ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE
Series I

XXXIX

Series editors

Carlos Steel
Russell Friedman
Pasquale Porro (Bari)
M.W.F. Stone
Gerd Van Riel

The "De Wulf-Mansion Centre" is a research centre for ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, B 3000 Leuven (Belgium).
It hosts the international project "Aristoteles latinus" and publishes the "Opera omnia" of Henry of Ghent.

PLATONIC STOICISM – STOIC PLATONISM

The Dialogue between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity

Edited by
Mauro BONAZZI and Christoph HELMIG

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS
2007

EUDORUS' PSYCHOLOGY AND STOIC ETHICS*

MAURO BONAZZI
(Università degli Studi di Milano)

The second book of Stobaeus' *Anthologium* has often been used as evidence to reconstruct the position of Eudorus of Alexandria and its relation as much to Stoicism as to Platonism. Indeed, if scholars of Stoicism have tried to show how this evidence proves Eudorus' dependence on Stoic doctrines, scholars of Platonism have exploited it to demonstrate Eudorus' key role in the development of Imperial Platonism. That such diverse interpretations are possible is due to the different ways in which Stobaeus' testimony has been used. Indeed, even if the portion of the text that is explicitly attributable to Eudorus appears to hold fundamentally Stoic views, it is also true that cardinal principles of Imperial Platonism, above all *homoiosis toi theoi*, occur on the following pages, and their origin would otherwise go unexplained.

I will endeavor to show that neither of the two interpretations is fully acceptable. In an attempt to question the legitimacy of "broader" readings of Stobaeus' text, I will simply state that the way Eudorus is referred to in the citations make such readings rather unjustified. For instance, when introducing the passage at issue Stobaeus (or his source) mentions various texts and not only Eudorus' text, while towards the end Stobaeus states his intention to "proceed in the order that to me seems the best".[1] Insofar as these assertions introduce a wealth of sources and place an emphasis on the compiler's compositional license, they neither confirm nor refute the suggestion that Eudorus is a strong presence, and they greatly hinder any attempt to delineate clearly the boundaries of his influence. To base one's support for the argument of Eudorus' Platonism on doctrines that are difficult to attribute to him with certainty could easily give rise to dangerous misconceptions. Whilst a solution to these intricate textual disputes has

* Previous drafts of this paper were discussed in Milan, Gargnano, and Cambridge ('B' Club). Many thanks are due to Francesca Alesse, Pierluigi Donini, Paolo Fait, Brad Inwood, Carlos Lévy, Jan Opsomer, David Sedley, Malcolm Schofield, and to other participants of the Gargnano Colloquium. I also wish to thank Jenny Pelletier and Russell Friedman for help with the English.

[1] Stob., *Eclog.* II, 42, 5-6 and 45, 7-10 W.-H.

yet to be delivered, I maintain that it is safer to refer to the section where his name is expressly stated.

On the other hand, this does not mean that Stobaeus' passage should be read as a proof of Eudorus the Academic's adherence to Stoicism (at least with respect to ethical and psychological doctrines).[2] And neither does it suggest that he is more of a historian than a philosopher who is primarily concerned with reporting other schools' doctrines (Stoicism in ethics, Platonism elsewhere) rather than defending any *himself*. What I propose to demonstrate is that even the sole section expressly attributed to Eudorus is compatible with what we know about Platonism from the early Imperial Age. To this end, it will also be useful to draw comparisons with other testimonies or fragments that may safely be attributed to him. Odd as it may seem, scholars have seldom bothered to compare Stobaeus' passage with other testimonia relating to Eudorus. However, I hope to be able to prove that only by pursuing this course of action will it be possible to promote a greater understanding of Eudorus' philosophical personality and of the role he played in the philosophical framework of the early Imperial Age.

1. Eudorus and the doctrine of *horme*

If we confine ourselves to the part expressly attributed to Eudorus, we do not find much that is new: Eudorus is said to have written a book, worthy of purchase, and presented as διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, tackling *problematikos* all the issues belonging to the field of knowledge (ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως, Ἀκαδημιακοῦ φιλοσόφου, διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσαν ἐπεξελήλυθε προβληματικῶς τὴν ἐπιστήμην).[3] The structure of the text follows the traditional tripartition of ethics, physics, and logic.[4] Without mentioning the latter two parts, Stobaeus or his source

[2] Besides Stobaeus, Eudorus is referred to as Academic also by the Anonymus Commentator on Aratus' *Phaenomena* and Simplicius (Anon., *Intr. in Arat.* 6, 96, 24 Maas = T 11 Mazzarelli; Simpl., *In Cat.* 187, 10 = T 16 M.). The examples of Antiochus, Plutarch, and the Anonymous Commentator on the *Theaetetus* show that the use of "Academic" did not necessarily imply an exclusive commitment to the sceptical Academy, but rather described the entire tradition stemming from Plato; cf. BONAZZI (2003), 208-211. It is in this broader context that Eudorus belongs.

[3] Stob., *Eclog.* II, 42, 7-10 W.-H. (= T 1 M.). The employment of third person verbs for Eudorus (*epexeluthe*, *hypetaxe*) and first person verbs for the compiler shows that this passage is better taken as a testimony than as a proper fragment.

[4] Stob., *Eclog.* II, 42, 11-13 W.-H. Remarkably, the order of the tripartion is the same as that which Antiochus claims to draw from Plato – cf. Cic., *Ac.* 19 with DILLON (1977), 63 and PROST (2001b), 245; *contra* BARNES (1989) –, whereas for the Stoics it was of prime importance to start with logic, as BABUT (2005), 73-76, rightly observes.

proceeds to make a summary presentation of the section dedicated to ethics:

> τοῦ δ' ἠθικοῦ τὸ μὲν περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ'ἕκαστον ἀξίας, <τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ὁρμήν>, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀδρομερῆ τῆς ἠθικῆς εἴδη, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ θεάσασθαι τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πράγματος ὅπερ αἱρεῖσθαι μέλλομεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε γένεσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν εὔλογον, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· ἡ θεωρία δ' ἐστὶ περίσκεψις τοῦ πράγματος καὶ οἷον ἐπίκρισις κατὰ τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ λογισμόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ περινοηθέντι καλῶς ἐπιβαλεῖν· τρίτον τὸ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῖς ἐπισυνάψαι. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ πρῶτα μέρη τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου θεωρητικόν, ὁρμητικόν, πρακτικόν.
>
> Of ethics one part refers to the study of the value of each thing, a second part refers to the impulse, and the third to action. These are the general species of ethics: first to consider the value of the act we are going to choose; for it is not possible that the impulse becomes reasonable, if it is not preceded by theory: theory is an investigation of the act and a sort of decision in accordance with the reasoning of it. Second is the successful addition of the impulse to what has been considered; third the attachment of action to them. These are the first parts of the ethical discourse: theoretic, hormetic, practical (Stob., *Eclog.* II, 42, 13-23 W.-H. = T 1 Mazzarelli).

The above citation is followed by a lengthy series of subsections that divide the first ethical tripartition (*theoria*, *horme*, *praxis*). Despite its conciseness, Stobaeus' account is not devoid of interest – neither in terms of the language employed nor of its contents. The text has a clear tripartite structure: theory comes first and amounts to an evaluation of the choices to be made; based on this evaluation, it is then a question of adjusting the impulse, and from these two processes, *theoria* and impulse, action springs forth.

