PLATONIC STOICISM – STOIC PLATONISM
The Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity

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The "De Wulf-Mansion Centre" is a research centre for ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, B 3000 Leuven (Belgium). It hosts the international project "Aristoteles Latimus" and publishes the "Opera omnia" of Henry of Ghent.
EUDORUS' PSYCHOLOGY AND STOIC ETHICS

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The second book of Stobaeus' Antkologium has often been used as evidence to reconstruct the position of Eudorus of Alexandria and its relation as much to Stoicism as to Platonism. Indeed, if scholars of Stoicism have tried to show how this evidence proves Eudorus' dependence on Stoic doctrines, scholars of Platonism have exploited it to demonstrate Eudorus' key role in the development of Imperial Platonism. That such diverse interpretations are possible is due to the different ways in which Stobaeus' testimony has been used. Indeed, even if the portion of the text that is explicitly attributable to Eudorus appears to hold fundamentally Stoic views, it is also true that cardinal principles of Imperial Platonism, above all homoiostes toi theoi, occur on the following pages, and their origin would otherwise go unexplained.

I will endeavor to show that neither of the two interpretations is fully acceptable. In an attempt to question the legitimacy of "broader" readings of Stobaeus' text, I will simply state that the way Eudorus is referred to in the citations make such readings rather unjustified. For instance, when introducing the passage at issue Stobaeus (or his source) mentions various texts and not only Eudorus' text, while towards the end Stobaeus states his intention to "proceed in the order that to me seems the best".1 Insofar as these assertions introduce a wealth of sources and place an emphasis on the compiler's compositional license, they neither confirm nor refute the suggestion that Eudorus is a strong presence, and they greatly hinder any attempt to delineate clearly the boundaries of his influence. To base one's support for the argument of Eudorus' Platonism on doctrines that are difficult to attribute to him with certainty could easily give rise to dangerous misconceptions. Whilst a solution to these intricate textual disputes has

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1 Stob., Eclog. ii. 42, 5-6 and 45, 7-10 W.-H.

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yet to be delivered, I maintain that it is safer to refer to the section where his name is expressly stated.

On the other hand, this does not mean that Stobaeus’ passage should be read as a proof of Eudorus the Academic’s adherence to Stoicism (at least with respect to ethical and psychological doctrines). And neither does it suggest that he is more of a historian than a philosopher who is primarily concerned with reporting other schools’ doctrines (Stoicism in ethics, Platonism elsewhere) rather than defending any himself. What I propose to demonstrate is that even the sole section expressly attributed to Eudorus is compatible with what we know about Platonism from the early Imperial Age. To this end, it will also be useful to draw comparisons with other testimonies or fragments that may safely be attributed to him. Odd as it may seem, scholars have seldom bothered to compare Stobaeus’ passage with other testimonies relating to Eudorus. However, I hope to be able to prove that only by pursuing this course of action will it be possible to promote a greater understanding of Eudorus’ philosophical personality and of the role he played in the philosophical framework of the early Imperial Age.

1. Eudorus and the doctrine of horne

If we confine ourselves to the part expressly attributed to Eudorus, we do not find much that is new: Eudorus is said to have written a book, worthy of purchase, and presented as διαφορικά τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον, tackling problēmatikos all the issues belonging to the field of knowledge (ἡσποὶ ἃυδρόπο τοῦ Ἀλέξανδρος, Ἀκαδημιακός φιλοσόφων, διαφορικά τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον, βιβλίον ἐξέδοθην, ἐν φίλαις ἐπεξεργάζεται προβληματικάς τῆς ἐπιστήμης). The structure of the text follows the traditional tripartition of ethics, physics, and logic. Without mentioning the latter two parts, Stobaeus or his source

proceeds to make a summary presentation of the section dedicated to ethics:

τοῦ δ’ ἥμισυ τὸ μὲν περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ᾽ ἐκάκωσιν ἁβικας, «Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ορμήν», τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν πραξίαν. Ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἀδρομορία τῆς ἡσποῆς εἰδῶν, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ διαπράσας τὴν ἁβικαν τῶν πράγματος ὑπὲρ αἰρεθῆσας μέλλουσαν, εὐθείᾳ γὰρ εἰς τὸ γένοις τῆς ἁμήν εὐλογοῦν, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· ἡ τειρίῳ δ’ ἐστὶν περισκεφήν τῶν πράγματος καὶ οἷον ἔπικρισις κατὰ τὸν περὶ αὐτού λογισμῶν. ἔστησεν δὲ τὸ τὴν ὀρμήν τοῦ περιορισθῆναι καλῶς ἐπιβάλει· τρίτον τὸ τὴν πράξην αὐτός ἐπισυνάγει. Ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τοῦ ἰδικοῦ λόγου θεωρητικῶν, ὁρμητικῶν, πρακτικῶν.

Of ethics one part refers to the study of the value of each thing, a second part refers to the impulse, and the third to action. These are the general species of ethics: first to consider the value of the act we are going to choose; for it is not possible that the impulse becomes reasonable, if it is not preceded by theory; theory is an investigation of the act and a sort of decision in accordance with the reasoning of it. Second is the successful addition of the impulse to what has been considered; third the attachment of action to them. These are the first parts of the ethical discourse: theoretic, hermetic, practical (Stob., Eclog. ii, 42, 13-23 w.-H. = Τ 1 Mazzarelli).

The above citation is followed by a lengthy series of subsections that divide the first ethical tripartition (theoria, horne, praxis). Despite its conciseness, Stobaeus’ account is not devoid of interest – neither in terms of the language employed nor of its contents. The text has a clear tripartite structure: theory comes first and amounts to an evaluation of the choices to be made; based on this evaluation, it is then a question of adjusting the impulse, and from these two processes, theoria and impulse, action springs forth.

An element that steadfastly commands attention is the strong likeness with Stoicism, whose vocabulary is constantly drawn on. Most of all, it is the focus on horne, a key aspect of Stoic doctrine that is thrice repeated in about as many sentences, which is the most telling piece of evidence. Nonetheless, despite employing language that is largely reliant on Stoicism, Eudorus’ doctrine presents a number of significantly different traits. The most conspicuous divergence is the following: Stobaeus’ account seems to

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(^2 Besides Stobaeus, Eudorus is referred to as Academic also by the Anonymous Commentator on Aratus’ Phaenomena and Simplicius (Anon., Instr. in Arat. 6, 96, 24 Maas = Τ 11 Mazzarelli, Simpl., In Cat. 187, 10 = Τ 16 M.). The examples of Antiochus, Plutarch, and the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus show that the use of “Academic” did not necessarily imply an exclusive commitment to the sceptical Academy, but rather described the entire tradition stemming from Plato; cf. Bonazzi (2003), 208-211. It is in this broader context that Eudorus belongs.

(^3 Stob., Eclog. ii, 42, 7-10 w.-H. (Τ 1 M.). The employment of third person verbs for Eudorus (ἐπεξευθεῖτε, ἑπετασία) and first person verbs for the compiler shows that this passage is better taken as a testimony than as a proper fragment.

