, not entirely appropriately, the Spanish ‘peripheries’.

The interpretations that postulate the peripheral nature of the Kingdom of Naples have emphasised that the viceroyalty lost its pre-eminence within the imperial system during the reign of Philip II. According to this line of argument, the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis
and the war in the Low Countries shifted the focus of Spanish policies towards Northern Europe. At the end of the sixteenth century a number of factors dramatically increased the number of northern ships in the Mediterranean: a run of bad harvests; the undermining of Venetian influence in the Levant; the relative cheapness and ease of hiring in Italy; and the advantages offered by ports such as Livorno to foreign merchants. This transformation was to bring about long-term consequences and has been considered as one of the reasons for the Mezzogiorno assuming a semi-colonial role in the following centuries. These factors, linked to the economic penury of Castile from the end of the sixteenth century, have been taken to explain how and why the Mezzogiorno became a mere subsystem within the Spanish Monarchy: its contribution henceforth would be a fundamentally fiscal one – or so, at least, the traditional viewpoint holds.

One of the problems of this hypothesis is that it does not take into account the prominent role of a new generation of Genoese businessmen active from the end of the sixteenth century, amongst whose number Ottavio Serra belonged. These investors were attracted by the possibilities and potential of the territory and its important functions within the Spanish Monarchy. As time would show, they certainly knew how to make their fortune and to find, obtain and retain a privileged position in the imperial strategy for themselves, their families and business partners. The traditional interpretation also fails to take into consideration the predominant role played by Naples in the production and distribution of grain during a period of general shortage throughout the Mediterranean (a situation that began in the last years of the sixteenth century); furthermore the argument for abandonment or marginalisation also overlooks the role played by Neapolitan public banks and businessmen in the funding of Spanish foreign policy in the seventeenth century – a phenomenon which resulted in Naples being closely connected with the most important exchange fairs and commercial harbours in both northern and southern Italy. Nor does it take into account the men and monies contributed by the kingdom and which served to maintain the armies serving His Catholic Majesty and the galley squadron of the kingdom. Moreover, the role played by Naples in supplying the financial resources necessary to maintain the Spanish Embassy in Rome is also too often forgotten or overlooked. The fact that the ambassador in Rome was generally appointed viceroy in Naples after the conclusion of his diplomatic mandate – a sort of diplomatic cursus honorum – is indeed illustrative of the importance of the monetary support provided to the ambassador. The Spanish Embassy in Rome depended on Neapolitan monies to such a degree that if the remittances from the viceroyalty fell short of expectations, the diplomatic mission was placed under severe strain. Furthermore, it is important to point out that Naples exhibited a remarkable vitality in regards to serving as a source of royal patronage, while still contributing to the defence and control of the Mediterranean by providing resources for the Tuscan coastal fortresses (the presidios) and the war against the Ottoman Turks. All these considerations indicate that, if the role of the Mezzogiorno had been modified, it remained a crucial part of the working of the Spanish imperial system. It is, therefore, profoundly inappropriate to regard it as a mere appendix of court policy.

The multifaceted conflicts that washed over Europe in 1618 turned Naples into one of the most important centres for Spanish logistics and an essential instrument for the maintenance of military campaigns in the North. Even if this new role exacerbated the crisis which had been affecting the Mezzogiorno since the sixteenth century, it also provided a stimulus for the development of new areas of investment – and, therefore, new business opportunities
– for merchants and bankers such as the Serra family. From the early seventeenth century systematic attempts were made to reform the financial system of Naples; these initiatives gained pace in the mid-1620s, in line with the reformist programme brought to the Spanish government by the Count Duke of Olivares. These new policies prove how important the resources from the viceroyalty were for the working of the Spanish Monarchy: indeed it became an essential platform, supplying other areas that were threatened or under attack.

The demands made of the Kingdom of Naples turned a number of businessmen into crucial agents and players within the Crown's foreign policy and financial system: this was especially true for those individuals who enjoyed connections with the other major commercial and financial centres of the Monarchy. This pattern is clearly illustrated by the growing responsibilities assumed by the Genoese in Neapolitan public finances. According to Musi, these responsibilities took different forms: as tax-farmers; as guarantors of the financial channels between Naples and Milan, Vienna and Madrid; as managers of the financial system of the viceroyalty, through which most of the revenue was transferred; and, finally, by discharging offices in the internal and external administration of the kingdom.

Neapolitan bankers and their agents not only transferred monies to Milan, Vienna and Madrid. They also arranged for payments to cities less loyal to the His Catholic Majesty such as Venice, which became fundamental for the transfer of funds to the Empire or for the movement of primary materials to the East. In the 1620s, the system for the movement of contributions from the Mezzogiorno was worked out through negotiations between the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa and the agents of the Republic in Naples. The connections between Genoa and Naples and the exchange fairs, which were crucial to guaranteeing the delivery of the funds, and Flanders, where a good deal of the money was directed, were also essential in this regard. What happened was that the precarious situation of Flanders meant that consignments of money initially dispatched to support the Emperor had to be redirected to the Low Countries. Thus, to give one example, in a letter of 2 July 1620 Gracián de Albizu, secretary to the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa, wrote to inform the secretary of the Council of State in Madrid, Antonio de Aróstegui, that 300,000 ducats obtained in Naples by Cardinal Zapata, the viceroy, had been redirected to Flanders, ‘because of the need and hurry that is there being given.

For the transfer of another consignment of money from Naples – in this case 100,000 ducats – the Spanish Ambassador of the Republic of Genoa sought the services of Andrea Spinola. A portion of this consignment (35,804 escudos, 13 sueldos and four dineros) had to be sent to Flanders: the ambassador made use of Battista Serra, whose services Andrea Spinola had guaranteed. According to the secretary, Gracián de Albizu:

For each escudo of 57 placas that is delivered [by Battista] in Flanders I [the secretary Gracián de Albizu] must give him 92 sueldos and 10 dineros and a half of the said currency; and so they assure me [and] Andrea Spinola (whose counsel I’ve followed in this matter, as in many others) says that this transaction has proven advantageous for His Majesty and that he was surprised [by the generosity of this figure] because some others who also have a banking house here refused to go lower than 94 sueldos and a half, and they walked out of the meeting and refused to discuss any more of it.

This quote illustrates Battista Serra’s ability to provide money from the partito (loan) set in Naples at competitive prices, something which made the Genoese merchant an effective cog in the Spanish wheel. This was demonstrated in another letter, dated 6 October 1620, in which Gracián de Albizu informed Aróstegui that Serra had outbid the bankers Gio. Paolo Costa and Francesco Riverola, who had been negotiating with the Duke of Feria in Milan.
For the delivery of the 35,804 escudos, 13 sueldos and four dineros remaining from the aforementioned 100,000 ducats, Battista approached the Genoese ‘Lazaro, Benedetto e Andrea Pichinotti’ company in Antwerp, and set up a polizza (payment order) marked with the signature of Genoa-based Genesio Sanguineto, who at the time was Battista Serra’s partner in operations involving payments in Antwerp. In a letter dated 16 August 1620 from Gracián de Albizu to Aróstegui

[Sanguineto] is the same person who provided the 347,166 ducats in Naples that I think you are referring to, and most of the Serra’s business is in the head of this Sanguineto, and since the payment orders are being carried through, it makes little difference who signs the paper.45

These examples illustrate not only the crucial role played by the Genoese in the delivery of exchange bills for the funding of the Catholic Monarchy’s wars, but also the Neapolitan provenance of the capital being distributed. In return for letters of exchange signed by the Genoese in Naples, the viceroy conceded them rents set on both direct and indirect taxes in the kingdom. Here, once again, the Genoese proved to be essential, as they assumed responsibility for the collection of these taxes. This co-operation between Genoa and Naples in supplying war financing was predicated upon the presence in the kingdom of agents who had the capacity to negotiate loans with the viceroy and were also able to issue payment orders to the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa, transactions that the Genoese later redirected to their final destination.46

The documentation found in the notarial section of the Archivio di Stato di Napoli and the Archivio Storico Banco di Napoli confirms the presence of Ottavio Serra de Gio. Battista (Battista q Antonio’s cousin) in the Genoese community in Naples from the early years of the seventeenth century. In the 1610s and 1620s, the involvement of these Genoese in the economic structure of the kingdom became increasingly important. They served the needs of a wide network of partners, relatives and agents and as one of the links in the financial chain that revolved around centres such as Genoa, Milan, Venice and Antwerp.

The case study of Ottavio Serra offers an insight into the close dependency that existed between the different economic and political centres, both inside and outside the Hispanic Monarchy. Logistics and the correct operation of the system depended upon the co-ordination of these enclaves or centres, tied by commercial and economic networks. In the working of this mechanism, the component units possessed equal importance to the connectors that bound them together. In other words, the essential element in the system was the capacity of the cities, fiefs, ports, and so on, to attract the commercial and financial elites that played a number of crucial roles: they contributed to making the most efficient use of available resources; they advanced technological innovation; they linked centres with distant merchants. These skills and activities were fundamental not just to maintaining the city and preserving its (many) privileges, but also – and more fundamentally – to the survival of the Spanish Monarchy itself.47 From these parameters we can appreciate how Naples provided the conditions necessary for the establishment and rise of the Genoese upon whom the entire fiscal system came to depend. Indeed, their role in the provision of grain and precious metals, and even the defence of the coastlines, was also extremely prominent. At times the actions of the Genoese in Naples, as administrators or as lenders to the viceroyalty court, facilitated the completion of contracts which the Crown had signed in distant realms.48 A monarchy consisting of territories separated by considerable distances, and characterised by different jurisdictional frameworks and influential local oligarchies, was very different indeed from the paradigm of the absolutist and centralised state.49 Above all its form of
government and financing depended enormously on its skill in co-opting economic and political elites, negotiating with urban oligarchies or resolving conflicts without recurring to violence or coercion. Evidence of this last skill, and of the tight relationship between the cities and the merchant and financial elites, can be found in some of the suspensions of payments by the Catholic King. As Álvarez Nogal and Chamley have underlined, the bankruptcy of Philip II in 1575 decreed against the Genoese financiers allowed him to take advantage of the profound ties established between the foreign bankers and the cities of Castile: the bankruptcy declared by the Crown was not due to a supposed lack of liquidity, but by the need to persuade the cities with a vote in the Cortes that they should accept higher encabezamientos (fixed quantities to be collected in a city during a specified period of time) on which juros (bonds of public debt) could be established which would attract new loans from the bankers. The nefarious consequences that the suspension of payments had on the trade fairs and the commerce of Castile, which were heavily dependent upon the economic activities of the financiers, compelled them to ask the king for an urgent adjustment with his bankers so that they in turn could pay their creditors.  

Overall a number of features – the leading role of the cities; the high degree of urban autonomy; the importance of the transnational networks of businessmen in the smooth working of the system – underline the validity of the recent line of thinking that postulates that the old paradigm of a centralised state is inadequate. Rather than seeing the Spanish Monarchy as a composite monarchy dominated by the logic between the centre and periphery and in which royal patronage was the decisive factor in negotiations with local elites, it might be understood as a complex polycentric system.

The study of the international network of Ottavio Serra is extremely useful to highlight some of the arguments referred to in the previous paragraphs, first of all, the important role assumed by the Kingdom of Naples in the seventeenth-century international panorama. Indeed, Ottavio’s varied businesses were indicative of the Neapolitan economic dynamism, a dynamism that responded to the strong demand for resources from the main financial, commercial and military centers which were involved in a new escalation of war. Second, the case study analysed demonstrates the relevant functions assumed by a new rank of Genoese merchants, who managed to replace the ‘old’ generation of bankers by means of a virtuous combination of commercial and financial activities. By observing how these intermediaries kept making their fortunes in Naples and efficiently allocated their capital where it was required, this article also intends to emphasise the capacity of the Neapolitan kingdom to remain an attractive context to merchant communities in a period that some scholars have considered as the beginning of its decadence.

**The heterogeneous nature of the Genoese community in Naples: Ottavio Serra as a ‘hinge’ between the Ligurian colony, the Viceroy and the Republic**

In the course of the later sixteenth century the Genoese faced a new, and inauspicious, situation. This new panorama led many Genoese businessmen to abandon their activities; but it also served as a springboard for those among them who were in a position to turn the new conditions to their advantage.

Ottavio Serra (1570–1639), son of Gio. Battista q Paolo, is a clear example of a new generation of bankers that came to fill the void left by the bankruptcy of a large number of private agents in the late sixteenth century. Having been active in the Kingdom of Naples
from at least the 1590s, his activities developed at the same time of those of his cousin Battista q Antonio, with whom he collaborated closely. Battista q Antonio acquired a privileged position in the Spanish court, especially after his inclusion in the 1598 Medio General.\textsuperscript{53} This demonstrated how the network was established as a factor in the success of both the group and the individuals who formed it.\textsuperscript{54}

Ottavio's activities as a merchant and a currency converter, together with his motley network of contacts both within and outside the viceroyalty, perfectly illustrate the high degree of internationalisation that characterised the economic life of Naples, as well as the important role played by the kingdom in this family business and, indeed, in the achievement of the crown's foreign-policy ambitions. The international impact and range of Ottavio Serra's activities, therefore, offer a perfect opportunity to analyse the operation of a decentralised business network that spanned a variety of jurisdictional environments and thus to transcend the excessively local perspective that has hitherto dominated the study of the Genoese community in Naples.\textsuperscript{55}

The rise to prominence of Ottavio Serra ran parallel to the increasing ‘oligarchisation’ of the Ligurian colony in Naples, a process which, in Brancaccio's words, ‘tende a consolidare l’impronta aristocratica della leadership e a legare organicamente il governo dell’istituto consolare alle famiglie della nobiltà, soprattutto quella vecchia’\textsuperscript{56}, and so roused the protests of those Genoese who were being excluded from its influential circles. This process also affected the Republic of Genoa itself and had an effect upon some of the most active and sizeable Genoese communities abroad, for example those in Seville and Antwerp.\textsuperscript{57} This phenomenon forms the basis of the institution of the Neapolitan ‘seggi’ in the early seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{58}

The lack of unity within the Genoese community in Naples did not prevent certain individuals from enjoying the support and friendship of many of their countrymen. Cornelio Spinola, for instance, discharged the office of consul between 1618 and 1649 (albeit with some interruptions) clearly commanded the respect of many of his fellow Genoese.\textsuperscript{59} Cornelio Spinola's rising influence, however, was not to everyone's taste.\textsuperscript{60} The fact that the Viceroy and the Genoese colony could look to community leaders rather than the formally appointed officials forced the Republic to rely on them to facilitate negotiations with the viceroy and to promote unity within the Genoese colony.

In this context Ottavio Serra appeared in the early seventeenth century as one of the discordant voices within the Genoese community. He emerged as the clearest representative of the new arrivals who were starting to acquire greater visibility in the economy of the kingdom. In fact, in 1609 Ottavio formed part of a clique of Genoese who, on their own initiative, made a complaint against the consul, Tommaso Pinello. The matter in hand was the distribution of the costs derived from a factoría, a payment by the viceroy to the Genoese Ottavio Pavese and Bonifacio Nasello for the importation of silver into the Kingdom of Naples. Among the members of this group were Francesco Squarciafico, Gio. Ambrogio Casella and Antonio de Spinola, all of whom would subsequently become key partners of Serra.\textsuperscript{61} This episode offers a very novel insight into the consulate: while constituting an institution founded to protect the interests of a foreign community, it could become a destabilising factor in the equilibrium of the nation. This was especially the case if it was unable to neutralise the onslaught of those ambitious sectors that competed with each other to ensure the best business conditions and prospects of social advancement for their members.
Precisely because of his regular relations with the viceroy and by the breadth of his business interests in the *Mezzogiorno*, Ottavio Serra became one of the most visible leaders of the Ligurian community in Naples. Semi-official recognition of his role by the government of the Republic of Genoa allowed him to moderate the everyday conflicts that arose within the consulate. It should not be forgotten that Ottavio was born in the kingdom and his acquisition of citizenship in 1605 turned him into a Napolitano to all extents and purposes.62 His status clearly favoured his role as an intermediary in negotiations between the nation and the viceroyalty administration. These circumstances explain why, if Cornelius Spinola held the official post of consul of the Republic from 3 August 1618, several letters sent to him (Spinola) immediately after this date by the Genoese government were simultaneously addressed to Serra.63 The collaboration of Serra and Cornelio Spinola was not confined to the role of mediation and representation on behalf of the Republic, but was also manifested in the economic realm through their joint signing of *asientos* with the viceroy.64

It would seem, therefore, that Serra enjoyed the goodwill of both the Republic and the viceroy. A memorandum (dated 29 January 1619) prepared by several Genoese residents in Naples and addressed to the government of the Republic explained that the Duke of Osuna, on seeing that there were a number of pending issues and that no news regarding the appointment of a new Genoese consul was forthcoming, ‘called upon the first two members of the Genoese nation that he found in the palace’ to assume responsibility for the consulate; the two Genoese whom he summoned were Cornelio Spinola and Ottavio Serra.65

The year 1618 was a particularly critical year because of the outbreak of war in the Holy Roman Empire, as a result of which Ottavio Serra’s financial services to the viceroy became more necessary than ever; this is somewhat striking66 because Osuna’s policies had very negative consequences for the economy of the kingdom and especially for the Genoese expatriates. The hostile attitude of the Neapolitan government towards the Genoese did not seem to deter Ottavio Serra, who carried on offering his services even when his co-nationals were proving to be very reluctant to do so.67 Proof that this type of complex commercial web formed around a nation did not always act as a coherent unit, and of how the mere fact of having a common origin did not mean that all of the operatives adhered to the interests of the group, is not difficult to find. Collusion between Serra and Osuna was suggested by Colapietra, who did not hesitate to qualify the former as ‘quite distant from his countrymen’.68

Osuna’s policy not only damaged the support base of the previous viceroy, the Count of Lemos, but also prejudiced the general interests of the foreign commercial communities in the kingdom. In fact Osuna’s measures paralysed commerce and undermined the economic reforms carried out by Lemos69; these initiatives set the government’s focus on the Genoese, whom Osuna accused of being the cause of the precarious state of the kingdom’s economy, and whose rents and capital he seized in the universal confiscation published in 1618. The overall motivation for this measure can be traced back to the War of the Monferrato, during which the enemies of Spain, including Venice, had no doubt in raising funds for the Duke of Savoy. To meet its costs Venice issued highly lucrative debt bonds, and many Genoese bought them, thus incurring the wrath of the Spanish ministers, who accused the Genoese of funding the enemy. Pressure from the court and Naples’ financial dependence on the Genoese – exacerbated by the beginning of the war in the Empire – forced Osuna to withdraw the measure a year later.70
In this context, the increasingly close co-operation between Ottavio Serra and the vice-royalty court from 1618 can plausibly be seen as a response to Osuna’s need for an agent who was capable of accessing the irreplaceable Genoese capital without having to make use of the circles of financiers who had made their fortunes under his predecessor, Lemos. Similarly, Ottavio’s prominent position in the kingdom was favoured by Genoa’s need for intermediaries who could serve as informal but well-connected agents in the Mezzogiorno; these kinds of diplomatic ‘hinges’ were frequently essential to reconcile the often divergent interests of the Republic, the consul, the main Genoese families (in Naples and elsewhere) and the viceroy.

The Serras’ network in the Kingdom of Naples: private interests, royal service and involvement in the family business

The early career of Ottavio Serra in Naples: origins, activities and contacts

Although the relationship between the Serra family and the Mezzogiorno went back to at least the period 1560–80 (see the activities of the brothers Antonio, Gio. Battista and Girolamo) Ottavio Serra’s activities began to be registered in official documentation at the end of the sixteenth century and the first years of the following century. He settled in Naples not only as a member of an international financial-commercial network, but also as an autonomous merchant in his own right. This status offered him access to the Neapolitan economic and financial structures, which in turn meant that he was better able to assist the operation of other family members in southern Italy.

The proof provided by Gio. Battista Serra, Ottavio’s son, to gain admittance to the Order of Santiago, offers a splendid insight into Ottavio’s career and his ability to integrate into Neapolitan society. The Order was carried out thorough investigations of the applicants’ backgrounds, and for this reason Gio. Battista’s file is more informative about his father than about Gio. Battista himself. According to some of the witnesses summoned to assist in the process, Ottavio was born in Naples as a result of his father’s (Gio. Battista q Paolo) illicit liaison with Camilla Cagnone (or Cannone), from Naples.

His cousin, Battista Serra q Antonio, who also served as a witness in the aforementioned process (carried out in Genoa in 1631), claimed that Ottavio was born in Naples around 1567 or 1568, when his father Gio. Battista q Paolo was staying in the city. At any rate, before settling in Naples for good, Ottavio spent several years in Genoa, where he gained experience in business with his uncle, Girolamo q Paolo. Girolamo clearly played an essential role in the education of his nephews, a role that he had previously overseen for the children of his brother Antonio (amongst whose sons featured Battista, mentioned above) after his sibling’s premature death.

According to the testimony of Nicolás Pelaço, Ottavio’s departure for Naples must have been prompted by his lack of means at the time. In this, he imitated his father and his uncles Girolamo and Antonio (who parted from Genoa in the last two decades of the sixteenth century), a pattern of action which clearly illustrates that the Genoese regarded the Mezzogiorno as an ideal field for early business activities and social advancement.

By the 1620s, Ottavio was a prominent merchant and currency exchanger in the kingdom, but several testimonies from Genoa reveal that before entering this business he practised other trades which were not at all connected with finance. On 27 July 1627, for instance,
Conrado Grimaldi stated that Ottavio had been at the service of the Lomellini family in Tabarca, probably as a soldier, which is hardly surprising given the island's strategic position, the lucrative trade in coral based in it or the tight relationships between the Lomellini and Serra.78 This situation, as set out in the work of Trivellato, enables us to assess the relevance of the study of biographies of figures who achieved a transnational impact such as Ottavio Serra: cases such as this one are of enormous value for the purposes of historical reconstruction and the delimitation of a common space whose analysis would be difficult to achieve in other ways.79

This sort of trade was not particularly highly regarded by the interviewers: it was considered ‘vile’ and undignified by the Order of Santiago. The analysis of the records of Ottavio Serra’s bank account, as well as those of the company he co-owned with Antonio Spinola, reveals some of his commercial activities in the sale of consumer goods, such as wine, cold meats or tuna preserves (tonnine).80 These are not mentioned in his son’s file, but they confirm the witnesses’ account regarding the participation of the applicant's father in non-genteel activities. If this were not enough to scandalise the interviewers, several witnesses in Genoa claimed that Ottavio had practised other trades in Naples, such as ‘attorney in lawsuits’ and ‘rent collector’ on behalf of others.81 In fact, according to the witnesses, Ottavio was still practising these activities at the time of this investigation of his son's background. For example, on 29 April 1631, Gio. Battista Bacigalupe claimed that Ottavio was at the time in charge of the business of the Centurione and Gio. Stefano Doria.82 All of these occupations demonstrate the crucial role exercised by this type of agent and the need to study such figures from an interdisciplinary perspective.83 It is common in studies of agents to emphasise the common heritage or shared origins – be they national, familial or religious – that bound them to the patron or employer whom they served and represented. However, the function of agent as a connector between two legal, institutional and fiscal realities usually passes unnoticed. That is to say, there is a tendency to overlook his capacity to disseminate new ideas, to allow different cultural spaces to communicate and understand one another and, in certain circumstances, to arrange for specific forms of jurisdiction that favoured the interests of his partners, patrons and clients.84

Ottavio Serra’s activities on behalf of other financial and mercantile companies, amongst whose number were some of the most powerful in the kingdom, and the Neapolitan aristocracy were essential to his social ascent. In this regard, his contacts with his cousin Battista q Antonio, an influential figure, were particularly significant. This was especially true in the period between 1607 (Philip III’s bankruptcy occurred in November of this year) and 1617, when Battista q Antonio played a pre-eminent role in the financial structure of the court in Madrid. During this period the amount that the Catholic Monarch owed Battista, who was acting as Ambrogio Spinola’s agent and the King’s right hand in the Low Countries, amounted to 27.6% of the king’s total debt, making Battista the second largest creditor of the crown. In addition, Battista was also the fifth largest creditor in his own right, with 4.9% of the total debt being owed to him. His uncle Girolamo Serra was in 11th position, with barely 0.1% of the total debt. This illustrates that a process of generational substitution, which was already under way after Battista Serra took a leading role in the negotiations for the Medio General in 1598, was fully consolidated by 1607.85 The king’s commitment to Battista Serra and his financial services explains the choice of Battista as one of the four Genoese appointed to direct the Diputación del Medio General, which was created in Madrid in 1608 in order to restore the royal patrimony (Real Hacienda) and to manage the Crown’s heavy
financial burdens.\textsuperscript{86} Once again it is clear that events occurring in certain locations shaped the unfolding of networks belonging to a specific group and the rise of one or two of its members in the geographical spaces in which they operated. In the same way that the rising importance of Antwerp from 1580 may have been an influence in the return of Girolamo Serra to Genoa, where he obtained an important position as an asentista dedineria, so the considerable prominence of Battista Serra in Madrid in the early 1600s revitalised the role of the Mezzogiorno in the family business and, with it, of the young Ottavio Serra.

Battista's prominent position at court turned Ottavio into an extremely well-placed intermediary for the Neapolitan nobility, who used his services to advance their businesses in Castile. In return for Battista’s interventions in Madrid, Ottavio made payments at the Piacenza fairs to the accountant of the ‘Serra-Pallavicino’ company (co-owned by his cousins Battista and Paolo Serra & Antonio, with Nicolò Pallavicino also a partner) or other agents appointed by Battista. Thus taking advantage of the mediation of Battista Serra & Antonio in Madrid, Ottavio Serra and his partner Antonio Spinola carried out numerous services on behalf of the aristocracy of the Mezzogiorno: for example, they oversaw the purchase of noble titles and succession duties and, more prosaically, the management of their privileges before the court.\textsuperscript{87}

The important mercantile and financial activities of Ottavio Serra in Naples, and the prestige of his network in conducting financial transactions, made him the go-to person in the Madrid court for related matters between 1607 and 1617. This was true not only for the barons, but also for merchants, court officials and viceroyalty councillors.\textsuperscript{88} His intermediate role was not adversely affected by Battista Serra’s departure from Madrid between 1617 and 1618 because the family was still exceptionally well placed at court due to the presence of Francesco de Gio. Pietro Serra, Ottavio’s cousin and Battista’s successor in Spain.\textsuperscript{89}

In order to operate in Naples, however, Ottavio needed more than good contacts in some of the most important centres of the monarchy. The need to gain clients without incurring too much risk meant that Ottavio’s initial period in the Mezzogiorno (from 1604, if not earlier) was undertaken in the service of a Naples-based company founded by Francesco Squarciafi co and Quilico Spinola.\textsuperscript{90} By 1607 at the latest\textsuperscript{91} Ottavio had established a partnership with Antonio Spinola, who later became Genoa’s consul from around July 1614.\textsuperscript{92} Their partnership appears to have declined from 1616, as after this date Ottavio Serra started to feature as an individual in the records. The period of most intense co-operation between Serra and Spinola was between 1607 and 1616, when Battista Serra was among the four Genoese sitting in the aforementioned Diputación del Medio General, established in Madrid in 1608. Battista’s prominent position clearly favoured the commercial and financial activities of the ‘Antonio Spinola e Ottavio Serra’ company in the Kingdom of Naples.

Ottavio Serra’s aforementioned co-operation with the ‘Squarciafi co-Spinola’ company was similarly nuanced. The members of this group not only belonged to two of the most important Genoese aristocratic families active in the Mezzogiorno, where they started operating from at least the second half of the sixteenth century\textsuperscript{93}, but they were also in charge of the management of many of the Serra family’s interests in Naples. The analysis of the account that the company possessed in the Spirito Santo bank reveals the links between Quilico Spinola and the Genoese Agostino Belmosto, who were both brothers-in-law and business partners.\textsuperscript{94} The brothers Antonio and Agostino Belmosto had established a close relationship with Girolamo Serra as early as the early seventeenth century, as well as with the Ravaschieri, another Genoese family with whom Girolamo had transacted business in Naples in the
The connection between Serra and Belmosto was not confined to business, as is shown by the fact that Girolamo stood as guarantor for Maddalena Belmosto’s (sister of Antonio y Agostino) 6000-lire dowry. Moreover the Serra family and the ‘Squarciafigo-Spinola’ company shared more than partners: Francesco Squarciafigo and Quilico Spinola carried out economic services in Naples for Girolamo Serra and the company co-owned by Battista and Paolo Serra and Nicolò Pallavicino. These services included the collection of rents and the payment of exchange bills from Piacenza, Madrid and Valladolid.

The rapid social rise of Ottavio Serra elicited some surprise on account of his humble origins and the modest activities of his early career. Lucio Monella, one of the witnesses questioned during the investigation into his son’s background, attested on 17 July 1631 that Ottavio Serra ‘had left Genoa a very poor man, and is now very wealthy’. According to other testimonies, at the time of the investigation Ottavio owned his own trading house, carriage and servants.

Although his son’s ennoblement as Prince of Carovigno did not take place until 1625, Ottavio’s financial records (preserved in some of the principal banks of the city) as well as those of the ‘Spinola-Serra’ company, demonstrate his proclivity to purchase and consume luxury products, doubtless a manifestation of his desire to demonstrate his high social status. For example, on 23 August 1612, Antonio Spinola and Ottavio paid 104 ducats for an eight-year-old slave called Cristina. There is little doubt that the active involvement of Ottavio Serra and Antonio Spinola in the consumption and distribution of this kind of ‘product’ strengthened the links between the company and the Neapolitan aristocracy, which they supplied with all manner of luxury items, including banisters and furniture made of high-status materials.

The co-operation between Serra and Antonio Spinola also extended to some of the most lucrative economic sectors in the Mezzogiorno, such as naval insurance and the textile trade. Serra’s experience in the latter sector went back to his work under Francesco Squarciafigo and Quilico Spinola, who were engaged in the trade of woven silk textiles, damasks, taffeta and velvet, and many other activities. These were highly profitable lines of business which encouraged Serra to expand his operations beyond the commercialisation of woven cloth. A payment made by Giovan Geronimo Magliolo to Giovan Domenico Aucello on 13 July 1612 for a green damask ‘dell’opera di Serra’ seems to indicate that Serra had begun a manufacturing business.

His involvement with the textile trade was, therefore, neither occasional nor limited to the Neapolitan sphere: on 3 October 1611, the ‘Spinola-Serra’ company paid 82.2.10 ducats to Francesco Antonio Lasso in exchange for 15 canne of crimson damask for Cardinal Giacomo Serra, Ottavio’s cousin in Rome. In addition, Nicolini’s examination of the giornali of the Banco de Pietà, in Naples, has revealed some payments that were made by Serra and Spinola for the purchase of ‘canne di teletta’ and velvet. Records for embroidery and bleaching work performed on their behalf during 1612 can also be found. All this evidence confirms the relationship of both Genoese merchants with the Neapolitan silk industry and the commercialisation of the manufactured products. These facts allow us to underline the role of Naples as a manufacturing centre and not simply as a provider of primary material to the cities of the north such as Genoa, Venice, Lucca, Milan, Rome or Bologna. This is not to say that the value of the exports of primary materials from the Mezzogiorno should be underestimated: this was a genuine powerhouse for the pre-capitalist economies of the North and an incentive to the configuration of the network of Italian cities. But this phenomenon underlines the contribution of foreign
businessmen to the productive sector of Naples and not simply the commercialisation of its primary materials or manufactured goods.  

‘Spinola and Serra’s activities in this sector also included less expensive and more popular textiles, such as wool and hemp, especially in the 1610s – paradoxically, a time of crisis for the wool industry.  The company’s entrance into the hemp sector can be linked to the expansion of this crop in the Kingdom of Naples (especially in the regions of Caserta and Secondigliano) and the value of this material for the manufacture of naval sails and rigging.  

Naples’ prominent role in the grain-distribution networks and its role in the defence of the Mediterranean probably explain Spinola and Serra’s interest in the manufacture of biscotto (biscuit) for the galleys, an activity which Girolamo Serra had previously pursued in the late sixteenth century. This also illustrates the crucial part played by merchants in the distribution of the nobility’s agricultural surplus. Biscuit was much cheaper in Naples than in Genoa, and demand was guaranteed because it was an essential staple for the king’s fleet: for these reasons it became a significant economic asset for the Mezzogiorno.  

The progressive slackening of the partnership between Ottavio Serra and Antonio Spinola – discernible, as noted above, from 1616 onwards – did not affect the former’s interest in the commercialisation of biscuit; as far as this product was concerned, Serra was the go-to person for the viceroyalty authorities and for the commander in chief of the king’s galleys, the Duke of Tursi (in fact Tursi and Serra ended up as relatives). Thus, in a letter addressed to the Duke of Osuna on 17 January 1618, Carlo Doria recommended that Serra be responsible for supplying the galleys. The accounts of the Spirito Santo bank reveal that the Doria Tursi were frequent clients of Ottavio Serra and his ‘Spinola-Serra’ company, at least between 1607 and 1612, as demonstrated by the contacts which they maintained with the Doria family agents in Naples, Ortensio Ruschi and Justice Alonso de Vargas.  

The ‘Spinola-Serra’ company and its services to the family  

Despite the importance of the ‘individual’ activities undertaken by Ottavio Serra and his partner Spinola, their success – the rise of their company in the Mezzogiorno; their considerable volume of business and wide-ranging involvement in the finances of the viceroyalty – cannot be understood without taking into account the assistance that they received from a number of relatives and clients based outside Naples. In turn Serra and Spinola subsequently provided innumerable economic services to these figures and indeed represented them and their interests in the kingdom. In evidence collected by the investigation into his son’s application for the habit of Santiago, Battista Raffo eloquently underlined that Ottavioran and managed businesses in Naples on behalf of others:  

… especially his relatives and friends, who used to place their affairs in his hands, and, as I understand things, he took a cut of every piece of business that he conducted, and that is how he got his own property and how he improved his own business.  

Ottavio started operating as his relatives’ and friends’ agent from an early stage. For example, as early as 1596 he was acting on behalf of his father, Gio. Battista, following the collapse of the ‘Calamazza et Pontecorvo’ bank. Similarly, Ottavio started representing his cousin Battista Serra and his partner Nicolò Pallavicino from at least 1606.  

An examination of Ottavio’s accounts from the Spirito Santo bank for the years 1604–7 and 1612 reveals the complex networks woven by the Genoese merchant
around his businesses and those of his family. Although the detailed analysis of his other bank accounts, and those of his company, has yet to be undertaken, we have enough information to sketch the degree of the Serra family’s penetration into the Mezzogiorno, the intensity of the interaction between different locations and regions, and Ottavio’s ability to make his presence felt in many niches of the economy, both within the Kingdom of Naples and outside it.

Concerning the last of these points, it is worth underlining that by the early seventeenth century Ottavio was well connected with the most important exchange fairs in Naples, especially those that took place in Monteleone\textsuperscript{120} (Calabria Ultra) and Cosenza\textsuperscript{121} (Calabria Citra), followed by Lecce\textsuperscript{122} (Terra di Otranto) and, to a lesser degree, Bari\textsuperscript{123} (Terra di Bari), Aquila\textsuperscript{124} (Abruzzo Ultra) and Barletta\textsuperscript{125} (Terra di Bari). The continued presence of these fairs in the economic operations that Ottavio Serra organised at an international level highlights a number of relevant issues and indicates the dynamism of the Neapolitan periphery, which was characterised by urban enclaves dominated by powerful oligarchies which obtained state privileges and exemptions for trade fairs or for the establishment of financial institutions in their territories.\textsuperscript{126} In this regard it is worthwhile highlighting the case of Antonino and Cesare Ferrao (father and son), bankers, feudatories and gentiluomini of Cosenza, with whom Ottavio maintained intensive contacts. In 1606 they obtained from the viceroy a licence to open a public bank in the city.\textsuperscript{127} The granting of this privilege should not be interpreted as a symptom of the institutional weakness or backwardness of the Naples state. As Lanaro has pointed out in reference to the privileges granted for the organisation of fairs by Venice to the cities of Brescia and Verona, the phenomenon must be understood in relation to the contractual power of the groups’ leaders who administered these spaces.\textsuperscript{128} The assignment in favour of the Ferrao was based upon the fact that ‘the said city of Cosenza [is the] capital of the province and of commerce, [and] where many different nations, businessmen and merchandise coincide’. That is to say, the authorities of the viceroyalty adopted measures to protect the activities of the businessmen of many nations who were operating in it.\textsuperscript{129}

There is no record of his involvement with the fairs of Aversa (Terra di Lavoro), Salerno (Principato Citra), Lanciano (Abruzzo Citra) and Lucera (Capitanata), which does not mean that Ottavio Serra and his partner Spinola had no connection with them. An exhaustive examination of the bank records in their entirety would be necessary to obtain more definitive conclusions on this matter. At any rate, the important role played by the Calabrian and Terra di Otranto fairs indicates that Ottavio Serra and his network were very active in these territories in the early seventeenth century, which was later confirmed by the purchase of the fiefs of Cassano (Calabria Citra) and Carovigno (Terra di Otranto).\textsuperscript{130} Indeed, some of the bills of exchange that were issued in Monteleone, Cosenza and Lecce and received by Ottavio Serra and Antonio Spinola in Naples concerned the payment of the rents corresponding to the properties which their relatives, partners, friends and clients owned in these regions.

In this regard, Ottavio Serra’s role was not merely to forward these rents by means of bills of exchange. He was also actively involved in purchasing and administering these rents, as shown by the entries in his bank accounts and his constant dealings with provincial percettori, the vice-royalty officials in charge of tax collection and the distribution of fiscali (incomes set on direct taxes of the kingdom).\textsuperscript{131} In this role, Ottavio Serra did not always operate as an independent agent, as demonstrated by his collaboration with the ‘Squarciafico-Spinola’ company, which, as we have seen, had also been entrusted with some of the Serra family businesses in Naples.\textsuperscript{132}
Although the records do not suggest that Ottavio was the final recipient of any of these rents during his first years in Naples, there is little doubt about his central role in the management of the family property portfolio, which included rents owned by his uncle Girolamo Serra\(^ {133}\), his uncle’s wife, Veronica Spinola, and Ottavio’s cousins, Battista, Francesco and Paolo Serra (sons of Antonio)\(^ {134}\); also mentioned were incomes belonging to Nicolò Pallavicino, another member of the ‘Serra-Pallavicino’ company.\(^ {135}\)

The interest of the Serras in the incomes of the Kingdom of Naples should not cause any surprise. In fact, the Ligurian community exercised an absolute control over the Neapolitan fiscal system, either as the owner of *fiscali* and *partite di arrendamento* (percentages levied on indirect taxes)\(^ {136}\) or as *percettori* (royal tax officials, an office discharged on a multitude of occasions by Genoese).\(^ {137}\) The sort of loans to the Catholic Monarch in which the Genoese were involved provided further incentives to their purchase of the fiscal incomes of the kingdom due to the use of the public debt of Naples as a guarantee of their *asientos de dineros*. At the same time, it should be remembered that the taxes on which these incomes fell were levied on commercial exchanges or the exploitation of certain resources: these were fields in which the Genoese were omnipresent, demonstrating – once again – the extreme dependence of the Spanish Monarchy upon this type of private agent. Furthermore this also provides considerable additional evidence as to the impossibility of the Spanish Monarchy being able to launch mercantilist policies.\(^ {138}\)

The list of incomes owned by the descendants of Girolamo Serra in the kingdom of Naples in the mid 1630s reveals that most were registered under the name of his wife, Veronica Spinola, and set down in the provinces in Terra di Lavoro, Principato Citra y Ultra, Terra di Otranto, Abruzzo Ultra and Calabria Ultra y Basilicata.\(^ {139}\) These properties were managed by Ottavio Serra on behalf of Veronica, a fact which, once more, confirms his irreplaceable role in the acquisition of these rents 15 years earlier, while also giving us an interesting insight into the role played by women in the diversification of the family assets.\(^ {140}\) This role was not that of mere recipients of rent, as demonstrated by the transaction executed by Ottavio Serra on behalf of Geronima Spinola in 1607. Here Geronima sold to her daughter – and Girolamo’s wife – Veronica Spinola a series of rents pertaining to real estate in Abruzzo Ultra and Calabria Citra, as well as other sources of revenue connected to the tax on silk and the customs dues (dogana) of Foggia.\(^ {141}\) It is important to point out that all these transactions were carried out with the formula of the *retrovendita* (a sale agreement which includes a repurchase clause for the benefit of the seller), which probably means that these are in fact concealed loans.

The practice of *retrovendita* or *retrovendendo* sales of rents to other members of the network was a way of circumventing anti-usury laws and also provides evidence of the important role played by the Neapolitan revenues (and the activities of Ottavio and the ‘Squarciafico-Spinola’ company) in the credit system of the family and the Spanish Monarchy. In this regard, we may highlight the intermediation of Squarciafico y Spinola in the financing of the ‘Serra-Pallavicino’ company through *retrovendendo* transactions involving the rents of this association in the Kingdom of Naples.\(^ {142}\)

These operations shed light on the nature of these financial networks, their connection with the trade fairs of northern Italy and the key role of Naples in providing equilibrium to the Spanish imperial system. There are many examples of concealed loans in 1606, which is hardly surprising considering the shortage of ready cash that hit the first fair of Piacenza in that year and led to its postponement until 8 February. The situation was the same for the
fairs of Pasqua (Easter), which had to be postponed until 6 May, and Agosto (August), when the Genoese financiers could not meet their obligations, despite the help of the Florentines. This type of manoeuvre had a fundamental function, not only for the financiers but also for the Spanish Monarchy between 1605 and 1606, which was engaged in a last great military effort with a view of negotiating a favourable truce with the United Provinces. The shortage of money was repeated in the Pasqua fair, which was in fact put back until 6 May, and in the Agosto gathering in which Genoese financiers were unable to meet their debts, even with the help of the Florentines.

Episodes of this sort demonstrate once again the value of the network in overcoming critical situations arising at strategic junctures, such as fairs, the negative consequences of which affected not only the family but also the services which the network carried out for the Spanish Monarchy in a number of different territories. Naples, along with other centres, was essential for the operation of the Spanish system, especially from the onset of the Thirty Years War. The generalised state of conflict that overcame the continent from 1618 onwards turned the Mezzogiorno into one of the key territories in the Spanish system in terms of logistics, as well as one of the basic tools for the maintenance of the war in the North. The Kingdom of Naples and its merchants and bankers, of whom Ottavio Serra was a prime example, provided a platform from which to deliver the funds ordered from Madrid, Milan and Genoa. The workings of this mechanism were clearly visible in the negotiations, mentioned above, between Genoese financiers and businessmen and the Spanish Ambassador in Genoa. 143

These businessmen and their intricate connections along the axis of the Spanish imperial system were of enormous importance to the oligarchies and nobility of Naples, who needed these economic elites for a number of purposes: the distribution of their surpluses; the advancement of their interests in the Court of Madrid; the acquisition of liquid capital; and access to the luxury goods that underpinned – and demonstrated – their status. In a panorama such as this, Madrid was far from acting as the unique centre of a system. Rather, it seems better to view the authority of the royal court as being moderated and balanced by a large number of agents operating from multiple centres. The essential themes set out in this article – the power and reach of the aristocracies and oligarchies; the influence and sway exercised by cities interconnected by motley networks of merchants and bankers, and inclined to jealously guard their privileges – present the picture of a crucible of jurisdictions that prevented the application of a one dimensional ‘national policy’. The problem of the Spanish imperial system did not originate in its ‘patrimonial component’, but in its contractual nature, something which, as Regina Grafe has successfully shown, forced the Monarchy to face ‘problems that were more similar to those that afflicted the Dutch Republic’. 144 The republican and dynastic models, which have often been assumed to be entirely different and antagonistic, in fact bear striking resemblances. 145 The analysis of the type of financial and commercial networks such as the one formed by Ottavio Serra presents us with a picture of a polycentric political reality consisting of a variety of interconnected units that were not only interacting with the King but also between themselves – sometimes, indeed, paying only marginal attention to the orders passed down from the court in Madrid and heavily influencing the decision-making process.

In conclusion, this case study stressed the ability of a new generation of Genoese for acting as a hinge between very different political, economic and legal frameworks by developing financial, fiscal, commercial and manufacturing activities in seventeenth-century
Naples and outside its confines. This new wave of intermediaries, which emerged at the beginning of the seventeenth century after the collapse of the great families of Genoese bankers, was not in Naples only to acquire some experience in business or to enjoy feudal rents. In an international context characterised by the urgency of an imminent war, their economic and relational capital proved essential to the military, logistic and fiscal needs of the Monarchy. The analysis of Ottavio Serra’s network demonstrates not only the dynamism of the Mezzogiorno during the period of its supposed decline but also the persisting importance of the realm of Naples and of the Genoese businessmen for the functioning of the Hispanic Habsburg empire.

Note on contributor

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Notes

1. A definition of the term “diaspora” can be found in Curtin, “Trade Diasporas;” Cohen, “Cultural Strategies.” On the use of network analysis for the historical study of merchant groups see Crespo Solana, Spatio-Temporal Narratives.
2. Trivellato has referred to this alternative approach as “microstorie con proiezione globale”: Trivellato, “Microstoria storia mondo,” 125–8. On the implicit need to examine in detail the primary sources in network analysis see Moutoukias, “Narración y análisis,” 224.
3. As shown by Imízcoz, who argues for a true “social construction of the State” on the basis of his analysis of the interaction between the social trajectories of members of the low and middle aristocracy from the north of the peninsula and the administrative and financial institutions in the Madrid court in the eighteenth century. Imízcoz Beunza, “Elites administrativas, redes cortesanas,” 12.
4. On the use of private (family, partners) and institutional (consulates, contacts in government offices) resources by merchants see Grafe, “On the Spatial Nature;” Grafe and Gelderblom, “Rise and Fall.”
5. Grendi points to this diaspora as one cause of the diminishing size of the Genoese nobility, and as one of the contributing factors in the growth of European notions of aristocracy in Genoa. In Grendi, “Profilo storico,” 70. For a recent analysis of the Genoese diaspora see Lo Basso, “Diaspora e armamento.”
8. According to Pacini, this expression refers to six heads of household, who were present in the city. However, and as also pointed out by Pacini, the laws themselves leave the meaning of the expression unexplained. In Pacini, I presupposti, 350.
10. Pacini defines the albergo as a demotopographic institution which assembled those who shared a single surname while distributing the urban space accordingly. For this reason, the institution was highly relevant from socio-political and cultural perspectives. In Pacini, I presupposti, 32–5. For the Genoese albero see Heers, Il clan familiare, 296–304, 310–14, 317–19, 324–7; Grendi, “Profilo storico,” 59–74.
11. This was probably due to the Serras’ highly endogenic policy with regards to both male and female members and to the recurring practice of primogeniture, itself a pronounced “Spanish” characteristic: Grendi, “Profilo Storico,” 62.

12. Guelfo Camajani, Liber Nobilitatis. The De Maris, who had to join the albergo Usodimare, were in a similar situation. In Musi, Mercanti genovesi, 27.


15. For the genealogy of the Serras see the genealogical trees in Podestà, Musella and Augurio, I Serra.

16. On these issues see Calabria, “Finanzieri genovesi,” 582; Colapietra, Le rendite dei genovesi, 94. The sources for the analysis of the consulships of the Serras in Naples are in Vitale, Diplomatici, 95 and 235.

17. At this date, he is only mentioned in a document in which his son Ottavio represents him during the crisis caused by the collapse of the Calamazza-Pontecorvo bank. In Archivio di Stato di Napoli (ASNa), Notai ‘500, 488/18, fols. 295r–297v (with un-numbered notes), 30 August 1596.

18. ASGe, Manoscritti, 521, fol. 1687r. Stefano De Mari was sent to Spain along with Baldassarre Lomellini in order to put the arguments of the nobili vecchi before the Catholic king. In Musi, Mercanti genovesi, 82. A precise summary of the reforms and the Genoese political situation before and after the civil war in 1575 can be found in Pacini, “La Repubblica di Genova,” 380–2.


20. Musi, Mercanti genovesi, 61 and 93.

21. Thus, the death of the head of the family, Antonio Serra, in 1582 must have been a major influence on the return to Genoa of Girolamo Serra to Genoa.


23. Thereafter, families which had been added to the alberghi in 1528 could have their old surname back.

24. For the public Neapolitan banks see Demarco, Banco Napoli Case Deposito, 12–22. At any rate, the Neapolitan public banks did not aim at replacing the private agents. In fact, the co-operation between public banks and private agents was constant. As pointed out by De Rosa, banks left commercial and speculative operations to the private sector, while most private agents had accounts in public banks. In De Rosa, “Rivoluzione dei prezzi.”

25. Musi, Mercanti genovesi.

26. For the frequent asientos carried out by Girolamo Serra with Antwerp between 1587 and 1591, see Archivio Serra di Cassano (ASC), Parte seconda, Scritture di Genova, vol. 36, doc. 27.


29. On the peripheral nature of the Kingdom of Naples and southern Italy see Galasso, Periferia Impero Napoli; Musi, Italia viceré; Musi, Sistema imperiale spagnolo, 229–37; Wallerstein, The Modern World-System.


31. Neapolitan public banks were rooted in previous charitable institutions. The city merchants operated through their accounts in these banks, which also facilitated the payment of the bills of exchange issued in the different financial fairs, both in the Kingdom of Naples – Lanciano, Lecce, Salerno, Lucera and Aversa – and elsewhere – Piacenza, Venezia and Roma: Demarco, Banco Napoli. Larchivio storico; De Rosa, “Moneda metal;” Di Matteo, “Banca città;” De Rosa, Banca finanza napoletana moneta.

32. Ruiz Martín, Finanzas Monarquía Hispánica Felipe IV, 51–3; Villari, Rivolta, 126–32; Muto, “Centro periferia;” De Rosa, “Ultima fase guerra Trent’anni;” Calabria, Cost Empire; Galasso,


41. For the constant influx of capital received by the Low Countries between 1618 and 1648, see Marcos Martín, “España y Flandes,” 31.

42. Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado, leg. 1935, doc. 132, letter from Gracián de Albizu, secretary of the Spanish embassy in Genoa, to Antonio de Aróstegui, secretary of the State Council, 2 July 1620, fols. 282r–283v: 282v. On the change of this transaction, see also idem, doc. 37, fols. 72r–73v.

43. ‘que por cada escudo de 57 placas que él ha de hacer pagar en Flandes le haya de dar yo [Gracián de Albizu] aquí 92 sueldos y 10 dineros y medio de esta dicha moneda y me aseguran así el Andrea Spinola (con cuyo consejo y parecer me he gobernado en esto y como otros muchos) que el negocio ha sido ventajoso para Su Majestad y que no se esperaba tal respecto de que algunos otros que tienen ahí casa no quisieron bajar de 94 sueldos y medio y se salieron de la plática sin querer tratar más de ello’. AGS, Estado, leg. 1935, doc. 135, Gracián de Albizu to Antonio de Aróstegui, 9 August 1620, fols. 288r–289v: 288r.

44. AGS, Estado, leg. 1935, doc. 139, Gracián de Albizu to Aróstegui, 6 October 1620, fols. 296r–297v.

45. AGS, Estado, leg. 1935, doc. 136 Gracián de Albizu to Aróstegui, 16 August 1620, fols. 290r–291v: 290r. Several documents consulted in the Archivo General de Simancas and the Archivio di Stato di Napoli confirm Sanguineto’s itinerant position between Naples and Genoa. In a document issued in Genoa, Sanguineto confirmed that he had left Genoa for good in 1628 in order to settle in Naples, whence he could look after his many concerns in the *Mezzogiorno*. ASC, Parte prima, Scritture di Cassano, vol. 36, doc. 25.

46. For instance, that Battista Serra’s cousin, Ottavio Serra di Gio. Battista was Sanguineto’s representative in Naples, as confirmed by a payment order for 250,000 ducats signed by Sanguineto in Genoa. This amount was to be delivered to Flanders and had been raised in Naples on 28 September 1621, ‘por mano de Ottavio Serra suoprocuratore’ (by means of his agent, Ottavio Serra). AGS, Estado, leg. 1935, doc. 262, fols. 566r y v. This payment order was addressed to the ‘Lázaro, Benedetto e Andrea Pichinotti’ company which, as previously noted, acted on behalf of the Serra family in Antwerp. Plausibly, these payments issued by Genesio Sanguineto in Genoa in agreement with the viceroy in Naples had been negotiated by Ottavio Serra.

47. A similar case has been made by Oscar Gelderblom in recent a study of the cities of the Low Countries: Gelderblom, *Cities of Commerce*, 12–15.

48. This is clearly shown by the 100,000 ducats advanced by Ottavio Serra to the viceroy in November 1621. This money was required in order to satisfy the arrears on the *Dogana* (customs duties) of Foggia, which Philip IV owed to the King of Poland. The Spanish king was very eager to maintain the good faith of the Polish monarch, because of the Polish troops sent to reinforce his uncle, the Emperor, in his Turkish wars. In ASN, Sommaria, Partium Regii Patrimonii, busta 41, fol. 20v–21r.
49. Grafe, *Distant Tyranny*.

50. This situation facilitated the negotiation of later transactions with private agents. In Álvarez Nogal and Chamley, “La crisis financiera.”


52. Cardim et al., *Polycentric*; Grafe, *Distant Tyranny*; Grafe, “Polycentric States.”

53. The *Medio General* was an agreement between the king and the bankers, according to which the king’s floating debt was turned into a bonded debt. After Philip II’s 1596 bankruptcy, which was solved by a *Medio General* in 1598, Battista Serra secured a prominent place in the royal finances, becoming one of the most important bankers during the reign of Philip III. For Battista Serra see Ben Y essef Garfi a, “Bautista Serra agente.” For Battista Serra’s prominent role in the *Medio General* of 1598, see Sanz Ayán, “Estrategia monarquía.”


60. Evidence for the controversial nature of Spinola’s position as consul may be found in Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASGe), Archivio Segreto (AS), Litterarum, 1887, letter from the Republic to Cornelio Spinola and Ottavio Serra, 20 October and 7 November 1618.

61. ASGe, AS, 2635, letters from the Genoese consul in Naples, Tomaso Pinello, to the Republic, 2 June 1609 and 26 January 1610.

62. ASNa, Sommari, Processi antichi, ordinamento Zeni (Regia Camera della Sommaria), busta 128, fasc. 23.

63. In ASGe, AS, Litterarum, 1887, letter from the Republic to Cornelio Spinola and Ottavio Serra, 20 October and 7 November 1618, fols. 95v and 90r.

64. In a notarial statement issued on 3 April 1620, Ottavio and Cornelio Spinola, on the one hand, and Gio. Maria Spinola and Gio. Battista Sauli, on the other, declared to be part with a third of a remittance of 400,000 ducats for the Empire and payable in Vienna. In ASNa, Notai ‘500, 488/27, fols. 231r–v.


66. Gio. Battista Delfín, one of the witnesses summoned for the examination of Gio. Battista Serra, Ottavio’s son, concerning his application to join the Order of Santiago, remembered that the wealth of the candidate’s father had ‘been amassed with business between him and the Duke of Osuna.’ This testimony was given in Genoa on 18 July 1631. In Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid (AHN), Ordenes Militares (OM), expediente (exp.) 7718, file concerning Gio. Battista Serra Cattaneo’s insignia, 1627–31.

67. The fact that Serra played a much more prominent role in the financial stability of the viceroyal court than any other Genoese is shown by his offer of 65,000 ducats to cover the wages of the soldiers manning the Tuscan fortresses. ASNa, Sommarria, Consultationum, vol. 27, *consulta*, 31 January 1618, fol. 49r y v.