An element that steadfastly commands attention is the strong likeness with Stoicism, whose vocabulary is constantly drawn on. Most of all, it is the focus on *horme*, a key aspect of Stoic doctrine that is thrice repeated in about as many sentences, which is the most telling piece of evidence. Nonetheless, despite employing language that is largely reliant on Stoicism, Eudorus' doctrine presents a number of significantly different traits.[5] The most conspicuous divergence is the following: Stobaeus' account seems to

[5] DÖRRIE/BALTES (1996), 212-213, convincingly list many dissilimarities. Yet, apropos of the order between *horme* and *theoria*, Baltes' claim that for the Stoics the latter comes only after action is contradicted by texts such as D.L., VII, 108. I will try to show that the difference between Eudorus and the Stoics lies elsewhere.

reveal a dualistic-type psychology in stark contrast with the psychological monism distinctive of the Stoic tradition. It is a well-known fact that both the concepts of "monism" and "dualism" have given rise to ambiguity and misunderstanding. In the case of Stoicism, "monism" has to be regarded as meaning that Stoic moral psychology denies the existence of a power, or of a part within the soul, capable of resisting the rational faculty responsible for the process of performing an action.[6] If one grants this kind of theory of the soul, it is clear that impulse should be taken as a product of reason (specifically, the outcome of the assent granted to a presentation by reason). Therefore, no conflict can arise between reason, which gives assent and generates an impulse, and the impulse itself.

Yet the case of Eudorus is different, as these three clues show: 1) from the very first sentence, it seems that a certain contrast is outlined between *theoria* and *horme*, as if at first impulse were something non-rational and would only turn into *eulogos* later, thanks to *theoria*: impulse in fact can only *become* reasonable after *theoria* (οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε γένεσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν εὔλογον, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τὴν θεωρίαν). Naturally, by itself this reading is not indisputable, since another reading closer to Stoicism could be suggested: a *horme eulogos* is *generated* as a result of right reasoning whilst a *horme non-eulogos*, and indeed a *pathos*, is the outcome of bad reasoning.[7] Doubtless the brevity and conciseness of the passage hampers any attempt to take a clear and indisputable stand in support of either of the two readings. 2) Immediately thereafter, nonetheless, we read that impulse should be added to *theoria* (τὸ τὴν ὁρμὴν τῷ περινοηθέντι καλῶς ἐπιβαλεῖν). A careful reading of the two statements seems to hint that two different things are at stake, reason and impulse, and they are in a certain relation with one another. If this is the case, then Eudorus' doctrine clearly exhibits significant differences from Stoicism. It is indeed true that by many accounts the Stoic doctrine of

[6] Cf. INWOOD (1985), 28-33; INWOOD (1993), 155 and 158-159.

[7] In other words, one may object that γένεσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν εὔλογον might also be read as "that a reasonable impulse is generated". If this were the case, Eudorus wouldn't diverge much from the Stoics, because his doctrine would display a *theoria* evolving into impulse. In themselves both readings are plausible. But since the next phrase presupposes *horme* as a power distinct from *theoria* by stating that impulse should be added to *theoria*, it is more correct to adopt a reading compatible with the distinction between *theoria* and *horme*, which is also found in the first sentence. Interestingly, *eulogos horme* describes one of the three Stoic *eupatheiai*, *boulesis*, as opposed to *epithymia*, an *alogos orexis*, cf. *SVF* 3.431 f.; Stob., *Eclog.* II, 86-87 W.-H. But a similar definition also occurs in the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* (413c9), and this suggests that it did not have to be taken as uniquely distinctive of Stoicism; see also below n. 10.

the soul contemplates the joint presence of impulse and reason within the *hegemonikon*,[8] but it is just as true that the Stoics' traditional thesis explains the mechanism of human action by articulating the process as a sequence of presentation – assent – impulse – action; impulse follows rational assent and does not antagonize it. 3) But for Eudorus *theoria* and *horme* always appear to be separate and coexisting, as is also gleaned from the plural *autois* that follows straight afterward: the action is derived from the combination of *these two*, of *theoria* and *horme* (τρίτον τὸ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῖς ἐπισυνάψαι), and not from mere impulse, which is in turn the outcome of the rational assent to a presentation.[9]

If this reading is correct, then the juxtaposition of two different motivational forces, *theoria* and *horme*, would come to the fore in the passage, and *horme* would take on a meaning that is closer to the Platonic and Aristotelian sense than to the Stoic.[10] Among other passages, the most persuasive similarities are found in the *Magna Moralia*, where the ethical theory is expressly made to depend on the sum total of two factors, *logos* and irrational *horme*: impulses arise first, until reason intervenes causing good deeds to be done. The virtuous action is born out of the cooperation between *logos* and the natural impulse, but when this cooperation does not occur, passions do not necessarily follow reason and they may well defy it.[11] Even in the case of Eudorus, then, the issue would be to render the *horme eulogos*

[8] INWOOD (1985), 41 and MANSFELD (1991), 115-121.

[9] This third sentence distinguishes Eudorus' doctrine from another version of Stoic theory of action, according to which there is a preliminary impulse before assent, the sequence being: (preliminary) impulse[1] – assent – (rational) impulse[2] – action (Cic., *De fato* 40; Sen., *Ep.* 113, 18 and *De ira* II, 1-4; cf. also Plut., *Adv. Col.* 26). The origin of such a doctrine is controversial, cf. IOPPOLO (1987), 458-461 and INWOOD (1993), 166 n. 29 and 175 n. 48. In any case, since this doctrine insists on the temporal complexity of soul processes and not on its parts or powers, this theory involves a monistic psychology (INWOOD [1993], 175-176), which is distinct from Eudorus' dualism.

[10] Remarkably *horme*, though usually considered as distinctively Stoic, is repeatedly used by Plato and Aristotle: cf. e.g. Plat., *Phaedr.* 279a9, *Resp.* 436b2, 581b1; *Leg.* 866e2 (παραχρῆμα τῆς ὁρμῆς γενομένης), *Ep.* VII, 325e1 (πολλῆς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινά); *Def.* 413c9 (βούλησις [...] ὄρεξις εὔλογος); Arist., *Eth. Eud.* II, 8, 1224a20-30 (παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν [...] οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ); VIII, 2, 1247b18-19 (ἀρ' οὐκ ἔνεισιν ὁρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογισμοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὀρέξεως ἀλόγου;) and 29-30; cf. also *Eth. Nic.* I, 13, 1102^{b}20-21 (ἐπὶ τἀνάντια γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν), *Pol.* I 2, 1253^{a}29.

[11] *MM* II, 8, 1206b19-29; see also I, 35, 1198^{a}17 (ὁρμὴ ἄλογος); I, 35, 1197^{b}39; II, 3, 1199^{b}38-1200^{a}1 (ὁρμὴ ἄνευ λόγου); I, 35, 1198^{a}7-8, ^{a}9; II, 3, 1200^{a}4-5 (ὁρμὴ φυσική) and DONINI (1965), 181-185, 225-227, as well as VANDER WAERDT (1985a), 291-297.

as a non-rational part adjusted to reason; *eulogos* would come to mean that which obeys reason – from an ethical standpoint this could imply being moderate and restrained.[12]

What emerges, then, is a complex relationship – marked by dependency but also by transformation – with Stoicism. The language used is certainly shaped by the Stoics' technical jargon. Indeed, a number of parallels on this subject could be made with other Stoics of the time.[13] There is no denying the bond with Stoicism. Yet, as the case of *horme* shows, there are also significant differences in the way certain concepts are deployed, which may possibly reflect Platonic and Aristotelian usage. Under the guise of a dependency on Stoicism, a framework seems to come to the fore in which Platonism also plays a key role.

How shall we judge Eudorus' position and his interest in mediating between Stoic doctrines and Plato (as well as Aristotle)? As I will try to show, within the philosophical context of the 1st century BC, Eudorus' use of Stoic terms does not imply a leaning towards Stoicism. Rather it is better understood as a partisan attempt that aims to appropriate doctrines supposedly distinctive of Stoicism in order to vindicate the centrality of Platonism. As we will see, Eudorus is not the only Platonist to adopt such a strategy against the Stoics in the early Imperial Age. But, before considering Eudorus' relationship with the other Platonists of his time, we have to deal with another complex problem regarding late Hellenistic Stoicism.