(^4 Stob., Eclog. ii, 41, 11-13 w.-H. Remarkably, the order of the tripartition is the same as that which Antiochus claims to draw from Plato – cf. Cic., Ac. 19 with Dillon (1977), 69 and Prost (2001b), 245; contra Barnes (1989) –, whereas for the Stoics it was of prime importance to start with logic, as Babut (2005), 73-76, rightly observes.

(^5 Dorrie/Baltes (1996), 212-213, convincingly list many dissimilarities. Yet, apropos of the order between horne and theoria, Baltes’ claim that for the Stoics the latter comes only after action is contradicted by texts such as d.L., vii, 108. I will try to show that the difference between Eudorus and the Stoics lies elsewhere.
the soul contemplates the joint presence of impulse and reason within the
hegemonikon, but it is just as true that the Stoics' traditional thesis explains
the mechanism of human action by articulating the process as a sequence
of presentation—assent—impulse—action; impulse follows rational assent
and does not antagonize it. 3) But for Eudorus' theoria and horne always
appear to be separate and coexisting, as is also gleaned from the plural
autois that follows straight afterward: the action is derived from the
combination of these two, of theoria and horne (τριτήν τὴν πρῶτην ἀυτοῖς ἐπισκέψαι),
and not from mere impulse, which is in turn the outcome of the rational assent
to a presentation.

If this reading is correct, then the juxtaposition of two different motivational
forces, theoria and horne, would come to the fore in the passage, and
horne would take on a meaning that is closer to the Platonic and Aristotelian
sense than to the Stoic. 10 Among other passages, the most persuasive
similarities are found in the Magna Moralis, where the ethical theory is
expressly made to depend on the sum total of two factors, logos and irrational
horne: impulses arise first, until reason intervenes causing good deeds to
be done. The virtuous action is born out of the cooperation between logos and
the natural impulse, but when this cooperation does not occur, passions
do not necessarily follow reason and they may well defy it. 11 Even in
the case of Eudorus, then, the issue would be to render the horne eulogos

7 This third sentence distinguishes Eudorus' doctrine from another version
of Stoic theory of action, according to which there is a preliminary impulse before
assent, the sequence being: preliminary impulse—assent—rational impulse—
action (Cic., De fato 40; Sen., Ep. 113, 18 and De ira II, 1-4; cf. also PLUT., Adv.
Col. 26). The origin of such a doctrine is controversial, cf. IPPOLITO (1987), 458-461
and INWOOD (1993), 166 n. 29 and 175 n. 48. In any case, this doctrine insists
on the temporal complexity of soul processes and not on its parts or powers,
this theory involves a monistic psychology (INWOOD [1993], 175-176), which is distinct
from Eudorus' dualism.
8 Remarkably horne, though usually considered as distinctively Stoic, is repea-
tedly used by Plato and Aristotle: e.g., PLAT., Phaedr. 279a9, Resp. 436b2, 581b1;
Leg. 866e6 (παραχωρια τῆς ὁρμῆς γενομένης). Ep. VII, 325e1 (πολύς μετον ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ
ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ κοινά); Def. 413c9 (βουλής [. . .] ὁρμῆς εὐλογος); ARTIST, ETH. EUJ. II, 8,
1224a5-30 (παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμῆν [. . .] οὐ γὰρ ἢ δὲ ὁρμῆς καὶ τὸ ὁρμῶμα ἐμφανίζεται); VIII,
2, 1247b18-19 (ἐπὶ δὲ ἐκείνῳ ὁρμῆ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῆς ἀμὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς, αὐτῆς δὲ ἀπὸ ὁμοσλογίας)
and 29-30; cf. also ETH. NIC. 1, 13, 1102β10-21 (ἐπὶ ταύτην γὰρ ἐν ὁρμῆ τῶν ἄρσεων), Pol. 1, 1253β29.
9 MM II, 8, 1206b9-29; see also I, 35, 1198β7 (ὥρμῃ ἀληγος); I, 35, 1197β9; II, 3,
1199β38-1200α1 (ὥρμῃ ἀληγος); I, 35, 1198β7-8; II, 3, 1200α4-5 (ὥρμῃ φυσικᾳ) and
DONINI (1965), 181-185, 225-227, as well as VANDER WAERDT (1965), 291-297.

5 In other words, one may object that γένεσθαι τὴν ὁρμήν εὐλογον might also be
read as "that a reasonable impulse is generated". If this were the case, Eudorus
wouldn't diverge much from the Stoics, because his doctrine would display a
theoria evolving into impulse. In themselves both readings are plausible. But since
the next phrase presupposes horne as a power distinct from theoria by stating that
impulse should be added to theoria, it is more correct to adopt a reading compatible
with the distinction between theoria and horne, which is also found in the first
sentence. Interestingly, eulogos horne describes one of the three Stoic eupatheias,
bouleia, as opposed to epitymhma, an abgos orixis, cf. SVF 3, 431 f.; STOB., ECLAG. 11,
86-87 W.-H. But a similar definition also occurs in the pseudo-Platonic Definitions
(413c9), and this suggests that it did not have to be taken as uniquely distinctive
of Stoicism; see also below n. 10.
as a non-rational part adjusted to reason; *eulogos* would come to mean that which obeys reason – from an ethical standpoint this could imply being moderate and restrained.\(^{12}\)

What emerges, then, is a complex relationship – marked by dependency but also by transformation – with Stoicism. The language used is certainly shaped by the Stoics’ technical jargon. Indeed, a number of parallels on this subject could be made with other Stoics of the time.\(^{13}\) There is no denying the bond with Stoicism. Yet, as the case of *horme* shows, there are also significant differences in the way certain concepts are deployed, which may possibly reflect Platonic and Aristotelian usage. Under the guise of a dependency on Stoicism, a framework seems to come to the fore in which Platonism also plays a key role.

How shall we judge Eudorus’ position and his interest in mediating between Stoic doctrines and Plato (as well as Aristotle)? As I will try to show, within the philosophical context of the 1st century BC, Eudorus’ use of Stoic terms does not imply a leaning towards Stoicism. Rather it is better understood as a partisan attempt that aims to appropriate doctrines supposedly distinctive of Stoicism in order to vindicate the centrality of Platonism. As we will see, Eudorus is not the only Platonist to adopt such a strategy against the Stoics in the early Imperial Age. But, before considering Eudorus’ relationship with the other Platonists of his time, we have to deal with another complex problem regarding late Hellenistic Stoicism.

2. Panaetius, Posidonius, Eudorus

The considerations outlined above generally refer to a comparison with Stoicism, as if it represented a single and consistent body of thought throughout the centuries. Indeed in the late Hellenistic Age, between the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, Stoic philosophy is believed to have undergone an intense process of transformation at the hands of its leading authorities,

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\(^{12}\) As LONG (1996a), 126 notes, Eudorus’ taxonomy of ethical topics removes impulse from the primary position it used to have in Stoic classification. One might suggest that this too depends on a dualistic doctrine in the sense that Eudorus deals first with the rational part and then introduces impulse and passions.

