



UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO

GRADUATE SCHOOL IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
PH. D. PROGRAM IN POLITICAL STUDIES - XXVIII COHORT

PH. D. DISSERTATION

“Trusting the Other: Generalized Trust in Divided Societies”

DISCIPLINARY SCIENTIFIC SECTOR: SPS/04

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Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Giuliano Regeni's job was searching for the truth. He studied and researched in order to better understand this world. He never gave up. And we don't have to give up now: we must ask for truth and justice, **for him** and all the victims of conspiracy and State crimes.

Il lavoro di **Giuliano Regeni** era la ricerca della verità. Studiava e faceva ricerche per capire meglio questo mondo. Non si è mai arreso e noi dobbiamo fare altrettanto: dobbiamo pretendere la verità e la giustizia, **per lui** e per tutte le vittime di cospirazioni e crimini di Stato

Declaration

I certify that the dissertation I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the Graduate School of Social and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. No part of the dissertation has been previously submitted to any university for any degree, diplomas, or other qualifications.

Abdalahdi M. Alijla

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Abstract

In this thesis I aim to examine the influence of institutional conditions on the level of generalized trust in divided societies. I argue through this thesis that institutions in divided societies are an important source of social trust in the long term and can easily destroy the level of social trust in societies if designed ineffectively and prove to be unfair and unequal. In general, the findings suggest that equal and fair public institutions are crucial to the social mechanism of trust.

In this thesis I relied on a mixed methods approach based on qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was used to answer the question of: to what the extent do institutional conditions have an effect on trust, using eight case studies. Regression analysis, backed with the case-study analysis was used to offer in-depth analysis of the case of Lebanon. This thesis provides empirical evidence that institutions have a substantial impact on the level of trust between strangers within a divided society.

In this research I have developed a conceptual framework from several relevant bodies of literature, mainly theories of social capital and generalized trust, that have been used as basis for the analysis. The QCA analysis shows that fair institutions with an effective and independent judicial and legal system, and an efficient non-sectarian civil society can maintain the level of generalized trust in divided societies and may contribute to more trust in the society. The QCA also shows that the absence of equality and fairness in formal institutions and the absence of public deliberation and consultation, including civil society, have a greater negative impact on generalized trust in divided societies.

I conclude that institutions in divided societies play an important role in maintaining and even building social trust in the long run, but they can also be detrimental to the level of social trust in societies if designed ineffectively and prove to be unfair and unequal. The findings suggest that equal and fair public institutions are crucial to the social mechanism of trust.

Table of Contents

Abstract		VI
List of Figures		XI
List of Tables		XII
Abbreviations		XIII
Chapter 1	INTRODUCTION	
1.1	Point of Departure	2
1.2	Background	4
1.3	Divided Societies and Trust	5
1.4	Research Question and Hypothesis	9
1.5	Thesis Structure and Overview	10
Chapter 2	SOCIAL CAPITAL: WHERE TRUST BEGINS	
2.1	Introduction	13
2.2	Social Capital's Origin and Definitions	13
2.3	Coleman's Development of Social Capital Concept	18
2.4	Putnam's Formula of Social Capital	21
2.5	The Conundrum of Social Capital's Source	23
2.6	Social Capital's Dilemma: Different Theories	24
2.7	Generalized Trust and Social Capital	27
2.8	Conclusion	28
Chapter 3	TRUST AND INSTITUTIONS	
3.1	The Centrality of Generalized Trust	30
3.2	What is Generalized Trust?	31
3.3	Origin of Generalized Trust	34
3.4	The Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust	35

3.5	Civil Society/ Association Theory of Generalized Trust	36
3.6	Cultural Theory of Generalized Trust	38
3.7	Generalized Trust and Race	39
3.8	Trust and Institutions in Divided Societies	41
3.9	Conclusion: Generalized Trust, Institutions and Context in Divided Society	44
Chapter 4	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	
4.1	Theoretical Foundations	47
4.2	Research Question and Conceptual Framework	50
4.3	Research Design	53
4.4	Case Selection	58
4.5	Data Collection Methods	62
4.6	Data Analysis	66
4.7	Research Quality	70
4.8	Challenges	73
4.9	Conclusion	75
Chapter 5	Which Institutional Conditions Maintain Trust?	
5.1	Introduction	76
5.2	What are divided societies?	77
5.3	Research on Generalized Trust in Divided Societies	79
5.4	Theoretical framework	80
5.5	Ineffective Institutions in Divided Societies	82
5.6	Generalized Trust, Institutions and Institutional Conditions	83
5.7	How Do Institutions Generate or Destroy Trust?	88

5.8	Operationalization, Mechanism and Analysis	97
5.9	Explanantes and Explanandum	99
5.10	Analysis	104
5.11	Results	105
5.12	Discussion	107
5.13	Conclusion	115
Chapter 6	Between Inequality and Sectarianism: Who Destroys Generalized Trust? The Case of Lebano	
6.1	Introduction	118
6.2	Lebanon: A Divided Society	120
6.3	Lebanon: Society of Distrust	124
6.4	Statistical Model and Results	127
6.5	Inequality: Expenditure on Public Universities as an Example	135
6.6	Inequality: The Trap of Lebanese Society	139
6.7	Sectarianism in Labor Market and Business	142
6.8	Sectarian Civil Society	144
6.9	Sectarian Legal System	146
6.10	What is behind low trust?	148
6.10	Conclusion	151
Chapter 7	CONCLUSION	153
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	165
	APPENDICES	174

List of Figures

Figure 1.1	Structure of the thesis	12
Figure 4.1	Grouping of case studies	68
Figure 5.1	The Causal Mechanism of Institutions and Generalized Trust	89
Figure 6.1	Trust in Lebanon 2007, 2011, 2013	127
Figure 6.2	Obtaining Jobs through connections (Clientelism)	131
Figure 6.3	The most important challenges facing Lebanon today (2010/2013)	132
Figure 6.4	Main priorities related to democracy in Lebanon	132
Figure 6.5	Generalized Trust and Institutional Conditions in Lebanon	135
Figure 6.6	How equally are you being treated?	141
Figure 6.7	Generalized Trust and Institutions in Lebanon: Causal Mechanism	151

List of Tables

Table 3.1	Four theories of trust and their related arguments	34
Table 4.1	Research Strategies in Different Situations	53
Table 4.2	Cases and Selection Criteria	61
Table 4.3	Sources of Data and Evidences Source	62
Table 4.4	Case Study Tactics for Research Design Tests	72
Table 5.1	Typologies of Research on Social Capital and Generalized Trust	80
Table 5.2	Institutions and Generalized Trust	85
Table 5.3	Explanans (Institutional Determinants)	98
Table 5.4	Explanandum Description (Outcome)	103
Table 5.5	Raw data from V-Dem, QoG and WVS	103
Table 5.6	Data matrix	104
Table 5.7	Causal recipes accounting for a high score of generalized trust	106
Table 5.8	Causal recipes accounting for low score of generalized trust	107
Table 6.1	Explanatory conditions used in analysis	128
Table 6.2	Four Models of Generalized Trust and Institutions Conditions: Lebanon	134

Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QoG	Quality of Government Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
UN	United Nations
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy Institute
WVS	World Value Survey
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats in Bosnia
OHR	High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina
GFPA	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
GT Index	Generalized Trust Index
Taif	Document of National Understanding in Lebanon

Chapter 1

Introduction

“In divided society, institutions reflect trust among different people. Institutions in divided societies are the link or the rope between these different ethnicities, if institutions work well, people will have trust and share an important value, if not, they will be fragmented and will not trust their own neighbors from different ethnicities”

Velma Saric

1.1 Point of Departure

This thesis discusses the influence of institutions on the level of generalized trust in divided societies. It asks why there are different levels of trust in divided societies and how formal institutions affect this paradigm. Generalized trust is understood as trust in random strangers without having a prior relationship or experience with them (Hardin 2001). Despite its importance and the role it plays in various social contexts, there is no consensus among social scientists on the definition of generalized trust (Barber 1983).

Trust is a key element not only on an individual level, but also at a community level. It is important in sustaining peace and works as a trigger to ending conflicts as well. It facilitates social coordination and interaction between individuals who have had no previous social interaction (Gambetta 1988). Despite the fact that this type of interaction is risky, in that one does not know its consequences, trust that leads to this kind of new interaction can effectively building bridges and be a catalyst for acquiring information. This kind of interaction is vital in post-conflict reconciliation processes where different ethnicities and

groups need to interact, creating a public sphere and debate as to which institutions they want and what kind of political system they desire.

Generalized trust is also considered a coercive method of control over social behavior (Coleman 1990). Moreover, social capital, of which generalized trust is considered to form a significant part, is believed to play a significant role in the development of democratic institutions (Foley, Putnam, and Edwards 2001). Additionally, social capital and trust contribute to peace building and hinder conflict in divided societies (Michaelene Cox 2008). Therefore, maintaining the level of generalized trust among people in divided societies throughout the reconciliation process becomes necessary. Considering historical, cultural and societal factors, institutions (both formal and informal) become the focus of the reconciliation process in divided societies.

The first step in rebuilding states and societies is designing and building viable institutions. There is consensus among social scientists that institutions are crucial to state-building in the aftermath of civil war or internal violence (Schindler 2010). Civil war and ethnic violence can destroy not only communities, but also institutions, leaving whole societies in ruins. Once conflict ceases, there is always a need to establish and redesign institutions to accommodate new realities and meet the requirements of the conflicting parties based on the conflict-ending agreements (e.g. Altaef agreement in Lebanon)¹. A large number of studies focus on institutional building (e.g. UN Report in State in Crisis and Post Conflict Countries 2007) as well as reconfigurations that are needed to adapt to the new state of the war-torn or divided society. Attention is often given to the crucial element of trust, by advocating that these institutions are designed to work transparently and effectively, with an aim to boost social trust between the different hostile groups (Bar-Siman-Tov 2011).

¹ The Altaif (*Taif*) agreement is the Lebanese National Agreement between the conflicting parties that was signed in Saudi Arabia to end the Lebanese Civil War. It was signed in 1989.

In democracies, institutions are the pillar of the society that is characterized by cohesion and absence of conflict. In divided societies, ethno-national elements complicate the situation, presenting a challenge for institutional and state-building. One of the major goals in divided societies is the rebuilding of viable, multi-ethnic societies. This thesis focuses on how institutions in divided societies work and influence the level of generalized trust, which, in turn, impacts lasting peace between previously in-conflict groups.

1.2 Background

Divided societies are challenged by history, culture, tradition, war and fragmentation, which create a low level of generalized trust and hence, a low level of social capital.

Social capital and generalized trust are two different concepts, yet generalized trust forms the major part of social capital. Therefore, many scholars tend to use the two interchangeably, a practice that will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section. The term 'social capital' was first used by Glenn to refer to social inheritance in familial inter-personal relations (Portes 1998), although the recent development of the concept of social capital can be attributed to Bourdieu (1985), Coleman (1988) and Putnam & Weil (1993). According to Bourdieu, social capital is the “aggregate of real or potential resources that are associated to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relations of mutual recognition” (Bourdieu 1985: 248). Coleman (1988) argues that two key features characterize social capital: consisting of some aspect of the social structure, and facilitating certain actions by individuals who are situated within this structure. These actions can be: building social networks, the acquisition of information, or the use of social cooperative norms and values. However, social capital has also been structurally defined as: generalized trust, access to membership in various types of networks, and norms of reciprocity (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993a). In other words, social capital is interpreted as

the degree of trust, co-operative norms, associational memberships, and networks within a society.

The literature on social capital, and, consequently, literature on generalized trust, has been divided into two main streams. On one side, there are scholars who argue that generalized trust variations depend on society-centric approaches (Fukuyama 2001; Martti Siisiäinen 2000). This means that generalized trust is inherited from historical, cultural and societal norms and values. On the other hand, there are scholars who support the institution-centric approach. This theory argues that for social capital to flourish, and generalized trust to increase, it needs to be embedded in and linked to the political context of a state as well as its formal political and legal institutions (Berman 1997; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Levi 1998; Tarrow 1996). According to these scholars, generalized trust can be created as a result of the policies and legal frameworks of political institutions.

1.3 Divided Societies and Trust

Divided, mixed or ethnically fractured societies are frequently torn apart by ethnic, political or nationalistic conflicts. The management of these societies is characterized by complexities caused by aspirations of the various ethnic groups to have their own political, cultural and societal institutions. Often, these aspirations are in conflict with each other and may lead to a decrease in trust under unequal and unfair institutional conditions, such as preferential public administration, biased public officers or particularistic public services. These are institutional conditions that favor specific ethnicities or groups of people, which leads to inequality in services, opportunities and other public goods.

This research will examine the impact of specific institutional conditions on generalized trust. For example, common bureaucratic practices may have a greater effect on the level of generalized trust than power-sharing institutions/institutional factors in a divided society.

This is because individuals recognize inequality and fairness from daily encounters with bureaucracy in local administrative procedures.

Trust in divided societies is a sensitive, yet intriguing topic that researchers have studied in an attempt to understand why one might trust strangers in a society in which multiple ethnicities and cultures exist and are often in conflict with one another. Moreover, variations in the level of generalized trust in divided societies can be fascinating in that they can provide a complex and detailed understanding of the possible connections between institutions, context, and cultural factors on the one hand and generalized trust on the other hand.

There is evidence to suggest that institutions are crucial to the creation of generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Generalized trust is positively associated with well-functioning institutions, public policies, and quality of governments (Knack and Keefer 1997; Peyrefitte 1996; La Porta et al. 1997; Putnam 1993a). The relevance of generalized trust to institutions lies in its capacity and ability to resolve problems of collective action, such as the provision of various forms of public goods, and avoiding a situation known as a 'social trap' in which short-term benefits for some groups of society have longer-term, often negative consequences for other groups or the society as a whole (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). Moreover, equality and fairness of formal institutions in divided societies can serve as the link between trust and institutions. Therefore, institutions are important mechanisms in influencing the creation or destruction of generalized trust.

Arguments for generalized trust are based on the literature on social capital, which highlights generalized trust as the principal component in social capital (Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 2001; Putnam 1993a). The basic argument is that the performance of public sector institutions and implementation of sound and fair policies can enhance the level of

generalized trust among citizens in divided societies.

I consider generalized trust to be social capital, or the main component of social capital. The reason for this is that individuals in any society can be members of associations, organizations and networks that consist of people who lack trust. Moreover, most definitions of social capital consider networks and associational membership as part of social capital. Arguably, and based on the cultural experience of the researcher, a divided society may have a high degree of memberships in associations and face-to-face interaction with strangers while simultaneously having a low level of generalized trust. Moreover, associations and NGOs in many divided societies, for example Lebanon and BiH, contribute negatively to the level of generalized trust as many of these NGOs are sectarian-based. Thus, members are polarized rather than being part of building bridges and advancing cooperation with other sects or members from other sects. This is clear in tribal societies such as Iraq, Jordan and the Arabian Gulf. In addition to this, members who lack trust usually play a destructive role in the other components of social capital and negatively affect the existence of other values related to social capital (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

Many scholars study generalized trust not as part of social capital, but rather as making up the entirety of social capital, arguing that generalized trust and social capital are synonymous (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Wilson 1997). They study social capital and its various effects, sources and consequences from different perspectives. For instance, from an economic perspective, social capital is considered a positive element in economic prosperity and growth. For the political scientist, social capital is important to the process of democratization. Social capital generates a feeling among citizens, despite their ethnicities or sects, of mutual respect and responsibility for their actions and gives them a sense of a shared future. For instance, Putnam, who studied the decentralization process in Italy,

concluded that the level of social capital in different regions determined how well democracy worked.

As social scientists try to examine social capital and generalized trust in developing countries, they end up focusing mostly on the cultural aspect, as there is little empirical data that covers an extensive period of time. Therefore, most scholars do most of these studies focusing largely on democracies where data are available for a long period of time (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010).

There have been very few studies that examine social capital and generalized trust in divided societies. These have taken place mostly post-war during the period of nation building from a peace and conflict perspective, such as in Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (Hakansson and Sjöholm 2007). In cases where divided societies were challenged by a lack of trust among the public, institutions had to be designed in order to adapt to the new realities, build trust among people, and increase confidence in political institutions.

This research proposes that a major source of generalized trust in divided societies can be found in state machinery, namely, the legal and administrative institutions of the states. The question asked is: “Why would unfair, corrupt, inefficient and biased practices in the administrative and legal machinery of the state influence the level of trust in their society?”

The intent of this thesis is to fill the gap in the discourse of generalized trust and institutions, providing empirical evidence that institutions have various levels of influence on generalized trust. The effects of institutions on generalized trust has been derived using a cross-case study analysis in eight societies: Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Turkey, Macedonia, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, and Iraq. The research hypothesis is that

institutions have an effect and can be a major source for maintaining the level of generalized trust in divided societies.

Measuring generalized trust in relation to institutional societal factors will guide policy-makers and researchers to a wider understanding of the mechanism of generating and maintaining generalized trust.

1.4 Research Question and Hypothesis

In order to get an insight into generalized trust in divided societies, this research will conduct a comparative cross-case study, using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method, and then refine the data with a single case study that focuses on Lebanon. The main question that this research aims to explore is:

“Under which institutions is generalized trust in a divided society maintained or destroyed, and how does this happen?”

Hypothesis

Following previous studies, my hypothesis is that various institutional conditions could be empirically modeled as determinants of generating or destroying generalized trust. The research tests one main hypothesis related to the effect of institutions on generalized trust. The main hypothesis is that generalized trust is associated with formal institutions.

In other words, trust is associated with three main factors. The first of these factors is institutional conditions (unbiased public administration, equality in providing public services, universality of public goods, feelings of safety and security, and policy-making decentralization). The second is the societal institutional conditions (public deliberation, activation, and creation of civil society). Last is a special governmental design (monopoly of power, and whether the judiciary is given a role as a potential avenue of influencing

trust). These factors reflect easily how individual experiences in the society in respect to equality and fairness are based on interactions with institutions.

As more research is being conducted on generalized trust and social capital and the important role they play in developing society, the process and conditions in which generalized trust is generated or destroyed in a divided society remain empirically unexplored. Given the complexity and diversity of divided societies, where some are still in the process of reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction, it is crucial that institutions are designed and implemented with full consideration of ethnic, political and reconciliatory circumstances. This is especially important regarding how these policies at state-level or city-level would directly impact the level of generalized trust.

1.5 Thesis Structure and Overview

This thesis is structured into seven chapters (see Figure 1.1). Following the introduction given in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 consists of a literature review on social capital and its link to generalized trust. It describes the different components of social capital and examines how and why they develop. In one part of the literature review, studies on generalized trust and institutions are examined. This identifies institutional conditions as a gap in the existing literature on social capital and generalized trust. Chapter 3 introduces generalized trust, its concepts, different theories, and where this thesis stands. It is also the point at which the link between generalized trust and institutions is made.

Building upon the literature and theory review, Chapter 4 begins by identifying major research gaps and formulating research questions. This is followed by an alignment of various elements of research design with the nature of the inquiry, which has to do with the selection of the case studies. Research design covering data collection, data analysis

procedures, and research quality assurance are also presented in this chapter, as well as a discussion of the challenges and activities involved in conducting research in practice.

Chapter 5 presents the main analysis of the thesis. It is a cross-case study using a QCA approach to find the combination of institutional conditions that effect, in higher measures, the level of trust. It presents and discusses different findings from various cases studies, with a focus on the institutional conditions used in the analysis.

Chapter 6 discusses in detail the Lebanese case study and how institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust. Using a single case study approach, backed by quantitative analysis from the Arab barometer dataset, this chapter selects a few variables that represent the institutional conditions (based on the findings of Chapter 5) and discusses them thoroughly, as to how they affect generalized trust in Lebanon as a divided society. In this chapter, analysis shows that institutions and trust in institutional performance, especially the inequality in receiving public services and the feeling of insecurity, increase the level of distrust within the Lebanese population.

Finally, Chapter 7 draws together the key research findings and translates them into implications for both theory and practice. It also acknowledges research limitations and indicates directions for future research.




Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis

CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL CAPITAL: WHERE TRUST BEGINS

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will review the key literature and theoretical approaches to the themes that I investigate in this thesis. Beginning with the definition of social capital, it draws the link to the different theories of formation and how generalized trust and social capital can be interchangeably used. It focuses on the Hanifan, Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman definition and explanation of social capital and its link to generalized trust. As such, I will consider literature examining social capital and generalized trust in general, deducing a working definition that paves the way to the theme of this thesis.

2.2 Social Capital's Origin and Definitions

There is a huge body of literature that discusses and focuses on social capital, but this literature fails to offer a unified definition. It is always problematic to arrive at a definition because the concept is flexible, allowing researchers to use it according to their field and specialty. For example, economists tend to use a slightly different definition than political scientists or sociologists. However, all scientists recognize that definitions of social capital differ across various disciplines in academia. In this chapter, I will review the key literature and theoretical approaches to the themes that I investigate in this thesis, the first challenge being to find a definition for social capital. I will also introduce different theories of social capital, how this concept was developed and its origin.

In the past, the usage of social capital as a concept was limited to a local level, whether one country or society, after which it moved beyond the local level to become a global term used in the arenas of the UN, international NGOs, states and global agencies (Lane 2006). Therefore, the emergence of global social capital leads us to think beyond borders to a form of social capital where ethnicities across countries share it, even though they are located in different countries.

Many scholars argue that social capital appeared in the works of Aristotle and later Alexis de Tocqueville, Durkheim and Adam Smith (Bahmani-Oskooee, Mohsen, Miguel-Ángel Galindo 2009). Traces of the concept of social capital can be found in the literature of Adam Smith. A clear and direct mention of social capital appeared in 1916 by Lyda Hanifan, a fact which most researchers and scientists agree upon. Moreover, measurement of social capital, social networks, generalized trust and cooperation can be traced back to ancient philosophies, even though these bear no relation to the modern concept of social capital (Farr 2004).

The debate among political scientists on one definition of social capital has led to the birth of many definitions and measurements of the concept itself. However, there is a consensus among political scientists and sociologists that social capital has become one of the prominent areas of study and will develop even further in due course (Lin, Nan, Karen S. Cook, and Ronald S. Burt 2001). Moreover, it became a big part of political science after Robert Putnam attempted to measure social capital and prove that it has a beneficial impact on democracy. Social capital has proven to be linked to the functioning of democracy, civil society, public policy and development. It acts as a catalyst to increase political participation and implement public policies (Fukuyama 2001). In the next section, I will explain the different definitions and theories of social capital.

2.2.1 Hanifan's definition

Lyda Hanifan referred to social capital as such:

“In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit, the rural community, whose logical center is the school. In community building as in business organization and expansion there must be an accumulation of capital before constructive work can be done.” (Hanifan 1916: 9)

Hanifan's definition of social capital is based on its non-physical assets, placing greater emphasis on social solidarity, goodwill, trust and other intangible assets. He uses this definition to support his argument about community participation in rural areas, and makes the argument that the lack of such capital in rural districts is of high significance and society must seek ways to improve the conditions of this capital. His argument, as a pedagogist, is aimed at not only developing schools but also a wider societal atmosphere whereby developing social capital would lead to the development of the economy, culture and values. He tested this argument in West Virginia where he tried to build trust and increase social networks among a population there. Before the start of semester, he held meetings with the community, trying to advance the quality of the school. Subsequent meetings in the rural areas developed a discussion of wider issues in the society with these meetings serving as a community center (Hanifan 1916).

The concept of social capital was developed through a process of dialogue with scientists and researchers contributing gradually, yet significantly to the concept and literature during different periods of time. Each addition or new definition was linked to the discipline in which it was used. Studying the background of scholars who tried to define social capital

will assist in knowing how, why, and where (in terms of discipline) the definition comes from. As Schuler argues, social capital's development has been strengthened and developed due to the contribution of three scientists; Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam (Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000).

2.2.2 Bourdieu's Formulation

Pierre Bourdieu used the term social capital in his article, "The Forms of Capital" where he defined social capital differently:

"Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition."
(Bourdieu 1992: 119)

Therefore, according to Bourdieu, social capital consists of two main components: (1) association memberships and social networks, and (2) mutual cognition and recognition. He argues, "The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent ... depends on the size of the network of connections that he can effectively mobilize." (Bourdieu 1986: 249) Bourdieu argues it is the quality of the outcomes that are produced and the strength and quality of the relationships between the different actors, not the quality of the group itself that determines social capital. He argues that membership in groups and involvement in social networks can be used to improve the social position of the actors in different social fields or classes. One manifestation of these groups is voluntary associations such as trade unions, political parties, etc. Bourdieu uses this to enforce his arguments on the 'theory of symbolic power'. He argues that differences in social capital can be realized at different levels of cultural and economic capital. In reality, his argument is based on the different level of powers actors have on social capital. He asserts that social capital has a 'multiplication effect' on the influence of other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1985).

Associations and groups create bonds of solidarity among members and institutionalize the capital they preserve. Therefore, voluntary association can be seen as a facet of social capital as it is a kind of resource, produced by association in a collective manner, and shared by its members.

According to Bourdieu, capital is a transformative phenomenon that can be converted from one form to another based on time and context. The economic, social and symbolic "profit" as a result of belonging to the association establishes a base for the growth of solidarity. The development of social networks is dependent both on individual subjective feelings in terms of recognition, respect, and communality, and on the institutional guarantees afforded by the organization.

The second characteristic of social capital according to Bourdieu is a symbolic one, with mutual recognition and cognition as the source. He argues that differences between social classes have to be transformed to symbolic differences to function as effective social capital. According to him, capital can be seen as a distribution of economic, social and cultural assets on paper and to be more effective, it has to be depicted as symbolic differences (Bourdieu 1985).

“Symbolic capital ... is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e. when it is known and recognized as self-evident” (Bourdieu 1985a: 204).