2. Panaetius, Posidonius, Eudorus

The considerations outlined above generally refer to a comparison with Stoicism, as if it represented a single and consistent body of thought throughout the centuries. Indeed in the late Hellenistic Age, between the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, Stoic philosophy is believed to have undergone an intense process of transformation at the hands of its leading authorities,

[12] As LONG (1996a), 126 notes, Eudorus' taxonomy of ethical topics removes impulse from the primary position it used to have in Stoic classification. One might suggest that this too depends on a dualistic doctrine in the sense that Eudorus deals first with the rational part and then introduces impulse and passions.

[13] Cf. in particular Seneca's *Letter* 89, which introduces a similar (though not identical) tripartition to the one we find in Stobaeus' account of Eudorus (*inspectio, de impetu, de actionibus*) and seems to uphold the reading of *eulogos*: *primum enim est ut quanti quidque sit iudices, secundum ut impetum ad illa capias ordinatum et temperatum* (*Ep.* 89, 14 = 56B LS); see also Epict., *Diss.* III, 2, 1-5 (= 56C LS): ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον, ἵνα τάξει, ἵνα εὐλογίστως, ἵνα μὴ ἀμελῶς. On the possiblity of using these texts as evidence for Eudorus, see the rightly cautious observations of DÖRRIE/BALTES (1996), 212 following DÖRRIE (1976), 303 n. 1.

Panaetius and Posidonius. It was against their brand of Stoicism that Eudorus had to measure himself. Eudorus' understanding of the philosophy of the two main Stoics of his time is tellingly confirmed by the testimonies in our possession, which expressly place him in relation to the two Stoics on a number of different issues.[14] This adds even further interest to the possibility of a comparison in relation to the issues debated in Stobaeus' passage. After all, one of the most innovative elements the two philosophers raised actually deals with the problem of moral psychology. For both Panaetius and Posidonius are said to have at least partly rejected Chrysippus' cognitivistic theory, in which emotions are considered to be judgments, and so hark back to the Platonic-Aristotelian model that also contemplated the existence of non-rational parts of the soul.[15]

A few passages from Cicero's *De officiis*, an essay owing much to Panaetius' teaching, are crucially important in this respect. Panaetius' influence has prompted many scholars to regard a particular passage as a testimony of his philosophy, wherein a bipartition of the soul is expressly laid out that associates *horme* with the non-rational part, in contrast to the rational part:

> *Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est* ὁρμή *graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque sit.*
>
> Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold: one force is appetite (that is, ὁρμή, in Greek), which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be left undone (Cic., *De off.* I, 101 = T 122 Alesse; trans. Miller).[16]

The similarities with Eudorus are striking in this text. Posidonius' case is no less interesting. In Galen's famous account Posidonius is in fact supposed to have abandoned the unitary concept of the soul, thereby restoring the teaching of the Ancients (*palaios logos*) – Plato as well as Pythagoras and

[14] Cf. T 10-11 M.; besides, Eudorus displays acquaintance also with Posidonius' disciple Diodorus of Alexandria (T 9 M.).

[15] Cf. now ALESSE (1997) (Panaetius); SORABJI (2000), 109-114, 121-125, and VANDER WAERDT (1985b), 381-394 (Posidonius).

[16] Cf. also what follows: *Nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt* (Cic., *De off.* I, 102 = T 123 Alesse). *De off.* I, 132 (T 121 A. = 53J LS) is less significant, since *motus* was perfectly compatible with Stoic doctrine (*SVF* 1.22-23, 2.458, 3.169 and 377), cf. PROST (2001a), 45.

Aristotle – in clear opposition to Chrysippus. His distinction between *to theoretikon* and affective motions (*pathetike kinesis, pathetike holke, to pathetikon*) could well have influenced in turn Eudorus' distinction between *theoria* and *horme*.[17]

In recent years, however, much criticism has been leveled against such reconstructions of both Panaetius' and Posidonius' theories. In the first case, there are issues primarily of a historical and textual nature. Panaetius undoubtedly showed great interest in Plato, but his appreciation by no means implies that he had dropped the core doctrines of his school, such as *horme* and psychological monism, which it is closely associated with.[18] Confronted with these facts and lacking a clear statement on the matter,[19] it is wiser to refrain from attributing to Panaetius such a non-Stoic theory as the one associating *horme* with irrational impulses.[20] Moreover, it should be noted that this doctrine would appear to clash with the theory of the soul that is drawn from other accounts explicitly bearing Panaetius' name.[21] A significant passage is found in *Tusculanae Disputationes* (I, 79-80):

> Are we then to believe Panaetius when he disagrees with his revered Plato (*a Platone suo dissentienti*)? For whilst he calls him at every mention of his name inspired, the wisest, the most saintly of men, the Homer of philosophers, he yet fails to approve of this one opinion of his about the immortality of the soul. [...] He alleges next as his second proof that there is nothing sensible of pain without being also susceptible of sickness; all, however, that is subject to disease, will also perish; now souls are sensible to pain, therefore they also perish (*nihil esse quod doleat quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum: dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire*). These arguments can be refuted. For they show his ignorance of the fact that, when a statement is made about the eternity of the souls, it is made about the mind which is always free from disorderly impulse, and not about those parts of us which are subject to the attacks of distress, anger, and lust, and these Plato, against whom his arguments are directed, regards as remote and isolated from the mind (*sunt enim ignorantis, cum de aeternitate animorum dicatur, de mente dici, quae omni turbido motu semper vacet, non de partibus iis, in quibus aegritudines irae libidinesque versentur, quas is, contra quem haec dicuntur, semotas a mente et disclusas putat*; trans. King).

[17] Cf. fr. 169, 79 (*to theoretikon*) 80 (*pathetike holke*), 84 (*pathetikon*), 102 (*pathetike kinesis*) Edelstein-Kidd (= Galen., *PHP* V, 5, 21); on *pathetikon* cf. also fr. 166 (= V, 6, 31, 33, 36) and 158, 1 E.-K. (= IV, 288, 9). Less useful is the occurrence of *logistikon* in Galen, *PHP* V, 5, 4 (= fr. 187 E.-K.), since it is disputed whether it was used by Posidonius himself or if it was attributed to him by Galen; cf. TIELEMAN (2003), 68 and 223.

[18] Cf. LÉVY (1992), 477-478. On Panaetius praising Plato and Aristotle, cf. PROST (2001a), 49-50.

[19] On Panaetius and *horme* the only explicit evidence is Nemesius (*De nat. hom.* 15, 72, 9-11 Morani = T 125 A.), who is unfortunately far from being clear on the subject of *horme*, since the occurrence of the word seems to depend more on Nemesius than on Panaetius; cf. ALESSE (1997), 258-261. In any case it is clear that in this testimony impulse doesn't appear as a separate source of emotion alongside reason, and it is therefore compatible with Stoic doctrine; cf. TIELEMAN (2007), § 4.

[20] PROST (2001a), 46-47 n. 30.

[21] Another parallel might be detected in *De off.* II, 18, attributed to Panaetius in part (= fr. 89 van Straaten) or entirely (T 60 A.). Nevertheless, leaving aside the problem of attribution, the similarities of this text with Eudorus are more apparent than real; cf. ALESSE (1997), 194-195 with further bibliography. Rather *De off.* II, 18 can be paralleled with the distinction among theoretical, ethical, and practical virtues we find in Stob., *Eclog.* II, 51, 3-4; cf. GIUSTA (1964), 152 and (1967), 29-30.