69. Specifically, Bianchini mentions the establishment of a fixed exchange rate between the Neapolitan and foreign currency. In Bianchini, *Storia finanze regno Due Sicilie*, vol. 1, 354. For an examination of the effects of Osuna’s policies on Lemos’s reforms see Muto, *Finanze pubbliche napoletane*, 103–7.
70. Specifically, in March 1619: Brancaccio, “Nazione genovese,” 108; Coniglio, Viceregno Napoli, 238. For Osuna’s time as Viceroy see Schipa, Pretesa fellonia; Colapietra, Governo spagnolo; Coniglio, Viceregno Napoli, 229–39.

71. Especially because, at the time, Gio. Battista, son of Ottavio, was only seven years old.


73. See Ben Y essef Garfia’s PhD thesis, “Familia genovesa Battista Serra.”

74. AHN, OM, exp. 7718, examination for Gio. Battista Serra Cattaneo’s Santiago’s insignia, 1627–1631, fol. 9r.

75. For the education of Genoese merchants and bankers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see Zanini, “Manualistica Genovese.” Sanz Ayán, Un banquero, 71–82.

76. Girolamo’s role as tutor of Battista and the children of Antonio is eloquently described in the codicil issued in Loano on 12 May 1616. In ASC, Parte seconda, Scritture di Napoli, vol. 5, doc. 2, fol. 23v.

77. Pelaço’s testimony was given in Genoa on 16 July 1627. In AHN, OM, exp. 7718, examination for Gio. Battista Serra Cattaneo’s Santiago’s insignia, 1627–1631, fol. 15v.

78. In AHN, OM, exp. 7718, examination for Gio. Battista Serra Cattaneo’s Santiago’s insignia, 1627–1631, fol. 12v. For example, Antonio Serra, Ottavio’s uncle, was married to Claudia Lomellini, a member of the family branch of the Lomellini which controlled the administration of the island.


80. Some documents attest that these preserves were kept in some warehouses that Ottavio Serra and his partner Antonio Spinola owned in Procida. In Archivio Storico Banco di Napoli (ASBNa), Spirito Santo (SS), year 1607, giornale di cassa (gc), matricola (m.) 47, 9 October 1607, fol. 942; idem, 22 December 1607, fol. 1558. For the purchase of cold meats see idem, 21 August 1607, fol. 526. For the purchase of wine see idem, 11 October 1607, fol. 963 (referring to the acquisition of two botti of verdisco wine). The botte is a measuring unit from the Mezzogiorno, and is equivalent to 523.5 litres. For the wine purchased by Ottavio Serra see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, giornale di banco (gb), m. 46, 13 February 1607, fol. 131; ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gc, m. 44, fol. 151, 16 January 1607; idem, 9 April 1607, fol. 910; idem, 28 April 1607, fol. 1031.


82. AHN, OM, exp. 7718, examination for Gio. Battista Serra Cattaneo’s Santiago’s insignia, 1627–1631, fol. 6r.

83. Cools, Keblusek, and Noldus, Your Humble Servant.

84. We are not referring merely to the national consuls, but also to the granting of private judges to some businessmen at the service of the Spanish monarch. See Sanz Ayán, El juez privativo.

85. The list of creditors affected by the 1607 bankruptcy, and what percentage of the total debt was owed to each of them, can be consulted in Pulido Bueno, Gran mercader familia Centurión, 251. De Carlos Morales arrives at a similar list from different sources in De Carlos Morales, “Política y finanzas,” 799.

86. Although initially the work of this body was scheduled for only four years, it remained active until 1617. De Carlos Morales, “Política y finanzas,” 830–1.

87. There are abundant references to these services in the notarial section of the Archivio di Stato di Napoli. For example, on 5 February 1607, Ottavio Serra, acting on behalf of Francisco Carrafa q Faby, requested the title of Duke of Campo di Lieto (a province in the county of Molise) for Caracciolo, for 110,000 reales castellanos, to be refunded by Ottavio in the Easter fair of Piacenza through the ‘Serra-Pallavicino’ company. In ASNa, Notai ‘500, 488/16, fol. 47r–48r.

88. The letter from Antonio Spinola and Ottavio Serra (in Naples) to Battista Serra (in Madrid), on 22 July 1608 can be mentioned, for example. In this instance, the “Spinola-Serra” company was acting on behalf of the Genoese merchant Cesare Zattara, who, in the name of the Count
of Casalduny, had sent Gio. Maria Cavanna a payment order for 60,000 reales castellanos to be handed to the auditor Pedro de Tapia. “Spinola-Serra” were asked in this letter to Battista Serra to advance the money should Cavanna find difficulty in facing the payment. In ASNa, Notai '500, 488/17, fols. 597v–598v. Carlo Tapia, a member of the Sacro Regio Consiglio of Naples also used Ottavio Serra’s services for the payment of privileges in Madrid: ASNa, Notai '500, 488/18, letter from Ottavio Serra to Battista Serra, 7 November 1609, fols. 671r y v.

89. The letters from Ottavio Serra and Antonio Spinola, first to Battista Serra and then to Francesco Serra di Gio. Pietro, following the latter’s departure from Madrid, demonstrate the intensity of contact from 1607 (at the latest) and 1618. From 1618 onwards, Ottavio Serra’s payment orders were no longer addressed to Battista Serra, but to Francesco Serra di Gio. Pietro. The first of these letters can be found with the documents pertaining to the notary Gio. Simone De Monica, and is dated 19 December 1618. In ASNa, Notai '500, 488/25. For the transfer of Battista’s Spanish business to his cousin Francesco Serra di Gio. Pietro, see the former’s will, issued in Genoa on 3 October 1637: ASGe, Notai Antichi (NA), 5861. Battista Serra's departure from Madrid took place sometime in 1617–18. He left in order to represent the Genoese Republic before the Governor of Milan.


91. The notary’s documents include many of Spinola and Serra’s notarial documents from 1607 onwards. In ASNa, Notai '500, 488/16 with documents for the year 1607.

92. Brancaccio, 'Nazione genovese', 117. For the correspondence between the Republic and the consul Antonio Spinola, see also ASGe, AS, Litterarum, 1883, the Republic of Genoa to Antonio Spinola, Genoese consul in Naples, 17 July 1614, fols. 33r–33v; idem, the Republic to Antonio Spinola, 4 September 1615, fol. 46v.

93. Regarding the Squarciaficos, special mention must be made of Uberto Squarciafico, Marquis of Galatola, percettore in Terra d’Otranto and deceased in 1562: Colapietra, "Genovesi Puglia," 25.

94. ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 42, 22 February 1606, fol. 126; idem, 23 March 1606, fol. 59; ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 16 June 1607, fol. 458.

95. The Belmosto acted on behalf of Girolamo Serra in different businesses and court suits in Naples in the early seventeenth century. In ASNa, Notai '500, 488/11, 19 August 1602, fol. 358v; idem, fols. 360r–362r; ASNa, Notai '500, 488/12, 3 April 1603, fol. 161r; ASNa, Notai '500, 488/13, 20 August 1604, fol. 262v–263r.

96. The Belmosto were from the town of Levanto, which was probably also the Serra’s hometown, as attested by many testimonies given during Gio. Battista Serra’s process. For this, see Lercari’s online entry for the Belmosto (see Bibliography).

97. For the payment of loans backed by the fiscali (rents extracted from the viceroyalty’s direct taxes) collected by ‘Squarciafico-Spinola’ on behalf of Battista Serra, see ASBNa, SS, year 1604, gb, m. 36, 20 July 1604, fol. 365; idem, 11 September 1604, fol. 498; idem, 8 November 1604, fol. 649; ASBNa, SS, year 1605, gb, m. 38, 18 March 1605, fol. 143.

98. See an example of a bill of exchange issued by Battista Serra in Valladolid and executed by ‘Squarciafico-Spinola’ in Naples, in ASBNa, SS, year 1604, gb, m. 36, 9 September 1604, fol. 493; idem, 19 November 1604, fol 674; ASBNa, SS, year 1604, gc, m. 35, 25 October 1604, fol. 1703. For bills of exchange, later executed by ‘Squarciafico-Spinola’ in Naples, issued by the Serra abroad and channelled through Piacenza, see ASBNa, SS, year 1605, gb, m. 38, 22 September 1605, fol. 680; ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 41, 30 March 1606, fol. 203.


100. On 20 July 1607, the ‘Spinola-Serra’ company purchased two carriage-cushions to prevent the passengers from suffering any grave injury in case of brusque movements. Soon afterwards, on 2 August, the company features as buying the carriage itself. In ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gc, m. 47, 20 July and 2 August 1607, fols. 283 and 386, respectively. Regarding Ottavio’s real estate in Naples, in the early seventeenth century he lived in a rented house with two bedrooms, kitchen and cellaro located in Santa Lucia del Monte (the current Quartieri Spagnoli). In ASBNa, SS, year 1604, gc, m. 35, 27 July 1604, fol. 1255.
102. For the purchase of banisters from Sebastiano Santillo, see ASBNa, SS, year 1604, gc, m. 35, 22 September 1604, fol. 1580.
103. For example, on 15 February 1607 Ottavio Serra paid 392 ducats to Miguel Vaaz as compensation for the damages suffered by one of Vaaz’s ships, loaded with wheat (“per dano havuto in ducati 500 per tantiche li mesi passati l’assicurò sopra grani dalle parte di Abruzzo in Napoli sopra la nave padrone ...”). In ASBNa, Pietà, year 1607, gb, m. 4, 15 February 1607, fol. 119r. For the prominent role played by the converted merchant Miguel Vaaz in the Kingdom of Naples see Sabatini, “Mercato conteso.”
104. The suppliers of the “Squarciafico-Spinola” company included Gio. Batta Pepe, a merchant and retailer active since 1606. He also supplied Ottavio Serra. Numerous entries attest to payments concerning robbie vendute (things sold) for which reason it cannot be discounted that this merchant also traded in other kinds of goods. For Francesco Squarciafico’s and Quilico Spinola’s involvement in the textile trade see, for instance, ASBN, SS, year 1604, gc, m. 35, 31 May 1604, fol. 912.
106. ASBNa, Pietà, year 1611, gb, m. 7, 3 October 1611, fol. 132r.
109. Against the traditional notion of southern Italy as a backwater see Sakellariou, Southern Italy.
110. The twofold role played by the Genoese in the Neapolitan economy, as producers and guild members and as merchants has been stressed in Dauverd, Imperial Ambition, 81–109. The Neapolitan aristocracy also used the technical knowledge of merchants to increase production in their land: Cirillo, Verso la trama sottile.
111. Concerning this, Antonio Spinola and Ottavio Serra fought a court case against the Genoese Gio. Agostino Arquata who was in charge of weighting, storing and selling a cargo of wool sent by Spinola and Serra from Messina to Naples in several vessels. In ASNa, Notai Antichi ‘500, 488/20, 3 August 1611, fols. 513r–514v. On the wool trade in Naples in the seventeenth century, the incentives granted by the Neapolitan state for its production and distribution, and its relationship with the tax system, see Rossi, La lana.
112. The commercialisation of some of these products was regulated by the viceroyal authorities: ASNa, Sommaria, Consultationum, vol. 26, 24 April 1619, fol. 255r and v, in which Ottavio Serra is ordered to hand 80 bundles of hemp to Domenico Battimello per far filare. For a historical analysis of the cultivation of hemp and its social and environmental implications in Naples see Casoria and Scognamiglio, “Implicazioni sociali canapa.”
113. For Serra and Spinola’s involvement in the production of biscuit for the galleys and in the distribution of the surplus of the aristocracy see ASNa, Notai ‘500, 488/24, fols. 615v–616v: 615v. For the grain market in the Mezzogiorno in the Modern period see: Macry, Mercato Napoli grano; Papagna, Grano mercanti Puglia; Alifano, Grano pane Napoli. On the role played by the merchant capital in the consolidation of the feudal system within the territories under the Spanish Monarchy, see Herrero Sánchez, “Las Repúblicas mercantiles.”
114. AGS, Estado, leg. 1432, Giovan Andrea Doria to Felipe III, 1 October 1604 doc. 109, fol. 227r.
117. Ruschi and Vargas were the agents of Giannettino Doria (cardinal) and Carlo Doria in Naples. According to bank accounts in the name of “Spinola-Serra,” Ruschi and Vargas, acting
on behalf of Giannettino and Carlo Doria, entrusted Ottavio Serra and Antonio Spinola with numerous deposits for investment. In some cases, the deposits in question exceeded 4000 ducados. Some examples in ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 17 July 1607, fol. 539; idem, 21 July 1607, fol. 553. Further deposits by Vargas, operating in the name of Carlo Doria, are also attested for 1612: en ASBNa, SS, year 1612, gb, m. 75, 4 February 1612, fol. 135; idem, 16 February 1612, fol. 171; idem, 31 March 1612, fol. 339; idem, 11 April 1612, fol. 391.


119. In ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 41, 30 August 1606, fol. 607; idem, 27 September 1606, fol. 693.

120. For an example of a bill of exchange issued in Monteleone and executed in Naples in favour of Ottavio Serra see ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 41, 22 December 1605, fol. 908. For an example of a bill of exchange issued in Monteleone and payable by Ottavio Serra or his company in Naples see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 4 May 1607, fol. 321.

121. For examples of bills of exchange issued in Cosenza and payable by Ottavio Serra or his company in Naples see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 28 May 1607, fol. 399. For examples of bills of exchange issued in Cosenza and executed in Naples in favour of Ottavio Serra for his company see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, m. 46, 25 May 1607, fol. 390; idem, 31 August 1607, fol. 640.

122. For examples of bills of exchange issued in Lecce and payable by Ottavio Serra or his company in Naples see ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 41, 31 July 1606, fol. 538; ASBNa, SS, year 1606, m. 42, 24 July 1606, fol. 459. For examples of bills of exchange issued in Lecce and executed in Naples in favour of Ottavio Serra for his company see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 10 December 1607, fol. 881; ASBNa, SS, year 1612, gb, m. 75, 15 June 1612, fol. 639.

123. For evidence of the flow of bills of exchange between Bari and Naples with the participation of "Spinola-Serra" see ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 23 January 1607, fol. 69; ASBNa, SS, year 1612, 18 June 1612, fol. 653.

124. For the involvement of "Spinola-Serra" in the circulation of bills of exchange between Naples and Aquila, see for example ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 43, 11 December 1606, fol. 834; ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 18 January 1607, fol. 57.

125. Some examples in ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, 21 August 1607, fol. 618; ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gc, m. 47, 27 September 1607, fol. 853.

126. For the importance of these cities as essential nodes in the urban network of the Mezzogiorno and for the Mediterranean exchange system see Vitolo, L'Italia.

127. ASNa, Sommatoria, Consultationum, 20, consultation and vote for Antonino and Cesare Ferrao, 10 November 1606, fols. 193r–194r.

128. Lanaro, “Periferie senza centro.”

129. The original text reads: ‘… essere detta città di Cosenza cap della provintia, e di commertio dove concorrono diverse nationi di gente è negozianti di più mercantie …‘. The viceroy’s eagerness to recruit and favour those Genoese who could serve the Crown, assist the viceroyalty and, at the same time, act as middlemen with other members of the Genoese nation, is clearly illustrated by this kind of measures, as well as by the numerous committees created on the initiative of the viceroy for the design of an economic policy in order to solve the kingdom’s financial difficulties. It was very usual the appointment by the viceroy of prominent members of the Genoese nation as deputies or as consultants of this committee. In this regard, it is necessary to question Dauverd’s arguments according to which the viceroys defended the interests of the kingdom while the Genoese stood as representatives of the Crown’s ‘imperial ambitions’. According to Dauverd, the main concern of both the Genoese and the Spanish sovereign was not to foster the kingdom’s development but to extract as many resources as possible from it. This idea perpetuates the myth of a predatory Crown and of Genoese businessmen as nothing but the administrators of a system that also worked for their own benefit. In Dauverd, Imperial Ambition, 136, 140–6.

130. Cassano was finally assigned to the heirs of Girolamo Serra in 1622. For the Cassano Serra see Podestà, Musella and Augurio, I Serra, 373–448. Carovigno was purchased by Ottavio

131. For example, on 23 October 1607, Ottavio Serra paid Francesco Antonio Amertrano and Ottavio Cavari, percettori in Terra di Lavoro, 15 ducats for the serviced rendered: ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 45, 23 October 1607, fol. 707. Another document that proves that Ottavio Serra received payments from the percettori in Basilicata in ASBNa, SS, year 1605, gb, m. 38, 27 August 1605, fol. 565. For the contacts with percettori in Terra di Lavoro and Contado di Molise see ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 42, fol. 749, 15 November 1606. The prominent role played by the Genoese in the purchase of the kingdom’s fiscali is referenced in Brancaccio, “Nazione genovese,” 85–8; Calabria, “Finanzieri genovesi,” 606–7.

132. ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 42, 22 July 1606, fol. 461.

133. ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 38, 27 August 1605, fol. 565.

134. Some evidence in ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 42, 20 July 1606, fol. 454; idem, 31 October 1606, fol. 701. A letter of attorney issued in Genoa on 10 April 1609, in which Paolo Serra authorised his cousin Ottavio Serra to sell or otherwise alienate Paolo’s land in Terra di Otranto and Calabria Citra and Ultra in ASGe, NA, 5826. Also, evidence that Ottavio also represented Battista Serra in this regard is in ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 45, 15 October 1607, fol. 686.

135. In addition, Nicolò Pallavicino was married to Maria Serra, sister of Battista Serra q Antonio. There is ample evidence of Ottavio Serra’s involvement in rent management on behalf of Pallavicino in Naples. See for example ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 42, 11 September 1606, fol. 568.


137. The office of percettore, which could be sold, offered its holder good business perspectives; generally, the Genoese used the amounts collected for financial speculation. Muto, “Una struttura.”

138. Grafe, “Polycentric States.”

139. The document which bears witness to these returns in the 1630s is a list of rents pending collection in the Mezzogiorno: ASC, Parte seconda, Scritture di Napoli, vol. 1, doc. 52.

140. Some examples of the rents purchased by Ottavio Serra on behalf of Spinola in ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 46, March 1607, fol. 188. For the role played by Veronica Spinola in the transmission of property in the Mezzogiorno, see idem, 9 July 1607, fol. 522. Similarly, a latter bank document proves that Veronica owned several rents in Principato Citra: in ASBNa, Pietà, year 1611, gb, m. 7, 12 September 1611, fol. 73v.

141. ASBNa, SS, year 1607, gb, m. 45, 18 June 1607, fol. 122. For the relevance of Genoese women in the family’s economic strategies and distribution of property see Grendi, I Balbi, 270-301. For the role of women in urban economies in the Middle Ages see Simonton and Montenach, Female Agency; Catterall and Campbell, Woman in Port. For the role of Genoese women in the family’s strategy for social promotion see Ben Y essef Garfia, “Lazos sociales,” 156–72.

142. ASBNa, SS, year 1606, gb, m. 41, 8 July 1606, fol. 485. In ASBNa, SS, year 1606, m. 42, 3 October 1606, fol. 624.

143. For these questions and the links between Madrid, Genoa and Naples in the 1620s see Ben Y essef Garfia’s proposal on the Serra networks “Familia República Monarquía Hispánica Battista Serra” (forthcoming).


145. For the similarities between republican and dynastic states see Herrero Sánchez, Repúblicas y republicanismo (forthcoming).

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Archival sources

AHN: Archivo Histórico Nacional de Madrid
   - OM: Órdenes Militares
AGS: Archivo General de Simancas
   - Estado
ASGe: Archivio di Stato di Genova, AS (Archivio Segreto)
   - Manoscritti
   - Litterarum
   - Lettere Consoli Napoli
   - Notai Antichi
ASNa: Archivio di Stato di Napoli
   - Sommario
   - Notai '500
ASBNa: Archivio Storico Banco di Napoli
   - SS (Spirito Santo)
   - Pietà
ASC: Archivio Serra di Cassano, Naples
   - Parte prima. Scritture di Cassano
   - Parte seconda. Scritture di Napoli
   - Parte seconda. Scritture di Genova

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Looking through the mirrors: materiality and intimacy at Domenico Grillo's mansion in Baroque Madrid

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ABSTRACT
In 1662, the Spanish crown granted Genoese banker Domenico Grillo an incredibly generous monopoly contract aiming at reactivating the slave trade to the Spanish colonies in the New World. Yet despite the fundamental role Grillo's slaving business played in the transformation of the geopolitics of the Atlantic, his fleeting incursion into the field of human traffic has so far received limited historiographical attention. This paradox may result from the little information that, beyond the records of his commercial transactions, colonial archives appear to have retained about the complex personality of this Ligurian financier. Seeking to bypass this frustrating documentary gap, this work draws on alternative historical, genealogical and archaeological approaches in order to explore the social and cultural meaning of the various materialities once populating Domenico Grillo's intimate lived spaces in Baroque Madrid.

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Preamble: the crime scene
Church bells in Madrid were minutes short of striking seven on the evening of Friday, 13 May 1678, when the lively clamour of the crowd milling about the Calle del Caballero de Gracia was suddenly cut off by the loud and unmistakable bang of a musket shot. The startling detonation was still echoing in the air when, right by the nunnery of San José, witnesses saw a fancily dressed young man falling from his carriage and crashing into the gutter with a dull, wet sound. In a matter of seconds, a dense flock of beholders had gathered around the man, all eagerly watching as a group of good-hearted volunteers lifted the victim's lifeless body from the ground and pushed him back into the carriage from which he had just slipped down. As they did so, the dead man's face fleetingly emerged from under the brim of his wide, black hat – a morbid sight which instantly changed the frantic babbling of the viewers into a muffled gasp of disbelief, for most of them had clearly recognised the one who had just been murdered, right before their eyes. In no time, the news spread throughout Madrid that Domenico Grillo¹, the younger, homonymous nephew to the Marquis of Clarafuente, one of the most renowned Ligurian financiers operating at the court of Spain,
had been shot in mysterious circumstances a few blocks away from the mansion that his powerful family had occupied for decades on the central Calle de Alcalá (Figure 1).

Reports of don Domenico's tragic fate would, of course, almost immediately reach the ear of the city warden, don Manuel Bernardo de Quiros who, in pursuance of his public duty, hastened to the murder scene in order to launch a proper criminal investigation. Thrusting his way across the crowd, don Manuel walked up to the carriage to confirm the rumours as to the identity of the deceased. Having done so, he proceeded to escort young Domenico's corpse back to his family's abode, wasting no time in carrying out some preliminary inquiries and interviews which would mark the onset of an exceedingly long judicial process seeking to elucidate the killing of the noble Genoese. The investigation would eventually determine that he, whom the elderly Marquis of Clarafuente described as a perfectly calm, sober and reclusive young man, was in fact a quite turbulent individual fond of revelling and carousing in the Madrilenian underworld. Above all, don Manuel's research would reveal that, with the complicity of his close friends Gianbattista Piquinoti and Vincenzo Centurione, also members of the Ligurian financial elite long established in Madrid, young Domenico sustained a secret, passionate relationship with a married woman of doubtful reputation who, in the end, would be charged and condemned for her lover's violent death.²

**Tracing back the uncle’s track**

Despite the narrative potential of the colourful vignette opening this essay, it is not my purpose here to elaborate much further on a story describing the extravagant social life of Domenico Grillo – an inconspicuous historical figure who seems to have enjoyed most of his short existence frolicking around within exclusive circles of youthful Genoese, stationed in Madrid to be trained by their elders in the arts and mysteries of early-modern banking. Indeed, most of the genealogies focusing on Genoese patricians do not even acknowledge young Domenico's existence or, at most, refer to him as having died as an infant or a child.³ Yet if I have decided to launch this article with a mention of his mostly uneventful life, it
is because Domenico’s tragic story effectively highlights how little we actually know about the private universe of his uncle and mentor, the fascinating Domenico Grillo, the elder, Marquis of Claramonte and Grandee of Spain. It is his secretive and intriguing personality, rather than his unfortunate nephew’s one, that I seek to explore throughout this work.

Testimonies gathered by don Manuel Bernardo de Quiros within the context of Domenico Grillo’s death leave no doubt that, by the late 1600s, don Domenico Grillo, the elder, was a widely recognised public figure in the highest social, political and economic spheres of Western Europe. Along with his life-long business partner, don Ambrosio Lomellino, who was also Genoese-born, Domenico Grillo had carved himself a solid financial reputation, particularly during the second half of King Philip IV of Spain’s reign. Grillo’s transnational fame as a banker would reach its zenith when, in 1662, following a heated debate within the Royal Council of the Indies, he and don Ambrosio secured a seven-year monopoly contract over the slave trade to the Spanish colonies in the New World. Even though, at least in appearance, it followed the structural lines of a standard asiento contract typical of the Spanish administrative system, Grillo’s monopoly was bitterly received, in the colonies as in the metropole, for it offered to a foreign party some exceptionally favourable conditions to reactivate the transatlantic slave trade to the Spanish Indies, officially suspended since the revolt of Portugal in 1640. While this is not the place to provide a detailed account of the nature and long-term consequences that Grillo’s asiento had in the history of the modern world, let it suffice to say that this contract included some particularly innovative clauses which, for the first time, situated the practice of human traffic in an ambiguous legal terrain straddling the domains of public and private law. Further, Grillo’s asiento was set into a complex economic and geopolitical framework, within which the slave trade assumed a fundamental role in the development of a capitalist system of production and exchange that would forever transform the political, social and cultural order of the Atlantic world.

The asiento was, therefore, a business of colossal proportions – both in terms of its economic significance and in those of its geographic scope. It, thus, comes as no surprise that, brief as it was, Grillo’s incursion into the field of human traffic has left behind an exceptionally rich path of archival traces which, interestingly enough, has only been approached in detail by a few researchers since the turn of the twentieth century. While it is clear that Grillo’s experience opened up the way to the expansion of the great British, Dutch and French slave-trading companies which would dominate the Atlantic market in the centuries to come, most literature on the subject seems to downplay the critical part that the Genoese played in the transformation of human traffic into a massive financial enterprise with truly global implications.

Largely resting on the stacks of the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, the profusion of records documenting Domenico Grillo’s shady financial manoeuvres and constant legal disputes with the fiscal of the Council of the Indies is, however, of little use when it comes to examining the nature of don Domenico’s private world. Indeed, while the records that preserve the memory of the asiento constantly invoke the names of Domenico Grillo and of his associate – arguably in an almost ritual effort to reify the legitimacy of the dealings all these manuscripts were meant to represent, evidence of the banker’s actual presence on the premises where his dealings took place are, in fact, exceedingly rare. At least from the 1660s onwards, Domenico Grillo operated almost exclusively by proxy, to the point that his own signature hardly ever appears on the extensive body of written documents that were
field on his behalf. Hence, Grillo’s personhood seems reduced to the graphic expression of a banker whose name everyone could hear but whose face only few could see.

By and large, Domenico Grillo’s daily life appears to have been set on a surreal social stage on which the bodies of the almighty acquired an untraceable, immaterial and, to some extent, almost godly disposition. To be sure, it may well have been the case that, wary of what an unruly archive could have captured and revealed about the nature of his private world, Domenico Grillo made a conscious effort to avoid exposing his intimacy to the tyranny of the written word. Consequently, in such an obscure documentary context, prying into the creases of Domenico Grillo’s psyche becomes analogous to an archaeological venture which, building upon what archaeologist James Deetz once referred to as the small things eclipsed by historical texts\textsuperscript{10}, may allow us to approach, if still in an intuitive mode, the opaque personality of this Genoese banker. Thus, in the absence of first-hand accounts that could assist us in understanding the Baroque mindset of Domenico Grillo, my work seeks to apply an unorthodox, two-fold approach to the study of the past, pairing an exploratory discussion of don Domenico’s richly documented genealogical connections with what I present as an archival archaeology of his distinctive object world. While such methodology may be deemed unremarkable in the field of historical archaeology\textsuperscript{11}, it could also be considered problematic by scholars interested in making larger statements as to the rapidly changing logics of material production and exchange which characterised European societies from the early 1500s onwards. While the narrow scale I have chosen in this work is of little use to draw conclusions about the patterns of social and cultural behaviour prevailing among Ligurian financial elites at the court of the Spanish Habsburgs, one should not mistake this move for a lack of analytical ambition. More than digging through the archive in hopes of demonstrating how and why the private world of Domenico Grillo may have contrasted or corresponded with those observable among different individuals or communities with comparable backgrounds and aspirations, my goal here is to explore, at least for now, Grillo’s individual project of material consumption as a self-standing unit within which specific traits of his complex personality may be expected to stand out. As archaeological research has firmly established in the last few decades, the field of material culture studies seems especially well suited to address issues of identity formation, in the past and in the present, particularly through the documentation of individual processes of embodiment and phenomenological experimentation of the material world.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, as Miller and Tilley have rightfully noted: ‘Objects are the foundation for a more genuine empathy and sympathetic comprehension of the life of others.’\textsuperscript{13}

In this article, I want to fully recognise the solid contributions that historians such as Bruno Blondé\textsuperscript{14}, Maxine Berg\textsuperscript{15}, Evelyn Welsh\textsuperscript{16} and Giorgio Riello\textsuperscript{17}, among others have made to the study of Western material culture and which, on the basis of rigorously gleaned sets of archival data, convincing statistical analyses and keenly crafted editorial work, have succeeded in revealing the unstable sociocultural dimensions of a wide range of early-modern practices of consumption. Mainly focusing on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries England, Italy, Flanders and France, these authors’ scholarship has effectively complicated classic economic models and discourses on capitalist development by including previously neglected analytical categories such as choice, taste, luxury or fashion in their historical approach to the innovation, circulation and appreciation of material things.\textsuperscript{18}

Clearly, this tradition of material-culture studies, mainly grounded in economic and cultural history strongly resonates with the archaeological exploration I propose in this
essay. Admittedly, however, my theoretical concern here is more closely related to a line of intellectual dialogues openly contesting any disciplinary claim to the monopoly of knowledge. As stated by Miller and Tilley in their editorial to the now well-established *Journal of Material Culture*[^19], such dialogues seek to create a point of articulation between different academic perspectives, bringing together the works of a wide array of scholars willing to accept that the materiality of objects is not simply instrumental, but constitutive of the cultural and political significance, meaningfulness and symbolic power of things.^[20]

**The philosophical countess**

By virtue of her sex, Clelia Grillo Borromeo Arese (1684–1777) would never have the chance to try her luck in any of the complex financial transactions which, for generations, had made the fame and fortune of the Genoese.^[21] This, however, would not stop don Domenico Grillo’s grand-niece from becoming one of the most vocal academic figures to emerge in Italy during the Century of Lights.^[22] Indeed, it is for the fabulous vitality of her mind that Countess Borromeo Arese is widely recognised today as being one of the first European women to engage in the field of the liberal arts.^[23] Playfully teased in her close family circle for her unusually sharp wit, Clelia displayed a ravenous appetite for knowledge that, however, most men in her social milieu seemed to consider a suspicious and undesirable feature in a prospective wife. Thus Clelia’s father, don Marc’Antonio Grillo da Mari, would need to grant his daughter one of the most impressive dowries of her time in order to wed her into the illustrious house of Count Carlo Borromeo. Yet what appears to have materialised into a prosperous and fertile wedlock with one of the most powerful families of Milan also provided la donna Clelia with the social and financial means needed to pursue what would be her all-time obsession: the creation, in her palace in Milan, of a first-tier intellectual space dedicated to the promotion and circulation of new ideas in all fields of the liberal arts.^[24] While what she had portentously named the Accademia Clelia dei Vigilanti was never to become much more than an enlightened dream, Clelia Grillo nourished her illusions in the lively and abundant correspondence she sustained with some of the most brilliant minds of the early 1800s.^[25]

Here, I suggest that what la donna Clelia ardently sought within the sphere of knowledge was, in fact, strikingly similar to what her Genoese kin had accomplished in the field of trade. Indeed, the philosophical countess was much less interested in manufacturing knowledge than in monopolising its distribution beyond the limits of the modern world.^[26] Further, la donna Clelia was impatient, eclectic and inconstant, and her ways seemed more akin to those of a risk-loving wholesaler than to those of a disciplined savant.

To be sure, what remains of Countess Borromeo’s writing testifies to an indomitable and provoking temperament which, I suggest, might well have been one of the hallmarks of the house of Grillo. As I have already noted elsewhere[^27], Clelia Grillo’s nature was, more than a combination of intelligence, curiosity and munificence, a compelling expression of the daring disposition that her lineage seemed to have been cultivating for a while. Thus, I would like to argue here that Countess Borromeo’s exceptionally well documented life story could, indeed, be offering us an important indirect glimpse into the otherwise inscrutable psyche of her forefathers.
The slaver’s den

Bright, cunning and secretive indeed, such seems to have been the personality of don Domenico Grillo. A confirmed bachelor until the end of his days, Grillo had settled in Madrid in the late 1640s, drawn by the financial opportunities to be found at an imperial court in perpetual need of cash. Grillo had, by the 1660s, slowly but surely built up a solid reputation as a banker of means, able to stand up to other, long-established families of Spain-based Ligurian moneylenders such as the Balbi, the Doria, the Spinola or the Centurione. It was, therefore, a relatively new but quite relevant figure in the Spanish financial scene who, on 19 June 1668, almost 20 years before la donna Clelia would see the light of day, would have no choice but to open up the doors of his stately home to a conspicuous delegation of royal officials ready to execute a confiscation order on his personal estate. While this seizure action certainly did not take Domenico Grillo by surprise, it no less constituted an incredible offence for a man of his status. Truly, within the particular cultural context of the Spanish Golden Age, only the questioning of a man’s pureness of blood may have been as socially hurtful as the public revelation of his disgrace. And still, how else could the Royal Council of the Indies urge the chief slaver to the King of Spain to satisfy the outrageous debt of over one million pesos he had accumulated in arrears since the establishment of his asiento, in 1663?

Facing a deep, unsettling attack on his name and reputation, don Domenico Grillo would waste no time in putting his dense network of influential higher-ups in play. While the news of his discredit must have spread out rapidly beyond Madrid and all over the vast Spanish colonial empire, the confiscation ordered against him would ultimately have no effect on his estate. Quite the contrary: far from causing the permanent dissolution of his slave-trading firm, this short-lived legal action would open up the ground for a two-year extension of Grillo and Lomellino’s asiento.

Building now upon an archaeological analysis of the terse list of artefacts resulting from the Council’s ephemeral intrusion into Domenico Grillo’s private world, I will attempt to gain a better understanding of the social and cultural rationale guiding the material constitution of Domenico Grillo’s lived space. By focusing on this fascinating object lesson that no historical study has deemed relevant to explore so far, I will aim at bringing some much needed light into the foggy depths of a Baroque slaver’s mind. More than just performing a mechanical recitation of the many different materialities composing don Domenico’s object world, my intention here is to document and understand the logic of the choices that Domenico Grillo made as an early capitalist consumer. Specifically, I argue that, when approached from a theoretical standpoint acknowledging the fundamental role that material culture plays in the configuration of social life, Domenico Grillo’s object world may be interpreted in terms akin to those normally applied to the well-established field of Baroque collections studies. While Grillo’s biographical profile would hardly correspond to that of the great European collectors of the 1600s, there is little doubt that all the objects he exhibited in his mansion in Madrid embodied practical conventions and potent symbolic messages which ratified the leading role Grillo sought to play at the social and economic core of the early-modern world.

The remainder of this article will, then, constitute an invitation to read the cold and methodical description that the appraisers of the Royal Council of the Indies once made of don Domenico’s things, not as a disembodied, flat and timeless inventory in which emotion...
plays no part, but rather as a richly textured walk through the intimacy of an astute Genoese merchant sensuously engaged in an unyielding quest for fame, rank and fortune. Domenico Grillo’s domestic collection will, therefore, be revealed in the following sections as a distinctive *theatrum mundi* in which, just like in any early cabinet of wonders, the taxonomical conventions of today seem constantly challenged or held in check.

The hall of mirrors

While historical documents fail to mention the exact position of Domenico Grillo’s mansion on the Calle de Alcalá, there are not too many buildings on that street which, by the late 1650s, could have fit the cursory description that royal officials once established of his home. According to their seizure act of 1668, the appraisers of the Council of the Indies came into the Grillo mansion through its main gate, which led right into a vestibule dividing the house’s service and residential areas. Overall, the ground floor of the building – or *cuarto bajo* – included a large drawing room directly connected with the vestibule and leading itself into a lower gallery wrapped around an inner garden. Round the corner of the gallery, one could access an enfilade of six different rooms and bedrooms, which suggests the house was made of three or four sections running around a quadrangular, open space. The building’s main staircase probably rose from the vestibule at the entrance of the house, and landed into a hall on the first floor – referred to as *cuarto principal* – or main floor. Here, one could find two independent office rooms facing a second, larger drawing room. This latter room was most probably aligned with the main façade of the house, and had three doors opening into an upper corridor. Apparently reproducing the model observed on the ground floor, an undetermined suite of rooms was set along the axis of that corridor. Interestingly enough, official records mention the existence of one additional – and relatively small – room standing directly above the main floor of the house. It is tempting to suggest that this room could have corresponded to the top of a corner tower, which was quite a distinctive element in aristocratic houses in Baroque Madrid.

Finally, the Council’s officials reported the existence of two additional rooms on the ground floor: one was a small room situated next to – or under – the main staircase, while the other one was another office, apparently located closer to the kitchen and the service areas.

In this article, I will concentrate on the main room of the ground floor of the Grillo mansion, referred to in the Council of the Indies’ act as the *cuadra segunda*, or second room of the house. Whereas the use that was given to the term *cuadra* may have been entirely consistent in the Spanish Golden Age, Covarrubias defines it as a spacious room further inside the house than the *sala* – or great hall. This definition only weakly fits the case of the Grillo mansion, in which the *cuadra segunda* actually seems to have functioned as a large space used as the main meeting and dining area in the house, and thus corresponding to the standard definition of a great hall.

The Council inspectors may have stared in awe as they entered this second room, for it was populated with six of the largest mirrors available in the early-modern world. Rare and exceedingly precious, mirrors were, in Domenico Grillo’s times, far from being the commonplace, everyday artefact they have come to be today. So exceptional was the social nature of looking-glasses in the Baroque era that it is well worth spending some time illuminating the multiple roles mirrors could have played in our chief slaver’s home.
As Sabine Melchior-Bonnet ably posits⁴¹, one cannot stress enough the enormous impact that the introduction of flat looking-glasses in Western households had on early-modern sensitivities. It was not until the Renaissance that European glassmakers mastered new techniques to produce larger panes of flat glass that could be used to fabricate larger mirrors. Brought close to perfection by the skilful glassblowers of Murano, the flat looking-glass contributed to a drastic change in the epistemology of reflection. Yet, by plagiarising the tangible world, yielding an apparently faithful image of reality, flat mirrors allowed Westerners to take one step further in the shaping of their subjectivities. Further, early-modern looking-glasses signified a new challenge to the concept of representation, mimesis and knowledge, and played a determinant role in the understanding of reality as something which could be tamed and manipulated at will. The mirror was, thus, the material channel through which individuals could take an objectifying distance from their inner self, inspecting their conscience through the gaze of an estranged, intangible illusion.

In Domenico Grillo’s days, however, the optical phenomenon of reflection had not yet been rationalised and, thus, still partially belonged to the realm of enchantment.⁴² But it was in this state of coexistence of rational thinking and medieval lore that reflection started to play a determinant role in the shaping of early-modern social life. Mirrors became, in the 1600s, incomparable socialising and civilising instruments, luxurious rehearsal grounds on which the Baroque social spectacle could be easily played out. It was through mirrors that individuals like Domenico Grillo learnt how to co-ordinate emotions and sensations, training themselves on the best way to dominate the power of appearance.

Domenico Grillo, thus, lived in a narcissistic social world, one in which natural reason was gradually being replaced by a rationale of performance which granted people the possibility to create and control powerful social holograms of themselves. This social transformation, however, often took the form of a blinding masquerade. The Baroque individual fancied disguises more than revelations, adorned replicas rather than bare selves. As an object, therefore, the mirror had an unpaired capacity to encapsulate power, though as Foucault once noted in referring to the Baroque world, it did not do so through violence and coercion but, rather, through seduction and enchantment.⁴³

What this hall of mirrors suggests is that, a keen Genoese banker in the flesh, Domenico Grillo had learnt to behave as a man of his time, bowing to the constraints of Baroque etiquette in order to secure his journey to success. Still, in the spectacular kaleidoscope⁴⁴ of his by no means humble crystal stage, we cannot fail to see the Janus-faced nature of an individual both bound to the making of a perfect image of body, and yet striving to keep some of his true self inaccessible to the outer world. In Baroque society, then, the self needed a visual echo to exist, trapping Domenico Grillo in a powerful dynamic in which being and seeming were dialectically opposed.

While we ignore how, or in which circumstances some of the socialites in the city of Madrid would have been invited to trespass into the Grillos’ specular, social stage, Domenico Grillo’s guests would have been, no doubt, impressed by its powerful visual nature. Through an extensive study of the availability of mirrors in seventeenth-century France, Melchior-Bonnet finds compelling evidence of their rarity in late Renaissance Paris.⁴⁵ Interestingly enough, while mirrors were certainly more common in high-income households than amongst the working classes, French aristocrats were not always the ones displaying the greatest number of them at home. As a matter of fact, those owning more mirrors in France
at the peak of the *ancien régime* seemed to have been nobles of the robe, high officials and rich bourgeois, all ascending social sectors willing to invest in items of distinction.

In seventeenth-century Madrid, mirrors were probably at least as rare and expensive as they were in Paris. In the first half of the century, Fernando Enríquez Afán de Ribera, first Duke of Alcalá – a renowned statesman who amassed one of the finest collections of paintings of his time – reportedly owned six mirrors, only two of which may have corresponded to flat ones of the kind Domenico Grillo had. The remaining pieces in the duke’s collection included at least one convex looking-glass and, interestingly enough, a reputedly magic mirror whose enchanting powers were, unfortunately, not fully described. In 1677, in the inventory made of the property confiscated to Queen Mariana’s former favourite, Fernando de Valenzuela – arguably one of the most powerful men in Spain prior to his deposition – there were up to 19 mirrors listed, although only four of them were as large as the ones that Domenico Grillo had owned more than a decade before. Indeed, it is worth stressing the fact that each one of the six mirrors hung in the great hall of the Grillo mansion was as large as the technical knowledge in the seventeenth-century glassmaking industry allowed them to be – that is, about 1m in width.

Most visitors to the Grillo mansion would have, perhaps, simply enjoyed don Domenico’s hall of mirrors, dazzled by the magic of reflection without too many philosophical or metaphysical considerations about the nature of resemblance in mind. Those thoughts, in practice, remained the territory of savants and intellectuals. In practice, too, mirrors played an important part in the shaping of the Baroque domestic space. By multiplying the dim and sensual dancing light of candles, mirrors contributed to lighting up dark rooms, thus creating an illusion of density and volume which was essential to Baroque aesthetics. Mirrors were also important architectural components. Even in daytime, they could be placed opposite windows, reflecting the outside landscape to create a framed, indoor simulacra of nature of which Baroque society was especially fond.

The Spanish writing desk

Mirrors were, of course, not the only objectifications of power and authority present in the great hall of the Grillo mansion. For a skilful financial politician like Domenico Grillo, often vexed by his foreign origins in the traditionally xenophobic court of Madrid, this would have been the right space to flaunt an unreserved allegiance to the Spanish crown. Both illumined by and multiplied through the glittering enchantment of reflective crystals, half-body portraits of the late King and Queen regent of Spain acted as orthodox signifiers of don Domenico’s commitment to the Spanish Habsburgs. These kingly portraits would have held court upon a number of writing cabinets, a most unique type of furniture which may be considered an archetype of the development of decorative arts in seventeenth-century Spain. Ever since the Baroque age, richly decorated writing cabinets have been deemed the greatest exponents of a distinctive Spanish style merging sturdy elements of clear European tradition with intricate, veneered decorations of Mudéjar influence (Figure 2). Eloquently described by Burr as ‘an outgrowth of the hutch or the treasure chest’, the Spanish writing desk, usually sober and unpretentious on its exterior, was characterised by a drop-leaf front which could be opened to reveal a number of small – yet sumptuously decorated – drawers or cupboards. When the coffered fall-front was released, it rested on pull-out supports and
could thus be used as a writing surface, which explains the initial denomination of these cabinets.

Originally designed to be a mobile artefact in which small valuables could be transported\textsuperscript{51}, escritorios were typically endowed with sturdy, wrought-iron handles on their lateral sides, and rested on independent trestle stands or bufetes which placed them at a convenient height for everyone to appreciate them. In seventeenth-century Spain, the popularity of writing cabinets was enormous and, as Burr notes\textsuperscript{52} on the basis of their almost ubiquitous mention on testaments and inventories of the period, anyone with some pretension to wealth or social distinction must have owned at least one such portable device. This statement should however not downplay the relevance that Spanish cabinets had in the Baroque object universe, their sensuous resonance with the late Renaissance material rhetoric indulging into meaningful excess.\textsuperscript{53} Much like the facades in Baroque Madrid, Spanish escritorios had ‘a simplicity, rigid rectangularity, and austere dignity’\textsuperscript{54} that set them apart from more refined and carefully executed Italian or French creations. Yet, when revealed to the outside world, these could be truly wonderful, almost architectural, fabrications conjugating precious wood, stone, bone, ivory and metal into a secretive symphony of colours and textures.

The opening of Spanish cabinets was, thus, an intrinsically theatrical performance, through which spectators, subjugated by the compelling layout of a compartmentalised, self-contained microcosm, called for a particular ordering of the world. In that sense, escritorios were condensed versions of the Baroque wunderkammers, encapsulated fields of enchantment that had the potential to replicate, at a smaller, more intimate scale, the courteous object lessons Domenico Grillo bowed to on his daring journey towards success.

There were no less than six such writing desks on display in the great hall of don Domenico’s mansion, which, in a somewhat anachronistic expression of binary symmetry recalling more the controlled, balanced order of the Renaissance than the organic explosiveness of the Baroque\textsuperscript{55}, were arranged in three sets of identical pairs. First, the Council inspectors’ attention was captured by two ebony cabinets, mounted in silver and flanked with silver lions, each one standing on a trestle table or bufete (Figure 3). Both of these cabinets contained an unspecified number of drawers, some of which were locked and subsequently

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{Spanish_Escritorio.jpg}
\end{figure}
opened on the inspectors’ request. Oddly enough, the inside of this first set of *escritorios* was found to be completely empty.

The Council’s officials went on to list a second set of cabinets on stand, which they described as having nacre inlays and ormolu bronze frames. Each piece had 10 drawers disposed around a small, central cupboard, and was flanked with a set of four dragons; they rested on two matching trestle tables with sculpted legs. Finally, the third pair of cabinets, the largest of all, were also made of precious ebony and stood on matching trestles of the same wood. They were decorated with six, unspecified bronze figures and were divided into 10 drawers as well, (Figure 4).

Time after time, the appraisers of the Council methodically visited every drawer in the cabinets, listing all of their finds in the same order in which they unlocked them. Items of all sorts could be found in the second pair of cabinets, ranging from stockings and lace to crystal flasks and sweets, an ample range of treasured materialities that looked, tasted and smelt like the distant lands from which they came. Read in retrospect, the unpacking of Domenico Grillo’s intimate treasures resonates well with the description of a Baroque cabinet of wonder, in that it sensuously describes a congregation of objects celebrating the nascence of the modern world, the redefining of geographical and bodily frontiers and the creation of spectacular avatars of social rank. Once again, the striking disorder in which these objects were described may only exist for our modern minds, nurtured in Cartesian
tradition. In fact, this ‘disorder’ may rather be speaking of an inscrutable order of promiscuous fragrances and stale tastes in which American clay pots could be eaten\textsuperscript{56} and chocolate bricks were worth gold.\textsuperscript{57}

**Craving gloves**

In his first set of cabinets on stand, don Domenico kept 12 new pairs of white stockings, stored along with bands of black and gold lace – perhaps to be interpreted as a witty cock-a-snook to the sumptuary laws that the Spanish Habsburgs had repeatedly failed to impose at their court. In fact, never had official restrictions on the attire of the Spanish people been so strong than under Philip IV, when a series of *juntas de reformación* encouraged by the count-duke of Olivares entirely outlawed the use of gold and silver not only in male and female dress, but also in any other sort of sumptuary fabrication.\textsuperscript{58} In practice, of course, the impact of these laws remained much less than it was intended, such as Domenico Grillo’s gilded cabinets and garments clearly indicate. In contrast, there seems to be no specific regulation in the use of gloves at the court of Madrid: don Domenico owned over 12 dozen pairs of gloves, of which three dozen were said to be *of Rome*. Few accessories in Western dress are as symbolically laden as gloves, repeatedly encountered as marks of aristocracy and embodiments of rank. Gloves could be, alternately, messengers of love, desire and honour, or instruments of shame that have inspired countless artists and poets since medieval times.\textsuperscript{59}
While this is not the place for a detailed account of the complex protocol underpinning the use and exhibition of gloves in Baroque times, it would seem remiss not to comment on the extraordinary number of gloves Domenico Grillo owned. By the mid-seventeenth century, both male and female leather gloves were typically perfumed and, while the finest skin to make them usually came from Spain, the smell of Spanish gloves was frequently deemed pungent and offensive. The celebrated gloves of Rome, in contrast, released such a sweet scent that even poets dedicated verses to their enthralling fragrance:

Nor all what Arabia possesses in scent … Can smell any sweeter than the said gloves of Rome.  

Gloves, from Spain, from Rome, or from elsewhere, were thus travelling items and powerful objects of prestige that easily melted in the Baroque mise-en-scène in a thick cloud of evocative odours. As an early-modern proverb used to put it, it took three rounds of contributions from three different realms for a glove to reach perfection: Spain would tan the skin; France would cut it; and, finally, England would get to sew it. Although this proverb may be somewhat inaccurate, it represents well the cosmopolitan nature of these mobile objects of refinement. After a closer look, gloves married quite well with other powerful insignia of early-modern etiquette, at a time when to flatter others through the senses appeared to be the norm, rather than the exception. Then, presumably, the inspectors of the Council of the Indies would have found it only natural to find them in incredibly large numbers, tucked into the creases of Domenico Grillo's theatrum mundi.

**Worldly tastes**

Alongside gloves, drawers in Grillo’s casketed microcosms contained many other sensuous treats that could perform as powerful catalysts of distinction. Indeed, Domenico Grillo also craved the savours of both the Old and the New World. Through handfuls of Persian, sugared pistachios and candied plums from his Genoese homeland, Grillo could greedily bite all the flavours of the universe. Through the precious American water-cooling pots he owned, Grillo could sip the subtle fragrance of red Mexican, Chilean or Panamanian clays (Figure 5). But, above all these candies, don Domenico would have treasured his large reserves of chocolate: the bitter-sweet elixir of the Aztecs which had been quick in ravishing the Spanish palate with its stimulating properties and enticing taste. While it is clearly an exaggeration to assert that, in early-modern times, cacao and its derivates could be worth their weight in gold, it is nonetheless a fact that chocolate bricks or the so-called powder of Oaxaca were some greatly esteemed American delicacies which captivated European markets with their rich, overwhelming scents. Like so many other exotic goods, chocolate was coveted both for its alleged medical properties and for the provocative flavour that would soon revolutionise the culinary traditions of the Old World.

A pound of chocolate may have well been worth almost 20 loaves of bread in early-modern Spain; it was no less avidly fancied by all sectors of local, urban society, as suggested by the literature of the Spanish Golden Age. Yet as any other product imported from the New World, chocolate represented a misleadingly heartening way to sweeten the taste of distinction, exclusion and social segregation which came along with the consumption of slave-grown colonial crops. Despite – or, rather, because of this – the preparation of chocolate in Baroque times may have been as ritually laden as it was in the land of the Aztecs. If deprived from any particular spiritual meaning, it still involved the use of a whole new
gamut of specialised, costly material culture – the most elementary way to transform a gift of nature from faraway lands into a potent embodiment of social class. Indeed, in Baroque Spain, the ritual of chocolate-drinking was strongly associated with silver bowls referred to as *tembladeras* and Chinese porcelain *jícaras* – those chocolate pots, specifically commissioned for the Iberian market which would all find their proper place at don Domenico’s home (Figure 6).
A shield of ink and paper

There would, indeed, seem to be little space for the rhetoric of human traffic in this sensuous universe, made of palatable rarities and odorous icons of status. And yet, it was presumably with little wonder that, squeezed in between a curiously empty drawer and a compartment brimmed with bundles of gloves, royal officials inventorying all the objects in the Grillo mansion came across a wad of unspecified printed documents relative to the *asiento*. It was, again, through a symbolic shield made of ink and paper that Domenico Grillo acknowledged the complicated nature of the daring trade on which he gambled his reputation and good name. Within the chief-slaver's cabinets of wonders, the dehumanising terms of the traffic warranting the social and economic order of the modern world were obfuscated by the intoxicating taste of Mexican chocolate and the soft touch of Roman leather. The uniquely carved surface of Grillo's precious desks allowed for the essence of colonial encounters to be distilled in an immediate, voluptuous and overwhelming amalgam of bodily perceptions that efficiently masked the complex set of social and cultural frictions in which they were embedded.

Among the massive amounts of paperwork compiled during the time of Grillo and Lomellino's *asiento*, very few documents were issued in printed format, a variant normally reserved to papers of the greatest relevance, such as copies of the original contract and its 1668 amendment. Even though Council officials do not specify the content of this particular text, its uncommon, standardised material nature ascertained the first-tier importance of the message it conveyed and could, therefore, justify its bewildering presence among Domenico Grillo's exotic valuables. Perhaps more than any other sort of written text, printed documents of the *asiento* were powerful entities vowed to circulation that spanned well beyond the Spanish colonial empire. Printed documents were precious in that they reified and publicised the exact terms of Grillo's ascent to the highest spheres of Spanish monarchy, but could also capture and disseminate those of his imminent discredit. Clearly, these were personal collectibles, objects of display which ought to be treasured and controlled for; just like mirrors and gloves, they could be used both as potent instruments of distinction or as latent reflectors of public dishonour.

The magic of the queen of stones

Social frictions, however, were not only present in Domenico Grillo's microcosm under a coded, textual guise. Detested throughout the Spanish Empire for holding the most begrudged business of his time, Grillo had accommodated to living under the gloom of resentment. In his luminous *theatrum mundi*, however, there was probably little space to deal with the hatred of the African chattel that the *asiento*'s vessels circulated through the Caribbean and who were certainly more preoccupied in surviving their horrendous passage into the New World than to curse, one by one, the many masterminds who transiently set the rules of human traffic in the modern world. In contrast, the malevolence of the powerful may have seemed a more plausible risk for someone so closely enmeshed in the political intrigues of the court of Madrid. It was perhaps for his own sake, but also as an unmistakable mark of status that, in one of the drawers of his collection, Domenico Grillo kept powerful bezoars – without any doubt some of the most fabulous elements in the Baroque pharmacopoeia.  69
While rare minerals were almost indispensable components of any early-modern cabinet of wonders, bezoar stones had been considered incredibly valuable possessions in the West since at least the 1580s. The fame of bezoars, actually consisting of mineral concretions occasionally found in the stomachs of wild goats, deer and ruminants in general, came hand in hand with the growing popularity of criminal poisoning among European elites of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since they were considered to be effective remedies against almost any kind of poison. By extension, all sorts of curative and apotropaic properties were attributed to bezoars and, along with powered gold, pearls, emeralds and other gems, they were considered unfailing components of longevity potions. Bezoars imported from Persia – or Oriental Bezoars – were the most esteemed of these mineral concretions, which could also be collected in Chile and Peru. Bezoar stones could be set in hoops of precious metal, thus becoming precious jewels which could be dipped in potentially poisoned beverages in order to neutralise their harmful properties. Bernegales – gold or silver drinking bowls typical of seventeenth-century Spanish dinnerware – often came with a hollow space at the bottom, specifically made to hold bezoars in place while the bowl was in use (Figure 7).