\(^{13}\) Cf. in particular Seneca’s *Letter* 89, which introduces a similar (though not identical) tripartition to the one we find in Stobaeus’ account of Eudorus (*inspectio, de impetu, de actionibus*) and seems to uphold the reading of *eulogos*: *primum enim est ut quanti guidque sit judex, secundum ut impetu ad illa capias ordinatum et temperatum (Ep. 89, 14 = 568 l.5); see also Epic., Diss. III, 2, 1-5 (= 56C 13): δ’ απις τας άρσις και σφάρας και άπλιος τ’ απις τ’ ανθρωπίνων, ινα ταξις, ινα εμπληκωτως, ινα μη αμελως. On the possibility of using these texts as evidence for Eudorus, see the rightly cautious observations of DÖRRIE/BALTES (1996), 212 following DÖRRIE (1976), 303 n. 1.

Panaetius and Posidonius. It was against their brand of Stoicism that Eudorus had to measure himself. Eudorus’ understanding of the philosophy of the two main Stoics of his time is tellingly confirmed by the testimonies in our possession, which expressly place him in relation to the two Stoics on a number of different issues.\(^{14}\) This adds even further interest to the possibility of a comparison in relation to the issues debated in Stobaeus’ passage. After all, one of the most innovative elements of the two philosophers raised actually deals with the problem of moral psychology. For both Panaetius and Posidonius are said to have at least partly rejected Chrysippos’ cognitivistic theory, in which emotions are considered to be judgments, and so hark back to the Platonic-Aristotelian model that also contemplated the existence of non-rational parts of the soul.\(^{15}\)

A few passages from Cicero’s *De officiis*, an essay owing much to Panaetius’ teaching, are crucially important in this respect. Panaetius’ influence has prompted many scholars to regard a particular passage as a testimony of his philosophy, wherein a bipartition of the soul is expressly laid out that associates *horme* with the non-rational part, in contrast to the rational part:

*Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posit: est, quae est, bροφι, graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapiat, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque sit.*

Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is, *bροφι*, in Greek), which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be left undone (Cic., *De off. I*, 101 = Τ 122 Alesse; trans. Miller).\(^{16}\)

The similarities with Eudorus are striking in this text. Posidonius’ case is no less interesting. In Galen’s famous account Posidonius is in fact supposed to have abandoned the unitary concept of the soul, thereby restoring the teaching of the Ancients (*palatios logos*) – Plato as well as Pythagoras and

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\(^{14}\) Cf. T 10-11 M.; besides, Eudorus displays acquaintance also with Posidonius’ disciple Diodorus of Alexandria (Τ 9 M.).


\(^{16}\) Cf. also what follows: *Nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive figiendo non scitis a ratione retinuatur, it sine dubio finem et modum transeunt* (Cic., *De off. I*, 103 = Τ 123 Alesse). *De off. I*, 132 (Τ 121 A., = 331 l.3) is less significant, since *motus* was perfectly compatible with Stoic doctrine (*SVF 1.22-23, 2.458, 3.169 and 377*); cf. PROST (2001a), 45.
Aristotle – in clear opposition to Chrysippus. His distinction between *to theoreitikon* and affective motions (*pathetike kinesis, pathetike holke, to pathetikon*) could well have influenced in turn Eudorus’ distinction between *theoria* and *horne.*

In recent years, however, much criticism has been leveled against such reconstructions of both Panaetius’ and Posidonius’ theories. In the first case, there are issues primarily of a historical and textual nature. Panaetius undoubtedly showed great interest in Plato, but his appreciation by no means implies that he had dropped the core doctrines of his school, such as *horne* and psychological monism, which it is closely associated with. Confronted with these facts and lacking a clear statement on the matter, it is wiser to refrain from attributing to Panaetius such a non-Stoic theory as the one associating *horne* with irrational impulses. Moreover, it should be noted that this doctrine would appear to clash with the theory of the soul that is drawn from other accounts explicitly bearing Panaetius’ name. A significant passage is found in *Tuscullane Disputationes* (i, 79-80):

Are we then to believe Panaetius when he disagrees with his revered Plato (a Platonist su dissidentiis)? For whilst he calls him at every mention of his philosopher the wisest, the most saintly of men, the Homer of philosophers, he yet fails to approve of this one opinion of his about the immortality of the soul. [...] He alleges next as his second proof that there is nothing sensible of pain without being also susceptible of sickness; all, however, that is subject to disease, will also perish; now souls are sensible to pain, therefore they also perish (*nihil esse quod dolore quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum: dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire*). These arguments can be refuted. For they show his ignorance of the fact that, when a statement is made about the eternity of the souls, it is made about the mind which is always free from disorderly impulse, and not about those parts of us which are subject to the attacks of distress, anger, and lust, and that Plato, against whom his arguments are directed, regards as remote and isolated from the mind (*sunt enim ignorantia, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de mente dici, quae omnibus turbidum motu semper vacet, non de partibus ipsis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque versentur, quas is, contra quem haec dicuntur, semotae a mente et discussa putat*; trans. King).

The rebuttal of such a fundamental thesis as that of the immortality of the soul clearly shows how an interest in and a favorable inclination towards Plato do not imply a deferential approach. Conversely, the concession to Plato depends on his compatibility with Stoic doctrines. This clearly becomes apparent in the case of the soul, which Panaetius believed to be corporeal in agreement with the Stoic tradition. At this stage, without delving into the issues concerning the survival of the soul, it should be noted that Panaetius’ argument in *Tusc. disp.* i, 79 presupposes a unitary conception of the soul. The argument that the entire soul is subject to pain corresponds to the theme of the *pathetike soul* (*dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire*); yet saying that *pathos* concerns the entire soul and not merely a part of it is typical of the monistic Stoic doctrine. As Cicero’s reply shows, this conception clashes with the bipartite psychology of Platonists. The dualism is actually introduced to defend Plato’s conception against Panaetius.

Problems of an equally sensitive nature are found with regard to Posidonius. Over the last few years, scholars have repeatedly and understandably raised doubts concerning the credibility of Galen’s account and his polemical attempt to interpret Posidonius against Chrysippus. Other

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17 Cf. fr. 169, 79 (*to theoreitikon*) 80 (*pathetike holke*), 84 (*pathetikon*), 102 (*pathetike kinesis*) Edelstein-Kidd (= Galen. *PV* v, 5, 21); on *pathetikon* cf. also fr. 166 (= v, 6, 31, 33, 36) and 158, 1 e.-k. (= iv, 286, 9). Less useful is the occurrence of *logistikos* in Galen. *PH* v, 5, 4 (= fr. 187 e.-k.), since it is disputed whether it was used by Posidonius himself or if it was attributed to him by Galen; cf. Tieleman (2003), 68 and 233.


19 On Panaetius and *horne* the only explicit evidence is Nemesisus (*De nat. hom.* 15, 72, 9-11 Morani = T 125 A.), who is unfortunately far from being clear on the subject of *horne*, since the occurrence of the word seems to depend more on Nemesisus than on Panaetius; cf. Alessi (1997), 159-261. In any case it is clear that in this testimony impulse doesn’t appear as a separate source of emotion alongside reason, and it is therefore compatible with Stoic doctrine; cf. Tieleman (2001), § 4.