Bourdieu draws a line between the concept of symbolic capital and legitimate capital. Symbolic capital defines what forms and uses of capital are recognized as legitimate bases of social positions in a given society. It seems that Bourdieu is defining social capital in relation to a theory of symbolic power where he differentiates between different forms of capital. His work is strongly related work concerning social class. As we can see, there is

Marxist influence in Bourdieu's work as he discusses social class and symbolic power. However, he added the intangible dimension of capital, as opposed to Marx who focused on economic and tangible resources.

The effectiveness of symbolic capital depends on real practices of communication. Symbolic capital cannot be institutionalized, objectified or incorporated into the habitus. Symbolic capital exists only in the 'eyes of the others'. "It gives the legitimized forms of distinction and classification a taken-for-granted character, and thus conceals the arbitrary way in which the forms of capital are distributed among individuals in society." (See Martti Siisiäinen 2000, Bourdieu 1986; Joppke 1987, 60).

Where other writers see social capital as a fundamentally heartwarming network of social connections, Bourdieu instead uses it to explain the cold realities of social inequality. Here, social capital reflects the very worst side of the saying, 'It's not what you know, it's who you know.' His term points towards a world where the elite jobs go to posh men who attend exclusive schools. Bourdieu could very well be right – in fact, studies of social mobility continue to show that, to varying degrees, this is what indeed happens (Gauntlett 2011).

2.3 Coleman's Development of Social Capital's Concept

Coleman's definition of social capital is close to that of Bourdieu; however, the point of departure and contribution is different. Like Bourdieu, Coleman links social capital to economics. He aims to combine the insights of sociology and economic theory, seeing social capital as a way of making sense of the overly rational and individualistic models of traditional economics.

For Coleman:

“Social capital consists of some aspect of social structure, and facilitates certain actions of actors- whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure” (Coleman 1988: 98).

Coleman introduces social capital by outlining two broad intellectual disciplines in the description and explanation of social action. The first is the sociological approach, which sees the individual in a social and cultural environment, subject to norms, rules, and obligations. The second is the economic approach, which is about self-interested, independent individuals seeking to fulfill their goals. He fits his theory within the functionalist view of social action, which is conditioned by social structure and rational theory and suggest that actors’ goals can be achieved by the utility-maximizing doctrine of self-interest.

In Coleman’s model social capital is a resource which actors in any given society can use, similar to other resources such as human capital, physical capital, economic capital, the exception being that social capital is not owned by individuals, but comes instead as a set of collective resources available to them, giving it clear instrumental purpose. Coleman sees social capital as essentially residing in the social structure of relationships among people. However, he also sees social capital as a bonding mechanism that adds to the levels of integration in social structures, where social capital can be embedded as a resource. For example, if you live in a street where you can rely on your neighbor to take care of your garden and trees while you are away, then you have access to this form of capital, social capital, which other people in another neighborhoods do not have access to. Furthermore, this kind of resource cannot be sold or given. To be able to enjoy its privileges, you are required move to the area and become a member of that neighborhood. You must establish connections and relationships with neighbours, all of which takes time and effort in order to develop this kind of resource. All of this is necessary simply because social capital is a resource based on trust, norms and shared values, and developed from within, in

collaborative manner by people in these communities. For Coleman, social capital is a resource that relies on people who look at society from a collective perspective, who perform supportive and helpful actions because they believe in the general good and in solidarity with their fellow citizens. Coleman can't quite reconcile this with the kind of rational action that his theory assumes:

“Social capital is an important resource for individuals and may affect greatly their ability to act and their perceived quality of life. They have the capability of bringing it into being. Yet, because the benefits of actions that bring social capital into being are largely experienced by persons other than the actor, it is often not in his interest to bring it into being.” (Coleman 1988: 118)

For Coleman, social capital shares with financial capital an ease of making the micro-macro transition. Social capital infuses value into the aspects of social structure that become resources at the disposal of goal-seeking actors. As such, social capital can be used conceptually at both the micro and macro levels without requiring a separate theory of social structure working at the two levels of inquiry (Tzanakis 2013). Between Bourdieu and Coleman there are many differences, one of the primary ones being that Bourdieu considers social capital as reproduction of social inequality, though it may assist in integration and increased solidarity among specific groups. For Coleman, social capital is, somehow, of benefit to the general public, whereby any contribution by actors benefits the whole.

Coleman's contention that resources, attitudes and norms such as trust and reciprocity or social networks and associations can be understood as social capital has received criticism. Foley and Edwards argue that social capital is context-dependent and therefore context-specific. Since context conditions the use, value and liquidity of social capital, every attempt to fix social capital into an integrative function, as in Coleman's formulation, is severely

limited in scope (Foley and Edwards 1999). They stress that precisely because social capital is context-dependent, social resources are neither equitable nor evenly distributed. This is a point on which Coleman remains conspicuously silent. Shucksmith also rejects any treatment of social capital as a collective good. In his view, treating social capital as a collective good masks inherent inequalities in which assets are accessed and appropriated differentially by those who already have social and cultural capital (Shucksmith 2000).

2.4 Putnam's Formula of Social Capital

Putnam's work started a new discipline of research when he examined the concept of social capital in his well-known article "Making Democracy Work" in 1993 (Putnam 1993a). His aim was to understand democratic institutions and how they influence political and governmental practices. Bringing the concept of social capital to the discipline of political science grasped the attention of political and social scientists and increased the level of interest in the subject, widening its research agenda. For Putnam, social capital is 'features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam 1993b).

In his very well known work in Italy, he tried to examine the necessary conditions for the development of strong institutions and prosperous economy. His conclusion is that reform of Italian institutions in Northern Italy was a result of "civic community." He asserted the same reason to be behind the economic prosperity in Northern Italy. In northern areas of Italy (compared to their southern counterparts), there are well-functioning local governments and a better economy because public engagement and activities have contributed to a level of cooperation between citizens. The atmosphere of societal cooperation, networks and participation are very much a mechanism of advancing the functions of local governments. Trust between citizens is a contributing factor to these characteristics of society (Putnam 1993b). Moreover, Putnam differentiates between vertical and horizontal patterns of how social allegiances are set up. He argues that, while in the

south, people were subjects, in the north, they were citizens.

Activities of civic community are measured in terms of voter turnouts, newspaper purchases and participation in associations and societal activities. Putnam's final conclusion regarding the comparison between the north and the south is as follows:

"In the North the crucial social, political, and even religious allegiances and alignments were horizontal, while those in the South were vertical. Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and even trust - not universal, or course, but extending further beyond the limits of kinship than anywhere else in Europe in this era - were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue in the South, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy" (Putnam 1993a: 130).

He examined the quality of civil society and political development based on what he calls "historical treasure." In other words, "where you can get to depends on where you are coming from." Therefore, according to Putnam's argument, social capital is expressed in its sociological essence as community vitality.

For Putnam, forms of social capital are general moral resources of the community and can be divided into three main components: trust, social norms and social networks, particularly voluntary associations. He presents social capital as the amount of trust available in a given society, characterizing the political culture of modern society. Voluntary associations enable a horizontal linking of people, which produces trust/generalized trust. This norm strengthens the level of interpersonal bonding. What matters here is that social capital can be measured by the level of "trust" in a community or between individuals. Adding to that, from an institutional perspective, social capital can be depicted as the organization (vertical or horizontal) that distributes and leverages trust, where the value of this kind of capital lies in the relations between different parts of society.

2.5 The Conundrum of Social Capital's Source

The debate over the source of social capital continues as social scientists contribute to the literature. Many scholars argue that the bulk of social capital comes from institutions, mainly civil society institutions. This is in line with Putnam's argument (Leicht 2000). Other scholars argue that social capital relies mainly on traditional associations such as family and close-circle relations. However, many scholars reject this argument. Instead, they see governmental design and institutions as sources of social capital. Other scholars argue that public policies are the source of social capital. For example, Linda Cook found that the government in Russia plays a role in maintaining and destroying social capital (Cook 2003). Others examine how authoritarianism destroys social capital by eroding generalized trust, and discouraging civic engagement (Booth and Richard 1998).

Stolle argued that social capital resides in family, civil relations, civil society and political institutions (Stolle 2003). Later however, he and Rothstein argued that institutions have a greater impact on social capital (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Here, Hans Westlund backs their argument, stating that social capital has sources in public and private institutions and resides in all social classes, especially in civil society (Westlund 2006).

In addition to numerous attempts in social science studies to define the source of social capital, there have been other scholars who have tried to examine it from different perspectives. This research argues that the differences in definitions and disagreements among scholars on the real source of social capital come from the different disciplines and areas of study that theorists belongs to. In this respect, political scientists define it from their perspective, economists define and examine it from their viewpoint and sociologists the same. However, the agreement among all scholars is that social capital does not belong to another kind of capital.

There are as many different theories of social capital and its resources as there are different theorists' backgrounds. Schuller studied definitions and concepts of social capital from a different angle to Bourdieu, Putnam and Coleman. He argues that their definitions differ because they have different backgrounds. Despite this, all of them have one thing in common; the importance of social networks, and how social capital impacts health, education and crime (Schuller et al. 2000). Other scholars believe that there is no need to add a new capital to the existing one. However, that was when the concept of social capital was just emerging. As Kenneth Arrow says, there is no consensus among scientists that we need to add a new concept called social capital to existing forms of capital (Arrow, Kenneth 2000). Moreover, he went further on to argue that scientists must abandon the concept of social capital. He asserted that capital must rely on three dimensions: time elapses, sacrificing present resources for the future and transformative capability. Arrow's study has not received much attention, as it did not look deeply into the causes of the disagreement and the ambiguity of social capital on which he rests his argument.

2.6 Social Capital's Dilemma: Different Theories

As scientists continue to debate the definition, source, usage, measurement and emergence of social capital, there continues to be disagreement of its role in social, political and economic life. Scholars also try to falsify or find theoretical issues in the existing definition of social capital. As John Field discusses, social capital started as a simple concept and developed very rapidly to a more complex concept that focuses on people, their relationships and networks. As he argues, from that point, debates have been intense among scientists, which he asserts "is why the concept of social capital is limited, and may be defective" (Field 2003). Other scientists have taken radical positions by saying that social capital is not a concept. According to Babby and Leender, social capital assumes that actors

will get access to resources, as they participate in the community where these resources exist. For them, social capital theory focuses only on social resources in society and relationships among individuals. It is therefore an approach to study success and failure in a given society (Leenders 1999).

Other scholars consider social capital as a pattern to explain trust and cooperation in society. Paldam argues that many patterns explain how and why people build trust with one another and why they form social networks. He finds theories that explain cooperative behavior in all social science and economics fields and describes social capital as the glue that binds them all together. He categorizes the definition of social capital into three types: trust, cooperation and networks. He argues that trust facilitates voluntary cooperation between individuals, creating a strong correlation between social networks and trust. This thesis will follow these categories as many other researchers and scholars have done in the last two decades (Leenders 1999). Other scholars consider social capital as an approach developed to understand the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Moser 1999). Other researchers consider social capital as a mechanism to understand social and economic problems (Durlauf 2002).

Rose's Categories of Social Capital's Theories

2.6.1 Empirically Situational Approach

Social capital can be defined on a limited situational and contextual basis. It differs from one person to another and from one context to another. As Rose says, empirical theories of social capital assume that individuals rely on non-homogenous groups of networks. This depends on the conditions, incentives and actors. Since social networks change and

individuals differ from one situation to another, social capital cannot be defined as representing the whole society or group (Rose 2000).

2.6.2 Social Psychological Approach

This approach in examining and explaining social capital treats it as a social psychological capital, or cultural and traditional societal norms. As Welzel argues, social capital includes the culture of tolerance and trust that appears in broader social networks of any society as a consequence of increasing activism in voluntary association (Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch 2005). According to this approach, networks are a product of trust between the people more than trusts being a product of association. They argue that, as people trust each other more, they tend to interact more and form associations such as sport teams, music groups and other forms of associations, leading to an intensifying and increasing level of trust amongst them. Rose asserts that this group explains social capital as a set of cultural and traditional norms, whereby voluntary association/networks appear or increase as a result existing trust. At the least, trust and social capital are either the same or they are equal.

2.6.3 Cultural Approach

Cultural theory assumes homogeneity in social capital between individuals inside any given society. It argues that social capital exists at the same level across different societies with a similar culture. Rose refers to Fukuyama's study in which he sees social capital as static within any society without considering other institutional actors (Fukuyama 1995).

2.6.4 Two Measures: Between Consistency and Change

As we can see, Rose depends on two measures: firstly, social capital for individuals and secondly, contexts or situations. What Rose tries to conclude in his arguments is that social

capital depends on two changing measures which means social capital changes continuously. In an empirical approach, the two measures are in constant change, while in the psychological approach, the first measure -social capital on the scale of the individual- changes, while the second is static. The cultural approach on the other hand asserts that the two measures are static.

2.7 Generalized trust and Social Capital

When we argue about trust in society, we speak about the concept of “generalized trust.” Individuals usually do things out of good, not because they know each other or are rewarded on an individual basis, but because they trust that their own actions will be rewarded through a positive impact on the community. In a society, we need trust when we deal with strangers outside the family and close circle of relatives. Therefore, in order to leave the sphere of familiarity for a risky and complex environment, trust is needed (Luhmann 2000). Individual choices in daily life on the micro level produce mutual trust, reciprocity and higher type of trust on macro level that become an integrative value among the groups of strangers (Coleman 1988). Moreover, trust requires an intense social network and participation in different kinds of voluntary associations. As Seligman argues,

“The emphasis in modern societies on consensus (is) based on interconnected networks of trust - among citizens, families, voluntary organizations, religious denominations, civic associations, and the like. Similarly the very "legitimation" of modern societies is founded on the "trust" of authority and governments as generalizations” (Hausman and Seligman 1998: 14).

Generalized trust creates the basis for "brave reciprocity"², social networks and associations that are that are meant to be consistent and contribute to the development of the society. Generalized trust eases exchange without a need for enforcement and thus reduces

²Brave reciprocity is a concept borrowed from game theory, where yield that players(here individuals) yields total payoff for all.

transaction costs. This is the basis of cognitive social capital, which has been argued to be important in a country's institutional and economic development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). Other scholars suggest that social capital is a form of generalized trust, and therefore, its contribution to economic and agricultural development is always equal (Fafchamps and Minten 2001).

Trust and social capital can be so tightly connected as to prevent the ending of relationships when they are practically created in a society. In ethnically diverse societies, however, generalized trust appears to be low compared to homogenous societies. Studies by Alesina and la Ferrara find that racially diverse societies have lower levels of generalized trust than homogenous ones, which, according to them, reduces the efficiency of public services. This thesis attempts to prove the opposite mechanism whereby public policies impact the level of generalized trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Trust plays an important role, particularly when considering multi-ethnic groups living in the same society. Yet what, more precisely, is generalized trust?

2.8 Conclusion

With the rise of trans-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary research approaches within political science and sociology, the number of studies on social capital has increased significantly in different contexts that add to the academic literature by the emergence of different social capital theories. This thesis considers social capital in divided societies as a continually changing measure depending on the existing context. The context could be a change in the institutions, and this thesis examines and argues that institutions have a strong impact on the level of generalized trust, and therefore, social capital. This approach is closely related to the social psychological approach in examining social capital (Welzel et al. 2005). Sometimes, social capital refers to generalized trust, or the two can be used

interchangeably in this context. The reasons behind this is that most scientists agree that generalized trust constitutes the major part of social capital, however, they disagree on how much associational networks among individual contribute to social capital.

Divided societies present a unique environment for the study of social capital due to the educational, social, cultural and spatial division that exists between different religious and ethnic groups. Considering the high potential for social capital to contribute to the stability of societies, social capital plays an important role in inter and intra-group relations. Advancing research on social capital in divided societies requires more consideration. The models of social cooperation and trust and how they affect the level of social capital need thorough examination considering that ethnically/politically divided societies are easy to examine. Moreover, the impact of urban space in divided societies matters as the membership of voluntary association and activism affect social capital. Given the fact that ethnically divided societies may be spatially separated along ethnic lines as well, urban designation and separation need to be understood on a macro perspective in relation to how generalized trust, as the main component of social capital, can be maintained or destroyed.

CHAPTER 3

TRUST AND INSTITUTIONS

“The importance of trust pervades the most diverse situations where cooperation is at one and the same time a vital and fragile commodity: from marriage to economic development, from buying a second-hand car to international affairs, from the minutiae of social life to the continuation of life on earth.” (Gambetta 1988 ii)

In this thesis, generalized trust refers to trust between strangers and unspecified people. This kind of trust is not based on self-interests or anything else; rather, it is the personal belief that most people can be trusted, without fearing that they may cause harm. Despite the attention this has been given by sociologists and political scientists, few studies have examined the concept of generalized trust thoroughly from an institutional perspective. Although many among these great studies derived a sharp conclusion, they have seldom examined generalized trust and its source in institutions from the different analytical levels of an interdisciplinary approach. There is more of a focus by sociologists on generalized trust and its research than by political scientists. However, in the last few decades, more interdisciplinary studies have examined generalized trust. Welch et al argue that generalized trust is necessary for providing meaningful social relations, and it reflects the functioning heart of healthy society, polity and democracy (Welch et al, 2005).

3.1 The Centrality of Generalized Trust

The centrality of generalized trust has been touched on by Fukuyama, who describes social capital as “capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in a certain parts of it” (Fukuyama 1995). He argues that trust is embodied in the smallest social groups,

though individuals, to the biggest community patterns, through bonds of family and relatives. Fukuyama distinguished between two types of trust: the first is familistic trust, which builds bonds around family members and the second type being non-kin trust, i.e. between strangers. Non-kin trust is created among strangers to meet the virtue of modernity. According to Fukuyama, their trait to trust spontaneously in organizations, associations, or society with strangers is the reason why high-trust societies are economically more successful.

Theories on generalized trust approach the questions of trust's generation and its relationship with institutions from two distinct viewpoints: cultural and institutional. They follow the same theories that explain social capital. It is argued that cultural and institutional theories "share a fundamental assumption that trust is learned and linked to some level of experience," (Mishler and Rose 2001), yet they differ significantly on when this learning takes place and what kinds of experiences are critical. While cultural theories assume that trust is learned in cultural socialization with closest kin and friends and has a long-lasting effect on an individual, institutional theories emphasize that the learning of trust happens later in life and is closely affiliated with rational evaluation of institutional performance. The next sections present the definition and different theories of generalized trust.

3.2 What is Generalized Trust?

There are differences in how generalized trust is defined, largely because economists see generalized trust as a commodity. For example, Hardin examines trust as a commodity (Hardin 2004), and Misztal treats it as a public good necessary for the economy (Misztal 1996). Both argue that trust is necessary as it works as a lubricant facilitating all kinds of economic exchange (Krishna 2001). From an economic perspective, trust encourages cooperation between people, enhancing interpersonal relations, which promote cooperation

(Arrow, Kenneth 2000; Krishna 2001; Putnam 2000) and boost the market machinery.

The sociological perspective sees generalized trust as a means to strengthen and build social relations. For them, generalized trust is used to rebuild struggling communities or weak ones, and to promote growth in strong societies (Wilson 1997). Thus, generalized trust increases the security of a society and stabilizes social relations, increasing the stock of social capital (Miztal 1996).

What is trust then?

For Miztal, trust is the belief that one's intended actions will not harm us and will be seen as acceptable (Miztal 1996). This idea of trust is backed by the fact that individuals in any given society will react towards others based on the amount of perceived good intent, or "trust" they have in the society or the other individual (Hardin 2001). Other scholars define trust through the lens of complexity. For example, Luhman argues that trust is equal to the reduction of complexity (Luhmann 1979). The reduction of complexity is meant to allow societies to cope with uncertainties and complexities of modern societies (Lewis and Weigert 1985).

For this thesis, generalized trust is associated with uncertainty and complexity at the same time. The uncertainty lies in the reaction of the other individual or society in general. In divided societies, one does not see individuals only, but rather a whole group, sect or different ethnicity and therefore, with the exception of his close friends, these individuals are considered as one person. Complexity refers to the complexity of beliefs. Individuals react based on their belief or knowledge of others. Sometimes, an individual may have knowledge of another individual from a certain ethnicity or sect having had a bad experience with this individual. His knowledge or experience will be reflected in his trust in them. Simultaneously, the others will react to his(dis)trust with distrust. In summary, this

explains why trust is the expectation that others' actions are not harmful.

Types of Trust

There are two types of trust: generalized trust and particularistic trust. Generalized trust is directed at people in general in the community while particularistic trust is linked to identifiable people such as friends, family members and neighbors. Generalized trust is the one that forms the main and essential component of social capital. As Putnam argues, “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993a: 167).

There is also a difference between knowledge-based trust and generalized trust. The former is directed towards particular objects, individuals and organizations (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Moreover, Newton differentiates between thick trust and thin trust. Thick trust develops between people of the same tribe, class or ethnicity through frequent interactions. Thin trust develops between people with different backgrounds through intermittent interactions (Newton 2001). The former is based on strong ties whereas the latter is characterized by weak ties (Granovetter 1973). Thick trust can be another name for particularized trust whereas thin trust would be generalized trust.

Sztompka noted that there could be a distinct divergence between different types of trust particularly with primary trust and secondary trust. Primary trust depends on the trustworthiness of the objects of trust. Deciding who to trust is based on trustworthiness, reputation, performance and the properties of the objects of trust. Secondary trust is dependent on the surrounding context; where objects of trust exist and how they behave. Primary trust is related to particularized trust whereas secondary trust is associated with generalized trust (Sztompka 1996). This definition of trust does not depend on the characteristics of the object, individual or organization. It depends instead on how it

behaves.

From another perspective, Delhey categorizes generalized trust based on two schools of thought; trust as individual property and trust as social system property. The first maintains that trust is associated with individual personality and characteristics, social classes and demographic features. The second argues that trust is the property of the social system. According to the second one, the study of generalized trust and its origins requires examining the institutions of the societies and their properties (Delhey and Newton 2003).

3.3 Origin of Generalized Trust

Nannestad identifies four types of origins of generalized trust after reviewing the literature on generalized trust. He describes these four types as: the civil society explanation, the institutional explanation, the cultural explanation and the social structure explanation (Nannestad 2008). Table 3.1 shows the theoretical arguments of these theories.

Table 3.1 Four theories of trust and their related arguments

Explanation	Variables
Civil Society	Membership of voluntary organizations
Institutional	Satisfaction with democratic values, political freedom, public safety
Cultural	Optimism, personal variables
Social Structure	Satisfaction with the community, community safety

In the next section, we will focus on three different theories of generalized trust; the institutional theory of trust, the association/civil society theory of trust and the cultural theory of generalized trust.

3.4 The Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust

The institutional theory of generalized trust is the main theory that I rely on in this research. According to this theory, generalized trust cannot exist independently from politics and the state's institutions in the presence of civil society. Institutions create, change, and influence the level of generalized trust (Levi and Stoker 2000; Levi 1998; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Tarrow 1996).

When people face institutions and policies that cannot protect them and their rights, they lose trust in these institutions. This causes people to think that others are resorting to methods that violate the law, such as bribery. This assumption leads them to question whether they can really trust others, and one's level of generalized trust is decreased. Rothstein and Kumlin use game theory to prove that good governance increases the level of generalized trust in society (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005).

They argue that people expect representational institutions to act fairly. They see elected members of these institutions as the persons that were chosen to deliver services to them. However, they have little personal and daily contact with them, which means there is less chance to develop generalized trust between people and elected institutions. Thus, it is the implementation of public services such as the police and courts, health, and education that must be perceived as trustworthy in order to build generalized trust. Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that countries with a high level of trust have, for the most part, lower levels of corruption, better functioning bureaucracies, more effective legal systems, lower rates of theft and "better government." They also find a link between generalized trust and how institutions are able to effectively protect property and rights (Knack and Keefer 1997).

This thesis examines eight cases studies of divided societies. These countries are Lebanon,

Iraq, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa, and Kyrgyzstan. In this research, I argue that institutions influence the level of generalized trust. These societies all consist of one or more ethnicity or sect and have societal, religious and political disparities and hostilities.

The formation of the divided society from different ethnicities affects the conduct of public policy and has various measurements of institutional conditions, which in turn affect the level of generalized trust. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of professional civil service, unfair distribution of resources and inequality of economic and societal opportunities in some provinces, accompanied with the past, can present a strong element of support for the above argument.

In Lebanon, there is a high level of nepotism and patrimonialism in public service due to the power-sharing mechanism between more than five large sects and more than ten ethnic minorities within the government. This has led to a very low level of trust between the politicians themselves, the people and the politicians and the people themselves. Moreover, the people lack the ability to elect their president directly, making Lebanon one of the very few countries that have not had a president for a long time. Furthermore, there are few judicial and legislative constraints on politicians, political parties and the members of the parliament. This has led the people to question if they can trust others who are endangering the political landscape and opening doors to violence again.

3.5 Civil Society/ Association Theory of Generalized Trust

The association-based theory of generalized trust emphasizes the importance of voluntary associations and other networks in the community in the process of producing generalized trust. Building on Tocqueville's early work on American democracy, the networks-based approach highlights the role of civil society in generating faith in fellow citizens (Skocpol

1997).

Putnam argues that a dense network of voluntary associations generates social capital by cultivating norms of reciprocity and trust and providing networks of social interaction for civic action, which ultimately contribute to the effective performance of democratic institutions. Putnam relates civil society and association to democratic governance through social capital, with generalized trust being the essential component (Putnam 1993a). According to this theory, generalized trust is generated by face-to-face interaction between members of the voluntary associations. The more face-to-face interaction there is between individuals, the higher chance there is that they will build bridges and trust each other and transfer this trust to the wider community.