As much as the marvellous properties of these stones was trusted in early-modern Europe, they nevertheless remained quite exclusive items to own due to their rarity and cost. As John Tanner warned the readers of his popular medical treatise in the late 1650s,
bezoar powder was to be taken in moderation for the treatment of fevers and other debilitating diseases, for if it were used in excess the patient's purse would soon complain. The extravagant price of bezoar stones was probably not something that would keep Domenico Grillo from owning three, for their magic may have been considered as efficacious as that of the agarwood chaplet with which they shared a drawer in the mansion of the Genoese slave trader.

**More American scents**

The content of the third set of cabinets the Council's officials visited in Domenico Grillo's house was, in many aspects, similar to that found in the second one. Thirty pairs of gloves of Rome were found in the drawers of these writing desks, along with six other pairs made of ordinary, dog skin. The Council's officials also reported the finding of other pieces of amber-scented leatherwork, such as three pairs of women's gloves and three kidskin pillow covers. Yet, interestingly enough, in this group of somewhat larger ebony cabinets on stand, American novelties seemed to take the upper hand over other precious and perfumed fabrications. Here again, the sheriff and usher of the Council of the Indies unpacked some silver-mounted water-cooling búcaros from the New World, going as far as identifying some pieces as Panamanian (Figure 8). Further, the officials estimated there were nearly 40 pounds of chocolate in bricks and loaves in these escritorios, in the quite logical company of a silver tembladera weighing nearly two marks (about 16 ounces). The unique smell of cacao may have, however, been masked here by the powerful emanations of a few chunks of gum benjamin, or by the fumes escaping from several flasks of amber, jasmine and orange-blossom pastes, all fragrant preparations having both medical and cosmetic uses in the seventeenth century, and of which Domenico Grillo seemed to be quite fond. The ambivalent nature of these mixtures whose prophylactic power relied on their capacity to please the senses not only echoes complex bodily conceptions pervading in the Baroque era, but also resonates well with the bewildering taxonomies prevailing in the cabinet of wonders.

**Treasuring costume**

By the mid-seventeenth century, the medieval chest had already lost a major part of its importance as an ubiquitous, multi-purpose storing device. Notwithstanding, as new
and increasingly specialised storage items developed and spread through the early-modern world, chests continued to be commonly used to put away and transport elements of clothing. By contrast, the Spanish cabinet on stand might seem like an unusual piece of furniture in which to deposit clothes, in particular the cumbersome apparel typical of the Spanish Baroque costume. Domenico Grillo, however, found that his larger escritorios were appropriate places in which to tuck a green camelhair doublet worked with golden thread, a red satin combing-cloth embroidered with silver, 12 handkerchiefs, six pairs of cuffs, and yet another combing-cloth all made of cambric. While these fine garments were undoubtedly valuable markers of rank, it is still possible to speculate on the reason why they would have been treasured in the great hall of the Grillo mansion. Gold thread and lace were among the clothing ornaments that were, in theory, banned by sumptuary laws under the Spanish Habsburgs. Their unlawful, unfashionable and yet valuable nature would have been a good reason to relegate them to the realm of wondrous curiosities. It is perhaps no coincidence that, in another drawer of Domenico Grillo's last group of desks, the Council's inspectors found 58 ounces of silver ornaments, most of them belonging to other escritorios for, as we noted before, sumptuary laws could be applied to furniture too. This, however, did not necessarily imply that these objects were to be excluded from the universe of performance since, as a matter of fact, most objects found in Domenico Grillo's cabinets inhabited both performative and contemplative grounds at once.

**Significant absences**

As in the first set of cabinets the Council's officials had examined, clear allusions to the divine order of creation were, again, curiously scarce in Domenico Grillo's third group of escritorios, as if he were reluctant to concede the orchestration of his private microcosm to some almighty force competing against his will. Catholic paraphernalia, usually pervading in every social sector's object world in early-modern Spain, is intriguingly missing among Grillo's belongings. In don Domenico's large ebony writing desks, inspectors only came across one chaplet made of small agarwood beads, and a gilt-bronze and crystal pax bearing an engraved image of the Immaculate Conception. Although certainly quite as costly as the embroidered garments with which it shared its storage space, this latter object would seem even more out of place in Domenico Grillo's great hall if it were to be interpreted in terms of its primary, sacred function – that of being kissed and passed over among the pious at the Mass as part of the Catholic rite of peace. Rather, it seems likely that, in the context of Domenico Grillo's object world, a golden pax would have been esteemed more for its exchange value than for its liturgical meaning.

The Council's officials would not leave the sparkling space of the Grillo mansion great hall before swiftly turning their eyes towards the centre of the room, where a large, square walnut bufete covered with a crimson taffeta tablecloth stood. Ten studded chairs upholstered in red plush were also distributed around the space that, by daylight, was illuminated by five windows covered with striped taffeta curtains. This particular furniture combination strongly supports the idea that, although the Baroque house did not have the rigid spatial distribution domestic spaces would acquire in later modern times, the great hall of Domenico Grillo's house was used as a prime socialising stage where both meals and collections could be consumed and performed as potent reifications of status.
Domenico Grillo’s hall of mirrors was thus the place where he could display his public self through a quite fantastic call to the senses, an empowering, staged game of lights, savours and smells conceived to please and, most probably, also to enchant and deceive. Casting an archaeological glance on this richly textured object lesson, one cannot help but to seek the meaning of the material voids revealed in the Council of the Indies’ inventory. Arguably, wondering what could have gone missing in the cabinets and drawers the Council’s officials found empty would be more than a mere quibbling over details, for Domenico Grillo certainly had many things to hide away from inspecting and curious eyes. Luxurious jewellery, for example, a quite portable type of item in the form of which personal fortunes were often amassed in early-modern times, was found nowhere in Grillo’s otherwise lavish cabinets, an intriguing and suspicious absence that could easily drag us into all kinds of suppositions.

Post script

By the end of their second day of inventoring the contents of the Grillo mansion, the sheriff, usher and high scribe of the Royal Council of the Indies were still far from completing their mission. They would return to Domenico Grillo’s office room to go through all the administrative and accountancy records of the asiento, in search of any written proof suggesting that, in fact, the slave-trading monopoly contract the Spanish crown had established with the Genoese was the legal cover for a major financial fraud. We will, however, not follow the Council’s officials in this second stage of their task, for that would fall beyond the scope of the phenomenological object lesson I have attempted to reveal in this article.

As I read it, the historical document constituting the substance of this essay represents a fabulous instance of transfiguration of Baroque materialities into ink and paper. It has allowed me to engage in a dense description of Domenico Grillo’s lived space from a standpoint which is surprisingly akin to an archaeological endeavour for, in fact, what I have proposed here is a reconstruction of the Baroque spirit through the analysis of specific processes of material consumption. Further, my archaeological approach to an exceptional historical text, bluntly intruding on Domenico Grillo’s secretive object world, also tends to depict the Genoese banker as a man of his time, an ambitious social climber whose structured programme of material accumulation can be deciphered through the wondrous discourse of Baroque collecting. My claim here has been that the Grillo mansion constitutes a collection de facto, and should be regarded as such, a carefully planned aggregate of social capital, a politicised microcosm containing dazzling reflections of the rare, the precious and, sometimes, the commonplace, but never any guileless indication that the daring trade on which all this Baroque masquerade was based, concerned real living people, not just numbers and texts.

Notes

1. While the Spanish archive usually employs Hispanicised versions of Italian names, in this article I have opted for respecting the original spelling of those names. Hence, for example, I have substituted Domingo Grillo for Domenico Grillo, and Ambrosio Lomelin for Ambrosio Lomellino.
2. Manuel Bernardo de Quiros, declaración, 1678. Consejos 26185-7, 3er cuadernillo. Archivo Histórico Nacional de España (AHN), Madrid, Spain. AHN.
4. In its first instance, the 1663 asiento was granted to the partnership constituted by Domenico Grillo and Ambrosio Lomellino, and is usually referred to as the Asiento de Grillo y Lomelin. Following the death of Ambrosio Lomellino in 1667, his share of the partnership was officially passed on to his heirs but, in practice, Domingo Grillo assumes entire control over the administration of the asiento. In general terms, even before 1667, it is common to encounter documents referring to the asiento with the sole name of “Grillo”, or using the plural form, “Grillos.” For the practical purposes of this essay, I have opted to omit, if possible, any mention to Ambrosio Lomellino when describing the slave-trading transactions of Domenico Grillo.
5. Vega Franco, El Tráfico de esclavos con América; Gaitán Ammann, “Besieged Genoese.”
6. Vila Vilar, Hispano-America y el comercio de esclavos; Newson and Minchin, From Capture to Sale.
7. Scelle, La Traite Négrière aux Indes de Castille; also, “The Slave-Trade in the Spanish Colonies of America.”
9. Gaitán Ammann, Daring Trade: An Archaeology of the Slave Trade.
10. Deetz, In Small Things Forgotten.
11. A widely accepted subfield of anthropology, historical archaeology emerged in North America in the 1960s as the artefact-based, and generally text-aided study, of the complex forms of interaction developed between people and things as a result of the European political and economic expansion from the Early Modern period onwards. As such, historical archaeology is often referred to as the archaeology of European colonialism in the New World, but may also be described more broadly as the archaeology of capitalism and globalisation. See, for example, Andrén, Between Artifacts and Texts; Beaudry, Documentary Archaeology; Hall and Silliman, “Archaeology of the Modern World;” Hicks and Beaudry, “The Place of Historical Archaeology;” Johnson, An Archaeology of Capitalism; Little, Text-Aided Archaeology; Orser, A Historical Archaeology of the Modern World; Wilkie, “Documentary Archaeology.”
12. Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape.
15. See for example, Berg and Clifford, “From Consupmtion to Consumer Culture;” Berg and Eger, “The Rise and Fall of the Luxury Debates.”
20. On this line of theoretical elaboration in anthropology and archaeology, see, for example, Graves-Brown, Matter, Materiality, and Modern Culture; Meskell, Archaeologies of Materiality; Miller, “Consumption and Commodities;” “Consumption and Its Consequences;” Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption; Miller, Materiality; Mullins, “Ideology, Power, and Capitalism.”
26. Smith and Findlen, Merchants & Marvels.
27. Gaitán Ammann, “Daring Trade: An Archaeology of the Slave Trade.”
28. Sanz Ayan, Los Banqueros De Carlos II; Alvarez Nogal, Los banqueros de Felipe IV; also, “Las Remesas Americanas.”
29. "Autos contra la persona y vienes de Domenico Grillo por 1 millón y 350u de resto del asiento de negros,” 1668. Indiferente 2833, Noveno Cuadernillo, ff 1r-21v. AGI; see also, Gaitán Ammann, “Daring Trade: An Archaeology of the Slave Trade,” 143.
31. Soja, Thirdspace; Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
32. Miller, Material Cultures; also, Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption; Meskell, Material Biographies: Object Worlds from Ancient Egypt; also, Archaeologies of Materiality; Buchli, “Material Culture: Current Problems;” Thomas, Entangled Objects; Appadurai, The Social Life of Things.
38. Covarrubias, Tesoro de la Lengua Castellana.
39. Sarti, Europe at Home, 130.
40. Sennequier, Ickowicz, and Zapata-Aubé, Miroirs: jeux et reflets depuis l’Antiquité; Roche, Courage, and Devinoy, Mirrors.
41. Melchior-Bonnet, “Miroir et Identité a la Renaissance.”
42. Spadaccini and Martín-Estudillo, Libertad y Límites: El Barroco Hispánico.
43. Ibíd., 30.
44. Daniela Bleichmar, “Looking at Exotica in Baroque Collections.”
49. Burr, Hispanic Furniture; Andrew Ciechanowiecki, “Spain and Portugal.”
50. Burr, Hispanic Furniture, 35.
51. Eaton, The Story of Western Furniture.
52. Burr, Hispanic Furniture, 46.
54. Burr, “Hispanic Furniture.”
55. Darst, "Renaissance Symmetry."
57. Semper y Guarinos, Historia del luxo; Kennedy, “Certain Phases of the Sumptuary Decrees of 1623.”
58. Uzanne, Umbrellas and Parasols; Beck, Gloves, their Annals and Associations.
60. Uzanne, Umbrellas and Parasols.


66. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”


69. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

70. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

71. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

72. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

73. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

74. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

75. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

76. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

77. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

78. Dakin and Wichmann, “Cacao and Chocolate, an Uto-Aztecan Perspective.”

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References


Small but powerful: networking strategies and the trade business of Habsburg-Italian merchants in Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century

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ABSTRACT
Lombardian merchants played an important role in long-distance trade between the Italian and the Iberian Peninsulas since the Middle Ages, in contrast to widely held beliefs and historiographical neglect. The eighteenth century witnessed the intensification of this role. Instead of being worse off after Lombardy passed from Spanish sovereignty to being ruled from Vienna, the Lombardian mercantile community in Cadiz made use of the institutional framework offered by the imperial maritime policy of the Habsburgs, which compensated for a lack of their own commercial institutional framework. Making use of different social strategies, which combined kinship, cultural and transnational co-operation, Lombardian merchants skilfully connected Spanish America with Habsburg Central Europe through the Mediterranean, despite the fact that their degree of formal integration into the Spanish trading system was limited. This occurred in the episode of growth that followed the Bourbon reforms in Spain after the 1760s. Although their business networks reached a wide geographical area, Lombardian merchants also acted as intermediaries for the incorporation of the Triestinian traders into long-distance maritime trade networks, and therefore contributed to linking both ends of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

Studies on merchant communities in the early-modern period have undergone a profound transformation in recent years. From focusing on specific national communities and family relations present at cosmopolitan port cities, they have progressively switched to the exploration of transnational networks and, most recently, cross-cultural trade relations. These approaches can be regarded as complementary to one another, rather than as alternative, exclusive models. Different types of networks – based on kinship, cultural closeness or cross-cultural relations – were used in mercantile co-operation in the early-modern period, alone or in combination, depending on the context and the strategies of merchants and mercantile communities.

This article makes use of these theoretical considerations regarding two basic issues. First, it focuses on Italian merchants but avoids some of the shortcomings of classic national
historiographies, for example by not instilling them retroactively with a homogenous ‘Italian’ character, and by not necessarily considering these merchants as intrinsically linked to their home territories and their ruling elites. Occasionally these frameworks continue to shape the examination of merchant communities despite the limitations that they pose on the understanding of the wide-ranging activities of what were highly mobile and heterogeneous groups; merchant communities were characterised by a constant reconceptualisation of their identities. In addition, they operated within far-ranging multi-cultural networks. While French or English mercantile histories can build upon a well-established national narrative, based on a relatively secured and stable state, and have often come to be understood in terms of centralist mercantilism, other actor groups and territories that lacked this kind of continuity present a very different paradigm. This is the case, for instance, with Italian merchants, whose historical and political evolution has recently become a favourite subject of study, as shown by a prolific bibliography. Among them, Genoese and Tuscan traders, active in Mediterranean and Atlantic ports, have received most attention.

This article will contribute to this discussion by studying those Italian merchants who were active in the Spanish Atlantic harbour of Cadiz during the second half of the eighteenth century and whose territories of origin were under the sovereignty of the Habsburg Imperial Court in Vienna. This Habsburg Italian community included traders from Lombardy, a former Spanish possession which was put under Austrian rule as part of the geopolitical reshuffling following the Spanish War of Succession (1701–13); and Tuscany, governed under a regime of Secundogeniture by the Habsburg Emperor from 1737 as a result of the Polish War of Succession (1733–8). Naples (1713–34), Sicily (1720–34) and Parma and Piacenza (1738–48) were temporarily under Habsburg rule as well, but their trading communities will not be considered here because their association with the Viennese Court was very brief. In the context of the debate about cultural identities and co-operative institutions in early-modern merchant communities, I shall also explore if and how the new sovereignty created a common identity among Lombardian merchants in Cadiz.

Both terms – identity and nation – have received much academic attention in recent times: Nations are understood, in the context of the early-modern age, and in particular regarding the history of transnational long-distance maritime trade, not as a framework for collective identity based on the State, but rather as groups that either shared a common judicial framework (as subjects of a polycentric state, typical of the early-modern period), or were related by reasons of geographical and/or cultural, linguistic or religious affinity. These groups and their interests were typically represented by maritime consulates. For example in Livorno, one of the most prosperous ports in the Mediterranean, in particular during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Germans and the Flemish shared a single consulate, while the Spanish consulate was directed by the Florentine Antonio Borgi, who also represented the Kingdom of Naples (linked to Spain) and the Armenian-Levantine community. For their part, in eighteenth-century Cadiz the Hanseatic and the Empire’s consulate were clearly separated.

These examples clearly illustrate the complex interconnections between ‘nation’ and cultural identities. In addition, identities were not stable, but highly fluid and flexible; they changed according to the mobility and modes of interaction of traders with the local society. Klaus Weber observed that ‘commercial links and kinship among the respective national communities were so numerous that as a whole they may be regarded as a single cosmopolitan social group.’
Social stratification within mercantile groups doubtlessly was a significant factor in the internal organisation of merchant communities in each commercial hub, but one that could not operate in isolation, for the restrictive regulations and trade monopolies imposed by different governments also affected the formation of merchant networks. In 1503, the Spanish crown set up a commercial monopoly in order to control trade with its overseas colonies in America, and later also Asia, which, in effect, limited direct involvement with this trade to Spanish merchants. This monopoly was managed by the House of Trade (Casa de Contratación) and the Merchant Guild (Consulado de Cargadores a Indias), based in Seville until their transference to Cadiz during the reign of Philipp V, the first Spanish Bourbon, whose access to the Spanish throne was one of the main outcomes of the War of the Succession.

While foreign merchants were forbidden to participate in Spanish colonial trade, they were still needed as providers of maritime insurance, credit, export commodities and ships; this participation was achieved by both legal and informal means. Thereby, until the late eighteenth century, Cadiz was a privileged node in the emergent global economy, a cosmopolitan trade centre dominated by a 'foreign financial conglomerate'. Conversely, English trade, for example, was much more reliant on private initiative and privileges, yet the system was similarly limited by laws which severely restricted the access of foreign merchants to British trade.

Naturalisation of foreign citizens was an important instrument of interaction between 'foreign' and 'domestic' traders as it permitted merchants to acquire legal rights within the tight regulation of mercantilist trade monopolies and gave access to the highly protected colonial trade. In Spain, until the 1791 reform, local communities had a say concerning who should be given citizenship. In eighteenth-century Cadiz, which followed the system previously used in Seville, albeit with some modifications, naturalisation documents were issued by the Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) on request of the House of Trade, assisted by the Merchant Guild. The aim was to keep colonial trade for Spaniards, whose role was often limited to acting as intermediaries for large commercial houses, many of which belonged to non-Spaniards. Naturalisations demonstrate the fluidity and political character of merchant communities; their analysis should not be clouded by contemporary takes on statehood and nationhood.

My second aim in this article, to reconsider the involvement of the Central European territories under the Habsburgs in maritime trade, will help us to explore this issue more in detail. Research is increasingly aware of the role played by the multicultural Central European monarchy of the Habsburgs in maritime commerce, but this new trend still has to overcome the reductionist approach which gives priority to spatial, instead of to demographic considerations, and which has hitherto resulted in a distorted perception of the issue. Economic historiography has paid much attention to the formation of internal markets and has posed little challenge to the claim that the ‘landlocked’ Habsburg Monarchy detached itself, at least partially, from long-distance maritime trade when trade centres shifted to the Atlantic at the turn of the sixteenth century, a move that has been interpreted as a somewhat protracted effect of the American expansion of the Iberian monarchies.

While more recent scholarship highlights the significance of Atlantic markets for the economy of South Austria and Bohemia and stresses the role played by merchants from these regions, the focus on the part played by Milanese traders as connectors between the Habsburg central dominions and Atlantic markets exposes the highly transnational
character of long-distance trade. This fact also underlines the complex interaction between fragmented sovereignties, multiple jurisdictions and distant geographical areas. At the same time, the case posed by the Lombardian merchants also highlights the commercial importance of the Mediterranean, against the challenge posed by recent (and some not quite so recent) claims. Specific attention will be paid here to the Milanese merchants’ links between Cadiz and the Adriatic Sea, in particular the port city of Trieste.

A glance at the longue durée: Lombardian merchants in Spain and Cadiz between the fifteenth and the late seventeenth century

The relationship between the Iberian and the Italian peninsulas has been a tight one since at least the Middle Ages, because of political and dynastic links, the avenues of cultural exchange and the intensity of commercial transactions. The closeness of the relationship is also illustrated by the fact that, according to the official census data of 1791, Italians were the second-largest group of foreign residents in mainland Spain, after the French. While this general categorisation blurs the kind of historical identities that this article aims at exploring, it gives a fair idea about the intimacy of the Spanish-Italian relationship up to the final chapters of the ancien régime.

Within this wider context, the presence of traders from the duchies of Milan and Mantua on the Iberian Peninsula has a claim for longevity that is in sharp contrast with the limited historiographical interest it has been granted to date. Already in the Late Middle Ages, Milanese merchants settled in remarkable numbers at Spanish Mediterranean harbours such as Valencia. Both the Genoese and the Lombardians were at that stage heavily involved in the silk trade: they supplied the expanding manufactories at home with raw materials while exporting a range of consumer goods, mainly textiles, to the Iberian Peninsula. Milanese commercial networks reached Lisbon in the sixteenth century, attracted by Portugal’s colonial trade (especially some particularly lucrative products, for example, pepper). They also included some key commercial nodes on the Iberian Peninsula, such as Seville, Toledo and Medina del Campo (by then the most important fair in North Castile) in their extensive family networks.
Despite their considerable numbers and the wide geographical scope of their commercial networks, both Lombardian and Tuscan merchants remained in the shadow of the powerful Genoese mercantile community. The Genoese played an essential part in Spanish imperial maritime trade and in the Spanish monarchy’s financial structure. As Manuel Herrero Sánchez has shown, this influence reached far beyond the famous ‘century of the Genoese’ (*el siglo de los genoveses*, 1528–1627), the growing importance of Dutch and Flemish businessmen notwithstanding, and persisted well into the eighteenth century, as Catia Brilli has demonstrated for Cadiz. The predominant Genoese position in the financial and mercantile networks constructed around the Spanish Monarchy has contributed to masking the role Lombardian business houses played in these same networks at least from the late sixteenth or the early seventeenth century. The Milanese reinforced the connection between the Spanish Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean and Central Europe and were seamlessly integrated into the Genoese-Spanish financial and mercantile networks in spite of the relative decline of Lombardy’s role in international long-distance trade during the seventeenth century. Some Lombardian merchants aspired to a more direct involvement in these transactions between the Alps and the Iberian Peninsula and founded their own trading houses in Spanish harbours, hence transcending their role as the Central European intermediaries for the Genoese. In this context, the Andalusian Atlantic became a region of paramount importance. Even before the monopoly-associated institutions moved from Seville to Cadiz in 1717, Lombardian merchants started operating in the harbour of Cadiz, which was later to become the central node of Bourbon Spain’s mercantilist system.

The extant, and rather sporadic, references point to a stable, albeit small migration. The first population census of 1713 lists eight Milanese and three Tuscan residents. Their numbers increased considerably later in the century, as a random sample from the population census of 1773 demonstrates: 30 citizens from the duchies of Milan and Mantua were registered in the Cadiz census (against only two natives of Tuscany) and this is only for five of the city’s 15 districts.

An examination of the wills, codicils and testamentary letters of attorney (poder para testar) deposited with all of the city’s public notaries (currently available in the electronic database of the Historical Provincial Archive) between 1750 and 1820 presents quite a different picture. Table 1 illustrates the contrast between the uncontested numerical leadership of Genoese citizens and the small number of Lombardian (46), Venetian (28) and Tuscan (16) residents. Multiple registers with persons issuing more than one will have been excluded. Although not all of these wills are necessarily related to merchants, the widely known preponderance of commercial activities among the foreign residents of Cadiz makes them a valid approximation for ranking the weight of trading groups. This survey thus suggests that Milanese, Venetians and Tuscans formed second-range commercial communities in Cadiz. The aforementioned census data indicates that a high number of Milanese migrants worked as employees, secretaries or servants in the firms and trade houses of the high commercial bourgeoisie. This gives a geographical dimension to Manuel Bustos Rodriguez’s conclusion that Italian migrants in Cadiz – alongside those from France, Andalusia, the Basque Country and other regions in northern Spain – occupied most of the professional posts in wholesale trade, but merely as employees.

The social profile of Lombardian immigrants at the Andalusian Atlantic coast is related to the demographic growth undergone by the duchies of Milan and Mantua, where the population increased from 900,000 to 1.32 million between 1750 and 1785, turning the
region into one of the most densely populated in Europe, with 141 inhabitants per square kilometre. Emigration was one of the answers to the growing need for alternative sources of income and employment, despite the development of the prosperous proto-industrial sector (mainly silk and cotton industries), and the increasing rationalisation of agricultural activity. These growing sectors could not, however, compensate for the poverty of the soil and the burdensome feudal obligations which were increasingly made payable in money, not kind, leading to the termination of traditional sharecropping practices. The contrast between the low social profile of Milanese merchants and the few, but powerful and successful, trading houses in Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century is striking, as will be seen.

**Between ‘Milanese’, ‘Imperial’, ‘German’: legal status and institutional framework of Lombardian merchants**

The data so far presented is sufficient to enable the cautious conclusion that the presence of Milanese merchants in Cadiz increased in the course of the eighteenth century. Apart from the social and economic reasons explaining the presence of Lombardian traders on the Andalusian Atlantic coast, the impact of institutional and legal changes acquires equal importance. After the Milanese sovereignty switched from Madrid to Vienna in 1714, territorial borders shifted, which means that some parts of what was later to become Lombardian territory were not (always) part of the Milan of the Habsburgs. Bergamo and Brescia for example, belonged to the Republic of Venice up to 1797, while Valenza, Valsesia, Lomellina and Alessandria were lost as early as 1707. In addition, Milan ceded Novara and Tortona (in 1736) as well as Lago Maggiore, Vigevano and Pavia (in 1744). As a rule, the categories ‘Milanese’ and ‘Lombardian’ will be used generally to refer to the Milanese territory under the Habsburgs while mentions to the actual city of Milan will be explicitly indicated.

The shift of rule also brought a change in the status of Lombardian traders in the Iberian Peninsula: previously, they had been subjects of the Spanish Crown, but now they were considered foreigners from a legal point of view, a situation which, in principle, also affected their counterparts from the Austrian Netherlands. Yet while the powerful Flemish merchant community was quick to press for their own interests, having their old consulate re-established in the Treaty of Vienna (1725), no similar moves are reported concerning the Milanese traders. Thus, Milanese traders were more clearly regarded as subjects of the Emperor than did the Flemish, at least in appearance. In fact, the imperial consulate in Cadiz granted by Madrid in the Treaty of Vienna – which was, however, attached to the Flemish consulate at least until the 1760s – was run by Milanese traders during the last quarter of the eighteenth century: Paolo Greppi and Carlo Bazzoni (a native of Novara and thus not even a citizen of Habsburg-governed Lombardy until 1815) were commercial representatives of the Habsburg-ruled community. They were followed by José Nerini, a Venetian trader, who was appointed to the post after the Austrian incorporation of the Republic of Venice, first agreed in the Peace Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) and finally confirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

However, the first register of foreign inhabitants (matrícula de extranjeros) in Cadiz, dating from 1764, mentions Joseph Carlos Maggi as the only Lombardian trader in Cadiz and describes him as being under the protection of the Spanish king and hence lacking a proper consular representation. From the 1770s Milanese merchants were officially registered as belonging to the Habsburg merchant community. They were thus described as members
of the imperial mercantile ‘nation’, which was under the leadership of its consul, Baron Bartolomeo di Carignani, a former official in the Lower Austrian council of commerce and the descendant of a family with its origins in the Republic of Lucca, bordering Tuscany.\textsuperscript{43}

Beside the nation’s deputy Carlo Sigismondo Agazzino, who, along with the Scottish-born Arthuro Gordon, acted as substitute for the consul, the registers mention Paolo Greppi, Joseph Scorza, Juan Baptista Calcagni, Juan Zeruti and Carlo Antonio Bolza, an employee of Consul Carignani. Although the registers do not offer information on the traders’ origin, the city’s population census from 1773 identifies all of them as Milanese.\textsuperscript{44} In turn, we can only speculate about the background of other Italian names, such as Gilattrino and Tasa, which are also present in the \textit{matricula}. The registers for the 1770s also reveal the highly heterogeneous character of the Habsburg merchant nation, which in the official discourse was always referred to as ‘imperial’. Apart from the Milanese, one also finds Juan Baptista Ronqueti, from Novara, the Tyroleans Pedro and Juan Inson (or Imson), the Croatian employee Juan Thomasich, and the Tuscan traders Francisco Xavier Goidoti and Juan Isidro Massagrati, among others. The latter names demonstrate that Tuscan traders enlisted eventually with the imperial consulate before it was also accredited for the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1782.\textsuperscript{45} For their part, the large group formed by Bohemian traders generally preferred to operate without consular representation, with the sole exception of the firm Schürer & Co. Merchants from other states of the Holy Roman Empire, in particular from the Hanseatic cities, had their own, well-established consulate.\textsuperscript{46} Only in 1791, when the Spanish crown introduced a more restrictive registration for both foreign residents (\textit{domiciliados}) and temporary settlers (\textit{transeúntes})\textsuperscript{47}, did many of the Bohemians accept going under the jurisdiction of the imperial consulate. By then official numbers had dropped significantly, so the remainder of the imperial Habsburg merchant nation consisted of just three Milanese merchants (Giuseppe Marliani, listed as \textit{transeúnte}, Antonio and Ambrosio Sangirico).\textsuperscript{48} Although the thoroughness of the registers of foreign inhabitants varied according to year and place, and has therefore to be treated with caution, in mercantile centres, such as Cadiz, they are deemed to be particularly reliable.\textsuperscript{49} The case of the Habsburg imperial community in Cadiz seems to confirm this reliability: their registers are very detailed and encompass a wide range of trading categories, including wholesale traders, retailers and commercial employees. Such thoroughness stands in sharp contrast with the unwillingness shown by these traders to provide information regarding their commercial profits for the revision of the unique tax registration (\textit{única contribución}) in 1771/2.\textsuperscript{50} In fact, several outstanding Milanese traders do not appear in the relevant list.\textsuperscript{51}

Categories varied according to different sources and years. Juan Bautista Calcagni (Calcagny), for instance, was listed as a subject of the Piemontese King in the first register of foreign residents in 1764, while in the census of 1773 he was identified as Milanese.\textsuperscript{52} A similar case is found in Jorge Fedriani, who was labelled as ‘German’ (\textit{aleman}) or ‘Imperial’ (\textit{imperial}) by all sources in the 1770s\textsuperscript{53}, but who was, in fact, a citizen of Genoa, as he declared in his testamentary letter of attorney four decades later, on 2 April 1812.\textsuperscript{54} This underlines the fluidity of the spatial identities, as declared, and their legal significance. In both cases, ‘national’ affiliation was closely connected with business activity: while Carignani joined a commercial company with the Milanese merchants Paolo Greppi, Giuseppe Scorza and Carlo Sigismundo Agazzino in April 1769\textsuperscript{55} (and then, apparently, began to officially claim a Milanese identity and registered at the imperial consulate), Fedriani seems to have arrived from Trieste. He appears there in the late 1760s, posing as a Livornese businessman
and founding a silk velvet factory together with the Viennese merchant Filippo Giuseppe Languidir (also: Languider or Langwider), the son-in-law of Giacomo Balletti, one of the leading merchants of the Habsburg harbour on the North-Eastern Adriatic coast. Only a few years later this co-operation extended to trade, and Fedriani was put in charge of the commercial house opened with Languidir in Cadiz, with the financial support of Balletti. After the collapse of this enterprise – the house was closed from at least 177556 – Fedriani seems to have changed consulates; at least, he is not mentioned in the 1791 list.57 This clearly demonstrates the constant realignment of merchant identities, which changed according to the social and legal dimension of their business commitments: as soon as traders from outside the Habsburg dominions joined commercial houses owned by Habsburg subjects, they seem to have preferred to put themselves under the protection of the imperial consulate. This, incidentally, put the consulate mainly at the service of the interests of traders with a strong Mediterranean orientation, which was pretty much in compliance with the mercantilist plans of the Austrian authorities at Vienna and Trieste.58

In sum, the evidence demonstrates the close integration of Milanese merchants into the institutional framework of the Habsburg Monarchy, represented by the imperial consulate in Cadiz. As mentioned above, consulates played an important role in defending the rights of the imperial mercantile community, for example by ensuring that conditions laid down in bilateral trade treaties were enforced. They also passed information regarding shipping, custom duties, taxes and political developments to their governments. Thus, consulates were instrumental in reducing uncertainty in long-distance trade, lowering transaction costs and facilitating long-distance transactions.59 Regarding the Habsburg dominions, two treaties signed by the courts of Madrid and Vienna are of particular relevance in the eighteenth century: the already mentioned Treaty of Vienna (1725) and the commercial agreement of Aranjuez (or Italy, 1752). The first treaty laid down the creation of maritime consulates, while the second established a mutual clause of most-favoured nation and toll reductions for the introduction of goods from the Austrian Netherlands to Spain. In both cases, the treaties were mainly concerned with the interests of Flemish merchants.60

The Lombardian modus operandi clearly differed from that of the other two communities under Habsburg rule; although the representation of Tuscan traders fell to the imperial consul when Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo appointed Paolo Greppi as Tuscan representative on 3 August 1782, it was based on the dynastic union between Emperor and Grand Duke. Accordingly, the Tuscan mercantile community maintained its own institutional framework.61

In contrast, the small Milanese mercantile community, who had neither the financial and mercantile capacity of their Flemish counterparts, nor a merchant fleet or port city in their home territory, as the Tuscans, had little option but to integrate into the imperial institutional framework for maritime trade. However, several Lombardian businessmen assumed leading positions within the consular office at Cadiz, and used it to remedy the lack of other corporate institutions for the – otherwise not particularly compact – Milanese subgroup.

**Several Lombardian merchant houses in Cadiz: business mechanisms and strategies on the micro-level**

Despite the significant role played by Lombardian merchants in Cadiz – one of the most vibrant international maritime nodes of the eighteenth century – their activity has not been
paid commensurate attention in the large number of studies on foreign mercantile communities in the Andalusian port city which have been published in recent years. In order to offer a first approximation, we analyse four Milanese mercantile companies that operated in Cadiz in the second half of the eighteenth century. The focus is on business mechanisms and strategies in the context of the extraordinary boom of Spanish colonial trade – in its vast majority channelled through Cadiz – between the Free Trade Decrees of 1765 and 1778 and the Napoleonic wars, which initiated its irreversible breakdown: between 1772/7 and 1784/9 imports from Spanish America to Cadiz rose from 86 to 203.5 million reales.

The earliest of the Cádiz-based Lombardian companies with connections to long-distance wholesale trade was created by Juan Angel Belloni, from Condogno, whose business scope was remarkably wide. This is demonstrated by the two trading houses he ran – Galli Belloni y Compañía, alongside Julian Cayetano Galli, from Florence, (1734–43) and Belloni y Moris, together with the Piemontese Juan Domingo Morris (the company was terminated in 1756). After both companies went bankrupt, Belloni still had enough resources (he was solidly backed by the fortune of his wife, Josefa Augustina Albrecht) to continue with his trading activities on his own account, at least until 1773 when he drafted his will. Although these companies were based in Cadiz, where Belloni still claimed to reside in the 1760s, both he and Juan Domingo Morris feature as residents of nearby Sanlucar de Barrameda in 1765. This underlines the strong interconnection between the different harbours in the Bay of Cadiz. Likewise, other Milanese merchants can be found in nearby Puerto de Santa Maria, where their numbers progressively increased – two in 1791, four in 1794 and seven in 1808.

The second of these companies, in terms of chronology, is the aforementioned house Pablo Greppi Agazzino y Compañía. The company was created in 1769 and was active until 1808. It was based on the alliance of three influential Milanese families, which occupied an important place in the hierarchy of trade and finances in the state of Milan. Among them, Antonio Greppi, Ferdinando Agazzino and Pietro Marliani were the key figures, providing capital, initial contacts and commercial spirit and sending their sons to Cadiz to manage the business. Accordingly, three of the companies’ five partners initially were closely linked to the city of Milan, both regarding the sources of its capital and the influence of their fathers in decisions concerning business affairs. During its operation, the company was dissolved and re-founded twice (in 1781 and 1800). The changes in its name (first, to Greppi Marliani y Compañía, and then, to Pablo Greppi y Calcagni) reflected the reshuffling of the company’s internal structure as partners joined, left or died (Figure 1). While two partners – Agazzino and Scorza – left in the early 1780s, the real turning point in the history of the company was the death of Giuseppe Marliani and Paolo Greppi at the turn of the eighteenth century; the firm’s activity ceased after the death of the last remaining partner – the aforementioned Juan Bautista (Giovanni Battista) Calcagni, who was the only partner who did not belong to the clique of families from the city of Milan. The liquidation of the firm started that same year, and was still in process in 1817.

The houses of Santiago Martineli (Pozzino y Martineli) and Carlo Bazzoni were much smaller than those of Belloni and Greppi. Although their founding dates are not known, it can be assumed that their activity began as well in the last quarter of the eighteenth century (that is, their activity largely overlapped with that of Greppi) and that it continued until the early nineteenth century. Martineli’s firm closed in 1800, after the death of its partners and Bazzoni’s firm disappeared after his death in 1818. The majority of these four companies were comprised solely of Italian merchants, although according to the sources only the
Greppi company was formed mainly by Milanese merchants, with the important exception of Calcagni and the fact that Paolo Greppi himself was born in Bergamo and was hence a Venetian ‘co-citizen’ (‘*connatural*’), as he declared in his testamentary letter of attorney in 1777. As already noted, Bazzoni came from nearby Novara, but acted as vice-consul with Greppi, and later, from 1805, as consul in both Cadiz and Barcelona. Apart from his work at the Tuscan consulate he was also the official representative of the Republic of Ragusa, the Ottoman tributary mercantile republic in Dalmatia, on the Adriatic coast, just as Greppi had done before him.

**Social integration: naturalisation, migration, marriage and family**

Almost all of these Milanese merchants were temporary residents, although this concept changed after the reform of 1791 when the declaration of loyalty to the Spanish king and the expulsion of French citizens two years later increased the pressure on foreigners after decades of debates on their judicial status in the Spanish Monarchy. Among the Milanese merchants studied here, only one, Belloni, acquired a naturalisation letter in 1751, when he joined the Merchant Guild. He was one of four Milanese subjects whose application for a naturalisation letter at the House of Trade in Cadiz was successfully approved by the Council of the Indies between 1700 and 1787. In order to become a subject of the Spanish King, and to matriculate in the Cadiz merchant guild and, hence, participate officially and directly in colonial trade with the Spanish overseas dominions, several requirements had to be met: marriage to a Spaniard, residence in the country for at least 20 years (including a fixed place of residence for at least 10 years), and the possession of landed property above 4000 *ducados* were among the most important. However, not all of the criteria had to be fulfilled strictly in order for the naturalisation process to be a success. Furthermore, in some cases merchants managed to get accepted in the Merchant Guild without having obtained a formal naturalisation letter beforehand. After 1780, membership of the Merchant Guild was dropped as a necessary precondition for direct participation in the colonial trade.
Also in Belloni’s case the Spanish king issued a dispensation regarding the missing years of residence, since Belloni had settled in Spain in 1734. He easily met the remaining criteria as he married the naturalised daughter of a Flemish-Italian immigrant couple. His two business partners also obtained naturalisation in 1728 and 1751 respectively.

Naturalisation may be regarded as a strategy followed in order to ensure the continuation of business, or to seek higher profits through direct control of this trade. However, the reliance on Spanish intermediaries was far from posing an obstacle to successful business, as is demonstrated by the fact that the rest of the Milanese merchants analysed here preferred their status as foreigners under the authority of the imperial consulate. Paolo Greppi even explicitly rejected his father’s suggestion that he obtained a Spanish naturalisation letter in order to matriculate in the Merchant Guild, preferring the post as imperial consul instead. This demonstrates that the legal status did not reflect the degree of social integration of merchants, but responded to different life and business strategies. Naturalisation also implied accepting Spanish laws, which in the case of Cadiz were those of the Crown of Castile, among which inheritance law stands out. Also, naturalised citizens had to cut off all relationships with their original community of origin. The category of temporary resident (transiénte), therefore, seems hardly adequate to describe the social reality of these merchants, who for the most part died in the Bay of Cadiz at an advanced age. Such was the case of Greppi’s business partners, Giuseppe Marliani and Giovanni Battista Calcagni, who at time of their deaths, in 1798 and 1808 respectively, remained citizens of Milan and Piedmont.

In turn, the category of transiénte seems adequate for interpreting the activities of the two remaining business partners, Carlo Sigismondo Agazzino and Giuseppe Scorza, who left Cadiz in the mid-1780s, and even Greppi himself followed this model up to a certain extent. Although Greppi had lived in marriage with Maria Rivas y Díaz – the widow of a colonel in the Spanish army – for almost eight years by the time he left Andalusia in 1791, he had kept secret both their relationship and the son they were raising, fearing his father’s disapproval of what, from the perspective of a recently ennobled family, could be considered a low-prestige marriage. Furthermore, Greppi’s leave meant withdrawing from his position as the main partner in one of the most successful commercial companies in one of the top maritime trade centres of the period; he did so in order to comply with his father’s persistent wish to have his fifth and youngest son back in the city of Milan for both family and business reasons.

The case of the Greppi Company is a good illustration of the widely accepted importance of family as an institution in the organisation and co-ordination of mercantile networks. This implied not only the movement of money and commodities, but also the migration of people. Regarding the latter, three out of five company partners migrated to the Bay of Cadiz when their fathers in the Lombardian capital decided to invest in the Cadiz-based trade. Also, Giuseppe Scorza, who acted as tutor for the young Paolo Greppi before he turned 25, was especially determined in this regard, although in his case his determination was aided by his loyalty towards Paolo’s father, Antonio Greppi, for whom Scorza’s son Baldassarre worked as secretary in the management of the customs administration of the State of Milan. The so-called appalto (Ferma) was co-directed by Antonio Greppi between 1751 and 1770. Similarly, the close relationship between the Greppi and the Marliani families derived from their activity in the Ferma: Marliani was employed in the secretary of the Milanese Ferma and since 1761 was one of the co-directors of the Ferma of Mantua. Only Calcagni, from Giaveno in Piedmont, who already had experience in managing his own trading house
before joining the Greppi, was not part of this inter-family clique and its connections with the administration of Habsburg Lombardy. Paolo’s management closely related the family’s investment in Cadiz to Milan, both in terms of capital and decision-making, which makes the interpretation of the house as a mere branch plausible, although this idea underestimates both Paolo’s autonomy and the even more independent role of the remaining partners.

That family played a decisive role for maintaining trans-regional links across far distances is also made apparent by the example of Santiago Martineli, who appointed his two sisters, both living in the city of Milan, as heirs when he formalised his will a few weeks before his death in September 1800. A different pattern can be detected in the cases of Juan Angel Belloni, Giuseppe Marliani and Carlo Bazzoni, who bequeathed their assets to their families either in the Bay of Cadiz, Andalusia, or in other parts of the Iberian Peninsula. This decision not only reflects the fact that these merchants were integrated into Spanish society to a larger degree than the remaining Milanese traders, but also that they were more independent from their families of origin. Likewise, all three of them took Spanish wives, while Martineli and Calcagni died unmarried. However, there was an additional factor in all this movement of capital, which was the crisis of Cadiz as a trade centre from 1796 onwards, with the beginning of the wars with France, and especially from 1808, when Spain was occupied by Napoleonic troops. In addition, this led to the emergence of movements for independence in Spanish America, which ultimately resulted in the virtual dissolution of the Spanish Empire in the 1820s. This caused a sharp decline of colonial trade and the reduction of the formerly cosmopolitan Cadiz to the role of a mere regional harbour. In this changed climate, some foreign merchants decided to withdraw their capital and return to their countries.

The different family patterns were also relevant when it came to raising capital. In agreement with the general pattern, it is hardly surprising that the two merchants who successfully married into established mercantile families in Cadiz – Belloni and Marliani – used their wives’ dowries in order to finance their commercial business. While Belloni used both the dowry and the assets of his wife, amounting to 319,082 reales de vellón, as well as the wealth bequeathed to him by his brother in law, Jacobo Albrecht, to finance his trading business in the early 1770s, Marliani’s marriage with Francisca de Paula Casens Dufresne put him in possession of her dowry of 6500 pesos fuertes. In fact, this sum was largely raised by Casens’ uncle, Tomas Hilson, and corresponded almost exactly with the sum Marliani’s father, Pietro, had invested in the Greppi company, which his son had joined in 1777.

However, as this investment was earmarked for his future inheritance, Marliani used it only as security to turn his wife’s dowry into commercial capital. Only after his father’s death, in 1787, did he come into full possession of the capital, which by then had increased to 120,000 pesos fuertes. He then obtained that both his mother Magdalena Ferrari and his brother Roque forfeited from their legitimate claims on their inheritance share of the investment in the company. In turn he left both of them the rest of his father’s property in Milan, and came up for a yearly pension to his mother.

The rapid growth of Marliani’s capital underlines the outstanding success of the Greppi company, which was to continue, although at a slower rate due to the impact of the Napoleonic wars in the 1790s, until Marliani’s death in 1798. When Francisca de Paula Casens filed the inventory in order to proceed to the execution of the will of her husband, his share in gross capital amounted to 204,621 pesos fuertes, nearly twice as much as his partner Calcagni (117,850.30 pesos fuertes), but still much less than Paolo Greppi’s overwhelming 891,472.20 pesos fuertes.
The examples demonstrate different ways in which the wives’ dowries contributed to the accumulation of commercial capital. The literature abounds in interpretations and theories about this much-discussed subject. Of particular interest is Paloma Fernández’s assertion of sons-in-law’s dominant position in business; marriages permitted the merger of capitals from different businesses and thus the constitution of larger, and more competitive, firms.  

However, neither Greppi nor Calcagni could resort to dowries. Greppi, in particular, relied on his father in Milan for capital, which he, nevertheless, managed to increase considerably. Also, Antonio Greppi’s late death and his large number of children made a Marliani-style emancipation unviable for Paolo. While Belloni and Marliani confirm Paloma Fernández Pérez’s general claim that marriage to daughters of Cadiz trading families facilitated foreign merchants to start businesses on their own account, the inflow of capital from abroad, in this case Austrian Lombardy, was even more significant. The examples of Belloni and the Greppi company highlight the opportunities for massive and quick profits resulting from the commercial boom fostered by Charles’s III ‘Free Trade’ reforms in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Most of this capital was re-invested locally: Belloni acquired two houses in Sanlucar and two vineyards in nearby Jerez de la Frontera, Marliani owned a house in Puerto Real, while it is unclear what happened to Greppi’s fortune after he died suddenly on his way to Paris in September 1800. In sum, the examples corroborate Fernández Pérez’s conclusion that the importance of dowries declined in Cadiz during the second half of the eighteenth century due to the presence of stronger merchant firms and the generally expansive trading conjuncture. However, the role played by the inflow of capital is more relevant to the issue than the model allows.

In consonance with Fernández Pérez’s conclusions, we observe that women, through marriage, played an important role in the success of commercial enterprises, which is often erroneously ascribed predominately to male agency. Women were not only the backbone to their husbands’ companies, as provider of (fresh) capital, but also participated actively in networking and management.

**The formation of commercial networks: from family and cultural bases to transnational links**

Apart from its role in commercial mediation, the institutional limitations of the Spanish colonial trade monopoly forced merchants to enter into a peculiar form of networking, as non-naturalised merchants had to rely on Spanish intermediaries. As previously noted, among the traders under consideration only Belloni obtained formal participation in colonial trade. Both before and after his ingress into the Cadiz Merchant Guild Belloni shipped goods to the Spanish American colonies: in 1749, for example, Belloni and his naturalised partner Morris consigned goods to Veracruz, acting as representatives of Ermengol Gener from Barcelona. Much later, Belloni sold two pearl bracelets in Mexico, although in his will, in 1773, he was still waiting for his representative, Jacobo de Vegara, to send him the returns. In consequence, even formal participation in the Spanish colonial trade required the operation of commercial networks that were essential for the management of commodity and capital flows.

The Greppi enterprise had to rely on an even more intense co-operation with Spanish merchants in order to access the highly beneficial colonial trade. While the Cadiz notary files confirm that the company signed sound credit contracts and one bottomry loan between
1774 and 1784 for the shipment of goods, mainly to Cuba but also to Honduras, Veracruz, Guaira and New Granada, the company still relied on a broad range of Spanish merchants for the successful management of their business on the other side of the Atlantic. Bottomry loans were a common resource among foreign merchants, who had no direct access to the monopoly trade system and had to rely on their Spanish intermediaries for exporting goods to Spanish America. As the law forbade the appointment of Spanish merchants as agents of foreign firms, these operations were conducted by means of credit mechanisms. Bottomry loans involved the ship, in which case they worked as a kind of maritime insurance, the merchandise, or both. When the loan involved the transported goods, the loan took the shape of a contract between a foreign merchant and his Spanish intermediary for the export and sale of a cargo in Spanish America; generally, the Spanish agent received a share of the profits.

In the 1780s the company already had a wide array of correspondents in Cuba, Guatemala, Caracas and Veracruz. In some cases, commercial contacts went beyond mere business relations. Here, Marliani turned out to be the most prolific network-builder for the commercial house. His marriage with Francisca de Paula Casens Dufresne connected him to the registered merchant with the Indies (cargador a Indias), Cayetano Dufresne, son of a French merchant broker (corredor de lonja) in Cadiz. Both Cayetano and his brother Juan had been members of the merchant guild since 1763 and opened Marliani privileged access to trade with Spanish America. Moreover, Paula Casens Dufresne's father, the military ship captain Juan Casens and her aforementioned uncle, Brigadier Tomas Hilson, were important agents in this family network that overlapped with cross-cultural ones.

On the basis of these family relationships, Marliani's bonds were socially and economically significant; his closest allies included several famous figures, such as Count Juan Manuel de Sarriá, the son of a Basque emigrant born in Peru who was a member of the Merchant Guild since 1772, or Francisco Bustamente de Guerra. Sarriá, who was one of the leading members of the upper tier of Cadiz's merchant community and an aristocrat, was appointed administrator of Marliani's will, labelled as 'close friend' and, like Bustamente, attester to the baptism of several of Marliani's children (three in the case of Sarriá; Bustamente participated at two baptisms). At the time of his death, Marliani shared a company with the Dutch merchant Renato Boom, and owed some money to the Hamburg merchant Joaquin Pedro (Joachim Peter) Hinrichsen.

Paolo Greppi, who had started in business a decade earlier than his prestigious partner, progressively shifted from his early contacts with the French Basque trader Juan Pedro Jaureguiberry and the Venetian consul Espiridon Capitanachi, to increasingly close ties with Milanese traders in later years – for example Carlo Bazzoni or Angelo Bocconi. After his retirement from Cadiz he relied on the Milanese Giuseppe Fontana and the Genoese Canepa to manage his commercial investment in the company.

While Belloni and Marliani were closely connected with different members of the Spanish trading community in Cadiz, Greppi's network was much more closely connected to his home region in Northern Italy (Venetia and Lombardy) with which he and his family had strong links. This pattern is also illustrated by the company's trading activity along the European Atlantic façade and the North Sea. The Greppi relied on Milanese correspondents (with whom family ties partially also existed) in Amsterdam, London and Hamburg, three key mercantile centres. In Amsterdam, during the 1780s, Greppi's activities were entrusted to the companies of Guaita and Turri; in London, the Milanese company relied on Bartolome
and Antonio Songa; and in Hamburg, Bovara Brentano Greppi, where Greppi’s brother Giacomo was a partner between 1766 and 1787, was the Cadiz firm’s stable correspondent. This is not to say that the Greppi company had no correspondents or agents of other cultural backgrounds in these cities. In 1771, Antonio Greppi sold five bolts of silk to Duveluz & Sapte, from London, for 764 Milanese lire. Eight years later, Agazzino again contacted a London trading house, Mauricio Ronagney y Compañía, to appoint them as their representatives before the High Court of Admiralty, which was to decide on the issue involving the Venetian ship La Nativita della Madonna and its cargo; the ship had been captured by a British corsair on her way to Guaita in Amsterdam a couple of months earlier.

Although the Greppi company relied on transnational networks in order to conduct its wide-ranging business transactions, the role of Milanese firms in the European Atlantic coast and the North Sea is striking, and a good reminder of the strong connection of the Greppi family with Lombardy. This confirms the theories that put so much stress on the role played by close cultural networks. In the end, we can observe some division of labour between the partners of the Greppi Marliani firm in Cadiz, where each partner contributed with his own network strategies, covering different areas and social environments. This contributed to widening the scope of the firm’s activities and guaranteed its outstanding success. While Milanese networks often feature in the core of the company’s business activity, and can be thus regarded as highly trustworthy, it was only its combination with transnational networks, most importantly Marliani’s, that made it possible for the company’s business activity to expand to the extent it did.

Networks for the management of mercantile flows between the Spanish Atlantic, the Mediterranean and Central Europe: from Cadiz to Genoa and the Adriatic Sea

While the Spanish colonial trade system almost imposed a transnational co-operation model, and the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Cadiz offered a rich and seemingly unending potential for bridging cultural boundaries and striking business deals between distant places, the trade patterns with the home regions of these Milanese merchants was far more monocultural. Belloni, who explicitly mentions his trade in wine with different European locations in his will, could rely on his family’s trading house in Genoa, in operation between 1762 and 1790. This house received colonial products (for example dyestuffs) and sent textiles to the colonies.

The Greppi company, despite their close co-operation with Spanish (mainly Basque), French and Dutch merchants, relied mainly on Genoese intermediaries for channelling trade to Milan – where the fathers (and also investors) of the Cadiz-based agents resided. From Milan, Antonio Greppi redistributed goods throughout Northern Italy (for example, to Como and Bergamo) and Vienna, in this case with the cooperation of Milanese intermediaries, for instance Giuseppe Larisi and the banker Giuseppe Antonio Segalla. In turn, they exported finished products, such as hats, silks and other textiles. Eventually, the Greppi company also started to interact with the Milanese banking and trading house of Brentano Cimaroli in the Habsburg capital, which discounted a bill of exchange to them in 1786. This bill was drawn on the Tyrolean trader in Cadiz, José Ynson, who rejected payment of the 1000 libras tornesas in February 1787.
Apart from this socially complex chain of mediators between Habsburg Central Europe, Genoa and the Atlantic, the company also maintained important business relations with the Adriatic Sea. While the origin of the Greppi family in the Bergamo province made them maintain important trade links with Venice, both the private correspondence and the notary files testify to an increasing exchange with Trieste from at least the late 1770s. Contacts with the already mentioned Triestinian firm Languidir & Fedriani that opened a rather short-lived branch in Cadiz, started with a regional network that involved both Giacomo Balletti, Languidir's father-in-law, and Antonio Greppi who exchanged grapes and rosoglio in 1771, while Balletti consigned grain, nails and ironware to Greppi's clients in Vienna, Goro and Ferrara. The contacts reached the Atlantic, where Balletti had been operating since the 1740s. In 1775, Balletti asked Paolo Greppi in Cadiz to recover a loan of 11,000 florins from Giorgio Fedriani following the collapse of the company that, as previously noted, he shared with his son-in-law.