21 Another parallel might be detected in *De off.* ii, 18, attributed to Panaetius in part (= fr. 89 van Straaten) or entirely (T 60 A.). Nevertheless, leaving aside the problem of attribution, the similarities of this text with Eudorus are more apparent than real; cf. Alessi (1997), 194-195 with further bibliography. Rather *De off.* ii, 18 can be paralleled with the distinction among theoretical, ethical, and practical virtues we find in Stob., *Eclag.* ii, 51, 3-4; cf. Giusta (1964), 152 and (1967), 29-30.

22 Cf. *T* 146 A.: Panaetius proposed to expunge the *Phaedo* from Plato’s dialogues because of its insistence on the soul’s immortality.


24 Cf. also Alcin., *Did.* 178, 24-32.

sources at hand speak consistently of Posidonius’ loyalty to the doctrines of his school on a broad range of topics. In Galen’s case, a careful reading of his pages reveals a significant discrepancy between the passages by Posidonius that Galen quotes and the conclusions Galen feels entitled to draw. An in-depth analysis of Galen’s account would require much more space than is presently available here. However, if we confine ourselves to the more topical issues, we can notice how the fragments expressly attributed to the Stoic thinker do not necessarily harbour beliefs that conflict with traditional Stoic doctrine.

A first point not to be underestimated is that Posidonius, as other Stoics, maintains that the soul is corporeal. According to Plutarch’s testimony in his treatise On the Generation of the Soul, Posidonius is said to have attempted to submit a corporeal interpretation of Plato’s psychology. If paralleled with Galen’s evidence, Plutarch’s text shows that the pathetikon cited by both Galen and Plutarch, and the kindred concepts of pathetikai kinesis and pathetikai holkai (recurring frequently in Galen) do not apply to non-rational parts of the soul, but refer to the soul’s passive side and its reliance on corporeality. The conceptual sphere of pathetikon indicates the bond of dependence between the soul and outer influences, when the former does not possess sufficient compactness and consistency (tonos). Therefore, Posidonius’ psychology does not contemplate a bipartite psychological model, juxtaposing an irrational part to the rational part, but builds on a mind/body duality in terms of a psychophysical reality that is wholly compatible with the ‘orthodox’ Stoic doctrine.

To this extent, if this reconstruction is correct, it follows that Posidonius did not reject the doctrine of impulse. Insofar as pathetikai kineses are associated with the passive dimension of corporeity, they do not alter the Stoic theory of action. One must be careful not to mistake pathetikai kineses (or pathetikai holkai) with the actual affection itself, pathos, which is when the soul is weak and affective motons, associated with experiences such as pleasure and pain, cause a positive (or negative) value to be assigned to a neutral object and encourage the making of false opinion, hence a passion (pathos). Indeed, for a passion to come into being, the soul must asent to a presentation. Both pathos and, more generally, horkse, stem from rational activity. This argument ultimately surfaces after several hints by Galen. Specifically, the dependence of pathos on assent is implied in the definition of pathos as pleonazousa sugkaththesis, where sugkaththesis replaces horkse. And also in the famous and controversial passage in v 5.21 Galen admits that according to Posidonius pathe (and therefore impulses) all depend upon false opinions and assumptions (haplopeises, kriseis), and so upon an assent by the rational power. Regardless of Galen’s ambiguities, Posidonius’ allegiance to the Stoic doctrine of horkse is clearly testified by Diogenes Laerius, who cites him along with Zeno, Cleanthes, Hecaton, and Chrysippus, as well as by two accounts of Lactantius and Pseudo-Plutarch. Whether Posidonius may or may not have introduced some changes or corrections to the Stoic theory it is a controversial point, but the bedrock of his doctrine remains faithful to Chrysippine theory.

all forms of organic natural life reflect their specific psychophysical character and state.

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20 Cf. Cic., Tusc. disp. 11, 61 (= T 38), De fin. 1, 6 (= T 33a), Hort. fr. 18 (= T 33), Sen., Ep. 33, 4 (= T 54), 108, 38 (= T 55), 87, 31-40 (= T 170), 83, 9-11 (= T 175). Gal., PHP V, 6, 4-5 (= 187 E-K). Significantly, Diogenes Laeritus often attributes Posidonius as one of the most authoritative representatives of the Stoic tradition (VII, 39, 40, 41, 54, 60, 157), and so does Arios; see Viano (2005), 343.


23 Tieleman (2003), 211-212.

24 Cf. also the telling mention of the Chrysippine image (Galen, PHP IV, 2, 14-18 = SVF 3,466) of the runners in IV, 3, 4-5 (= fr. 34, 18-20 E-K): τό κελευτερούς: τόν δρόμον άμετά πέρα της προσφέρεσας άλουζ ή αντία, τό βάρος τον σώματος.

25 Cf. svf 3,473 (= 1,6 657 = Galen. PHP IV, 6, 2-3), with Sedley (1993), GILL (2005), 458: ‘[T]he core point of the theory may be seen as being [...] that the reactions of...
namely that passions, as much as impulses, depend upon judgment, and are activities of reason.

Posidonius’ allegiance to his school has major consequences also for our view of his relation to Plato (as well as Pythagoras and Aristotle). The fact that Posidonius was an admirer of Plato is confirmed beyond doubt by many ancient writers. ²⁸ Yet admiration does not entail unconditional support; in some cases we know that Posidonius did not spare Plato any criticism,²⁹ whilst Plutarch’s aforementioned account from De an. proo. clearly shows that Posidonius’ main intent was to prove Plato’s compatibility with Stoicism. This approach is also well suited to the passages we have been discussing. Contrary to what Galen would have us believe, it was not Posidonius who shifted from Stoic horne to Plato’s psychic faculties, but it was Plato (in Posidonius’ view) who anticipated the Stoic doctrine of horne with his doctrine of faculties. ⁴⁰

So what is the state of things with respect to Eudorus? Clearly the juxtaposition of such widely diverging interpretations hampers any attempt to assess Eudorus’ position. However, a few remarks can be made on at least a couple of points. The first concerns horne. Panaetius and Posidonius appear to have remained faithful to Stoic doctrine, whereas fundamental differences on this matter are to be found in Eudorus’ approach, who attributed an original value to horne unlike the one assigned to it by traditional Stoic doctrine. The second point deals with the rank held by Panaetius and Posidonius within Stoic tradition and their relation to Plato. As one can easily note, a key issue, which is clearly a distinguishing mark of Panaetius and Posidonius, consists in their novel interest in Plato (and Aristotle). Through Panaetius and Posidonius the Stoics experienced a renewed interest in Plato, Aristotle (and even Pythagoras).⁴¹ But such recasting of Platonic and Aristotelian theories in the more up-to-date terminology of Stoicism⁴² neither implies a presumed leaning towards Platonism nor can be construed as surrendering to Platonism. Despite their concessions, both Panaetius and Posidonius continued to be regarded as the leading figures of the Stoic school. This rekindled interest in Plato’s thought has to be regarded as an attempt to prove his underlying convergence with Stoicism, and it is also clear that an approach of this kind, in which Plato (and Aristotle) were touted as imperfect forerunners of theories that would later be successfully wrought and enhanced by Zeno and Chrysippus, aimed at claiming possession of Platonism and bending it to the needs of Stoicism.⁴³ So much for Stoicism. This obviously carries some consequences for Eudorus, but first it is necessary to evaluate the Platonist position.