Many scholars argue that the mechanism of how particularized trust among the members of these associations can be translated into generalized trust is ambiguous. Cohen argues there is no reason to expect that interpersonal trust between members extends to non-members. Moreover, it is not yet understood which type of voluntary associations and activities are linked to the production of generalized trust. Within the framework of this research, I found no casual mechanism between membership in associations (charity, voluntary or religious) and generalized trust in Lebanon and Iraq, based on the Arab Barometer's dataset. Yet, this thesis is not interested in the variable of association, and therefore no analysis was done on it.

Associations are a very important form of social interaction and reciprocity. They influence social interaction and cooperation between different actors and individuals in different ways. According to Putnam, it "increases the potential costs to a defector in any individual transaction", "fosters norms of reciprocity" and "facilitates communication and improves the flow of information about the trustworthiness of individuals." Associations "embody

past success at collaboration, which can serve as a culturally-defined template for future collaboration,” (Putnam 1993b). As we see, associations are crucial, not only for building cooperation, but also for initiating the necessary platform for interaction, cooperation and building trust.

This is clear in Iraqi and Lebanese societies for example, where, despite millions of dollars having been devoted to supporting such activities over long periods of time, the level of generalized trust either remains the same or has decreased. International funds for civil society organizations are usually poured into ethnic-centric or sect-centric organizations, whose activities benefit only one sect or work mostly in areas with majority of one sect. In this case, the argument that associations can build trust among different ethnic groups is made void as there is only one group targeted and thus only that group benefits. In many cases, these organizations belong to or are managed by the sectarian political elites or their political parties, which, instead of building trust between ethnicities, turn into associations that destroys trust as they mobilize for their own ethnicity or provide services for their own members only.

3.6 Cultural Theory of Generalized Trust

The cultural-centric theory of generalized trust argues that generalized trust is more related to general worldviews. Uslander, the most well known advocate of the cultural-centric theory, considers trust to reflect an optimistic worldview. He posits two different types of trust: strategic and generalized trust. According to him, generalized trust stems from the family and is inherited from the parental environment. He argues that “generalized trust stems from an optimistic view of the world that we initially learn from our parents...” and a “mixture of values people learned as children and ideals they took up later in life,” (Uslander 2003). For Uslander, optimism is the most notable cultural value. He argues that

the main component of optimism is the view of a shared future or a better shared future in the society. He argues that optimism is “a view that the future will be better than the past and the belief that we can control our environment so as to make it better.” For him, optimists in any society see the future differently; they see in their surroundings a good place and the society around them as good people. They do not worry about other people exploiting or cheating them. Therefore, they tend to trust strangers or at least do not doubt them. They focus more on the future and see developing a long-term relationship with others as a priority (Moss et al. 1958).

The cultural-based theory of generalized trust supports the argument that when people are more socialized and optimistic, they tend to trust others more. They believe that unknown people can be trusted. This theory argues that trust is inherited from parents at an early age. Moreover, it argues that trust is static and cannot be changed, as it is not based on experience and interaction with other individuals within the society. Furthermore, this theory maintains that optimistic individuals and families have a higher level of generalized trust than pessimists. Therefore, pessimistic families try to isolate their children from the outside world, leading to a lack of interaction and keeping the level of trust low. In summary, this theory argues that at no time do institutions and the state have any link or causality with the level of generalized trust.

3.7 Generalized Trust and Race

A common finding in studies of generalized trust is that there are significant differences in people’s ability to trust, especially in societies that have different races. An explanation for this is that there are ranges of individualistic and communal characteristics, which vary by race and influence trusting behavior. For instance, people’s willingness to trust is found to increase significantly as their education and income increase. In mixed or ethnically divided

societies some groups are more disadvantaged than others and more likely to live in poor, racially segregated and neglected neighborhoods. This compounds with factors fueled by unequal economic and societal opportunities and institutionalized by government policies, all of which may undermine the level of trust.

A key explanation for this persistence is that individuals who are members of a discriminated against or disadvantaged group are less likely to trust individuals from another group because of the discriminatory or prejudicial treatment they have received in the past (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Past experiences may influence expectations of trusting behavior not just for the individuals directly affected, but also their children.

South Africa, Turkey and Iraq offer a particularly interesting context to explore race differences as they feature a long history of segregation and systematic discrimination. Whites in South Africa, Sunnis in Iraq and Turks in Turkey have long occupied an economically advantageous position in society. Although the apartheid system ended in South Africa in 1994, the legacy of apartheid persists in access to education and employment. In Iraq, though Saddam's regime ended in 2003, the segregation persists as the Shiites took over the country, giving more economic and societal opportunities to Shiites and depriving Sunnis of their rights. In Iraq, residential segregation continues to be informally enforced as the militias of both sides keep growing and murdering members of the opposite faction. In South Africa, residential segregation along race lines is no longer enforced, yet this segregation largely continues, at least in part because of sustained differences in socio-economic status. The same applies to the Kurds in Turkey.

3.8 Trust and Institutions in Divided Societies

“The cascade of problems stemming from bad policy is a driving force behind the low level of generalized trust, and diversity”

Fadi D. : 2015

The importance of generalized trust that many social scientists and scholars recognize is that it leads to better governmental performance and a happier public. However, others argue that it may be that good governance makes people more likely to trust each other. Both may be true. This research examines and argues that institutions and good governance make people more likely to trust each other.

Levi argues that a state and its institutions can create generalized trust (Levi 1998). She argues that a state, and particularly a democratic state, can produce trust in people. Furthermore, she argues that states build trust through:

“The use of coercion” and that “democratic states may be even better at producing generalized trust than are nondemocratic institutions...because they are better at restricting the use of coercion to tasks that enhance rather than undermine trust.” (Levi 1998: 87)

Democratic states, with a restricted use of coercion have a higher level of generalized trust because they design and use state institutions for advancing the level of generalized trust within the society rather than destroying it. A state with institutions that distribute power equally, provide equal access to public goods and services, and do not marginalize or exclude an entire ethnicity or sect will enjoy a higher level of generalized trust. For example, Northern Ireland has a higher level of generalized trust than Iraq or Lebanon. This is because of the dramatically different political and economic institutions. Imposing an institution on an ethnicity or a part of the population that provides preferential treatment and services for other ethnicities or the majority will have negative consequences on generalized

trust. Individual satisfaction in institutions and equality in front of law and public services will have a positive impact on generalized trust. As Rothstein demonstrates,

“If people believe that the institutions that are responsible for handling ‘treacherous’ behavior act in fair, just and effective manner, and if they also believe that other people think the same of these institutions, then they will also trust other people.” (Rothstein 2001)

In comparison, Levi argues:

“The trustworthiness of the state influences its capacity to generate interpersonal trust...” (Levi 1998: 9)

Kumlin and Rothstein elaborate on this linkage:

“...If you think...that these...institutions [of law and order] do what they are supposed to do in a fair and effective manner, then you also have reason to believe that the chance people of getting away with such treacherous behavior is small. If so, you will believe that that people will have very good reason to refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and you will therefore believe that “most people can be trusted.” (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005” 322)

Generally speaking, a state’s institutions will impact generalized trust in any society. If an individual thinks that others will behave the same as he is behaving, by not breaking the law and will receive the same treatment, services and opportunities, he or she will not behave in a treacherous manner that may harm others. This, in turn, leads to a high level of trust in others. Strong state institutions and impartial public administrations restrict unlawful behavior on an individual basis, and by extension collective unlawful behavior, resulting in a law-abiding society where trust prevails.

In divided societies, the role of institutions is seen as particularly important and necessary. Stolle suggests that the negative relationship between social capital or trust and heterogeneity is caused by segregation rather than the diversity itself(Stolle and Harell 2013). The level of generalized trust in many divided societies is not low, such as in Ireland and Belgium, but others have a very low level such as in Lebanon and Iraq. Trust is low

when one minority feels that it is not recognized, or if the majority or a particular group has a monopolizes power and/or wealth based on the institutional framework or institutional gaps. Institutional gaps are usually the undefined regulations that distribute political, societal or economic rights to individuals or social groups. These gaps are usually abused in favor of one of the sects or ethnic groups. Stolle argues that ethnic conflicts are caused by structural frameworks, such as social mobility, linguistic and educational constraints or unjust distribution of power between the groups (Stolle 2002). He also argues that modifying institutional constraints to groups by adopting politics of recognition and minority rights may reduce segregation and resentment, opening up the possibility of developing social capital. This thesis echoes Stolle's argument.

The bulk of empirical research on generalized trusts in mixed societies considers local areas as the place of interaction where generalized trust is generated or decreases. By defining the place and context as narrowly as possible, it is easier to draw theories about where generalized trust can be enhanced or diminished based on the contact or conflict. Therefore, local areas have potential for maintaining the level of generalized trust. Moreover, institutions in local areas are crucial to generalized trust. This is because the main two elements in generating generalized trust are the level of interaction in terms of contact between people and institutions, and whether or not they protect individuals' and groups' rights fairly and equitably. The mechanism can be presented as follows:

Diversity -> (society) interaction + institutions -> generalized trust erosion or generating

Depending on the above mechanism, the more refined the place, as a unit of research, the more creditable the findings on the relationship between generalized trust and institutions in divided societies can be. While I do emphasize the local place as a key element in understanding the link between generalized trust and ethnicities from an institutional perspective, a state or country's role should not be dismissed. In reality, a state's institutions

are reflected in the village or on the local scale.

In divided societies, it is necessary to know about the impact of different institutions that affect generalized trust. Many divided societies adopt ethnically or ideologically diverse institutions while others adopt the opposite. In ethnically mixed societies, there is much discussion about diversity, division and the formulation of the institutions that are designed to manage diversity and public resources. If the state's institutions are accommodative, universalistic and fair, then we can expect a high level of generalized trust.

3.9 Conclusion: Generalized Trust, Institutions and Context in Divided Society

This chapter discussed the definition of generalized trust. It also described the different theories that examine generalized trust and its origins. Indeed, each theory has its own advocates and detractors. For the purpose of this study, we accept the institutional theory of generalized trust. This does not mean we falsify or reject the other theories. Rather, we provide a new detailed mechanism of how such institutions and why the presence of some policies may affect the level of generalized trust more than another set of policies or institutions.

Levels of generalized trust are most likely affected by more than one causal mechanism, which is reflected in the above theories. Each theory only explains a certain proportion of the generalized trust present in a country and its historical and political context.

While a number of variables have been defined and will be investigated, it is likely that others will still need to be identified in order to more fully explain levels of generalized trust in our case studies, particularly given unusual post-socialist and post-conflict contexts.

What are the important dimensions in the context of divided societies that are necessary for the maintaining and development of generalized trust? Based on many comparative and case studies, a variety of actors and elements are of high importance on both the local and

national scale for generalized trust in divided societies. Through the review of literature on social capital, generalized trust and institutions, and with focus on eight cases studies, I find the following factors to be of high importance in relation to institutions and generalized trust:

- Socio-economic resources of the country and economic inequality that is institutionally initiated among the different groups, may greatly influence the level of generalized trust (Rose 2000; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).
- The social interaction, both formal and informal in densely populated area. When the society is homogenous, this is positively associated with trust. When local government provides more space for interaction, such as sport clubs, hospital and educational facilities, the more interaction occurs and higher levels of trust are achieved. In this matter, a comprehensive and neutral civil society in these dense areas becomes of high importance, as they are the third party and facilitators of interaction between people.
- Individuals who have had personal and direct experiences with others of different racial backgrounds are more trusting than those who have not had such experiences (Marschall and Stolle 2004).
- Fair and equal institutions in the local and central government lead to more trust. The more they are universalistic and consultative to the different ethnic groups, the higher the trust among individuals themselves and also between individuals and institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

How does one extend trust to strangers they have never met before and on whom one does not have any prior information? How does generalized trust increase or decrease in divided societies based on the institutional theory of generalized trust?

These are important questions that the next chapter will deal with, because trust in strangers constitutes a key component of social capital essential for the health of a society.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis is comprised of inter-disciplinary research that bridges political science and sociological studies with the purpose of examining the institutional conditions of generalized trust in divided societies.

This chapter gives an overview of the thesis's research approach and aims at discussing the methods and rationale that have been adopted to achieve the goals of the research. It identifies the research question, the theoretical perspective and research gaps.

It also contains a description of the methods used to conduct a qualitative multi-case study, namely Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), and single case study (regression analysis). Moreover, the chapter explains the reason why this research adopted mixed methods in general and a QCA in particular. It discusses the definition of divided societies and the selection of the case studies along with the data collection methods used including primary data, secondary data, semi-structured interviews, direct observations and document analysis. The chapter then looks at the qualitative analysis techniques that used to analyze the data. It ends with a discussion on issues of research quality, such as reliability, validity and generalization.

4.1 Theoretical Foundations

There are different theories concerning the origin of social capital, which contribute to the ongoing debate on the sources of generalized trust; these range from the theory that asserts

the link between association membership and generalized trust to the institutional theory of generalized trust.

Despite the vast literature on generalized trust and the important role it plays in the development of society, the processes and the conditions in which generalized trust is generated or destroyed in a divided society remains unexplored, both empirically and in comparative studies. The several attempts that have been made to explore this question were either challenged by the specificity of the context of the examined country and the scarcity of data, or by the inability to investigate it from a policy perspective. As a matter of fact, more sociologists are focusing on generalized trust, rather than political scientists who are more interested in democracy and democratization in divided societies.

Many scholars argue that associational membership generates generalized trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Putnam 1993). As Brehm and Rahn assert, there is a strong effect of civil engagement through associational memberships on interpersonal trust: “The more citizens participate in their communities, the more they learn to trust each others; the greater trust that citizens hold for others, the more likely they are to participate” (Brehm and Rahn 1997).

Participation usually happens in voluntary associations or through informal community gatherings. Associational membership increases the level of political participation and cooperation among members, which then multiply reciprocity and trust (Almond and Verba 1989).

Other theorists provided a new perspective into the issues that challenged this theory. Levi argues that generalized trust emerges as a result of institutions and policies (Levi, 1998).

Explaining why institutions are more important than associations, Newton argues that citizens are influenced in their daily life by institutions, such as schools, governmental agencies and families, all of which matter more than their engagement and membership in associations (Newton 2001).

Other scholars focus on social bonds. For example, Fukuyama argues that trust is rooted in individual morality (Fukuyama 2001); this means that there is a collective shared moral compass within a community where one individual would trust the other. As Freitag claims, “The willingness to share collective endeavors as well as a set of individual normative beliefs and moral codes such as the support of fairness or the disapproval of freeloading conditions the attitudes that individuals have toward their fellow citizens,” (Freitag 2003). They assert that trust emerges from the need for personal morality in everyday life, which is acquired from family members during childhood.

Another explanation about the origin of generalized trust frames it as a product of a wider trust in political institutions. Theorists supporting this hypothesis stress the idea that confidence in political institutions will enforce the law and ensure punishment for those who break it. According to Hardin, cooperation and trust would be impossible without strong governmental institutions (Hardin 2004).

Despite the ongoing and previous research on the origin of trust, few questions have yet to be answered, such as: which institutions affect trust the most and which institutional conditions or combination thereof can influence the level of generalized trust? This thesis intends to answer these questions using data from a variety of sources, filling the research gap by selecting a few institutional factors important to ethnically diverse societies and examining their effect on the level of trust within different timeframes.

The argument of this thesis is based on theories that stress institutions are crucial to the creation of generalized trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). According to this perspective, generalized trust is positively associated with well-functioning institutions, public policies and quality of governments (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; Peyrefitte, 1996; Putnam, 1993).

A number of institutional, political and societal variables may have an influence on the level of generalized trust in any given society. Yet, institutional variables are mostly associated with good governance determinants (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Thus, it is important to consider institutions, their conditions, the political context, and the effects of interaction between these factors in a serious manner.

4.2 Research Questions and Conceptual Framework

4.2.1 Knowledge Gap

Based on previous literature review, two important unresolved issues were identified. Firstly, there are few studies examining the link between generalized trust and institutions in divided societies. Secondly, although experts acknowledge, empirically and philosophically, the fact that institutions have an impact on generalized trust, very few attempts have been made to examine specific policies or institutional conditions, especially in divided societies.

Compared to the extensive attention that has been paid to studies on democratic mixed societies, there has been very little discussion on the applicability of these theories in non-democratic divided societies. And despite the great amount of research on social capital and generalized trust in the last three decades, there are still some important gaps in understanding the sources of generalized trust, especially the relationship between institutions and trust (Farrell 2005).

4.2.2 Research Questions and Research Objectives

Comparative research on generalized trust in divided societies from a policy perspective is still rare. Existing studies argue that there is a direct link between institutions and generalized trust, albeit, few give empirical and comparative evidence to support their arguments. (Levi 1998, Rothstein and Stolle 2004) This thesis argues that there is a direct link between institutions and the level of generalized trust in divided societies. Secondly, it argues that different institutions, or combinations of them, are more important than others according to the time and place of their implementation.

Therefore, this thesis addresses the following key question:

Under which institutions is generalized trust in a divided society maintained or even destroyed and how does this happen?

This question is important for several reasons; most importantly, by knowing which institutions influence generalized trust more, policy-makers and analysts can give more weight to and put more effort into these institutions. As a result these institutions will cause an elevated level of trust making these societies less vulnerable to internal conflict, which is costly in both the short and long run.

In order to answer this question, different theories on generalized trust and social capital have been studied, with the aim to examine the impact of institutions and policies on generalized trust. Based on a range of theories and hypothesis, a few research objectives are as follows:

- How do institutions impact generalized trust?
 - Does generalized trust originating in divided societies differ from that in heterogeneous societies?

- How do different types of institutions affect the level of generalized trust in divided societies?

These sub-questions are highly important for the following reasons: The first sub-question can lead to the conclusion that institutions influence generalized trust in both divided and homogenous societies. Moreover, the second yields more empirical evidence that there are specific institutions that can have a higher impact on some societies. The sub-questions are mainly answered using QCA, attempting to find empirical outcomes that support this thesis argument. The QCA also provides examples from case studies based on interviews, reports, archives and regulations all of which are examined qualitatively. Statistical analysis of Lebanon as a case study based on the outcomes of the QCA analysis will confirm the results of the cross-country analysis.

4.3 Research Design

4.3.1 Selection of the Research Method

There are several ways to conduct research in the social sciences, such as surveys, case studies, comparative analysis, archival examinations, experiments, path dependency, and analysis of history(Berg 2001).

Table 4.1 presents the different methods and their applicability. Each of these research strategies has pros and cons, which need to be taken into consideration. For instance, experiments are more important when testing cause-effect relationships in controlled settings by separating the cause from the effect. One of the main strengths of experimental research is its strong internal validity; yet, generalizing findings can be problematic because

there can be other external factors affecting the results. Such a method is also costly and time-consuming (Silva 2008).

Case study is an in-depth examination of a problem in a real-life setting over a certain period of time. The main strength of this method is its ability to investigate wide social and political factors that are associated with the research question. One of its drawbacks is a lack of control, which makes it difficult to establish causality and the mitigate the impact of a personal bias of the researcher due to his or her observational and interpretive abilities (Bhattacharjee 2012).

Table 4.1 Research Strategies in Different Situations (Yin 2003:5)

Strategy	Research Question	Control over Behavioral	Focus on Contemporary
Experiment	How, why?	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, how, what, where, how much?	No	Yes
Archival Analysis	Who, what, how, where, how much	No	Yes/No
History	How, why?	No	No
Case Study	How, why?	No	Yes

Three main questions must be answered before selecting a proper research method: the type of the research question, how does the researcher control the events in the research environment and third what is the degree of relevance of new or historical phenomena(Yin 2009). Answering these questions with respect to this thesis, it is clear that a qualitative case study serves the purpose of this research.

The form of this thesis' question is "how." The question is "How do institutions generate, maintain or even destroy generalized trust in a divided society?" or in other words, "Under which institutions is generalized trust in a divided society maintained or even destroyed and how does this happen?" It is also applicable when the question is asked in a different form such as, "Why do different divided societies have different levels of generalized trust?" This research does not need a control for behavioral events. It focuses on modern historical events, examining how generalized trust can be maintained or destroyed by institutions by analyzing data on social problems from 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The consequences of the events are examined both historically and in the present-day.

A mixed method is used to answer the thesis' question. The methods used are a combination of a qualitative method (QCA) in the comparative analysis of the different cases and a common statistical model (logistic regression) in the single case study.

A qualitative multi-case study approach was selected to answer the question raised by this thesis due to the nature of the research question and its applicability to the context and available data. This research strategy is useful in analyzing questions in which the process is affected by the context.

In order to analyze multiple-cases data, QCA was used to find the combination of variables that affect the level of generalized trust. The researcher conducted a set of interviews with experts and policy makers from the different case studies; the influence of the institutional conditions derived from the QCA analysis of these interviews was then used to quantitatively analyze their effect on generalized trust in Lebanon.

4.3.2 Why a Mixed Method?

The combination of QCA and case study methodology allows for a more solid and deeper understanding and investigation into the research question. This facilitates the research as it

provides the researcher with the chance to see which institutions have a greater or lesser impact, which means less efforts and time when studying the most influential institutions. As it is a mixed method, I will both be performing qualitative research and applying the case study method with regard to policies in divided societies.

Mixing qualitative methods with statistical analysis expands the scope and enhances the validity of research (Creswell 2014). Therefore, the Lebanese case study uses a statistical model based on in-depth qualitative research to test the results of the QCA analysis and support the main argument of this thesis.

This thesis is based on a mixture of variable-oriented and case study-oriented research strategies. Case-oriented methods can sometimes be biased and have no set structure, where many variables will change over time, yet may remain unnoticed or unexamined by researchers. Case-oriented study is usually used to test theories and to understand specific case studies in a specific context. Variable-oriented studies may also present an issue of bias and lack of generality. The bias of variables-oriented study is usually in favor of structural explanations where human agents and social process can be absent.

The major analysis of this research is based on the application of Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)(Ragin 2007). CsQCA is a case-oriented approach ideally suited for a small to medium number of cases. Every section of research has to have a research design, which must include study questions, propositions, unit of analysis, the causal mechanism that links data to the proposition and the criteria of interpreting the findings(Yin 2009). Research design is the logical link between the initial question, the data, and interpretation of the findings.

The methodology of this research entails data collection and a description of the different case studies; it also uses an inductive data-analysis approach.

Generally, the careful selection of a qualitative case study and the use of a QCA of case studies provide the best method to study the effects of institutions on generalized trust in divided societies for the following reasons:

- Focusing on generalized trust and a limited number of survey values (measurement of the dependent variable—generalized trust) simply provide too few observations for a statistical analysis. While a collection of single case studies, with in-depth research in one or two cases, suits both QCA and the aims of this thesis.
- This thesis focuses on the level of generalized trust and on how specific institutions and institutional conditions influence it; this necessitates a qualitative assessment categorizing these institutional factors and how they can be coded.
- From this thesis correlation between the different variables is expected. Public goods are not particularistic, for instance, when power distribution does not exclude minorities.
- This thesis is more interested in case-specific pathways and not the average effect of policies on the level of trust. This requires a case-based approach that thoroughly examines the complexity of interaction between the different variables.
- This thesis focuses more on examining in-depth, the effect of specific institutions or interacting institutions, which needs a case-based approach. QCA will assist in deciding if a combination of interactions or one particular institution has a greater impact and will allow for a deeper examination of the case studies.
- QCA can be applied empirically to policy analysis.
- QCA allows for a more informed discussion between policy makers and the researcher or the policy analyst, since one of its most important characteristics is transparency. The researcher approaches the analysis with a clear method, which

allows the researcher to make clear-cut decisions during the research period (Rihoux and Grimm 2006).

- QCA allows the use of different types of data (quantitative or qualitative) and the researcher can choose different ways to operationalize them. Hence this thesis uses data from more than one source to fit the purpose of the research.
- This method uses a case-based research and analysis process, which this thesis follows.
- The method can be applied on different levels - cities and region, national, sub-national, and regional. As Rihoux and Grimm argue, “There seems to be a particularly strong potential in the application of those methods at the level of supra-national regulatory bodies, who attempt to reach policy goals to be implemented in different national and regional settings.”
- The results are presented in a manner to provide policy-makers and practitioners with clear recommendations to meet the needs of these societies in terms of policy and institutional reform priorities.

In Chapter 6, the Lebanese case study aims to examine and test the results of QCA analysis. It also uses a mixture of methods, a case-oriented method with interviews and tracing policy changes in institutions, and a variable-oriented one, which is based on regression analysis of data. A logistic regression is used to explain the effect of institutional conditions on generalized trust as a dependent variable. As generalized trust is binary, the regressions show the degree of change to either more trust or less trust. In order to ensure that the analysis was done correctly, a number of models were integrated, with each one including different variables, and the last model including all of the variables.

4.4 Case Selection

Expressions like “divided societies”, “contested societies”, “multi-ethnic societies” and “polarized societies” must be used with clear definitions to avoid misinterpretation and confusion. Each one of these definitions is rooted in different urban contexts and emphasizes a different dimension of fragmented societies(Haklai 2013). Moreover, some terms are used to describe different environments. For example, divided societies can be used to describe deeply politically divided societies; yet in other cases, it alludes to ethnic or racial divisions such as those existing in some cities in the United States. The nature of the division can vary across time in the same society. If conflict increases as a result of violence, division increases. Violence can be attributed to the desire to hold political power, as in Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. In other cases it can be explained as a consequence of economic elements (material gain) such as in Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. In some cases (e.g. South Africa), it is motivated by social factors.

Societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey have experienced ethnic conflict and violence associated with political differences. In cases like Lebanon and Iraq, the conflict over power is the focal point and the magnet for unresolved ethnic issues. In other cases such as Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, the conflict over resources as well as economic and cultural equality is the source of conflict between ethnic groups. In cases such as Turkey, the conflict over territorial sovereignty and land is the key catalyst for tensions related to ethnicities. In this thesis, the type of societies examined is one that is subject to ethnic conflict, reflecting ethnic fractures.