Balletti's death in 1776 put an end to this co-operation, but the 1780s witnessed an intense relationship of the Greppi company with Trieste, which was much to do with state-related business between Madrid and Vienna. The steadiest relationship was the one with Antonio Rossetti; in 1782, Greppi put Rossetti in charge of shipments – between Trieste and Cadiz – of Hungarian copper and nails for the Spanish Treasury (Real Hacienda); in these transactions, Greppi acted as a representative of the Imperial Court in Vienna (which held the monopoly on the production and sale of copper within the Habsburg Monarchy). This operation also involved the Milanese banker Giuseppe Antonio Segalla, Greppi's already mentioned correspondent in Vienna. In the early 1780s Greppi and Rossetti seem to have entered a temporary partnership, or at least a tight co-operation, as they purchased two ships in Cadiz that later sailed to Cuba and Honduras respectively.

While these examples once again prove the privileged position Greppi seemed to have regarding the Spanish mercantilist regulations, the Milanese-Triestinian connection with colonial trade was part of a wider network connecting Rossetti's firm with the Atlantic. Between 1774 and 1777, Rossetti had already been trading with the German firm of Friedrich Romberg (or Ronberg) in Ostend, which maintained a widely spun activity among the Austrian Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Italy (through Naples), provided equipment to the French Navy and later was involved in slave trade. In 1782, Rossetti bought the ship 'Endraght' from the heirs of the firm Giovanni Fexier at Amsterdam for 8000 Austrian florins. On the other hand certain members of the Rossetti family, Carlo and Baldassare, opened a factory in Cairo in the late 1770s, and Carlo was also one of the founders of the Belletti Rossetti Zaccar company, which opened a trade link between Trieste and Egypt in 1782. The Greppi firm in Cadiz was thus one of the key connections of the Rossetti family in their dealings with the Ottoman Eastern Mediterranean and Spanish, Dutch and Flemish Atlantic trade, which were channelled through Trieste.

Greppi's ties with Trieste also involved other merchants of different cultural background – Austrian and Dutch among others – what underlines not only the steadiness of the connections between Trieste and Cadiz the Greppi company mediated, but also the variety of connections the Milanese enterprise maintained in order to introduce Central European produce in the Spanish Atlantic. On a more general level, these examples demonstrate how this Milanese commercial enterprise – characterised by the extreme breadth of its commercial scope and its close links with both its Lombardian home region and the core Habsburg dominions – acted as intermediary for the Triestinian merchants
and supported their integration into international trade circles. These linked the eastern Mediterranean and the Spanish Atlantic, where the Triestinian merchants largely lacked own agents until the early nineteenth century. Similarly, the examples demonstrate that the Greppi involvement with trade in the Adriatic Sea – essentially the republics of Venice and Ragusa – also played an important role concerning both commodity consignments and shipping.

Conclusions

Despite their comparatively small number, Milanese trading houses played an important role in the commercial transactions between the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic between the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. This pattern continued in operation throughout the eighteenth century. By making skilful use of the change of sovereignty between Spanish and Viennese Habsburg rule, and fully exploiting their close links with Genoese mercantile and financial networks, Lombardian merchants managed to act as a small but powerful commercial group and their role was important in trade between Central Europe, the Iberian Peninsula and Atlantic and North Sea markets. In this regard, they took the uncontested lead among the Habsburg imperial mercantile community at Cadiz although they remained far off the big commercial communities such as the Genoese, French, Flemish or German in eighteenth century-Cadiz.  

However, it has to be stressed that, as a group, Milanese merchants were but loosely interconnected among each other; indeed, the direct links between the members of the group were few. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned theories on the constitution of merchant ‘nations’ are proven right and wrong at the same time: the Habsburg Imperial community included different politically defined subgroups (Croatians from the Kingdom of Hungary, Tyroleans from the County of Tyrol, Lombardians from the State of Milan, Tuscans from the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Bohemians, and so on) but also attracted groups that had some linguistic, geographical or religious affinities with them, such as the Piedmonts. However, in exceptional circumstances and only for brief periods, individuals with very different origins, for example a Genoese and a Scottish subject were included in the list of merchants under the protection of the Empire. The Imperial merchant community in Cadiz thus reflected the multi-cultural profile of the polycentric Habsburg Empire which emerged from the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt. As such, it also demonstrates the fluidity and constant reformulation of the merchants’ identities during the early-modern period, a fluidity which is hard to accommodate in the conceptual framework of modern national narratives.

While the Milanese traders maintained long-distance relationships with their co-citizens in London, Amsterdam or Hamburg, they also joined transnational networks with a hand in the Spanish colonial trade system, which was to undergo a spectacular growth following the Bourbon ‘Free trade’ reforms that opened the former restrictive mercantilist framework and triggered the economic transformation of the eighteenth century. Unlike other foreign groups such as Genoese and Flemish merchants, Milanese traders hardly sought naturalisation and direct participation in Spanish colonial trade.

While the economic capacity of densely settled and proto-industrialised Lombardy meant that capital was abundant in order to secure supply and demand markets for the thriving Milanese economy, the social strategies for participating in these business operations varied. On a general level, Milanese merchants used kinship, cultural affinity (‘ethnic’ networks),
political belonging and transnational (or cross-cultural) co-operation to varying degrees, on different levels and according to changing circumstances and contexts in the same way as other merchant communities did. Accordingly, family connections were often at the core of commercial firms, as the examples of the Belloni and the Greppi Marliani have demonstrated. This pattern fits with the evidence that indicates that family and kin relationships were an important factor of cohesion in commercial enterprises as well as an efficient means of protection against the agent-principal problem, which was exacerbated by slow communication and other incentives to fraud. The Greppi and the Belloni examples clearly illustrate that family ties played a paramount role in channelling investments from Habsburg Lombardy towards the Spanish Atlantic, and in organising the export of Central European manufactures and the import of colonial products. Kinship was not only important for keeping the accumulated capital within the family, but even more because the behaviour of relatives was much more predictable and reliable, as the readiness of Antonio Greppi and Pietro Marliani to steadily pump capital into the Cadiz-based firm demonstrates. In addition, the dense and dependable flow of information between Paolo Greppi and his father Antonio reflects the latter's will to reproduce trust by monitoring his son's actions. In addition, Antonio also had an independent informant in Giuseppe Scorza. At any rate, Paolo Greppi still had a considerable margin for independent action, which Antonio could not possibly control from Milan. Space mattered and trust, therefore, remained an essential precondition for the success of the house.

While family relations were to a large extent kept within a core of Milanese commercial houses, some partnerships exceeded not only the family limits, but the political borders of Habsburg Milan as well. Furthermore, in some cases these connections were markedly cross-cultural in character. Examples include Giuseppe Marliani's partnership with the Dutch trader Renato Boom, but most importantly his marriage into a Spanish family (with some French roots to boot), which gave him access to the Spanish colonial trade. Belloni's marriage also fits with this model, while his partnerships with Morris (Tuscan) and Galli (Piedmontese) were rooted in cultural affinity, but shared the strategy of naturalisation in all cases.

The cross-cultural character of some commercial networks was even more pronounced in the Atlantic, reaching out to the Northern Sea. Although companies like Greppi's often relied on their Milanese correspondents in major northern European commercial centres, they also depended on a wide range of foreign business partners; of course, concerning their participation in the Spanish colonial trade, cross-cultural networks were at the very core of the firms' activities.

The role played by formal legal integration by means of a naturalisation letter from the Spanish crown was rather less pronounced, but marriage was in many cases an efficient way to establish transnational ties, hence combining kinship and cross-cultural networks. While this usually went hand-in-hand with social integration in the Bay of Cadiz, it was neither a necessary prerequisite nor a self-reinforcing pattern, as demonstrated by the examples of traders who died without marrying locally. In turn, even marriage did not totally preclude the possibility of retirement and relocation to the home region, which in many cases also included the repatriation of capital in the commercial crisis brought about by the Napoleonic Wars and the decomposition of the Spanish Empire. This behaviour, however, was sometimes connected to the existence of strong family ties with the home region. On these occasions, transnational ties remained either at the periphery of the network structure,
or they were focused on geographically and culturally close groups in neighbouring territories like Venice or Piedmont. These examples make the term transnational doubtful in its social and cultural dimension, as it concerned relationship among neighbouring spaces, although its political value remains intact.

The reasons for choosing family-based, mono-cultural or transnational networks depended to a large extent on the kind of transaction to be conducted and on the level of trust required; narrower cultural gaps and more reliable information lowered transaction costs. Thus, the Greppi relied on Genoese intermediaries who were closely connected with their Milanese business, while the Cadiz branch relied to a large extent on a range of Basque intermediaries to conduct their transactions with the Spanish colonies. This relationship was possible because of the Greppis’ reputation, which meant that they could choose preferably to transact with the wealthiest and most reliable among Spanish merchants and to extend their activities as widely as possible. This could be achieved by a commercial strategy that was aimed at reducing risks and transaction costs.

These different patterns also had a tremendous impact on the organisation of trade: while merchants who integrated socially and were most heavily engaged in transnational co-operation managed rather quickly to emancipate their businesses, both in terms of investment and decision-making mechanisms, their fellows who maintained their dependency on their home territories and families had to endure a much heavier family interference with their business deals, which limited their freedom of action. In practice, however, the long distances and asymmetrical information contributed to giving them considerable autonomy (which recalls the economic dilemma of trust). The wide-reaching range of Lombardian trading activities was strongly oriented towards Central Europe, mainly through Genoa, while the case of the Greppi company clearly demonstrates how the rising Triestinian mercantile community was gradually incorporated into long-distance trade networks between the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as far as Spanish America. At the same time, this allowed Milanese merchants (and other intermediaries) to access Eastern Mediterranean markets and the Ottoman Empire, turning the Trieste mercantile community into a sub-network of Lombardian business connections. Co-operation with Tuscan, Flemish and other Austrian merchants also took place, following the schemes outlined by the Viennese Court to build strong maritime connections between the scattered possessions acquired after 1713/14. Thus, Milanese traders mediated trade flows into the interior of the Habsburg Central European dominions, as far as Vienna, but also integrated centres beyond its borders including Amsterdam, Hamburg and London acting thus as connectors of a polycentric empire, but also of commercial capitals of various empires. The political and institutional framework was thus a stimulus for the small, but powerful, group of Lombardian tradesmen. These acted in complex ways in order to connect Habsburg Central Europe and the Spanish Atlantic in the second half of the eighteenth century without strictly following the mercantilist and cameralist schemes of the Viennese authorities. This, ultimately, demonstrates that the state, in contrast with what other interpretations may suggest, was not only an important factor by creating the appropriate institutional framework for international trade, such as maritime consulates and commercial treaties, but offered a secure environment for capital accumulation to fairly accommodated traders, such as the Greppi and Marliani. Hence, the state contributed to the success of big trading companies managing the connections between Central Europe through the Alps as far as the Spanish Atlantic, but also to the reinforcement of oligarchies.
Notes


2. Casson, "Networks."


7. The terms "cross-cultural" or "trans-national" are preferred here to "cosmopolitan" as cultural boundaries in international commerce were transcended without losing their significance completely. Trivellato, "Republic," 137, 146–7.


10. Aglietti, Herrero Sánchez, and Zamora Rodriguez, *Los Consules extranjeros*; Pradells Nadal, *Diplomacia y comercio*


18. Gasser, "Triests Handelsversuche Teil 1."


25. Ibid., 106–9; Muñoz Navarro, "Relaciones comerciales," 324.

26. Ibid., 324–9; Franch Benavent, "Inmigración italiana," 110.

27. Crivelli, "Rovellasca."


29. Brilli, "Mercaderes genoveses."


32. Driesch, *Kaufleute*, 199, ref. 1. The author seems to give a wrong date – 1709 – for the first population census (*padrón*) of Cadiz.

33. AHMC, Sección Padrones, L.1006: Padron de Cádiz 1773. The five districts were: Cuna, San Antonio, Bendición de Dios, Comisaría de Jose Artecona, Comisaría de Benito Masnata.

34. Bustos Rodríguez, *Cádiz en el sistema atlántico*, 129, 140–1, 204–5.


41. For the source and its methodological limitations see: Recio Morales, "Las reformas;" Crespo Solana and Montojo Montojo, "La Junta."
42. Driesch, *Kaufleute*, 200; AHMC, Consules extranjeros Estado, num. 1, 630/1, Exp.10: Matricula de Extranjeros, Cádiz 1764.
44. AHMC, Sección Padrones, L.1006.
46. Ibid., 113–16, 133–43, 357.
49. Recio Morales, "Las reformas," 75.
51. AGI, Consulados, 892bis; AHMC, L.6952: Impuesto de la Única Contribución (Catastro de Ensenada): Hacendado vecinos. Índice onomástico: letras M-V. Año 1771 L. 6952, Tomo III.
52. AHN, Estado, 629, Expediente 10: Matriculas de extranjeros, Cadiz, 1764: Copia de la Relacion que remite el Governador de Cadiz, de los Comerciantes Extrangeros que existen establecidos en aquella ciudad; AHMC, Sección Padrones, C.5817: Lista de los Nacionales Extrangeros y otras personas que gozan del fuero militar de guerra en esta plaza de Cádiz, año de 1765, Impressas en dicha Ciudad en la Real Imprenta de Marina de Don Manuel Espinosa de los Monteros, en la Calle de San Francisco.
53. AHMC, Sección Padrones, L.1006; AHN, Estado, 629/3.
54. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 1/57, fol.104-105: Poder para Testar: Don Jorge Fedriani a Don Tomas e Hijo.
58. Gasser, "Handelsbeziehungen;" Idem., "Karl VI."
64. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 19/4511, fol. 1232–42: Testamento de Juan Angel Belloni.
65. AHN, Estado, Exp.21: Matricula de Extranjeros de Sanlucar de Barrameda 1765.
fol. 199–219: Revocación de Depósito testamentario Hecha por Don Benito Canepa; Ibid., fol. 221–2: Obligación: Benito Antonio Canepa en favor de Don José Coidnet.


69. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 21/5109, fol. 77–8: Poder para Testar Don Pablo Greppi a Don Juan Jaureguiberry y otros; Riva, "Da negoziane," 385.

70. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 19/4544, fol. 1555–8; AHN, Estado, 634/2, Exp.51: Numº 1619: Consulta orig. de 3 de Marzo de 1803, con el Expediente que la dimanó sobre nombramiento de Consul de la República de Ragusa en Cádiz, y sus adyacencias, a favor de Don Carlos Bazzoni. Resuelta por S.M. aprobado; Ibid., Estado, 635, Exp.17: Nº 1708: Consulta de 10 de Octubre de 1805, con el Expediente que la produjo sobre aprobacion de la Patente de Consul de Alemania en la Ciudad de Barcelona en favor de Don Carlos Bazzoni. Resuelta por S.M. conformandose; Ibid., Estado, 637, Exp.18: Nº 1746: Informe del Comandante General de Gibraltar sobre Cosme Burlini.


73. AGI, Consulado, libro 445; Brilli, "La importancia," Driesch, *Kaufleute*, 203, ref. 2 (although with slightly different numbers).


76. Ibid., fol. 139–43, 190–6.

77. ASMi, Dono Greppi, carteggio 380: Cadice 27 Xbre 1771, Paolo Greppi a Antonio Greppi, Milano.


80. Ibid., 439–41.


82. Tonelli, "Baldassarre Scorza," 33.

83. ASMi, Dono Greppi, carteggio 69: Mantova 3 Gennaio 1771 Marliani a Antonio Greppi; S. Mori, "La Ferma Greppi," 172.


85. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 10/1890, fol. 394–5.


87. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 19/4511, fol. 1237–8.


89. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 9/1701, fol.39.


91. Ibid., 107–14.

92. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 9/1701, fol.35; 19/4511, fol. 1234; Riva, "Da negoziane," 443.


94. Ibid., 226, 230–2.


97. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 19/4511, fol. 1237.


101. Ibid., 21/5110, fol. 171: Poder: La Compañía de Pablo Greppi Agacino y Compañía a Don Mariano Carvo.

102. Ibid., 21/5114, fol. 4: Poder: Pablo Greppi Marliani y Compañía a Juan Fermín de Aysinena.

103. Ibid., 21/5114, fol. 354–5: Poder especial: Don Pablo Greppi Marliani y Compañía al Señor Don Francisco Saavedra.

104. AGI, Contratación, 2113: Registros de venida del año 1784 de Nueva España con el capitán de navío Don Fernando Angulo: De Veracruz y la Havana Año de 1784. Registro del Navío de guerra Septentrión que en 1o de Marzo de 1784 entró en este Puerto procedente de Veracruz y Havana a cargo de su maestre Don Juan Josep Larrio.

105. AHMC, Sección Padrones, L.1006; AGI, Consulados, 892bis: Relación de los Individuos de Comercio que han obtenido licencia de la Real Audiencia de Contratacion para pasar a los Dominios de America desde el mes de Junio de 1771 hasta esta fecha; Bernal, Financiación, 686; García-Baquero González, Comercio, 88; Ruiz Rivera, Matrícula, 54, 156.


109. Ibid., 21/5109, fol. 582: Poder: La Compañía de Pablo Greppi Agacino y Compañía a los Señores Turri y Compañía; 21/5111, 25–6: Carta de pago y abandono: Los Señores Magarola y Compañía Contra Don Pablo Greppi Agacino y Compañía; 21/5115, fol.117: Protesto de no acep.on: La Comp.a titulada D.n Pablo Greppi Marliani Comp.a Contra la titulada Miller y Dovar.


111. Liva, "Le aziende Greppi;" Weber, Deutsche Kaufleute, 133; AHPC, PN Cádiz, 21/5113, fol. 1–3: Ratificación de Pertenencia La Compañía de Brentano Bovara y Grepi Contra Don Cristobal de Uribeta.

112. ASMi, Dono Greppi, carteggio 69: Londra 5 Febbraio 1771 Duveluz et Sapte a Antonio Greppi.


114. Crespo Solana, "Redes."

115. Niephaus, Genus Seehandel, 58, 278.


117. AHPC, PN Cádiz, 21/5118, fol. 60: Protesto de no pagamento: Don Pablo Greppi Marliani y Compañía Contra Don Josep Ynson.

118. ASMi, Dono Greppi, carteggio 69: Venezia, 2 Febbraio 1771 Spiridion Zaraculi a Antonio Greppi; Ibid., Venezia, 9 Febbraio 1771 Giovanni Torre a Antonio Greppi; Ibid., carteggio 168: Venezia 5 maggio 1787 Cortecelli a Antonio Greppi; Ibid., Venezia 5 maggio 1787 Zanchi a Antonio Greppi; Liva, "L’Archivio Greppi."

119. ASMi, Dono Greppi, carteggio 69: Trieste 2 Gennaio 1771, Giacomo Balletti a Antonio Greppi, Milano. Ibid., Trieste, 9 Gennaio 1771 Giacomo Balletti a Antonio Greppi.

120. ÖStA/HHStA, DK StAbt Spanien, 105/5, fol. 467.

124. Alfonso Mola, "Colonial Fleet;" Martínez Shaw, "Bourbon Reformism."
127. AST, Archivio Notarile, 382, 79: Rossetti Signore Antonio compra una nave con tutti gli altrazzi dalli SS.ri Giovanni Texier e Compagna d’Amsterdam per f 8000. 18 Xbre 1782.
136. O’Rourke and Williamson, "After Columbus."

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Weber, Klaus, and Margrit Schulte-Beerbühl. "From Westphalia to the Caribbean: Networks of German Textile Merchants in the Eighteenth Century." In Cosmopolitan Networks in Commerce
Coping with Iberian monopolies: Genoese trade networks and formal institutions in Spain and Portugal during the second half of the eighteenth century

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ABSTRACT
This article explores Genoese trade interests in Cadiz and Lisbon, the two capitals of Iberian colonial trade at the end of the early-modern period. The author aims to explain the persisting intermediary role of a merchant community that has been largely overlooked by historians. The structure of the trade networks established in the two cities will be reconstructed by using the primary sources conserved in the archive of the Durazzos, a powerful aristocratic family of the Republic which has left a unique collection of private correspondence. This sizeable and largely unexplored documentation illuminates the different strategies used to access the Spanish and Portuguese monopolistic systems, the main actors who traded in both contexts, their relations with the local elite, and the nature of the business networks linking Genoese investors in the mother city with the expatriated agents. The author concludes with a comparative analysis of the institutional resources that Genoese used to maintain their interests, with particular attention paid to the religious institutions established by the ‘nation’ in the two port cities.

Abbreviations:
AMC = Archivo Municipal de Cadiz
AGI = Archivo General de Indias, Seville
ADGG = Archivio Durazzo Giustiniani, Genoa
AHPC = Archivo Histórico Provincial de Cádiz
ANTT = Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
ASG = Archivio di Stato di Genova
ASVE = Archivio di Stato di Venezia

From the Middle Ages, the ports of the Iberian Peninsula played a key role in the Genoese commercial system by connecting the Mediterranean to the European Atlantic shores. After the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans (1453), Genoa progressively abandoned the traditional Eastern Mediterranean routes and the Spanish monarchy became a privileged destination for Genoese businessmen, capital and migrants. In symbiotic alliance with the Spanish Habsburgs, the Republic entered a new phase of prosperity that allowed

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its businessmen to thrive in trade intermediation and to dominate international finance while contributing to the Iberian imperial expansion. In the eighteenth century, this pre-dominance was a distant memory: the emergence of great maritime powers in Europe, and the repeated bankruptcies of the Spanish Crown in 1627 and 1647, eroded the Genoese intermediary role and diverted their capital to other financial centres. Nonetheless, many clues suggest that the merchants of the Republic were able to retain a share of profits derived from the growth of European economy and of trans-Atlantic trade, both of which experienced a new positive trend from the end of the seventeenth century after a long crisis. As a result of this growth, social mobility took an increased significance in European capitals and great commercial cities, allowing new Genoese merchant families to emerge either in their home country or abroad.

Despite growing marginalisation and political weakness, which impeded the neutral Republic’s merchant fleet in the oceanic routes, the Portuguese and Spanish hubs remained vital for the Genoese to maintain their interests in trans-Atlantic trade. The port registers of Genoa attest that Lisbon and Cadiz (which succeeded Seville as the monopolistic port for Spanish colonial trade in 1680) were the main Atlantic ports of origin and destination for the Republic’s maritime trade until the end of the eighteenth century. These sources, however, impede precision for assessing the nature of the size of Genoese involvement in Iberian trade routes in comparison to other maritime powers.

Both in Cadiz and in Lisbon, in fact, the Genoese faced competition from the local merchant elites, and from other powerful rivals. In Cadiz, the rise of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne and the resulting family compacts with France allowed the French to impose themselves as the wealthiest and most influential community among foreigners, with strong interests in trade intermediation between Spanish America and the Mediterranean shores. In Portugal, a series of trade agreements signed between 1661 and 1703 with the house of Braganza allowed the British to dominate Portuguese trade and to establish the greatest number of trade houses in the capital. These privileges, along with the slave trade asiento gained after the War of Spanish Succession, also gave the British a primary role in the import of luxury goods from Italy to Lisbon as well as grain and rice from the Mediterranean.

As chief emporium of Lombardy, the kingdom of Sardinia and that of Naples, the free port of Genoa maintained a strategic position in the entrepôt trade of velvet, damask, silk, paper, olive oil, wheat and other edibles, which were exported to the Iberian Atlantic ports in return for all kinds of colonial products (especially sugar, coffee, tobacco, hides, cotton, indigo and cochineal). The Genoese intermediaries’ capacity for keeping a share of commercial exchange between the Mediterranean and Atlantic ports, despite increasing competition, can be inferred by the continual existence of expatriated communities in both centers of Iberian mercantilism, where the Genoese presence had ancient roots. Genoese prosperity in the two port cities is evident in eighteenth-century censuses, as well as by contemporary observers, which document a seizing merchant elite and a substantial professional and artisanal population.

In 1791, the Cadiz authorities estimated 5801 Italian residents, individuals including many women and children, and comprising the largest foreign community of the port. The city census of 1794 clarifies that most of these ‘Italians’ hailed from Genoa, a minority of whom were registered as wholesalers and the remainder as retailers, porters, servants, gardeners and artisans employed in all kinds of handcraft productions.
Regarding the Genoese settlement in Lisbon, an anonymous British gentlemen who lived for many years in Portugal gives us the image of a vibrant community that as late as 1809 represented the largest trade nation in the city after the British:

The Italians, who are pretty numerous, are either Genoese or Milanese. They carry on much business especially with Italy. They aid their success by a degree of economy which approaches to parsimonioussness. Though none of the Italian houses are extremely opulent, many of them are in very prosperous circumstances.  

The Venetian Consul in the Portuguese capital, Anselmo Perelli, does not mention the Milanese but he is more precise in describing the competitiveness of the Genoese, especially in respect to other Italians. In a dispatch of 1780, he reported that Lisbon hosted about 6000 Genoese immigrants. They were employed in trade as agents, notaries and intermediaries or were artists, servants and cooks, all of whom, in his opinion, were also smugglers and spies. Without considering those who regularly sailed to India and to America, another 10,000 were scattered across the kingdom working as gardeners and farmers. There were also some Piedmontese retailers and Roman or Neapolitan smugglers, but their traffic was often discovered and they could not prosper in their businesses. The Venetians were very few in number and mostly vagabonds or poor: only six of them were well established in the city, and none were merchants.

Despite not being unbreakable barriers to the entry of competitors, the Spanish and Portuguese monopolistic systems offered few opportunities to relatively small and powerless merchant nations. In Spain, participation in the *Carrera de Indias* was formally precluded to foreigners lacking special treaties or concessions. To overcome the prohibitions, interlopers recurred to practices of fraud and contraband – often by means of Spanish middlemen – or they could try to access to the corporation of the Spanish trade monopoly in Cadiz, the Consulado de Cargadores á Indias, a privilege that was granted to only a minority of merchants. The only way to enter formally the legal circuits of colonial trade was through Spanish naturalisation or by means of the foreigners’ Spanish-born sons, to whom a 1620 royal decree entitled the same rights as Spaniards. In the Spanish kingdoms, naturalisation was not much a matter of legal norms but one of reputation and, in most cases, acting as a member of a community was sufficient to be considered as such by local authorities. A formal *carta de naturaleza* was nonetheless essential to gain the formal right to trade in the Indias without fear of controls or possible accusations from local competitors. Between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, entry requirements for formal naturalisation had become more and more restricted in order to favour the subjects capable of demonstrating their long permanence, solid investments and full integration in the local society; as for the foreigners’ descendants who were born in Spain, their privileges were contested by Spanish merchants and temporarily suspended through the first decades of the eighteenth century.

In Lisbon, mercantilist barriers to colonial trade became particularly restricting after the earthquake of 1755, when the Marquis of Pombal, the Portuguese Prime Minister, inaugurated a series of reforms aimed at ‘nationalising’ the economic relations of Portugal with its overseas dominions and at enhancing the intermediary role of ‘national’ merchants. The core of these reforms was the creation of the Company of Grão-Pará and Maranhão, which was granted the slave-trade monopoly in the two Brazilian captaincies along with administrative functions on the coast of Guinea, and of another privileged company with a patent for exclusive trade in Pernambuco and Paraiba. These measures were followed by the expulsion of the British factors from Brazil, which obligated British investors to use
Portuguese agents as middlemen for importing gold to Europe. Simultaneously, the government fostered consolidation of the Portuguese merchant elite by establishing the Junta do Comercio, which admitted only a minority of great wholesalers from Lisbon and Porto while excluding smaller local agents who had opposed the institution of the monopolistic companies for trade in Brazil. Unlike the Spanish Consulado, which was an independent merchant guild, the Junta was a state instrument that disciplined economic activities by favouring the emergence of a small and loyal circle of Portuguese capitalists with a prominent role in the management of colonial trade as well as in the public finance industry.

If we compare the Genoese involvement in the Spanish and Portuguese monopolistic institutions during the eighteenth century, we can observe a significant difference. In Cadiz, the Genoese were the foreign group that obtained the highest number of naturalisations, besides showing a massive interest for accessing the Consulado de Cargadores á Indias through their Spanish-born sons. In Lisbon, on the contrary, very few merchants were granted naturalisation or accessed the legal circuits of colonial trade despite their long-term presence and integration into the host society. To better understand how the Genoese succeeded in maintaining a significant position in the capitals of the Iberian imperial trade, and how these different mercantilist contexts influenced their business strategies, it is necessary to analyse the structure of their commercial networks, along with the way they used the local institutional resources and those of their own ‘nation’ in the two ports.

The study of trade, production and political representation in Spain and in its overseas dominions has led historians to conclude that mercantilist theories in the Spanish monarchy were doomed to fail, as their implementation was essentially incompatible with the local economic and political conditions. As for the Portuguese empire, recent studies clearly demonstrated the structural role that free agents of different nations, ethnic groups and religious affiliations played in the construction of overseas exchanges by informally operating outside the commercial monopolies imposed by the Portuguese state. The presence of more-or-less powerful interlopers in the Iberian monopolistic trade, however, cannot be interpreted as a sign of the insignificance of the institutions – the merchant guilds – which formally enjoyed this privilege. From the 1973 seminal work of North and Thomas, the role of institutions has become a central issue in the study of economic development. As for the merchant guilds in particular, understood either as alien or local associations of businessmen in a given country, some scholars have radically discussed their efficiency in facilitating long-distance trade by stressing how their function – and the reason of their persistence – was rather that of ensuring an unequal distribution of profits in favour of a privileged minority of intermediaries to the detriment of the wider society and economy. Other scholars describe this interpretation as ‘anachronistic’ – as it attributes the merchant guilds and their ruling protectors a dominion over society that they did not have – and emphasise that merchants combined multiple institutional resources to cope with the uncertainties of long-distance trade. In this view, the theoretical juxtaposition of the soft ties of trade networks with the hard rules of commercial regulation has lost much of its significance. The study of the Spanish Atlantic, which offers a vantage point to assess this supposed antagonism, has pointed out not only the institutional character of merchant networks, but also to what extent imperial institutions were, and functioned, as networks.

The analysis of the Genoese case, on the one hand, will show how the wise combination of business relations, ‘national’ privileges and the institutional resources of the host countries allowed a marginal but still dynamic community to stay afloat in an increasingly
competitive commercial world, retaining a share of the profits of trade intermediation between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic worlds with no significant support from the mother country. At the same time, this case reminds us of the persisting importance of the legal framework regulating access to the Iberian colonial trade, which was never capable of excluding interlopers – not even powerless merchant nations – but nonetheless influenced their choices and business strategies until the imperial system came to an end.

Genoese trade networks in Cadiz: the key role of the naturalised agents

The widespread reticence of Genoese expatriates to leave much trace of their trade interests makes it difficult to reconstruct in detail their business networks through the documentation conserved in the archives of the Iberian ports. This task, however, can be at least partly fulfilled by consulting the commercial correspondence of the Durazzo family in Genoa. The private archive of this prominent noble family, whose members governed the Republic as Dogi nine times through the centuries, provides a clear picture of the mechanisms governing the circulation of goods and capital between Genoa and the Iberian Atlantic. In the eighteenth century, Marcello Durazzo and his son Giacomo Filippo, Marquises of Gabiano, contemporarily invested – with different intentions and results – both in Cadiz and in Lisbon without possessing a trade house in either port. The family’s commercial letters, thus, are particularly useful for understanding how trust networks and business collaborations were built beyond the existence of kinship relations or of stable company contracts between the Genoese investors in the mother city and their partners in the capitals of the Iberian colonial trade. As they refer to the contacts established by a single family, these letters can only give us an idea of the business networks operating on the Iberian routes. Nonetheless, the richness of details provided by this kind of source, along with the size, completeness and rarity of this particular archive, make this family’s merchant correspondence a unique set of information.30

Regarding their interests in the Spanish emporium, the Durazzos chiefly invested in sea loans on the shipments of commercial and war vessels towards the Indias. Their participation in this profitable activity dates back to 1673, when Giovanni Durazzo moved to Cadiz and established a commercial house that allowed him to prosper in the insurance sector until his death (1694).31 In the following century, when the family abandoned the Spanish port, their investments in sea loans linked to the collaboration of prominent expatriated countrymen. From the 1760s, the Durazzos established intensive and long-lasting business relations with five Genoese trade houses in Cadiz. The most important was that of Esteban Mosti and his Spanish-born son Joseph Antonio, who specialised in capitalising sea loans for single registered ships (registros sueltos) to America. To manage their business, the Mostis collaborated with the Uztáriz y San Ginés, owners of one of the greatest maritime trade and insurance companies in the Spanish port. Through the Mostis, Marcello and Giacomo Filippo Durazzo invested in numerous shipments to South America and in particular to the Río de la Plata, where the Uztáriz’s agents held close contacts with the Viceroy and the representatives of the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias in Buenos Aires.32 The private correspondence between the two families highlights that the Mostis acted as agents but did not depend on the Durazzos. By virtue of their relations with the Spanish merchant elite, they found profit-making opportunities to invest their own capital and, when convenient, to attract additional investors. The Durazzos frequently participated in the Mostis’ ventures
by placing with them a fixed sum of money that ranged from 1500 to 4000 pesos for each loan.\textsuperscript{33} The two families’ co-operation was constant but never developed into a stable company; it merely depended on the investment opportunities that could arise. When Esteban Mosti died and his activity passed to his son, the latter simply wrote to Durazzo to inform him about the new management and to declare himself at his disposal for future businesses opportunities.\textsuperscript{34} Despite the lack of any contractual formality or kinship bond, this collaboration endured from the middle 1760s to the beginning of the new century.\textsuperscript{35}

To maximise their investments and limit potential losses, the Durazzos normally allocated their capital in sea loans related to different simultaneous expeditions, often employing more than one agent. Besides the Mostis, among their favorite intermediaries was the Count of Prasca, the Spanish-born son of a naturalised merchant from Finale, who had also been Consul of Genoa in Cadiz from 1725 to 1750.\textsuperscript{36}

In the 1770s the Durazzos expanded their interests towards the exchange of merchandise. To penetrate this sector, they turned to intermediaries specialised in trade, but who were equally well established in the circuits of the Spanish monopoly as those through whom they invested in sea loans. Among these, we again find some of the most esteemed and prosperous exponents of the Genoese merchant elite in Cadiz.\textsuperscript{37}

The first one was Francisco Cambiaso, member of a merchant family that over the eighteenth century was admitted to the Genoese patriciate (1745) and provided the Republic with two Dogi (Giovanni Battista and Michelangelo Cambiaso). In Cadiz, the Cambiasos had two shops and a vessel authorised for the Spanish colonial trade. Francisco was not naturalised and thus had no formal access to the \textit{Carrera de Indias}, but he could count on the collaboration of his cousin (and father of his wife) Thomas Micón y Cambiaso, who received naturalisation in 1737\textsuperscript{38} and was appointed, with the noble title of Marqués de Méritos, as member of the accounts division of the Spanish council of finance in 1766.\textsuperscript{39}

The activities of the Cambiasos, who also owned trade houses in Lisbon and Genoa and had profitable business relations with Livorno, made the family one of the chief Genoese referents for trade and investments between the Iberian empires and the Mediterranean during the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1779, Giacomo Filippo Durazzo sought the intermediation of Francisco Cambiaso and was introduced to Francisco’s Spanish-born son, José María, who took charge of his father’s trade house in Cadiz after four years of training in the major commercial hubs in Italy, France and England.\textsuperscript{41} Initially, their collaboration consisted of the dispatch of low-quality paper to be sold in Cadiz but the business did not prosper due to the saturation of the American markets and the fact that, as explained by José María, the Genoese traders of Cadiz were able to purchase the paper directly from the Republic’s manufactures at more convenient prices. The relationship between the two families continued with other sporadic shipments of paper to Spain until 1785, when José María informed Giacomo Filippo Durazzo that there were increasing opportunities for making profits in the \textit{Indias}; if he wanted him to be his agent, however, he should send him good-quality paper, along with carefully specified kinds of silk and velvet that would easily meet the local demand. On his own initiative, Cambiaso bought a great batch of cowhides and sent it to Durazzo; the shipment was followed by a letter in which Cambiaso promised that, if Durazzo was able to ‘adequately foster’ him by selling the hides in Genoa at a good price, he would send him more goods in the future. Durazzo tried to consolidate this relationship with the creation of a stable company, but Cambiaso preferred his freedom to decide when and how it would
be convenient for him to involve the nobleman in his trades. Unfortunately, Durazzo was unable to satisfy his partner and the collaboration did not last.42

In order to extend his business network in Cadiz, Giacomo Filippo Durazzo also contacted the Genoese merchant Joseph Sigori, whose Spanish-born sons Domingo, Pedro and Antonio were granted access to the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias in 1771.43 In 1784, Sigori entrusted Durazzo to sell indigo and a variety of American goods in Genoa. He also commissioned him a load of Sicilian and Neapolitan wheat for the supply of the Iberian ports on behalf of a Lisboan merchant, Francisco Emanuel Martinez. After these shipments, however, their collaboration did not last because Sigori had various agents in Genoa, and Durazzo did not further encourage him with any good orders.44

Much more important intermediaries in the Durazzos’ network were the Enrile, members of a prominent Genoese merchant family of Cadiz who, beyond naturalisation, had obtained the title of marquises. The Durazzos’ interest for co-operating with the Enriles was related to the possibility of investing in the Compañía Gaditana de Negros, a privileged company of which José María Enrile was one of the founders and his Spanish-born son, Gerónimo, became president.45 The company enjoyed the monopoly of the Spanish slave trade from 1765 and 1779, also having among its businesses the import and export of goods from and to America.46 Through the Enriles, the Durazzos invested large sums in sea loans for the company’s shipments as well as for the Spanish fleet and many registros sueltos.47 The advantages of co-operating with the naturalised merchant emerge from a letter of 1770 in which José María Enrile informed Marcello Durazzo about a delay in the distribution of the loans’ premiums due to a royal decree ordering the seizure of the capital of foreigners in a ship sailing from America. Despite the unusual inconvenience, Enrile assured Durazzo that, as the properties of those who enjoyed the ‘Spanish privileges’ were never called into question, his partner would not suffer any adverse consequences.48

If in this case Enrile was able to honour his promise, he could do nothing to remedy the increasing financial difficulties of the Compañía Gaditana. Regularly informed about the situation by his other agent in Cadiz, the above-mentioned Antonio Joseph Mosti49, Durazzo interrupted his participation in the venture in 1772. This episode attests to the importance of relying on the collaboration of more than one agent in the same port, a strategy that multiplied profit-making opportunities while diversifying the sources of information for better management of the investments. On that occasion, Mosti also acted as intermediary between Enrile and Durazzo for liquidating their balances: the only condition imposed on Durazzo was to pay interest and commissions to Enrile by means of a private obligation; if he needed a formal acquittance in front of a public notary, it should be a mere generic agreement without specifying ‘all the interests in America, in order to avoid the unlikely but always possible risk of being penalised for the violation of the law preventing the foreigners from trade in the Indias’.50

To allocate their capital in the Spanish Atlantic trade, in synthesis, the Durazzos exclusively recurred to Genoese intermediaries who were legally licensed to trade with the Indias through naturalisation or their Spanish-born sons. These merchants did not consolidate their position in Cadiz thanks to their relationship with the noble Genoese family; on the contrary, it was the latter that sought their collaboration, with the aim of benefiting from the advantages deriving from a privilege – Hispanicisation – acquired after a long permanence in the host society. The Genoese who had licit access to the Carrera de Indias were not only able to participate regularly in the Spanish colonial trade without any fear of accusations
for contraband. Being part of the small circle of merchants admitted to the Consulado de Indias allowed them to access more easily the information about potentially profitable shipments (in terms of demand and availability of products, prices and sea loans), to establish good contacts with other powerful agents, and even to manage directly trans-Atlantic shipments on their own vessels.

Unlike other contexts – such as the Low Countries and, in Spain, the port of Bilbao – where the local commercial guilds granted the foreign nations an equal treatment in legal disputes for the enforcement of their contracts, the Consulado of Cadiz maintained its traditional role as a corporation and a commercial court aimed at safeguarding the interests of licensed intermediaries to the detriment of outsiders. As shown by the case of Enrile, such a limitation led the naturalised Genoese agents to operate with a high degree of informality when trading on behalf of foreign investors, but it did not impede them from becoming the main and most trustworthy intermediaries for their counterparts in the mother city. In a context of asymmetry of information, besides, the closeness to the Spanish and American markets granted the naturalised merchants a central role that allowed them to make business in their own name as well as to achieve a considerable bargaining power with their clients and suppliers in the Republic. In these subjects’ perspective, the merchant guild that represented the Spanish monopoly on colonial trade was the instrument through which Spanish competitors were excluded from trade intermediation between the Indias and their homeland.

The case of Lisbon: a web of alliances with the Portuguese merchant elite

In the port of Lisbon, the Durazzos contacted a higher number of intermediaries than in Cadiz, but this strategy did not reflect a wider scope of their interests. On the contrary, it evinces a major difficulty in inserting themselves into a mercantile network dominated by powerful competitors.

In the late 1720s, the Durazzos had a short collaboration with Giovanni Battista Ravara, a prominent Genoese merchant of Lisbon with reliable correspondents in Goa, who proposed them to act as intermediaries for selling coral to India as well as other products, such as paper, silk, rice and wheat, to Portugal and other European markets. From the 1770s, the Durazzos’ interest and attempts at participating in trade with Portugal grew decisively. Initially, they sought the intermediation of the Genoese company of Tealdo Crosa in Lisbon for unspecified commercial and financial transactions that included British and Portuguese merchants, but the collaboration was neither intense nor durable.

In the early 1780s, they entered into contact with the Genoese Consul in Lisbon, Pietro Badano, who sent them some batches of coffee, sugar and pepper to be sold in Genoa; even this partnership, however, did not prosper due to Badano’s difficulty in purchasing merchandise in Lisbon under favourable conditions as well as Giacomo Filippo Durazzo’s inability to make sufficient profits from the sale of Portuguese goods in the Italian port in comparison to other Genoese competitors.

To impose himself as a great importer of goods coming from Portugal and its overseas dominions in Genoa – a business that seemingly interested the nobleman more than that of exporting European goods to Lisbon – Durazzo needed to enter into contact with merchant families who were well-integrated in the Portuguese trade circuits. In Lisbon, he found many
prosperous agents among expatriated countrymen, but their commercial bonds with the mother city were so consolidated that they left little space for new arrivals.

Giacomo Filippo’s first step in entering these networks was contacting and offering a profitable deal for a load of wheat to Giuseppe Salomone, a young low-rank intermediary who possessed very good connections in Lisbon. After working for several years in Genoa as the secretary of Pietro Garibaldi, one of the main importers of goods coming from Lisbon, Salomone was sent to Portugal to work for Giuseppe Murta, who regularly traded with Pietro Garibaldi. The young agent made himself available to Durazzo for sending him goods at the first occasion and, above all, for introducing him to the circuit of the great merchants of Lisbon who controlled commercial exchanges with Genoa. Establishing solid business relations with these intermediaries, however, was not easy, because some only worked for their own relatives and others already had good ‘old friends’ in Genoa enjoying such privilege.

The business panorama depicted by Salomone in his letters to Durazzo shows that the flow of trade and investments between the Republic and Portugal was not exclusively in the hands of the Genoese, but also in those of the Portuguese and other foreign intermediaries. The main Genoese traders in Lisbon were Giuseppe Murta and a certain Canale, who could count on well-established connections with their relatives in the mother city and other resident importers. Among the Portuguese, Salomone mentioned some of the leaders of the business class that emerged under the aegis of the Marquis of Pombal: Baron Joaquim Pedro Quintela, Paulo Jorge, the Da Cruz family and the Bandeiras.

Quintela was an opulent businessman whose family had made its fortune with Pombal’s rise to power. His investments extended to a wide range of activities, which included interests in the Royal Treasury, the rights to sell olive oil in Portugal, contracts for the collection of taxes in Lisbon, privileges for the collection of the tithe in Pernambuco and Bahia, the general contract for the trade of tobacco in association with other prominent merchant families, and, in 1790, the exclusive right for the export of Brazilian diamonds to foreign markets. The wealth accrued through his activities and his ties to the highest sphere of political power (besides obtaining the title of baron, he was knight of the Royal House, knight of the Ordem de Cristo and honorary member of the Council of the Royal Treasury) allowed him to become one of the most influential businessmen in Portugal.

The second name in the Genoese agent’s list, Paulo Jorge, was the Portuguese-born son of a Milanese merchant who had migrated to Lisbon at the beginning of the century. With the rise of Pombal, he notably expanded his father’s businesses by entering the Company of Grão-Pará and Maranhao, which allowed him to prosper in colonial trade and then to consolidate his fortune through the acquisition of real-estate properties.

Defined by Salomone as among the wealthiest Portuguese, both Quintela and Jorge had extensive commercial exchanges with Genoa, where they could count on a well-established network of traders and investors. The other two Portuguese houses he mentioned were equally potent, and their relations with Genoa relied upon veritable partnerships.

The Da Cruzs were one of the chief merchant families of Lisbon, with strong interests in the tobacco trade and whose members held multiple offices in public administration. Their fortune depended on close personal relations established with Pombal before he became minister, but also on the construction of strategic business alliances. Anselmo José da Cruz Sobral, the youngest of four brothers, was sent to Genoa in 1755 to complete his mercantile apprenticeship and to establish contacts in the Republic. During his stay, he created
a company with a local trader and married a Genoese woman, Maria Maddalena Antonia Crocco. When he returned to Portugal in 1760, he established his own trade house and collaborated with his elder brothers, José Francisco and Joaquim Ignacio, who had been trained in wholesale trade in Brazil. José Francisco became provedor and deputy of the Grão-Pará and Maranhão Company, administrator of the customs house in Lisbon, as well as a close advisor of Pombal in financial matters. Joaquim Ignacio consolidated the family’s business by succeeding his brother in all his posts and by marrying a wealthy Brazilian heiress. At his death, the family fortune, offices and honours passed to another brother, Anselmo José, who also held the royal soap monopoly and contracted the tobacco monopoly with Geraldo Wenceslão Braancamp, his son-in law and director of the Pernambuco Company. In the 1780s, the magnate Anselmo José could vaunt many ‘old friends’ in Genoa but he mainly traded with the already-mentioned Garibaldi. The close ties with Genoa allowed the Cruzes to play a key role in the distribution of Brazilian tobacco in Mediterranean markets. During the 1730s, Genoa had emerged as chief entrepôt for Brazilian tobacco and, from 1764, the port city had become the general deposit for tobacco in the Mediterranean in lieu of Livorno. This privileged position was the result of the web of contacts the Genoese merchants had developed in the Iberian world, through which they obtained important contracts for the purchase of Brazilian tobacco in Genoa to be sold to the Spanish monopoly (especially to those of the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia). The relevance of this trade for the Republic is attested by a contemporary observer, who noted that, still in 1793, the best tobacco coming from Brazil was shipped to Genoa.

According to historian Kenneth Maxwell, the Bandeira trade house was one of the few among the Portuguese that possessed the necessary technical knowledge in modern double-entry and other bookkeeping methods to facilitate operating beyond the empire’s frontiers. This advantage allowed José Rodrigues Bandeira to carve out a privileged position in the Portuguese merchant elite as first provedor of the Junta do Comercio and as director of the Pernambuco Company, with special interests in the export of tobacco. As in the case of Da Cruz, Bandeira’s ability to operate in foreign markets came from his association with Genoese intermediaries, namely his partner Bacigalupo and his factor Margiocchi, who resided in Lisbon and managed regular trade exchanges with the Republic as well as with other Italian ports.

Among the foreigners with solid contacts in Genoa there was the Dutch Consul in Lisbon, Daniel Gildemeester, who was also a prominent businessman with strong relations with the Portuguese elite. As the main shareholder of the Company of Pernambuco, in 1761 he obtained a 10-year royal contract for extracting and selling Brazilian diamonds. When the Portuguese Crown, in 1771, decided to manage directly the extraction monopoly, he was granted the exclusive right for the sale of this item to European countries, a privilege that he maintained until 1786. According to Salomone, Gildemeester accumulated a great fortune from the Spanish war with England during the American Revolution (1779–83), which obliged Spain to open its colonial trade to the Portuguese flag. In so far as its business grew, the family created three different houses in Lisbon, one of which regularly allocated Genoese capital in bottomries on behalf of powerful investors such as Giovanni Luca Durazzo – Giacomo Filippo’s brother – Francisco Bacigalupo, and, again, Pietro Garibaldi.

To carve out a space in such a dense network of interests, Durazzo first sent a collaboration proposal to Paulo Jorge, but he received no response. Salomone explained to Durazzo that, to be persuasive, it was necessary to lure Jorge with ‘proposals and gifts of high rank’, but
even so, it would have been hard to gain his favour. Durazzo then turned to Baron Quintela, who replied that he already had many agents for the distribution of merchandise and he would only invest capital in sea loans on his behalf, but he offered no precise indications. Durazzo also desired to collaborate with the Da Cruzes, but Salomone did not put him in contact because they were satisfied with their collaboration with Pietro Garibaldi; besides, if they ever needed to diversify their contacts, they could rely on ‘older’ Genoese friends.\textsuperscript{79}

Salomone did his best to find profitable contacts for Durazzo, but his efforts did not meet the nobleman’s expectations.\textsuperscript{80} He also tried to convince his employer, Giuseppe Murta, to explore possible ways of collaborating with Durazzo without it being known by Garibaldi, but Murta kept privileging his usual intermediaries and he only left to Durazzo low-quality or too expensive merchandise that could not be conveniently sold in Genoa.\textsuperscript{81}

Salomone succeeded in putting Durazzo in contact with other Portuguese and foreign intermediaries in Lisbon, but their businesses never evolved into stable collaborations. Some of these new contacts, such as traders Manuel Da Silva Franco (who managed the business of Daniel Gildemeesters’ brothers), and Martínez and Francisco Manuel Miz, ordered from Durazzo various shipments of Neapolitan and Sicilian wheat, but none of them sent him batches of Asian or American products.\textsuperscript{82} The only one who proposed him such a possibility was Miz: although he had ‘many friends’ at his service in Genoa, Miz declared himself ready to abandon them in favour of Durazzo if he would it more profitable, but nothing substantial followed.\textsuperscript{83} Durazzo was able to establish regular business relations only with Daniel Gildemeester, who initially sent him some batches of sugar from Brazil, but afterwards he almost uniquely acted on his behalf for investing in bottomries.\textsuperscript{84}

In summary, the Durazzos’ attempts to insert themselves in Portuguese trade did not totally fail, but their success was much more limited than in Spain. Their difficulties owed less to the lack of reliable countrymen in Lisbon than to the greater competition among the Genoese intermediaries – in the Republic as well as in Portugal – for accessing a market that apparently offered the Genoese smaller margins of insertion than in the Spanish emporium.

\textbf{The nation’s formal institutions in the two port cities}

The progressive international marginalisation of Genoa made it difficult for its expatriated communities to claim commercial privileges or immunities in the eighteenth-century Iberian monarchies. It is no coincidence that, in this period, the Genoese maritime trade along the Mediterranean and Iberian Atlantic coasts largely depended on practices of fraud and contraband. The employment of Spanish or Portuguese figureheads, the shipments of Genoese goods to and from the Iberian Peninsula on foreign vessels, and the use of flags of convenience on Genoese ships were all common ways to pay less custom duties or to avoid the fees imposed by the consuls of the Republic in the ports of destination.\textsuperscript{85} If these strategies concretely reduced the transaction costs for the Genoese intermediaries and \textit{de facto} enhanced their competitiveness, they also deprived the consuls of the necessary funds for exercising their functions. As a result, both in eighteenth-century Cadiz and Lisbon, the Genoese consuls had chronic difficulties – and, sometimes, a scarce interest – in protecting their countrymen through formal or informal negotiations.\textsuperscript{86}

In many respects, the Genoese agents in the Iberian ports epitomised the classical early-modern consuls, whose private commercial interests coexisted with – and often prevailed over – political, judiciary or administrative functions.\textsuperscript{87} If compared to other foreign
communities\textsuperscript{88}, however, the Genoese consuls’ ability to act on behalf of their numerous expatriated countrymen appears particularly limited. During the eighteenth century, while other European states – such as France and Spain – began to define more precisely their consuls’ functions and to assign some forms of compensation for their services, the electi agents of the Republic continued to rely exclusively upon the fees imposed on commercial navigation, but the sector was regulated by such a chaotic set of rules that the Genoese were considered, and probably were, the most undisciplined seamen in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{89} In Spain, besides, the position of the Genoese consuls was further undermined by the Bourbon administration, which transferred some of the foreign agents’ traditional functions (such as the right to set informally the disputes among captains and mariners, as well as that of making last wills and testaments or inventories) to the Spanish authorities.\textsuperscript{90}

The expatriated Genoese traders of Cadiz and Lisbon could also rely on ‘national’ religious institutions, but their importance and actual utility for the community’s interests appear quite different in the two ports. Comparing the ways in which these resources were used will help to illuminate not only the features and level of cohesion of the Genoese trading groups, but also their economic strategies in the Spanish and Portuguese mercantilist contexts.

Traditionally, immigrant communities were made up of individuals employed in different sectors and of different social statuses. The foundation of privileged institutions, such as chapels, fraternities or hospitals, helped to reaffirm constantly the existence of the community within the host society, through practices of co-operation and sociability that transcended wealth inequalities among its members. As powerful leaders of foreign trading nations, the great merchants managed the funds of these institutions and all the related initiatives. By offering assistance to infirm persons, a shelter to transient immigrants, masses or burial to the poorer, and dowries to the orphaned girls, the merchants strengthened their leadership over the community of origin and ensured their survival as a privileged group. The role of the merchant nations’ religious institutions in the Spanish monarchy has not been explored in depth, but the existing studies, mainly focused on the Genoese in Naples, the Portuguese and the Dutch, point to their key role in supporting the settlement and consolidation of these communities both in symbolic and material terms.\textsuperscript{91}

In the Andalusian emporium, the Genoese were the first foreign nation to obtain the privilege for establishing their private chapel and burial in what today is the old cathedral, the church of Santa Cruz, on the initiative of the merchant Francesco Usodimare (1483).\textsuperscript{92} The privilege, along with the right of establishing their own consul in the city, testifies to the early importance of Cadiz in the Genoese harbour system connecting the Mediterranean to the Barbary and European Atlantic shores, as well as the leading role of the businessmen of the Republic in the management of commercial exchanges on these routes.\textsuperscript{93} The persisting importance of the nation’s chapel – which, according to some chronicles, also served as a warehouse for smuggled goods\textsuperscript{94} – is attested by its restoration between 1651 and 1671, when other prominent Genoese merchants commissioned the supplement of a great marble altarpiece adorned with the statues of the Virgin and of the Republic’s patrons – saints George, Lawrence, John the Baptist and Bernard.\textsuperscript{95}

The initiative reflected the strategic importance that Cadiz acquired especially after 1649, when a bubonic plague halved the population of the then monopolistic port of Seville. The epidemic, which indirectly contributed to the elevation of Cadiz as the new emporium of Spanish trade with the Indies, encouraged many foreign and Spanish intermediaries to
move from Seville to the Atlantic port. As a result of this migration and of their traditional presence in Cadiz, the Genoese became the greatest and most powerful trading community in the port between 1670 and 1680, but their dominant position did not last for long.

In the wake of the eighteenth century, the increasing competition from other European maritime powers and the political neutrality of the Republic during the War of Spanish Succession impeded the Genoese from confirming or renegotiating favourable economic conditions with the new Bourbon kings. Such adverse circumstances, in parallel with the possibilities for accessing the Spanish monopoly through naturalisation and Spanish-born sons, help to explain not only the limited authority of the Genoese consuls of Cadiz, but also the progressive abandonment of the other institutional resources the 'nation' had inherited from the past. Significantly, among the last wills and testaments the Genoese left in the archives of the port during the eighteenth century, only one refers to the Genoese chapel as the burial place of choice. All the other existing documents containing specific indications in regard to burial places, membership in religious congregations or bequests to charitable institutions, unveil a great variety of choices that testify to a scarce community cohesion and, conversely, a high degree of integration of the Genoese merchant elite in the local society.