The rebuttal of such a fundamental thesis as that of the immortality of the soul[22] clearly shows how an interest in and a favorable inclination towards Plato do not imply a deferential approach. Conversely, the concession to Plato depends on his compatibility with Stoic doctrines. This clearly becomes apparent in the case of the soul, which Panaetius believed to be corporeal in agreement with the Stoic tradition.[23] At this stage, without delving into the issues concerning the survival of the soul, it should be noted that Panaetius' argument in *Tusc. disp.* I, 79 presupposes a unitary conception of the soul. The argument that the entire soul is subject to pain corresponds to the theme of the *pathetike* soul (*dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire*); yet saying that *pathos* concerns the entire soul and not merely a part of it is typical of the monistic Stoic doctrine. As Cicero's reply shows, this conception clashes with the bipartite psychology of Platonists. The dualism is actually introduced to defend Plato's conception against Panaetius.[24]

Problems of an equally sensitive nature are found with regard to Posidonius. Over the last few years, scholars have repeatedly and understandably raised doubts concerning the credibility of Galen's account and his polemical attempt to interpret Posidonius against Chrysippus.[25] Other

[22] Cf. T 146 A.: Panaetius proposed to expunge the *Phaedo* from Plato's dialogues because of its insistence on the soul's immortality.

[23] Cf. T 119 A.: *inflammata anima*.

[24] Cf. also Alcin., *Did.* 178, 24-32.

[25] Cf. COOPER (1999); GILL (1998) and (2005); TIELEMAN (2003), 198-287.

sources at hand speak consistently of Posidonius' loyalty to the doctrines of his school on a broad range of topics.[26] In Galen's case, a careful reading of his pages reveals a significant discrepancy between the passages by Posidonius that Galen quotes and the conclusions Galen feels entitled to draw. An in-depth analysis of Galen's account would require much more space than is presently available here. However, if we confine ourselves to the more topical issues, we can notice how the fragments expressly attributed to the Stoic thinker do not necessarily harbour beliefs that conflict with traditional Stoic doctrine.

A first point not to be underestimated is that Posidonius, as other Stoics, maintains that the soul is corporeal.[27] According to Plutarch's testimony in his treatise *On the generation of the soul*, Posidonius is said to have attempted to submit a corporealist interpretation of Plato's psychology.[28] If paralleled with Galen's evidence, Plutarch's text shows that the *pathetikon* cited by both Galen and Plutarch, and the kindred concepts of *pathetikai kineseis* and *pathetikai holkai* (recurring frequently in Galen) do not apply to non-rational parts of the soul, but refer to the soul's passive side and its reliance on corporeality.[29] The conceptual sphere of *pathetikon* indicates the bond of dependence between the soul and outer influences, when the former does not possess sufficient compactness and consistency (*tonos*).[30] Therefore, Posidonius' psychology does not contemplate a bipartite psychological model, juxtaposing an irrational part to the rational part, but builds on a mind/body dualism in terms of a psychophysical reality that is wholly compatible with the 'orthodox' Stoic doctrine.[31]

[26] Cf. Cic., *Tusc. disp.* II, 61 (= T 38), *De fin.* I, 6 (= T 32a), *Hort.* fr. 18 (= T 33), Sen., *Ep.* 33, 4 (= T 54), 108, 38 (= T 55), 87, 31-40 (= fr. 170), 83, 9-11 (= fr. 175), Gal., *PHP* V, 6, 4-5 (= 187 E.-K.). Significantly, Diogenes Laertius often introduces Posidonius as one of the most authoritative representatives of the Stoic tradition (VII, 39, 40, 41, 54, 60, 157), and so does Arius; see VIANO (2005), 343.

[27] D.L., VII, 157 (= fr. 139 E.-K.) alongside with Zeno and Antipater: πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν; Achill. *Intr. in Arat.* 13 (= fr. 149 E.-K. = Eud., T 10 M.) together with Chrysippus; Eusth., *Comm. in Homer. Il.* XII, 386 (= fr. 28b E.-K.).

[28] Plut., *De an. procr.* 1023B-D (= fr. 141a E.-K.) with REYDAMS-SCHILS (1999), 96-97, and FERRARI (2002), 280-282; see also the strange definition attributed to Plato in D.L., III, 67.

[29] TIELEMAN (2003), 211-212.

[30] Cf. also the telling mention of the Chrysippean image (Galen, *PHP* IV, 2, 14-18 = *SVF* 3.462) of the runners in IV, 3, 4-5 (= fr. 34, 18-20 E.K.): τοῦ πλεονάζεσθαι τὸν δρόμον ὑπὲρ τὰ μέτρα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἄλογος ἡ αἰτία, τὸ βάρος τοῦ σώματος.

[31] Cf. *SVF* 3.473 (= LS 65T = Galen. *PHP* IV, 6, 2-3), with SEDLEY (1993), GILL (2005), 458: "[T]he core point of the theory may be seen as being [...] that the reactions of all forms of organic natural life reflect their specific psychophysical character and state."

To this extent, if this reconstruction is correct, it follows that Posidonius did not reject the doctrine of impulse. Insofar as *pathetikai kinesesis* are associated with the passive dimension of corporeity, they do not alter the Stoic theory of action. One must be careful not to mistake *pathetikai kineseis* (or *pathetikai holkai*) with the actual affection itself, *pathos*,[32] which is when the soul is weak and affective motions, associated with experiences such as pleasure and pain, cause a positive (or negative) value to be assigned to a neutral object and encourage the making of false opinion, hence a passion (*pathos*). Indeed, for a passion to come into being, the soul must assent to a presentation. Both *pathos* and, more generally *horme*, stem from rational activity. This argument ultimately surfaces after several hints by Galen. Specifically, the dependence of *pathos* on assent is implied in the definition of *pathos* as *pleonazousa sugkatathesis*, where *sugkatathesis* replaces *horme*.[33] And also in the famous and controversial passage in V 5, 21 Galen admits that according to Posidonius *pathe* (and therefore impulses) always depend upon false opinions and assumptions (*hypolepseis*, *kriseis*), and so upon an assent by the rational power.[34] Regardless of Galen's ambiguities, Posidonius' allegiance to the Stoic doctrine of *horme* is clearly testified by Diogenes Laertius, who cites him along with Zeno, Cleanthes, Hecaton, and Chrysippus,[35] as well as by two accounts of Lactantius and Pseudo-Plutarch.[36] Whether Posidonius may or may not have introduced some changes or corrections to the Stoic theory[37] is a controversial point, but the bedrock of his doctrine remains faithful to Chrysippean theory,

[32] Cf. COOPER (1999), 467-468.

[33] *PHP* IV, 3, 8 (= fr. 34, 34-36 E.-K.): πλεονάζουσα συγκατάθεσις ἔσται τὸ πάθος; cf. also IV, 5, 12 (image of the runners), V, 322, 17-26 (= fr. 169, 106-117), IV, 7, 28 and 33 (= fr. 165) with COOPER (1999), 462 n. 24.

[34] Galen, *PHP* V, 5, 21 (= fr. 169, 77-84 E.-K.): καὶ ταῦθ' ὁ Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύναι πειρᾶται πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων τὰς αἰτίας ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὁλκῆς, προηγεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτῆς τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀσθενήσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζώῳ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ παθητικοῦ. See COOPER (1999), 471-472; GILL (1998), 126; TIELEMAN (2003), 237-238.

[35] D.L., VII, 85-87 (= fr. 185 E.-K.).

[36] Ps.-Plut., *De lib. et aegr.* 4-6 (= fr. 154 E.-K.); Lact., *De ira Dei* 17, 13 (= fr. 155 E.-K.); on these texts see KIDD (1988), 564 *ad loc.*: "I see no reason why Posidonius could not have also held to the orthodox Stoic classification of πάθη."

[37] Thus GILL (1998), 127-129, and COOPER (1999), 467-468; *contra* TIELEMAN (2003). Galen's evidence informs us that Posidonius discussed *aporiai*, but this doesn't necessarily imply a polemical attitude; cf. fr. 164, 12, 85, 108 E.-K.

namely that passions, as much as impulses, depend upon judgment, and are activities of reason.