This thesis represents a qualitative case-study research that seeks to fuse empirical and conceptual work on generalized trust in divided societies. At its core it is a study of eight cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Macedonia, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan

and South Africa. The Bosnian, Lebanese, South African and Iraqi cases are typical examples of divided societies. Studies on Bosnia and Macedonia were conducted after the Balkan war, South Africa, before and after the apartheid regime, Iraq following the collapse of Saddam's regime and Lebanon since the Lebanese civil war started in 1974. The ethno-national division in politics and daily life is deep within these societies.

The selection of eight case studies and their examination using a case-based qualitative method (QCA) allow for a degree of probabilistic generality. However, each case can still have its own unique contextual factors.

The method used here is a combination of medium number of cases, and N=1 case study. While a large N does provide great benefits in its clarity, theoretical elegance and parsimony, it does not give an in-depth qualitative analysis such as in smaller N cases (Peters 1998). However, this comes at the expenses of richness and depth of study in the context derived from national, subnational or regional case studies(Landman 2000). Therefore, using eight case studies is beneficial to providing both analytical elegance and in-depth examination of the research question. I have chosen to adopt a multiple-case design, with the research unit defined as a divided society.

The case studies are mostly non-democratic or transitional countries. The main explanatory issue here is that different divided societies that share the same element of violent conflict and post-conflict reconciliation have different levels of generalized trust. My selection covers a range of cases: one from the former Soviet Union (Kyrgyzstan), two from the Arab World (Lebanon and Iraq), two from the Balkans (BiH and Macedonia), one from Africa (South Africa), and two semi-democratic and democratic countries (Turkey and Pakistan).

The scope of these case studies is states that have experienced an internal (armed or non-armed) conflict and political instability as a result of ethnic conflict between at least two

groups. According to the UCDP/PRIO dataset, any country that has experienced internal armed conflict between the government of the state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention from other states (Type 3 in the dataset) is defined as a divided society³. Therefore, these case studies are countries, which have experienced a Type 3 conflict in the last 30 years where the consequences, such as political instability or division, are ongoing⁴. The selected cases are detailed in Table 4.2. The main aim is to measure generalized trust, compare it among these divided societies and to examine how different policies increase or decrease generalized trust.

This thesis will examine the unique differences in institutional conditions between the various countries of study, which could explain the varying degrees of generalized trust. The cases come from small population segments of ethnically divided societies. Each case fits the criteria of having experienced a conflict between at least two ethnic groups, some featuring an extreme amount of violence with over 1000 fatalities.⁵

The research also examines the differences within the cases themselves. Each case is represented by two or more timeframes that are aimed at capturing the difference in institutional conditions and the level of generalized trust. Each case study is represented by two phases in the analysis, with the exception of Turkey and Pakistan. The rationale behind this is to capture first how changes in institutions occurred directly after the end of the civil war or conflict and again after five or ten years post-conflict. It is beneficial to do so as generalized trust does not change significantly over short periods of time.

For example, the Lebanese case number 1 examines the period directly after the withdrawal of the Syrian army, while the second time frame examines the institutions and the level of

³ <http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/3-2005b/>

⁴ <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2014>

⁵ Uppsala Conflict Barometer 2013.

trust as of 2014. In Iraq, the first phase examines institutions directly after the fall of the Iraqi Ba'ath state led by Saddam Hussain, while the second looks at the situation over five years later. Turkey and Pakistan are the exception as they have gone through several significant institutional and political reforms over the last two decades, making it necessary to include the changes in institutions and the level of generalized trust.

Table 4.2 Cases and Selection Criteria

Country	Organized Conflict Index 2014/ the last 30 years	No. of Ethnic Groups/Sects
South Africa	4/5	4
Lebanon	4/5	18
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2/5	3
Macedonia	2/5	6
Pakistan	4/5	5
Turkey	2/5	2
Iraq	5/5	5
Kyrgyzstan	4/4	3

Despite the fact that there are many divided societies that have experienced violence, the scope of existing research is limited, with only a few cases that have continuous data on generalized trust and accurate data on policy tools. Therefore, the researcher was constrained in his case selection. In selecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Iraq, Lebanon and Kyrgyzstan, the researcher has chosen to examine the level of generalized trust in post-conflict eras, or in other words, during the reconciliation process. In Turkey,

Pakistan and South Africa, the researcher examines the level of generalized trust influenced by institutions across many years, during both reconciliation and peaceful times.

4.5 Data Collection Methods

As this research adopts a multiple-case research design, a number of different types of data are used. The case studies are comprised of documentations, interviews, direct observation (Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia), urban and physical artifacts (Yin 2009), each one with its own advantages and disadvantages. An overview is given in Table 4.3

Table 4.3 Sources of Data and Evidences Source: (Yin 2003)(Adopted)

Source of Evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly - Unobtrusive – not created as a result of the case study - Exact – contains exact names, references and details of an event. - Broad coverage – long span of time, many events and many settings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Retrievability – can be low - Biased selectivity, if collection is incomplete. - Reporting bias – reflects (unknown) bias of author. - Access – may be deliberately blocked.
Archival records	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [The same strengths as documentation] - Precise and quantitative. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [The same weaknesses as documentation] - Accessibility – can be low for reasons of privacy

Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Targeted – focuses directly on case study topic - Insightful – provides perceived causal inferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bias due to poorly constructed questions - Response bias - Inaccuracies due to poor recall - Reflexivity – interviewee says what interviewer wants to hear
Direct Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reality – covers events in real time - Contextual – covers context of event 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Time-consuming - Selectivity – unless broad coverage - Reflexivity – event may proceed differently because it is being observed - Cost – hours needed by human observers
Participants Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [The same strengths as direct observations] - Insight into interpersonal behavior and motives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [The same weaknesses as observations] - Bias due to investigator’s manipulation of events
Physical Artifacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - [The same strengths as observations] - Bias due to investigator’s manipulation of events 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Selectivity - Availability

As one of the main sources of data in science is quantitative data, mass numerical datasets over long periods of time provide an opportunity for researchers and academics to identify problems, measure changes and identify new trends, raising new questions. This thesis uses two major sources of data; the first is in collaboration with the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, where the researcher assisted in collecting primary data and used the Arab Barometer for the regression analysis of Lebanon as a case study; the second is interviews. V-Dem data will be used in QCA analysis, while interviews will be used in a case-study analysis that focuses on specific policies.

This thesis uses the V-Dem dataset for the majority of the independent variables, as it is a collection of data on more than 300 indicators measuring different dimensions of democracy from 1900 to 2012. With the help of multiple experts, this dataset codes each variable to provide measurement on various indicators (Coppedge et al. 2015). Experts' ratings are aggregated through a Bayesian item response theory model (Pemstein, Tzelgov, and Wang 2015). This model takes into account that coders may make mistakes. There are also bridging experts who code different surveys and provide data based on their knowledge, but are not from the country in question.

The data and the method by which the indicators selected from V-Dem were collected and coded are shown in Appendix A. A secondary dataset used are the Quality of Government datasets from Gothenburg University. Given the objectives of the research and the complexity of the field, the coded datasets alone are insufficient. Therefore, an in-depth approach is needed to complement the research, and this is achieved by the inclusion of interviews. Indeed, V-Dem data analysis using the QCA method will lead to specific results and allow the researcher to focus on some policy tools, yet interviews will examine these institutions and how they influence the level of generalized trust. The Arab Barometer

provides highly reliable scientific data that measure politically relevant attitudes in the Arab world. It has three time frames and covers 14 countries including Lebanon and Iraq.

Semi-structured interviews were adopted during the research, which allowed more flexibility to raise questions during the interview which were conducted either face-to-face, on Skype, by telephone, or email. Considering that this research focuses on divided societies, examining generalized trust and how institutions influence it, new questions may arise or the area of the focus of the interviews may be expanded a little to allow for a more in-depth analysis. Moreover, observations of daily life in Lebanon, BiH and Iraq provide for a deeper understanding of the society and how institutions interact with ethnicities and sectarian politics. Given the diverse case studies, translation was needed in some cases but this thesis primarily interviewed policy-makers, academics and community leaders who speak English in order to avoid the back-translation method for cross-cultural research.

4.5.1 Interviews in Divided Societies

Prior to conducting interviews, pilot interviews were conducted in two societies (Turkey and Lebanon). One interview was conducted via Skype and another face-to-face. The questions used were mainly yes or no answers which then led to more open-ended questions, such as, “Do you think having policies (later changed to 'institutions') that facilitate more civil society intra-ethnic groups increase trust?” The answer would be: “Yes/No”, which would then be followed by questions determining why and how. Upon completion of these pilot interviews, interview questions and formats were developed, providing clear guidelines for semi-structured interviews.

The interviewees were selected from the different cases studies on the basis of their knowledge, experience and work in the field of dialogue, policymaking and inter-community activities. In general, these included academics, professionals, individuals who

work in NGOs and religious leaders who have knowledge of or have encountered events associated with war, reconciliation and have the capacity to be interviewed (mostly in terms of the language). Additionally, they were selected on the basis of having knowledge regarding trust, policies and division in society. All interviews were arranged either by personal contacts or through an institutional capacity, such as V-Dem. The research and its purpose were explained to the interviewees. During the interviews, confidentiality was ensured according to the preference of the interviewee.

All interview data were recorded via note taking. Digital recording was not used because most of the interviewees refused to allow it. Some respondents were unable to talk comfortably and felt reluctant to speak, especially about sectarianism and division in society in regard to formal policies.

4.5.2 Secondary Sources

A very important part of the external and internal validity of any research is the diverse sources of evidences (Yin 2009). In this research, data were collected from different sources, detailed above. However, other resources were used, such as country reports from international and national organizations, case studies and archival reports that focus on policies, democratization and reconciliation. Sources including organizational and individual reports such as municipal and political parties' reports and agendas were equally used. These sources provide strength to the research, which is necessary to avoid interview bias.

4.6 Data Analysis

This research analyzes the cases both individually and comparatively to provide a careful investigation of the question. The combination of the two approaches can help to counteract

information-processing bias. This also prevents reaching false research conclusion and findings (Eisenhardt 1989).

4.6.1 Cross-Case Analysis

Cross-case analysis is very beneficial when it comes to examining complex and compounding factors. It identifies the combination of actors that have contributed to the outcome of the given case as well as giving an explanation as to why this outcome is different from another by taking into account to present conditions. Furthermore, cross-case analysis provides clarity with regard to hypotheses, concepts and theories that are discovered from one case or a combination of cases (Khan and VanWynsberghe 2008). It also enhances the researcher's capacity to ask more questions and discover relationships that may exist between the compared cases (Ragin 1997).

One tactic in cross-case analysis is to select a group of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between them. However, in this thesis, policies that influence the level of generalized trust will be grouped together. In addition to cross-case analysis, a second phase of data analysis is carried out in examining these institutions within a single case study in depth.


This juxtaposition of similar institutions can go beyond simplistic governmental framework, finding more nuanced similarities between different cases, which then leads to a higher level of understanding of the research question. The grouping of the presented cases is indicated in Figure 4.1

4.6.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

To do a cross-case analysis, this thesis uses QCA as the main method of multi-case analysis, which is followed by pure qualitative research, based on interviews and secondary data analysis.

FsQCA is a research approach that is case-oriented and suited to small to medium N, N being the number of cases. This method examines the specific combination of conditions under which an outcome, in this case, generalized trust, occurs, but does not give a numerical estimate of the effect of these conditions on the outcome (Mahoney 2010)

Figure 4.1 Grouping of case studies



In QCA, causation is expressed in terms of sufficiency and necessity, which are currently receiving much attention among political scientists and sociologists. Therefore, many theories and hypothesis are tested and formalized using the concept of necessity and sufficiency (Goertz 2003). The QCA method enables both in-depth and information rich study of individual cases and the scientific comparison of cases to reveal complex links that are typical of cross-case research (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). QCA is based on the idea that the configurations of the variables or conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. Necessary conditions must be present for an outcome to occur. However, their presence cannot make the outcome occur every time. On the other hand, sufficient conditions always lead to the outcome but the outcome can also occur in their absence.

Fuzzy sets provide QCA with a novel tool that transforms categorical concepts into measurable conditions. Its explanation is that each case holds a degree of membership in one or more sets.

4.6.3 Case Study Analysis

The second phase of the research involved the thorough examination of the case studies. A single case study (Lebanon) was selected due the quality of interviews and availability of data. Moreover, for each case, interviews, policies, administrative papers, observations and reports were used as both primary and secondary sources. Data from the semi-structured interviews were analyzed with the coding process. First, the interview text was reviewed and divided into categories (e.g. the entry and exit of policies of civil society, expenses on educational and health, distribution of political power and bias in public administration). These categories were then analyzed in accordance with their relation to each other and to trust.

The use of logistic regression (logit) is a necessary step to check effect of combinations of variables and single conditions from the analysis. By selecting a set of variables that represent the set of conditions used in QCA, this study assessed which conditions had more influence on generalized trust than others. Logistical regressing is one of the most used statistical methods to assess the probability of trust in a society as a result of a set of variables. Logistic regression models test the relationship between a set of independent variables and the dependent variable; in this case, either trusting or distrusting others. For practicality and a binary outcome, this study uses logit regression and is modeled using STATA 12.

4.7 Research Quality

Evaluating the quality of any empirical social research includes four aspects that need to be maximized; these are “construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability” (Yin 2009).

Construct validity regards enough operational measures for the concept to be examined. It refers to how the subject of the study is addressed and which processes have been taken into account to obtain adequate observations (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009). Case study research can achieve construct validity by responding to different theories in literature review and more than one source of data. In order to establish construct validity in this research, two tactics were used. On the one hand, multiple sources of data were used: WVS, V-Dem, QoG, Arab Barometer, European Value Survey. On the other hand, interviews and data collected were used, under a confidentiality agreement. After collecting the data and running the initial analysis, the first findings were presented to the informants and they discussed the results.

Internal validity/credibility is the identification of causal relations where independent variables may influence other variables in the research study (Johnson 1997). In qualitative research it is not enough to examine cause-and-effect in terms of dependent and independent variables, but it is also necessary to establish a generative mechanism, equally important as the causal mechanism (Guba and Lincoln 1994). To achieve internal validity, two methods were used in this research. First the examination of a cross-case study analysis using the QCA method to derive and deduce findings regarding policies that affect generalized trust, and second, an in-depth analysis of a single case-study research using logistic regression. It also linked the findings to previous theories, mainly the institutional theory of generalized trust. Moreover, it was presented as preliminary findings and methods in a peer-reviewed discussion at a conference, and received feedback and criticism.

External validity or generalizability or transferability is regarded as the scope to which the findings and results of the study can be replicated beyond the case studies examined (Yin 2009). Single-case studies cannot ensure statistical generalizability. According to Eisenhardt (1989), four to ten case studies can provide a good basis for analytical generalizability. Therefore, a multiple-case study method was adopted to strengthen the external validity of the research.

Reliability aims at reducing errors and biases in the study. Reliability also deals with the capability of other researchers to examine the same question and cases and obtain the same results. It is based on the realist assumption that there is only one reality, which can be examined repeatedly (Yin 2009). To obtain reliability, a very careful documentation, clarification and verification of research data and processing was conducted. Although some names of informants cannot be shared publicly, they can be shared with academics and the research supervisor at any time should this be needed.

Table 4.4 Case Study Tactics for Research Design Tests

Test	Case Study Tactic	Implementation phase	How this study takes them into consideration
Construct Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multiple sources of evidence - Informants review draft and preliminary findings. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection Composition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multiple sources of evidence - Interviews with academic, policy makers and community leaders
External Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use replication logic in multiple-case studies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data Collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multiple-case study method adopted, with 8 cases
Internal Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perform pattern matching - Perform explanation building - Address rival explanations - Use logic models 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data Analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Used previous theories - Used mixed method - Presented findings in peer-reviewed conference - All possible combinations of findings were considered
Reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use Case Study protocol - Develop Case Study database 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Careful documentation and clarification of the research procedures and data - Case study database, including case study notes, interview transcripts, case study documents.

4.8 Challenges

As this study examines generalized trust in divided societies by a defined set of institutions, the difficulty of finding applicable literature, obtaining primary data and selecting the right individuals to interview was a big challenge. One of the most important reasons why there are few empirical studies on the relationship between institutions and generalized trust in divided societies, particularly the undemocratic or semi-democratic ones, is the lack of data on public organizations.

Most professionals, policy-makers and civil society personnel divided societies are unwilling to cooperate with academic research and are very sensitive to external investigation of issues such as institutions, ethnicities, minorities and trust among the public.

Due to this difficulty of conducting research on divided societies, on trust and public institutions, it is important to employ personal contacts and social networks, to adopt informality when conducting interviews and seeking permission to gain access to data.

Another difficulty was the scarcity of the variable of generalized trust in the World Value Surveys and local surveys done by national organizations. It was also challenging to gain access to local surveys done by local centers in these countries, as they see this data as confidential, which must not be provided to second or third parties. Therefore, relying on WVS and surveys from Iraq and Lebanon, in addition to stable networks and relations with these centers, was very helpful.

In addition to this, it was difficult to obtain secondary data from V-Dem on some policies and institutional conditions. Thus I worked individually in contacting academics and

policy-makers to code the data for V-Dem in the case studies of this research, which took a lot of time and effort. Assistance in aggregating and cleaning the data by the V-Dem team was of immense help. Without these personal connections and networks, getting the data for long periods of time and for more than these case studies would be difficult a research journey research and diving into the policies of each country for each year.

Given the confidentiality and sensitivity of institutions and generalized trust in ethnically mixed societies, all the key interviews were conducted with academics and senior civil society professionals. They usually refused or did not have the necessary documentation of the policies being discussed on hand, as the whole issue of trust and policy was informal in many cases.

A failed research interview happened with a local policy-maker and academic in southeastern Turkey in the city of Malatya and in the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. In Turkey, calls and attempts to get to the board of the city were refused once they found out about the research question. This city has Turks and Kurds. In Kirkuk, Kurdish academics refused to answer the questions, explaining that these issues are natural and there is no need to add fuel to the fire in that region by doing such sensitive research. Using personal and informal channels was the only alternative to this. Language was a barrier and a time-consuming factor in this research. Looking for experts and community leaders who speak even a little English was a real challenge, as it required a lot of time and effort.

In summary, when conducting research on generalized trust and institutions, it was extremely difficult in many cases to access the policy-makers and civil society professionals for interviews. It was however relatively easy to get access to raw data from primary and secondary sources using personal networks and relations.

I gave my best effort to move back and forth, narrowing and broadening the research scope to stick to the research questions. I tried to present the views of different ethnicities, stakeholders, decision-makers and governmental officials as well.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter provides the framework and methodology of the research. Given the research question, objectives, and literature review, this research has come closer to the sociological position of social constructionism, and thus cross-country and an individual case study approach has been adopted. It has developed eight case studies aiming to explore the effect of institutions on the level of generalized trust in divided societies. Detailed sections of the research question, objective, method and design were presented in this chapter. This chapter has established the research framework and methodology appropriate for this research and valid and reliable results are expected.

The findings of the cross-case study analysis and of the case description will be presented in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 5

Which Institutional Conditions Maintain Trust?

5.1 Introduction

In divided societies, the question of generalized trust is more complicated as the societies are composed of different ethnic groups, each one with its own political and societal agenda to meet its own aspirations. Ethnic groups within these divided societies maintain their own vision of what the nation should be and what the political institutions should be. Therefore, many of these societies have been dragged into violent conflict, losing trust with other groups. In a post-conflict era, these societies try to rebuild their state's institutional capacities, reconfiguring the different related institutions to meet the minimum aspiration of all ethnic groups. Yet, not all these institutions are implemented and put fully into force, allowing some ethnic groups to exploit these institutions or gaps within the newly-established institutions, which in turn influences the relations between the different groups/sects and, consequently, also the level of generalized trust.

This chapter provides evidence of what kind of institutions make people express high-generalized trust or distrust and under which institutional circumstances they do so. As this research tries to address institutional sources of trust, I would like to endeavor to solve the issue of the institutional origins of generalized trust. In this chapter, I start by explaining the meaning of divided societies and will then briefly examine how institutions influence generalized trust. I will also discuss different institutional conditions that influence the level of generalized trust, explaining why they are selected, and their relevance to the question of

this thesis. Drawing on data from V-Dem, QoG and WVS, I will identify the combination of variables with the necessary and sufficient conditions (institutional conditions) in which the examined divided societies build higher generalized trust. In the next sections and chapter, I will corroborate these findings with interviews and data collected from interviews and previous literature. By using Configurationally/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), I will show how certain institutions, and the combination thereof, are necessary or sufficient to help divided societies maintain a higher level of generalized trust.

One of the principal questions of interest for researchers and policy makers relating to institutions and generalized trust is the huge variations in the level of generalized trust among societies, countries, regions and cities (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Why do some societies enjoy a greater level of generalized trust? What differences are there between these societies that makes the level of generalized trust differ? Is there an institutional dimension that causes the variation in generalized trust? All these questions have not been fully explored and pose a real challenge to policy makers. The field of examining the different levels of generalized trust empirically is weak since it is under-researched and therefore has very few hypotheses.

Building on the previous chapters, and with the available data, this thesis empirically proves that institutions influence the level of generalized trust in divided societies. The question that I examine is under what kind of political and social institutions/circumstances people express trust or distrust in each other.

5.2 What are divided societies?

The terms divided societies, contested societies, multi-ethnic societies and polarized societies must be clearly defined to avoid misinterpretation and confusion. Each of these concepts is characterized by different urban circumstances and emphasizes varieties of

dimensions in their fragmented societies. Moreover, some terms are used to describe different environments. For example divided societies can be used to describe a deeply politically divided society. Deeply politically divided societies are societies where polarization and division are based on political ideologies (Cavanaugh 1997), such as Egypt (Political Islam, nationalists and secular parties) or Palestine (Hamas, Fatah).

It is common in divided societies for members of sects or ethnicities to desire power and superiority over others. This is also true of the desire to have better services such as education, health services, roads and higher quality of life. As May Nabhan explains, “In Lebanon, members of sects feel proud of the service they receive from their own hospital and educational institutions. They always talk of how clean and organized their districts are too.” (Personal Communication, M. Nabhan 2016, Beirut) Therefore, ethnic or sectarian division over power or wealth is present and reflected in the sectors of services and formal and informal institutions.

In divided societies the legitimacy, political structure, decision-making process, and institutions are strongly contested among the different ethnic groups. Moreover, the governance process is fought over as a way of seeking power, equal opportunities in economy/land, or an autonomous political system. Therefore, socially divided societies can become, at some point, politically divided societies. In this thesis, the types of societies being examined are prone to intense ethnic conflict and violence, reflecting ethnic or nationalistic fractures. In such societies, ethnicity and nationalism create pressure on group rights, autonomy or even territorial separation (Bollen 2007). Societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey have experienced ethnic conflict and violence associated with political differences.

5.3 Research on Generalized Trust in Divided Societies

There are many theories that examine social capital and generalized trust in divided societies. However, these studies focus more on race-based issues. For example, Hinks and Posel examine the conditions of generalized trust in South Africa as a racially divided society. Also Burns examines trusting behavior and factors and identifies huge differences in the level of trust, with blacks being less trusting than whites in the United States.

Existing literature has done much to suggest that the concept of generalized trust can significantly contribute to the understanding of different political and societal conditions in divided societies. It shows that generalized trust is highly important to maintaining state-society relationships, economic growth, peace and stability and development (Varshney 2003).

Institutional theory studies emphasize the link between effective institutions and the level of generalized trust, while other studies highlight the association between culture, history and generalized trust. While these are very relevant to the thesis, the main aim is to see which kind of institutions have greater influence on generalized trust. This comparison allows for the study of unique, complex and multi-layered political and social phenomena, capturing very important relevant aspects with the aim of peace and stability/conflict-diffusion.

The debate on the influence of institutions on generalized trust is at the core of the institutional theory of generalized trust. In social capital studies, institutional configurations are studied as an option that facilitates the maintenance of generalized trust if these institutions manifest equality, transparency and rule of law. In practice, there are very few divided societies that have succeeded in institutional redesign; the majority has failed. Two main challenges arise when studying questions of the influence of institutions on generalized trust: 1) scholars focus on one type of institution as a whole and not a set of

institutions or one specific institution at a time. There should be also a qualitative, deep examination of comparative studies that supports a hypothesis, which allows an exchange of information and data between specialists, individuals and researchers. 2) There have been very limited efforts to study institutions and their influence in specific contexts such as divided societies or societies that have been prone to conflicts.

Table 5.1: Typologies of Research on Social Capital and Generalized Trust

Origins of Social Capital. Generalized Trust			
Civil Society/ Associations	Influenced by institutions	Dependent on Economic growth	Historical factors and family product
Measurements			
Social Networks	Voluntary Associations	Generalized Trust (WVS)	Civil norms/values
Consequences			
Government Performance	Community Projects	Political Behavior, Political Interest, Well-being	
National	Regional/ Local	Individual	

***Adapted with advancement and change from Rothstein and Stolle**

5.4 Theoretical framework

Generalized trust is defined as trusting most people; relatives, family members, people you know well and strangers. Research in different disciplines finds that there is a strong correlation between high levels of generalized trust and democratization, economic growth, societal peace and high quality institutional performance (Knack and Keefer 1997; Newton 2001; La Porta et al. 1997; Putnam 2000). According to various barometers, such as Arab Barometer and African Barometer, countries have different levels of generalized trust. Differences arise from many factors. Many scholars argue that institutional settings affect

the amount and type of social capital and level of generalized trust (Hall and Taylor 1996; Levi 1998; Stolle 2003; Tarrow 1996). Barometers are a reliable source that measure political and societal attitudes of citizens.