The tendency towards integration and, in some cases, assimilation into the host society, was a common behavior among other groups of expatriates, such as the Portuguese and the Irish, who had a cultural affinity and traditional ties with the Spanish monarchy. The profession of the Catholic religion – one of the main factors of identity cohesion throughout the empire’s disparate dominions – facilitated integration of foreigners, but this did not necessarily suffice for them to abandon formally their 'nation' of origin; naturalisation and full integration, in Spain as well as in other contexts, was primarily a matter of economic convenience. This might explain why the French merchants of Cadiz, which, in contrast to the Genoese, enjoyed a highly privileged position in the port, tended to remain under their nation's law.

In the capital of the Portuguese empire, where the vast majority of the Genoese trader migration concentrated in the kingdom along the centuries, different market conditions and the existing institutional resources generated a different response. The Genoese had obtained commercial advantages for importing their products in Lisbon and for exporting precious metals since the second half of the fourteenth century but, as in Cadiz, their position appeared decisively weakened towards the eighteenth century. In 1769, the Genoese Consul obtained confirmation of some of the ancient prerogatives, but these were reduced to the Consul’s immunity from being arrested or controlled by the local authorities except for the corregedor do cível, the judiciary institution of the foreign nations in the port. Ten years later, all members of the nation seemingly obtained the right of protection from the corregedor’s special jurisdiction. The existing sources, however, testify that this achievement did not strengthen the authority of the Consul, who ended up being considered more as a competitor in trade than a representative of the community’s interests.

More than from the few privileges they maintained as a merchant nation, the Genoese were able to benefit from those enjoyed by the broader group of Italian expatriates. In 1521, Pope Leo X (a Medici) granted permission to Italians to establish a congregation and build a church – Our Lady of Loreto – that would represent all 'Italians' in Lisbon as a corporate nation. At the time, the Florentines were the most influential Italian group, but in the following century their hegemony steadily declined in favor of the Genoese, whose
predominance in trade intermediation soon extended to the control and administration of the Church.

Unlike their counterparts in Cadiz, who almost abandoned their national chapel in favor of strategies aimed at integrating themselves in the Spanish merchant elite, the traders who left the Republic to settle in Lisbon did the most they could to monopolise the administration of the Italian church. Their ambition became apparent in 1690, when the papal nuncio in Lisbon asked the confraternity to draw up new statutes and the Genoese called into question the jurisdiction of the nuncio. In 1729, the Genoese Consul imposed a levy on all Italians for contributing to the celebration of the marriage between the Infanta of Spain and the Crown Prince of Portugal, an event that would be supported by the Italian congregation as a whole; although the Tuscan merchants refused to pay by protesting that the levy should be imposed by the church, not by a consul, the episode confirms the de facto predominance of the Genoese in the management of the Italian community’s affairs.  

The church of Our Lady of Loreto was almost destroyed by the earthquake of 1755, but it was too important to be abandoned. The related congregation controlled substantial economic rents deriving from many properties and held tax-collecting rights that had been accumulated along centuries of economic activity and negotiations. These included a palace, 11 residential properties in Lisbon, three lots of land devoted to wheat production outside the city, and a saline near Setubal. Their tax-collecting rights were made up of customs duties on tobacco and sugar, and sales taxes imposed on oil, meat, wine and fish. To maintain such a sizeable capital, which produced a rent of more than 3 millions reis per year, in 1776 the Genoese merchants of Lisbon asked and obtained special permissions from the king and from the pope for the reconstruction of the church. Two years later, the members of the congregation entrusted two well-known Genoese brokers with the task of finding the necessary financial means in the Republic. After a few months, they received a loan of 16 millions reis from one of the leading families of the Genoese aristocracy, the brothers Giovanni Battista, Carlo Ignazio, and the aforementioned Michelangelo Cambiaso, who also acted in the name of the underage heirs of their departed brother Giovanni Maria. The loan, which allowed the inauguration of the new church in 1785, was repaid with the confraternity’s rents. Indirectly, all the Italians contributed to the financial effort, but the administration of the revenues was under the exclusive control of the Genoese.

The management of the church and fraternity constituted an enormous economic advantage, allowing the Genoese to control much of the profits deriving from maritime trade between Portugal and the Italian peninsula, particularly the Republic of Venice. The latter had inaugurated direct commercial relations with Portugal in 1754 in order to cope with the competition of its main rival on the Adriatic Sea, the port of Trieste. From 1777, a formal agreement obtained with the favor of Maria I and Pedro III increased the maritime trade between the Serenissima and Lisbon – especially the import of valuable products coming from America and Asia to the Republic – but this trade very soon fell under Genoese control.

As denounced by the Venetian Consul in 1780, Venetian ships landing in Portugal almost totally depended on Genoese intermediation to obtain loads and hires, as well as to find purchasers for their goods in Lisbon. Ships sailing under other Italian flags received the same treatment. This dependency generated high costs for the non-Genoese Italian merchants aiming at investing in trade with Portugal and great profits for the Genoese, who also commonly employed their sailors or captains on the Venetian vessels for conducting illegal shipments with the complicity of the Venetian crew. Furthermore, all products
coming from or directed to Venice or to other Italian ports had to pay the additional fees and customs duties the nation's fraternity was entitled to collect for its maintenance. The Portuguese and the other foreign merchants of Lisbon were exempt from paying these duties, but they had established such a strong complicity with the Genoese that the other Italians could not avoid the burden: whenever an Italian traded with a non-Genoese agent in Lisbon, he found in his bills an additional tax to pay ranging from 0.5% to more than 1% on the value of his goods; if he imported sugar, the fee was 6 reis per case. 113 All these duties had been granted by the king as royal privileges for the maintenance of the church and fraternity which virtually belonged to all Italians, but everything concerning the church had become an exclusively Genoese affair. The artists, marbles, paintings, silver crafts, silk textiles and tools needed for the reconstruction and ornament of the building after the earthquake came from Genoa. Most of the nine marble altars of the church were dedicated to the Genoese merchants who controlled the fraternity's rents. The Genoese refused admittance to other Italians to either the church's administration or among its priests. In 1780, all 26 clergymen were Portuguese except the parish priest and his vice, who were from Genoa. When a Portuguese priest died, the Genoese replaced him with a new one coming from the Republic.

Despite the other Italians never attending the church, all of them, plus the Greeks and Jews of Venice, were obligated to pay a new additional tax on their shipments to Lisbon for its maintenance. The Venetian Consul was offered an office in the fraternity, but he did not accept the proposal. In his opinion, the Genoese had offered him a low-rank office only to receive some money in exchange: if he had accepted, he would not have been able to obtain any advantage for his countrymen, and he would not have even been informed about the assets of the church. There was no way to know how exactly the Genoese used that 'holy money'; but Consul Perelli had his own opinion: they did whatever they wanted in the name of the Genoese nation, they paid lawyers to defend their interests, offered 'gifts' to obtain favors from local authorities, bribed ministers, employed workers for their factories, and maintained Portuguese priests in the Our Lady of Loreto church. They also gave financial help for the Genoese poor but, probably, most of that money ended in the pockets of the high-ranking officials of the religious institute. 114

The Church of Our Lady of Loreto was not the only resource for making profits. In 1687, the Genoese obtained permission to establish another religious institute in the city, the Convent of Capuchins, which was also entitled to the Italian community as a whole. In 1739, the Convent was reestablished outside the city's walls, along the Tejo River shores, with the financial help of King João V. 115 The convent (named Santa Apolónia) had been created to host the elderly or physically impaired Italian missionaries who returned to Portugal after many years of overseas activity. In the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the convent almost exclusively hosted Genoese friars. This predominance did not result from the lack of missionaries from other Italian states but from a well-calculated strategy. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese authorities had imposed severe controls against contraband and high customs duties ranging from 27% to more than 50% of the imported goods' value and, as reported by the Consul Perelli, the control of the convent allowed the Genoese to maintain contraband on exports and introduce illicit goods with a benefit that often surpassed 100% of their value.

A few years before, some Genoese Capuchins returning from America foresaw the convenience of monopolising the convent and asked other countrymen to join them. In a
short period of time, the convent was full of Genoese Capuchins who had never been in the missions. To take control of the convent, they sent sailing to America the other Italian friars and to Italy those returning from the missions. They could always count on the support of the Apostolic Nuncio, who regularly approved their decisions even when the friars who were obliged to return to Italy were very old or sick. The complicity between the Genoese Capuchins and the priests in Lisbon transformed the convent into a veritable ‘free port’ at the complete disposal of the Ligurian merchants, who used to go there in the night to introduce prohibited foreign goods or products that would have been subject to high customs duties.  

The use of churches and monasteries for commercial purposes was a common practice among merchant colonies in both Northern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean from the Middle Ages. For the Genoese of Lisbon, this system worked with no drawbacks until the mid eighteenth century, when three Piedmontese friars returning from America refused to be sent to Italy despite the repeated orders issued by the Nuncio. To defend their rights, they denounced the Genoese as ‘heretic’ to the King, but all they obtained was to be jailed for 27 years. One of the Piedmontese friars died in prison; the others were liberated after the fall of Pombal (1777), who had actively supported their imprisonment. In the following years, they did not cease to condemn the Genoese abuses and campaigned for the return of the convent to its original functions. According to the Venetian Consul, the other Italian nations would be allowed to operate in Portuguese trade only if the Genoese lost control of the convent. 

Supported by some Roman friars, the Piedmontese opponents did their most to obtain the favour of the court and to fuel rebellion among the non-Genoese Capuchins. These initiatives worried the Genoese so much that between 1778 and 1781 the dispatches of the Genoese Consul, Pietro Badano, were almost exclusively dedicated to the convent. The Consul tried to convince the Portuguese Secretary of Foreign Affairs that King João V had originally granted the Genoese the exclusive right to use the convent. As principal mediator in the conflict, Badano also had to hold back the initiative of some Genoese merchants, who had been instigated by the friars to write to their correspondents in the mother city to impede all non-Genoese Capuchins from sailing to Lisbon. For its part, the Republic of Genoa sought the support of the Apostolic Nuncio in Lisbon as well as that of the Father General of the Capuchins in Rome. Inside the convent, the Genoese Capuchins tried to remove the Father Superior, Celestino da Genova, whom they considered too cowardly and unable to defend their interests against the Piedmontese. 

The conflict was seemingly resolved in 1782, when Queen Maria I formally restated the right of all the Italian friars to access the convent and its administration. Despite the Queens’s decision, however, the legal dispute continued and non-Genoese Italians, especially those engaged in trade, did not succeed in gaining more influence in the port. Non-Genoese Italians were able to ward off the Genoese monopoly over the convent, but their achievement was not enough to erode the hegemony of a nation which, by then, greatly surpassed them in numbers, wealth and business connections. 

In recounting his many-years–long stay in Lisbon, the already mentioned anonymous British gentlemen noted that, unlike the French, the Italians mostly lived ‘in a solitary style, very rarely paying visits even to those of their own nation’. The scarce community cohesion among Italians was the natural consequence of a struggle for survival and prosperity which, for the Genoese, consisted of the appropriation of all the possible margin
profits deriving from trade between Portugal and the Italian peninsula as a whole. The high degree of competitiveness existing even among countrymen, along with the scarce political support they received from the mother city, explains the lack of social intercourse within the Genoese nation itself.

In light of the events described above, however, the businessmen of the Republic were far from being a loose-knit group. In critical circumstances, especially when the nation's interests were at stake, they unified their efforts for implementing common strategies and responses. To have conclusive proof of their cohesion as a group, we only need to borrow, once again, the words of the Venetian Consul in Lisbon: ‘[The Genoese] are so naturally against the Venetian name and trade that, if they could, they would be happy to erase them from the world and the memory.’ Regarding their habit of using or embarking Genoese seamen on Venetian ships, he observed:

The Genoese won't waste any occasion to make their interest. Whenever convenient for them, they will use Venetian ships no matter what contrasts they might have with Venice; whenever unprofitable, they won't use them no matter what signs of friendship and collaboration Venice might offer them.123

These words leave no doubt about the enduring significance of a commercial mentality that was at the very root of the Genoese identity and success, capable of explaining the acrimony towards the rival Italian republic as well as their capacity for profiting from its resources.

**Conclusion**

In the eighteenth-century Iberian Atlantic, diaspora networks and business-oriented forms of collaboration among fellow countrymen allowed the Genoese to prosper in trade despite the lack of support from a strong territorial state and their progressive marginalisation with respect to greater commercial powers. The ability of the expatriated merchants in using the few remaining privileges and formal institutional resources they had as a nation or as individuals in the hosting societies, however, were equally indispensable to their survival.

The correspondence of the Durazzo family describes the Genoese trade networks as complex and flexible structures that – like those of other trading communities124 – transcended the placement of relatives and associates in the main port cities of interest. The merchants based in Genoa who did not possess a trade house in the main Iberian ports could resort to many potential ‘friends’ waiting for mutually profitable collaborations. If these relations consolidated – whether leading or not to the creation of stable companies – they could last for more than a generation.

Despite the Iberian mercantile context offering but narrow margins of insertion to small merchant nations, the Genoese share of commercial exchange between the Mediterranean and the main Iberian ports was not concentrated in the hands of few intermediaries. On the contrary, it was distributed among many125 different subjects competing with one another, and extremely rare were cases of Genoese families owning a trade house in both Cadiz and Lisbon. As can be inferred from the Durazzo family’s business letters, investing in both Spanish and Portuguese trade was a highly attractive option, but carving out a space in such a dense network of countrymen – especially if the aim was to operate in the distribution of colonial goods in the Republic – could be a difficult endeavour even for prominent members of the Genoese aristocracy.
The process of adaptation to the restrictions imposed by Iberian mercantilism led the Genoese to develop trading and social networks that, to a great extent, also transcended their community of origin. This process took different directions in Spain and Portugal because of varying market conditions. In Cadiz, where the monopolistic barriers left a certain margin of liberty to individuals aiming at integrating themselves in local society and economy, the Genoese were able to access colonial trade through naturalisation and, more commonly, through their Spanish-born children. As legitimate members of Cadiz's merchant elite, these privileged intermediaries were able to exclude Spanish businessmen by the management of the major flows of trade and investments between the country of origin and the capital of trade with the Indias. These advantages, alongside the political weakness of the Republic, explain why the most powerful exponents of the Genoese trade in Cadiz did not formally belong to the Genoese nation and justify the scarce influence of the nation's institutions in the Spanish port.

In Lisbon, where the spaces offered to the Genoese were more restricted than in Spain due to the predominance of British interests and of a powerful local merchant elite, the businessmen of the Republic conserved a share of trade linking the empire to the Italian peninsula by establishing alliances and stable companies with the chief Portuguese magnates, who, in turn, took advantage of Genoese know-how for expanding business beyond the empire's frontiers. Unlike their counterparts in Cadiz, the Genoese of Lisbon showed a higher degree of community cohesion, which can be ascribed to the persisting relevance of some strategic privileges inherited from the past, such as the religious institutes, and to the efforts made for maximising their usefulness. In the Spanish port, the abandonment of the Genoese chapel reflected the strategies of a group of expatriated merchants whose competitiveness relied upon the possibility of operating beyond their nation's narrow legal boundaries; for their countrymen in Lisbon, conversely, the community's religious institutions continued to represent a key resource to stay in business, especially to the detriment of the other Italian nations who formally shared privileges with them.

Ultimately, ‘Genoeseness’ was and remained a confidence-inducing quality among Genoese businessmen operating along the Iberian routes. The success of this politically marginal group, however, was made possible by the strategies its members adopted to avoid the risks of self-segregation, either by establishing alliances with the local economic elite in the host countries or by becoming part of it.

In some respects, the Genoese persistence on the Iberian routes recalls that of the Sephardic Jews in early-modern Europe: unlike the Jewish merchants, the Genoese operated in a context in which their religious profession was a substantial factor of social acceptance; similarly to the Sephardim, they continued to thrive in long-distance trade by relying upon the collaboration of other entrepreneurs – either of their ‘group’ or not – scattered in chief ports and commercial cities. Members of the two groups not only worked together with outsiders; as shown by the study of the Indo-Portuguese branch of coral-diamond exchanges in the early eighteenth century, led by Sephardim of Livorno in association with some Genoese merchants of Lisbon and a prominent Hindu caste in Goa, the openness towards the establishment of stable inter-group networks is at the root of the enduring success of both trading communities.
Notes

5. On the transformation in the mechanisms of social promotion which occurred between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Munck, *Seventeenth-Century Europe*, 80–110, 158–75.
7. For an overview, see Bartolomei, “Identidad e integración;” and Bartolomei, “Les relations entre les négociants français de Cadix et le pouvoir.”
11. Women and children were 405 and 1952 respectively, Estado de los Extranjeros que hay en Cádiz, 29 Aug. 1791, Consulados, leg. 91, AGI.
12. Molina, “L’emigrazione Ligure.”
14. Anselmo Perelli, 6 Sep. 1780, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, 695, Lisboa, ASVE. I wish to thank Benoit Maréchaux for suggesting this document to me.
17. For an overview, see Freire Costa, Lains, and Münch Miranda, *História Económica de Portugal*, 264–76.
20. Pedreira, “Os homens de negócio.”
23. In this study the network concept is used in a rather broad sense. The fragmentary nature of the existing documentation impedes reconstructing precisely the entire web of Genoese agents involved in the distribution chain between the main Iberian Atlantic ports and the Republic, but it allows us to illuminate the business relations established among some individuals – mostly prominent figures – who traded on these routes. For a thorough methodological analysis on the study of social networks, see Thompson, *Between Hierarchies & Markets*; and Caracausi and Jeggle, *Commercial Networks*. For a discussion and an overview of the literature about merchant networks in the Spanish Atlantic Trade, see Grafe, “Spatial Nature.”
26. North and Thomas, Rise of Western World; and North, Institutions, Institutional Change. For an overview of the existing literature on this topic, see Nunn, “Importance of History.” For a recent interpretation on the role of institutions in the growth of European trade, see Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce.
27. Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade.
28. Grafe and Gelderblom, “Rise and Fall.”
30. The archive conserves thousands of letters coming from a wide array of destinations in Italy and in the rest of Europe.
32. Stefano Mosti e figlio a Marcello Durazzo, 6 March 1767, 21 Nov. 1769, 12 Jan. 1770, and 26 Oct. 1770, Cadice, 143, Durazzo family papers, ADGG; Antonio Joseph Mosti a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 6 Sep. 1776 and 4 June 1779, Cadice, 294 Durazzo family papers, ADGG; Antonio Joseph Mosti a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 7 May 1779, Cadice, 296, Durazzo family papers, ADGG; Antonio Joseph Mosti a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 31 May 1781, Cadice, 297, Durazzo family papers, ADGG; Antonio Joseph Mosti a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 27 Feb. and 27 July 1784 Cadice, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG. On the Ustáriz family and their agents in Buenos Aires, see Ruiz Rivera, “Rasgos de modernidad”; and Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad y Regiones, 76, 89 (note 18), 103.
33. Stefano Mosti e figlio a Marcello Durazzo, letters from 1767 to 1770. Cadice, 143, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.
34. Antonio Joseph Mosti a Marcello Durazzo, 5 July 1771, Cadice, 144, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.
37. In a 1770 fiscal census of Cádiz, all the subjects mentioned herein appear as the wealthiest Italian businessmen of the port, Ruiz Rivera, El Consulado de Cádiz, 66–73.
38. Libro 445, and Leg. 891, Consulados, AGI.
39. Testamento de Thomas Micón y Cambiaso, Marqués de Méritos, 18 Oct. 1769, Not. Cádiz, 4507, AHPC. The close collaboration between the Micones and the Cambiasos in Cadiz emerge in two letters in which Francesco Emmanuele Micone (José María Cambiaso’s uncle) informed Durazzo about the state of insolvency of Barnaba de Frías, of which Francesco was liquidator and representative of the nephew’s credits, Francesco Emmanuele Micone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 12 June and 31 July 1792, Cadice, 303, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.
41. Franco Cambiaso a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 1 Sep. 1779 Cadice, 296, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.
42. Giuseppe Maria Cambiaso a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 7 Dec. 1784, 31 May 1785, 14 June 1785, 2 Aug. 1785, and 6 Sep. 1785, Cadice, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG. The paper Durazzo sent to Cambiaso was too expensive to be profitably sold in Cadiz or in America and equally difficult was to find purchasers for the cow hides in Genoa due to an excessive supply of that product.
43. Libro 447, Consulados, AGI; Testamento de Joseph Sigori, 25 April 1782, Not. Cádiz, 394, AHPC.
44. Giuseppe Sigori e Figli a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 8 Oct. and 5 Nov. 1784, 21 January, 21 May, and 25 Sep. 1785, Cadice, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.
45. Torres Ramírez, *La Compañía Gaditana de Negros*.

46. The creation of privileged companies for trade in America was part of a strategy through which the Bourbons attempted to deal with the threat of competing naval powers in transatlantic exchanges, but the new policy did not impede the most prosperous foreigners, especially those who were deeply integrated in the Spanish merchant elite, to participate in the venture with their capital and expertise. On the role of privileged companies in eighteenth-century Spanish Atlantic trade, see Rodríguez García, *Compañías privilegiadas*; and Walker, *Spanish Politics*. On the Genoese participation in the Spanish slave trade, see, Brilli, “Genoveses en el comercio.”

47. Letters between the Enrile and the Durazzo families, 291 (years 1764–5), 292 (1766–70), 143 (1767–70), 293 (1771–2), Cadice, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

48. José María Enrile a Marcello Durazzo, 17 Aug. 1770, Cadice, 143, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

49. *Antonio Joseph Mosty a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo*, 20 Oct. 1772, Cadice, 144, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

50. Estratto della lettera dal Spagnolo in Italiano scritto al Sig. Joseph Antonio Mosti il Sig. Giuseppe Maria Enrile in cui si espone in che termini ..., *Antonio Joseph Mosty a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo*, 20 Oct. 1772, Cadice, 144, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

51. For a discussion and analysis on the role of guilds in the distribution of commercial information, see Ogilvie, *Merchant Guilds*, 344–90.


54. Letters from Giovanni Battista Ravara to the Durazzo family, 128 (years 1726–8), Lisbona, Durazzo family papers, ADGG. On the Ravara family, see Trivellato, “Merchants’ Letters,” 100–1.

55. Letter from the Tealdo Crosa brothers to the Durazzo family, 143 and 144, Lisbona, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.


57. The deal proposed by Durazzo consisted in a shipment of wheat from Puglia to Lisbon by charging only 4% interest, Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

58. Pietro Garibaldi’s activity in Genoa is attested since at least 1786; shop owner Giovanni Niccolò Garibaldi, probably a relative of Pietro, appears in a city register of 1762, Niephaus, *Genua Seehandel*, 419, 424. In 1793, a contemporary observer mentions the trade houses of Gio. Garibaldi, Pietro’s son (who was a money-exchange broker), and that of Giacomo Niccolò Garibaldi, (who mainly traded cotton, coffee and cochineal); Metrà, *Il mentore perfetto de’ negozianti*, t. III, 410.

59. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 20 Jan. 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

60. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

61. In particular, Giuseppe Murta was in business with his nephew and with Pietro Garibaldi in Genoa (to whom he mainly shipped tobacco and cotton), while Canale traded with his brother-in-law, Bernardo Canale; ibid.

62. Quintela inherited the activity from his uncle, Ignácio Pedro Quintela, who was member of both Brazil companies and of the Junta do Comercio and, among other privileges, contractor for the collection of the tithe in Bahia; Maxwell, *Pombal, Paradox of the Enlightenment*, 74–5.

63. For more details, see Pedreira, “Os homens de negócio,” 123, 170–1.

64. In 1801, his capital amounted to 424 millions reis. Considering that a Lisbon merchant of that time was able to accumulate from six to 65 (20 on the average) millions reis in his career, the incomparably greater patrimony of Quintela made him a veritable magnate, Pedreira, “Os negociantes de Lisboa,” 422.

66. The son of Paulo Jorge, João Roque, had regular financial relations with Niccolò Ignazio Pallavicini, while Quintela was in business with Francisco Vallarino Rossi, Francisco Bacigalupo, Giovanni Merello and Giuseppe Carbone; Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, 21 June 1785, and 26 July 1785, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG; Joaquin Pedro Quintella a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 7 June 1785, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG. Merello and Carbone, owners of a shop for the sale of silk textiles in Genoa, were also prominent brokers for the collection of international loans in the mother city: between 1764 and 1792, they collected 30 loans for a total value of 34 million lire. Filippo Carbone, possibly a relative of Giuseppe, traded Brazilian tobacco in Genoa; Metrà, *Il mentore perfetto de’ negozianti*, t. III, 410–11; Felloni, *Investimenti finanziari genovesi*, 407.


70. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.


75. Margiocchi organised regular shipping to and from Genoa, where he was in business with his brother and another associate, Matteo Campantico; Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG. The Company Bandeira Bacigalupo, which included a not better identified Connolly, also traded with the port of Livorno; Acção cível de embargo à primeira em que são autores Bandeira Bacigalupo e Connolly e réus Lázaro Pitaluga Alizeri e Companhia, 1762, Conservatória da Companhia Geral de Pernambuco e Paraíba, mç. 5, n.º 19, cx. 7, Feitos Findos, ANTT.


77. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 1785, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

78. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 May 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

79. Ibid.

80. Initially, he put Durazzo in contact with Vincenzo Mazziotti, the Neapolitan Consul in Lisbon, who shipped him some batches of sugar and cotton. This collaboration, however, did not last because, according to Mazziotti, Durazzo sold the batches at a too low price with the excuse of their bad quality, Vincenzo Mazziotti a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 28 Sep. 1784, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

81. When Durazzo got bored of receiving such a treatment and refused a batch of bad-quality tobacco, Murta interrupted any correspondence with him. Despite the intervention of Salomone, who advised Durazzo to apologise to Murta and to make more efforts to ‘meet the favour of the friends,’ the two merchants’ mutual distrust persisted and impeded them to keep collaborating, Giuseppe Murta a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 19 July 1785, and Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 19 July 1785, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

82. Giuseppe Salomone a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 21 June, 26 July, and 4 Oct. 1785. Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

83. Francisco Manuel Miz a Giacomo Filippo Durazzo, 29 Sep. 1785, Lisbona, 299, Durazzo family papers, ADGG.

84. Letters to Lisbon, 302 (years 1789–90) and 303 (1790–3), Durazzo family papers, ADGG.


The emergence of consuls as public functionaries of the state, with a fixed salary and precise institutional responsibilities, is the result of a process that started in the middle of the eighteenth century but, in most countries, reached a full accomplishment only in the following century. For an updated bibliography about the consular service during the early-modern period, and an analysis of its evolution, see Aglietti, *L’istituto consolare*; Marzagalli, Ghazali, and Windler, *Consuls en Méditerranée*; Aglietti, Herrero, and Zamora, *Los cónsules de extranjeros*.

See, for example, the case of the influential French community in eighteenth-century Cadiz (Bartolomei, "Identidad e integración"), and the central intermediary role played by the consuls of the much less consistent Scandinavian expatriate communities (Müller and Ojala, "Consular Services"; Pourchasse, "Dynamism and Integration").

On the difference between *missi* and *electi* consuls (the former appointed and paid by their governments to carry out a specific mission, and the latter elected by the community of expatriated merchants to serve their interests), see Bartolomei, "Utilidad comercial."

Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition*; Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation Upon the Ocean Sea*, 56–9; Crespo Solana, “Trusteeship and Cooperation.” On the case of seventeenth-century Seville, see Moret, *Aspects de la société*, 55–6. For a more general overview, see Flynn, *Sacred Charity*. See also Rivero Rodríguez, “Hospital de los italianos.” The same applies to many other merchant communities in different times and places, such as, for example, the English in fifteenth-century Bruges (Thielenmans, *Bourgogne et Anglaterre*, 261–2, 270), Hamburg merchants in Amsterdam during the fifteenth century (Smit, *De Opkomst*, 184–5), the Greeks in early-modern Venice and Ukraine (Fusaro, “Coping with Transition,” 99; Carras, “Community for Commerce”), the Armenians in eighteenth-century India (Chaudhury, “Trading Networks,” 66–7), and the German merchants in eighteenth-century London (Schulte Beerbühl, *Forgotten Majority*, 40).

See also Rivero Rodríguez, “Población, sociedad y desarrollo urbano,” 83. See also Ravina Martín, “Un padrón de Contribuyentes.”

For more details, see Brilli, "Administrando la debilidad.”

Domínguez Ortiz, *Orto y ocaso de Sevilla*, 131–52; Bustos Rodríguez, *Cádiz en el sistema atlántico*, 50.

Bustos Rodríguez, “Población, sociedad y desarrollo urbano,” 83. See also Ravina Martín, “Un padrón de Contribuyentes.”

Both episodes are mentioned in Trivellato, *Familiarity of Strangers*, 217, 359 (note 142).

Dom Joze por graça de Deos …, Lisboa, 22 Nov. 1775, Notai Antichi, 14015, ASG; Paolo Mauritiis scrittore delle bolle di questa Nunciatura di Lisbona, Lisbona, 23 March 1778, Notai Antichi, 14015, ASG.

The initiative was taken by Giuseppe Fontana, Natale Gilardi, Gio Batta Galleano, Niccolo Tealdo, Francesco Maria Rossi, Sebastiano Alizeri, Giuseppe Galli, Niccolò Maria Gnecco,
Bernardo Andrea Durante, Giovanni Stefano Turpia, Antonio Galli, Angelo Luigi Rossi, Giacomo Tealdo, Gaetano Salvo, Francesco Maria Avenente, Emmanuele Chiappe, Alessandro Antonio Bono, and Geronimo Selaico, Saibais quantos este instrumento de procuração ... Lisboa, 2 June 1778, and Franciscus Xaveriiis Pallani, Antecedencia sub signo 77, Genova, 14 Aug. 1778, Notai Antichi, 14015, ASG. The Genoese brokers were Giovanni Merello and Giuseppe Carbone, see note 66.

10. In Nomine Domini Amen, DD. Jones Merellus et Joseph Carbone uti Procuratores Administratorium Ecclesiae et Confraternitatis Beatae Mariae Virginis de Loreto, Genova, 5 October 1778, Notai Antichi, 14015, ASG. Michelangelo was member and supremo sindacatore of the Giunta di Commercio in Genoa and he was elected Doge in 1791. He married the daughter of his uncle, Giovanni Battista Cambiaiso, who was Doge in 1771, protettore of the Banco di San Giorgio and owner of a prosperous trade house in the Republic; Piastra, Dizionario Biografico dei Liguri, 419–20, 425–6.


12. The useless attempts to eliminate the contraband under the Venetian flag in Lisbon and the frequent episodes of insubordination among the Venetian sailors led Anselmo Perelli to resign from the consular office in 1782, Marchesi, “Le relazioni tra la Repubblica Veneta ed il Porlogallo,” 5–30. See also Pietro Badano, Lisbona, 24 Nov. 1778, Lettere Consoli, Portogallo, mazzo 1, 2659, Archivio Segreto, ASG.

13. Anselmo Perelli, 6 Sep. 1780, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, 695, Lisbona, ASVE.


15. De Castro, Mappa de Portugal Antigo, e Moderno, 72.

16. Anselmo Perelli, 6 Sep. 1780, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, 695, Lisbona, ASVE.

17. Slessarev, “Ecclesiae Mercatorum.”


19. Anselmo Perelli, 6 Sep. 1780, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, 695, Lisbona, ASVE.


21. Saccardo, Congo e Angola, 256.


23. This and the preceding quotations are from Anselmo Perelli, 5 Oct. 1780, Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, 695, Lisbona, ASVE.


25. In 1764, Cadiz was the home of 49 Genoese wholesalers AMC, 5871. The merchants who accessed the Consulado de Cargadores a Indias as naturalised subjects or as Spanish-born sons of Genoese immigrants in the eighteenth century (particularly from 1742) were 116, Brilli, “Importancia de hacerse español,” 229–30. As for Lisbon, the Genoese merchant elite comprised at least 18 wholesalers in 1778, see note 109.


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Politics of place: political representation and the culture of electioneering in the Netherlands, c. 1848–1980s

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ABSTRACT
This article is a first attempt to explore how a politics of place has manifested itself in Dutch electoral culture since the middle of the nineteenth century. It aims to move beyond a narrow interpretation of a politics of place as an 'old-fashioned' feature of electoral politics to be associated with a distinct, long-gone era of political representation. Instead, this article shows how it was continuously negotiated. This gives us a better understanding of the changing nature of political representation in the Netherlands. Compared to Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century, local senses of community and their clash with ideology-based party politics were far less prominent. There was, however, an ongoing debate about the degree to which Parliament should reflect the various regions of the country, so that local party associations and voters could feel represented and address their MP for issues pertaining to their locality. Moreover, after 1918 parties were concerned about the need to maintain political communication on the spot to counter lack of political involvement and feelings of alienation among the electorate. The article ends with a call for further reflection on the nature of clientelism in the Netherlands by exploring direct interaction between voters and their representatives.

INTRODUCTION
The 1918 general elections signalled a new era in Dutch parliamentary democracy. The district voting system, which had been introduced in 1848, made way for an electoral system based on nationwide proportional representation. Historians of Dutch political history have argued that the new system confirmed and strengthened the rise of party. Elections turned into a clash between nationwide operating political parties who dictated the selection of candidates and centralised election campaigns. The rise of party has been presented as one of the examples of the ‘nationalisation’ of the Netherlands, which slowly took shape in the second half of the nineteenth century. From a small-scale society, regional in outlook, the Netherlands developed into a nation united in diversity. The latter referred to the coexistence of separate networks of organisations around a shared belief system – be it religion or class – that were represented in Parliament by confessional and social-democratic political...
parties. What has hitherto remained underexplored in Dutch historiography is how a politics of place fared against this background.

In British historiography, and to a lesser extent in German historiography as well, the rise of party has been the subject of an on-going debate – a debate which is fairly non-existent among Dutch historians. In Britain this debate centres on the degree to which a politics of place persisted throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some historians, notably Duncan Tanner and Jon Lawrence, have stressed that the rise of a party democracy around the turn of the century should not be narrated in terms of a nationalisation of electoral politics with parties constructing constituencies around a well-defined set of ideological principles and a distinct political platform. They showed that the ability of parties to tap into local culture and specific local interests often proved crucial in determining the outcome of elections. Several studies have for instance revealed how a politics of place helped Conservatives cement electoral victories in urban districts by tapping into local sentiments and issues as well as by developing links between national issues and the concerns of the local electorate. In this on-going debate, others, however, have argued that electoral politics did take a 'national' turn following electoral reform in the early 1880s. Although less explicitly, a similar discussion is to be found among German historians. In her major study on electoral culture in Imperial Germany Margaret Anderson does reflect on differences across the empire, but stresses the overall dominant role of party and national government in the conduct of election campaigns. The Kulturkampf – which was aimed against the powerful position of the Roman Catholic Church in certain parts of the empire – as well as class conflict contributed to the rise of 'identity politics' in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when political parties managed to 'structuralize voting'. In his analysis of Weimar electoral culture Dirk Lau even explicitly sidesteps an exploration of the politics of place and takes for granted that differences across Germany were minimal. The enlargement of electoral districts, combined with the use of a list system did indeed make a politics of place, in terms of politicians claiming to represent local interests, less viable than before. Recently, however, a new generation of German historians, drawing inspiration from British historiography, have emphasised that elections always take place within a particular local setting, and have sought to explore the interplay between local practices and cultures and national ideas, practices and discourses with regard to electoral culture.

This article is a first attempt to interrogate Dutch electoral culture along similar lines by showing how a politics of place manifested itself in Dutch electoral culture since the mid-nineteenth century. It covers quite a long period, from the introduction of direct elections and a rudimentary form of parliamentary democracy in 1848 until the early 1980s. This long-term perspective implies that this article does not offer a full-blown empirically grounded case study of the whole period under investigation. Instead, it sets out to indicate the various ways in which a politics of place has been evident in two different electoral systems: district voting and nationwide proportional representation.

What first needs to be clarified, however, is how one might conceptualise a 'politics of place', a concept which is often used in historical studies without any explicit definition. It first of all refers to the political capital inherent in locality-bound identities: identities which are linked to a specific place, be it a neighbourhood, town, city or region. Politicians might substantiate their claim to represent the people by drawing on such local senses of belonging by stressing their own personal ties to a particular locality. In that case their representative claim is based on the fact that they are born and raised there or live among the people who
should now send them to Parliament. Second, a politics of place can be conceptualised as interest-based politics with politicians claiming to represent interests that are linked to a specific locality. Both these forms of a politics of place can easily come together: a local boy who claims to be best capable of defending the interests of his locality. This was, however, not necessarily the case. Candidates with a strong 'local' background could just as much draw upon non-local, class-based identities as the other way around: the lack of personal bonds with a particular locality still opened up the possibility of presenting oneself as the champion of local interests. Third, a politics of place refers to direct interaction or communication between politicians and the people in a particular locality, which German historians have rephrased as 'political communication on the spot'. It signifies the practice of politicians facing the people in their own habitat: at their doorstep, in the streets and public places of their towns and cities. This might seem self-evident, but political communication on the spot has been a historically contingent, yet rarely problematised feature of electoral politics. In the end national elections somehow have always also been a local affair, but how this actually played out and how this local nature has evolved ever since the mid-nineteenth century deserves more attention.

Recent calls for a new, more cultural approach to party history have not addressed the issue of the relationship between the rise of party and a politics of place. Hitherto, Dutch historians have instead mainly focused on the rise of party and the changes this brought to electoral and parliamentary culture throughout the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many studies have shown how Dutch political culture was shaped by a representation of the Netherlands as a diverse, pillarised society. Pillarisation refers to the establishment of separate networks of organisations around a shared belief system – be it social democracy, Catholicism or orthodox Protestantism – ranging from trade unions and political parties to sports clubs. Political historians have shown how political parties managed to establish themselves in the Dutch political landscape by claiming to represent one of these pillarised communities. Soon these parties started to orchestrate the selection of candidates in districts across the country as well as centralised campaigning. Studies on electoral culture have revealed that throughout the second half of the nineteenth century MPs increasingly lacked any personal ties to the district that sent them to Parliament. Moreover, MPs first and foremost were expected to represent a political ideology rather than local interests. The French political scientist Bernard Manin has conceptualised this in terms of a shift in the nature of political representation in Europe towards the turn of the century. The era of 'parliamentarianism', in which representation had been based on personal relationships and a shared background (geographically or professionally) of candidate and voters, came to an end. In the new era of 'party democracy', voting became an expression of class or religious identity, which suggests that local ties were no longer of any profound importance.

This article aims to offer a new perspective on this issue by moving beyond a narrow interpretation of a politics of place as an 'old-fashioned' feature of electoral politics to be associated with a distinct, long-gone era of political representation. Instead, by adopting a threefold conceptualisation of politics of place it shows how it was continuously negotiated, in the era of party democracy and the current era of audience democracy, too. This will give us a better understanding of the changing nature of political representation in the Netherlands: of how politicians asserted their claim to represent the people.
parliamentary democracy roughly between 1848 and the 1870s, an era dominated by a liberal conceptualisation of political representation, and subsequently moves on to a discussion of the rise of party in the final decades of the nineteenth century. It shows that liberal politicians deemed a politics of place inappropriate in all three of its definitions because it ran counter to a representation of MPs as independent politicians who were expected to defend the general interest. Liberals stigmatised a politics of place as clientelism bordering on corruption and depicted it as the hallmark of conservative politics. Yet an investigation of electoral culture shows that a politics of place was present throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, even among liberals. This part of the article is primarily based on newspaper reports, which, in the early decades of parliamentary democracy, made up the most important platform for contemporary reflections on electoral culture as well as the main medium for political communication and propaganda. Moreover, the correspondence of Johan Rudolph Thorbecke, the leading liberal politician of the second half of the nineteenth century, is explored.

Subsequently, the article offers a discussion of practices of candidate selection and electoral culture after the introduction of nationwide proportional representation, which is mainly based on an analysis of party sources and contemporary newspaper reports that reflected on electoral culture. It first of all argues that in the interwar years the abolition of district voting resulted in a reflection among political parties about a politics of place, particularly in terms of the personal bonds between candidate MPs and the electorate. An analysis of internal party discussions about candidate-selection procedures within the social–democratic and Catholic parties, the two biggest Dutch parties at that time, shows how they tried to allow for a controlled expression of place. Local party branches were taken into the loop of candidate selection and the representation of local or regional interests was taken into account when parties drew up their lists of candidates. Finally, the article discusses internal party debates in the post-war period about a politics of place in terms of political communication on the spot.

**Politics of place and new conceptualisations of political representation, 1848–1918**

Europe’s mid-nineteenth-century electoral culture is commonly associated with a politics of patronage, clientelism and corruption. Recent studies have offered a new interpretation of such practices. Frédéric Monier and Marnix Beyen have argued that the requests of voters and the MPs’ willingness to cater to their needs and interests should not be written off as clientelism, but should be seen as essential elements of political representation. It shows us that MPs were willing to take questions and requests from the people seriously and even found political capital in it by taking up the issues voters brought before them, in parliamentary debates. In the Netherlands discussions about clientelism profoundly shaped the electoral culture following the introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1848. The key figure within this debate was the liberal statesman Johan Rudolph Thorbecke, who was responsible for the Constitution of 1848 and the Electoral Law of 1850. Thorbecke was a ‘doctrinarian’ liberal in the tradition of Francois Guizot. His main goal was the implementation of a new political culture which centred on, among other things: the selection of politicians and governors based on their capabilities, rather than their social backgrounds; the defence of the general interest instead of particular interests, which included local or
regional interests; and free elections. Against this background politicians were expected to show themselves to be acting independently, unhampered by instructions from whomever.\textsuperscript{22}

Thorbecke presented this new political culture as a fundamental break with the immediate past, which he portrayed as an era dictated by clientelism, nepotism and narrow-minded conservatism. Thorbecke resented the oligarchic political culture of the Dutch Republic and the (United) Kingdom of the Netherlands in the decades before 1848.\textsuperscript{23} The promotion of his own conception of political representation went hand in hand with pejorative references to ‘particularism’, ‘provincialism’, ‘districtism’ and ‘esprit de clocher’, concepts that did not refer to various distinct geographies of alliance and interest, but were interchangeably used to condemn a (candidate) MP’s inappropriate focus on local issues and connections instead of the general interest. Such a politics of place was disqualified by liberal newspapers as old-fashioned and a regression to the times of the Republic when ‘sectional’ interests had threatened to undermine the stability of the state.\textsuperscript{24} According to Thorbecke’s ideal image, MPs were trustees, not delegates. Voters would place their trust in a certain candidate based on his capabilities and – if he had been in office before – on his activities in Parliament, not on personal ties between voter and representative as had been the case before.\textsuperscript{25} Thorbecke therefore favoured the establishment of ‘diverse’, heterogeneous and not-too-small electoral districts, making sure to draw boundaries almost at random to ensure that districts cut across regions and other geographies of community.\textsuperscript{26} Plans to make districts more homogeneous, particularly in terms of religion, were torpedoed because this would bring about elections dominated by ‘local heroes, antipathies and conniving’.\textsuperscript{27}

Up until the 1860s elections barely left any trace in the public spaces of the towns and cities of the Netherlands. Fearing that an all-too-public appearance of candidates would make them vulnerable to clientelism, Thorbecke and other liberal politicians refused to get in direct contact with voters. Thorbecke declined invitations to visit districts where his name had been put forward, bragged about the fact that he had not visited one of the districts that sent him to Parliament in 25 years and often left letters from voters unanswered.\textsuperscript{28} The main channels of electoral communication were newspaper adverts that chiefly mentioned the name of the proposed candidate.\textsuperscript{29}

Despite the near absence of any visible political communication on the spot, deference and personal networks were still key factors in mobilising voters behind a particular candidate.\textsuperscript{30} Although M.W. van der Aa’s novel \textit{How to Become a Member of Parliament}, published in 1869, gives a romanticised view of the parliamentary elections in the fictional town of Wijkerdam, his description of the electoral culture as a ‘local vanity fair, dominated by personal ambitions, frustrations and relations’ seems quite accurate.\textsuperscript{31} For many voters, voting was a social act dominated by perceptions of class difference: through the ballot they expressed their respect for and trust in the upper classes: the ruling elite in their district.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, estate agents and clergymen were there to make sure that the local electorate knew how to cast its ballots ‘properly’.\textsuperscript{33} The absence of a full secret ballot enabled them to do so: voters did not fill in the ballot paper in a voting booth, but received it at home. It was not uncommon for voters to be asked by ‘election agents’ before they entered the polling station to cast their vote to show how they had filled in the paper.\textsuperscript{34} In these cases a politics of place was not based on a politics of interests associated with a particular locality but on personal ties. The fact that in the 1850s and 1860s a majority of MPs had some sort of link (either through birth or their professional careers) with the district that had sent them to Parliament also speaks for the importance of personal networks.\textsuperscript{35} In 1869, towards
the end of his career, Thorbecke asked himself the rhetorical question of how many MPs would stand a chance of getting elected outside their home base. He and fellow liberal politicians blamed the voters who had failed to perform their ‘duty’: those who favoured local heroes over liberal candidates were said to suffer from a ‘fever’ and were characterised as politically backward.

The liberal press also accused conservative politicians of refusing to adapt to the new political culture. To what extent was a politics of place with MPs seeking election based on their personal ties to a particular district and their ability to defend its interests indeed a characteristic of conservative politics? The fact that conservative politicians tended to stand for election in one district only, whereas liberal candidates were open to accepting a candidacy in multiple districts, indicates that they were more place-bound. Moreover, on occasions conservative candidates adopted a discourse of place, using it to criticise liberal politics. Liberal politicians were portrayed as ‘men from the Hague’ – the seat of the Dutch Parliament – who were only in it for the money, rarely visited meetings of Parliament and were more concerned with securing well-paid jobs than serving the needs of their districts: ‘We need men from our midst to be elected to parliament, men who know what we Twenthenaren and Sallanders [a region in the east of the Netherlands] want.’ It was part of a larger conservative criticism of the centralist policies of Thorbeckean liberals which were said to crush the republican tradition of regional autonomy.

A politics of place was, however, not uncontested among conservative politicians, nor was it their exclusive domain: liberals also used a language of place if they believed it would advance their candidature. The famous Dutch writer Multatuli protested after his name had been put forward as a conservative candidate for a district in Friesland, a province in the north of the Netherlands, under reference to his local roots. He refused to be associated with any ‘esprit de clocher’ that he felt threatened the ‘power of the nation’. Interestingly enough, the only major election scandal in the second half of the century involved the behaviour of liberal politicians: during the election campaign in the 1860s a liberal MP in a district in Limburg had secretly promised the local electorate that in return for their support the liberal government would withdraw a bill concerning a tax raise in Limburg.

In essence, this scandal unearthed the tension between a liberal ideal image of political representation and the practices and realities of campaigning. Because Thorbecke had so vividly rejected any political communication on the spot, clientelism – in its positive reinterpretation as practices that enable interaction between the people and their representatives and contribute to people ‘feeling represented’ – had to take place in secrecy, at least as far as liberal politicians were concerned. Conservative and orthodox Protestant politicians, in contrast, argued that politicians should be allowed to campaign, to state clearly their political principles and thus to enable voters to support and hold accountable a candidate whose ideas and agendas were in line with theirs. This contestation of the dominant liberal, Thorbeckean conceptualisation of political representation and the accompanying political culture grew stronger with the rise of party in the final decades of the century.

Electoral culture gradually became more vivid from the late 1860s onwards. Political communication on the spot intensified. On occasions, candidates and voters came together at public meetings where one or more candidates delivered a speech, answered questions from the audience or took on opponents in a political debate. Liberal newspapers embraced this new electoral culture hoping that it would advance ‘political life among the electorate’, at least as long as the politicians refrained from showering voters with promises. Those
who feared that this would undermine a proper rule of democracy were reminded of the British case, which was supposed to show that bringing voters and candidates together did not threaten the functioning of parliamentary democracy.  

This new, more interactive electoral culture was also spurred on by the emergence of a new political discourse that centred on the politicisation of religion. From the late 1860s onwards the school-funding controversy (in Dutch: *schoolstrijd*) started to loom large over Dutch politics. Orthodox-Protestant politicians, soon followed by Catholic MPs, demanded equal government funding for private, confession-based schools compared to public (state) schools. In districts across the country confessional politicians mobilised voters around this issue. Religion became an overriding identity, in districts where voters had traditionally favoured an MP with clear personal ties to their district as well.  

The politicisation of religion was primarily the work of local electoral associations that selected candidates based on their stance in the school-funding controversy. In the Catholic districts in the southern part of the Netherlands the clergy took responsibility for this. In other parts of the country leading opinion-makers like the orthodox Protestant minister Abraham Kuyper took the initiative. Kuyper tried better to co-ordinate his campaign for equal funding by establishing a political party: his Antirevolutionary Party (ARP) was a national organisation that united people across the country behind a common political agenda and a coherent set of political ideals and aimed to win seats in Parliament. The rise of party, however, unfolded slowly, particularly compared to Germany and Belgium. Local electoral associations did not give up their independence easily and at first heavily contested Kuyper’s attempts to subject them to a centralised leadership and programme.  

The foundation of Kuyper’s ARP in 1879 was followed by the establishment of a liberal party organisation in 1885, a social-democratic party in 1894 and a Catholic Party in 1904. All of these ‘parties’ only gradually developed into well-coordinated organisations managed by a powerful party board. In fact, the term ‘party’ was avoided by almost all of the first nationwide political movements, because of its negative connotation: it was associated with discord that threatened to destabilise the country. Instead, several parties preferred to label themselves as ‘unions’ or ‘federations’ that maintained a lose structure with enough room for manoeuvre for individual MPs and for the affiliated local electoral associations.

What impact did this slow emergence of party have on the politics of place? In regions with a strong regional identity, like the northern province of Friesland or the Catholic southern province of Limburg, the number of MPs who originated from the district that sent them to Parliament remained high. Moreover, being able to tap into such a politics of place turned out to be important political capital, particularly now that with the rise of ideology-based politics elections often involved not two but several candidates from various parties; boasting ties with the local electorate could set a candidate apart from his opposition. Furthermore, the intensity of political communication on the spot expanded throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, turning the local into a vivid political arena where electoral associations distributed leaflets and brochures and politicians participated in debates at local meetings, in public squares or in the pub.

The claim in Dutch historiography that the rise of party had a negative impact on the politics of place should therefore be qualified. Yet, the fact remains that political parties invited voters to identify themselves first and foremost with a nationwide political community, with people with whom they shared a religion or class background. The conservatives, who had distinguished themselves through their appreciation of local autonomy and had
fought Thorbecke’s centralist agenda, were marginalised. In the 1870s conservative MPs either joined the liberals in their resistance of government support for denominational education or switched sides to the confessionals. With this, their – albeit not exclusively ‘conservative’ – politics of place withered – in contrast to Britain where in a range of districts Tory candidates fended off Labour and Liberal opponents by tapping into a local sense of community.  

Proportional representation and a politics of place, 1918–40

In his dissertation on the replacement of district voting by nationwide proportional representation Jasper Loots argues that the new electoral system confirmed the rise of party and cemented the dominant position of party in the decades to come. Parties had already emerged as the main force in politics long before 1918, but in the end, elections had always come down to a contest between single members of those parties. From 1918 onwards elections first and foremost turned into contests between parties and party leaders. The new system was primarily introduced to ensure a truly proportional representation of various groups in society, some of whom had been underrepresented under the district voting system. Moreover, liberals in particular also hoped that the new system would once and for all put an end to the persistent tendencies towards a politics of place in terms of deference to ‘local celebrities.’ The reconceptualisations of political representation fostered by the new electoral system are, however, testimony to the fact that place, in various guises, continued to play a role in Dutch electoral culture.

The electoral system itself ensured that elements of the district voting system were preserved. Inspired by the Finnish electoral system, the introduction of nationwide proportional representation went hand in hand with the division of the country in 18 electoral rings. These rings were purely administrative entities: the term ring (in Dutch: ‘kring’) was deliberately used to mark the difference with the abolished electoral districts. They, nonetheless, were meant to maintain some sort of geographical link between voters and candidates. What the state committee responsible for designing the new electoral system had had in mind was that local electoral associations should be given the opportunity to push forward candidates of their own choosing. In each ring parties were allowed to – and did in fact – submit a different list of candidates. Almost none of the major parties entered the elections with a single person heading the list in all electoral rings. The person topping the list was often a prominent politician who was somehow connected to the ring where his name was put forward – mainly by birth or residence – and often also some of the other candidates lower on the list could boast such connections. These candidates, however, rarely campaigned on issues that were of particular interest to their ring.

These practices, nonetheless, show that geographical considerations did play a role in the parties’ conceptualisation of political representation. Most parties designed the list of candidates in such a way that their MPs would be representative of the different sections of their political community. The social democrats, for instance, made sure to include representatives of affiliated trade unions and agricultural organisations, but also tried to maintain some sort of regional distribution, making sure that its MPs came from across the country. With an eye on the electorate, this would also help to smooth the transition from district voting to nationwide proportional representation.
Political parties indeed seem to have been concerned about the voters’ attachment to a politics of place in terms of their perception of an MP as somebody who should be ‘one of their own’ in order to be able to represent the interests of his or her local community. This clearly speaks from the interwar election campaigns of the Catholic Party. In the mainly Catholic, southern part of the Netherlands Catholic political organisations had been virtually non-existent before, because there had been no need to mobilise voters: Catholic MPs had often been elected unopposed with many voters not even bothering to go the polls. Traditionally, MPs were rooted in the districts that sent them to Parliament and perceived themselves as representatives of a particular district instead of a Catholic political organisation in statu nascendi. With the new system this changed. First, since every vote counted, all Catholic voters had to be mobilised. Second, the Catholic Party was keen to use the opportunity to crush local sentiments among its members by only sending MPs to Parliament who were willing to follow the party line. To that end, party leaders turned to a language of discipline, duty and a range of military metaphors to urge both voters and their MPs to unite under the banner of the Catholic Party. In a speech in the 1918 campaign a prominent party member explicitly denounced a politics of place: ‘When people ask you who you are, would you answer them that you are a Roman Catholic from a certain place, of a certain class, supporter of a particular candidate? No, we would answer: we are Roman Catholics.’

Particularly in the southern vestiges of Catholic power, however, sentiments of place were still widespread. According to regional Catholic newspaper Limburger Koerier: ‘For good reasons, people from Limburg prefer to send people from Limburg to The Hague.’ Candidates from outside the province were characterised as ‘strangers’. In these parts of the country MPs were still primarily expected to represent the interests of their ‘district’ rather than more abstract political ideals or agendas. This was fuelled by feelings of discrimination dating back to the Dutch Republic when the southern Catholic provinces had had a lower status and had been treated as colonies. In the industrial centre of Tilburg, also located in the Catholic south of the Netherlands, a renegade former Catholic MP showed the continuing potential of a politics of place by winning a seat in Parliament in the 1925 and 1933 elections on a campaign in which he presented himself as the champion of local interests. In general, however, all major parties managed to contain such politics of place by allowing for a controlled expression of sentiments of place through their candidate-selection procedures. Although some regionally based parties did enter the political scene, they were almost without exception unsuccessful in their attempts to enter Parliament.