3. Eudorus and the rebirth of Platonism

If we turn to the Platonists we easily and repeatedly find what we miss in Stoicism: horne appears with reference to the irrational part of the soul – horne within the context of a dualistic psychology. Due to a lack of space I will not discuss all the passages but I will select the more interesting ones. Indeed, one text has been already introduced – the Ciceronian De officiis 1.101. If neither Panetius nor Posidonius can lay claim to it, this text ought to be clearly ascribed to the Platonic-Academic tradition – the same tradition, after all, which Cicero claimed to subscribe to. In any case, De officiis 1.101 is not the only Ciceronian text to entail a dualistic psychology. Along with the De officiis account, one of the most important passages is found in Book Four of Tusculanae disputationes:⁴⁴

Quoniam, quae Graeci vocant πάθη, nobis perturbationes appelari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas partes dividit: alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi.

Since we would rather call “disturbances” rather than “diseases” what the Greeks call πάθη, I will clarify the concept by adopting the time-tested classification devised by Pythagoras, and later taken on by Plato. These thinkers imagined a twofold soul, and believe that one part is endowed with reason and the other is devoid of it. They place tranquility, a state of sweet and restful balance, in the part endowed with reason, and

³⁸ Cf. T. 91, t. 95-102 e.-k.
³⁹ Fr. 178 e.-k. (= Sen., Ep. 94, 38) on the Laws, elsewhere appreciated.
⁴⁰ TIELEMAN (2003), 204-205, 219 and 226.
⁴¹ BARNES (1991b), 120, argues that the Stoic school had always been interested in Plato since Zeno and Chrysippus. Generally speaking this is correct, but it would be better to distinguish between a philosophical interest (a philosophical interest in Plato had always been present in Stoicism) and a historiographical interest (whose importance grows especially since Antipater in the context of school polemics against the sceptical Academy).
⁴² GILL (2005), 463.
⁴³ TIELEMAN (2003), 208-209.
⁴⁴ The two texts date from the same period at the end of Cicero’s life, between summer 45 BC and autumn 44 BC.
in the other they place the unruly motions set forth by anger and desire which are contrary and hostile to reason (Cic., Tusc. disp. iv, 10).

More so than in the other passage, the above reference to Pythagoras and Plato spells out the connection to the Platonic tradition more so than to Stoicism.44 The bond with Platonism is no less manifest elsewhere in Tusc. culaeae disputationes, as for example the parallels in i 20, i 80 and ii 47 show.45 But again, side-by-side with the Platonic reference, the terminology and the concepts that are used rely on Stoicism, which one can infer by the term constantia (the Ciceronian translation for the Stoic eupatheia), by the description of pathos as a motion, and probably by the use of tranqulitatis for translating euthymia.46 Just as Stobaeus and De off. i, 101 show, this passage further reveals an essentially Platonic doctrine dressed in Stoic garb. The parallel with Tusc. disp. iv, 10 represents a pivotal moment in the reconstruction of the historical and philosophical context Eudorus operated in.47

Sadly, though, it is hard to pinpoint with certainty the source that may have influenced Cicero. One of the most significant results achieved by scholarship in recent years has been to stress the Latin writer's outstanding originality insofar as he was always capable of mastering the sources and debates among philosophical schools and adapting them to the needs and interests of the Roman world. The zeal with which scholars have tracked down those authors Cicero was thought to have slavishly plagiarized, to the extent of attributing the philosophical content of his writing to them, has often brought about serious errors of perspective. Such errors have in

44 In what follows Cicero overtly distinguishes the Platonic-Pythagorean source (fons) from the subsequent Stoic doctrine, where he will adopt Stoic terms and doctrines (Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus; IV, 11); cf. LEVY (1992), 474-475.
45 Tusc. disp. 1, 20: Plato triplici, finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce possit, et duas partes parere voluit, inam et cupiditatem, quas suis locis, inam in pectore, cupiditatem super praecordia locavit; Tusc. disp. 1, 80 (cf. supra, p. 116); Tusc. disp. ii, 47: quasi duo sumus, ut alter imperet, alter pareant! [...] est enim animus in partis tributus duas, quorum altera rationis est participes, altera experit. Cum igitur praecipiant, ut nobismet ipsis imperemus, hoc praecipitum, ut ratio coercet temeritatem.
46 Cf. TIELEMAN (2003), 293-294.
47 Indeed, the connection is even more persuasive if the link between Tusc. disp. iv, 10 and the use of horne in relation to the soul's irrational part in De off. i, 101 is held to be correct, as I am inclined to believe. One additional problem is the legitimacy of Cicero's simultaneous use of both Platonist and Stoic doctrines. TIELEMAN (2003), 247, rightly observes that Cicero's overriding moral purposes can explain how he could feel justified in reconciling such different psychological models; cf. also Tusc. disp. iv, 6 and 9.

turn unjustly warranted the most widely divergent interpretations. Faced with these hurdles, and unwilling to add further confusion to the already muddled world of Quellenforschung, it is however still possible to make out the conceptual framework the above mentioned passages can probably be traced back to. Insofar as their dependence on Stoic sources cannot be proven beyond doubt, these passages ought to be clearly ascribed to the Platonic-Academic tradition – the same tradition, after all, which Cicero claimed to subscribe to.48 It seems that an agreement may at least be reached on this point, from which it follows that Eudorus' position does not represent a unicum in the philosophical context of the 1st century BC.

Is it possible to narrow down the source that is thought to have inspired Cicero? A likely candidate is certainly Antiochus, even though this argument is hard to prove conclusively for the reasons given above and due to a lack of explicit references. Antiochus is well known as a rather complex figure; certainly he was interested in comparing Stoicism and Platonism, although the purpose of this comparison remains unknown and scholars disagree as to what his philosophical position was. For my part, I assume that Antiochus has to be regarded neither as a hidden Stoic nor as an anti-Stoic Platonist, but as a Platonist concerned with integrating and subordinating Stoicism into what he takes Platonism to be (Plato and the Old Academy up to the scholarchate of Polemo, as well as Aristotle and some other Peripatetics) by dismissing the supposed Stoic innovations as merely verbal. Briefly, his aim is to recast certain Stoic doctrines in a Platonic context in order to reaffirm Platonism's superiority over Stoicism.49 In other words, it is a strategy parallel but opposed to the one pursued by Panaetius and Posidonius.