Researchers on social capital and generalized trust show that there are two different main theories of generalized trust; society-centric and institutional-centric. The society-centered approach maintains that generalized trust is inherited from historical, cultural and societal norms and values (Fukuyama 2001). Based on this approach, the characteristics and experiences of individuals in the society matter as these impact the level of trust and cause it to vary from one to another. For example, the level of generalized trust in war-torn countries is affected by the experience of individuals, and the level of generalized trust in divided societies is less than in homogenous societies (Hardin 2004; Platteau 1994).

The institution-centric approach argues that for social capital to flourish, and generalized trust to increase, “it needs to be embedded in and linked to the political context of a state as well as the formal political and legal institutions,” (Berman, 1997; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Levi, 1998; Tarrow, 1996). According to them, generalized trust can be created as a result of the implementation of formal institutions.

The institutional theory of generalized trust considers the state as a source of social capital (Tarrow, 1996). States set expenditures, the taxation ratio, policy networks, legal frameworks and regulations. These policy tools set the contract between the citizen and the state’s different bodies. By that, states must provide services for the citizens, enforce laws, discourage law breaking, protect minorities, and support participation and engagement of citizens (Levi, 1998). Yet, there is still a gap between institutions, policies and generalized trust.

This brings us to the link between generalized trust and divided society. The argument is made that heterogeneous societies have low generalized trust because of the different ethnic backgrounds. The argument can be true, to a degree, if one group or another is oppressed, marginalized or isolated from the society. The marginalized group and its members will no longer trust as their voice is not heard and they do not expect the others to give them space to represent themselves and their needs. This may be true in some societies. Yet, ethnicity or political ideology is not always a decisive factor in creating or maintaining generalized trust. Formal institutions in divided societies can reinforce the feeling of marginalization, inequality and partiality of within the society. When one ethnic group receives better services, more benefits legally or illegally (e.g. clientelism) at the expense of another, the feeling of marginalization and exploitation of wealth become a drive for mistrust. This is based on a scenario where one ethnicity takes what others deserve as equal citizens within the society.

5.5 Ineffective Institutions in Divided Societies

Irrespective of how divided the society is, there is a general consensus in the cases studies that governments must provide a more effective governance scheme, and design highly responsive institutions to the needs of their citizens. Citizens in divided societies desire their needs to be met effectively, especially when they feel that other ethnicities may be exploiting public administration (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). When needs are met effectively and efficiently without delay, the sense of inequality and arbitrariness in public administration decreases.

Central government(s) generally try to improve public services for their citizens unless sectarianism prevails and political elites evade public pressure, as in the instance of Lebanon and Iraq, where high rates of sectarianism and sectarian politics affect the

government's capacities. Political and sectarian leaders prefer to keep the status quo, as they benefit from it, sustaining their leadership in highly sectarian and divided societies. By providing services based on clientelism, they give the impression to their sects that they are the ones who can provide services for them, defend them or keep the balance of power.

Yet, in other cases, the aim of these transformational changes in institutions is to maintain regime legitimacy, such as in the case of the central government of Kyrgyzstan, which increased the education and health budget for its southern areas, where the Uzbek minority lives (Personal Communication Gulnaz I. 2016). Moreover, many governments in divided societies are moving toward a more Weberian style of bureaucracy to empower different education and health programs by being neutral and equal in terms of the different ethnicities and regions of the countries.

Furthermore, a movement towards more effective institutions includes de-personalization of the security; military, ministerial and legal systems in divided societies are needed. In Lebanon, South Africa and Bosnian and Herzegovina, many security and civil servants are sectarian-based employees, depending on the position and location of the service. For instance, the Shiite sect in Lebanon informally manage the Beirut airport, where almost all high ranking security officers and the security chief are Shiite, while the port of Beirut is managed and controlled by the Christian Maronites (Personal Communication Rodine M. 2016).

5.6 Generalized Trust, Institutions and Institutional Conditions

The causal mechanism between generalized trust and institutions has been a matter of debate among scholars. The debate focuses on the institutional sources of generalized trust and which institutions are more related to creating and maintaining generalized trust. In the ongoing dialogue, there have been some missing links concerning the inference of causality

between generalized trust and governmental institutions. The missing links are more related to the specificity of institutions and the strength of influence. The missing links stem from the “theoretical gap between the cooperative capacity of the community and the production of collective good by the political institutions,” (Breuskin 2012). Putnam has not provided a connection between societal and formal institutions. To fill the empirical gap in the institutional theory of generalized trust, many scholars provide studies that more fully explain these missing connections. Many scholars argue that government institutions could be the source of generalized trust, providing a space with benefits to encourage trust and reciprocity (Levi 1998; Tarrow 1996). These institutions not only facilitate, but also maintain existing generalized trust.

The institutional approach suggests that the state’s institutions facilitate the development and creation of generalized trust. In this sphere, Rothstein and Stolle argue that trust among citizens is intertwined with institutions. They emphasize that generalized trust is connected to “generalized attitudes about the fairness and impartiality of institutions,” (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Table 5.2 explains the different institutions and their impact on generalized trust.

Rothstein and Stolle found two main links between institutions and the generation of generalized trust: attitudinal and institutional links. The attitudinal argument suggests that there is a link between the political system and the generalized trust (trust in strangers). The institutional link suggests that there is institutional and political trust and generalized trust. However, in the same paper, three main problems arise: there are no specific institutions, it lacks definition of trust in government, and there is not a mechanism to explain the trust between people and the political system. The institutional theory states that institutions facilitate the creation and maintenance of generalized trust by encouraging connections

between citizens, enforcing laws, integrating people in the political system and providing public goods to all people.

Table 5.2 Different categories of Institutions and Generalized Trust

Characteristics of Institutions	Mostly Universalistic Institutions/ programs	Means-tested programs	Means-tested and universal.
Social Divisions	No social division	Single out who deserves benefits	Singled out based on groups (privileged or not-privileged)
Corruption	No Easy Rules	Desire to cheat to get into the program, as it will be tested	Cheating is desired
Impartiality	Everyone receives same treatment	Very different treatment	Very different treatment.
Generalized trust	High trust between people	Those who do not receive the same treatment will trust	Less trust in the privileged group.

According to Stolle and Rothstein, impartial and fair policies can increase generalized trust. Their findings suggest that there are three factors that can influence the degree of correlation between policy and trust. First, citizens derive trustworthiness from their experience of institutional impartiality. Second, individuals usually monitor and evaluate how fellow citizens behave in institutions, and whether they abuse them or not. The third factor is the degree of general discrimination in society, which may lead to distrust. This is where I base the selection of institutional and societal factors in this research. This thesis selects conditions that can measure impartiality, inequality, and inefficiency within formal institutions.

Rothsten and Stolle have three main categories of questions, which they link to the maintenance of generalized trust. The representational dimension of political institutions tends to engage people more actively, increasing confidence in the political institutions. It

follows that he who is represented in the political and societal fabric, has more confidence in the institutions and other people. The implementation dimension of political institutions tends to actively engage people, leading to higher levels of trust among them. The implementation dimension argues that impartial institutions and effective rule of law (punishing those who break the law) increase trust. Rothstein and Stolle found two main factors that maintain trust: the perceived level of corruption and the perceived level of bias and inequality.

Based on their argument, the more effective and universalistic the institutions, with no particularistic spending based on ethnicities and sects, the more the debate will move away from singling out “the others” in order to find more common ground between the different sects. As Stolle and Rothstein argue, such institutions provide inclusiveness to the society where everyone is treated equally and has equal opportunities compared to the rest of society (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

Lowndes and Wilson examine the institutional design of states and how it affects social network formation. They argue that institutions can extend/constrain the formation of associations and their scale of influence on policy-making (Lowndes and Wilson 2001). The protection of freedom of expression, the existence of and participation in civil society and freedom of associations all offer universal facilities and educational programs that shape associational life. A higher degree of associational life between individuals in a society results in greater generalized trust.

Uslander underlines the importance of institutions, mainly governmental policies, in generating generalized trust. Uslander examines generalized trust and concludes that the implementation of redistribution policies is highly linked to the level of generalized trust (Uslander 2003). As Uslander points out, when individuals trust strangers, they start to treat

them honestly, because they do not think they will cheat them, and thus benefiting from their marginalization is not an option. However, when we distrust strangers, we believe that they will cheat us and aim to benefit from any corrupt institution or corruption in general, even at the expense of others. In this thesis, I take Uslander's argument the other way; the more we treat other people honestly, and think that they are not going to cheat us and seek to benefit from existing corrupt institutions, the more we will trust them. But when we see the strangers as cheaters, benefiting from existing corruption mechanisms, then we have less trust in them.

Uslander's argument is that corruption stems from inequality, mainly economic and cultural inequality. However, for me, economic inequality is not the only condition of corruption. Political and societal inequalities also lead to corruption. For example, given the fact that a high-ranking politician in Lebanon or Turkey can secure job opportunities for their sect/ethnic group, expedite an application, or handle a process at a governmental office is a manifestation of corruption and prejudicial trade between the two individuals who belong to the same sect or ethnic group. Therefore, inequality leads to clientelism where sectarian and ethnic leaders present themselves as the only providers for benefits for their own sect/ethnic group.

Institutions can facilitate and encourage a community's participation in decision-making and deliberations through civil society organizations. In the same scholarly camp, Kriesi and Baglioni argue that political institutions are able to generate higher social activism in divided communities (Kriesi and Baglioni 2003). The easier it is to enter or leave civil society organizations, the greater the probability that citizens from different ethnic groups will participate in the community's activities and interact more frequently.

As we can see, the institutional approach suggests that the state plays a role as a facilitator in generating/destroying generalized trust/social capital. Considering that some of these studies have been conducted in homogenous societies, while others were done in divided societies, there is unclear causal mechanism linking social capital and political institutions with a focus on specific institutions. This thesis will fill the gap, providing a connection between institutions and generalized trust. Using multiple institutional conditions/ factors, it examines how they affect the level of generalized trust, drawing on the specificity of the cases studies as divided societies.

5.7 How Do Institutions Generate or Destroy Trust?

The question that remains is how institutions generate or destroy, directly or indirectly, generalized trust in divided societies. The argument is found in how impartial and fair these institutions are. I argue that impartial, fair, universalistic institutions allow all sects and ethnicities in the society to have equal access to education, health, public goods, and equality before the legal system (one legal system). Figure 5.1 explains the causal mechanism of institutions and generalized trust.




Figure 5.1: the causal mechanism of institutions and generalized trust.

Individuals in divided societies rely on daily bureaucratic encounters to get a sense of how fair and equal institutions are. In street-level bureaucracies, they may have different experiences, depending on which programs, or which benefits they enjoy from the bureaucratic system. In almost all governmental institutions in welfare states, policies or programs are categorized into three different types of social policies. These categories are universalistic, selective and conservative (Esping-Andersen 1990). Each one of these

^{6*} This was adapted from Rothstein and Stolle

categories has its own characteristics such as to whom the policy is directed, whether it requires a test for entry to enjoy benefits, whether it is exclusivist, and whether the government or public administration officer is able to manipulate the policy. These characteristics may decide how equal and fair policies and programs are, and how they affect the level of trust.

In means-tested programs and particularistic spending institutions, the purpose of the institutions becomes more to identify a group of people and single them out of the group of beneficiaries. Although at the core of these institutions there is a mechanism to separate those who deserve the service from those who does not, it does not end the debate as to where and how to decide the conditions that allow access to the benefits. This is not only costly in divided societies, but also provides a financial burden, as each ethnicity or sect will have their own agency in a mixed society, providing more benefits for their own sect or ethnicity, or providing a higher quality service to their sects over others. This moves the society from the debate on how to be equal with other sects to focusing on providing only the bare necessities for these others rather than providing them the full package of benefits. These services are usually provided by sectarian institutions or by formal institutions led by sectarian administrations.

Moreover, such unequal institutions provide opportunity for people commit fraud in order to enjoy the benefits of a certain group. This is because local officers abuse their authority. People who work at the administrative level will assist people from their own sect to access programs, even if they do not qualify for the program. For instance, a Turkish public administrative officer working in a social security department in a mixed city with a Kurdish majority may allow another Turk to access the social security means-tested program even though he does not qualify for it. This is very common practice in divided

societies in the Middle East with means-tested programs, such as Lebanon and Iraq (Personal Communication Luay K. 2016).

The arbitrariness in public administration and partial, unequal treatment of citizens from different sects, where public administration officers are not held accountable, creates a norm of corruption and clientelism. This is especially true when a mechanism to oversee these agencies, programs or on a broader scale the local governments is lacking. Therefore, we can see a higher level of administrative and political corruption in divided societies with unfair and unequal institutions in democracies.

Inequalities negatively impact honesty and trust in homogenous societies. In divided societies, it is far worse. They destroy the level of trust among different sects and ethnic groups, but also within the members of each ethnic group. They give individuals the sense that the whole system is exploited, where one ethnicity or set of ethnic leaders provides better service to their sect, and this creates a sense of pessimism for the future, as individuals grow dependent on sectarianism and sectarian leaders.

The distribution of resources equally provides a sense of shared fundamental values and destiny among individuals in any society (Uslander 2003). When political resources, such as political power, and economic resources, such as expenditures are equally distributed, people are more likely to feel that they are equal with their fellow citizens and trust them. Conversely, in divided societies, where inequality is high, people will always stick to their sects, especially to sectarian leaders to benefit from whatever they can provide in terms of resources or advantages. This brings to mind the Roman proverb, “divide and conquer”, where sectarian leaders cause division in their own sects in order to sustain their leadership. They sow distrust among different members of the sect by providing unequal services as well. For example, in Pakistan, the Panjabi political ethnic leadership has a norm of being

the head of a tribe, where they provide different services such as appointing heads of families. In some cases they appoint two heads for one big family in order to sustain their leadership. At the same time, trust between the members of the big family declines as they start to seek services and compete to have more services from the sectarian leadership (Personal Communication 2015). As Boix and Posner argue, the more people feel injustice, the more they have negative stereotypes of other sects, destroying trust among them (Boix and Posner 1998).

In divided societies, institutions are the daily arena where citizens encounter partiality or impartiality. Yet, there is another arena where individuals can find impartiality, which complicates the mosaic of the political and societal composite when it comes to institutions and generalized trust. The political system itself is a factor that fosters competition among people, exploited by the sectarian elites and politicians. Citizens personally experience sects and sectarian leaders who plant fear of the other in an attempt to sustain their leadership and personal benefits from sectarianism (Personal Communication Medhet T. 2016). Individuals experience fear mongering in a divided society, from the law, police and institutions where monopolies of power exist, or public offices are held by one dominant sect, allowing sectarian leaders to have more access to provide services to same-sect individuals as they see fit. If citizens perceive that the political system, legal system and institutions are not corrupt and impartial, they will be more inclined to obey the law, will not think that others are trying to exploit the system and will accept decisions by centralized or decentralized authorities (Levi 1998).

For example, in Bosnia, skepticism is often leveled at the political system amongst leading parliamentarians and state heads, often in order to garner votes through fear-mongering, which is a particularly noticeable issue during the electoral season. At the local level, there

is a clear rural/urban divide in the level of trust amongst various ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo and Tuzla, some of Bosnia's largest cities, remain multicultural hubs, and ethnic division is often treated with indifference at the societal level. Bosnia's migrants from other Muslim areas, however, have increasingly populated Sarajevo in the past decade, particularly from Turkey and the Gulf states, thus slightly damaging its reputation for multiculturalism. Nevertheless, Sarajevo, like Tuzla, is better integrated than other municipalities in rural areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the war, few municipalities saw ethnic majorities, and those that did were small, rural communities near the borders with Serbia and Croatia. Twenty years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, however, this has changed dramatically, particularly given the division of the state into the Federation and the Republika Srpska. This change was also driven by inappropriate or lacking responses to returnee populations, most notably in the Republika Srpska, as documented in Toal and Dahlman's *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal*.

Milorad Dodik, SNSD head and President of the Republika Srpska, is notorious for manipulating public discourse in the RS in favour of division at the expense of public trust in state institutions. Dodik has repeatedly threatened Bosnia with the secession of the Republika Srpska by 2018, incorporating this separation into the long-term strategic agenda of the SNSD. High Representative Valentin Inzko responded in a report to the United Nations. "Under the authority vested in me, I [...] once again make clear that the entities have no right to secede from BiH under the [Dayton Peace Agreement, GFAP] and that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH are guaranteed by the GFAP, the BiH Constitution and by international law".⁷ In 2011, and again in 2015, Dodik called for an entity-level referendum in the Republika Srpska on the legitimacy of rulings by the BiH

⁷For more information, check this page which contains all reports:<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/bosnia-herzegovina/index.php?page=2>

Court and the National Prosecutor's Office, and in 2006 called for a similar vote challenging the OHR's authority in state affairs. Amongst Dodik's chief concerns is what he sees as institutional bias against Bosnian Serbs, who make up the greatest number of defendants in war crimes trials held at the state level. Through this claim, he therefore discredits the work of the courts in also prosecuting Bosniaks and Croats held responsible for committing crimes against Serbs during the war. Naser Orić, the Bosniak paramilitary leader who was controversially arrested in Switzerland in June 2015, was, for example, extradited to Sarajevo to face trial in the national courts for the massacre of Bosnian Serbs near Srebrenica in 1995, taking some weight from Dodik's claim (Personal communication Velma S. 2016).

Expectations of fair treatment are also extended to the level of civil society entry and exit. When a sect or an ethnic group is denied the formation of a sectarian bloc, in comparison to others, then there is impartial treatment and unequal access to civil society and the official public sphere. Facilitating the entry and exit of civil society organizations allows individuals to be members of voluntary associations, interacting with other people from different sects. The closure of civil society organizations in general or for specific sects will impede the process of interacting by allowing prejudice against others, and lessen trust in institutions, as they will be labeled as partial and unfair.

So, how do these institutions help societies build trust in divided societies? Based on the Rothstein and Stolle argument, this thesis argues that generalized trust in others and attitudes toward impartiality and fairness are intertwined in divided societies. The link between generalized trust and institutions comes through in two ways. First, the experience of individuals in the political system, the dissemination of information and how they perceive others, influences others who live in the same system. Second, the political system

itself influences the experience and behavior of individuals directly, how they deal with others and whether they trust them or not.

The causal connection between generalized trust and institutions is based on cognitive inference (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). This thesis argues that people in divided societies form generalized trust from their experience and encounters with institutions, especially street-level bureaucracy. For instance, a Lebanese Sunni will not trust the Lebanese legal system or its courts because they are corrupt and under the influence of other sects in the society. A person's own experience is public and is extended and felt by many others from same sect or other sects. If the legal system, courts, judges and the politicians are corrupt and other sects and ethnicities are exploiting the system as a whole, why would an individual citizen be honest or trust others as they manipulate the system and try to harm society in general or another sect in particular?

If the experience of an individual is that his sectarian leader or local bureaucrat from the same sect does not act honestly, does not abide by the law, or acts partially and unfairly, he will not trust others, as he will think other sects have this kind of clientelism and corruption as a norm. I argue that those universalistic policies -non-particularistic spending and impartial public administration- are less likely to exhibit corruption and clientelism. This way, individuals from different sects build their knowledge of other fellow citizens from different sects, especially considering that sectarian leaders influence their sectarian constituencies, setting an example for the people.

If individuals observe their fellow citizens from different sects cheating the political system and abusing it, this sends a signal to the society about the behavior of other people. In divided societies, this suggests to some that each sect acts like that. Furthermore, the abuse of the system by political and sectarian leaders tells the whole society that they all are

cheating and abusing the system. Such corrupt systems and institutions do not inspire people to trust others, as they are highly likely to cheat. The only one way to make people feel that “most people can be trusted”, is if they behave well and refrain from cheating and misusing the institutions (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

I argue that an individual's own experience can affect how they think of others and whether they will trust them or not. For example, if sects and ethnic groups are labeled as a problem in a society, which is normal in all divided societies that have experienced violent conflicts. If a sect or a group of people is excluded from political and society and their voice become unheard, then why would they trust others? How can a whole ethnicity or sect trust the majority or another group if they are excluded from an institution or from political power?

The major argument here is that the causality goes from how individuals perceive the impartiality and fairness of the political system and other's behavior in relation to the political system to generalized trust. The exact mechanism goes from (1) the political system design in general, where an ethnic group is excluded, (2) the behavior of sectarian leaders and public administration officers, and (3) an individual's experiences in society, considering the effect of media, and neighborhood.

There are other factors, such as family history and the experience of parents and same-sect or same ethnicity experience. This is also can affect how fragmented the society is.

This thesis does not argue that the only and major source of generalized trust comes from institutions; rather it argues that institutions contribute greatly to the creation and maintenance of trust in divided societies. It also examines some institutions using institutional conditions from a number of divided societies, which may be different than homogenous societies. Therefore, I argue that generalized trust has different sources, yet institutions greatly determine its level in divided societies

5.8 Operationalization, Mechanism and Analysis

North argues that “institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction,” (North 2005). Institutions are the norms and values that constrain and manage interaction between people in complex ways. These institutions are either formal or informal. Moreover, institutions are the mechanism that may enable or constrain the political, administrative, economic and social interaction in the society (Uphoff 1992). Institutions provide incentives and disincentives for people to act in certain ways, in which they try to reduce uncertainties in the society, to establish common shared values, to enhance efficiency, and strengthen government performance, especially in the economy (North 1991). These institutions range from providing services to people, to punishment of those who violate the law, or commonly agreed-upon laws. In complex societies, such as a divided society, there is also a need to have institutions, which are able to formulate policies and implement them wisely to avoid conflicts over resources (personal communication Rabea D. 2016).

Institutions are studied in relation to social capital in two perspectives: perceptions and assessment of public institutions, especially welfare policies (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). They argue that there are two sets of measurements of institutions in social science; the first measurements are of governance quality, corruption levels, efficiency and regulatory burdens while the second are of legal protection of property rights and law enforcement.

By bringing institutions into the heart of the picture, generalized trust can be examined from a different perspective. Governments need to choose which institutions are selected out of the toolbox in order to design and implement effective public institutions. In divided societies, this task is more complicated. They must be effective, meeting the demands of different ethnic groups and political parties, while simultaneously achieving policy goals.

Despite the wide array of institutional conditions and their provisions, this paper sticks to a few that are available and that reflect the status quo of public service provision.

I have coded several institutional conditions (political and societal) extracted from the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem) data and Quality of Government Institute (QoG) at Gothenburg University. The selection a variety of institutional conditions meets the requirement for proper scope conditions for the nine cases of divided societies. In Table 5.3, I summarize the institutional conditions that are used in the analysis, and the corresponding theory that I rely on.

Table 5.3: Explanans (Institutional conditions/ factors)

Theory	Determinants/ Conditions	Hypothesis
Civil Society	Entry and Exit of CSO CSO consultation	The more CSO are able to work freely, free from division, providing space for the individual to interact, the more trust will be built (Putnam, Knack and Keefer).
Associations	Public Deliberations	
Institutions Theory	Particularistic Spending Public Administration Universalistic Policies Accountable Authority Political Power Monopoly Decentralized Policy-Making	These conditions/ factors measure impartiality and fairness in the political system. The more inequality and arbitrariness, the less generalized trust exists or grows (Rothstein and Stolle,
History and Population	Fractionalized Index	

5.9 Explanantes and Explanandum

This thesis codes 11 explanatory conditions, each with a score from 0 (absence of the explanatory property) to 1 (presence of the explanatory property) after reviewing the most relevant policies from both V-Dem and QoG institutes to a state's institutions that have a theoretical background or hypothesis which indicates an impact on the level of generalized trust. In the explanation model, only 8 conditions were coded as Public Arbitrariness, Particularistic Spending while Universality of Public Policies or Social Programs represent equality within society.

The explanatory conditions that represent the institutional measurements and conditions are:

<Equality>, <equ>

Equality means ensuring that individual and groups are treated equally in the eyes of the law, and this applies to public administration and its officers as well. This means they must be treated fairly regardless of race, religion, region or political affiliation. Rothsten, Uslander and Stolle argue that trust relies on equitable distribution and equality of opportunity. Universalistic policies, universal public expenditures and the absence of arbitrariness in public administration reinforce equality in society. This explanation is measured by the following three major conditions:

Particularistic spending

Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted to a specific corporation, sector, social group, regional party or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork”, “clientelistic,” or “private goods”. Public goods are intended to benefit all communities within a society, though they may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituencies. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-tested

criteria are allowed to receive the benefit. The value of this question considers the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending.

Universalistic Policies

A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested. A universal program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs, but the essential point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is to evaluate the quality of state institutions on cash-based or social institutions-based programs.

Public Administration Arbitrariness

This indicator focuses on the extent to which public officials obey the law and treat like cases alike despite the ethnic origins, geographical area or racial group. This indicator shows if the public administration is characterized by arbitrariness, nepotism, cronyism or discrimination.

<Political Power Monopoly>, <ppw>

A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, religion, or some combination thereof. Social group identities are also likely to intersect, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e. as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time, there are social groups within a society that are understood by those residing within that society to be different in ways that may be politically relevant.

<Decentralized Policy Making>, <asg>

For different geographic or ethnic groups to become independent or autonomous, decentralized institutions should be initiated where the state is divided based on ethnicities

or other factors into different autonomous regions. Autonomous regions are not the same as provinces or counties. This variable indicates autonomy if it explicitly mentions regions, areas, or districts that have a self-governing body that proposes bills and regulations outside of the centralized government.

<*Public Deliberation*>, <png>

The public has more effective participation in decision-making when institutions provide a space for debate and discussion of the decision-making process. This indicator refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate and other public forums such as popular media. The presence of this indicator is based on when important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent public deliberations are.

<*Entry and Exit of Civil Society*>, <eec>

This condition refers to what extent the government achieves control over entry and exit of civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life.