What effect did the introduction of nationwide proportional representation have on Dutch electoral culture, in particular with regard to political communication on the spot? After 1918 elections were more about mobilisation than about contestation. Compared to before, voters were confronted less with political opposition, like political debates between two opposing candidates in a nearby pub or park. Most parties no longer hosted meetings with debate fearing that this would merely hand free publicity to their political opponents. Campaigns centred on mobilising one’s ‘own’ electorate. In the district system, in contrast, in order to win a majority of the vote parties had tried to win the support of the electorate at large. Direct communication between politicians or their helpers and the electorate had played a vital role. After 1918 campaigns first and foremost were a showcase of party unity and strength with parties hosting mass meetings in major venues in cities like Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht where thousands of supporters gathered to listen to
speeches and to sing party hymns. Moreover, parties flooded the country with countless amounts of brochures, pamphlets and posters. Through this culture of campaigning parties contributed to a representation of elections as the expression of loyalty. Although parties did fight for overlapping constituencies – the social democrats, for instance, tried to win the sympathy of confessional working-class voters – their propaganda also tapped into sentiments of loyalty and duty. In this respect Dutch electoral culture was more similar to Germany than to Britain.

What has, however, remained under the radar of Dutch historians of electoral culture is that parties were very much concerned about the need to maintain some of the key ingredients of the old electoral culture, particularly in terms of political communication on the spot. Despite the massification of political communication parties were still keen to keep approaching voters in person. The central party offices urged their local branches to carry out door-to-door canvassing as a way to preserve direct interaction between party and voters. Since most parties were in essence federations of local electoral associations headed by more or less dominant party boards, the parties depended on their local and regional branches for the actual execution of the campaign. Within the Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) ‘regional federations’ were responsible for party propaganda in their area.

In preparation for the 1918 elections, they designed a ‘propaganda plan’, issued brochures and pamphlets, organised meetings and co-ordinated the activities of local party branches. Apart from the campaign instructions issued by the party board, the regional federations were free to tailor the Party’s message to the local situation. In the southern, Catholic regions of the Netherlands, the SDAP for instance issued campaign newspapers in which the Party’s socialist ideology was cloaked in religious, Biblical discourse. The propaganda plans were ambitious and aimed at a high intensity of political communication on the spot. The northern federation planned to organise no less than 130 meetings between 18 May and 3 July, the day of the elections. Not all of these plans, however, eventually materialised. Some of the local organisations were frustrated by the fact that the introduction of proportional representation had turned them into mere propaganda committees with hardly any say in the selection of candidates. Worried about what they perceived as a weakening of local party life the party board issued a survey among its regional branches to check what was going on. The results were ambivalent. Some regional party activists argued that the Party needed to invest more in effective political communication on the spot, tailored to the specificities of the local electorate. Others, however, complained that the Party was thinking ‘too locally’. Although political representation was primarily conceived as the representation of groups united by class or religion these discussions about political communication as well as the candidate-selection procedures discussed earlier show that parties were keen to take issues of place in terms of local identities, interests and cultures of communication into account.

Place and the gap between politicians and the people, 1945–80s

During and after the Second World War the prevalence of nationalist sentiments brought about by the experience of war and occupation spurred discussions among prominent Dutch intellectuals and politicians about the establishment of new political parties that were supposed to surpass the boundaries of religion and class. This resulted in the establishment of the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA): a coalition of the social democrats of the
SDAP, progressive liberals and a couple of left-wing confessional politicians. The Catholic Party also discussed the nature of its reestablishment. Its primary concern was to keep Catholics from all ranks and files on board and not to lose working-class voters to the PvdA. In order to tie in with the widespread call for ‘renewal’, the old Catholic Party made way for a new party: the Catholic People’s Party (KVP). Although these ‘new’ parties were in essence constructed on the foundations of existing political organisations, the political atmosphere of the immediate post-war years did give the new party boards the momentum to push through a profound reorganisation through which they aimed to strengthen their grip on the local party branches. In 1947, for instance, the board of the KVP issued new regulations, which gave it greater control over the selection of candidates for Parliament.

Simultaneously, however, discussions arose about a growing gap between the political (party) elites and ‘the people’. Blame was put on the development of parties into professional organisations that had become alienated from the public at large, as well as on the electoral system, which had contributed to politics becoming the affair of a small party elite. In numerous debates in the 1950s and 1960s Parliament considered possible solutions, like the reintroduction of district voting in order to bring the people and their representatives closer together. The representation of regional interests was not on the minds of those in favour of electoral reform: district voting was first and foremost supposed to counter the estrangement between politicians and voters by drawing attention to the fact that politicians represented them instead of the more abstract notion of party.

Place, however, did begin to play a prominent role in conceptualisations of political representation from the late 1960s onwards. Dissatisfaction with the behaviour of an alienated political elite expanded into a wider criticism of their lack of attention for developments outside The Hague, the centre of Dutch government. In the 1950s and 1960s reports on the impact of rising urbanisation and the emergence of a post-Fordist economy revealed the existence of regional backwardness: while cities in the west were growing rapidly, other parts of the country experienced the disappearance or marginalisation of old industries, like the coal mines in Limburg or the textile industry in the east of the Netherlands. Geographers published reports on the declining ‘livability’ of such regions, in terms of service provision, housing and employment. In this context an image of Parliament and politicians took shape as an inward-looking political elite that had no clue of or interest in what was happening outside their ‘bubble’ in the Hague. In 1967 a state committee which discussed the modernisation of the Dutch constitution argued that regional interests were underrepresented in Dutch Parliament.

Against this background the social-democratic and the Catholic Party adopted a new, decentralised system of candidate selection to the benefit of its local and regional party branches. In the 1970s the social democrats institutionalised a kind of ‘shadow’ district system. The Party’s regional federations were handed a key role in the candidate-selection procedure. They were only willing to support candidates who promised to move to the region they were supposed to represent in Parliament. The regional branches of the Catholic Party in turn designated half of the Party’s 40 ‘safe seats’. In the 1980s all of the major parties put heavy weight on a balanced representation of regions in their candidate-selection procedure. Ruud Koole has argued that such a focus on place – and increasingly gender as well – reflected the fact that the ties between political parties and other civil-society
organisations like trade unions, which had been handed designated seats in Parliament earlier, had loosened. Political representation was indeed reconceptualised in such a way that MPs were now conceived as delegates who should take note of the wishes and needs of voters in a particular part of the country and who should be willing to be held accountable for their actions in Parliament by those voters. Moreover, in order to be ‘proper’ representatives in this sense, MPs had to perform their attachment to a particular place, by living amongst those who had sent them to Parliament or by otherwise showing their familiarity with a particular region.

The regionalisation of candidate selection did not remain uncontested. In the early 1980s the socialist newspaper Het Vrije Volk questioned the amount of attention given to regional interests in an already small country like the Netherlands. Critics argued that the Party’s ‘basism’ – an effort to increase the influence of ‘regular’ party members at the cost of the party board – went hand in hand with a misplaced distrust in the actions of the Party leadership. In 1992, after many failed attempts, the Partij van de Arbeid finally decided to recentralise candidate selection. The Christian Democrats, in contrast, after having suffered a heavy loss in the 1994 general elections, reflected on the need to reintroduce a politics of place. After the elections a regional branch argued that the Party had failed to develop a ‘strong regional profile’ and had become a ‘typical Randstad party’. Again, much like the 1960s, lowering the scale of representation to the level of regions was supposed to remedy the feelings of alienation among the electorate. The Party decided to change its regulations by allowing regional candidates to campaign for preference votes.

Figure 1. PvdA election caravan in Limburg, a southern province of the Netherlands, in the 1967 general election campaign, 24 January 1967. Source: Fotocollectie Anefo, file 920-0100, 2.24.01.05, National Archive. Photographer: Ron Kroon. Creative Commons License, CC-BY-SA.
Communication on the spot in an audience democracy

Post-war electoral culture has mainly been discussed in terms of its virtualisation and Americanisation, which refers to the increasing role played by the mass media and public-relations experts in political communication. Seen from this perspective, parties are chiefly occupied with generating enough media attention for their political views through the use of spin doctors, the selection of MPs based on their ability to perform on TV and the organisation of media events. As a result of this, direct interaction between voters and politicians has turned obsolete. The concept of ‘audience democracy’ aptly illustrates this. According to the French political scientist Bernard Manin, voters have turned into the spectators of a mass-mediatised performance of politics. How has a politics of place in the shape of political communication on the spot fared in this context?

Judging from the last parliamentary elections, which were held in September 2012, political communication on the spot still plays a prominent role in election campaigns. The social democrats, who against the odds turned out to be the main competitors of the liberal party in a true ‘horse race’ campaign, stressed that their investment in local campaigning was the main reason behind their success at the ballot box. The PvdA had started its campaign months before the elections with leading Party members canvassing across the country in order to take note of voters’ sentiments. The media had hardly noticed it and instead focused its election broadcasts on a range of election debates in the final weeks before election day.

What matters most here is not the question if the PvdA had indeed won the elections based on its local campaign efforts, but the perception that these efforts had been crucial. In fact the concern about the nature and intensity of political communication on the spot, like

Figure 2. Door-to-door canvassing by PvdA Party leader Joop den Uyl in the 1982 general election campaign, 1 September 1982. Source: Fotocollectie Anefo, file 932-3051, 2.24.01.05, National Archive. Photographer: Ron Kroon. Creative Commons License, CC-BY-SA.
door-to-door canvassing, is one of the striking constants in post-war intraparty discussions on electoral culture. Its continuing importance was derived from its perceived effectiveness and because it expressed the parties’ willingness to discuss their political principles in direct interaction with the electorate.

For effective political communication on the spot parties depended on the co-operation of their local branches. Party archives bear witness to recurring concerns about the lack of activity and zeal among local party activists. Political communication on the spot was often spotty and depended on the coincidental presence of a few active party members, willing to invest their spare time in distributing brochures, organising meetings and covering walls with posters. Election campaigns were therefore often preceded by campaigns aimed at reinvigorating local party branches. In the 1950s, for instance, the PvdA started its ‘Torchbearers Action’: the formation of local clubs of party activists who were instructed to host ‘living room meetings’ in order to stimulate discussions about politics in their local neighbourhood. The Catholic Party came with a similar initiative in the run-up to the 1956 campaign. Such activities are also a fine example of a new electoral culture that according to Martin Conway manifested itself across Europe. While ‘crowds and even mass meetings were a declining element of politics in Europe by the 1950s’, private methods of electioneering became more popular.

Also in the 1960s and 1970s, when elections developed into televised contests between party leaders, political communication on the spot remained a major concern. Parties made sure that their leader toured the country and delivered at least one speech in every region. Moreover, in line with the tendency of many parties to link MPs to a particular region, candidates were instructed to focus their campaign on their ‘own’ region. Regional campaign teams provided them with the necessary information on local issues so as to enable them to effectively tap into local political sentiments. Moreover, candidate MPs were instructed not to spend too much time in the ‘traditional’ surroundings of local party activists, at local party meetings, but to get in touch with voters face-to-face. In the 1960s, inspired by the election tours of the German social democrat Willy Brandt, the PvdA introduced its ‘election caravan’, with politicians touring across the country in order ‘to hear from the people what … they want from us’, according to party leader Joop den Uyl (Figure 1). Den Uyl argued that voters were keen to interact with politicians instead of merely listening to their speeches. In the 1970s and 1980s it became common practice for all major parties to conduct such election tours. Of course such activities garnered plenty of much-coveted media attention, but parties were also keen to express their willingness to engage directly with the public (Figure 2).

Conclusion

Looking back at the past century and a half, how does the Netherlands stand in comparison to surrounding European countries as far as the politics of place is concerned? Compared to Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century, local senses of community and their clash with ideology-based party politics were far less prominent in Dutch electoral culture. A crucial difference is the absence of a well-established conservative political movement in the Netherlands. Their marginalisation from the 1870s onwards resulted in a political landscape dominated by movements that were at least ambivalent towards a politics of place. Liberal politicians denounced the representation of regional interests and a politics of patronage
and clientelism as contrary to the principles of parliamentary democracy and political representation. Yet, the contestation of the narrative of the rise of party in British political culture might inspire Dutch historians to reflect more critically on the supposedly smooth transition of local electoral associations into a nationwide operating political movement. Moreover, although at first hand a culture of clientelism as sketched for France by Beyen and Monier appears to have been less common in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, further research is necessary to establish the actual nature of the interaction between voters and their representatives. Party archives give evidence of its extent in the form of countless letters written to the party office or the party leadership. The abolition of district voting in 1918, in contrast to countries like Belgium or France, undoubtedly contributed to such a conceptualisation of political representation in which voters first and foremost felt represented by their political party, rather than one of its MPs in Parliament. Clientelism, thus, has not been absent, but has taken a different shape in the Netherlands, which needs to be explored in more detail. Finally, in terms of political communication on the spot, similarities with Germany stand out. In contrast to Britain, in Germany and the Netherlands election campaigns were set up by party headquarters and were centred on the mobilisation of the electorate. After 1918 contestation, for instance in the form of a public debate between two opponents, was far less common than in Britain. In addition, in both countries party boards were concerned about the lack of zeal among their local branches and tried to reinvigorate political communication on the spot in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1960s onwards parties developed a more instrumental approach, using a politics of place in terms of candidate selection by local party branches and an intensification of political communication on the spot to bridge the perceived gap between voters and political elites.

Through an investigation of procedures of candidate selection and electoral culture since the mid-nineteenth century, this article has tried to avoid narrating the history of elections as a move away from place. Such a narration was at the heart of liberal conceptualisations of political representation throughout the second half of the nineteenth century in which a politics of place was framed as an obstruction to a political culture based on principles and the defence of the general interest. Instead, this article has tried to offer a first overview of how place continued to play a role in discussions on political representation. Two issues stand out. First of all, the degree to which Parliament should reflect the various regions of the country, so that local party associations and voters could feel represented and address ‘their’ MP for issues pertaining to his or her locality. Second, the need to maintain political communication on the spot in order to counter lack of political involvement and feelings of alienation among the electorate.

In the end, parties were still confronted with a ‘crisis of party’. Membership rates declined rapidly towards the end of the twentieth century and surveys showed a declining trust in politicians. In local elections the established, nationwide operating parties lost ground to local political parties, who emerged as the second largest force in Dutch municipal councils in 1998. The populist momentum of the early 2000s took shape around the activities of a range of anti-establishment local political movements which won elections in several big cities and who joined hands to establish a new, national political movement – Leefbaar Nederland – in the run-up to the 2002 general elections. Other populist parties like the Lijst Pim Fortuyn and the Partij voor de Vrijheid, headed by Geert Wilders, soon followed. These parties did not claim to represent specific regional interests, but argued that the established parties had lost touch with the electorate. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in renewed calls
among the established parties to reconfigure political representation in terms of a more
direct connection between voters and their representatives through some form of district
voting and a more humble approach of the electorate through direct interaction between
politicians and the public. A politics of place, in various veins, thus continues to inform
discussions on political representation.

Notes
1. Loots, Voor het volk, 214; Bos et al., Een sprong; De Jong, Electorale cultuur.
3. Tanner, Political Change; Lawrence, Speaking.
4. Lawrence, “Class;” Roberts, “Villa Toryism;” Windscheffel, Popular Conservatism; Roberts,
“Popular Conservatism.”
5. Lawrence particularly engaged in a debate with James Vernon: Vernon, Politics; for a recent
argument in favour of a nationalisation of electoral politics in the late nineteenth century
see: Blaxill, “Electioneering.”
7. Lau, Wahlkämpfe, 10–11, 15.
10. Ibid., 167–8.
11. But see Lawrence, Electing, in which he tracks the changing nature of (direct) communication
between politicians and the people; Gatzka, Richter, and Schröder, “Zur Kulturgeschichte,”
14–15.
14. For recent discussions about pillarisation theory see: Van Dam, Staat van verzuiling.
15. De Rooy, Ons stipje, 113–49; Van Klinken, Actieve burgers; Te Velde, Van regentenmentaliteit;
Van Veldhuizen, “A Grassroots Sacred Socialist History.”
16. Loots, Voor het volk, 203; De Jong, Van standspolitiek; De Jong, Electorale cultuur.
17. Loots, Voor het volk, 14.
20. Anderson, Lehrjahre, 52–62 where she presents an international comparison of election
corruption; O’Gorman, “Campaign Rituals.”
21. Monier, La Politique; Beyen, “De politieke kracht;” Beyen, “Clientelism;” for a similar
argumentation see: Briquet, La tradition.
22. Kroeze, Een kwestie, 22.
behavior see: Te Velde, “Onderwijzers.”
1848; Loots, Voor het volk, 21.
26. “Iets over het wets-ontwerp tot regeling van het kiesregt en de benoeming van afgevaardigden
ter Eerste en Tweede Kamer,” Arnhemse Courant, 10 June 1849; see also: “Provincialisme
en personalisme,” Utrechtsche Provinciale en Stads-Courant, 24 November 1848; Loots, Voor
het volk, 32. Thorbecke also did not shy away from some gerrymandering, making sure that
some districts included enough liberal voters as to ensure a liberal victory. Ibid., 208.
27. Thorbecke to B.W. Blijdenstein Jr., 7 January 1856, in Briefwisseling J.R. Thorbecke, VI, no. 316.
28. Thorbecke to L.D. Storm, 9 November 1848, in Briefwisseling J.R. Thorbecke, V, no. 217;
Thorbecke to J. Schoemaker Doyer, 15 November 1848, in Ibid., no. 219; Thorbecke to E.J.
Kiehl, 3 December 1857, in Ibid., VI, no. 429.
32. De Jong, Van standspolitiek, 48.
34. Van Driel and De Jong, De Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, 184–8.
35. Van den Berg, De toegang; see also: Sagittarius, Parlementaire portretten.
41. De Rooy, Ons stipje, 110.
42. “De verkiezingen X,” Algemeen Handelsblad, 28 May 1869; Advert, Provinciale Overijsselsche en Zwolsche courant, 7 June 1869.
43. Multatuli, Aan de stemgerechtigden, 42.
44. Multatuli, Advert, Leeuwarder Courant, 30 October 1860.
45. Kroeze, Een kwestie, 22–74.
46. Cf. Monier, La politique; Beyen, “Clientelism.”
47. Kroeze, Een kwestie.
51. De Jong, Standspolitiek, 141.
52. De Rooy, Ons stipje, 130–1.
53. Ibid., 120.
56. Bos et al., Een sprong, 61.
58. Loots, Voor het volk; De Jong, Electorale cultuur.
60. Loots, Voor het volk, 129. Since parties were allowed to submit a different list of candidates in each ring, some of the candidates went up for election in one ring only. After the election, seats were assigned to each party based on the number of votes cast for candidates on its lists in all electoral rings. Subsequently, seats were assigned to candidates based on preference voting regulations.
69. Vossen, Vrij vissen, 100.
70. Van Wijnbergen, *Stemt no. 1*, 30–1; Bos et al., *Een sprong*, 83–6.
73. Board of the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) to regional federations of the Party, March 1918, file 2184, SDAP Archive, International Institute of Social History (IISH).
74. “Propagandaplan van de Gewestelijke Federatie ‘Overijsel’ der SDAP,” 30 May 1918, file 2184, SDAP Archive, IISH; see also the “propagandaplannen” by the Regional Federation Zuid-Holland. Ibid.
76. “Propagandaplan van de Gewestelijke Federatie Groningen der SDAP” [1918], file 65, SDAP-Groningen Archive, IISH.
78. Dossier “Verslapping van het partijleven,” file 792, SDAP, IISH.
79. A. Koekoek to the party board, received on 4 October 1922, file 2198a, SDAP Archive, IISG; A. van Dam to C. Werkhoven, Winterswijk, 29 September 1922, Ibid.
80. F. van Meurs to C. Werkhoven, 28 September 1922, Ibid.
82. Ibid., 188–91.
91. In 1980 the Christian Democrats founded a new party, Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), a merger of the three major confessional parties KVP, ARP and CHU.
95. Interview with Hans Spekman, party chairman of the PvdA at the seminar *De verkiezingscampagnes van de SDAP en PvdA door de jaren heen. Van “Stemt Rood!”, naar “Uw Vertrouwen Waardig!” tot “Sterker en Socialer”*, The Hague, 9 November 2012.
99. “Verkiezingen 1956 in Nederland” [KVP], file 1502, KVP Archive, KDC.


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A regionalisation or long-distance trade? Transformations and shifts in the role of Tana in the Black Sea trade in the first half of the fifteenth century

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ABSTRACT
The Italian trading stations in Tana were important in the long-distance trade system of the Italian maritime republics Venice and Genoa. The deeds of two Venetian notaries who worked there during the 1430s, Nicolo de Varsis and Benedetto de Smeritis, are an important source for tracing the transformation of the issues and directions of Italian trade in the Black Sea region, a trade which was recovering from the crisis of the fourteenth century. Notwithstanding the Venetian-Genoese struggle and previous crisis events, this recovery made the economic conditions favourable. Although some scholars see a regionalisation of trade in fifteenth century, the source evidence challenges this interpretation. Westerners began to import Italian, Flemish and English textiles to the Eastern markets, and the local goods (fish, caviar) were widely exported to Europe – even to the markets of Flanders. Finally, the slave trade was intensive. My main argument here is that though there were considerable transformations in the Italian trade, there was no real regionalisation of trade, which retained its long-distance character.

In the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries the economy of Europe made a breakthrough in its commercial expansion. This was the epoch of increasing trade connections between Europe and the East, when profit resulted from the difference in production expenses in the various regions. Venice and Genoa became the most important centres of international commerce. Their long-distance trade relied on a network of trading stations. These settlements were situated all around the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, connecting Western Europe, the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean with Eastern Europe, Middle and Eastern Asia by trade routes. Located where the Don River flows into the Sea of Azov, Tana was one of the major stations on the northern Black Sea coast. Studies of various aspects of the history of the Venetian and Genoese trading stations in Tana, the life and customs of its inhabitants, its social structure and its commerce make possible the reconstruction of the history of political, economic and cultural relations of the Black Sea region with Russian

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principalties, Western Europe, the Byzantine Empire, the Ulus of Djuchi and the Middle East, as well as the ethnic and social structure of the trading stations.

The Italian merchants felt comfortable in the Black Sea region largely because of the awareness of the khans about the possibility of profiting from tolls, while the khans were also largely patronising the trade and merchants themselves; at the same time, the main concern of the policy of the Italian maritime republics in the East was providing the most favourable terms of trade and taxation for their subjects. All trade at the Italian stations was strictly controlled by their administrations. Tana became a terminal of Italian commerce and a crossroads of the routes of trade as early as the fourteenth century. The crisis following the Black Death seriously damaged the safety of long-distance trade with Central and Eastern Asia because of the increasing danger on the trade routes. Nevertheless, this decrease was paralleled by an increase in the importance of local goods and regional Black Sea trade items (grain, wax, fish, caviar and so on). The fifteenth century began with recovery from the crisis and the growth of trade dynamics. The goods for mass consumption (for example, grain and fish from the Black Sea region) began to play a more important role than spices and luxury had before. In this period, Venetian trade reached its peak, connecting the space from Egypt and Black Sea to Flanders with its galleys. The mechanisms of capitalism became dominant in Italy; in addition, the budget of Venice suffered less in the fourteenth century than those of most other European countries. Its income per annum was in first place in Europe by 1423.

Both Venice and Genoa formed guarded naval expeditions with a final destination in Tana, while the continental route from Tana to China through Central Asia took 284 days. While Genoa had a strong network of stations in the Black Sea region, the Venetians had only two points (Tana and Trebizond), but the importance of the region for them was immense. It can be estimated through the examination of the commodity circulation in Constantinople – roughly 1 million perpers per annum. Even during wars and political tension, Venice took care to send expeditions to Tana at any cost.

One can trace the increase in trade in the fifteenth century based on the rates of auctions selling the shares of the galleys of the Venetian expeditions to the Orient. From 1405 to 1450, the percentage of the rates of Tana galleys in Levantine expeditions overall was 24%; from 1436 to 1439 it was 38%, which means favourable market conditions. Besides long-distance trade with the Mediterranean and Western Europe, regional trade was not of the least importance. Tatar coins with the overstriking of Caffa can be regarded as evidence of the intensive trade exchanges between the Crimea and the Azov Sea region. In general, the 1430s were the peak of Venetian trade in the Black Sea region.

It was often claimed in the previous scholarship that the crisis events of the fourteenth century were followed by the decline of long-distance trade. Though in fact nobody now holds the opinion that Tana completely lost its commercial importance, the ‘regionalisation’ of trade in the Black Sea basin in the course of the fifteenth century became a commonplace. This meant a decline in long-distance trade paralleled by a growing volume of regional trade (which surely did grow). However, was it really a decline of long-distance trade as a whole, or rather structural change in it? Was it the ‘regionalisation’ of trade, or rather a shift of the same long-distance trade from one type of goods to another?

I am trying here to address this problem based on the sources covering a decade (roughly 1430–40). These sources are the notarial deeds of two fifteenth-century Venetian notaries at Tana: Niccolò de Varsis and Benedetto de Smeritis. These sources have not been previously
published and have never been the subject of intensive study. The notarial documents in general are among the main sources for research on life in Tana. The trade in this settlement required the production of the documents; therefore these notarial deeds are pretty numerous. Regrettably, during the Ottoman invasion a large number of them was destroyed. Nevertheless, it was a requirement for a notary that the copies of his deeds should have passed to his successor to be sent later on to Venice together with other different papers. As a result of this meticulous collecting of the deeds in the Venetian archive, we now have at our disposal 1194 deeds drawn in Tana by 34 notaries who worked there. In this study, I researched those of Varsis and Smeritis covering roughly the 1430s. The Varsis documents from busta 231 contain various documents (testaments, general commissions, commissions to receive salary, liberations of slaves and so on), while the remaining two are mainly composed of the testaments. It is clear that these are not complete sets of the documents of Varsis and Smeritis, but rather a limited part (testaments and refutations – bb. 917, 750). Obviously, here we face a methodological problem dealing mainly with the testaments that can reflect only a part of the economic activity of the Venetians on the Black Sea (and mainly with a sort of time lag, hence representing a delayed effect, since the testaments would normally quote the bargains that were made previously). However, we do not have other notarial sources covering the same period of the presence of the Venetians in Tana; we should therefore extract from these sources all the possible data.

In this study, I will analyse the unpublished notarial testaments drawn by two fifteenth-century Venetian notaries in Tana (Niccolò de Varsis and Benedetto de Smeritis) as a source for a reconstruction of some aspects of the material culture of the trading station. These notaries were working in Tana between 1430 and 1440. The documents are available at the State Archives in Venice in the Notarili Testamenti and Cancelleria Inferior, Notai sections. Niccolò de Varsis and Benedetto de Smeritis drew up deeds (the imbreviaturae of which are extant) in Tana mainly between 1430 and 1440. They are stored in the State Archives in Venice (Notarili Testamenti and Cancelleria Inferior, Notai collections). The documents by Niccolò de Varsis are imbreviaturae, all on paper except for one parchment instrumentum in b. 231, arranged in two folders. Another cartulary belongs to Smeritis, six sheets with testaments; some of the pages may have been lost. The notarial deeds that have been thoroughly researched for the first time in this study gave me source material, which allows us to broaden the picture of the Italian presence in the Black Sea region in the Middle Ages, as well as to amend some points on the scholarship on the history of the Black Sea region. Both Niccolò de Varsis and Benedetto de Smeritis, the notaries whose deeds I studied, drew them up in Tana mainly in the 1430s. These notarial documents are found today in the collections of the Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Notarili Testamenti and Cancelleria Inferior, Notai: (1) Busta 917, Benedetto Smeritis (mainly testaments from Tana from 22 July 1432 to 6 April 1436, as well as the testaments drawn up in Constantinople and Alexandria); (2) Busta 231, one mixed cartulary of Niccolò de Varsis with the imbreviaturae of different deeds from Tana (2 May 1436 to 9 October 1436), an imbreviatura of one document drawn up earlier in Constantinople (25 March 1435), and a parchment instrumentum (17 August 1445); (3) Busta 750, mainly the testaments drawn up by Niccolò de Varsis, dating back to different times (from 19 August 1428 to 7 October 1439).

Researchers have long regarded Venetian notarial acts as one of the most important sources for the economic, social, political, ethnic and legal history of the Italian trading stations. The documents drawn up by the Italian notaries in the Levant, in the trading
stations of the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Black Sea coast have attracted the attention of scholars from different fields, being a relevant source for reconstructing the history of the Italian republics, Eastern Europe and the region at the edge of the Caucasus. Most of the acts I examined do not represent commercial bargains or transactions in themselves, unlike some documents dating back to earlier times, which were studied previously and are not the main part of my original research, but which I use for the background to my study. Another methodological problem comes from the nature of the sources, which obviously underrepresent the trade conducted by the local Oriental merchants, who had their deeds drawn at the Venetian notary much less often than the Western Europeans. Nonetheless, having acknowledged these methodological difficulties of using the testaments for such a study, I daresay that the deeds often contain valuable data on economic history, which I will present in this article. Namely, the deeds (most of which are the testaments) often quote the bargains made previously (but still normally within the period of the 1430s or 1420s) or otherwise report the commercial transactions made by the persons quoted in the deeds. Here I will examine the position of Tana in the commodity circulation among Europe, the Black Sea region and the East in the 1430s. Based on a combination of the notarial sources that I have mentioned above and the results from previous research I will try to infer on the subject of alleged decline or regionalisation of trade inasmuch as the complex analysis of relevant sources allows it.

**Goods imported from Europe**

**Textiles**

Textiles and clothes made in Europe (and quite often Northern Europe) are among the things most often mentioned in the testaments as an object of bequeathing. This is quite natural. Textiles were the main category of goods imported from Western Europe and the Mediterranean and often even served as currency. This trade reflected the changes in the European economy of the High Middle Ages as a whole and the emergence of industrial textile production in particular. There was a demand for European textiles on the markets of the Black Sea, and these textiles were widely used by the Tatars. At the same time, Westerners were attracted by Eastern raw materials (cotton, dyes, alum) for their growing industry.

After 1400, the price of the products of European industry increased rapidly, connected to the general recovery of the European economy. In the deeds one can often encounter different types of textiles and clothing. Loesti was the most popular. Baldassare, son of the deceased Marco, mentions that Biagio Alberegno had to give him 10 sommo for 1 piece of linen of loesti; he also mentions that in 1430 he and Bartolomeo Rosso sent 19 slaves to Venice and got 32 pieces of linen of loesti in exchange, as well as that he got 10 pieces of linen of loesti for Andrea Contarini. In 1431 Francesco Contarini offered to sell loesti at 10 sommo per piece. Apparently, 10 sommo per piece was a conventional price for a decade. Besides loesti, the deeds mention other textiles. Loesti is repeatedly mentioned otherwise. Sometimes one even encounters slaves who bought and sold textiles.

Loesti was surely not the only type of textile to be imported to the region, but it seems to be the most popular. It might have originated either from Aalst, a town in Eastern Flanders, or probably from the English town of Lowestoft. Neither of these two hypotheses on the textile’s provenance is surprising because the Venetian galleys began to sail to Flanders...
beginning in the thirteenth century, and these voyages were connected with those to Tana. The galleys of Tana left only after the galleys from Flanders charged with the textiles arrived at Venice; the scheduling was arranged consequently. Another type of English textile is kersey (charœxea), a type of cloth which takes its name from the settlement of Kersey in Suffolk. Presumably its production began there, but by the fifteenth century the main producer of kersey was the West Riding of Yorkshire, including the Metropolitan Borough of Calderdale. Kersey was widely exported to Central and, as we can see now, to Eastern Europe. In addition, sometimes the deeds mention textiles without a specification of their kind (for example: item Andrea Nigro ipse habere debet brachia quinque tella Nigroponti).

Once, a master of a slave named Martin allowed him to retain upon his liberation all cloth and flax fabric (panno de lano et lino) that he had previously. A bequeathing of a green vestes to a professional cloth-maker, who must have had enough of the fabric himself (according to the testator’s will it had to be given to a certain tailor Lorenzo: item dimito Laurentio sartori vestem meam viridem quam porto dictum) can be an example of the high demand that the European-produced clothes met in Tana both among the Italians and among the locals, and therefore of a considerable scale of trade.

In general, Latin Romania was deeply involved in the textile trade. A German, Albert de Crunut, son of the deceased Dirck, mentions that he had to give Andrea Nigro 5 cubits of textiles in Negroponte. Clothes are often mentioned (clearly they were mainly of European origin besides the ones made of fur); often the deeds specify the colour and whether they had a lining or not. The clothes mentioned are diplois, clamyda, toga, roba, vestes; often the deeds mention black berets and other types of hats and caps, textiles for sacerdotal robes and so on. Once, antependia are mentioned. As has been written earlier, besides Italian textile production, that of Flanders and the British Isles are reflected in the deeds (the above-mentioned loesti and charœxea; two new black caps from London are also mentioned – ‘due birete nigre nove de Londres’, and two robes from Scotland – ‘robe echosse’), which is an example of a long-distance Venetian clothes trade. Venice actively exploited the above-mentioned tandem routes of the galleys of Romania and Flanders, scheduling the time of the arrival and departure of galleys so the Tana galleys left only after the arrival of galleys with textiles from Flanders.

Other products of European industry

Other goods were mostly imported to be used by the Italians themselves. Venetian glass has been discovered in Eastern Crimea. The glass trade became quite important by 1400, and presumably Tana was involved. In 1439, Badoer registered a batch of Venetian glass in Constantinople; it was destined for retail trade and gifts. The deeds also mention some utensils clearly originating from Europe: weapons, including swords, longbows, crossbows and arrows of individual ownership, as well as 200 shields from Valencia (presumably to be sold or otherwise traded for equipping the garrison), golden rings with various jewels, a silver belt and a tin vessel. Sometimes the weight is specified; Michele de Matheo de Suazio left his brother a silver belt of 13 ounces. Spices, however, were not that significant in the overall structure of trade; they are more interesting as items of material culture and everyday life.
Goods exported to Europe and goods destined for local consumption

Fish

Giovanni Liardo received through *cambium* \(^{53}\) 20 ducats from Giovanni Basilio with the condition that had he wished to transfer *cambium* to Venice he should have done it with a deposit of 2 *botte* of sturgeon. \(^{54}\) In his will Michele de Mattheo de Suazio mentions the gain from 25 *botte* of sturgeon sold. \(^{55}\) Baldassare, son of the deceased Marco, mentions that he charged 500 bezants for 4 *botte* of sturgeon and another 1000 bezants for 7 *botte* of sturgeon. \(^{56}\) Thus, one can judge the prices: 10 ducats, 125 bezants and 142.8 bezants per *botta* respectively. Earlier deeds also mention sturgeon \(^{57}\), as well as *peschiere* with a number of Venetian workmen \(^{58}\), often owned by officers, nobles and merchants (Giosafato Barbaro, Giovanni da Valle \(^{59}\)); they were situated far from the trading station (around 40 miles, according to Barbaro) and sometimes they were endangered by the Tatar threat. \(^{60}\) These *peschiere* retained their importance into the sixteenth century under the Turks. \(^{61}\) Some scholars have even claimed that fish was the main item of trade in Tana. \(^{62}\) Balard wrote that it was exported to Constantinople, Trebizond, Caffa, Simisso and Smirna \(^{63}\); however, none of my deeds implies selling them on the spot or in Constantinople – only in Venice. Thus, as well as caviar, sturgeons were the objects of long-distance trade. Less expensive species of fish from Tana were the basis of the diet of the lower classes in Constantinople. \(^{64}\) At least after 1427, the fish trade was controlled by a special Venetian office called Ternaria Nuova. \(^{65}\)

Caviar

Byzantium had a long-standing tradition of caviar trade \(^{66}\) from the Don River to Constantinople and Europe through Tana. \(^{67}\) It retained its importance in the 1430s. Giovanni de Giorgio de Segna received six vessels with caviar measuring four *cantar* each (1 *cantar* equals 47.6 kilo), in total, 24 *cantars* of caviar \(^{68}\), which shows the large scale of the trade. \(^{59}\) Pero Tafur also mentions the caviar from Tana sturgeon. \(^{70}\)

In 1433, the price of the caviar in Pera was fixed at 6.5 to 7 *perpers* for a Genoese *cantar* (47.65 kilo). \(^{71}\) In 1438, Giacomo Badoer bought caviar from Tana (8 *cantars* = 380.8 kilos) at 6 *perpers* per *cantar*, and, later, 7 and 11 *cantars* (333 and 523 kilo) for 6.8 and 5 *perpers* per *cantar*, respectively. \(^{72}\) Barbaro reports a story of how the Tatars plundered 30 barrels of caviar from the hiding place of his friend, Giovanni de Valle. \(^{73}\) However, such losses were episodic, while the commercial interest was constant. Eventually, the Venetians and Genoese introduced the taste for caviar into Europe. \(^{74}\)

Salt

The Italians (mainly the Genoese \(^{75}\)) supplied Constantinople and Trebizond with salt from Sivash. \(^{76}\) Barbaro wrote that this salt was as large-grained as that from Ibiza (*Gieviza*) \(^{77}\), one of the main salt-mining places in Europe. \(^{78}\) Places where salt was mined on the shore of the Black and Azov Seas are marked as *saline* on old Italian maps. \(^{79}\)
**Ceramics**

Excavations in Tana show that a large part of the ceramics in use were either of local production, or originated from the Ulus of Djuchi or from the other areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea region. At the same time, ceramics from Tana can be found elsewhere, and the finds of the ceramics from the Volga region in Soldaia are finally persuasive that the ceramics trade through Tana was intensive. The vessels depicted with *graffito* are commonly regarded as the ‘Latino-Paleologian’ group; they were produced in Crimea and the region of the Azov Sea.

**Wine**

Wine was permanently lacking in Tana, hence, it was one of the main imports. Baldassare, son of the deceased Marco, mentions that he charged around 74 ducats for the wine he sold, and another 80 bezants for another *botta* of wine. The wine was mainly imported to Tana from Trebizond, where the merchants had a privilege of duty-free wholesale wine trade. Based on the analysis of the ceramic containers, Volkov claimed that Trebizond was the only importer of wine to Tana. However, this claim is too bold. Volkov himself says that one of the main groups of ceramics found at Tana was that from Eastern and Southern Crimea, a wine-producing region of Gothia.

Researching the data of a Genoese financial inspection of 1351, one finds that the wine from Gothia was brought to Caffa and taxed at 10 aspres per barrel. This tax gave an income of 25,000 aspres per annum, hence the amount of wine can be calculated at around 2600 barrels. Caffa supplied 50% (which should be less than 2600 barrels) of its wine needs from Gothia and imported the rest from the Aegean region. Where did the Genoese re-export the rest of the wine from Gothia? The only possible solution was that they sold it in Tana to both Italians and Tatars, who soon became addicted to wine (just to recall the episode from Barbaro, when his guest Edelmugh got his fill of it). Moreover, there was a transit wine trade from Crimea to the Russian principalities through Tana and the Don River; Crimean wine vessels have been found in the regions of the Volga and Don as well as northwards up to Moscow. Presumably, the Russian word *виноград* (grapes) could have German (that is, Gothic) origins (*Wingart*). Apparently Balard was mistaken in claiming that the import of wine from Trebizond to Crimea and Tana was not important. I would add that besides the import from Trebizond there was an import from Crimea. The abundance of imported wine vessels in a small settlement which was not a centre of wine production is evidence of the well-developed wine trade as well as of its widespread consumption.

**Timber**

Timber is mentioned in the deeds only once. This issue of trade had the advantage of low freight rates. Relatively cheap timber from the Russian principalities was needed for the growing industry in Italy, and this promoted the raw-materials trade, the scale of which was quite large, and, which can be seen from the other (mainly Genoese) sources.
**Wax**

Tana was a transit point for the wax trade. Giovanni Petri mentions 12 cantars of wax in his will. In his testament Antonio de Papia, son of the late Chinacsius, gave candles to the church of St Mikel in Murano. The candles could also be produced in the small factories of the churches of Tana. Wax was 28.4% of Badoer’s exports from Constantinople to Venice. Part of it probably came from Asia Minor, but most of it was clearly from the north, coming via the River Don. The Venetians determined special freight rates for the wax from Tana and in some years it was one of the main objects to be loaded on the galleys. (Wax was regarded among the *sottili* issues.)

**Fur**

Eastern Europe supplied the European markets with furs from the Russian lands, Tana being a pivotal intermediary thanks to its position in the estuary of the River Don, on the most reliable and safe route linking Tana to the Russian lands of those times. (The journey must have lasted around 40 days.) Along with Caffa, Tana was among the main suppliers of Russian fur to the European markets. One can find numerous references to clothes made of fur in the deeds – fur coats (Russian borrowing *subbum* from *уйба*), caftans (again a borrowed word) and other types of clothing made from various kinds of fur, from sable and fox to modest sheepskin. Sable was especially popular. The first mentions of merchants from the Russian principalities, perhaps linked with the fur trade at Italian trading stations, date to the fourteenth century. There were six routes linking Russia with the Black Sea: (1) the Dnepr; (2) the Don (through Tana); (3) from Smolensk and Slutzck to Moncastro; (4) through Caffa; (5) via the Volga up to Saraj, and then via the Don to Tana; and (6) via the Volga to Astrakhan, then via the Caucasus to Trebizond and Constantinople. The second route took around 40 days, and its increasing importance and relative safety can be testified to by the fact that it was chosen by the Metropolitan Pimen on his way to Byzantium.

**Leather**

Leather (including high-quality cordobans) was exported through Tana to Trebizond. Cordobans (clearly meant to be sold) are mentioned in the will of Baldassare, son of the deceased Marco from St Peter de Castello.

**Oil**

Like wine, oil was imported to Tana (presumably from Romania). Antonio de Papia, son of the late Chinacsius, mentioned one botta of oil to be given to Baldassare Marzi.

**Cereals**

Crops from the northern Black Sea coast were exported to Byzantium, Italy, Western Europe and the Near East at least from 1268, and demand was high. The Empire of Trebizond, as well as Constantinople, was especially dependant on this supply. It is known for certain that even the nomadic Tatars were involved in agriculture; Barbaro reported their immense
harvests of millet (1 to 50, 1 to 100, according to Barbaro).\textsuperscript{114} Whether Tatars’ farming was close to Tana has been argued\textsuperscript{115}, but no evidence is known.

\textbf{Animals}

Barbaro described the animal trade, the occupation of Tatars, exhaustively.\textsuperscript{116} It is hard to estimate the scale, but surely it was huge. Horses and bulls were the main items of this trade (through Walachia and Transylvania to Germany and Italy); other items were camels (the Tatars sold them to Persia), and sheep.\textsuperscript{117} The deeds do not give much evidence of it – only once do they mention a mule to be given to the consul.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{Silk}

The silk sold through Tana was of lower quality and quantity than that sold through Trebizond.\textsuperscript{119} Badoer bought silk in Constantinople at 153 to 165 aspres of Trebizond per \textit{libra}.\textsuperscript{120} However, silk is often mentioned in the deeds, sometimes in large amounts, and it is often specified that it be for sale; it can be pieces of cloth\textsuperscript{121}, silk shirts\textsuperscript{122}, shawls, and so on, although I did not find any evidence of prices. While the textile trade seemed to reach its peak, the silk trade in the fifteenth century was most likely in decline. Nevertheless, silk as plain pieces\textsuperscript{123}, shirts made of silk\textsuperscript{124}, shawls and so on are still often mentioned, but rather as items of personal use than as items of trade.

\textbf{Spices}

Spices, medicines and other Eastern herbs equalled 21.4\% of Badoer’s exports from Constantinople to Venice.\textsuperscript{125} It is significant that after Djanibeck plundered Tana in 1343 and the trade with Italy was stopped, prices for spices and silk doubled in Italy.\textsuperscript{126} Pegolotti also mentions Tana as an important transit point on the spice trade.\textsuperscript{127} However, in the fifteenth century spices were a bit less important. Barbaro describes that earlier some six or seven large galleys came to Tana for the sake of Eastern spices and so on, while those goods were unavailable even in Syria!\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{Slaves}

The source data on slavery and the slave trade in Tana is a separate subject requiring a comprehensive study. What is relevant for this article is that the sources of the 1430s clearly show that the Italian slave traders and commoners who bought the slaves in Tana preferred to sell them in Venice, because the prices there were higher. Slaves, therefore, were an object of the long-distance trade.

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As said earlier, it was often claimed that the fifteenth century was a period of decline in long-distance trade and the regionalisation of Black Sea commerce\textsuperscript{129} because of the permanent underloading of the \textit{sottili} goods in Tana.\textsuperscript{130} The evidence for this could be the paramount role of the ‘round’ vessels and other ships transporting the heavy goods of regional origin (rather than galleys, which were used for costly Eastern goods). In the deeds
of the 1430s, one encounters navis\textsuperscript{131}, another navis,\textsuperscript{132} gripparion\textsuperscript{133} and some other private ship.\textsuperscript{134} However, in the 1430s, mudaes of galleys from Romania and the Black Sea were in even better condition than those of Flanders.\textsuperscript{135} My sources show clearly that the role of local goods (like fish and caviar) increased – but this does not necessarily mean the decline of long-distance trade: the same sturgeon and caviar were exported to Europe. Certainly the import of Western textiles was considerable as well. Then, the deliberation of the Senate (28 March 1434) on the galleys of Romania mentions spices, wax, silk and dyes for textiles\textsuperscript{136}, so one can infer that the connections with the Volga region and Central Asia still existed, if not as strongly as previously. Last, but not least, the slave trade was mainly long distance.

I do not have at my disposal precise data on the main directions of trade. Definitely, the routes of mudaes (Venice – Romania, including Negroponte – Trebizond – Tana) were among the main ones\textsuperscript{137}; routes from Tana to Constantinople, Trebizond and Caffa were in use as well. These three cities were Tana’s most stable commercial partners according to the deeds. Thus, Giovanni de Segnorio had to pay 500 aspres to Antonio de Benedetto (residing in Caffa), as well as 800 aspres to the Office of Provisioning in Caffa.\textsuperscript{138} A mas-sarius of Caffa Battista de Cremona also visited Tana. Astrakhan, Samarqand and Urgench are rarely mentioned in the sources of the 1430s, which means a shift in the trade interests from the trade with China to that with closer lands. Although in the fifteenth century the significance of land communications increased\textsuperscript{139}, the land route to Tana through Hungary and the steppe was not widely used until 1453.\textsuperscript{140}

How the Italian trade influenced the economy and social structure of the local communities is not so clear.\textsuperscript{141} Apparently, the increasing local trade did not lead to the rapid rise of local Armenians, Jews and Greeks. Local merchants, however wealthy they were, can in any case only be regarded as subordinate partners of the Italians. At the same time, the statement of Balard about the monopolisation of the trade by the Italians, who deprived locals from it entirely\textsuperscript{142}, was argued long ago.\textsuperscript{143} The Italians did not eradicate local enterprise, but rather co-operated with them as junior partners and collaborators.\textsuperscript{144}

In general, the data from the incanti auctions of the galleys of Tana show the increase in trade dynamics of the 1430s. This data, persuasive in itself, can be verified by comparing it with the materials of taxation. The Genoese commodity circulation in Tana, calculated based on these materials, equalled 20,853 and 56,000 ducats for the years 1423 and 1463 respectively\textsuperscript{145}, which means considerable growth; the Venetian commodity circulation must have had an even stronger tendency to increase. Hence, notwithstanding the Venetian-Genoese struggle and previous crisis events, the recovery made the economic conditions favourable.

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The thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries were the epoch of the emergence of capitalism and its economic tools in international trade. According to Braudel, Venice became the first world economy at exactly this time and all the tools that modern capitalism has at its disposal were formed by the Italian maritime republics. In the 1430s, commodity circulation increased, following the recovery from earlier crisis. The incanti amounts of the 1430s became more stable than previously and demonstrated a tendency towards economic growth. Besides incanti, the frequency of visits by galleys to the port of Tana and the length of their stays at the trading station provide additional evidence of the recovery from crisis. This economic growth lasted until 1453, when it was stopped by political rather than economic factors.
The import of textiles and other products of European industry to Tana was considerable, and they met demand among the local population. The scale of the import of European textiles shows that the imported amount was above the needs of the Latin population of Tana. Hence, it was destined for the local market as well. The same was true for wine from the region of the Aegean Sea, Trebizond and perhaps Crimea; the deeds also mention weapons produced in Europe (though whether they could be of any commercial importance or not is unclear). Some of the textiles were apparently of Italian production; others, however, originated from Flanders and the British Isles. The time of the arrival and departure of the Venetian galleys of Romania and Flanders was even organised so that the galleys going to Tana departed after the ones from Flanders bringing the textiles to Venice. This was therefore a route of long-distance trade, and the route of primary importance.

The exported goods in the 1430s were predominantly raw materials and food. Tana intensively exported fish and caviar; among the other items exported to Europe one can mention furs, timber, leather, wax, salt and cereals. It is worth mentioning that while minor species of fish could be sold, for example, to Constantinople, sturgeon and caviar travelled on the Italian vessels as far as Flanders. Slaves were also commonly sold in Constantinople or Venice, where prices were higher. Now, an obvious conclusion comes to one's mind: the processes that followed the crisis events of the second half of the fourteenth century can hardly be called the ‘decline of the long-distance trade’. It is very true that there was a decline in trade with Central and Eastern Asia (as mentioned earlier), particularly with China through Tana. The silk trade, the spice trade and others were losing their relative importance. However, the trade clearly retained its long-distance character. In the fifteenth century it did not concentrate simply around the routes connecting Italy through the Black Sea region with Eastern Asia; rather, the importance of the Tana–Venice–Flanders route increased. I would be cautious about the usage of the concept of the regionalisation of trade. Contacts and distances like “Russian lands–Tana–Romania–Italy–Flanders and the British isles” should be taken into account. Where something ‘regional’ may seem relevant is the shift from the silk trade, the spice trade and so on to the export of the regional goods (fish, caviar, cereals and salt) that were nevertheless exported far from the Black Sea region in the established framework of long-distance trade. This situation was most likely not discontinued until 1453.

The Black Sea region provided an import–export service of vital importance for Europe. As I implied earlier, commerce retained its long-distance character, which did not decline, although it was paralleled by the increasing importance of regional goods. The role of goods from Eastern Asia was probably of less importance compared to the fourteenth century; however, the export of fish, caviar, furs and so on, as well as the import of European textiles, utensils and other items were increasingly becoming more and more considerable. The model of European economic colonialism, that is, the products of European industry being exchanged for raw materials from the colonies, already existed in fifteenth-century Tana.

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Notes

1. Капров, Итальянские морские республики, 210.
2. Hereafter, in saying “Northern Black Sea coast” or “Black Sea region,” I imply the coast of the Azov Sea as well. In addition, one should mention that the division of the Italian Tana and the nomadic Djuchid city of Azak (broadly called “Tana” by Western European writers) is quite arbitrary. However, following the established tradition in historiography, I use the name “Tana” to refer to the Italian settlement.
3. This happened largely due to the recovery from crisis in Europe itself, the growth of local markets, the involvement of the countryside in exchange, and the intensification of contacts. Another important factor was the development of the banking sector.
4. The Venetian trade with Flanders is reflected in the deeds of the 1430s. The expedition to Flanders is mentioned in: Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Notarili Testamenti. 750. f. 23r. (See a brief presentation of the sources in later notes).
5. Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme; the funds invested annually into commerce equaled 10 mil. ducats and gave 40% profit.
8. Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 421–2.
9. Shitikov, “Константинополь и венецианская торговля,” 51. The increase in the quantity of galleys went along with an increase in the rates for each one at auction.
10. One should take into account that these expeditions by galleys were concerned with the sottili goods (spices, silk, jewels, textiles); the amount of cheaper and heavier goods prevailing in that period (grain, salt, wine, oil, fish) transported on the private “round” vessels is hard to estimate.
12. See for example, Berindei and Veinstein, “La Tana-Azaq,” 143.
13. Karpov, “Венецианская Тана,” 10. The deeds include trade documents, those dealing with buying and selling goods, other contracts of sale, sale of real estate with a transfer of rights, the sale and liberation of slaves, the sale of shares, trading commissions (comisiones, missio), trade agreements and contracts (in societas, commenda), gifts of real estate with certain conditions, procuraciones, testimonies, bonds, receipts of debt, sales of ships, loans, cambium, the repayment of debt, marriage contracts, receipts for dowries, wills, employment contracts for service, promises, agreements to provide services, renting of dwellings, ships, and servants, arbitration agreements, inventories of property, and so on.
14. What factors contributed to the loss of some documents? First, some deeds could be lost due to objective reasons: fire, water and rodents were always the enemies of any documents. In addition, the notaries and their scribes perceived documents as a burden which occupied space. The Ottoman conquest also had an impact, so only those documents that were sent to the metropolis survived.
16. ASV, CI. 231; ASV, NT. 750.
17. ASV, NT. 917.
18. Here and henceforth, the term “Black Sea coast” is used to refer to the Black and Azov Seas.
19. This problem is, however, not a major one for our argument, since we are interested mainly in the long-distance trade, and therefore mainly in the segment of trade conducted by the Italian merchants, both Venetian and Genoese.
20. Капров, Итальянские морские республики, 156.
23. See in: Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle*.
24. ASV, NT. 750. 23r. Notably, 19 slaves were equal in price to 32 *panni loesti* (*item de 1430 misimus in manibus viri nobilis ser Hermolai Pisani Venetiis testas decemnovem de quibus habuimus pannos loestos triginta duos*).
25. ASV, NT. 750. f. 28r–f. 28v.
26. ASV, NT. 750. (1)–(2) f. 18v, f. 19v (4)–f. 20r, 27r–27v, 28v. ASV, NT. Cart. 917, 1.
27. ASV, NT. 750. f. 44r.
28. For others see: ASV, NT. 750. (1)–(2) f. 18v, f. 19v (4)–f. 20r, 27r–27v, 28v. ASV, NT. Cart. 917, 1.
31. ASV, NT. 750. f. 28v.
33. ASV, NT. 750. f. 21r.
34. ASV, NT. 750. f. 44r (not. n/n)–f. 44v.
35. ASV, NT 750. 3–3v, 22r.
36. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19v (4)–f. 20r.
37. ASV, NT. 750. f. 21v–22r, 23r.
38. ASV, NT. 750. f. 23r.
39. Moreover, some of them are not related to trade dynamics, but were brought by the Venetians from home.
40. ASV, NT. 750. f. 20r–f. 20v.
41. ASV, NT. 750. 22r.
45. One had to own arms to be admitted to galleys, notwithstanding his status.
46. ASV, NT. 750. 3–3v, 21v–22r, 23r.
47. ASV, NT. 750. f. 28v.
48. ASV, NT. 750. 8, 24r–24v, 25r.
49. ASV, NT. 750. 8, 23r.
50. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19v (4)–f. 20r.
51. ASV, NT. 750. f. 23r.
52. A bill transaction.
53. ASV, NT. 750. 3–3v.
54. ASV, NT. 750. 23r.
55. ASV, NT. 750. 23r.
56. ASV, NT. 750. 26v; 1430.
57. ASV, NT. 750. 20r–20v.
60. Ibid., 77–8.
62. Balard, *La Romanie Génoise*, Vol. 2, 706. Fishing was seasonal (July to August), and the Genoese Matrega was often a transit point for the Italian ships. Besides Tana, Lo Copa on the Kuban River was important (Balard, *La Romanie Génoise*, 706–7); however, Tana was a leader in the export of fish, and according to Pero Tafur it was exported to Europe as far as Castille and Flanders. See Tafur, *Wanderings and Travels*, 53–4.
65. Ibid., 357.
66. Ibid., 348.
68. ASV, NT. 750. f. 29r.
69. Schreiner, Texte zur spätbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 129, 132. The Greek book of accounts published by Schreiner witnesses that once 9.5 cantars of caviar from Tana were sold (Ibid., 62, 117). Caviar is called koupatikon (Ibid., 42, 118), and allegedly it was from Lo Copa (Ibid., 62; Jacoby, “Caviar Trading,” 355), but most likely it simply meant that the caviar was in barrels (Latin cupa), pace Peter Schreiner.
70. Tafur, Wanderings and Travels, 166.
73. I viaggi in Persia, 77–8.
75. Ibid., 359.
77. I viaggi in Persia, 78.
78. Pegolotti, La Pratica della mercatura, 154, 224.
79. See: [Fomenko] Фоменко, Образ мира на старинных портонах.
80. Volkov, Керамика Азова XIV – XVIII вв., 5–6. The amount of imported ceramics in Tana equalled only around 30% of all ceramics in use. Some of it was of the “Trebizond” group, some of it originated from Trillia, Crete, Madjar, Saraj, Choresme, Crimea, and presumably Spain and China. The “Crimean” group is represented by vessels from Caffà, Soldaia, Solkhat and southwestern Crimea.
82. Ibid., 547.
83. Karpov, Итальянские морские республики, 127.
84. ASV, NT. 750. 23r.
85. ASV, NT. 750. 23r.
87. ASV, Senato, Misti, LX, f. 236r. Régestes … № 2532.
90. I viaggi in Persia, 78–9.
91. Veksler, Melnikova, Московские клады, 56.
94. ASV, NT. 750. (1)–(2) f. 18v.
96. ASV, NT. 750. (1)–(2) f. 18v: Item dare teneo ser Th ome Beniventi pro cantaria duodecim zere.
97. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19v (4)–f. 20r.
99. ASV, Senato, Misti, XXXIII, f. 15v–16r.
100. ASV, Senato, Misti, XLVII, f. 85r. Régestes … № 1237.
101. Karpov, Итальянские морские республики [The Italian maritime republics], 117.
103. Ibid., 152.
104. Interestingly, the words for fur coat or homespun coat (subbum), and caftan (cofanus) used in the deeds are borrowings. Another borrowing from Russian is a name for a sleigh used by Barbaro (zena).
105. ASV, NT. 750. 8, 20r–20v, 22r, 27r–27v, 28v, 31r.
111. ASV, NT. 750. f. 23v–f. 24r.
112. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19v (4)–f. 20r.
113. Карпов, “Торговля зерном в Южном Причерноморье,” 26–35.
114. I viaggi in Persia, 86.
117. I viaggi in Persia, 84–6.
118. ASV, NT. 750. f. 20r–f. 20v.
119. Карпов, Итальянские морские республики, 116.
120. Il Libro dei conti di Giacomo Badoer, 15, 42, 166, 308, 309.
121. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19r (3)–f. 19v (4), 23r, 25r.
122. ASV, NT. 750. 8, f. 20r–f. 20v, f. 30v–f. 31r.
123. ASV, NT. 750. f. 19r (3)–f. 19v (4), 23r, 25r, 28v. Shirts are also mentioned otherwise, without the specification of silk: ASV, NT. 750. f. 20r–f. 20v, f. 30v–f. 31r. Another example: dimitto Chaterine filie Dominici viri mei chamisiam unam rechamatam de ciemisino et chabaga unam de sersti vergatam … item dimitto Marine uxori Hermachoza chamisiam unam de tella de sorgati (ASV, NT 750. 8).
124. ASV, NT. 750. 8, f. 20r–f. 20v, f. 30v–f. 31r.
126. Syroechkovsky, Гости-суровожане, 14.
130. Карпов, Путями средневековых мореходов, 58.
131. ASV, NT. 750. 5.
132. ASV, NT. 750. 23r.
133. ASV, NT. 750. f. 20r–f. 20v.
134. ASV, CI. 231. f. 2r, 2v, 3r.
135. Карпов, Путями средневековых мореходов, 61.
136. ASV, Senato, Misti, reg. 59, ff. 52r–53v.
137. One can trace a seasonal character in the trade based on the documents of the Venetian Senate on the sending of galleys, as well as on the statistical distribution of the notarial deeds within the year. They are concentrated mostly in the period between April and July, while the winter was a “dead season” for navigation.
138. ASV, NT. 750. 5.
139. Rolova, “Итальянский купец,” 64.
140. Карпов, “Из Таны в Ургенч,” 219.
144. Idem, “Итальянская торговля в Трапезунде,” 86.
145. Idem, "Кризис середины XIV в.," 238.
146. I discovered relevant data on the prices of certain goods; contextualisation of this data and its comparison to the prices of the preceding and following periods could contribute to the economic history of the region as a whole.