Posidonius' allegiance to his school has major consequences also for our view of his relation to Platon (as well as Pythagoras and Aristotle). The fact that Posidonius was an admirer of Plato is confirmed beyond doubt by many ancient writers.[38] Yet admiration does not entail unconditional support; in some cases we know that Posidonius did not spare Plato any criticism,[39] whilst Plutarch's aforementioned account from *De an. procr.* clearly shows that Posidonius' main intent was to prove Plato's compatibility with Stoicism. This approach is also well suited to the passages we have been discussing. Contrary to what Galen would have us believe, it was not Posidonius who shifted from Stoic *horme* to Plato's psychic faculties, but it was Plato (in Posidonius' view) who anticipated the Stoic doctrine of *horme* with his doctrine of faculties.[40]

So what is the state of things with respect to Eudorus? Clearly the juxtaposition of such widely diverging interpretations hampers any attempt to assess Eudorus' position. However, a few remarks can be made on at least a couple of points. The first concerns *horme*. Panaetius and Posidonius appear to have remained faithful to Stoic doctrine, whereas fundamental differences on this matter are to be found in Eudorus' approach, who attributed an original value to *horme* unlike the one assigned to it by traditional Stoic doctrine. The second point deals with the rank held by Panaetius and Posidonius within Stoic tradition and their relation to Plato. As one can easily note, a key issue, which is clearly a distinguishing mask of Panaetius and Posidonius, consists in their novel interest in Plato (and Aristotle). Through Panaetius and Posidonius the Stoics experienced a renewed interest in Plato, Aristotle (and even Pythagoras).[41] But such recasting of Platonic and Aristotelian theories in the more up-to-date terminology of Stoicism[42] neither implies a presumed leaning towards Platonism nor can be construed as surrendering to Platonism. Despite their concessions, both

[38] Cf. T 91, T 95-102 E.-K.

[39] Fr. 178 E.-K. (= Sen., *Ep.* 94, 38) on the *Laws*, elsewhere appreciated.

[40] TIELEMAN (2003), 204-205, 219 and 226.

[41] BARNES (1991b), 120, argues that the Stoic school had always been interested in Plato since Zeno and Chrysippus. Generally speaking this is correct, but it would be better to distinguish between a philosophical interest (a philosophical interest in Plato had always been present in Stoicism) and a historiographical interest (whose importance grows especially since Antipater in the context of school polemics against the sceptical Academy).

[42] GILL (2005), 463.

Panaetius and Posidonius continued to be regarded as the leading figures of the Stoic school. This rekindled interest in Plato's thought has to be regarded as an attempt to prove his underlying convergence with Stoicism, and it is also clear that an approach of this kind, in which Plato (and Aristotle) were touted as imperfect forerunners of theories that would later be successfully wrought and enhanced by Zeno and Chrysippus, aimed at claiming possession of Platonism and bending it to the needs of Stoicism.[43] So much for Stoicism. This obviously carries some consequences for Eudorus, but first it is necessary to evaluate the Platonist position.

3. Eudorus and the rebirth of Platonism

If we turn to the Platonists we easily and repeatedly find what we miss in Stoicism: *horme* appears with reference to the irrational part of the soul – *horme* within the context of a dualistic psychology. Due to a lack of space I will not discuss all the passages but I will select the more interesting ones. Indeed, one text has been already introduced – the Ciceronian *De officis* I 101. If neither Panetius nor Posidonius can lay claim to it, this text ought to be clearly ascribed to the Platonic-Academic tradition – the same tradition, after all, which Cicero claimed to subscribe to. In any case, *De officiis* I 101 is not the only Ciceronian text to entail a dualistic psychology. Along with the *De officiis* account, one of the most important passages is found in Book Four of *Tusculanae disputationes*:[44]

> *Quoniam, quae Graeci vocant πάθη, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos, in his explicandis veterem illam equidem Pythagorae primum, dein Platonis discriptionem sequar, qui animum in duas parte dividunt: alteram rationis participem faciunt, alteram expertem; in participe rationis ponunt tranquillitatem, id est placidam quietamque constantiam, in illa altera motus turbidos cum irae tum cupiditatis, contrarios inimicosque rationi.*

> Since we would rather call "disturbances" rather than "diseases" what the Greeks call πάθη, I will clarify the concept by adopting the time-tested classification devised by Pythagoras, and later taken on by Plato. These thinkers imagined a twofold soul, and believe that one part is endowed with reason and the other is devoid of it. They place tranquility, a state of sweet and restful balance, in the part endowed with reason, and

[43] TIELEMAN (2003), 208-209.

[44] The two texts date from the same period at the end of Cicero's life, between summer 45 BC and autumn 44 BC.

> in the other they place the unruly motions set forth by anger and desire which are contrary and hostile to reason (Cic., *Tusc. disp.* IV, 10).

More so than in the other passage, the above reference to Pythagoras and Plato spells out the connection to the Platonic tradition more so than to Stoicism.[45] The bond with Platonism is no less manifest elsewhere in *Tusculanae disputationes*, as for example the parallels in I 20, I 80 and II 47 show.[46] But again, side-by-side with the Platonic reference, the terminology and the concepts that are used rely on Stoicism, which one can infer by the term *constantia* (the Ciceronian translation for the Stoic *eupatheia*), by the description of *pathos* as a motion, and probably by the use of *tranquillitas* for translating *euthymia*.[47] Just as Stobaeus and *De off.* I, 101 show, this passage further reveals an essentially Platonic doctrine dressed in Stoic garb. The parallel with *Tusc. disp.* IV, 10 represents a pivotal moment in the reconstruction of the historical and philosophical context Eudorus operated in.[48]

Sadly, though, it is hard to pinpoint with certainty the source that may have influenced Cicero. One of the most significant results achieved by scholarship in recent years has been to stress the Latin writer's outstanding originality insofar as he was always capable of mastering the sources and debates among philosophical schools and adapting them to the needs and interests of the Roman world. The zeal with which scholars have tracked down those authors Cicero was thought to have slavishly plagiarized, to the extent of attributing the philosophical content of his writing to them, has often brought about serious errors of perspective. Such errors have in

[45] In what follows Cicero overtly distinguishes the Platonic-Pythagorean source (*fons*) from the subsequent Stoic doctrine, where he will adopt Stoic terms and doctrines (*Stoicorum definitionibus and partitionibus*; IV, 11); cf. LÉVY (1992), 474-475.

[46] *Tusc. disp.* I, 20: *Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes parere voluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas suis locis, iram in pectore, cupiditatem supter praecordia locavit*; *Tusc. disp.* I, 80 (cf. *supra*, p. 116); *Tusc. disp.* II, 47: *quasi duo sumus, ut alter imperet, alter pareat*! [...] *est enim animus in partis tributus duas, quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers. Cum igitur praecipitur, ut nobismet ipsis imperemus, hoc praecipitur, ut ratio coërceat temeritatem.*

[47] Cf. TIELEMAN (2003), 293-294.

[48] Indeed, the connection is even more persuasive if the link between *Tusc. disp.* IV, 10 and the use of *horme* in relation to the soul's irrational part in *De off.* I, 101 is held to be correct, as I am inclined to believe. One additional problem is the legitimacy of Cicero's simultaneous use of both Platonist and Stoic doctrines. TIELEMAN (2003), 247, rightly observes that Cicero's overriding moral purposes can explain how he could feel justified in reconciling such different psychological models; cf. also *Tusc. disp.* IV, 6 and 9.

turn unjustly warranted the most widely divergent interpretations. Faced with these hurdles, and unwilling to add further confusion to the already muddled world of *Quellenforschung*, it is however still possible to make out the conceptual framework the above mentioned passages can probably be traced back to. Insofar as their dependence on Stoic sources cannot be proven beyond doubt, these passages ought to be clearly ascribed to the Platonic-Academic tradition – the same tradition, after all, which Cicero claimed to subscribe to.[49] It seems that an agreement may at least be reached on this point, from which it follows that Eudorus' position does not represent a *unicum* in the philosophical context of the 1st century BC.