<*Civil Society Consultation*>, <csc>

This condition concerns the level to which civil society organizations are consulted when certain institutions are designed or implemented. This refers to the presence of a large civil society that has effective and efficient influence in society. The higher the CSO consultation is, the higher the engagement of citizens in the policy-making process, as enabled by this consultation.

<*Accountability Authority*>, <ec>

According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner:

"Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that superordinate's and subordinates be able to recognize when decision-processes have been "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of

the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121)

Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Any "accountability groups" may impose such limitations. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are: the ruling party in a one-party state, councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, the military in coup-prone polities and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is, therefore, with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.

<Fractionalized Index>, <efr>

Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and "ethno-religious" groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

Given this operationalization, and on the basis of the data matrix, a csQCA analysis was performed for the whole model as below:

equ* asg * png* eec * csc * ec * efr -> high GT

The asterisks indicate the joint presence of the causal properties, while the headed arrow represents the sufficient causation of the joint properties to the outcome. The label high GT is operationalized by the World Value Survey (WVS).

The WVS is the only reliable worldwide survey that measures generalized trust. The standard question ('Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?'),

introduced by Rosenberg, is used to measure generalized trust. In contrast to the binary measure used in the World Values Survey and the Arab barometer, the European Social Survey features an 11-point response scale, where 0 indicates the lowest level and 10 the highest level of trust. Before generalized trust measurements can be used as fuzzy sets to gauge the outcome, they have to go through further transformation: “raw scores” to form the degree of membership. Generalized trust as an index was developed to meet the calibration process as follows:

$$\text{TRUST INDEX} = 100 + (\% \text{ Most people can be trusted}) - (\% \text{ Can't be too careful})$$

Based on the index, I found the mean of the values for the countries and the time frame, which is 42. Cases with a GT index value higher than 42 will be equal to (1): higher generalized trust, while less than 42 will be equal to (0): less generalized trust.

Table 5.4: Explanandum (Outcome)

Variable	Operationalization	Model
Trust Index	Dichotomized {0,1}	csQCA

Table 5.5 Raw data from V-Dem, QoG and WVS

.	Year	equ	ppw	asg	png	eec	csc	ec	efr	GT
KGZ	99-04	0	2	0	2	2	1	4	.67	34
KGZ	10-14	1	3	0	2	3	0	2	.67	77
IRQ	99-04	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	.54	95
IRQ	10-14	1	2	0	1	3	1	4	.54	66
LBN	08-10	0	1	0	4	3	1	7	.77	24
LBN	10-14	0	1	0	2	3	1	7	.77	30
ZAF	90-93	0	0	0	3	2	1	2	.87	59
ZAF	99-04	0	2	0	4	4	1	7	.87	26
ZAF	10-14	0	2	0	4	4	1	7	.87	47
PAK	94-98	0	1	1	2	3	1	6	.53	41
PAK	99-04	1	1	1	4	2	1	2	.53	65
PAK	10-14	1	1	1	3	3	1	6	.53	48
BIH	94-98	0	1	0	2	2	0	2	.53	54
BIH	99-04	1	1	1	3	3	0	2	.68	51
MKD	95-99	0	2	0	1	2	1	2	.70	23
MKD	99-04	1	2	0	2	3	1	2	.70	64
TUK	94-98	0	2	0	3	2	1	7	.29	13
TUK	99-04	0	2	0	4	2	1	7	.29	39
TUK	10-14	0	2	0	2	2	0	7	.29	29

Table 5.5 contains the nine conditions that I used during QCA and their respective operationalization. Whenever valid data were available in other datasets, I used this as a base for our coding. The outcome calibration was based on the threshold of 55, as Table 5.5 shows above.

5.10 Analysis

Table 5.6 shows the 10 variables in a data matrix as explanatory variables and generalized trust as an outcome variable. The outcome variable shows either a high level of trust (1) or a low level of trust (0). A variable of 1 indicates a presence of trust while 0 denotes an absence of trust. As a reminder, QCA aims at identifying the different configuration of the path that leads to the presence or absence of an outcome.

Table 5.6 Data matrix

case_id	UNI	PG	PA	PPW	ASG	PNG	EEC	CSC	EC	EFR	Outcome	O
KGZ9904	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	34
KGZ1014	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	77
IRQ9904	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	95
IRQ1014	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	66
LBN0810	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	24
LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	30
ZAF8993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	59
ZAF9904	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	26
PAK9498	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	41
PAK9904	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	65
PAK1014	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	48
BIH9498	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	45
BIH9904	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	61
MKD9599	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	23
MKD9904	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	64
TUK9498	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	13
TUK9904	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	39
TUK1014	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	29

5.10.1 Necessity and Sufficiency

The causal relationship of necessity and sufficiency are defined theoretically as a set: necessity is supported when it can be demonstrated that instances of an outcome constitute a subset of instances of a causal condition. Sufficiency is supported when a set of cases with the condition is perfectly included in the set of cases displaying the outcome. (Rihoux and Marx 2013) Consistency represents the extent to which a causal combination leads to an

outcome. It also depicts the strength of the causal relation, calculated as the sum of the membership scores that cases have to the intersection out of the sum of the scores of the alleged subsets.

$$N. \text{ Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i)}$$

$$S. \text{ Consistency} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i)}$$

Coverage represents how many cases with the outcome are represented by a particular causal condition. Coverage is calculated as the sum of the membership scores of the cases to the intersection out of the sum of the score to the alleged superset.

$$N. \text{ Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i)}$$

$$S. \text{ Coverage} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i)}$$

It is important to keep in mind that QCA does not assume linearity of causation.

5.11 Results

The results of QCA for accounting for the existence of generalized trust appear in Table 5.7. Five causal models describe sufficient and consistent conditions leading to generalized trust (coverage=1, consistency=1.00). Model 1 represents the presence of equality and fractionalized society, the absence political power monopoly, entry and exit of civil society, decentralized policy-making, public deliberation, and accountability authority as set of conditions that results in the occurrence of generalized trust. Interestingly, equality is shown to be a necessary condition for a high level of generalized trust.

According to the results, Model 1 is not the only causal model for achieving generalized trust. There are alternative paths (Model 2-Model 5) that explain the configuration of antecedents for predicting a desired outcome (GT). Different from symmetrical analyses,

the role of antecedents depends on the attributes of other ingredients in the causal model. For example, equality positively contributes in the prediction of generalized trust in Model 1-5 resulting in high trust. Model 2 indicates that the presence of equality, political power monopoly, the entry and exit of civil society, a highly fractionalized society, the absence decentralized policy making, accountability over executives and public deliberation lead to higher generalized trust (See Model 2 in Table 5.7). Other casual models are outlined in Table 7.5 These results confirm the hypothesis that one condition cannot work solely to improve generalized trust and that a combination of conditions (institutional conditions) is necessary to have a greater effect on generalized trust. It also shows that equality is a necessary condition to account for a high level of generalized trust.

Table 5.7 Causal recipes for simulating high score of generalized trust

Model: $gntrst = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)$	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
<i>Causal Model</i>		
<i>M1: equ*~ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*~ec*efr</i>	0.285714	0.285714
<i>M2: equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*~ec*efr</i>	0.285714	0.142857
<i>M3: equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*csc*efr</i>	0.285714	0.142857
<i>M4: equ*~ppw*asg*~png*eec*~csc*~ec*efr</i>	0.142857	0.142857
<i>M5: equ*~ppw*asg*png*~eec*csc*~ec*efr</i>	0.142857	0.142857
<i>Solution coverage: 1.000000</i>		
<i>Solution consistency: 1.000000</i>		

Note: equ: equality, ppw: political power monopoly, asg: decentralized policy-making, png: public deliberation, eec: entry and exist of civil society, csc, civil society consultation, ec: accountability authority, efr: fractionalized index, gntrst: generalized trust.

Casual conditions for accounting for a low score of generalized trust are presented in Table 5.8. Results from the QCA revealed that 8 consistent and sufficient conditions indicate a negation of generalized trust (coverage=1, consistency=1.00). Model 1 describes a condition with presence of political power monopoly and accountability authority, and absence of equality, decentralized policymaking, public deliberation, entry and exit of civil society, and fractionalized society which results in the negation of trust.

In Model 2, the absence of equality, decentralized policymaking and entry and exit of civil society, and the presence of civil society consultation, political power monopoly and accountability authority represent conditions for a negation of generalized trust (Table 5.8). Interestingly, the absence of equality is a feature in all causal-models resulting in the negation of trust. In this regard, all causal antecedents contribute to the negation of trust in all models, which suggests that equality plays a key role in accounting for the negation of generalized trust. The implications of these results are discussed in the next section.

Table 5.8 Causal recipes for simulating low score of generalized trust

Model: $\sim gnrst = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)$	Raw coverage	Unique coverage
<i>Causal Model</i>		
M1: $\sim equ * ppw * \sim asg * \sim png * \sim eec * ec * \sim efr$	0.181818	0.090909
M2: $\sim equ * ppw * \sim asg * \sim eec * csc * ec * \sim efr$	0.181818	0.090909
M3: $\sim ppw * asg * \sim png * eec * csc * ec * efr$	0.181818	0.090909
M4: $\sim equ * \sim asg * png * eec * csc * ec * efr$	0.181818	0.090909
M5: $\sim equ * \sim asg * png * eec * csc * ec * efr$	0.181818	0.090909
M6: $\sim equ * ppw * \sim asg * \sim png * \sim eec * csc * \sim ec * efr$	0.090909	0.090909
M7: $\sim equ * \sim ppw * \sim png * eec * csc * ec * efr$	0.090909	0.090909
M8: $\sim equ * \sim ppw * \sim asg * eec * csc * ec * efr$	0.181818	0.000000
<i>Solution coverage: 1.000000</i>		
<i>Solution consistency: 1.000000</i>		

Note: equ: equality, ppw: political power monopoly, asg: decentralized policy making, png: public deliberation, eec: entry and exist of civil society, csc, civil society consultation, ec: accountability authority, efr: fractionalized index, gnrst: generalized trust.

5.12 Discussion

The analysis proves that there is a need for combined conditions to have a positive impact on generalized trust (outcome =1). In the comparison, there is no set of combined conditions that produces a truth table without contradictions. This indicates that a deeper understanding and research on the subject need to be done.

Building on the theories and previous literature, the research identified three important

conditions that might influence the level of generalized trust with regard to equality of institutions, which include public administration arbitrariness, particularistic spending and universal policies. The analysis showed that a fractionalized index also influenced the level of generalized trust. The analysis of one model or one case study (Lebanon will be discussed as a single case study in the next chapter) would probably show, at a micro level and with detailed conditions, the different results/paths of such an analysis. The implications and theoretical argument are explained below.

First, with regard to the theoretical implications, the analysis shows that fractionalization in divided societies is not a condition in lessening the level of generalized trust. The presence of high fractionalization in the society did not deter a higher level of generalized trust. This finding supports the institutional theory of generalized trust and other theories which argue that generalized trust sources are not only limited to the societal and cultural fabric of a society. The level of generalized trust is not solely determined by society and culture in divided societies, but rather is a variety of sources, including institutions. Arguably, this finding supports the argument of Rothstein, Stolle, Levi and Uslander that institutions play a key role, especially everyday experience with bureaucratic institutions and the legal system, in influencing the level of generalized trust. As part of the equality index, public administration arbitrariness measures to what extent public officials obey the law and treat like cases alike despite ethnic origins, geographical area or racial group. It exposes the inequality in the system, especially when it comes to access to public services or means-tested programs. As a result, the connections of ethnicity and trust, polarization and trust, social division and trust are questionable according to these findings. Knack and Keefer argue that countries with ethnically homogenous societies show a higher level of generalized trust within the same ethnicity, as cooperation norms are strengthened, but trust with other groups is weaker (Knack and Keefer 1997). Perhaps their arguments are valid,

but according to the research findings, it does not hold that ethnicities matter. Different ethnicities play no role in influencing the level of generalized trust, as sectarian and ethnic leaders sustain their position using informal institutions such as corruption and providing clientelist services to their sect in order to maintain a leadership role over them. In ethnically and religiously divided societies, leaders have the goal of sustaining their power over their citizens by planting fear within their own sects toward others sects. They also provide a variety of clientelist services to their own sects, but for the purpose of dividing their own sects in order to keep their leadership role. This does not necessary intensify or increase a spirit of cooperation among the members of the group, but rather increases the division which is normal in divided societies.

The reason why ethnicity or the presence of high levels of fractionalization does not influence the level of generalized trust in many cases of divided societies is that there is structure of informal institutions that work as a binding contract between these ethnicities, especially in countries with a tribal system. For example, ethnicity in Pakistan is identified on the basis of language. It is mostly an ethno-linguistic population, which is internally subdivided into clans and tribes. The respective languages and the embedded socio-cultural situation is the major binding force. A clan settled in two different areas in Pakistan may speak two different languages or dialects and may be more strongly bonded with people of other tribes/clans in the same area on the basis of language as compared to their own tribe/clan settled in another area of Pakistan. Besides, there is also diversity amongst the races, clans and tribes; for instance, the Pathans speak the Pushto language, and amongst themselves, there are Afridis, Yusafzais, Aurekzaies, Kakakhels etc. Similarly, amongst the Punjabis, there are Rajputs, Mughals, Janjuas, Jats, Araiens etc. all of whom speak the Punjabi language with varied dialects (Personal Communication Asma K. 2016). This means that in Pakistan, a divided society is not seen by the members of these ethnicities as a

reason to distrust other since they belong to the same clan and abide by the same tribal rules. Ethnicity is like clanism in Muslim-majority countries, where informal tribal rules prevail over formal institutional rules (including rule of law), where members of a tribe or clan must obey the informal code of behavior, a breach of which can be shameful for the whole tribe. Therefore, ethnic divisions in these societies are irrelevant to trust. For example, buying lands in tribal societies such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Iraq is done based on trust between tribes and members of tribes with local witnesses. In the majority of cases, contracts are not registered or signed in official and formal institutions. This is because a code of conduct and tribal institutions are strongly present in both cases where formal institutions are strong or weak.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, state division along ethnic lines (the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, IEBL, between the FBiH and RS roughly follows the final front lines during the 1992-1995 war) acts as an invisible barrier to inter-ethnic participation and trust, particularly in the Republika Srpska. Anecdotal evidence suggests Serbs in the Republika Srpska are more skeptical of the Bosnian state and everyday life in the Federation than Serbs in Serbia. For example, young people living in Istočno (East) Sarajevo often travel 230+ kilometers to Banja Luka, the RS capital, for parties rather than walk across the IEBL to Dobrinja, a Sarajevo neighbourhood, and take the trolleybus into the city centre. This reflects the paranoia of older generations who were more susceptible to wartime propaganda and more actively involved or directly affected by the consequences of war, which ultimately determined the current state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Personal Communication Velma S. 2015).

In Turkey, ethnic division in divided or mixed cities is not affected by solely by the existence of other ethnicities. Kurds in Eastern Turkey live in a mixed city with Turks,

Turkman and other small ethnicities such as Assyrians, yet they do not trust the institution of appointing a mayor from the capital city of Turkey over someone from the same city. The coexistence of the Kurds and Turks works very well unless there is a formal intensification of the conflict. Kurds see the Turkish state rather than the Turks as an ethnicity as the oppressor. In Turkey, the low level of generalized trust has to do more with political factors at the national level than with individual ethnicity (Ekmekci 2010). In the WVS 2004-2008, Turkey had the second lowest level of generalized trust, which changed in the 2010-2014 WVS when the level was a bit higher after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) initiated some reform measures concerning the Kurdish status, especially allowing them to have a TV station and appointing Kurdish mayors in many Kurdish- majority cities.

In Kyrgyzstan, identity and ethnic divisions were not a problem per se as a barrier to higher generalized trust within the society. The ethno-regional divisions have been translated into political identity. This is exactly how it works in sectarian societies where political elites and sectarian leaders work to sustain their role by the politicization of ethnicities or identities. For example, the Northern clan leaders, led by Akaev supported the modernization of urbanized Krygzstan based on liberal and democratic values, while the southern part was lead by Absamat who was a communist leader. This geo-regional polarization continues as Akaev-Abasmat (North-South) divisions to this day(Khanin 2000).

In Kyrgyzstan, a study done by Gulnara and Iskakova, interviewing 36 leading members of the Uzbek ethnic group in 2008-2009 shows that of the major obstacles in trusting other members of opposition from the north, ideology was listed in last position. The major contributors to distrust were economic conditions and everyday life, specific unpopular governmental policies and the political ambition of the political ethnic elites who were trying to maximize their access to patronage and get benefits from the government (Huskey

and Gulnara 2010).

Secondly, with regard to policy implications, the necessary absence of inequality and unfair treatment in public offices and in accessibility to the services of the state's institutions are very important in maintaining a higher level of generalized trust. In all the sets of combinations of low generalized trust, only inequality was present in all. This is another proof that generalized trust can be destroyed much more easily than maintained based on the absence or presence of the analyzed conditions. The absence of a decentralized policy-making is reflected in seven of the models out of eight, which have low levels of generalized trust. This supports the argument that there may be a need for decentralized policy-making in divided societies whenever there are deep divisions and deeply unequal and unfair institutions.

For example, article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina states, "The Federation shall provide two-thirds, and the Republika Srpska one-third, of the revenues required by the budget, except insofar as revenues are raised as specified by the Parliamentary Assembly." National spending is generally divided proportionally by population but can also be distorted so that one-third of all spending is distributed to each constituency of people. This results in overpayment to Croats and underpayment to Bosniaks in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not due to direct political bias but is an unintended consequence of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Republika Srpska, though severely indebted partly due to widespread corruption, more efficiently manages its finances, so to speak, as they must be distributed to fewer ethnic minorities leaving a greater pot for ethnic Serbs. Whereas in the Federation, funds must be divided at least amongst Croats and Bosniaks in an agreeable fashion. Many place fault in the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Constitution for disproportionate distribution and tax collection

and express distrust toward the international community due to the current financial stagnation in Bosnia, while they also blame ethnic parties and politicians for financial mismanagement within the existing structure (Personal Communication Zlatan M. 2015).

The findings show that accountability of authority - the degree of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives in these cases - is irrelevant. They are neither necessary nor sufficient. The cases show that civil society consultation and entry and exit of civil society are more important, (as their absence might lead to a low level of generalized trust), as long as there is a presence of inequality. This proves that destroying trust can be easier in the absence of civil society or an effective role for civil society.

In the table 5.8 models, civil society entry and exit condition and civil society consultation are not necessary to get an outcome of low generalized trust. However, when looking at individual cases, timeframes do matter. Absence of entry and exit of civil society is not sufficient to bring down generalized trust as Table 5.7 shows.

In summary, based on both the preliminary and the intermediate results, I found that there is not one definitive path that leads to a positive outcome of higher generalized trust. However, an alternative path is to consider combinations of institutional conditions that are necessary to achieving a higher generalized trust. Equality, political power sharing among many ethnic/social groups, and civil society consultation on major policy change are necessary conditions for a higher generalized trust. The presence of these conditions implies: (a) Both institutional conditions that represent equality, fairness and a role in the policy-making process are needed, jointly, to work hand in hand to create a political and societal environment that leads to higher generalized trust, and (b) the presence of equality (no particularistic expenditures and no public administration arbitrariness) is important to

achieve a higher generalized trust, and (c) each society has a preference in institutions which lead to higher generalized trust. For example, in Iraq and South Africa, after war and apartheid, civil society consultation and entry and exit were more important than wealth spending and public administration inequality, as there was a process of national reformation of the political system and reconfigurations of the political institutions. In Macedonia, Iraq and Kyrgyzstan after the end of violent conflicts of five years or more (2000-2004,2010-2014,1999-2004, respectively), equality and fairness of institutions and power-sharing among the different ethnicities were more important for creating higher generalized trust.

However, taking into account limited empirical diversity and the additive influence of individual cases and conditions, I am very cautious when seeking to draw a generalized conclusion. This will be clearer with an in-depth single case study of specific conditions, which I will present in the next chapter.

Moreover, upon examining the level of generalized trust before and after a conflict/war (as well as time elapsed), it appears that cases like Iraq, South Africa, and Lebanon face a decline in generalized trust in the absence of public deliberation, civil society consultation and entry and exit of civil society. These same institutions eventually grow less important, with equality, fairness in public administration, and power sharing becoming more important. During the time of reconfiguration of institutions, the public is more interested in being part of the reconstruction of these institutions. They put more weight on civil society, local participation, consultations, and deliberations. In the aftermath of the reconfiguration of state institutions, the public becomes more interested in implementing these institutions.

In general, it seems that institutions have a higher capacity to destroy generalized trust than build it, which supports the argument of Rothstein and Stolle (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

This reinforces both theories: the institutional theory of generalized trust and the cultural-centric approach of generalized trust. Building generalized trust is a complexity that needs not only institutions, but also cultural background and societal history to contribute to its creation. That being said, it seems that poor institutions that are built upon segregation bias and discrimination against specific social/ethnic groups or institutions that ignore the public have a strong impact in destroying or lowering generalized trust in divided societies.

However, the results do not provide us with neat groups of cases that share similar structural characteristics and follow similar trajectories. Instead, cases are characterised by individual sets of solution terms, preventing us from constructing a clear and meaningful taxonomy of cases.

5.13 Conclusion

Generalized trust in divided societies is becoming an important topic in social science, and increasingly present in political science, sociology, and peace and conflict studies. From a political science perspective, researchers look for different sources of generalized trust in divided societies, mainly institutional sources. There has been a few studies, which focus on institutions and their influence on generalized trust. The main argument of institutional theory is that institutions are reflected in the daily life of individuals, especially in the bureaucratic machinery. If this bureaucratic machinery is unfair and unequal for a specific group of people, then, based on cognitive inference, they will feel excluded, unheard, and isolated from the whole. This in turn influences their level of trust of other groups, and simultaneously within the group itself, as the sectarian and ethnic leaders will be more assertive in their role which is based on sustained clientelism and corruption, under the strategy of “divide and conquer.”

The thesis has analyzed, for a number of divided societies, the conditions under which they are likely to have a high generalized trust. Considering the different models under which generalized trust scored low and high, results indicate that generalized trust is destroyed more easily than is maintained or created. The findings also suggest that the fractionalization factor is not relevant when it comes to maintaining a high level of generalized trust, but it works negatively in tandem with other conditions in creating a low level of generalized trust.

The analysis has several implications with regard to divided societies. As shown in the above sections, the absence of equality and fairness in formal institutions and the absence of public deliberation and consultation, including civil society, have a greater negative impact on generalized trust in divided societies. Conversely, findings prove that the absence of equality within formal institutions, including particularistic expenditure, is necessary in cases with a high level of generalized trust. However, it cannot guarantee an increase in the level of generalized trust when present. This paradox suggests that deeper investigation is needed in each society to gain a more thorough understanding. Further investigation of individual conditions in each country from the case studies is being conducted. This paper's findings support previous research in this area, yet a more general approach has not examined specific institutions in terms of institutional theory (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).

The results also highlight the nature of generalized trust during political transition and suggest the importance of a shared destiny, collective political struggle and common identity in divided society. For instance, in BiH, strong societal links were built on ethnicities, but after the war, these societal links became more firmly based on nation building. These links acted as a break, slowing down the eruption of ethnic hatred or ethnic competition over power. This explains why generalized trust was higher in the period of the

reconfiguration of state institutions, then dropped significantly (the same applies to Iraq and South Africa).

This thesis suggests that a combination of institutions is proven to be an effective tool in increasing generalized trust. Moreover, it stresses that there are challenges in assessing the level of generalized trust in divided society from a comparative perspective, especially in developing countries where data are rare and insufficient to undergo an in-depth research.

Institutions are important, and their link to generalized trust through the causal mechanism of inequality, fairness, consultation of civil society and public deliberations suggest that reform of institutions in divided societies in post-war-reconciliation time is more than an exercise in political engineering. Some societies are much better than other societies because of international intervention and monitoring. Political and institutional reengineering, such as professional legislatures, more public goods than particularistic and equal distribution of financial subsidies in local governments, may represent the way to have a higher level of generalized trust and therefore a society less prone to conflict and war.

CHAPTER 6

Between Inequality and Sectarianism: Who Destroys Generalized Trust? The Case of Lebanon

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter we focus on Lebanon, which experienced substantial ethno-religious violence (civil war) and mobilization (1991-present). The main question of this chapter is why so many Lebanese individuals distrust each other. It looks at the institutional conditions in Lebanon and how they affect the level of generalized trust in Lebanon.

This chapter refines the findings of the previous chapters. It examines how institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust and focuses on four major explanatory variables of institutional conditions: rule of law, civil society entry and exit, educational and academic institutes and other arbitrary public administration.

In 2015, a new wave of protests erupted in Lebanon. These protests were the start of a lengthy period of political instability in Lebanon. The informality of the sectarian political system in Lebanon has gone so far that the country has not a president for more than two years. The political unrest started as the solid waste and sanitation company, “Sukleen” ended their contract, which filled Beirut’s streets with garbage, and political sectarian leaders began to fight with each other as to which company would be contracted next. The youth movement named, “*Al Shaeb Yuruidu Iskat Al Nizam Al Ta’efi*” claims that the people want the sectarian regime down. According to Fawaz Traboulsi, Lebanon is a country of sects, where the political class is also sectarian. There is little need to explain how divided

the country is when the state recognizes 18 official ethnic groups within its political system(Traboulsi 2016). Walking in the streets of Beirut, you can see an abundance of political messages, filling the walls of Beirut's homes. One reads, "Why there is poverty in Lebanon? Because it has a sectarian political system!" Traboulsi argues that sectarianism is not only a disease in Lebanon, but it becomes the host of all diseases.