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Political travel across the ‘Iron Curtain’ and Communist youth identities in West Germany and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s

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ABSTRACT
This article explores tours through the Iron Curtain arranged by West German and Greek pro-Soviet Communist youth groups, in an attempt to shed light on the transformation of European youth cultures beyond the ‘Americanisation’ story. It argues that the concept of the ‘black box’, employed by Rob Kroes to describe the influence of American cultural patterns on Western European youth, also applies to the reception of Eastern Bloc policies and norms by the Communists under study. Such selective reception was part of these groups’ efforts to devise a modernity alternative to the ‘capitalist’ one, an alternative modernity which tours across the Iron Curtain would help establish. Nevertheless, the organisers did not wish such travel to help eliminate American/Western influences on youth lifestyles entirely: the article analyses the excursions’ aims with regard to two core components of youth lifestyles in Western Europe since the 1960s, which have been affected by intra-Western flows, the spirit of ‘doing one’s own thing’ and transformations of sexual practices. The article also addresses the experience of the travellers in question, showing that they felt an unresolved tension: the tours neither served as a means of Sovietisation nor as an impulse to develop an openly anti-Soviet stance.

In 1975 a pro-Soviet West German Communist youth-group advertisement for an organised tour to East Germany promised ‘hot days’ in Potsdam, combining fun with local rock music and an accurate understanding of socialist regimes. Greek pro-Soviet Communist youth undertook organised travel to Eastern Bloc countries as well. Aiming to strike a fine balance between indoctrination and holiday, such excursions sought to spread an Eastern Bloc-inspired lifestyle through a segment of politicised youth in West Germany and Greece.

This article analyses the connection between political youth travel across what is depicted in scholarly and public debates as the ‘Iron Curtain’ and the shaping of Communist youth identities in West Germany and Greece. I examine the itineraries the excursions followed and the activities they entailed. I also explore how publications of West German and Greek pro-Soviet Communist organisations represented them, and how they were experienced by
their participants. I probe changes to the excursions and their framing by organisers and participants during the 1970s and 1980s. The article aims in particular to scrutinise the relationship amongst these excursions, the reception of policies implemented in the Eastern Bloc by young pro-Soviet Communists in West Germany and Greece and their lifestyles. It intends to complement arguments about the transfer of American cultural products to Europe since the 1950s; social and cultural change in Western Europe in the 1960s–80s; and the relationship between the former and the latter.²

My focus is on political youth travel through the Iron Curtain organised by the Communist Youth of Greece (Kommounistiki Neolaia Elladas, KNE) and its student group, PSK (Panspoudastiki Syndikalistikí Kinisi, All-Students Unionist Movement). KNE, formed in 1968 and legalised in 1974, is the youth wing of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, KKE). The article also explores such tours arranged by SDAJ (Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend, Socialist German Workers’ Youth) and its student organisation, MSB (Marxistischer Studentenbund, Marxist Student Federation) Spartakus (henceforth MSB). SDAJ is the youth group of DKP (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, German Communist Party). SDAJ and DKP were established in 1968 – the latter by former members of KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, Communist Party of Germany), which had been banned in 1956.

Ideologically motivated travel from ‘Western’ countries to the USSR and other state-socialist regimes was certainly not a novelty of the 1970s. The Soviet Union had attracted such travellers already in the interwar period.³ Moreover, organised political youth travel from Western Europe to the Eastern Bloc in the 1970s–80s was not peculiar to West Germany and Greece. Quite the contrary: young Communists of diverse stripes, pro-Soviet and critical of the USSR, as well as from several Western European countries, including Denmark, Austria and Switzerland, participated in such organised tours.⁴ Nevertheless, I have chosen to examine SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK for two reasons: the particularity of their ideological orientation in the Communist movement in Western Europe; and their trendsetting role in some of the transfers between West Germany/Greece and Eastern Bloc countries. Concerning the former, support towards the USSR was increasingly challenged during and after protests around 1968 and the quelling of the Prague Spring. A vigorously active New Left played a preponderant role in the uprisings that occurred in the late 1960s in Western Europe, lambasting pro-Soviet Communist groups as tantamount to bureaucratic organisations. Meanwhile, Western European Communist organisations, such as the Italian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Spain and the French Communist Party, embraced Eurocommunism to a greater or lesser extent in the 1970s: not necessarily in confrontation with the USSR on matters of internationalist strategy, they developed a politically pluralistic socialism contrasting that of Eastern Bloc regimes.⁵ DKP and KKE with their youth wings were among the few Communist organisations in Western Europe that, at least at the higher levels of their hierarchy, unequivocally construed Eastern Bloc regimes as role models. The analysis of these groups, their youth-travel programmes, and the diverse lifestyles they advocated encompasses ‘shades of red’ heretofore unexplored in research.

While adamantly pro-Soviet Communist groups existed elsewhere in Western Europe as well, such as in the United Kingdom, in the 1970s and 1980s, their membership and influence was far more limited in comparison to the SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK with the exception of the Portuguese Communist Party and its youth wing. Concerning the groups in question, the PSK emerged as the first or second most popular group in university
student elections every year, with extremely high participation rates, from 1974 to 1988.7 Outside the universities KNE also obtained a degree of influence among young workers in Athens.7 KKE and KKE enjoyed some popularity among Greek migrant workers and students in West Germany as well.8 Meanwhile, in post-1968 West Germany, the New Left soon petered out, clearing the way for the emergence in the 1970s of a wide array of radical actors. One of them was SDAJ, which attracted a number of students, including some who had participated in the protests of the late 1960s.9 It also proved to be quite influential among young workers: according to historian Knud Andresen, by the end of 1969 it had ‘turned into a pressure group of considerable strength among young workers and pupils’.10 Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) data shows that SDAJ had around 29,000 members in 1974; the same agency estimated around 15,000 in 1981 and 1986.11 According to the same source, MSB in 1974 had around 4500 members, making it then the strongest radical left-wing student group, whose hotbeds were Bonn, Hamburg and Marburg.12 In 1981 and 1986, its membership was estimated at 6000.13

Although the membership figures of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK were not insignificant, they formed a minority among politicised youth in West Germany and Greece. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the main left-wing competitors of KNE were the Socialist Youth of PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) and the Eurocommunist RF (Rigas Feraios).14 A network of politically unaffiliated feminist initiatives also appeared in the mid-to-late 1970s. However, the main challenges to KNE and KKE emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s. Meanwhile, in the 1970s, a broad range of radical actors appeared in West Germany, including Maoist groups such as KBW (Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschland, Communist League of West Germany). The various Maoist and Trotskyist student groups managed in total to harvest 17.2% of the seats in the university and technical higher schools’ parliaments in 1974.15 The Maoists maintained a degree of popularity until the mid-1970s. Left-wing terrorist organisations, feminist and homosexual liberation groups, and loose-knit initiatives running self-managed institutions, such as squats and clinics that ignored market rules, emerged as well.16 Such ‘alternative’ initiatives were particularly influential in West Germany: participation grew significantly by 1980 to around 80,000 activists involved in approximately 11,500 projects.18 Like KNE, SDAJ faced mounting challenges through the 1980s. The intensification of the Cold War arms race triggered global protest, including in West Germany, from the late 1970s onwards, reaching its apogee in the early-to-mid 1980s.19 SDAJ engaged actively with other radical subjects critical of the USSR. As a result, ever more SDAJ members criticised the orientation of their groups, gaining momentum in the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Shortly afterwards, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc deprived SDAJ and DKP not only of their role models, but also of an important source of funding and reduced their strength significantly.20

Meanwhile, West Germany and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s saw an intensification in contact with the Eastern Bloc until its 1989 collapse. Although this process was not necessarily linked with the West German and Greek Communist Left, the operation of pro-Soviet Communist organisations in both countries contributed to this development. The Greek intensification of people and idea transfer through the Iron Curtain was the outcome of the transition from the 1967–74 dictatorship to democracy as well as of the concomitant
delegitimisation of the anti-Communist discourse dominant in Greece since the late 1940s. As a result of post-1974 erosion of anti-Communism, Communist groups were legalised. Anti-Americanism was gaining ground in Greece, as even right-wing subjects blamed the United States for encouraging, or at least tolerating, the military intervention of Turkey in Cyprus in 1974. KKE, KNE and PSK found a broadening audience receptive to their ideological prerogative of the USSR as an alternative to the United States.\textsuperscript{21} In this vein, KNE and PSK played a pioneering role in arranging youth travel, especially through university student unions, across the Iron Curtain: since the 1950s, those unions had organised travel abroad, mainly to Western Europe but occasionally to non-European destinations like Egypt, for graduating students.\textsuperscript{22} The growing influence of PSK in student unions since 1974 affected these destinations, increasingly lying in Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{23} and the USSR.\textsuperscript{24}

In West Germany the formation of DKP and the creation of SDAJ and MSB also accommodated the transfer of people and ideas between West Germany and state-socialist regimes. Early organised youth tours from West Germany to the Eastern Bloc did not aim to instil Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Hamburg YMCA, for instance, had played a key role in the organisation of youth exchange programmes with Leningrad authorities since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, the role of young pro-Soviet Communists in West Germany set a trend of organised excursions to the German Democratic Republic: until the West German state began providing financial and institutional support to such exchange programmes from 1978 onwards as part of the Ostpolitik\textsuperscript{26}, it was SDAJ, MSB and SJD-\textit{Die Falken} (Sozialistische Jugend Deutschlands-\textit{Die Falken}, Socialist Youth of Germany-Falcons), which leaned towards the Social Democratic Party, that arranged organised youth travel to the German Democratic Republic (henceforth GDR). Available figures show that every year, several thousand people participated in excursions to the GDR organised by SDAJ and MSB.\textsuperscript{27}

What adds to the significance of the political travel under study is its resilience throughout this period against a backdrop of different West German and Greek state attitudes towards the Communist Left. In contrast with Greece, where the state no longer obstructed the activity of the Communist Left after 1974, the government of West Germany ‘expanded the scope of executive power greatly’ during this decade; whoever the West German state regarded as ‘extremist’ was bound to face legal sanctions.\textsuperscript{28} This also applied to the operation of SDAJ in general and its organised tours to the Eastern Bloc in particular, which were met with hostility by the West German state. The latter revised its regulations on state-funded youth travel in 1977, clearly excluding those arranged by groups it defined as anti-democratic. In this vein, it also refrained from financing the excursions organised by SDAJ.\textsuperscript{29} Despite differing official reactions, pro-Soviet Communist groups in both countries facilitated a wide array of transfers between West Germany and Greece, and Eastern Bloc countries. Most amounted to virtual travel to Eastern Europe and the USSR meant to foster positive impressions that actual travel would strongly vindicate through first-hand experience. While this travel did not entirely achieve the goals of its organisers, as shown below in detail, narrations of these tours continued to circulate in pro-Soviet Communist organisations throughout the 1970s and 1980s. They were a core component of the effort to disseminate representations of the USSR and its loyal state-socialist regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. They also stirred discussion not only among participants, but among the many more youth that read about them.

This article describes this travel as a case of a hybrid form of tourism, which in German could be translated as \textit{Polittourismus}\textsuperscript{30} (political tourism or travel). Participation in such
travel patterns lends support to historians Ellen Furlough and Shelley Baranowski’s challenge of several scholars’ portrayal of contemporary tourism as essentially ‘escape’ from routine.\textsuperscript{31} To a greater or lesser extent, these Communists approached leisure and, more broadly, lifestyle, as interconnected with politics. In approaching political tourism, I exclude travel of West German and Greek pro-Soviet functionaries to the Eastern Bloc to participate in official delegations. Although a clear and total distinction between the two is hard to defend, delegation-related mobility was largely not meant to include leisure time and was experienced by participating SDAJ and KNE cadres as akin to work and not at all tourism.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, delegations usually comprised a few cadres, while political youth tourism addressed a broader circle of participants.\textsuperscript{33}

The article draws on diverse sources to highlight the organisations’ official discourse on political travel to the Eastern Bloc and its impact on participants. These include newspaper articles and official organisational documents pertaining to the arrangement and appraisal of the tours, oral testimonies and written autobiographies. In utilising such material, I did not seek a representative sample to distil quantitative data. In line with historian Alessandro Portelli, I believe that oral testimonies are unreliable sources with regard to factual validity.\textsuperscript{34} Rather, those testimonies and autobiographies have helped me explore the range of travel experiences of young pro-Soviet Communists of differing rank in the groups. I approached them from a post-positivist perspective: I particularly considered the impact of any events that occurred between the analysed era and the point when the interview was taken.

\textbf{The study of transnational flows and youth lifestyles in the 1960s–80s}

The dissemination of North American cultural patterns in particular has proven to be at the fulcrum of identity making in post-Second World War Europe, helping young people develop lifestyles distinct from those of their parents.\textsuperscript{35} Scholars stressing the impact of such cultural patterns on youth cultures have been increasingly reluctant to employ the term ‘cultural Americanisation’, a term which may point to the top-down imposition of specific cultural politics, while what transpired, in their view, was a selective reception and resignification of American cultural products by subjects, some of which were even critical of the foreign policy of the United States.\textsuperscript{36} Whereas most relevant works analyse the 1950s and 1960s, American Studies expert Rob Kroes offers a more ambitious thesis, arguing that ‘generation upon generation of youngsters’ growing up in different European settings have been affected by American cultural products since the 1950s. These patterns have helped spread ‘non-conventionality, informality, and a sense of freedom of choice’, including sexual liberalisation. Kroes employs the term ‘Americanisation’ only if understood as a ‘black box in the simple diagram of cultural transmission and reception’: in this black box, messages are ‘translated’, ‘decontextualised and recontextualised’ in order to suit the receivers’ frame of reference.\textsuperscript{37}

Nevertheless, there is no unanimity among scholars about the impact of transfers from North America to Western Europe on social and cultural changes in the latter. Historian Arthur Marwick argues that cultural transformations, such as more sexual freedom, the creation of a vast market for and by the youth and the spread of a spirit of ‘doing your own thing’, are elements of a ‘cultural revolution’. This has appeared in the West since the long 1960s (c.1958–c.1974).\textsuperscript{38} However, in contrast with Kroes, he stresses the role of not merely American, but, more broadly, intra-Western flows of cultural patterns and people to the
initiation of this ‘revolution’. In addition, Marwick contends that this ‘cultural revolution’
did not solely affect the youth: emerging youth subcultures, as he calls them, interacted
with various other social groups, which contributed to and were influenced by profound
cultural transformations.

The concrete transfers of people and ideas that shaped cultural change in general and
youth lifestyles in particular in Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s have so far remained
underexplored. Recent works have begun to analyse a wide array of cultural products
shaping diverse segments of Western European youth. They have stressed, for instance, a
‘re-invention of national tradition’ in Greece in the 1960s–70s. 39 I wish to encourage more
research on this variety of cultural influence, arguing that transfers from the Eastern Bloc
to Western Europe were part of this puzzle: a proportion of Western Communist youth
considered adopting them.

Scholars have been increasingly examining cultural transfers from the West, especially
from the United States, to Eastern European countries and the USSR during the Cold War. 40
Nevertheless, transnational flows from the Eastern Bloc to the West and their impact on the
lifestyle of young people residing in the latter have hitherto remained largely unexplored.
One of the very few exceptions is a remark made by historians Konrad Jarausch and Hannes
Siegrist: in defining ‘Americanisation’ and ‘Sovieticisation’ as processes of political, social,
cultural and economic transformation that affected West and East Germany, respectively,
they note an ‘irony’, namely that a segment of West German Communist youth underwent
a self-Sovieticisation. However, they do not elaborate further on this phenomenon. 41
Rather than labelling their impact as akin to self-Sovieticisation, I employ the term ‘black box’ for
these transfers as well: although cultural production in state-socialist regimes was meant
to offer organically coherent wholes and fixed meanings 42, their reception varied. Political
youth travel from Western to Eastern Europe helped vindicate an alternative to capitalism
modernity, resting on identification with the ideological orientation of Eastern Bloc regimes
and their lifestyles. Such a connectivity, however, did not rest on uniform understandings
of the Soviet Union and its loyal regimes: while pro-Soviet Communist youth organisations
in West Germany and Greece clearly designated Eastern Bloc regimes as role models and
were also financially supported by them, they did not embrace the entirety of Eastern Bloc
lifestyles. 43

In devising their version of Eastern bloc-inspired modernity, SDAJ/MSB and KNE/
PSK demonstrated an ambivalent attitude towards intra-Western flows: they discerned a
clear-cut dichotomy between the policies implemented by ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ regimes,
a taxonomy which the tours they arranged were expected to vindicate. However, they did
not wish to eliminate all cultural patterns which intra-Western flows helped spread among
young Greeks and West Germans. Therefore, the youth lifestyles they aimed to reinforce
through such excursions were not necessarily the opposite of what relevant scholarship
has depicted as American-inspired youth cultures in Western Europe. To demonstrate this
complex relationship, the article addresses their attitude towards the hedonistic spirit of
‘doing your own thing’ and a transformation of sexual norms, which historians depict as
core components also of such youth cultures. These were also extensively addressed in
the ‘youth’ discourse of the groups in question. My analysis proceeds in four steps: first,
I address the standardisation of political youth travel arrangements from West Germany
and Greece to the Eastern Bloc countries by the mid-1970s. Despite such standardisation
the following sections show how young West German and Greek Communists represented
and experienced the policies of Eastern Bloc regimes and lifestyles in the visited locations as a black box. The second and third sections demonstrate that the organisers wished the excursions to serve as a combination of indoctrination and leisure, which, however, they understood in somewhat diverging ways. The second section analyses the former element, showing that the tours in question were carefully planned and aimed to instil discipline in their participants. Thus, they clearly differed from informal cross-border travel, in which other radical left-wingers engaged around 1968 and the 1970s and which, in contrast with the excursions in question, have been analysed in depth by historians. The third section addresses the leisure element in this form of travel, showing, simultaneously, that as the 1980s progressed, relevant travel reports put growing emphasis on the pleasure of East European tourism. Finally, the fourth section shows how travel to the Eastern Bloc was meant to vindicate different understandings of sexual norms there: ‘sexual restraint’ for the Greeks and ‘sexual freedom’ for the West Germans.

**Package tours: a Communist version**

Before the spiral of events that brought an end to the state-socialist regimes ruling Eastern Europe and the USSR, a number of youngsters aligned with or leaning towards KNE and PSK in Greece or SDAJ and MSB in West Germany had travelled to those countries as participants in ideologically motivated tours. This section will outline the efforts of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK to standardise their arrangement swiftly across the Iron Curtain to indoctrinate participants.

The groups offered such tours at least once annually in collaboration with travel agencies controlled by their parent Parties: hansa-tourist (ht), which was associated with DKP, and LEV-Tours, which informally represented the interests of KKE and KNE. The youth and student organisations also co-operated with travel institutions that addressed young people in Eastern Europe and the USSR. These were, for instance, Sputnik, the travel agency of the Komsomol, the youth organisation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Jugendtourist (Young Tourist) in the GDR, for the transportation and stay of their participants in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Tours lasted one to two weeks. Neither the West German nor pro-Soviet Greek Communist youth groups limited these excursions to a small circle of functionaries: unaffiliated youngsters who may have been sympathisers and were interested in Eastern Bloc life were welcomed. According to FDJ reports, several SDAJ/MSB tour participants to East Germany were not officially aligned with the group. Similarly, KNE’s student group contributed to the organisation of tours through the Iron Curtain available to any interested graduating student. These student excursions proliferated until the early 1980s; simultaneously from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, KNE co-arranged travel with LEV-Tours to the Eastern Bloc for youth regardless of student status. All such trips were akin to package tours: young people could book individually through the groups or ht and LEV-Tours. Two itinerary types can be discerned: the first centred on a particular location somewhere in Eastern Europe or the USSR, such as in Moscow in 1980, site of the Olympic Games. Visitors stayed at vacation campsites, youth hotels and hostels, where they usually had the opportunity to mingle with comrades of theirs from several Western and Eastern European countries. They were based at specific sites but visited nearby destinations. The second, expanded itinerary type included excursions to several places in the destination country.
The programme of these excursions appeared in relevant advertisements in *elan* and *Odigitis*, the publications of SDAJ and KNE, respectively. The former started publicising this kind of political trip in 1968. Initially, the advertisements consisted of a very brief text mentioning the destination (at first, limited to the USSR, GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) and the travel dates. The magazine began to present these travel programmes in a more systematic manner after the World Festival of Youth and Students, organised by the World Federation of the Democratic Youth (WFDY), in 1973. Young West German festival participants were not necessarily affiliated with left-wing, let alone pro-Communist, youth groups. For example, members of the Junge Union (Youth Union), the youth wing of the Christian Democratic Union, also took part. This occasion, however, provided SDAJ and other DKP-affiliated organisations with the opportunity to host a significant cohort of cadres, members and sympathisers. Shortly afterwards, *elan* began to publish an annual travel guide in collaboration with *rote blätter*, the MSB magazine, following the relevant request from its readers, as *elan* claimed, advertising all organised excursions offered by SDAJ. These destinations were mainly limited to Eastern Europe and the USSR. In contrast to the late 1960s and early 1970s, relevant advertisements in *elan* now contained detailed tour itineraries and descriptions of activities.

There was an exception, however, to this process of standardisation: the excursions through the Iron Curtain pursued by Greek student migrants living in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s and affiliated with KNE/PSK. Their members often travelled to East Germany informally, without KNE/PSK involvement. Youth cultural associations that addressed Greek migrants in West Germany and were aligned with KNE organised tours to East Germany, such as to Potsdam, too. KKE members regardless of age also tried to organise travel from West Germany to the USSR through Greek communities (*Gemeinde*), such as that of Hamburg. Such organised tours did not take place at regular intervals, however.

**Serious (fun)**

In embracing the same standardised arrangements in their tours through the Iron Curtain, SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK devised a form of political travel that they wished to revolve around ideological commitment and pleasure. Pleasure had functioned as a core component of youth culture in West Germany and Greece since its inception already in the late 1950s. This was exemplified by a hedonistic attitude of having fun while you’re young, experienced in commercial leisure spaces attracting young patrons, such as cinemas and dance halls. This development affected first the urban youth and subsequently spilled over into rural areas – in the case of Greece from the 1980s onwards, especially thanks to the spread of the cafeterias there. Intra-Western flows of cultural transfers, such as of British and American rock music, which were screened, broadcast or performed in these venues, ignited and shaped this spirit in both countries from the very beginning. Nevertheless, the spirit of hedonism that spread among young people in Western Europe should not be attributed only to such transnational flows: in developing a spirit of ‘doing your own thing’, participants in ‘alternative’ initiatives were also attracted by lifestyles flourishing in some Asian countries such as India. Part and parcel of Western European youth’s hedonistic attitudes was the spread of informally arranged youth travel in West Germany and Greece since the 1960s. In both countries, youth participation in tours arranged by not-for-profit or commercial travel agencies was limited; most opted for spontaneous travel: hitch-hiking
or, since 1972, Interrail. In West Germany youth peer groups mixing men and women engaged in such excursions as early as the 1960s; the trend began to gain momentum in Greece in the 1970s. Young West German travellers particularly appreciated cross-border travel, especially to other Western countries. In this vein, some radical left-wingers from North America and Western Europe engaged around 1968 and in the 1970s in informal travel mainly within the West, but also to South Asia, combining hedonism and contact with radical groups abroad.

SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK sought to imbue youth leisure with political meaning, but in different ways. Drawing on a bipolar model endorsed by the Greek Left in the 1950s, KNE and PSK employed a rigorous taxonomy, defining cultural products as either ‘progressive’ or supporting the ‘American Way of Life’. They used the latter to address cultural products stemming mainly from the United States but also from the ‘capitalist world’ in general. They associated the ‘American Way of Life’ with individualism and political apathy. In their view a ‘summer way of life’ with holidays totally detached from political discussion was yet another insidious weapon of imperialism. By contrast, SDAJ/MSB did not offer such a clear categorisation of cultural patterns in their publications. One way or another, KNE/PSK and SDAJ/MSB did not serve as bastions of resistance against hedonistic youth lifestyles, but were ambivalent towards them. Politicised leisure, including travel, did not have to be a killjoy in their view. The spirit that the SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK aimed to associate with excursions, as is shown in this and the next section, was akin to that of serious fun. This term was employed by historian Anne Gorsuch, who aimed to show that late Stalinist Soviet travel experiences combined recreation with indoctrination. This was made clear in the publications of the groups in question, which labelled these organised tours a mixture of ‘leisure and accumulation of information’ about state-socialist regimes.

Pro-Soviet Communist youth groups in both countries initially placed more emphasis on politics in the narrow sense, when publicising these tours. Their ‘accumulation of information’ clearly reflected their ideological orientation, presenting Eastern Bloc policies as an alternative to the ‘capitalist’ countries’ path to modernity. This was a staple of the tours in question throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Their organisers maintained that the destination countries combined technological innovation with the elimination of social class barriers, with citizens happy and committed to Communist ideals. They stressed in particular that, in contrast to the ‘capitalist world’, education and healthcare in the USSR and its allied regimes were available to all. Pro-Soviet Communist youth groups in both countries squabbled with other left-wingers, such as Maoists, who claimed the USSR had been controlled by a ‘new bourgeois class’ since Nikita Khrushchev’s rule. In defending the Soviet Union and its allies, the West German and Greek pro-Soviet Communist groups argued that these regimes could serve as a solid reference point for the vision of socialism that West German and Greek societies could implement.

To ensure this ‘accumulation of information’, these tours rested on a structured programme. This deviated from the spirit of spontaneity manifest in the political informal travel of other radical left-wingers, since the groups in question aimed to forge disciplined militants. This programme foresaw that participants would contribute to long discussions about interpretations of Marxist-Leninism endorsed by the USSR and its allied regimes as well as about their policies. Discussion topics were topical: in the 1980s, for instance, they stressed the opposition of state-socialist regimes and the pro-Soviet Communist organisations in Western Europe to the deployment of MGM-31 Pershing and cruise missiles in
Western Europe. Beyond these discussions, the ‘accumulation of information’ included visits to local institutions, such as schools and factories. These trips also entailed a reflection on Fascism in recent European history from the perspective endorsed by the state-socialist regimes, which stressed the ‘glorious’ resistance against the forces of National Socialism and Fascism during the interwar period and the Second World War, skipping references to the extermination of the Jews. In the case of travel to East Germany, relevant commemoration practices included visits to Sachsenhausen. Among those involved in indoctrination attempts during these excursions were older participants like the East German scholars who gave lectures at the campsite near the Scharmützelsee in East Germany, a key destination of organised political tourism from West Germany. While the participants were young, their experience was determined by people of multiple generations.

The political concerns raised by the West German and Greek pro-Soviet Communist organisations during the tours were not exactly the same, reflecting how each society was split during the Cold War. In the early 1970s, SDAJ and FDJ used gatherings in the East German Scharmützelsee camp to highlight the issue of the recognition of the GDR by the Federal Republic of Germany, demanding that the West German government not renege on its promise to establish diplomatic ties. The PSK’s Eastern Bloc excursions in the mid-to-late 1970s entailed meetings with Greek political refugees living there since the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949. The Greek state had stripped them of their citizenship and it was not until PASOK assumed power in the 1980s that most, and only those who identified as ‘Greek’ and not ‘Macedonian’, were allowed to return. In the mid-to-late 1970s, KNE and KKE campaigned for the refugees, publishing in extensive reports of meetings with them and their children and stressing these groups’ Greek national identity. Visits to locations such as Beloiannisz village in Hungary, where Greek political refugees lived, figured prominently in KNE and PSK excursions. By contrast, these locations were not part of the itineraries followed by members and sympathisers of SDAJ and MSB.

One way or another, this tourism was meant as an eye-opener for participants. Nevertheless, while other young radical West Germans and Greeks who increasingly engaged in informal cross-border travel could freely mingle with local populations, this did not apply to participants in these excursions: in the case of the GDR, they were expected to be accompanied by FDJ functionaries and members. The purported illuminating character of these excursions was a case of staged authenticity, to borrow a term introduced by Dean MacCannell, expert in landscape architecture. According to him, ‘a tourist’s desire to share in the real life of the places visited, or at least to see that life as it is really lived’ also applies to participants in these political tours. What tourists in general encounter, according to MacCannell, is a carefully selected performance of what was supposed to be the ‘authentic’ way of life in tourist resorts. In the tours under study, strict restrictions on traveller mobility also achieved this aim: spontaneous visits to East German homes were not part of the itinerary, much less contact with dissident voices.

Did such tours achieve the political goals set by the pro-Soviet Communist youth groups in West Germany and Greece? Participants did not always experience them as a vindication of the superiority of state-socialist regimes. Some frustration surfaces in the narratives of Greek student migrants in West Germany who were KNE functionaries in the 1970s–80s and who are no longer members of KKE. Nikitas Apostolidis, in describing tours to East Germany in the 1970s–80s, both informal and organised by KNE and its youth cultural associations, did not focus on encounters with jubilant workers and students. By contrast,
he stressed that ‘I felt that the [East German regime] made many mistakes (...) we tried to justify many mistakes, you cannot justify [the Berlin] Wall, we justified them, but knew that they were wrong.’ His testimony touched upon a taboo for the KNE official narrative, namely restrictions on individual liberties in state-socialist regimes. Available narratives from SDAJ functionaries and members indicate that the group did not totally fulfil its goals through its excursions, either. In this case, both oral testimonies and written autobiographies provide important insights, such as former SDAJ functionary Wilfried Reckert’s autobiography, written after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and published in 2006. As Andresen aptly remarks, his narrative about his participation in the activities of SDAJ and DKP is often imbued with ‘shame’ and has a self-critical tone: he states quite clearly that the success of Eastern Bloc excursions was ‘modest’.

The scepticism of narrators such as Stellakis and Reckert towards the excursions may draw on their thoughts during the 1970s and 1980s, especially after 1989. It was at this point that the Eastern Block collapsed, and some KNE/PSK and SDAJ/MSB members withdrew from the groups, factors that helped them make public potential ambivalence experienced during their tours to state-socialist countries. Oral testimonies and written autobiographies certainly bear the imprint of the era in which they appeared. The demise of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the USSR has served as a ‘biographical turning point’, as defined by sociologist Gabriele Rosenthal, namely as an experience that leads to a different interpretation of the narrator’s past, present and future. Andresen argues convincingly that the written autobiographies of former DKP and SDAJ functionaries that have appeared after 1989 differ in the way in which their activity in those groups is portrayed according to the generation to which these functionaries belong: those who joined the DKP after 1968 tend to stress that they had developed an individual identity beyond the prerogatives of these groups.

Such ‘biographical turning points’, however, do not entirely alter one’s narrative: by contrast, they help bring to the fore doubts experienced during the period in question, even if unexpressed in public until the biographical turning point occurred. While several testimonies show that former SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK members felt doubts to a lesser or greater extent about the societies they visited, they seem to have largely refrained from expressing them in public, as shown, for instance, in the testimony of Apostolidis. Tours through the Iron Curtain arranged by or co-organised by SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK continued throughout this period, as did their publication of relevant travel reports and advertisements, constituting a key feature of their propaganda. Their members, without necessarily having taken part in tours, actively engaged in publicising and defending them in rival left-wing youth-organisation spaces. For instance, in 1980 the final-year university students of the civil engineering faculty at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki split over holiday preferences: one group organised an excursion to Thailand, while another, affiliated with KNE, opted for Czechoslovakia. In a sense, in defending those excursions without having participated or despite having mixed experiences during their visits, pro-Soviet Communist youth seem to have followed an attitude that was a core component of KNE, but also SDAJ: Communist identity. They derived pleasure from demonstrating loyalty to their organisation and its goals – not necessarily because they entirely agreed with them, but because they thus created a sense of unity. In performing in front of their opponents, they were willing to reproduce the official line of their organisation. This attitude was slightly different from that which anthropologist Alexei Yurchak describes as pervasive in the meetings of the Komsomol in the USSR during the era of ‘late socialism’ (1960s–80s).
In the case of the Komsomol, there was a ‘performative shift’ during those years, with Komsomol members placing emphasis on the form of ‘ritualised acts of authoritative discourse’ rather than engaging ‘with their constative meanings’. Komsomol members voted unanimously in favour of the resolutions of their group, despite the fact that they often did not pay attention in meetings and subsequently acted at odds with the resolutions. By contrast, SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK members considered seriously both the performance and the constative meanings of their group’s resolutions. To achieve an enactment of unity, they abided by the group line; they made a conscious effort to convince themselves that it was right, or at least to avoid expressing doubts publicly, as the testimony of Apostolidis shows, even if their experiences contradicted this line.

**Across the Iron Curtain to pleasure?**

The previous section analysed the initial emphasis of such excursions on ‘seriousness’ rather than ‘fun’. The latter element, however, permeated the activities of the tours and their representations in SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK organs since the beginning. This section addresses this issue, showing the growing weight assigned to ‘fun’ in these groups’ relevant publications over the course of the 1980s.

Several leisure activities were provided as early as the 1970s: summer camps in Eastern Bloc countries had volleyball and table tennis, for instance. Nevertheless, the organs of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK did not offer identical descriptions of leisure activities in their role-model regimes. In contrast with SDAJ/MSB, which showed a degree of appreciation towards rock music from both the West and the Eastern Bloc, PSK, KNE and KKE linked rock music in general to illicit drugs and the ‘American Way of Life’ in general until the late 1970s. While they subsequently watered down their critique, especially as the 1980s progressed, the potential relationship between drugs and rock music never disappeared from their publications throughout this period. Such diverging approaches to rock music featured prominently in depictions of youth activities ‘in the socialist world’ in the travel reports of KNE and SDAJ, especially in the late 1970s: only the latter referred to political discussions followed by rock concerts at its Eastern European campsites. Similarly, oral testimonies of young Greeks participating in KNE/PSK fostered excursions across the Iron Curtain contain next to nothing about rock concerts at the destination. Rather, they focused on Greek folk and political songs that the travellers sang alongside the Greek political refugees they met there. Despite this divergence, there was no tension between the West German and Greek pro-Soviet Communists: they viewed each other as comrades and their organisations retained strong ties throughout the period under study, avoiding any critique of one another.

In emphasising politics in the narrow sense, general published descriptions of the tour activities focused primarily on ‘seriousness’ rather than on ‘fun’ in the 1970s, but this was reversed in the following decade. This change was linked not with the mixture of activities offered, which remained the same, but with their representations in the publications of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK. Concerning the former, their travel reports in the 1970s featured images of young people from West Germany walking in Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin and other large cities of the Eastern Bloc, in awe at contemporary institutions and memorials to the Second World War. In the 1980s, however, busy urban centres gave way to sunny beaches full of tourists in their relevant publications. In addition, the images that
accompanied elan-promoted excursions, including those across the Iron Curtain, privileged ‘pleasure’ and ‘spontaneity’ over joy through hard work and study: they showed a car full of young people, some playing the guitar; on another occasion, the caption read ‘Hot! With elan to pleasure’ (Heiss! Mit elan ins Vergnügen). This process could be labelled as the leisurisation and informalisation of depictions of youth travel across Eastern Europe and the USSR, undertaken by SDAJ and MSB. To an extent, they seemed to draw on aspects of ‘alternative’ travel that had appeared in West Germany since the late 1960s: ‘alternative’ subcultures or milieux developed travel patterns, such as hitch-hiking, free camping or staying in squats, which they juxtaposed with package tourism, mass consumption and what they viewed as ‘authoritarian’ norms. They also engaged extensively in recording their travel experience, producing, among others, travel guides marked by their spontaneous style. In addition, they developed emotional norms centring on joy during the 1980–1 youth revolts that erupted in West German and Swiss cities and in which they were involved. Although MSB and SDAJ did not explicitly depict the excursions as akin to ‘alternative’ travel and although their travel arrangement continued to resemble package tours, they addressed youngsters for whom commercial ‘mass tourism’ ‘stank’ and seem to echo the emotional norms of the ‘alternative’ Left. This leisurisation and informalisation also rested on a fundamentally different development: the growing effort of the USSR to encourage and direct mass consumption in the field of tourism. Historian Christian Noack describes this ‘leisure boom’ in the USSR from the 1960s onwards, which also included increasing government investment in tourist resorts like Sochi and Yalta on the Black Sea.

A similar process of leisurisation was at play in KNE and PSK publications on travel through the Iron Curtain from the early 1980s onwards. Not only did their repertoire expand to include Black Sea resorts, but images of attractive beaches gained ground at the expense of well-organised factories in advertisements. Similarly, a LEV-Tours advertisement in 1985 for Eastern Bloc excursions, targeting people of all ages, proclaimed that their main attractions would be vodka and the balalaika. In allowing more space for ‘time apart’ during such tours, they simultaneously dropped the critique of an Americanised ‘summer way of life’ they had mounted in the previous decade. The impetus for this shift in KNE/PSK publications is not as obvious as in the case of West Germany. Nevertheless, as sociologists Panayis Panagiotopoulos and Vassilis Vamvakas have stressed, frugality and the veneration of hard work ceased to play a crucial role as norms shaping actual practice dominant in Greece in the 1980s. Although the approaches and responses of KNE and PSK to such a delegitimisation of frugality certainly require further exploration, travel stressing mainly or exclusively encounters with committed Soviet workers did not seem to be the most effective way to attract new members and sustain old ones.

Despite the effort of organisers to mix leisure with politics, the expectations or experience of participants did not necessarily fall into the category of ‘serious fun.’ Dieter Stelle, who joined SDAJ in 1975, told me that he never participated in organised youth travel to East Germany, despite having been encouraged to do so by the organisation. He preferred to travel to southern Europe with his friends for vacation. He construed the latter as a mixture of ‘fun’ (Spass) and reflection on politics, such as on the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, which toppled the authoritarian regime ruling since 1933. He felt that despite the declarations of SDAJ, there was no serious fun in campsites such as the Scharmützelsee, which he envisaged as a rather solemn experience reflecting, in his view, the lifestyle of only the ‘high-ranking cadres.’ This discouraged him from participating.
Testimonies from youth who regularly took part in this travel, at least the SDAJ and KNE functionaries, tend to vindicate his assumptions about the limited opportunities for fun. For instance, Sotiris Katopoulos, a KNE cadre in the 1970s and early 1980s, recounted that due to his high-ranking position in KNE, he had to arrange meetings between Greek participants and local authorities, leaving little time for leisure. He went further to claim that his experience visiting those destinations as a participant of either an official delegation or an organised youth tour was identical. In contrast with Stelle, however, he did not see this negatively: he seemed to take pride in developing and demonstrating organisational skills on these occasions. Despite the effort to increasingly leisurise the representations of such tours, especially in the 1980s, they were consistently experienced as a strenuous, albeit not necessarily killjoy, activity.

Sex and the Eastern Bloc

A main feature of the hedonism with which youth culture was synonymous in West Germany and Greece (as well as elsewhere) was the transformation of sexual norms and practices since the 1960s. In West Germany this development was associated with the growing separation of sexuality from procreation through the spread of the oral contraceptive, the legitimisation of premarital flirting, and the eroticisation of public culture, including the appearance of male and female bodies at the beaches. Pornography also gained traction, especially through the import of relevant Swedish movies. These developments affected the youth, but not only: the contraceptive pill, for instance, was not only used by women who defined themselves as young. Changes to sexual mores in Greece at that point were quite different from those in West Germany: the contraceptive pill failed to gain momentum. Nevertheless, pornography gained ground (albeit mainly French and local rather than Swedish films) from the 1970s onwards, attracting primarily heterosexual male watchers of varied age. Moreover, it became increasingly legitimate for heterosexual students and young workers to engage in flirting and sex before marriage from the mid-1960s and, especially, from the 1970s. Premarital sex was a major motivation to travel for young people from both West Germany and Greece. Meanwhile, the appearance of men and women at the seaside became growingly sexualised in the sense that they showed more skin, even under the socially conservative dictatorial regime that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed no linear process of dwindling restrictions on sexual practices in the two countries, however. West Germany witnessed a ‘turn inwards’ in the late 1970s, as historian Dagmar Herzog describes a fatigue with growing sexual freedom, whereas some of the radical actors that had gained traction in post-dictatorship Greece opted for sexual restraint.

SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK dealt extensively with sexuality. Nevertheless, they differed on their approach to this issue, with the former cautiously adopting the demand for ‘sexual liberation’ and the latter praising sexual restraint. In the case of SDAJ, elan published texts that aimed to show youth how to derive pleasure from activity such as petting before and during sexual contact. This attitude raised the ire of some members, who complained that elan gave too much weight to sexual issues. Women’s groups formed within SDAJ in the late 1970s voiced their confidence in the contraceptive pill and raised the issue of availability to women who wanted it. Meanwhile, KNE/PSK publications endorsed the concept of the stable heterosexual couple that ultimately married. The latter, in their view, was a core component of Greek ‘popular tradition’ as well, a ‘tradition’ that the Greek Left
since the 1950s had claimed was in peril due to the spread of the ‘American Way of Life’.\textsuperscript{104} In this vein, KNE/PSK expected men and women to develop ‘sentimental’ relationships that precluded infidelity and, in the case of women, were based on the role model of the working mother. Thus, in contrast with the SDAJ/MSB, the contraceptive pill was presented either as a negligible concern in comparison to gender inequality in the workplace or acceptable only if the state supported working mothers financially.

One way or another, all the groups used Eastern European and Soviet societies as yardsticks for the sexual mores they advocated. This was not imposed by the high-ranking cadres of these groups in a top-down manner: quite telling is the case of \textit{elan}, whose readers sent in letters asking for information about sexual patterns in the Eastern Bloc.\textsuperscript{105} KNE countered sexual relations in the ‘socialist world’ to the ‘oversexualisation’ they depicted as happening in the West.\textsuperscript{106} By contrast, SDAJ’s virtual and actual travels through the Iron Curtain emphasised that sexual mores in East Germany showcased sexual freedom similar or superior to that experienced in West Germany. This was also manifest in their descriptions of travel through the Iron Curtain. Their diverging aims determined which elements of sexual relations in the Eastern Bloc they would choose to stress in their travel reports. Sexual patterns advocated by state-socialist regimes were far from uniform. In the case of East Germany, public discourse on sexuality was tightly controlled, but the contraceptive pill was easily available, in contrast with the USSR, and abortion quite common.\textsuperscript{107} Travel reports and descriptions of life in East Germany published in \textit{elan} referred extensively to facets of this condition, especially to the use of oral contraception in the GDR.\textsuperscript{108} While, however, \textit{elan} stressed the superiority of East Germany in comparison to West Germany concerning the condition of workers and apprentices, they presented no clear-cut difference in the field of sexuality. Nevertheless, they added that there was more potential in East Germany, arguing, for instance, that the contraceptive pill was easily offered to 18-year old single women, and implying that this did not occur in West Germany.\textsuperscript{109} On the contrary, KNE wrote next to nothing about these issues. The Greek pro-Soviet Communists chose to focus on the discourse of Soviet actors on sexuality, instead. Following Stalin’s death, sexuality no longer appeared in official texts in the USSR solely as a problem, as had happened in the Stalinist era. Sociologists and even romantic comedies reflected publicly on what they viewed as a ‘positive’ role model of sexual relations, revolving around the heterosexual married couple with children, and aiming to stem the tide of divorce and extramarital affairs.\textsuperscript{110} The KNE/PSK publications drew on such a narrative, arguing that it accurately depicted what was occurring in the USSR. Their travel reports and articles on sexual mores in the USSR in general, complemented with translated articles authored by Soviet sociologists, portrayed the USSR as the land of the consummation of happy family life that was the outcome of opposite-sex relationships; such a life was described as based on genuine love and the equality of men and women.\textsuperscript{111}

What participants in tours arranged by SDAJ/MSB narrated does not deviate from the assessment of sexual life in East Germany that appeared in their publications. Nevertheless, there is a noteworthy asymmetry in the ways in which at least some SDAJ/MSB members and the East German authorities understood the spread of nudism in the GDR from the 1970s onwards. In contrast with the preceding decades, the East German regime endorsed nudism as a symbol of ‘young, forward-looking’ society. At that point, both younger nude bathers and the regime increasingly viewed the practice as having sexual potential. Nevertheless, SDAJ/MSB members touring East Germany or simply discussing relevant travel reports did
not necessarily link nudism with sex. Dieter Stelle, who falls into the latter category, narrated to me that he personally viewed this lifestyle as a ‘progressive tradition of the working-class movement’, which was facilitated in a country that proactively supported the ‘best elements’ of this tradition. However, in mentioning this and while arguing that in the 1970s–80s he viewed East Germany as ‘more progressive’ in terms of sexual mores than West Germany, he did not, at least explicitly, link nudism with sexual desire.¹¹²

In the case of KNE/PSK, their travel reports did not necessarily match, once again, the experience of their participants. Some Greek pro-Soviet Communists who travelled through the Iron Curtain were not impressed by the purported flourishing of happy family lives there. By contrast, they were struck by the existence, in their view, of conditions that the prescriptive texts of their groups linked with the ‘American Way of Life’ and which they did not expect to find in the ‘socialist world’: prostitution and pornography. A PSK member who visited the USSR through an organised tour mounted a loud critique of a Maoist publication lambasting the USSR. He argued that Soviet workers were far happier than their counterparts in the ‘capitalist’ world. Nevertheless, he conceded that, when visiting, he witnessed ‘aspects of the American Way of Life’ there, such as the existence of sex workers.¹¹³ This ambivalence, which could turn to frustration, is evident in the oral testimonies of those KNE cadre participating in tours in the 1970s and 1980s. Theodoros Stellakis, who was a high-ranking KNE cadre and university student in the early and mid-1970s and who joined a splinter group in 1989, claimed that ‘I asked educated people about [Wim] Wenders in (East) Berlin and Moscow: they ignored him. Of Greek cinema, they only knew about a soft porn movie!’¹¹⁴ The actual experience of their members who travelled through the Iron Curtain refuted the bipolar model that set a ‘sexually prudent socialist world’ against a ‘morally corrupt due to the American Way of Life West’, which reigned supreme in the prescriptive texts of KNE/PSK. It was a rhetoric of similarity with developments occurring in the West, albeit, on this occasion, an undesirable one. While KNE members did not always follow the prescriptive texts of their group and, for instance, often engaged in premarital sex, they, including Stellakis, venerated the institutions of marriage and family in practice. Certainly, a comprehensive analysis of the lifestyle of KNE/PSK members throughout the 1970s and 1980s requires further research and is beyond the scope of this article. Glimpses into it provided by the oral testimonies I have collected show, however, that those KNE members travelling across the Iron Curtain did not necessarily experience the ensuing contact as shaping their behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, with the exception of the reference to prostitution in the USSR mentioned above, such concerns would not be voiced in public by the KNE/PSK members until 1989 or until they withdrew from these groups. Once again, the young pro-Soviet Communists tried to disregard doubts over the role-model character of the Eastern Bloc.

Conclusions

Historiography largely associates political, social, economic and cultural transformations that took place from the late 1940s to the late 1980s in Eastern Europe with ‘Sovieticisation’ and in Western Europe with ‘Americanisation’. It imputes to a greater or lesser extent the emergence of youth lifestyles in Western Europe since the 1960s to the spread of American cultural products. An alternative argument addresses broader, intra-Western flows of cultural patterns and people contributing to a ‘cultural revolution’ beginning in the long 1960s,
continuing in the subsequent decades. This revolution affected the lifestyles of various social groups, including the youth. This article resonates with very recent relevant scholarship showing that youth lifestyles in Western Europe formed due to a wide array of cultural flows. Transfers between Eastern Bloc countries and Western Europe have also been part of this complex puzzle, but their impact on segments of the youth in the latter has largely been neglected. To help fill this lacuna, this article concentrates on the pro-Soviet Communist youth groups in West Germany and Greece, which were rather influential, especially in the 1970s, albeit not hegemonic, in the left-wing youth of both countries under study. These organisations were among the few adamantly pro-Soviet Communist subjects in post-1968 Europe and contributed to the intensification of youth travel from West Germany and Greece to Eastern Bloc countries from the 1970s onwards.

The article stresses that these Communist groups utilised organised travel through the Iron Curtain to the USSR and its allied countries in Eastern Europe in particular. Although these groups standardised travel arrangements through the Iron Curtain in the same way, the encounters of young Communists from West Germany and Greece with policies implemented and cultural norms existing in the Eastern Bloc through such travel varied. The article argues that the reception of such policies and norms by the Communists under study was akin to a ‘black box’, to borrow a term Kroes has used to describe the appropriation of American popular culture by Western European youth. Thus, the encounters under study helped to reproduce representations of Eastern Bloc societies in West Germany and Greece that overlapped, but that were not the same. These representations appeared as a product of synergies in the organs of the groups in question: they revolved around aspects that state-socialist regimes wished to stress, but also as refracted through the particular lens by which each group viewed them. They stemmed from both a process of selective reception of patterns emanating from the Eastern Bloc and of projection of how each group wished those societies to be.

This selective reception and projection revolved around their effort to discern an alternative, ‘socialist’ modernity in the Eastern Bloc, however they particularly viewed it. They expected tours across the Iron Curtain to convince participants about its superiority over the ‘capitalist’ one. Thus, the tour organisers endorsed an acute dichotomy of ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’ worlds in terms of the policies implemented in each Cold War camp. Nevertheless, when dealing particularly with youth lifestyles in the Eastern Bloc in comparison to those flourishing in the West, their approach was more complex, one that I would like to describe as semi-open to cultural developments in the latter: the cultural patterns they wished to instil into their members and which travel through the Iron Curtain and encounters with youth cultures there were expected to reinforce, neither necessarily deviated from nor always resembled such Western-inspired lifestyles. To demonstrate this, I focus on two core elements of youth lifestyles, to the shaping of which such intra-Western flows contributed: hedonism and transformations to sexual norms and practices. With regard to the former, the tour organisers in question developed an ambivalent approach: they endorsed what can be described as ‘serious fun’, which involved a structured programme of ideological indoctrination and leisure. In the case of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK, however, the configurations of indoctrination and leisure were not entirely the same, as their differing approaches to rock music show. As the 1980s progressed, relevant publications of all the groups in question increasingly emphasised leisure during excursions in a process that I label ‘leisurisation’.

Meanwhile, from the 1960s onwards, cross-border youth travel facilitated the relaxation of sexual norms in Western Europe. This applied only to an extent to these tours, which
mirrored the varying approaches of SDAJ/MSB and KNE/PSK to sexuality: travel reports of the former concentrated on developments in the Eastern Bloc revolving around the relaxation, in their view, of sexual norms at a comparable or even superior level in comparison with the West. By contrast, similar publications of the latter chose to portray encounters with the purported sexual restraint of the citizens of state-socialist regimes. Such diverging approaches to sexuality and rock music should be imputed to the concept of a nationalised ‘popular tradition’, which figured prominently in the discourse of KNE/PSK, but not of SDAJ/MSB. Especially during the 1970s, the Greek pro-Soviet Communists regarded rock music and transformations to sexual norms that would, in their view, put stable heterosexual relationships at risk, as incompatible with this ‘tradition’. KNE/PSK tried to stress in their travel reports only those elements of youth lifestyles in Eastern Europe and the USSR they regarded as coterminous with their idealised version of Greek ‘popular tradition’.

The article demonstrates, however, that these excursions helped complicate the ‘black box’ reception of such patterns by the Communists participating in them. They made them feel a tension between embracing and criticising the Eastern Bloc that remained unresolved in the period under study. As written autobiographies and oral testimonies show, participants experienced such tours in diverse ways and only partially in accordance with the expectations of the organisers. While being exposed to and reflecting on the policies implemented and the lifestyles existing in Eastern Bloc societies, they did not necessarily develop pro-Soviet sentiment, but often experienced moments of doubt about those societies. Similarly, although such tours were not the sole determining factor of their lifestyle, whose comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this article, some participants in such excursions felt that their everyday life deviated from both an ‘American Way of Life’ and from the cultural patterns they observed in the Eastern Bloc. Nevertheless, the tours did not trigger an open rejection of state-socialist regimes among these Communists, either. Those who felt ambivalently towards the Eastern Bloc during the tours did not usually voice it publicly as long as they were affiliated with the groups and/or prior to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989. Publicly arguing in favour of policies implemented by and lifestyles flourishing in Eastern Bloc countries as well as advocating excursions to them was part of performances of unity among members of KNE/PSK and SDAJ/MSB.