Is it possible to narrow down the source that is thought to have inspired Cicero? A likely candidate is certainly Antiochus, even though this argument is hard to prove conclusively for the reasons given above and due to a lack of explicit references. Antiochus is well known as a rather complex figure; certainly he was interested in comparing Stoicism and Platonism, although the purpose of this comparison remains unknown and scholars disagree as to what his philosophical position was. For my part, I assume that Antiochus has to be regarded neither as a hidden Stoic nor as an anti-Stoic Platonist, but as a Platonist concerned with integrating and subordinating Stoicism into what he takes Platonism to be (Plato and the Old Academy up to the scholarchate of Polemo, as well as Aristotle and some other Peripatetics) by dismissing the supposed Stoic innovations as merely verbal. Briefly, his aim is to recast certain Stoic doctrines in a Platonic context in order to reaffirm Platonism's superiority over Stoicism.[50] In other words, it is a strategy parallel but opposed to the one pursued by Panaetius and Posidonius.

An account from Cicero's *Academica*, this time expressly attributable to Antiochus, appears to confirm this interpretation for the very issues under discussion. In the surviving part of the second version of *Academica*, Varro expands on the philosophy of his teacher Antiochus, stressing its differences with Stoicism. Despite the many points of agreement, one of Zeno's most serious mistakes in the field of ethics actually concerns his treatment of virtues:

> *cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem* [*scil. Zeno*] *adsentiebatur, nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat et opinionis iudicio suscipi.*

[49] On these issues cf. particularly LÉVY (1992), 472-485.

[50] I argue for this interpretation in BONAZZI (2007b).

> and whereas the older generation said that these emotions were natural and non-rational, and placed desire and reason in different parts of the soul, he did not agree with these doctrines either, for he thought that even emotions were voluntary and were experienced owing to a judgement of opinion (*Ac.* 39; trans. Rackham).

As the last sentence clearly illustrates, the underlying charge criticizes the claim that all the affections of the soul should be confined to the rational and hegemonic part of the soul; the Stoics' excessive rigour on matters of virtue stems from their excessively narrow notion of the soul. An explicit reference to *horme* is lacking in *Ac.* 38-39, but the passage points out that the fundamental divergence lies in the different manner of understanding the soul in relation to emotions. According to Antiochus and the *veteres*, emotions cannot just be the result of the *iudicium* (= *krisis*) of a merely rational soul, because the structure of the soul is different and it also possesses a non-rational part (*aliaque in parte* [...] *alia*). The analogies with other Ciceronian passages in *De off.* I, 101 and *Tusc. disp.* IV, 10-11, as also with Eudorus, are more than eloquent on this point.

Another interesting case is that of pseudo-Pythagorean literature. One of the reasons behind these apocryphal writings is undoubtedly to be found in the desire to ascribe to Pythagoreanism doctrines belonging to other schools, thereby claiming a first rank position in the history of philosophy for Pythagoras and his tradition. To this end, one strategy was to include in the treatises technical terms that were easily attributable to other philosophies. After all, such attempts could feature conciliatory as well as polemical intentions. The most manifest example of a conciliatory approach regards Platonism, namely the adoption of Platonic terminology and theories to underscore the strong link between the two traditions. A similar case is that of Aristotelianism. Conversely, the appropriation of terminology from other schools has sometimes sought to highlight fundamental and irreconcilable differences, as if to allege that these schools had actually misrepresented and betrayed the true teachings of Pythagoreanism. Such is the case with Stoicism, as the use of *horme* tellingly reveals.[51] The noun *horme* and the verb *horman* do not occur too frequently but, when they do, they refer to the irrational part of the soul – within the context of a dualistic-type psychology.[52] The most important passage is contained in the treatise attributed to Metopos:

[51] In general, see MORAUX (1984), 642-666.

[52] Cf. e.g. Theages, 190, 7-11, Aresas, 49, 2-5, ps.-Tim., *De univ. nat.* 222, 5-20 Thesleff.

> ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν μερέων τᾶς ψυχᾶς δύο τὰ πρᾶτα, τὸ μὲν λογιστικόν τὸ δ'ἄλογον· καὶ λογιστικὸν μὲν, ᾧ κρίνομες καὶ θεωρέομες· ἄλογον δὲ, ᾧ ὁρμῶμες καὶ ὀρεγόμεθα.
>
> Since the soul is indeed twofold, there being a rational and an irrational part, and whereas the rational enables us to pass judgment and make considerations, with the irrational we *have impulses* and appetites (ps.-Metop., *De virt.* 117, 12-14 Thesleff).[53]

Besides *horme*, it is noteworthy that also *logistikon* and the verbs *krino* and *theoreo* represent a significant parallel between Stoicism and Eudorus' account. Quite aside from Stobaeus' passage, many significant points in common are generally known to exist in the surviving accounts between Eudorus and pseudo-Pythagorean literature.[54]

The relationship between Platonism and Pythagoreanism leads us to the writings of Plutarch of Chaeronea, a philosopher living some decades after Eudorus. Setting aside the issue of Stobaeus' source, Plutarch is the first writer to quote Eudorus. With regard to the issues treated here, the most important text is clearly *De virtute morali*. The discussion in this text is conducted with distinctive terms drawn from Stoic vocabulary. Amongst others, *horme* appears in several occurrences with a clear and polemical reference to the doctrine of the Stoa.[55] Yet, in the same way as it was presented in the pseudo-Pythagorean writings, its meaning is altered by being associated with the irrational part of the soul; *horme* is the irrational impulse that makes action possible, and must be moderated by reason (τὴν δ'ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῇ καὶ μέθ' ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν, "the impulsion of passion springs from moral virtue, but it needs reason to keep it within moderate bounds and to prevent its exceeding or falling short of its proper season", 444B, trans. Helmbold; cf. also 450E).[56] In the following centuries this concept would enjoy a certain degree of popularity, as illustrated by the parallel in *Didaskalikos*, an introductory manual with no great claim to originality,

[53] See also 118, 1-5 and ps.-Archyt., *De educat. eth.* 43, 14.

[54] Compare particularly Eud., T 3-5 (= Simpl., *In Phys.* 181, 7-30) with ps.-Archyt., *De princ.*: BONAZZI (2005), 152-160.

[55] Plut., *De virt. mor.* 441C, 444B-C, 444E, 444F-445A, 446E, 447A, 449C, 450E, 451A; see also at 452C *hormema*.

[56] See also *De gen. Socr.* 588F-589A. In general, on the anti-Stoic context of this polemic, cf. BABUT (1969), 9-13.

where the impulsive faculty in man, *to hormetikon*, corresponds to the passionate part, *to thymoeides* (ἡ δὲ ὁρμητικὴ εἰς τὸ θυμοειδές; 178, 45-46).[57]

Plutarch's account is also very interesting from a historiographical standpoint. Unlike pseudo-Pythagorean literature that clearly could not quote its adversaries expressly, Plutarch is outspoken when spelling out friends and foes. Plutarch opposes a united Platonic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian front to Stoicism.[58] Without delving into such issues here, it is noteworthy that Aristotelians too were involved in rejecting historical monism. So, for example, Andronicus had reclaimed the Stoic definition of *pathos*, in order to exploit it likewise in a dualistic context.[59] Aspasius (to whom we owe the account of Andronicus, and who on another occasion quotes Eudorus) seems to have headed in the same direction, and undertaken to make a connection to Pythagoras.[60] Pierluigi Donini has rightly spoken of "constant interference and willful contamination" between the Platonic and Peripatetic schools.[61]

If we compare all these texts and philosophers we can easily observe that they all display a similar attitude towards Stoicism, even though they do not share the same degree of hostility towards it. All of them use Stoic terms and doctrines as weapons against Stoicism. Too often, the adoption of terms and doctrines distinctive of Stoicism has prompted scholars to argue in favour of a friendly dialogue between the two schools. But, as I hope I have shown, the opposite is the case for the Platonists. The use of terms taken from Stoic philosophy implies neither adherence to Stoicism nor a constructive conciliatory attitude. Rather it displays a subtler plan: an operation that could be dubbed "polemic resemantization", where terms are

[57] Cf. WHITTAKER (1990), 132 n. 411. This text presents a remarkable classification in *gnostikon*, *hormetikon* and *oikeiotikon*, which reminds one of Eudorus' tripartition. Moreover, elsewhere Alcinous associates the verb *epikrinein* (corresponding to the *epikrisis* we find in Eudorus) to *horme*: ἐπικρίνει ἐκ τῶν προθέσεων αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμῶν (187, 42-43).