An account from Cicero's Academica, this time expressly attributable to Antiochus, appears to confirm this interpretation for the very issues under discussion. In the surviving part of the second version of Academica, Varro expands on the philosophy of his teacher Antiochus, stressing its differences with Stoicism. Despite the many points of agreement, one of Zeno's most serious mistakes in the field of ethics actually concerns his treatment of virtues:

\begin{quote}
Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationes expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his guidem [sic. Zeno] adsentiebatur, nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabant et opiniones iudicio suscipi.
\end{quote}

48 On these issues cf. particularly LEVY (1992), 472-485.
49 I argue for this interpretation in BONAZZI (2007b).
and whereas the older generation said that these emotions were natural and non-rational, and placed desire and reason in different parts of the soul, he did not agree with these doctrines either, for he thought that even emotions were voluntary and were experienced owing to a judgement of opinion (Ac. 39; trans. Rackham).

As the last sentence clearly illustrates, the underling charge criticizes the claim that all the affections of the soul should be confined to the rational and hegemonic part of the soul; the Stoics' excessive rigour on matters of virtue stems from their excessively narrow notion of the soul. An explicit reference to horne is lacking in Ac. 38-39, but the passage points out that the fundamental divergence lies in the different manner of understanding the soul in relation to emotions. According to Antiochus and the veteres, emotions cannot just be the result of the iudicium (κρίσις) of a merely rational soul, because the structure of the soul is different and it also possesses a non-rational part (aliaque in parte [...] alia). The analogies with other Ciceronian passages in De off. I, 101 and Tusc. disp. IV, 10-11, as also with Eudorus, are more than eloquent on this point.

Another interesting case is that of pseudo-Pythagorean literature. One of the reasons behind these apocryphal writings is undoubtedly to be found in the desire to ascribe to Pythagoreanism doctrines belonging to other schools, thereby claiming a first rank position in the history of philosophy for Pythagoras and his tradition. To this end, one strategy was to include in the treatises technical terms that were easily attributable to other philosophies. After all, such attempts could feature conciliatory as well as polemical intentions. The most manifest example of a conciliatory approach regards Platonism, namely the adoption of Platonic terminology and theories to underscore the strong link between the two traditions. A similar case is that of Aristotelianism. Conversely, the appropriation of terminology from other schools has sometimes sought to highlight fundamental and irreconcilable differences, as if to allege that these schools had actually misrepresented and betrayed the true teachings of Pythagoreanism. Such is the case with Stoicism, as the use of horne tellingly reveals.\textsuperscript{51} The noun horne and the verb horman do not occur too frequently but, when they do, they refer to the irrational part of the soul – within the context of a dualistic-type psychology.\textsuperscript{52} The most important passage is contained in the treatise attributed to Meteopos:

\begin{quote}
ετει γαρ τον μερων τας ψυχας δος τα πρατα, το μεν λογιστικον το δε ἀλογον και λογιστικων μην, της κρινωμεν και θεωκωμες ἀλογον δε, της ὀρμωμεν και ἀρεγώμεθα.
\end{quote}

Since the soul is indeed twofold, there being a rational and an irrational part, and whereas the rational enables us to pass judgment and make considerations, with the irrational we have impulses and appetites (ps.-Metop., De virt. 117, 12-14 Thesleff).\textsuperscript{53}

Besides horne, it is noteworthy that also logistikon and the verbs krino and theoreo represent a significant: parallel between Stoicism and Eudorus' account. Quite aside from Stobaeus' passage, many significant points in common are generally known to exist in the surviving accounts between Eudorus and pseudo-Pythagorean literature.\textsuperscript{54}

The relationship between Platonism and Pythagoreanism leads us to the writings of Plutarch of Chaeronea, a philosopher living some decades after Eudorus. Setting aside the issue of Stobaeus' source, Plutarch is the first writer to quote Eudorus. With regard to the issues treated here, the most important text is clearly De virtute moralis. The discussion in this text is conducted with distinctive terms drawn from Stoic vocabulary. Amongst others, horne appears in several occurrences with a clear and polemical reference to the doctrine of the Sota.\textsuperscript{55} Yet, in the same way as it was presented in the pseudo-Pythagorean writings, its meaning is altered by being associated with the irrational part of the soul; horne is the irrational impulse that makes action possible, and must be moderated by reason (την δε ροην το παθει ποιει το θησον, λογιστημεν οριζοντος, όπως μετρει παρη και μεθευραβαλα μη αγκαταληπτον και ναιρον, "the impulsion of passion springs from moral virtue, but it needs reason to keep it within moderate bounds and to prevent its exceeding or falling short of its proper season", 444B, trans. Helmbold; cf. also 450B).\textsuperscript{56} In the following centuries this concept would enjoy a certain degree of popularity, as illustrated by the parallel in Didaskalikon, an introductory manual with no great claim to originality.

\textsuperscript{51} In general, see Moraux (1984), 642-666.
\textsuperscript{52} Cf. e.g. Theages, 190, 7-11, Aresias, 49, 2-5, ps.-Tim., De univ. nat. 222, 5-20 Thesleff.
\textsuperscript{53} See also 118, 1-5 and ps.-Archyt., De educat. eth. 43, 14.
\textsuperscript{54} Compare particularly Eud., T 3 (= Simpl., In Phys. 18, 7-30) with ps.-Archyt., De princ.: Bonazzi (2005), 152-160.
\textsuperscript{55} Plut., De virt. mor. 441C, 444B-C, 444E, 444F-445A, 446E, 447A, 449C, 450E, 451A; see also at 452C hormena.
\textsuperscript{56} See also De gen. Socr. 588E-589D. In general, on the anti-Stoic context of this polemic, cf. Babut (1969), 9-13.
where the impulsive faculty in man, to hornetikon, corresponds to the passionate part, to thymoides (ἡ δὲ ὑποθήκη εἰς τὸ θυμοιζόντα 178, 45-46).57

Plutarch's account is also very interesting from a historiographical standpoint. Unlike pseudo-Pythagorean literature that clearly could not quote its adversaries expressly, Plutarch ascribed the recognition of pathos, in order to exploit it likewise in a dualistic context.59 Aspasia (to whom we owe the account of Andronicus, and who on another occasion quotes Eudorus) seems to have headed in the same direction, and undertaken to make a connection to Pythagoras.60 Pierluigi Donini has rightly spoken of "constant interference and willful contamination" between the Platonic and Peripatetic schools.61