Ultimately the tours did not serve as a means of self-Sovieticisation. Rather, they reinforced endorsement of state-socialist regimes only to an extent. They also helped shape diverse youth lifestyles that rested on a partial identification with the social/cultural patterns existing in the Soviet and Eastern European societies. Such lifestyles did not necessarily differ from those fostered by intra-Western flows. Therefore, exploring these flows and cultural transfers across the Iron Curtain, affecting Western European youth in the 1970s–80s, as distinct phenomena, is not a promising avenue. Rather, research needs to consider seriously the diverse and complex ways in which these flows and their impact on youth lifestyles were related to one another.

Notes

2. It should be clarified that SDAJ, MSB, KNE and PSK arranged not only excursions across the Iron Curtain, but also to domestic destinations. Several of their members also engaged in non-organised, informal youth travel. On such travel patterns of members of the KNE, see: Papadogiannis, *Militant Around the Clock?*, especially chapter 3.
3. Fitzpatrick and Rasmussen, *Political Tourists*.
7. For more details on this issue, see: Ibid.
8. According to a Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) report in 1974, 2200 of those Greek migrants were affiliated with Greek pro-Soviet Communist organisations. Support for the wide array of associations in West Germany linked with these groups declined, however, during the period from 19,000 in 1971, to 14,000 in 1973 and 9150 in 1974. See: Verfassungsschutz '74, Federal Ministry of Interior, July 1975. Author's collection, 132–3. During the 1970s, at least according to sociologist and political scientist Ilias Katsoulis, there were more than 6000 Greek undergraduate and graduate students in West Germany. Moreover, between 1961 and 1973, when the oil crisis put an end to foreign labour recruitment, the Greek population in West Germany rose from 42,000 to 408,000. See: Katsoulis, “Demokraten gegen Obristen,” 291; Panayotidis, *Griechen in Bremen*, 89.
15. MSB gained 9.8% of the seats that year, higher than any single Maoist or Trotskyist group. See: Verfassungsschutz '74, Federal Ministry of Interior, July 1975, 47.
16. An overview of radical left-wing groups active in West Germany at that point is the following: Kersting, "Juvenile Left-wing Radicalism," 353–75. On these loosely knit initiatives, see also: Reichardt and Siegfried, *Das Alternative Milieu*.
17. The term “alternative” was employed by those subjects who wanted to demonstrate that they refused to be incorporated into the mass-consumption patterns that reigned supreme in that country. However, the extent to which they were indeed detached from such patterns is an issue that has caused reflection among historians. See, for instance, Bertsch, “Alternative (in) Bewegung,” 115–30. I am using quotation marks to show that they used this term to portray themselves. I do not wish to imply that this was a fake alternative voice in comparison to other left-wing subjects.
19. See, for example: Wittner, *Towards Nuclear Abolition*.
22. For example, in 1959 the Polytechnic School of Athens organised a student excursion to Egypt. See “Kinisis Syllogon,” *Panspoudastiki*, 2 December 1959, 4. On such an excursion to Western Europe, see: Letter from Giannis Papadogiannis to K.A. from Cambridge (UK), 17 July 1973, personal collection of Giannis Papadogiannis. Giannis Papadogiannis was then a university student, studying Chemistry at the University of Salonica; the school excursion in which he participated visited France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
23. I approach the very term “Eastern Europe” as not a timeless one, but largely a product of the Cold War era: I take into account that several of those countries that had been depicted as falling into this category during the Cold War now tend to present themselves as belonging to Central Europe.
24. Excursions across the Iron Curtain were not confined to young Communists in the Greek case, either. Commercial travel agencies not linked with the Left organised package tours to, for instance, Bulgaria. People of diverse ideological orientations took part. The activities on offer as well as the background and motivations of their participants merit further analysis.


26. West Germany’s contact with its state-socialist neighbour, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), gained momentum in 1969, when the West German government, comprising the Social Democratic Party and liberal Free Democratic Party from 1969 to 1982, initiated its Ostpolitik of establishing formal ties with the GDR. This process was not reversed after 1982, when the Christian Democrat and the Free Democratic Party took power. On the Ostpolitik, see, for instance: Pulzer, German Politics, 108–28.

27. For example, in a 1975 gathering that attracted in total 451 guests from West Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 212 were affiliated with the SDAJ and 60 with the MSB. In a similar gathering in East Germany in 1980, 482 sympathisers and members of the SDAJ took part alongside 174 sympathisers and members of the MSB. While I have not found the total number of members/sympathisers of those groups that travelled annually to Eastern Europe within the framework of such vacations, individual reports mention a few hundred on each occasion, while the number of such gatherings in Eastern Europe that the SDAJ and MSB co-hosted per annum was limited. On such individual reports, see, for instance: “Information zum Verlauf und zu den Ergebnissen,” 22 November 1975, 4; “Information über die Durchführung des Internationalen Freundschaftslagers im Jugenderholungszentrum am Scharmützelsee vom 19 Juli bis 2 August 1980,” 1, both in DY24, 23320, Bundesarchiv Berlin. Such reports were written by functionaries of the FJD (Freie Demokratische Jugend, Free German Youth), namely the official youth organisation of the German Democratic Republic regime. Unfortunately, there are no available figures about the number of participants in the excursions that the SDAJ/MSB co(-)arranged to other state-socialist regimes, such as the USSR and Hungary.


30. I use the terms political tourism and ideologically motivated travel alternatively, referring to the same hybrid type of mobility: I do not relegate tourism to the status of an inferior, superficial type of mobility and elevate travel to a means of self-improvement. Such a distinction has rather elitist connotations and is predicated on stereotypes about social class, which I reject. According to Furlough and Baranowski, “with the onset of mass tourism in the twentieth century and working-class tourists more present and visible, claims for the cultural superiority of ‘travel’ over tourism increased in intensity.” See: Baranowski and Furlough, “Introduction,” 2.

31. Ibid., 19.

32. For instance, Ernest Heller was an SDAJ functionary, being an honorary member of the council that guided group activities in Baden-Württemberg. In this capacity, he travelled to the GDR as a member of SDAJ delegations. However, he narrated to me that he did not participate in any campsite in the GDR that falls into the category of Polittourismus. Interview with Ernest Heller, 23 September 2014. I am using pseudonyms for all interviewees.

33. While only KNE/PSK organised political youth travel through the Iron Curtain, there was contact between the authorities of state-socialist regimes and delegations from a wide array of Greek left-wing organisations, including KNE, the Youth of PASOK and the Eurocommunists in the 1970s–80s. In the case of West Germany, Maoist groups also arranged tours to Eastern Europe, albeit solely to Albania. See: Kühn, Stalins Enkel, 92–6. Greek Maoists, by contrast, did not embark on such initiatives.


35. For instance: Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels; Stacey, Star Gazing, 204.

36. Some scholars, such as anthropologist Kaspur Maase, no longer employ the term “Americanisation,” referring to “cultural democratisation” instead. See: Maase, “Establishing Cultural Democracy,” 428–50.

37. Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, 167.
38. Marwick initially confined his research to the United States, UK, Italy and France. See: Marwick, *The Sixties*. On the applicability of the “cultural revolution of the Long Sixties” also in West Germany, see: Marwick, “Youth Culture,” 39–58. On its applicability to Greece, see: Kornetis, *Children*.


43. On the financial support from the USSR to KNE, see: Papadogiannis, *Militant around the Clock?*, especially chapter 2. A detailed analysis of the financial aid provided by Eastern Bloc regimes, especially East Germany, to SDAJ, awaits to be written. Some hints are provided in: Verfassungsschutz ‘74. Federal Ministry of Interior, July 1975, 58, where it is argued that DKP and its affiliated groups received around 30 million DM from East Germany in 1974. The figure, however, is just an estimate that requires crosschecking.

44. See, for instance: Jobs, “Youth Movements;” Bertsch, “Alternative (in) Bewegung,” 115–30. Jobs goes further to argue that such mobility helped such young travellers construe themselves as members of a “continent-wide [European], transnational social group.”


46. Concerning the general background of participants in SDAJ excursions to East Germany, at least according to existing primary sources, most were male workers aged between 17 and 20 who did not study at a university. In the case of KNE, those participants were mainly students, but their social class and gender are not reported in the available sources. For instance: “Bericht über das Sommerlager der SDAJ vom 1-14.8.1970...”, DY24, 23201, Bundesarchiv Berlin; “Konzeption für die Durchführung des Internationalen Sommerkurses an der JHS ‘Wilhelm Pieck,’” DY24, 22333, Bundesarchiv Berlin.

47. For instance, they arranged an excursion that aimed to facilitate an encounter with Bulgarian youth in 1977. See advertisement in *Odigitis*, 22 July 1977, 16. On excursions to the USSR, see: “Kalokairina taxidia stin ESSD,” *Odigitis*, 2 July 1981, 12.


49. From the mid-1970s and during the following decade, according to historian Heike Wolter, East Germany witnessed a substantial increase in the number of diverse accommodation facilities that addressed particularly young tourists. See: Wolter, “Ich harre,” 185–96. About the interaction of young pro-Soviet Communists from several European countries, see, for example: “Information zum Verlauf und zu den Ergebnissen,” 22 November 1975, 4. Nevertheless, some camps were limited to encounters between young Communists from West and East Germany. See, for instance: “Konzeption für die inhaltliche und organisatorische Vorbereitung des ‘Internationalen Freundschaftslagers FDJ-SDAJ’ vom 24. Juli bis 14. August 1971 im Zentralen Pionierlager ‘Maxim Gorki,’” DY24, 23033, Bundesarchiv Berlin.

50. Relevant information about excursions to Eastern Europe and the USSR organised by KNE and PSK were found at least once annually in their publications. On travel reports from excursions to the USSR in *Odigitis*, see, for instance: “Episkepsi sti S. Enosi,” 16. The organ of the PSK, *Panspoudastiki*, also published such texts. See, for example: “Ekdromi tis E Architektonon stin ESSD,” 8.

51. On the case of KNE, see, for example, the relevant advertisements of LEV-Tours, such as in: *Odigitis*, 7 July 1978, 21.

52. Advertisement in *elan*, July/August 1968, 79.
53. The WFDY is an international left-wing youth organisation. In the period under study it attracted mainly, but not solely, pro-Soviet Communist organisations. On its Festival in 1968 in Sofia, see: Rutter, “Look Left, Drive Right,” 193–212.


55. “Reisen ‘75 für elan Leser,” 17–20. This catalogue appeared once annually from that point onwards.

56. Interview with Nikitas Apostolidis; interview with Sotiris Katopoulos. Katopoulos was a school pupil in Athens until 1975 and later a university student and high-ranking cadre of KKE. In the late 1980s, he withdrew from KKE and joined the radical left-wing group NAR (Neo Aristero Reyna, New Left Current). Apostolidis has lived in West Germany since the early 1970s. During the 1970s he was a student and KNE member. He is no longer a KKE member, but is currently aligned with SYRIZA (Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras, Coalition of the Radical Left). On the (failed) effort of the Greek Community in Hamburg which was controlled by the Left to organise an excursion to the USSR, see, for instance: Letter from ht-reisen to Jakovos Papadopoulos (chairman of the Community), 29 September 1976, Archive of the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, Gemeinde der Griechen in Hamburg e.V, 1970–76.

57. Epitropoulos, “Youth Culture.” However, the issue whether pleasure has been a core component of all youth lifestyles in West Germany and Greece since the late 1950s requires further study.


60. Papadogiannis, Militant, 150.

61. “Serious fun” was actually introduced by historian Robert Edelman, who explored spectator sports in the USSR. See: Edelman, Serious Fun, x, 250; Gorsuch, All This is Your World, 47.

62. For example, advertisement in elan, April 1974, 43. Their definition of the mobility under study differs from the one that I offer, since the organisations in question approached such accumulation of information in a normative way, namely as a means of presenting the “truth” about those regimes, while this article takes into account the fact that the state-socialist regimes presented some of their facets to visitors.

63. See, for instance: “1917, 60 chronia sosialistikis oikodomisis,” 18–19.

64. For example: “Monopleyri paroussiasi,” 6–7.


66. A concentration camp in Oranienburg, Germany, which operated from 1936 to 1945 and was mainly used for the detention and execution of political prisoners.

67. “Rahmenkonzeption für das Internationale Freundschaftslager vom 26.7-15.8.1972 an der Sonderschule des Zentralrats der FDJ in Buckow,” 7–8, DY24, 23129, Bundesarchiv Berlin. This occurred at a point when the discussion about the extermination of Jews by the Nazis was gaining ground in West Germany, namely during the 1970s–80s. On the memory of the Holocaust in West and East Germany, see, for instance: Fulbrook, German National Identity. The only reference to the extermination of Jews by the Nazis as part of an antifascist commemoration during such travel in the GDR that I have found in relevant primary sources occurred in 1988 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Kristallnacht. See: Zentralrat der FDJ, “Information über die Durchführung des Internationalen Jugendlagers der Freien Demokratischen Jugend vom 30.10 bis 04.11.1988 in Werder,” DY24, 14163, Bundesarchiv Berlin. The issue of whether the East German regime began at that point to reframe the antifascist memory it endorsed, adding more weight to the elimination of the Jews, awaits further examination.

69. For instance, interview with Katopoulos.


71. Interview with Nikitas Apostolidis, 15 October 2012.


73. Reckert, Kommunismus-Erfahrung, 35–6; Andresen, “Vier Möglichkeiten.”


76. Interview with Danis Artinos, 12 May 2008. Artinos was in 1980 linked to a radical left-wing group that was highly critical of KNE. He narrated that during the assembly that decided the destination he argued against what the members of PSK had advocated, namely a trip to Czechoslovakia. Moreover, on a critique from a Maoist perspective of the content of travel reports concerning KNE-initiated excursions to the USSR, see, for instance: “Oi foititikes ekdromes sti Sovietiki Enosi. Enas didaktikos sosialismos,” 7. The article claimed, among other things, that class inequalities existed in the USSR. The discussion about such excursions even reached popular women’s magazines. See, for instance: Aggelopoulou, “Diakopes,” 56–7.

77. See: Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 25, 96.


80. “Urlaub in ‘Sanssouci,’” 11. Similarly, during the 1980s the SDAJ invited rock bands from East Germany, such as the Puhdys, to the events that it held in West Germany. See: “Heisse Rock-nacht,” 7.

81. Interview with Nikitas Apostolidis.

82. For instance, Odigitis published a very warm comradely message from elan on the occasion of the publication of its issue no. 300. See: Odigitis, 9 May 1980, 13. On the mainly positive approaches to rock, but also some critical voices, as expressed in elan, see also: Siegfried, Time is on my Side, 716.


84. For example, see: elan, March 1983, 36.


88. “Heisse Tips.” The issue whether SDAJ and MSB tried to attract participants in those milieux in order to counter their falling membership figures in the 1980s awaits further examination. Moreover, the issue of whether SDAJ/MSB were influenced by the emotional norms that the “alternative” Left developed in 1980/81 merits further exploration.

89. Those places did not necessarily develop as tourist resorts for the first time in the 1960s. For instance, Sochi had been constructed in pre-1917 Russia in order to “vie with the French Riviera for foreign tourists.” McReynolds, “The Prerevolutionary Russian Tourist,” 37.

90. Noack, “Coping with the Tourist,” 282. It should be stressed that one cannot argue that this shift to leisurisation/informalisation was imposed onto SDAJ and KNE by the Soviet Union, since the “leisure boom” in the USSR started well before this shift in the travel reports and advertisements of those groups.

91. Such a tendency is evident, for instance, in the following advertisement of LEV-tours in Odigitis: “Kalokairina taxidia stin ESSD,” 12.

92. Russian stringed musical instrument.

93. Rizospastis, 30 May 1985, 13. Rizospastis is the newspaper of the KKE.


95. Interview with Dieter Stelle, 19 September 2013.
96. Interview with Sotiris Katopoulos, 8 April 2008.
97. On changes to sexual norms in Western Europe at that point, see, for instance: Stearns, *Sexuality*, 133–64.
98. Silles, “Taking the Pill,” 43–4. However, Silles argues that “in the 1970s, the contraceptive pill became a contraceptive for the young” in West Germany and England. Silles, “Taking the Pill,” 54. Her analysis is based on age cohorts rather than on whether those she describes as “young” felt so.
100. Herzog, *Sexuality*. Herzog also stressed that growing sexual freedom was not necessarily experienced as a source of pleasure, but also of anxiety.
103. Articles about the contraceptive pill that saw print in *elan* include: “Emanzipation über Männereichen,” 4–5; “Die Pille mit 16,” 18–19.
108. Benzien, “Problem Du und Ich,” 4–8; “Fragen an die Hennigsdorfer,” 36. *Rote blätter* also published articles about sexuality in the GDR. See, for instance, the reflections of Franz Sommerfeld, the editor of *rote blätter*, on that topic, which saw print in *rote blätter* 9 (1979), 26.
109. Silles argues that only in the late 1960s did organisations such as Pro Familia gain momentum in West Germany, granting easy access to the contraceptive pill to unmarried and young women. Silles, “Taking the Pill,” 45. It is interesting, however, that this development was not mentioned in *elan*.
112. Interview with Dieter Stelle, 19 September 2013.
114. Interview with Theodoros Stellakis, 3 December 2007.

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The making of politics and trained intelligence in the Near East: Robert College of Istanbul

Ali Erken

ABSTRACT
This article examines the role of Robert College in Turkish-American relations in the early decades of the Turkish Republic. Relying on recently discovered archival sources and biographical accounts it explores political and educational networks between the United States and Turkey. Robert College, founded in 1863, was the first American College established abroad. It was, however, more than an educational institution; the College teaching staff acted as diplomatic and cultural correspondents for both countries. The trust the College staff earned among the Turkish elite during the First World War continued in the early years of Republic. This relationship turned into a more lucrative collaboration during the early periods of the Cold War. The story of Robert College in Turkey demonstrates the impact of trained intelligence on political relations between the two countries.

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Introduction
The first official treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the United States was signed in 1830, just a year after the Ottoman naval forces were destroyed in Navarino. This treaty granted the Americans exclusive trade rights in the Ottoman Empire and that the US merchants in the Ottoman ports would pay the same duties as the 'most favorable nations'. It was not yet accurate to assume that the early American interest in the Near East was only motivated by economic incentives; the first religious missionary campaign from the United States under the guidance of William Goodell, renowned missionary leader from Massachusetts, arrived in Istanbul in 1831. In the same year the first American chargé d'affaires opened in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Following the end of the Crimean War the number of US merchants and missionaries arriving in the Ottoman lands increased significantly. The inauguration of Robert College (RC), the first American school to have been established abroad, was made possible through the activities of two parties who met on the shores of the Bosporus in 1856. Cyrus Hamlin, an American missionary, had arrived in Istanbul in 1840 and founded the Bebek Seminary at the request of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). This was the first American foreign missionary society, founded in 1810 in Massachusetts.
was engaged in cooking bread for the victims of the Crimean War when Christopher Robert Rhinelander, an American businessman visiting Istanbul after the War, stopped by his small bakery on the Bosporus. Impressed with Hamlin's commitment Christopher Robert offered to support his activities and helped establish an educational institution in Istanbul.7

The construction of the College buildings involved a great deal of diplomacy and negotiation. During his experience at the Bebek Seminary Hamlin had problems with the ABCFM over the educational philosophy of the Seminary; in 1860 he cut his ties with the Missionary Board.8 Hamlin shifted from a classical Missionary model, decided not to continue a Seminary and opted to found a College.9 Robert College started its activities in 1863, but the Ottoman government was not willing to give permission for the construction of a building on the College site, partly because of the on-going Civil War in the United States.10 Yet it seemed the visit of Admiral David Farragut from the US Navy to the Sublime Porte in 1868 changed views. Farragut was commanding the US fleet in the Mediterranean and during his visit to Istanbul spoke to the Grand Vizier and Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the construction of buildings.11 That same year, Imperial permission to build on the Hisar site was granted. The available records also indicate that Hamlin, a cousin of Abraham Lincoln's vice president, wrote letters to the Secretary of State William Seward about developments at the College and waited until his visit for the official opening ceremony in 1871.12

The ‘orient’, the birthplace of Christianity, had received special attention from Protestant missionaries since the early nineteenth century.13 These missionaries were educated and cultured members of their society and were committed to the mission of exporting American culture abroad and instigating a spiritual revival in the region.14 The early focus of the missionary activities evolved around health and education. These endeavours helped gain them the goodwill of the Ottoman government.15 Missionary service stations spread across the Empire, ranging from Arab provinces and Anatolia, to the Balkans. Robert College of Istanbul, as the oldest educational institution established in the capital city, held a distinguished status in this organisation.

As outlined earlier, the service and education the Americans offered, which were independent of political affiliations, helped them build friendly relations with the Ottoman political elites, which were subsequently inherited by the Turkish Republic. Diplomatic and political connections between the two countries deepened following the end of the First World War, well into the early Republican period. As educated minds with a great deal of expertise in the region, the personnel of Robert College were able to shape and influence future strategies and policies of the United States over Turkish affairs. The collaboration between the US and Turkish political elites in the early decades of the Cold War likewise greatly benefited from Robert College staff. They played an active role in providing information and expertise on the needs of Turkey and how the United States could offer assistance.

Most available works on Turkish-American relations explore political and economic aspects at large, whilst studies exploring educational and religious activities of the American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire and early Republican Turkey have started to appear in recent years.16 Some of these studies have highlighted the role of American educators in helping to shape US policy in the Near East, but only a few studies offer detailed investigation based on primary sources.17 The most comprehensive study examining the relationship between the US political elites and the Protestant missionaries is still Joseph Grabill’s seminal work Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East, published in 1971.18 His study, however, does not benefit from the biographical accounts of the American educators in Turkey and
only deals with the period until 1927. These aspects of US–Turkish relations are therefore still unexplored. Relying on recently explored documents at Robert College archives and biographical accounts this article demonstrates how trained intelligence played the leading role in the making of US policy towards Turkey between the period of 1914 and 1960.

The dissolution of the Empire and the foundation of the Republic: Frank Gates and Cleveland Dodge

The quality of the education at the College made considerable progress largely thanks to its teaching staff and private donations from the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following the fall of Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1908, widespread political instability was unleashed across the Empire. The first real test for the College came after the eruption of the Balkan Wars in 1912, as the Greek and Bulgarian armies made significant advances against the Ottoman forces. A considerable proportion of the College students were of Greek and Bulgarian origin, and many of the leading Bulgarian nationalist leaders were graduates of Robert College. Gates, for example, narrates that the US Military Attaché asked him to use the College as shelter for the Americans in Istanbul if the Bulgarians broke Ottoman lines. Facing a political as well as physiological challenge the College administration wisely handled the tension among the students and its relations with the Ottoman government until the end of the war in 1914. The College staff, however, had no time to elaborate on these tumultuous years as the political crisis became more chaotic with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

It was no surprise that the Ottoman leadership entered the war hoping to recover the losses it suffered during the Balkan Wars. Until 1916, the war was at a stalemate in the Near East as the Ottoman-German forces proved resilient against the Allies. That the United States had remained neutral during the conflict made it possible for the Americans to continue to run their institutions within the Ottoman Empire at least until 1917. Nevertheless, during the First World War and later on, the United States faced serious setbacks in dealing with the developments relating to the Near East, mainly due to its lack of previous experience with the region. The most reliable asset the United States had maintained in the Near East was the missionary colleges. Hence the American diplomatic elites had no choice but to approach personnel working for these colleges, mainly staff at Robert College. On the part of Robert College staff, these years of turbulence and transition, though a cause of grief and stress, offered a wide range of opportunities to enhance American influence in the fields of culture and politics in Turkey.

Two men aligned with Robert College made a crucial contribution to Ottoman–American relations between 1914 and 1924. Caleb Frank Gates, the third President of Robert College between 1903 and 1932, had previously worked in Mardin and Euphrates as a missionary. Besides being both a missionary and an educator, Gates had displayed great ability in both diplomacy and human relations, during when pressure on the College became unbearable. In 1915 the Turkish government issued an order that would bring all schools under the control of the Ministry of Public Instruction. This had, in effect, meant that non-Muslim communities would no longer control their own schools. Thanks to Gates’ fluency in Turkish and acquaintance with Turkish customs, he sought every possible means to build a trustworthy and credible image for himself and the College. Throughout the First World
War, he had several meetings with both Enver Pasha, Minister of War, and Talat Pasha, the Prime Minister of the time.\(^{26}\)

Gates was one of the closest companions of the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, who served in Istanbul between 1913 and 1916. In his memoirs Gates describes Morgenthau’s presence in Istanbul as of great help for Robert College, and narrates that the Chief of Police told him the College would be closed once Morgenthau left the country.\(^{27}\) Indeed, Morgenthau put Gates in touch with Enver and Talat Pashas so that Gates could gain the confidence and trust of these leaders in the aims of the College.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, Gates and some College staff had assisted the Ottoman soldiers struggling with the shortage in medical supplies and logistical equipment during the war.\(^{29}\)

Gates therefore had direct contact with the Ottoman cabinet. He also had a close friendship with the Minister of Finance, Cavit Bey, who was a Robert College graduate and supporter of his former school. In one of the cabinet meetings towards the end of the War he had allegedly spoken out against Enver Pasha who decided to suspend the activities of American colleges including Robert College.\(^{30}\) Even at a time when diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States were broken, Gates had little difficulty in meeting with Ottoman politicians and making the case regarding the issue of foreign citizens and institutions.

This cordial relationship had started to be strained especially after 1917. Rumours of the United States’ joining the War on the side of the Allies increased the pressure on the College as the Germans had already declared in a statement that in case of war between the United States and Turkey every American institution in Turkey would be closed.\(^{31}\) The anticipated news arrived as the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, but the Ottoman ruling elite had done its utmost to preserve normal relations with the United States. Prime Minister Talat Pasha had stood firm in regards to the protection of American facilities in Istanbul, and had assured Gates of his support for the continuation of classes despite opposition from the leading military officers and bureaucrats.\(^{32}\) The College facilities were threatened to be seized on numerous occasions by the Ottoman military forces, but in each case Gates had managed to reach Talat Pasha, who was able to intervene to put a halt to the closure of the College.\(^{33}\)

Aside from Gates’ arduous efforts in Istanbul, perhaps a more crucial contribution towards US–Ottoman conciliation during the First World War came from Cleveland H. Dodge, the Chairman of the College Board of Trustees in New York.\(^{34}\) Dodge was one of the most prominent businessmen in the mining industry at the time. His interest in missionary activities had originated from the works of his father, William Dodge, who had been one of the early benefactors of the Syrian Protestant College.\(^{35}\) Many other members of the Dodge family were involved in missionary activities; Bayard Dodge, Cleveland Dodge’s son, went to Syria to work in the Syrian Protestant College and served as the College President for more than 20 years. Cleveland Dodge’s daughter Elizabeth was married to George Huntington, the Vice President of Robert College, and had taught at Robert College between 1916 and 1934.\(^{36}\) After many years of investment and hard work, developments in the Near East were a source of worry to the Dodge family and Cleveland Dodge, one of the founders of Near East Relief, had continuously lobbied for the United States to prevent any outbreak of a destructive war between the United States and the Ottoman Empire.\(^{37}\)

The Dodge family had a close friendship with Theodore Roosevelt, the US President between 1901 and 1909, and his family, which could be traced back to the late nineteenth
century. This had helped provide them with inner access to the American ruling elite. More important than this connection was Cleveland Dodge's close friendship with Woodrow Wilson, the US President between 1913 and 1921. Wilson and Dodge had been together since their days at Princeton and Dodge played an influential role in the ascension of Wilson to the presidency. Elizabeth Huntington-Dodge recounts that her parents used to stay in White Palace when they visited Washington, and held breakfasts and dinners together with Wilson family. She adds that the various heads of American institutions asked Dodge to urge President Wilson to prevent the United States from declaring war on Turkey. Dodge recounts that this was the only request he ever made to Wilson.

Once the First World War had ended and the armistice between the Ottoman Empire and Allied forces was signed, on 30 October 1918, staff at Robert College were to undertake a new mission. They were to ensure the transition period proceeded smoothly; Gates and some other college staff were contacted by the Turkish officials and Allied representatives in Istanbul so as to control the situation in the city. Gates narrates that once he was asked by Cavit Bey, former Minister of Finance, for US help in dealing with the crisis before and after the armistice. Similarly, on the advice of Lord Balfour, the British High Commissioner, Thomas Hohler, came to Gates to consult him on relief measures in Turkey. They were primarily concerned with the conditions of the Christian population especially in Anatolia, but they also displayed sensitivity with the Muslim population so as to prevent possible misconduct by the Allied forces towards them.

Before the peace conference commenced in Paris there were differing views on the future of the Ottoman Empire; one strong current was the foundation of a new state under an American mandate. It can be said that Robert College elites and certain American diplomats had a favourable view of the foundation of an American mandate in the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Gates, Dodge and former US Ambassador Morgenthau were determined that an American mandate would protect the Christian communities of the region and offered further advantages for the future of American influence. Before leaving for the Paris Peace Conference President Wilson consulted with Dodge again and seemed persuaded of the idea of the formation of an American mandate in Anatolia.

The emergence of a resistance movement throughout Anatolia, nevertheless, and victories on the Turkish side achieved against the Greek forces in several battlegrounds undermined these plans over the establishment of an American mandate. At the end of the Turkish Independence War the Peace Conference was convened in Lausanne and again two Robert College staff took part on opposing sides of the table for diplomatic negotiations; the College's first Turkish instructor, Hüseyin Pektas, was invited to the conference as a translator to Ismet Inonu while Frank Gates was invited by Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Istanbul, as his unofficial adviser. At the Lausanne Conference the Americans demanded the recognition and protection of American philanthropic and religious institutions, which was accepted by the Turkish side. The Republic of Turkey was declared on 29 October 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The new Turkish leadership would assert no political claims outside the boundaries of the new Turkey, which was a source of appreciation for the Americans. The Turkish elite were likewise willing to form friendly ties with the United States and considerable progress was achieved, partly thanks to the presence of Admiral Bristol in Turkey, who had a favourable view of the new Turkish state and its rulers. Going through turbulent years during and after the First World War, the College staff earned significant prestige in the eyes of the
new Republican leaders. However, the political atmosphere in the country turned bleak for the College as the fervour of Turkish nationalism swept the political discourse after 1923. Some of the republican elites had deep reservations about the presence of foreign schools in the country and there was a clear commitment among the rulers in enforcing secularisation reforms in the field of education.\textsuperscript{53} This policy had in effect meant the end of the missionary character of the American Colleges, to the displeasure of Gates, who was not willing to give up this mission.\textsuperscript{54} After the passing of new laws and regulations only a handful of foreign colleges could remain open, including Robert College, thanks to its historical prestige and success in revising its curriculum. Struggling with this transformation, the College had come to realise that there were still plenty of opportunities for Robert College under this novel ideological framework. Gates once wrote:

The impression in the United States is that the exigencies of the government make it impossible to carry on the work of our colleges in any satisfactory way. This is not at all the case, on the contrary we have an enlarged opportunity. There is in Turkey a freedom of thought and of inquiry such as has never been known before.\textsuperscript{55}

The Republicans’ commitment to the Westernisation programme impressed the college administration. In her memoirs Elizabeth Huntington-Dodge describes a ball they attended in Topkapi Palace at the invitation of the Vali (governor) of Istanbul, where she observed that people behaved according to Western customs and the Negro band played Charleston in the American style.\textsuperscript{56} These steps, at least to her, were of symbolic importance in society’s attempts to change social customs by ‘example of the upper class’ and the ‘unexpected way’ that a Robert College education had played in accommodating these plans.\textsuperscript{57} In the quest for a socio-cultural reframing of attitudes for a young country, Robert College staff would offer a great deal of assistance.\textsuperscript{58} A similar view was held by Gates, who was content with the Republican reforms, which meant dismantling the force of Islam within the public and political sphere; in his annual report for the year 1926–7 he concluded: ‘There is in Turkey a freedom of thought and inquiry such as has never been known before.’\textsuperscript{59}

Similarly the ruling elite in Turkey were deeply influenced by the Americans, which could be observed as increasing numbers of children enrolling at the college were from the families of politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals of the time. Even Mustafa Kemal Ataturk decided to send his two adopted daughters to Robert College so as to improve their English skills and make them familiar with American customs and culture.\textsuperscript{60} Besides, the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Commerce began sending students to the college, and even paying their boarding fees.\textsuperscript{61} These were indicative of a change in the political orientation of Turkey’s new elites, who were at ease with having relations with the United States rather than the British Empire or France. This attitude could best be described in the words of Mustafa Kemal, who praised American ideals as of a similar character to Turkish ideals:

The American ideal is our ideal. As you had a Declaration of Independence, we also have our National Pact …Turkey and America are democratic societies. Turkey and the United States can cooperate in the commercial and economic fields.\textsuperscript{62}

This appreciation was also derived from the College’s contribution to Turkish modernisation in different fields. The Robert College Engineering Faculty, founded in 1912, was able to produce well-trained engineers in accordance with the needs of the country.\textsuperscript{63} Notable scholars in the fields of history, arts and literature taught at the College, easing the way for educated circles to have a deeper acquaintance with Western culture.\textsuperscript{64} RC graduates, some
of whom pursued their higher education in the United States, played pioneering roles in the development of modern sport, art and literature in Turkey. These steps were instrumental in the fulfilment of Republican commitments in the way of Westernisation after 1923.

Cleveland Dodge passed away in 1926 and Frank Gates left his post in 1932. Dodge's son-in-law George Huntington contracted polio and had to leave the College in 1938, together with his wife Elisabeth Huntington-Dodge. Through personal connections and ideological adjustments they made a substantial contribution to Turkish-American relations during a period of profound transformation, not only in Turkey, but also for the United States with regard to its position in world politics. It seems their departure from the College and the ascension of Ismet Inonu, Mustafa Kemal's close associate, to power in 1938 had little impact on the nature of this relationship. Inonu was fond of Western culture and made a gesture to the Americans praising their culture during a radio speech he gave in English. Another sign of friendship he displayed towards the United States was the printing of special stamps on the 150th anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1939. The Robert College administration was delighted with this friendly Presidential gesture, raising their hopes for future projects in Turkey. This rapprochement did not last long, however, as the clouds of war started to gather over Western Europe again. Hitler's Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and then Poland, having stirred the anger of the British and French. On 1 September 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany. Ismet Inonu and the Republican leadership in Turkey exerted all their energies to keep Turkey out of the war, not bowing down to the hardening pressure from the Germans and the Allied forces between 1940 and 1945. The Second World War brought fundamental changes to Turkish-American relations as well as to the function of Robert College in this connection.

New world order, Turkey and Robert College

The war ended with a clear Allied victory against the Germans and the Japanese Empire in 1945, but this did not mean respite for Turkey, which had stayed out of the war, as its place in the new world order was still unclear. The victors divided the world according to their sphere of influence but Turkey's future status, on the borderline of the Soviet Union, was quite delicate. At the Potsdam Conference, Stalin raised Soviet demands on the straits and eastern frontiers of Turkey, which were left unanswered by the British and American governments. During the next two years the Turkish leadership experienced difficult circumstances with both financial and military consequences of the increasing Soviet pressure.

This state of distress subsided somewhat when US President Truman declared that his country would challenge Soviet expansion in the region. In his speech in Congress in 1947 he laid out details of the US aid plan to two of the neighbouring countries to the Soviet Union, namely Greece and Turkey. Referring to the Greek civil war between Communist rebels and government forces Truman urged the Congress that

[i]f Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

This statement marked the beginning of a new balance of power where Turkey would stand as a bulwark in the face of Soviet expansionism in the Near East and the Balkans.

This speech, later referred to as the Truman Doctrine, was followed by the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive economic plan devised by George Marshall, the US Secretary of State,
aimed at stimulating economic recovery in Europe so as to forestall the rise of Communist movements in these states. Turkey was among the countries to receive Marshall Aid, which was sorely needed by the Turkish leadership after long years of economic stagnation.\textsuperscript{75} Turkey’s orientation towards the Western bloc had inevitable consequences on domestic politics as well; the single-party regime ended in 1946 with the foundation of the Democrat Party and the first multi-party elections were held in the same year.\textsuperscript{76} Four years later, the Democrats ascended to government and the pro-liberal Democrat leadership embraced a novel economic policy after long years of statism, facilitating the flow of foreign, mainly American, investments to Turkey.\textsuperscript{77} They also made a swift decision to send Turkish troops to the Korean War to fight on the side of American forces. In return, Turkey’s bid for NATO membership was accepted in 1952 along with that of Greece.\textsuperscript{78}

The US political elite attributed further importance to the role of Turkey in the region after the fall of the pro-Western Egyptian government in 1952 as a result of the military coup.\textsuperscript{79} In a letter to Floyd Black, the seventh President of the College, increasing interest towards the role of Turkey by the United States is described as follows:

The question of the application of the Truman doctrine has produced a very interesting situation here. So much discussion, argument [and] controversy have been inspired by this new move that anyone of Turkey is in considerable demand for interviews and speeches.\textsuperscript{80}

The Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb in 1949 and made significant advances in space technology, which escalated concern in the United States.\textsuperscript{81} Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower, who was elected to the Presidency in 1953 after eight years of Democrat rule, advocated a more assertive involvement by the United States in the Near East, fortifying the containment of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{82} In a speech delivered in 1957, in the aftermath of Suez Crisis, he declared that the United States would be prepared to use armed force against ‘aggression from any country controlled by international communism’.\textsuperscript{83}

Aside from these military commitments, the political-intellectual elites in the United States realised challenging the Soviet Union would require winning the hearts and minds of the people against Communism. The humanities, media and education were the most viable means for the promotion of American values as opposed to the principles of socialism. From 1950 onwards US foundations such as the Rockefeller and Ford undertook international operations on a much larger scale and made serious investments in institution-building in the field of humanities education and communication.\textsuperscript{84} Such initiatives also involved re-evaluating Robert College’s aims in Turkey in relation to advancing US strategic goals in the Cold War.

In reality, the years during the Second World War had put an enormous financial burden upon Robert College’s administration.\textsuperscript{85} The College no longer enjoyed a chairman of the calibre of Cleveland Dodge from the United States and the Americans had focused on winning the war against Hitler’s Germany and Japan. During these years of transition, Robert College had managed to maintain its high standing, especially through language-teaching courses that it had still been able to offer at a very high standard. The number of qualified personnel with language skills had still been dire in the 1940s, so the ministries had continued to send successful students to the College. From 1940 onwards the military personnel from the Turkish Army, who had long been going to Germany to learn a foreign language, had begun to attend Robert College preparatory class for language education.\textsuperscript{86} In addition, Robert College enjoyed a high reputation among diplomatic circles. In the first UN meeting in San Francisco in 1945 three Near Eastern countries were represented by Robert College
graduates: Hamiz Atif Kuyucak (Turkey), Nureddin Kahalle (Syria) and Dr Shafaq (Iran). Turkey’s first Ambassador to the UN was likewise a Robert College graduate.  

Robert College benefited from the ever-closer partnership between Turkey and the United States after 1950. The College staff capitalised on their close ties with the political, financial and intellectual elites of both countries. Thanks to their propaganda in the United States as well as to the changing geo-political conditions in the region, general perceptions of Robert College had changed from being just an institution of education to a strategic station of American interests in the Near East. From 1950 onwards, aside from its growing reputation as an institution of education, the College developed into a nexus for the emerging political and economic networks between the United States and Turkey.

**Democrat Party rule and the Ballantine years**

An outstanding figure in the development of Robert College in the 1950s was Duncan Ballantine, the eighth President of the College, who served between 1955 and 1961. Ballantine was previously Professor of History at MIT and an Amherst Graduate like George Washburn, the second President of the College, and Howard Bliss, first President of the Syrian Protestant College. At the start of his tenure he had high ambitions for making the College a reputable institution at an international level, benefiting from the College’s previous graduates at home and abroad. He paid frequent visits to the United States to meet political elites, private foundations and alumni organisations to speak on this matter.

In many of his writings and speeches Ballantine shared his analyses of the political situation in the Near East, challenges and opportunities for the United States, with regard to the role of education in the Cold War. In one of his speeches he referred to President Eisenhower’s address at Baylor University where he called private foundations to undertake education initiatives in the rest of the world. This message, Ballantine thought, needed further deliberation, as the United States would not succeed in claiming world leadership in the face of global challenges unless it makes serious investment in trained intelligence at a similar scale to that of the Marshall Plan. Quoting Eisenhower’s comments, Ballantine built his argument:

> The whole free world would be stronger if there existed adequate institutions of modern techniques and sciences in areas of the world where the hunger for knowledge and the ability to use knowledge are unsatisfied because educational facilities are not equal to the need.

Explaining the purpose of offering American know-how to the rest of the world Ballantine gave the examples of Marquis de Lafayatte and General Pulaski, the French and Polish generals, who gave ‘technical assistance’ to the American forces in their independence war against the British. Ballantine was insistent that the United States could no longer afford the isolationism of the nineteenth century, and following the rise of Nazism and Communism the Americans would now realise that the world was a smaller place and the United States’ survival was linked with the ‘well-being of other liberty loving nations.’ The United States is a large and powerful nation, he continued, but not so powerful to exist without the partnership of other democratic nations. That is why, Ballantine concluded, that the Americans should support Robert College in its contribution to the progress of modern Turkey. These views, it seems, had found strong resonance among the US political elites. On the 100th anniversary of the College John F. Kennedy sent a message praising the works of Robert College:
The contribution which RC and the American College for Girls have made to education and American reputation with our friends in the Middle East has provided this nation with a unique reservoir of understanding and good will.95

Likewise Adlai Stevenson, the US representative to the United Nations, underlined the College’s importance for US foreign-policy goals.96 Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, summarised this orientation in a speech he delivered in 1962:

Since WW II cultural undertakings have become a recognized vital component in the conduct of American relations with other people … Only quite recently have we recognized the full importance of any investment in education for growth in our own country and in assisting the development of others … Turkey was the first country to stand up alone against Soviet aggression.97

Investing in education, Ballantine thought, would be ‘the greatest and cheapest’ investment the United States could make to its own security and welfare.98 This move would not be driven out of benevolence only, he underlined, but stem from an obligation incumbent upon every conscious American who felt themselves responsible for the next generations. In another speech he gave before the Amherst College alumni he urged the audience:

The world has been changing and half of the world’s population is exploding out of the 20th century … the fate of our children will be determined today … we need to build a free world where decency and hope prevails.99

The message Ballantine implied found strong resonance and in the words of Alfred Ogden, Chairman of Robert College Board of Trustees, who emphasised Turkey’s decisive position in the fight against Communism and in his proposal to the Olin Foundation he notes:

As a bulwark against communism, Turkey has now become an important factor in World relations. The area which Turkey occupies has been of strategic importance since ancient times, but perhaps never more so than today because she stands in the way of further Soviet expansion towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Premier Adnan Menderes on his recent visit to the United States to attend the CENTO conference made it clear that the Turkish people are determined to maintain that bulwark at all costs.100

Ballantine asserted that the US presence in the Near East was crucial, yet it should be built upon a more efficient basis, which could only be achieved with the strengthening of American institutions in the region.101 In a report presented to the Ford Foundation for the development of the Engineering Faculty he argued that the American schools in Turkey have been ‘the most significant enterprise of any kind … making an influence that no amount of money could buy and no “crash program” could secure’.102 That these colleges have so far served the American interests in a most efficient way, could only have been possible thanks to the acceptance and respect they received within Turkish society.103 These assessments, it seems, were shared by fellow Americans who made similar observations when they visited Turkey. Clarance Randall, the President’s economic adviser, wrote after a trip to Turkey:

The impact of the American education is already great. Everywhere in Turkish government business offices one encounters men trained at century-old Robert College. Americans could have done nothing more enlightened or better calculated to serve the cause of ultimate peace than the establishment of those schools.104

In fact, the College received appreciation from the Turkish politicians, regardless of their political affiliations, content with the College’s work and ethos. Ballantine describes one of his meetings with the Deputy Prime Minister, Fatin Rustu Zorlu, and Governor of Istanbul, a Robert College graduate, where he observed a decline in cultural nationalism
accompanied by strengthening American orientation among the Turkish politicians. Even a few months following the military coup in 1960 which overthrew the Democrat Party rule, Cemal Gursel, who was the head of the military junta, paid a visit to Robert College. Gursel expressed his sympathy with the College, reiterated Turkey’s commitment to the Westernisation and praised Turkish-American partnership. The Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Numan Menemencioğlu, a Robert College graduate, made a similar speech on the hundredth anniversary marking the occasion of the founding of Robert College in 1961.

Ballantine and Ogden drew attention to the contribution of the students of Robert College in the development of Turkey in relation to American interests. In his report to the Board of Trustees, Ogden boasted of the ability of Robert College students to work with the American forces during the Korean War thanks to their language and technical skills. As noted, many of the Turkish military officers had learnt English from Robert College. In addition to these contributions, College members worked as consultants and experts in several Turkish and foreign companies in various fields of engineering and finance. Ballantine also pointed out an on-going project under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme, launched by President Eisenhower in 1953, which proposed the construction of a research reactor in Turkey under the auspices of Robert College and two other Turkish universities. A similar perspective was tangible in the field of economic development, contending that Turkey’s economic development and well-being held the key for its resistance to Soviet expansion. The achievement of the Turkish economy after 1950, Ballantine and Ogden argued, was much to do with the technical know-how and expertise Robert College graduates had provided.

Building highways was an example of this. Ballantine shares the story of Vecdi Diker, a Robert College Engineering graduate, who built highways from Ankara to the Eastern frontier of the country in 1946. These roads were crucial, Ballantine maintains, in that they were the only channels for the Turkish state to transfer military and logistical equipment to the Soviet border. Without this highway, Turkish defence against the Soviets would have been flawed and handicapped. Another example he recounts was regarding Kemal Gulek, a Robert College graduate, Minister of Construction in 1947 and Minister of Transportation in 1948, who proposed to the Council of Ministers a vast programme for social-economic development requiring co-operation with the United States. Gulek managed to convince other ministers of the cabinet reluctant to accept outside assistance of the urgency of American technical aid and to complete this comprehensive programme in collaboration with the United States. These stories confirm, in the words of Peter Frank, chairman of the department of social sciences at Robert College, that the College supplied talented human capital in science, technology and industrial organisation at a time when Turkey needed it most.

In conclusion, Robert College’s long and distinguished history offers more than a sole intellectual enterprise in a foreign geography. Robert College served multiple functions in connecting the two countries suffering from political and intellectual remoteness since the mid-nineteenth century. Professors, members of the administrative boards of the College, and the College graduates introduced valuable intellectual input to Turkey, and at various times they undertook the role of political correspondent or advisor to the diplomatic personnel. This has helped both countries, lacking human resources in guiding their policies in relation to each other, sustain a peaceful and collaborative relationship even at times of crisis and transition. In the post-1945 period the United States realised the centrality of
trained intelligence and economic development in its struggle against Communist ideology. Robert College thus became a key component in their policy-making relevant to the Near East. Turkish politicians, satisfied with the contribution of Robert College to the Westernisation project, considered its presence in Turkey an endorsement to Turkey’s commitment to the Western bloc. Projects run through Robert College made no less impact on Turkish-American relations than the military–financial aid programmes. This model of partnership proved resilient in achieving political ends for both countries during the first half of the twentieth century.

Notes

2. Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri* (Turkish-American relations: a documentary survey), 2–5; Cark, *American Consuls*, 75; the US political elite became more interested in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire during the Greek revolt and the following Russo-Turkish war over Greek independence in the 1820s. Samuelson, “John Quincy Adams’ Lost History of the Russo-Turkish War,” 534.
3. Hamlin (Among the Turks, 28) notes that Goodell first came to Istanbul in 1831. Before then Goodell had first visited Beirut in 1828.
4. Erhan, “Ottoman-American Relations,” 4–6. A strong political current in the United States was isolationism. In a State of Union address on 2 December 1823 the US President James Monroe declared in regard to Europe that the United States would not interfere “in the internal concerns of any of its powers, consider the government de facto as the legitimate government and cultivate friendly relations with it”. Renehan, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 6–9; Brogan, *History of the United States*, 435–8. A rare source of information for the American public on foreign cultures was diplomatic consuls abroad.

19. Gates, *Not To Me Only*, 170; Huntington-Dodge, *The Joy of Service*, 67. Huntington-Dodge narrates John Stewart Kennedy, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Robert College from 1895 to 1909, left US$1.5 Million to the College. For an extensive study on the intellectual atmosphere at Robert College during the late Ottoman period see Orlin Sabev, *Spiritus Roberti*.


23. Altan-Olcay, “Defining America From Distance,” 34.


26. In one of these Enver Pasha visited Gates’ family in the college for a cup of tea and seemed to be quite satisfied with the meeting. Gates, *Not To Me Only*, 223–4.


28. Ibid., 222.


33. Gates, *Not To Me Only*, 229–31, Gates, *Not To Me Only*, 234. In one instance one Turkish and two German officers came to the College to take certain College buildings for a meteorological station, yet again Gates turned this down and soldiers left the buildings.

34. Dodge served as the President of the Board of Trustees from 1909 to 1926.


37. Huntington Dodge, *The Joy of Service*, 130–1; Grabill notes the conflict among the Turkish, Russian and Armenian forces did a lot of damage to the Missionary work so far done in the Eastern Turkey; Grabill, “Cleveland H. Dodge, Woodrow Wilson, and the Near East,” 255.


39. Grabill argues that Cleveland Dodge was the most influential person in shaping US policy toward the Near East during Wilson’s presidency; Grabill, “Cleveland H. Dodge, Woodrow Wilson, and the Near East,” 249.

40. They were classmates at Princeton. Cleveland Dodge was a trustee of Princeton University when Wilson was the University’s President; Huntington-Dodge, *The Joy of Service*, 50; De Novo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East*, 106.


42. She too was a close friend of Wilson’s daughter, Jessie Wilson. Huntington-Dodge, *The Joy of Service*, 87.


46. Gates, *Not To Me Only*, 253


49. Gates describes the change of mood on the Turkish side after the War of Independence; Gates, Not To Me Only, 175–288.

50. Gates, Not To Me Only, 287–9; in his memoirs Joseph Grew explains Admiral Bristol’s mediator role between the Turkish and British sides. Grew, A Turbulent Era, 538–42.


52. The American trade attaché in Istanbul, Gillespie, was appointed as the American consul to Ankara in 1922. Sönmezoğlu, İki Savaş Arasında Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish foreign policy between two wars), 154–5; Grew, A Turbulent Era, 538–42.

53. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kuruluşası (The formation of single party rule in Turkey), 76; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 416–18, 467–73.


56. Huntington-Dodge, The Joy of Service, 170–1. Huntington-Dodge also notes that Mustafa Kemal gave a ball in Ankara and invited the leading men in the city on the condition that everyone would bring with him an unveiled lady.


58. Freely, A History of Robert College, II, 17. In another report to the Board of Trustees, Gates talks about a bewildering rumour: “There is also rumor to the effect that the Turkish Government will in the near future declare itself in favor of Protestantism,” 29.

59. Freely, A History of Robert College, 22. Freely notes that Mustafa Kemal wanted them to start to the College promptly so that they would have as much of the American influence as they could.

60. Freely, A History of Robert College, 18.


62. Scipio, My Thirty Years, 133–4; Karl Terzaghi, renowned soil engineer, taught at RC after the First World War.

63. Edwin Grosvenor, father of Gilbert Hovey Grosvenor who was the President of the National Geographic Society between 1920 and 1954, taught at the RC. http://www.mgmt.boun.edu.tr/images/stories/dokumanlar/leaders/Issue_005/05-005.pdf. Professor Alexander Van Millingen, one of the foremost experts on Byzantine history was among the RC teaching staff between 1881 and 1915.

64. The RC’s contribution to the field of drama and theatre was striking. Professor Ernest Bradlee Watson, instructor of drama and English literature at RC, led the early development of theatre in modern Turkey. Later on the College graduates such as Tunc Yalman, Şirin Devrim, Haldun Dormen and Yıldız Kenter gained a good reputation in the field.


75. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri* (Turkish-American relations), 20–30. Marshall Aid provided a vital resource for the Turkish government to repair the deteriorating trade balance in the country.

76. For an extensive discussion of Turkey's transition to a multi-party regime see Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 138.


80. Robert College Records, Box: 30, File: 3.


83. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 100. The Congress approved “Eisenhower Doctrine” in the same year. Eisenhower visited Turkey in 1959. This was the first visit ever by an American President to Turkey.

84. Rockefeller Foundation released a grant of US$115,000 to Robert College for curriculum development in 1957. John Marshall, assistant director of the humanities division at Rockefeller Foundation, was a frequent visitor of Duncan Ballantine.


86. Freely, *A History of Robert College*, II, 73; Scopio notes that they accepted 50 students at first and then the number rose to 200. Scipio, *My Thirty Years*, 304–7.


88. Aside from the donations of private foundations Robert College received substantial amount of US government funds between 1955 and 1962. Only in 1956 was a grant of US$250,000 requested for student scholarships. For detailed data see Robert College Archives, Boxes 43 and 44.


93. Ballantine, “Propeller Club Talk.”

94. Ballantine, “Propeller Club Talk.”

95. See “Remarks by Adlai Stevenson at Robert College Board of Trustees.”

96. Adlai Stevenson made similar comments: “The purposes of RC are so relevant to our present concern with developing economies that it is difficult to promise too highly the prescience of the dedicated.” See “Remarks by Adlai Stevenson at Robert College Board of Trustees.”

97. “Excerpt From An Address By The Honorable Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State For Far Eastern Affairs. Centennial Dinner of Robert College.”


99. Ballantine, “Address Before the Alumni Association of Amherst College.” In another report he maintains a similar argument: “When we consider the strategic position of Turkey today as a bulwark of democracy, we should make his contribution greater.” Duncan Ballantine, “Report to the Board of Trustees.”

100. Ogden, “A Proposal to the Olin Foundation.” In several reports submitted to the US Congress, Robert College's contribution to US foreign policy was underlined: “We submit that these schools are of paramount importance to the long-range foreign policy of the US;” “Justification for Government Support to American Educational Institutions Abroad.”


102. Ballantine, “Proposal to the Ford Foundation.”
103. Ballantine, “Proposal to the Ford Foundation.” These institutions, Ballantine adds: “By their mission and spirit represent the future of America’s relations with its fellow countries of the World.”
106. Robert College of Istanbul, Turkey: Honors the fast and faces the future centennial 1863–1963. Also see “Message of General Cemal Gürsel, Head of State of the Turkish Republic on the Occasion of the Turkish-American Celebration of April 18th, 1961.”
107. “Speech Delivered by Ambassador Menemencioglu.”
109. Franck, “The Role of Robert College in Turkey’s Economic Life.”
111. Ogden, “Proposal to the Ford Foundation,” 4; Ballantine, “Propeller Club Talk.”
112. See Ballantine, “Scientific and Technical Institutions in Underdeveloped Countries; Ogden, “Proposal to the Ford Foundation.”
113. Ballantine explains that with some help from American engineers this road was built 350 miles across the mountains from Ankara to Erzurum; Ballantine, “Scientific and Technical Institutions in Underdeveloped Countries,” 209.
115. Gulek was also the president of the UN Commission to Korea in 1950; Ogden, “A Proposal to the Olin Foundation.”

Note on contributor

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