[58] DONINI (1999).

[59] Cf. Asp., *In Eth. Nic.* 44, 20-24 and 44, 33-45, 16.

[60] Asp., *In Eth. Nic.* 1, 14-2, 13 (on Socrates and Pythagoras) and 42, 13-47, 2 (*excursus* on passions, cf. also ps.-Andron. *De pass.* 1 3 and 6). Aspasius quoting Eudorus: Alex., *In metaph.* 58 (= Eud., T 2 M.).

[61] DONINI (1974), 63. No less interesting is Stobaeus' treatment of Peripatetic ethics in the II book of his *Anthologium* (see e.g. II 117, 11-118, 4 W.-H.: τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δ' ἄλογον· λογικὸν μὲν τὸ κριτικόν, ἄλογον δὲ τὸ ὁρμητικόν); cf. VANDER WAERDT (1985b), 373-381.

reclaimed and then employed in other contexts.[62] In this framework, the purpose of the reference to Plato or Pythagoras is to reinforce the legitimacy of these "(re)interpretations", for it proves that such doctrines had already been formulated, and that the Stoics had wrongfully misappropriated them at the cost of unwarranted alterations. In other words, the point is that the Stoics do badly what Plato had already done well. The Platonists often accused the Stoics of stealing doctrines. It was first attested to by Polemo (D.L., VII, 25), and was later dialectically exploited by the sceptical Academics (Cic., *Luc.* 16, *De fin.* III, 41) and then by Antiochus as well in order to integrate Stoicism into his own Platonism (*De fin.* V, 74). Eventually it would become quite common among later Platonists such as Plutarch or the Anonymous Commentator of the *Theaetetus*. Specifically, the terms of the encounter could vary from case to case, depending on the degree of dissent. Plutarch's position, for example, appears much more hostile than Antiochus'. In any case, this kind of combative stance (against Stoicism and other schools) reveals a competitive attitude and constantly strives to effect the subordinate integration of rival school doctrines, thereby emphasizing the pivotal role of one's own philosophical tradition.[63] As is well known, what it meant to be a Platonist was a highly controversial issue for Platonists of the Imperial Age. And from their polemics it seems that it was safer for them to define their Platonic identity in opposition to the other schools than in dialogue with their other Platonist colleagues.

Regrettably, because of the scanty evidence at our disposal it is difficult to reconstruct in detail all the passages of the controversy between Platonists and Stoics on these topics. But, at least the main reason for the two schools' opposition to each other is clear. The underlying reason always points to their different psychological theories. The Platonist soul is divided into rational and emotive components, whereas a primary feature of Stoicism is the defense of a purely rational soul. Given such different theories of the soul, endorsed by Stoics and Platonists, any attempt at reconciliation seems to be hardly possible, and one can fully appreciate the statement of

[62] On "polemic resemantization" see CHIARADONNA (2007c) apropos of the Platonist reception of Aristotelian categories.

[63] Further examples of this attitude are the *Commentary on the Theaetetus*, where the Anonymous Commentator traces the Stoic *kathekon* back to Socrates and Plato (IV, 17-23; see SEDLEY [1999]), and Alcinous who considers the Stoic definition of passion to be Platonic: ἔστι τοίνυν πάθος κίνησις ἄλογος ψυχῆς ὡς ἐπὶ κακῷ ἢ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ (*Did.* 185, 26-27, see also 186, 6: πλεονάζει). *Hegemonikon* is another term supposedly distinctive of Stoicism but repeatedly exploited by Platonists and Aristotelians: cf. e.g. Anon., *In Theaet.* XI, 28; Alcin., *Did.* 173, 7-10; 182, 30; Alex. *De an. passim.*

Matthias Baltes, who claimed that the doctrine of the soul was the turning point (*Kehrelehre*) of all Platonism.

Such a reconstruction also helps to clarify Eudorus' position. Even in Eudorus' case, we have seen that the use of terms having Stoic connotations reveals a different psychological model that seems to distinguish a non-rational *horme* from the rational part. If this reading is correct, it is a fair assumption that in Eudorus' case the approval of a dualistic psychology also implies a polemical attitude towards Stoicism. His use of Stoic terms does not so much reflect a subservient approach as one of rivalry.

4. Plutarch and Eudorus' doctrine of the soul

That such was Eudorus' view is further confirmed by another source. So far I have deemed it fit to concentrate on Stobaeus' account in an effort to avoid overlapping interpretations of the testimonies. Yet, another text, namely Plutarch's in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*, confirms that Eudorus supported a dualistic theory of the soul.

The main objective in *De animae procreatione* is to provide an exegesis of the issue centering on the creation of the world soul, a matter that is known to have raised great controversy within the Platonic tradition (1012C). From the Platonic perspective, the issue was further complicated, since it did not just confine itself to the world soul alone, but presupposed an interpretation of the soul in general, both the cosmic and the individual, where the latter amounts to a «part or copy» of the former.[64] Before submitting his original interpretation,[65] Plutarch endeavors to explain the grounds of disagreement by presenting the two most influential interpretations: those of Xenocrates and Crantor (1012D-1013A). Plutarch goes on to explain how Eudorus had tried to maintain that these two interpretations could be reconciled, as he believed them both to be plausibile (ὁ μὲν Εὔδωρος οὐδετέρους ἀμοιρεῖν οἴεται τοῦ εἰκότος, 1013B).

The comparison with Xenocrates and Crantor allows us to verify that Eudorus endorsed a dualistic psychology.[66] The case of Xenocrates is the more interesting of the two.[67] He believed the soul to be the product of a

[64] Plut., *De virt. mor.* 441F depending on *Tim.* 41d4-7; see BALTES (2000), 257-258.

[65] Admittedly, Plutarch opposes his interpretation to the opinion of «most of the Platonists» (1012B): see FERRARI (2002), 41-54. Yet, with respect to his anti-Stoic position, he shares the same basic psychological dualism of his Platonist colleagues.

[66] As it has been rightly remarked, Eudorus here is Plutarch's source; see FERRARI (2002), 231-232 n. 30.

[67] Similar considerations apply to Crantor as well, in spite of Plutarch's attempts to produce a contrast between the two; cf. DILLON (2003), 222-223.

twofold mixture of indivisible and divisible being on the one hand, and of sameness and difference on the other; whilst the intermingling of the first produced number, the second attributed the powers of rest and motion to number: the soul is number moving itself.[68] In a more detailed presentation of Xenocrates' position, Plutarch explains that indivisible and divisible being coincide with the One and the Indefinite Dyad, the two basic principles of reality, which in turn engender the limited and the unlimited.[69] It is worth noticing that from the late Neoplatonist Simplicius we obtain further confirmation that, like Xenocrates, for Eudorus the One and the Dyad also constitute the elements of reality: the One/Monas representing the principle of what is ordered, and the Dyad representing the principle of what is opposite to order.[70] In Plutarch's account of Xenocrates these principles are then characterized as faculties, *dynameis*, the faculties that constitute the essence of the soul (1013A).[71] The type of terminology used, in fact, lends support to the theory of a composite soul amidst a principle of order – divine and rational (fr. 213 and 205 I.P.) – and a principle of disorder and indeterminateness that is contrary to the former (fr. 101-102 I.P.). This is in accordance with other Xenocratean fragments and testimonies, where there is the clear mention of an irrational soul.[72] Adherence to Xenocrates' doctrine therefore implies the adoption of a bipartite model.