If we compare all these texts and philosophers we can easily observe that they all display a similar attitude towards Stoicism, even though they do not share the same degree of hostility towards it. All of them use Stoic terms and doctrines as weapons against Stoicism. Too often, the adoption of terms and doctrines distinctive of Stoicism has prompted scholars to argue in favour of a friendly dialogue between the two schools. But, as I hope I have shown, the opposite is the case for the Platonists. The use of terms taken from Stoic philosophy implies neither adherence to Stoicism nor a constructive conciliatory attitude. Rather it displays a subtler plan: an operation that could be dubbed "polemic resemantization", where terms are reclaimed and then employed in other contexts.62 In this framework, the purpose of the reference to Plato or Pythagoras is to reinforce the legitimacy of these "(re)interpretations", for it proves that such doctrines had already been formulated, and that the Stoics had wrongly misappropriated them at the cost of unwarranted alterations. In other words, the point is that the Stoics do badly what Plato had already done well. The Platonists often accused the Stoics of stealing doctrines. It was first attested to by Polemo (d.I., vii, 25), and was later dialectically exploited by the sceptical Academics (Cic., Luc. 16, De fin. i, 11, 41) and then by Antiochus as well in order to integrate Stoicism into his own Platonism (De fin. v, 74). Eventually it would become quite common among later Platonists such as Plutarch or the Anonymous Commentator of the Theaetetus. Specifically, the terms of the encounter could vary from case to case, depending on the degree of dissent. Plutarch's position, for example, appears much more hostile than Antiochus'. In any case, this kind of combative stance (against Stoicism and other schools) reveals a competitive attitude and constantly strives to effect the subordinate integration of rival school doctrines, thereby emphasizing the pivotal role of one's own philosophical tradition.63 As is well known, what it meant to be a Platonist was a highly controversial issue for Platonists of the Imperial Age. And from their polemics it seems that it was safer for them to define their Platonic identity in opposition to the other schools than in dialogue with their other Platonist colleagues.

Regrettably, because of the scanty evidence at our disposal it is difficult to reconstruct in detail all the passages of the controversy between Platonists and Stoics on these topics. But, at least the main reason for the two schools' opposition to each other is clear. The underlying reason always points to their different psychological theories. The Platonist soul is divided into rational and emotive components, whereas a primary feature of Stoicism is the defense of a purely rational soul. Given such different theories of the soul, endorsed by Stoics and Platonists, any attempt at reconciliation seems to be hardly possible, and one can fully appreciate the statement of

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57 Cf. whittaker (1990), 132 n. 411. This text presents a remarkable classification in gnostikon, hornetikon and oikiai from, which reminds one of Eudorus' tripartition. Moreover, elsewhere Alcman associates the verb epikrines (corresponding to the epikrisis we find in Eudorus) to horne: ἐπικρίνει πρὸς τῶν προδέοντων αὐτῶν καὶ ὕπατων (187, 43-43).

60 Asp., In Eth. Nic. 1, 14-13, 13 (on Socrates and Pythagoras) and 42, 43-47, 2 (excerpts on passions, cf. also ps.-Andron. De pass. 13 and 6). Aspasia quoting Eudorus: Alex., In metaph., 58 (= Eud., 2 M.).
61 DONINI (1974), 65. No less interesting is Stobaeus' treatment of Peripatetic ethics in the II book of his Anthologia (see e.g. II 117, 11-118, 4 w.-H.: τῆς γὰρ φύσεως τὸ μὲν ἐναὶ λογικῶν, τὸ δ' ἑλογον λογικῶν μὲν τὸ κριτικὸν, ἑλογον δὲ τὸ ὁρμητικὸν; cf. VANDER WAERDT (1985b), 373-381.

62 On "polemic resemantization" see CHIARADONNA (2007c) a proposito of the Platonist reception of Aristotelian categories.

63 Further examples of this attitude are the Commentary on the Theaetetus, where the Anonymous Commentator traces the Stoic kathekon back to Socrates and Plato (v, 17-33; see SEDLEY [1999]), and Alcman who considers the Stoic definition of passion to be Platonic: ἡμῖν γὰρ πάθος κίνησις ἅλος φυσικῶς ἢ ἐπὶ κακῶς ἢ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶ (Did. 185, 26-27, see also 186, 6: πλεονασμία). Hegemonikon is another term supposedly distinctive of Stoicism but repeatedly exploited by Platonists and Aristotelians: e.g. Anon., In Theaet. xi, 38; Alcin., Did. 173, 7-10; 182, 30; Alex. De an. passim.
Matthias Baltes, who claimed that the doctrine of the soul was the turning point (Kehrelhre) of all Platonism. Such a reconstruction also helps to clarify Eudorus’ position. Even in Eudorus’ case, we have seen that the use of terms having Stoic connotations reveals a different psychological model that seems to distinguish a non-rational horkhe from the rational part. If this reading is correct, it is a fair assumption that in Eudorus’ case the approval of a dualistic psychology also implies a polemical attitude towards Stoicism. His use of Stoic terms does not so much reflect a subservient approach as one of rivalry.

4. Plutarch and Eudorus’ doctrine of the soul

That such was Eudorus’ view is further confirmed by another source. So far I have deemed it fit to concentrate on Stobaeus’ account in an effort to avoid overlapping interpretations of the testimonies. Yet, another text, namely Plutarch’s in De animae procreatione in Timaeo, confirms that Eudorus supported a dualistic theory of the soul.

The main objective in De animae procreatione is to provide an exegesis of the issue centering on the creation of the world soul, a matter that is known to have raised great controversy within the Platonic tradition (1012C). From the Platonic perspective, the issue was further complicated, since it did not just confine itself to the world soul alone, but presupposed an interpretation of the soul in general, both the cosmic and the individual, where the latter amounts to a ‘part or copy’ of the former. Before submitting his original interpretation, Plutarch endeavors to explain the grounds of disagreement by presenting the two most influential interpretations: those of Xenocrates and Crantor (1012D-1013A). Plutarch goes on to explain how Eudorus had tried to maintain that these two interpretations could be reconciled, as he believed them both to be plausible (δ μεν Ευδορος συνδετηρος άμορφον οιται τηε εκός του 1013B).

The comparison with Xenocrates and Crantor allows us to verify that Eudorus endorsed a dualistic psychology. The case of Xenocrates is the more interesting of the two. He believed the soul to be the product of a twofold mixture of indivisible and divisible being on the one hand, and of sameness and difference on the other; whilst the intermingling of the first produced number, the second attributed the powers of rest and motion to number: the soul is number moving itself.64 In a more detailed presentation of Xenocrates’ position, Plutarch explains that indivisible and divisible being coincide with the One and the Indefinite Dyad, the two basic principles of reality, which in turn engender the limited and the unlimited.65 It is worth noticing that from the late Neoplatonist Simplicius we obtain further confirmation that, like Xenocrates, for Eudorus the One and the Dyad also constitute the elements of reality: the One/Monad representing the principle of what is ordered, and the Dyad representing the principle of what is opposite to order.66 In Plutarch’s account of Xenocrates these principles are then characterized as faculties, δυναμεις, the faculties that constitute the essence of the soul (1013A).67 The type of terminology used, in fact, lends support to the theory of a composite soul amidst a principle of order – divine and rational (fr. 213 and 205 I.4) – and a principle of disorder and indeterminateness that is contrary to the former (fr. 101-102 I.4). This is in accordance with other Xenocratean fragments and testimonies, where there is the clear mention of an irrational soul.68 Adherence to Xenocrates’ doctrine therefore implies the adoption of a bipartite model.