Sectarianism in Lebanon is a multi-faceted dilemma where difference between people is interpreted by the ideological distance between them. In Lebanon, with 18 officially recognized ethnic and religious groups, there is a very serious issue with generalized trust among them. This (dis)trust is usually represented by political fragmentation (a fragile political structure that gave rise to violent clashes in 2006, 2008 and 2010) and the long history of civil war that lasted more than 15 years (1975-1991). The civil war was a multi-faceted war where more than a dozen groups and countries were involved. The war was not only a sectarian and ethnic war, but also a conflict over power, sovereignty, wealth and the sustainability of a Christian/Muslim majority. Lebanon offers an excellent setting to contextualize the argument of the thesis as it is a deeply divided society, with low reported levels of generalized trust, political corruption, and the recent immigration crisis with more than one million Syrians fleeing to Lebanon, joining the quarter million Palestinians who have lived in its refugee camps for over 60 years. In 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to leave Palestine when Israel was established. Some of them fled to Lebanon where they still live in refugee camps. The very low reported levels of generalized distrust (82% in 2007, 79% in 2011, and 84% in 2013- stating that most people cannot be trusted) from the Arab Barometer is alarming, indicating a very exclusive trust circle among the Lebanese population, which is highly politicized (Maktabi 1999).

The surge of sect assertiveness from 1975 to this day, mainly after the *Tae'f*⁸ agreement of power-sharing, opened the debate on the role of sects, and how they will distribute their wealth. Lebanon's sects have set out to promote their superiority and control over political institutions, opening their own independent schools, expanding the use of the French and English languages, teaching their own version of history and culture and asserting their religious traditions.

6.2 Lebanon: A Divided Society

Various faith-based groups shape Lebanon as a state and a society. Six of them are major religious groups: three Muslim and three Christian. The Muslims comprise three sects: Sunni, Shi'a and Druze, and the Christians are also three groups, namely Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics. Historically, Lebanon has been governed based on territorial control of the different sects to protect the country's sovereignty (Salamey and Tabar 2012). The most well known efforts among the different denominational communities in Lebanon were informal and they succeeded in providing viable strategies for peaceful co-existence in Lebanon.

Political division, societal division, political and institutional reform and internal conflict resolution have always been managed through power sharing between the different sects. Therefore, maintaining non-violent coexistence was necessary to satisfy the conflicted sectarian and religious groups through the institutions of sectarianism (Haddad 2002). Any workable agreement needs to have the consensus of all groups, through compromise, to create a new political order, thereby avoiding violent conflict.

Sectarianism in modern Lebanon was established in the first and most prominent informal agreement called the National Pact in 1943, at the end of the French mandate period. This agreement lasted for 30 years and provided a fragile balance between the different sects as it

⁸ *Tai'f* agreement ended the Lebanese civil war in 1990. It will be explained further in subsequent sections

was built on sectarianism (Salibi 1988). According to Prof. Debs, the informal agreement between sects did not take into consideration the natural growth of population of the different sects, and what we are witnessing now in the current political fragmentation and division is a result of not taking into consideration the fast-growing minorities and sects since the early 1900s. Despite that, the Lebanese have tried to figure out how to manage their state and differences through accommodations and the neutralization of international and foreign powers.

The Lebanese Christians were allied with the Western powers, and would enjoy Western protection under the French and British states, while most Muslims refused Pan-Arabism calls, and agreed to have Lebanon with its existing boundaries. The 1943 pact had the ability to sustain peace for some time and ensured limited democratic elements in the deeply divided Lebanese society (Smock, D. and Smock 1975). However, other scholars identified very serious social, economic and political problems associated with the different communities in Lebanon, that hindered the formation of a viable state (Hudson 1968). As the different Lebanese sects exhibited different values and allegiances, accompanied with various historical backgrounds, they all tried to be independent and have their own political and social institutions with their own political aspirations. This culminated in civil war in the 1970s, that lasted for more than 15 years, without the domination of one group over the others. Moreover, the Lebanese leaders managed to further increase the religious and denominational schism in the political system by conferring public positions based on sectarianism, which favored the Christians at that time, who were highly educated compared to other communities. The whole system was established to ensure the primacy of sects and the power of the traditional elites/families. The division deepened even further by the continuous negotiation between the different sects concerning power-sharing and political representation. Political arrangements since independence and the 1943 package distributed

offices according to demographic and political weight, without taking into consideration population growth rate among the different sects (Kassis 1985). Christians gave concessions to Muslims for greater political participation and representation as the Muslim populations increased steadily and in huge numbers. However, the Maronites claimed that their role must be the leading one to guarantee the security and sovereignty of Lebanon and Lebanese society (Ayoub 1994). The domination of the Maronites in key political and military posts was recognized as a barrier to Pan-Arab nationalism; the Maronites demanded a Western-style Lebanon where they belonged to the West rather than to Arabs. The continuous tension between the different sects, mainly Maronites and Muslims, contributed to a deeply divided Lebanon. Political domination over key posts increased the social divisions between Muslims and Maronites, who were not trusted by their Muslim neighbors. This trust extended to include all classes of society for a long time coming to the point where taxi drivers wrote notes saying, "I do not take Muslims" and vice versa (Personal Communication O.Kassar 2015).

After the Egyptian revolution in 1953, and the political development in its aftermath, especially the resurgence of the Pan-Arabism and the Arab-Israeli conflict, there was a challenge among the different Lebanese sects. With the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees and the military buildup in Lebanon by the Palestinians, who are Muslims in general, the conflict took a new turn by the onset of the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990). The civil war was over many issues, but principally the distribution of power and wealth and foreign policy orientation. However, one of the more significant causes of the civil war was the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The Muslims saw the Palestinian military presence as an advantage for them and for the nationalists, while the Christians recognized the presence of the Palestinians as a threat to their power and existence in Lebanon. This war revealed how much Lebanese society is divided and fragmented not only

on political issues, but also in general as a disintegrated society. The war prompted foreign intervention in Lebanon, driving the Syrian army to enter Lebanon to prevent more bloodshed.

The Syrian intervention came because the Syrian regime did not want foreign states to intervene and gain influence over Lebanon. Despite the Pan-Arab regime in Syria, they allied with the Christians and non Pan-Arabism supporters. The Syrians remained in Lebanon until the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri in 2005. Moreover, Israel, wary of the existence and intensity of the Palestinian militias, launched two major military operations in 1978 and 1982 (Ellis 1999). All efforts to sit the Lebanese at the discussion table and agree under the sponsorship of the US and Syrians did not succeed until they reached final agreement, the “*Taif*” agreement, under Saudi supervision and sponsorship.

In 1989, the different Lebanese factions and sects agreed on the “Document of National Understanding”, which ended the civil war. It was sponsored by the Arabs and signed in Saudi Arabia, writing a new constitution for Lebanon. The agreement was signed based on the concept of “Power Sharing” and regulated the conflict of interests between the different sects. It did not modify the first agreement of power sharing of 1943; rather it altered the sectarian proportionality to the advantage of the Muslims. The proportion of Muslims to Christians had become 50:50 instead of 6:5 (Geukjian 2009). Lebanon still has a Maronite Christian president (not effective since 2014), a Sunni prime minister with more power and authority in public administration, and a Shiite speaker of parliament. In reality, the agreement thought to change the 1943 one to take into account population changes in Lebanese society as the number of Maronites was declining and Sunni and Shiite Muslims were advancing in numbers and power (Political and Armed). However, the Christians argue that *Taif* was wrongly interpreted and was imposed on them (Haddad 2002).

The *Taif* accord aimed at ending the violence in Lebanon and reconciling the Lebanese around a program of constitutional and institutional reform. The accord was successful in ending the political violence in Lebanon, but failed utterly to end the divisions between the different Lebanese sects. Instead of promoting cooperation between sects, it reinforced sectarian communities and institutions, producing a weak state. It also would have provided a space for a new and viable constitution that accommodates the different ideologies and denominations, along their political agenda in the greater Lebanon. Hudson argues that the *Taif* agreement actually deepened sectarian segmentation and sectarianism (Hudson 1999). It provided a space for the different sects to reinforce and strengthen their internal associations, isolating themselves in geographical limitations rather than cooperating with other groups. Others have gone as far as to argue that by this agreement, the lack of Lebanese identity has been strengthened, and that Lebanon is merely a plurality of people who have little in common and are unable to establish a viable state (Khashan 1992; Nawaf Kabbara 1991).

6.3 Lebanon: Society of Distrust

Lebanese society has a high level of distrust and misperception among the different sects (Haddad 2002). There is also a lack of a Lebanese national identity and a feeling of separate political identity/community in each sect. The low level of generalized trust has been reinforced by the failure of national and sub-national institutional conditions in Lebanon in general and after the *Taif* agreement in particular. Divisions and distrust have been exacerbated by the utter failure to integrate and reconcile the diverse groups and cultures onto one political community, resulting instead in a reality where each one tries to impose their own on the whole Lebanese society. The Lebanese case fits within Beetham's argument that societies divided and defined by antagonistic cultural groups will have difficulty in sustaining democracy, whether the groups are defined by ethnicity, religion,

historical memory, or anything that gives the people the sense of common identity, which distinguishes them from others (Beetham 1994). However, in Lebanon, it is not only the presence of different religious and ethnic groups but also the high level of distrust between them that contributes to a lack of democracy. The low level of generalized trust can be explained not only by historical and inherited distrust, but also by institutional conditions in the post-war era.

During my observations in Lebanon's capital, Beirut, I encountered two sentiments by taxi drivers. One, expressed by Ahmed Choufi, said, "I do not trust anyone. Those people who love their sects, religions and can not trust other people, I do not trust them," (Personal Communication, Choufi A. 2015) Another Lebanese man, Salah Boughad shared, "I do trust people from other ethnicities and religions more than I trust my Christian friends, Maronites or Catholic," (S. Boughad, personal communication, October 25, 2015). One of them argued that since the Taif agreement, Sunni prime ministers have poured money to their own cities: Hariri to Saida and Miqati to Tripoli. Another also asserted that financial assistance and expenditures do not go to the people of ethnic minorities, but rather into the pockets of the political elites, who legalize corruption and maintain their position to benefit from the political system. Therefore, he does not trust politicians and the political systems, including programs to assist people, such as social security and unemployment financial assistance (Personal Communication May N. 2016).

Another argues, "The problem is not with the people, they are like me and you. I trust them when they are friends and colleagues only, but not strangers. I have to have experience of them before knowing if I can trust them or not". However, he argues that they do not trust political institutions at all. "I can not trust the politicians, the government and political institutions. They consider Lebanon as a cake and everyone has their piece, making regulations as they wish, not for the benefit of the people." A third person observes,

“Politicians are using institutions and policies to frighten citizens and make them distrust each other to sustain their power,” (Personal Communication, D. Bakri 2015). One Maronite policeman argues that he must be careful when he deals with people in Lebanon. He argues, “When I see people violate law, exploiting other people because the laws and police are weak, then I must be careful,” he adds, “If a colleague asks me for a thousand US dollar, I will not give it to him. If I knew that the law and governmental institutions and agencies would give me back the money if I complained, then I would lend him the money and trust everyone in the society,” (Personal communication, G. Ellie2015).

The recognition of other ethnic groups in a society mostly decreases divisions and diffuses violent conflict in the community. However, this issue is very sensitive and may result in severe and opposite consequences. For example, Lebanon has been facilitating the integration of ethnic groups through institutions and other arrangements (e.g. constitutionalism); however, after twenty years, this has only resulted in putting some of these ethnicities in ghettos that people cannot escape from. In other words, instead of diffusing the reasons of conflict, such as trust between citizens, the newly created regime has endless negative consequences based on the long history of exploitation of power, creating a corrupted political elite and unlimited cases of protests and public opposition to the existing system.

All institutions that favor one ethnic minority group are a dangerous manifestation of a corrupted regime and endless distrust among these ethnic groups and within the ethnic groups. This is not because of nepotism but rather for a very primitive reason: as long as an individual in the society is connected to his ethnicity, it is going to sustain corruption, nepotism and neo-patronomialism, which will decrease trust first within the same ethnicity, and then between the different ethnicities (Maalouf 2004). The only solution for that is to

treat citizens as individuals and not based on their ethnicity. Figure 6.1 shows the level of distrust in Lebanon across seven years.




Figure 6.1 Trust in Lebanon 2007, 2011, 2013

6.4 Statistical Model and Results

This model is a deeper study of the model presented in Chapter 5. It goes deeper into the institutional conditions and examines their impact on the level of generalized trust. The model in this chapter is based on the logit model. It is expressed as follows:

$$Gtrust = f(\text{equality conditions, institutional trust in formal institutions, civil society conditions})$$

Trust is measured, as in the previous discussion, as a dichotomous variable and can take either a 0(trust) or 1(distrust). Equality conditions are presented in four variables: living conditions compared to fellow citizens, a feeling of security and safety in the society, equality in receiving public services compared to other citizens, and access to justice by the ability to file a complaint in the case of a rights violation. Institutional factor contain four other conditions, including performance of the judiciary and elected representatives.

Corruption and clientelism experiences are presented in clientelism condition. The last condition presents how much trust there is in civil society organizations. The construction of variables is described in Table 6.1

Table 6.1 Variables used in the analysis

Variable	Expected	Explanation
Gtrust	Depended	Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not?
Living conditions compared to others	+	Generally speaking, how would you compare your living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens? 1. Much worse 2. Worse 3. Similar 4. Better 5. Much better
Feeling of safety and security	+	Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are ensured or not? 1. Fully ensured. 2. Ensured. 3. Not ensured. 4. Absolutely not ensured.
Equality in country	+	To what extent do you feel that you are being treated equally compared to other citizens in your country? 1. To a great extent. 2. To a medium extent. 3. To a limited extent. 4. Not at all.
Access to make a complaint of rights infringement	+	Access to the relevant official to file a complaint when you feel that your rights have been violated. 1. Very Easy 2. Easy 3. Difficult 4. Very Difficult 5. I have not tried
Corruption	+	Do you think that there is corruption within the state's institutions and agencies? 1. Yes. 2. No.

Trust in representatives	+	To what extent do you trust the elected council of representatives 1. I trust them to a great extent 2. I trust them to a medium extent 3. I trust them to a limited extent 4. I absolutely do not trust them
Performance of the judiciary	+	Generally speaking, how would you evaluate the performance of the judiciary in carrying out its tasks and duties? 1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Bad 5. Very bad
Clientelism	+	Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to obtain a job without connections, while others say that jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on recent experience(s) you are personally aware of, do you think that: 1. Obtaining employment through connections is extremely widespread. 2. Employment is sometimes obtained through connections. 3. Employment is obtained without connections. 4. I do not know of any relevant experiences. 8. I don't know (have not read).
Trust in civil society	+	To what extent do you trust civil society institutions? 1. I trust them to a great extent 2. I trust them to a medium extent 3. I trust them to a limited extent 4. I absolutely do not trust them

Source of Data is the Arab Barometer, third wave 2013.

The results from the logit model are shown in Table 6.2. Model one. Which focuses on equality in society and shows that personal and family security and safety is significant and positively correlated to generalized trust. This means the less safe and secure a person is, the more he is likely to distrust people. The other variables in model one are also correlated to the level of generalized trust, however not as much as one's safety and security. As I argued

in the previous chapter, institutional conditions and trust in institutions also influence the level of generalized trust. Model two indicates that the performance of the judiciary is positively correlated to generalized trust. The more an individual sees that the performance of judiciary is bad, the less trust they will have in fellow citizens. This is in line with the main argument in Chapter five, which shows that distrust in the legal system will affect the level of generalized trust, as the citizen will have no faith his rights are protected by the legal system and therefore will see others as abusing the legal system. A weak judiciary and courts will lessen his trust in his fellow citizens. Model 3 tries to control the first two conditions beside others from institutional and equality dimensions. It shows also the same results as Model 2.


Model 4 examines whether trust changes when I add trust in performance of civil society. Civil society in Lebanon is sectarian and based on sectarianism, where CSOs have a difficult entry, as they represent sectarian affiliation and cause distrust in their performance leading to greater distrust among people. Model 4 is significant and is the best model among the mentioned models; all of its variables influence significantly, having a significant p value, generalized trust. This indicates trust in civil society, its existence and real activism, as a condition to generalized trust along with inequality in society. The four models, especially Model 4, present the most significant results and they support the argument that people in divided societies are less trusting when subjected to inequality, discrimination, a feeling of insecurity and distrust in the legal system and civil society.

The models are in line with the main argument of this and previous studies. The partiality of institutions, inequality of legal institutions and exclusion in society, leads to less trust among individuals. As trust is cognitive, I argue that these conditions are important as they show that they are significant in every model, even when we add more institutional variables. These findings are supported by other studies too. The daily struggle and the

feeling of security within the society negatively affects trust (Foster 1965). Also, partiality and arbitrariness in public administration and the feeling of exclusion in society lead to inequality and inability of the individual to complain to formal institutions, as sectarianism and sectarian institutions mean his complaint will not be taken seriously. These institutional conditions show that there are groups of people singled out from other groups, creating a sense of otherness.

Arbitrariness in public administration and partial, unequal treatment of citizens from different sects, and thinking that public administration officers will not be held accountable, creates a norm of corruption and clientelism (see Figure 6.2), with no mechanism to oversee these agencies, programs or in a broad scope, the local municipalities. Therefore, we can see a higher level of corruption in Lebanon.

Figure 6.2 Obtaining Jobs through connections (Clientelism)



Note: The answers above are those who responded “obtaining an employment through connections is extremely widespread”.

Surprisingly, the findings indicate that corruption is not significantly correlated to the level of generalized trust. The reason behind this is explained in Figures 3 and 4. Financial and administrative corruption lies behind other challenges for respondents. If we add the

percentages of all other challenges, corruption will not be a significant challenge or of interest to the Lebanese. Sectarianism, a politicized judiciary, sectarian and political oppression, stability and security and politicized sects (21.3%) are considered twice as high as corruption (11%). Moreover, almost 50% in Lebanon believe that their main priorities are mostly related to equality (Figure 4). Therefore, the result of inequality is corruption, and also the result of inequality is low generalized trust.




Figure 6.3 The most important challenges facing Lebanon today (2010/2013)

Therefore, the Lebanese model of divided society becomes:

Inequality + CSO bad performance + distrust in judiciary à low generalized trust and corruption




Figure 6.4 Main priorities related to democracy in Lebanon

These results are very important for policy makers and international agencies that work to lessen the fragility of peace in divided societies. Considering the issues of equality and safety and civil society, activism is a high priority for people, influencing significantly the trust between them. These results suggest that public administration arbitrariness, the feeling of security and safety within the society, and just and efficient judicial system are risky for the society and decrease trust in divided societies. Therefore, institutions and policies must be designed and complemented carefully to increase trust among people. Such institutions are an important source of trust. The discouragement of non-partisan, non-sectarian civil society organizations is important as it decreases the trust in the performance of CSOs, and stands against the purpose of their creation. Notably, sectarian civil society is linked to a decrease of trust in Lebanon as a divided society.

A further discussion of precise programs that show inequality and discrimination, and which civil society organizations they distrust, is beyond the scope of this study, yet results indicate that inequality, arbitrariness, ineffective and impartial judiciary might be the areas with a strong effect on trust and can be used to create a balance between historical hostilities and fragmentation in divided societies.

The analysis suggests that generalized trust in Lebanon is low for people who feel inequality and have worse living conditions compared to others and those who experience issues of insecurity and safety in the society. Moreover, it suggests that distrust in civil society and an inefficient legal system and judiciary is linked to distrust (Figure 5.5). I will look into these issues in depth to explain how these conditions affect trust.

Table 6.2, Four Models of Generalized Trust and Institutions Conditions: Lebanon

Predictor	(1) Equality Model	(2) Institutions Model	(3) Institutions + Equality	(4) Institutions + Equality + CSO
Demographic Variables				
Education	.02 (.05)	.01 (.05)	.02 (.05)	
Marital Stat.	-0.00 (.13)	-.01 (.13)	-.02 (.13)	
Religion	-.25 (.18)	-.42 (.19)	-.4 (.2)	
Gender	.48 (.19)	.42 (.19)	.45 (.19)	
Employment	-.35 (.11)	-.33 (.2)	-.32 (.2)	
Attitudinal Correlates				
Living conditions compared to others	-.038 (.11)		-.026 (.11)	-.03 (.07)
Feeling of safety and security	.48* (.11)		.4** (.11)	.42*** (.11)
Equality in country	-.10 (.07)		-.1 (.07)	-.15* (.07)
Access to defend one's rights	-.08 (.07)		-.13 (.07)	.22** (.08)
Institutions Correlates				
Corruption		1.19 (.74)	1.2 (.74)	1.3 (.75)
Trust in representatives		.19 (.11)	.17 (.13)	.07 (.10)
Performance of the judiciary		.30** (.08)	.28** (.08)	.21 (.09)
Clientelism		.14 (.17)	.24 (.16)	.26 (.16)
Civil Society Correlates				
Trust in civil society				.45*** (.09)
Constant	1.17 (2.14)	-.77 (.44)	-1.1 (1.1)	-.24 (.51)
Observations	1159	1159	1159	1146
Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses underneath				
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001				




Figure 6.5 Generalized Trust and Institutional Conditions in Lebanon

6.5 Inequality: Expenditure on Public Universities as an Example

Sectarian balance in Lebanon means a balance of sects and is not based on geography i.e. where different sects live in every region in Lebanon. However, there is a classical geographical concentration of sects in specific areas. For instance, the Druze are concentrated in Mount Lebanon while Sunnis are in Beirut, Tripoli, Saidoun and Akkra. These are among the biggest cities in Lebanon. Shiites are concentrated in the south, especially Tyre, and Hermel.

In Lebanon, particularistic expenditure is distributed ethno-geographically for three main reasons:

1. To buy loyalty of a sect or sectarian political party.
2. To postpone a public administration problem, by funding short-term programs that cover the problem.
3. To hand a bigger particularistic fund to another region/ethno-geographical area.

Educational institutions can explain such inequality and sectarian expenditures. In Lebanon, there are more than 50 universities, mostly private. Each university is controlled and managed by a sect or ethnic group. For instance, the Amal Shiite political party controls Sagesse University, while the Lebanese American University is run by Christian Maronites. Therefore, each religious and ethnic sect sees public universities as a budget-consuming entity, and try to dismantle or decrease its budget. This aim is to undermine the public educational institutions, while strengthening private, ethnically run institutions. The Lebanese University is the largest university in Lebanon. Shiites control it as rectors, the student union and the management. It is known as, “The University of the Poor” because it is public and cheaper than private universities. However, most of the youth activists and anti-sectarian movements, such as “Al Shaeb Yourid”, ‘the people demand’, “Bedna Nuhasib”, ‘We want to hold you accountable’ “Tel3it Rehetkum”, ‘you are smelly’, are organized and established by youth from the Lebanese University.

Expenditure distribution affects generalized trust heavily when funds go to the ethno-geographical area that the prime minister/minister originates from. For example, when the prime minister, who is always Sunni, is from Beirut, he usually concentrates the expenditure on his constituency in Beirut. Alhariri and Saniora were from Saidoun and poured huge chunks of the public budget into their cities, leaving most of the country with little public expenditure compared to their cities. As spending becomes particularistic on an ethno-geographical basis, people’s judgment about the area and its inhabitants becomes generalized. For example, Tyre and Saidoun have less trust between them as each city is inhabited by a different sect and is represented independently in the government and the political system. Nabeh Berri, the spokesperson of the Lebanese parliament, comes from the southern Shiite area. He has many private and public companies that run under his sectarian party, while the Druze Walid Junblat controls other private and public companies in his area

too. In 2015, new sectarian tensions arose in governmental and parliamentary institutions when the government decided to solve the garbage problem by exporting it abroad. Tensions escalated as the sectarian blocs had different interests in which private/public companies should take over the exportation of garbage.

There are some categories of institutions that contribute to distrust among people, such as governmental sectarian institutions with a high budget of particularistic expenditures, e.g. the council of the south for Shiite, the council of development and construction for Sunni, and council of the displaced Lebanese. Each of these semi-governmental institutions usually appoints employees from one sectarian group, where service providing becomes particularistic and public administration becomes arbitrary for other sects. This generates a level of distrust towards the employees from the ethnic sect, and this distrust becomes contagious. As Arab society in general, and Lebanese society in particular, relies on social networks and family ties to get public information, distrust becomes contagious to other members of the sect.

One of the main driving factors of distrust in Lebanon is the distrust of people in the political system and the political elites themselves. In times of crisis or elections, ethnicity and sectarian identity is stronger than national identity in Lebanon, so people follow and support politicians and political elites from the same sect despite the corruption.

There is also a cultural division between sects, based on which have more resources, and connections than others. This is evident in the number of private schools, the unequal access to cultural capital, the dropout rates at all educational levels and in educational opportunities abroad.

The number of students in public schools dropped from 351,000 to 275,000 between 2001 and 2011(R.A.C.E. 2014). This drop in numbers is one result of a new kind of privatization

by providing sect-based/ethnic-based education in private schools managed by the different ethnicities where religious and ethnic curricula are provided as a compulsory subject. Moreover, higher education is not exempt from division since each sect demands to have its own higher education institution. In 1974, there were only five universities, while in 2015, Lebanon had 24 universities and 19 higher education institutions.

The sudden proliferation of higher education institutions originated from the need of each sect to have its own academic institution where privileges go to the sect's students, and as a source of investment for the leaders of the sect, who in the majority of these institutions are the owners. In 2015, three main universities were established as part of the sectarian division; "Al Hadara University" 'the Civilization University', belonging to Hizbullah, the Shia, Phoenicia University owned by Randa Berri, wife of the speaker of the parliament and Shia and head of Amal movement, and lastly AZM University, owned by Nagib Meqati, a Sunni leader.