This reference to the One and the Dyad also recurs in Plutarch's text, where the debate centers more expressly on the human soul. Even the individual soul, being «part or copy» of the divine, comprises the two principles of the One/Monad and the Dyad.[73] It is easy to imagine how, with regard to

[68] *De an. procr.* 1012E-F (= Xenocr., T 188 Isnardi Parente = Eud., T 6 M.).

[69] *De an. procr.* 1012E: ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἓν μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον (καὶ Ζαράτας ὁ Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος, ταύτην μὲν ἐκάλει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μητέρα τὸ δ' ἓν πατέρα· διὸ καὶ βελτίονας εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅσοι τῇ μονάδι προσεοίκασι). Plutarch appears to be unaware that this Zaratas is another form of the Zoroaster whom he refers to elsewhere (1026B; *De Is.* 369D-E). This further confirms that he is drawing on his source, most probably Eudorus: CHERNISS (1976), 164-165 n. c (on Zaratas, see also Hipp., *Ref.* VI 23, 2).

[70] Simpl., *In Phys.* 181, 7-30 (= T 3-5 M.).

[71] Cf. also fr. 181 I.P.: [...] τὴν ψυχὴν [...] ἐξ οὐσιῶν μίαν πολλῶν ὑπάρχειν αὐτήν [...] ἅμα μίαν καὶ διαιρουμένην εἰς πλῆθος μερῶν οὐσιωδῶν.

[72] Cf. e.g. fr. 211 I.P.: οἱ δὲ [ἀπαθανατίζουσιν] μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος.

[73] Remarkably, in this chapter (27) of the *De an. procr.*, there occurs a philosophical doxography which has been persuasively traced back to Eudorus: see MANSFELD (1992), 286-287. This further confirms the importance of Eudorus' influence on Plutarch.

the human soul, these two principles are to be placed once again in relation to the two sides of the soul, a rational and an irrational part:

> these are the faculties of the soul of the sum of things but enter besides into mortal and passible organs of bodies [...] in these faculties the form of the dyadic and indefinite part (τὸ τῆς δυαδικῆς καὶ ἀορίστου μερίδος [...] εἶδος) makes itself more apparent, while that of the simple and monadic part (τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ μοναδικῆς) is submerged in greater obscurity. It would be not easy, however, to observe in man either an emotion (πάθος ἀνθρώπου) entirely divorced from reason (λογισμοῦ) or a motion of the mind in which there is present nothing of desire or ambition or rejoicing or grieving (*De an. procr.* 1025C-D; trans. Cherniss).[74]

Not only does Plutarch (and partly Simplicius) confirm that Eudorus has maintained a dualistic psychological theory (akin to the one found in Stobaeus), but it allows us to establish in which metaphysical context it should be placed.

Moreover, Plutarch's text not only corroborates the legitimacy of a dualistic interpretation of Eudorus' psychology, but also serves to clarify Eudorus' position vis-à-vis Plato and Stoicism. Lest we forget, the object of the debate is the *Timaeus* – therefore Plato's interpretation. And despite the lack of an explicit affirmation, it is clear that espousing the theses of Xenocrates and Crantor also implies adopting a certain interpretation of Plato's philosophy. This kind of interpretation necessarily entails a rejection of Stoic interpretations of Plato such as the one proposed by Posidonius, who in fact is lambasted in *De animae procreatione*. Indeed, it would be most interesting to find out whether the polemic against Posidonius in Plutarch is also dependent upon Eudorus as was the case with his account of Xenocrates and Crantor. But this problem is far too complex to be addressed on this occasion. What is certain is that if we compare the interpretation of Plato drawn from Plutarch's account with what we know about Posidonius and Panaetius, it also necessarily implies a polemical intention on Eudorus' part against the Stoic attempts to appropriate the Platonic tradition. A similar polemical move is also detectable in one other important source we have on Eudorus, namely the commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* by Simplicius, where the basic distinction in Stoic physics between *archai* and *stoicheia* is rejected as inconsistent in favour of the authentic Pythagorean and Platonic

[74] Like in the *De virt. mor.*, a polemical hint to Stoicism immediately follows; analogously, in the anti-Stoic attitudes of the *De virtute morali* the same Platonist doctrine is implied; see OPSOMER (1994), BABUT (1969), 42, and DONINI (1974), 93.

doctrine of principles and elements.[75] We have previously noted how the interest in Plato found in the two Stoics was driven by the desire to subject Plato to Stoicism. Confronted by this challenge, reference to the authorities of the Old Academy (in Plutarch) and of Pythagoreanism (in Simplicius) was thought to be needed to put things straight, and to reinstate the true line of succession of Platonism's most veritable tradition.

5. Philosophy and history of philosophy

The picture that emerges from surviving accounts allows us to piece together Eudorus' thought in a consistent manner, as much with respect to his doctrines as with the historical and philosophical context of his time. One of the most significant features of the surviving accounts that mention him is that they almost always tend to associate him with writings – from Plato's *Timaeus* (T 6-8 M.), to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Categories* (T 2, 14-22 M.) – or with other movements and schools – be it the Stoics (T 9-11 M.) or Simplicius' *pythagorikoi* (T 3-5 M.). This could inspire the doubt that Eudorus is more of a historian than a philosopher, and that he is more interested in giving accounts of the doctrines of others than endorsing them himself.[76] The comparison to other thinkers of his time, whether they belong to Stoicism like Panaetius or Posidonius, or to Platonism like Antiochus and Plutarch, clearly shows how the regard for philosophers and doctrines from other schools represents a form of doing philosophy that is typical of this period. The controversies surrounding the terminology and doctrines of other schools are the tools that make the redefinition of one's own philosophical choices possible.

This framework of debate allows us to evaluate better Eudorus' position in the history of Platonism. Eudorus' fortunes (or misfortunes) have in fact been traditionally bound up with the attempt to find in him the *protos heuretes* of those doctrines that constitute the core concepts of Imperial Platonism. One could doubtless note that his own doctrine of the soul, as we have so far reconstructed it, represents concrete proof of Eudorus' contribution to the development of Platonism. But this is not to say, of course, that Eudorus invented this doctrine *ex novo*, given that the accounts by Cicero and Antiochus point out that the issue had been debated even before Eudorus. After all, calling someone an "inventor" in the context of the early Imperial Age was more an insult than a compliment. What matters is establishing the truth: doing the history of philosophy is a way of doing phi-

[75] Simpl., *In Phys.* 181, 7-30 (= T 3-5 M.) with BONAZZI (2005), 127-139.

[76] Cf. e.g. MANSFELD (1992), 275 n. 104.

losophy.[77] This is a key point with regard to Eudorus. What I hope to have succeeded in demonstrating is that his importance ought not merely to be sought specifically in the more doctrinal sphere, for it also lies in his "historical" sensibilities, and in having promoted a comparison amongst other philosophical schools as a fundamental moment in philosophical practice. Very often, intense rivalry hides behind the façade of plain historical interest (similar observations apply also to his interest in Aristotle). Comparing the teachings of one's predecessors is a way of doing philosophy that enables one to vindicate the pivotal role of one's own school. On a more general note, this interest indeed reflects a deep-seated need in the early Imperial Age, the need to rethink one's own tradition in a time marked by great upheaval. The issue of one's own philosophical identity is a crucial problem in the early Imperial Age. Insofar as it ought to be clear that Platonism does not stem from a single person's creative effort, but gradually takes shape in the context of these debates and polemics, it should be possible to appreciate fully the contribution that a philosopher such as Eudorus made to the development of Platonism.

[77] MANSFELD (1988), 97.