This reference to the One and the Dyad also recurs in Plutarch’s text, where the debate centers more expressly on the human soul. Even the individual soul, being a ‘part or copy’ of the divine, comprises the two principles of the One/Monad and the Dyad.69 It is easy to imagine how, with regard to

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64 De an. procr. 1012E-f (= Xenocr., Il. 188 Isnardi Parente = Eud., T 6 M.).
65 De an. procr. 1012E. άμορφον μεν γαρ το 3 εν μεροιν δε το πληθος, δε τοις γαρ γνωσιν τον άμορφον τον ενδ ειρετον το πληθος και τη εμπρος άριστην ανατεθος, ήτοι δε και δυα διαλογων άριστων και Ζαρατης δε Πυθαγορα διδαχομενος, τις ομοιον οκληρου τον άμορφο και δε βολιους εστίν των άμορφων δος της μοναδας προτειοκακον. Plutarch appears to be unaware that this Zaratas is another form of the Zoroaster whom he refers to elsewhere (1026B; De Is. 369D-e). This further confirms that he is drawing on his source, most probably Eudorus: Cherniss (1976), 164-165 n. c (on Zaratas, see also Hipp., Ref. vi 23, 2).
66 Simpl., In Phys. 181 7-30 (= T 3 5 M.).
67 Cf. also fr. 181 1.4: [κατ᾽] την ποιησιν [ε] εσσωνις μεν πολλην ορθας αυτην [..] δια μεν και διαφερομενην αις πληθος μεροιν ανωθεν.
68 Cf. e.g. fr. 211 I.4: οι δε [αιαναλκου] μερις της αλογισας, ως των παλαιων Ξενοκρατης και Σπειτσευς.
69 Remarkably, in this chapter (27) of the De an. procr., there occurs a philosophical doxography which has been persuasively traced back to Eudorus: see Mansfeld (1992), 286-287. This further confirms the importance of Eudorus’ influence on Plutarch.
the human soul, these two principles are to be placed once again in relation to the two sides of the soul, a rational and an irrational part:

these are the faculties of the soul of the sum of things but enter besides into mortal and passible organs of bodies [. . .] in these faculties the form of the dyadic and indefinite part (τὸ τῆς δυαδικῆς καὶ ἀδριάτου μερίδος [. . .] σῶδος) makes itself more apparent, while that of the simple and monadic part (τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ μονοδικῆς) is submerged in greater obscurity. It would be not easy, however, to observe in man either an emotion (πάθος ἄνθρωπον) entirely divorced from reason (λόγισμον) or a motion of the mind in which there is present nothing of desire or ambition or rejoicing or grieving (De an. procr. 1025c-d; trans. Cherniss).74

Not only does Plutarch (and partly Simplicius) confirm that Eudorus has maintained a dualistic psychological theory (akin to the one found in Sto-Baenaeus), but it allows us to establish in which metaphysical context it should be placed.

Moreover, Plutarch’s text not only corroborates the legitimacy of a dualistic interpretation of Eudorus’ psychology, but also serves to clarify Eudorus’ position vis-à-vis Plato and Stoicism. Lest we forget, the object of the debate is the Timaeus – therefore Plato’s interpretation. And despite the lack of an explicit affirmation, it is clear that espousing the theses of Xenocrates and Crantor also implies adopting a certain interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. This kind of interpretation necessarily entails a rejection of Stoic interpretations of Plato such as the one proposed by Posidonius, who in fact is lambasted in De animae procreatione. Indeed, it would be most interesting to find out whether the polemic against Posidonius in Plutarch is also dependent upon Eudorus as was the case with his account of Xenocrates and Crantor. But this problem is far too complex to be addressed on this occasion. What is certain is that if we compare the interpretation of Plato drawn from Plutarch’s account with what we know about Posidonius and Panaetius, it also necessarily implies a polemical intention on Eudorus’ part against the Stoic attempts to appropriate the Platonic tradition. A similar polemical move is also detectable in one other important source we have on Eudorus, namely the commentary on Aristotle’s Physics by Simplicius, where the basic distinction in Stoic physics between archai and stoicheia is rejected as inconsistent in favour of the authentic Pythagorean and Platonic

5. Philosophy and history of philosophy
The picture that emerges from surviving accounts allows us to piece together Eudorus’ thought in a consistent manner, as much with respect to his doctrines as with the historical and philosophical context of his time. One of the most significant features of the surviving accounts that mention him is that they almost always tend to associate him with writings – from Plato’s Timaeus (τ 6-8 m.), to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Categories (τ 2, 14-22 m.) – or with other movements and schools – be it the Stoics (τ 9-11 m.) or Simplicius’ pythagorikai (τ 3-5 m.). This could inspire the doubt that Eudorus is more of a historian than a philosopher, and that he is more interested in giving accounts of the doctrines of others than endorsing them himself.76 The comparison to other thinkers of his time, whether they belong to Stoicism like Panaetius or Posidonius, or to Platonism like Antiochus and Plutarch, clearly shows how the regard for philosophers and doctrines from other schools represents a form of doing philosophy that is typical of this period. The controversies surrounding the terminology and doctrines of other schools are the tools that make the redefinition of one’s own philosophical choices possible.

This framework of debate allows us to evaluate better Eudorus’ position in the history of Platonism. Eudorus’ fortunes (or misfortunes) have in fact been traditionally bound up with the attempt to find in him the protos heuristes of those doctrines that constitute the core concepts of Imperial Platonism. One could doubtless note that his own doctrine of the soul, as we have so far reconstructed it, represents concrete proof of Eudorus’ contribution to the development of Platonism. But this is not to say, of course, that Eudorus invented this doctrine ex novo, given that the accounts by Cicero and Antiochus point out that the issue had been debated even before Eudorus. After all, calling someone an “inventor” in the context of the early Imperial Age was more an insult than a compliment. What matters is establishing the truth: doing the history of philosophy is a way of doing phi-

74 Like in the De virt. mor., a polemical hint to Stoicism immediately follows; analogously, in the anti-Stoic attitudes of the De virtute morali the same Platonist doctrine is implied; see Opsomer (1994), Babut (1969), 42, and Donini (1974), 93.

75 Simpl., In Phys. 181, 7-30 (= τ 3-5 m.) with Bonazzi (2005), 127-139.
76 Cf. e.g. Mansfeld (1992), 275 n.104.
losophy. This is a key point with regard to Eudorus. What I hope to have succeeded in demonstrating is that his importance ought not merely to be sought specifically in the more doctrinal sphere, for it also lies in his "historical" sensibilities, and in having promoted a comparison amongst other philosophical schools as a fundamental moment in philosophical practice. Very often, intense rivalry hides behind the façade of plain historical interest (similar observations apply also to his interest in Aristotle). Comparing the teachings of one's predecessors is a way of doing philosophy that enables one to vindicate the pivotal role of one's own school. On a more general note, this interest indeed reflects a deep-seated need in the early Imperial Age, the need to rethink one's own tradition in a time marked by great upheaval. The issue of one's own philosophical identity is a crucial problem in the early Imperial Age. Insofar as it ought to be clear that Platonism does not stem from a single person's creative effort, but gradually takes shape in the context of these debates and polemics, it should be possible to appreciate fully the contribution that a philosopher such as Eudorus made to the development of Platonism.

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77 MANSFELD (1988), 97.