According to Traboulsi, these institutions/policies that facilitate cash-based subsidizing, and educational expenditures on private academic institutions allowed the political sect elite to divide the society, empowering the leaders to control the people and dismantle any efforts by the students unions and university-based social movements to initiate any struggle against the political elites. He argues that such tools are dividing the society and lessening the trust between the people in general (Traboulsi 2016).

In education, there are quotas for different sects and every year a new number of seats are allocated to different sects in some universities or in most universities in an informal way. Rodine Mahmoud claims that in 2003, she was denied a seat at Sagesse as they were admitting only Druze students that year and not Sunni. Moreover, there are proven cases where grades have been manipulated by certain professors to the advantage of the students

from the same sects. In the Lebanese University, Shiites are taking over the faculty of law, while Sunnis dominate other campuses. Therefore, the students who are members or affiliated with the *Amal* Shiite party can receive high grades or pass, even though they fail general exams. This is because the student union and dominant Shiite parties can interfere in academic promotions and academic employment.

According to Rodine Mahmoud, trust among different sects and ethnicities in Lebanon are not stable because institutions cannot provide the same treatment for all parties. For example, an official document that needs to be obtained can be expedited for a specific person because the general manager or the majority of employees is from same sect. Universities and educational institutions in Lebanon are mirrors of the outer society and state-society relationship. As New York Times wrote in 2009 on Saint Joseph University student elections:

“Once again, the university has become a reflection in miniature of the country’s fiercely divided political scene. [Student council elections] results are seen as crucial indexes of a party’s overall popularity and routinely make the front pages of national newspapers” (Worth 2009).

6.6 Inequality: The Trap of Lebanese Society

In 1860, a civil war ended with the victory of the Druze however, not long after, they were weakened as the feudal system was declining. The Christians, mainly the Maronite, formed a self-ruling mechanism in Mount Lebanon, as they were the majority population there. In 1881, the Ottomans initiated the *Mutasarrifate* (Governorates), which were governed by two-level elected councils with twelve seats distributed among the six officially recognized sects, with a majority of Christians.

Soon after that, inequality appeared in favor of the Christians, and Maronites in particular. These privileges were manifested in the access to positions of political and economic power,


where the head of the military, head of the state, head of the intelligence services, head of the Bank of Lebanon, ministry of defense and ministry of finance were all Christian Maronites. There was an educational inequality that Maronites enjoyed, with support from Europe and foreign missionaries, while a decline was seen in state-owned educational centers. Moreover, there was an increased difference in economic and societal development between the center and the southern/northern regions in access to resources, state services, health accessibility and a disproportional distribution of public goods and wealth. This geographical and ethnically based distribution of wealth deepened divisions within society, with trust almost non-existent in many historical/political issues between the different ethnicities in society (Traboulsi 2016).

Dubar examines the relationship between sects and social classes in Lebanon. His findings assert that Christians and Maronites form the majority of the high and middle class in Lebanon, while Muslims, and Shia in particular, form the majority of urban and rural class. Many studies maintain that inequality in access to education is one of the clearest evidence of sectarian-social discrimination (Dubar, Claude, and Nasr 1982; Dubar 1974).

Lebanese sectarianism was created as a result of unequal access to many political and socio-economic rights between the Druze community and the Maronites and Christians in Mount Lebanon. The upper classes of Mount Lebanon belonged to the Druze landowning families, while merchants, moneylenders, artisans, farmers and low-class workers were Christians. A deeper division between the two classes was created by the penetration of a new trade route for silk in Mount Lebanon, which was mainly to the favor of Christians. Moreover, the division was increased by the access of Christians to education and religious schools by foreign missionaries, which were established in 1736 at the Synod of Al Luwayzah (Salibi 1988).

Sectarianism is part of the Lebanese political system and society. It is institutionalized and has become, in the last decades, a legal fact for individuals (Dubar, Claude, and Nasr 1982). The Lebanese, as members of the society have their political, education and social rights defined in the framework of their sect and ethnic group, rather than as Lebanese. Their rights are part of their ethnic and sectarian identity as opposed to their Lebanese identity. It is important to emphasize that the sects' leaders have control over the individuals of their sect. The control and command policies increased during the civil war, and strengthened in post war times, as they (the leaders) imposed policies and institutions, which allowed them to keep society institutionally divided and maintain leadership over it (Traboulsi 2016).

The unequal distribution of services, public goods and resources deprive most people of their rights, giving it to others. Moreover, each sect may feel the right to distribute resources to its members, who may already have more connections or wealth, pushing inequality further. This inequality and accessibility to justice contribute to a sense of vulnerability and frustration among people, eventually transforming it to distrust in others who may seek benefits and acceptance of injustice and inequality (Uslaner 2005). See Figure 6.6.



Note: The answers above are the sum of those who responded "to a limited extent" and "Not at all".

Figure 6.6 How equally are you being treated?

6.7 Sectarianism in Labor Market and Business

As a sectarian political system grew more entrenched in Lebanon in the aftermath of the civil war, the sects' leaders initiated policies that organized a sectarian arrangement in the labor market, such as the informal institution of a quota system, where positions are accorded based on sects, in the state's agencies and public sector. This informal law became a normal act and extended to include the private sector. This is clear in light of the preference of employers and corporate owners to recruit members of their own sect or ethnicity. This kind of discrimination also appears in salaries, promotions and allocation of high executive powers. Traboulsi argues that not only senior positions, but also low-level positions are distributed to maintain sect balance between staff members (Traboulsi 2016). This policy is not very different than policies during the civil war. Corporations and institutions during the civil war relied on members of their sects, from low-class workers to holders of senior positions (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The sectarian game that divided the Lebanese institutionally also provides room for corruption and nepotism in business and private sectors. The competition of the different sects over public service provision, contracts, and public works to have a monopoly over specific sectors to offer benefits regionally/ethnically from the service deepened the division in Lebanese society. This includes the distribution of state public contracts to sectarian blocs to maintain balance between the different sects.

In the early 2000s, there was a conflict between the Sunni Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri (assassinated in 2005) and the Maronite President, Emil Lahoud, over the privatization of the mobile phone companies. The president insisted that the mobile networks must remain public, while the prime minister demanded they should be privatized.

More recently, a dispute erupted between two major sectarian blocs over signing permanent contracts in the state-owned electricity company. The energy minister, Gebran Bassil refused to sign the contracts on the grounds that the majority of them are of the Shia sect. Gebran argued that the company did not in need such a huge workforce, all of whom were hired because they were of the Shia sect to which the Parliament speaker, Nabi Berri, belongs. Gebran Bassil argued that he would not sign the contact as he was not prepared to license more financial losses in the company (AlModon 2013).

In the same context, a conflict developed between the different sectarian blocs over contracts with the Turkish power ships, which were hired to address the shortage of power in Lebanon. The different sects agreed to commission the Minister of Energy (Shia and Maronite bloc) and former president of the Engineers' Syndicate (Sunni) to negotiate with the Turkish companies. The deal was sealed, but the contractors failed to meet the agreement's conditions. One of the ships did not arrive and one could not work fully. This scandal was covered up as it was, principally, a sectarian deal (Al Akhbar 2015).

The quota system between the different sects leads to a more sectarian division over resources and differences in the level of services for the different sects. As the substantive policies of cash-based and state expenditure increased, along with a desire to distribute the expenses, a privatization wave was initiated in the 1990s and 2000s. The privatization was sect-based where each company was indirectly or directly linked/owned by a sect. The main corporations included Lebanon Post, Public Transportation, Rubbish Collection Service, Security Service, energy, public health sector, education and higher education (Traboulsi 2016).

6.8 Sectarian Civil Society

Lebanese civil society is a collection of individual and communal groups, each linked to its associations and structure of mobilization within the Lebanese society. Since the last years of the civil war in 1990, many NGOs have been established and dozens of initiatives set up to bring peace and start reconciliation between the different sects in society (Ghosn and Khoury 2011). However, these organizations have been plagued by sectarianism and sectarian political elites. After the civil war, the state mechanism and institutions became weak, so charity organizations and civil society took responsibility for providing public services to the communities. During this time, civil society became a powerful tool for powerful political families and elites (Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi 2013). These civil society organizations were built on sectarian principles and continued after the war to serve as sectarian civil society organizations with substantial funds. Examples of these organizations are the Rafik Hariri Foundation (Sunni), the Bachir Gemmayel Foundation (Christian Maronite), Randa Barri (Shiite) and Rene Mowad (Christian).

After the end of the civil war, civil society tried to adapt to the changes, seeking funds from external donors, changing their missions and *modus operandi* to fit the donors' agendas and also the clientelist state institutions. Many of these civil society organizations were funded externally and adopted the agenda of foreign donors, focusing more on environmental issues, democratization, human rights and women empowerment. Volunteers ran almost all of the pre-1990s civil society organizations. Many had a political agenda of reform and the end of sectarian politics in Lebanon. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Election was one of the biggest initiatives of civil society that pressed towards institutional reform and local elections. However, after the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri, most of the civil society organizations, including LADE, allied with one party against the other, one side opposed to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the other

camp accusing the Syrians of assassinating Hariri and asking for international protection. This started a new chapter of civil society in Lebanon where civil society organizations began to adopt the political agenda of political elites and political coalitions in the country.

Therefore, civil society organizations in Lebanon are mostly either semi-governmental or affiliated with a sectarian political party or ethnicity, like the Kurds association and the Ahmadi association in Lebanon. Many civil societies receive external funding to implement programs in ethno-geographical areas. The Kurds were refused recognition as an ethnicity and were instead granted the status of a civil society organization (Personal Communication Rodine M. 2015). The same went for Ahmadi minority of Muslims. This raises the question of whether civil society truly exists in Lebanon or not. This is due to the sectarian political culture of Lebanese society and the power structure of the state and state-society relations.

Neither the state nor civil society provides an arena for the public to express their concerns concerning public issues. The state does not consult civil society when it comes to policy change or public deliberation for political and societal reasons. This is possible because of sectarian networks and ties that prevent citizens from political participation.

The failure of Lebanese civil society to hold sectarian leaders accountable and to ensure the participation of individuals in the consultation process, pressuring state and sectarian elites to stop exploiting and abusing the system, leads the public to distrust civil society. Lebanese civil society has been unable to get rid of its sectarian ties and the sectarian elites' hegemony over it and therefore, has become an agent of sectarianism in the society, reinforcing clientelism and the power of political and sectarian elites (Dyala Badran 2014).

Moreover, civil society organizations try to recruit activists and volunteers from the same sect or already sympathetic to their ideology (Ghosn and Khoury 2011). This widens the gap between different sects and civil society organizations themselves. Lebanese civil

society could, at least for now, convince the wider Lebanese population that it is independent from any political party, sect, ideology or international donors. As one former ambassador in Lebanon said, before asking which NGO one works for, they ask where your NGO gets their funds from and which sect it belongs to.” In Lebanon, it becomes common knowledge that a sect or a political party has an NGO representing its ideology.

The sense that each civil society organization belongs to a sect or is affiliated with a political sectarian party, gives the impression that one has no chance to be listened to, and if they have different views for the sect’s ideology, this organization will not represent their views. They will perceive each organization as a sectarian reserve. Losing trust in civil society implies losing trust in the wider society because CSOs diverge from their main purpose and goals, which is to represent the Lebanese people in general and to act as a third party in the face of the state when they violate individual and communal rights.

6.9 Sectarian Legal System

As the Lebanese are divided and recognized according to the law based on their denomination/sect, there is difficulty in finding a consensus among the Lebanese sects on judicial rules. Therefore, there are two sources of judicial power: the Lebanese parliament and the sects. Each sect is free to issue legislation on private issues relating to personal status (Personal Communication Rabea D. 2016). The various sources of legislation means that there are different courts, different charges, contradicting entities and also rules with different interpretations by different sects. This plurality of laws goes beyond the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and its public law, affecting relations between judges, policy makers and sectarian elites.

According to the Lebanese constitution, the courts of different levels and jurisdictions assume power under one system and represent a part of the unilateral system of judicial

power. In Lebanon there are seven types of courts and each one has its own purpose: constitutional courts, political courts, judicial courts, administrative courts, financial courts, military courts and extraordinary courts. These courts were designed and ratified by the Lebanese factions and the constitutional council in 1993.

The state of the judiciary in the post-war *Taif* agreement was amended and updated, stating that a judiciary must be autonomous, and members of the Higher Judicial Council judges must be elected by judicial body. Yet, this formula was not implemented, and the appointment of judges remains either sectarian or based on the balance of power or consensus among different sects.

The most dangerous exceptional courts are the military courts, which have become common in the last years, especially acting against youth revolting against corruption, sectarianism and monopoly of power in Lebanon. A temporary law was issued in 1958 after the start of the armed conflict and still is in force today. Other exceptional courts are religious and spiritual courts that violate the principle of constitutions and independence. Moreover, there are other judicial bodies: commissions of appropriation, commissions of challenge to taxes, and special commissions to examine financial issues, such as banks.

In Lebanon, the sectarian executive power is the one that appoints the judges and members of the Higher Judicial Council. This is in violation of the principles of the declaration of independence and the constitution (Personal Communication Rabea D. 2016). By giving room to the political elites to appoint, form and exercise their power over judicial bodies, judicial bodies come under the hegemony of sectarian political power. Therefore, the courts have been abused by the political and sectarian elites to gain political, economic and social advantages.

If people feel that governmental institutions treat them unequally and unfairly including the judicial system's institutions, such as courts, they will come to have no faith in the legal system (Uslander 2002). The legal system is important for two main reasons; firstly because it protects people from dishonest politicians and wealthy figures, and secondly because the legal system, and courts especially, are presumed neutral and outside the partisan political system. If it fails to meet these needs, i.e. protecting ordinary citizens and their wealth, people will have no faith in it and the law in general and will, therefore, start to not obey the law. The courts released Michelle Samaha (a Christian Orthodox Lebanese MP) in 2016 after being caught with explosive devices in Lebanon in an attempt to destabilize the country. This created a stormy reaction by the Lebanese population and almost all expressed distrust in the Lebanese courts and legal system. In the same timeframe, many youth activists were arrested for expressing their opinions against the government and sentenced to 4 years in prison. Since trust rests upon the foundation of equality in front of all governmental institutions, especially courts, these instances in the Lebanese judicial systems manifest the link between inequality, corruption and low trust.

6.10 What is behind low trust?

Of all the issues related to generalized trust and its origins in Lebanon, according to the previous discussions, inequality is probably the most complex and the most elusive. Confusion is present at every level of the discussion on the real source of generalized trust. Here too, posing the following argument could expand discussion, "Other variables and conditions are the real source and not the institutions themselves." This is real issue, which is addressed on different levels. 1) This chapter does not claim that these institutions are the only factors that influence the level of generalized trust; other conditions, such as personal experiences (e.g. psychological) can influence generalized trust. 2) This chapter is part of the whole research, which argues that each society has different ways of generating and

maintaining high generalized trust, and therefore, there could be other factors that have not been taken into consideration. 3) Institutional influence on generalized trust in Lebanon is related to sectarian leaders and the whole system that allows sectarian leaders full power, especially members of parliament.

The term divided society describes those societies in which one group tries to deny others equal access to the same rights and privileges they benefit from. These rights can be housing, employment, education, and protection. Each group tries to ensure these rights for themselves and not for the other groups. In societies where wealth and foreign factors are present, sects can be manipulated through the resources gained or provided to them by their sectarian leaders/elites. This is harmful in two ways: firstly in that it allows the sectarian elites/leaders to have a total monopoly on resources from foreign agents, such as money and benefits (e.g. scholarships for university students), which allow them to use these resources as a tool to sustain their power within their sects. This allows them to distribute these resources unequally among their sects, generating a feeling of insecurity, clientelism and corruption, all of which lead to low generalized trust. The second factor is an unequal amount and form of funds from foreign agents. One group can have much greater and more variable resources, while others are limited. This will create a gap between the different sects themselves and the members of each sect too. This mechanism can be harmful, as the members of the sects will insist on holding governmental institutions accountable, but not their leaders who are part of these institutions, a scenario that eventually will run the whole society into a cycle that does not lead to any change in these institutions. This means that institutions are controlled by the sectarian leaders/elites who tend not to initiate reform against sectarianism, arbitrariness and inequality.

Having sound, efficient and effective, equal institutions in Lebanese society means no sectarian leaders/elites or any politicians who can evade accountability measures, leading to

a point where sectarian leaders lose power over their sects and their benefits from the whole system. This Lebanese model explains why the country has a low level of generalized trust. Shiites receive funds from Iran, Sunnis from Saudi Arabia, and the Christian receive funds through foundations and civil society organizations from some European countries and the United States (S. Aboud personal communication 2016).


In this way, sectarian leaders and foreign funds can contribute to the complexity of institutions that influence the level of generalized trust. As figure 6.7 shows, sectarian leaders, empowered by foreign resources, influence the unequal distribution of resources through formal and informal institutions. Clientelism and corruption of elites widen the gap of inequality between sects and members of the sects, which in turn results in arbitrariness of public administration and sometimes particularistic spending, especially through the office of the Sunni prime minister, and ministers who represent different sects. The institutional conditions in the previous model on Lebanon do not merely stand by themselves; rather, sectarian elites and ethnic leaders are the ones who shape these institutions to reflect current form and efficiency. The ability of sectarian leaders to extend their terms four times without elections, and a situation where it takes two years for a president to be elected because of sectarian leaders politicians with foreign and regional agendas is evidence that sectarian leaders not only influence formal institutions concerning public administration, but also the whole political system.

As seen in the statistical model above, demographic variables such as religion, education, gender and employment status do not influence trust in strangers in general. Yet, if the question is related to inequality and living conditions compared to others and clientelism, there seems to be more of a correlation. With a system where a sectarian leader, the head of a political party (sect-based) and a business man can be a minister, spokesperson of parliament or the prime minister, institutions will be shaped and formed along sectarian

lines and not in the national interest of all (O. Kassa, personal communication 2016).

Figure 6.7

Generalized Trust in Lebanon: Causal Mechanism



6.11 Conclusion

Trust in Lebanon is low and it has been decreasing in recent years. This comes as no surprise to researchers since Lebanon has been going through political unrest in recent years, mainly after the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Moreover, the post civil war period has not ended politically as the country has been with no president for more than two years now (2014-2016). Lebanon is an ethnically mixed and sectarian society and this mix is responsible for the negative impact on the level of generalized trust.

I studied the impact of a few institutional conditions on the level of generalized trust in

Lebanon as a divided society. The paper finds that the feeling of insecurity and lack of safety, conditions of wellbeing compared to others, equality of services in society, trust in judicial performance and trust in civil society all greatly impact the level of generalized trust. People who feel insecure and unsafe in society and have a worse quality of life (economic or societal) are more likely to distrust others. I also found that high levels of trust persist within the groups of individuals who have more trust in civil society organizations and find the performance of judiciary to be good.

The interesting results from the analysis show that corruption does not significantly influence the level of trust among people in Lebanon. This is explained by the fact that people in Lebanon are more likely to see equality as a priority over corruption or see corruption as a result of inequality.

The most straightforward conclusion for this case study supports the main argument of the thesis that there is a straightforward and direct relationship between trust and institutions. The more unfair, unequal, or corrupt institutions are, the less people are likely to trust each other. As the main argument maintains that trust is based on cognitive feeling, the feeling of threat to personal safety within the society and loss of faith in the judiciary, lead to more distrust in society. Also, the more unequal the services are (including clientelism), the higher distrust will be in the society. This study also shows that distrust in civil society lowers the trust in society in general. One possibility is that civil society is becoming sectarian, and the other is that civil society is not doing its job properly as a third party and voice for the people.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Goal of this PhD Thesis

In conclusion, the findings show that different institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust and that each divided society has a different way of maintaining the level of generalized trust or destroying it, suggesting that the process of maintaining generalized trust is multi-causal and complex.

This study argues that oversimplifying the source of generalized trust and limiting it to only one source is not entirely accurate or well proven. The sources of generalized trust are many, including institutions, civil society, associations and the history and pattern of the population in society.

This PhD thesis contributes to the debate on generalized trust and public policy. The literature on generalized trust appears to be significantly dominated by the cultural theory and the social networks theory/associational explanation. Many scholars have partially accepted that it is very difficult to assess sources of generalized trust in societies. This appears to be particularly problematic when it comes to divided societies that, in recent decades, have experienced ethnic conflict. The underlying assumptions and the different theories (cultural, institutional theory, associational) discussed thoroughly in Chapters 2 and 3 do show that there is a need for empirical or case study research on divided societies to examine the relationship between institutions and generalized trust. This is a need for

academics, policy makers and the international community who work in the areas of peace, conflict and development in war-torn or divided societies.

Empirically, the thesis has analyzed the level of generalized trust and changes in specific institutional conditions in eight case studies (BiH, Macedonia, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan and South Africa). Comparative research on generalized trust in divided societies is still rare and incapable of explaining why the degree of generalized trust varies across these societies, despite very similar societal contexts. The thesis also examined institutions and generalized trust quantitatively and qualitatively in Lebanon as a case study.

I have argued that institutions have an effect on maintaining the level of generalized trust in divided societies. Previous literature has not focused as much on this issue, especially in regards to when, how and which institutional conditions affect the level of generalized trust throughout reconciliation/post-war processes in divided societies. Secondly, I contend that literature on generalized trust in divided societies is unable to empirically explain the various levels of generalized trust. In summary, this PhD thesis has addressed the following research question:

Under which institutions is generalized trust in a divided society maintained or even destroyed and how does this happen?

The chapters comprising this PhD thesis have centered on this research question, analyzing different aspects of political and societal institutions and institutional conditions. From a theoretical perspective, the thesis has aimed at the application of theoretical insights and empirical methods on generalized trust. Empirically, the focus was on using QCA to compare different policies and determine which policy combinations have a greater impact on the level of generalized trust in the selected case studies. Moreover, it used statistical

methods to measure the degree to which institutional conditions influence the level of generalized trust in Lebanon, benefiting from the QCA analysis as a guide to selecting specific conditions to test and to dig deeper into a context-based analysis.

Generalized Trust in a Comparative Perspective

Each country is unique, with its own political, social, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic divisions. Each country has its own history, response to history, and every sect has its own version of that history. For this reason, there are no two countries that can replicate the same mechanism for maintaining, creating, or destroying generalized trust. What may have worked in one place may not work in another, and what did not work or was not successful in one society may work well in another. The trajectory has to be channeled to the particular society. Variations in the levels of generalized trust in the eight case studies imply that ethnic or sect divisions are not the only factor. The uniqueness of each society implies that local experts and institutional designers are the only experts in their own situation and their judgment is the only one that will be relevant to their society.

This is very clear in the results of the analysis where each case study or several case studies shared the path of maintaining or destroying the level of generalized trust under specific conditions, while it changed under other conditions.

The different ways of maintaining or destroying generalized trust show that each country has a different set of economic resources and wealth, which play a significant role in increasing division and inequalities among its citizens. This applies across ethnic groups or sects. Economic resources are a huge factor in designing institutions that affect generalized trust. Another important resource is charismatic leadership; different sectarian leaders will exploit a divided society that lacks a charismatic leader, leading to greater vulnerability to division in institutions.

Each divided society establishes institutions with certain limitations: wellbeing of the state, economic resources, level of polarization and ethnic division, traumatization, displacement and also international and regional pressure. Institutional redesign and reconfiguration in post-war times will simply be empty rhetoric if it fails to confront the specific and complex needs of different groups and the limited resources available. It instead needs to provide a fertile environment for more equal and impartial public administration, facilitate the entry of civil society, and allow for deliberation/consultation on policy issues. This is very clear in the case of Lebanon and Iraq, where the rebuilding of institutions was focused primarily on certain regions and specific groups of people (elites of sects). For instance, building Solidere (urban and Commercial Center) in downtown Beirut was part of the effort to redesign the urban institutions and end the fighting in Beirut, yet it ended up deepening the socio-economic division among the Lebanese by depriving thousands of Lebanese people of their homes and sources of living. In Iraq, the military institution became more sectarian with a majority of Shiite leaders who built these institutions on a clientelist basis.

This thesis emphasizes the need for effective institutions to keep the peace among different sects. Weak and ineffective institutions allow powerful parties to prey on weaker groups or individuals without deterrence, which then increases inequality and decreases generalized trust between groups. These institutions must enforce the law in both public and private entities.

Therefore, in a reconciliation process, the first task for a divided society is to establish functioning and effective institutions in order to generate trust between different groups. These institutions should start with a legislature to prescribe the rules by which the society and other governmental institutions will be governed and an administrative bureaucracy with the capability of enforcing rules and providing essential public goods and services

(education, health, housing, judicial system) on an equal basis. Without these requirements, it would be very difficult to generate or maintain generalized trust.

In the last two decades, fiscal and administrative institutions have emerged as one of the central players in developed countries. However, in divided societies, administrative and some critical political institutions have been ignored as more researchers have focused on peace and development issues inside these societies from international relations and reconciliation theories.

A research agenda to advance generalized trust in divided societies requires a much more thorough consideration of models of institutions and governance than space allows us to undertake, but by drawing attention to the need for an explanation of how institutions destroy/maintain trust, demonstrating the linkages between generalized trust and formal institutions, and by sketching several hypotheses for what these explanations might be, I hope to have taken a step in contributing further to the research paradigm.

Conclusion: Institutions and Generalized Trust

This study tested the most important theory that focuses on institutions as a source of generalized trust in societies. As this research fills the gap in examining institutional conditions that influence generalized trust in divided societies, it also tries to analyze which conditions and factors explain the different levels of generalized trust in divided societies and whether there are specific cases or paths that lead to greater levels of generalized trust or that succeed in destroying it.

This study includes four types of institutional conditions/ factors, which reflect the four major theories on the source of generalized trust: Civil Society, Institutional Theory (policy), Associations and History (heterogeneous societies have a low level of generalized

trust). For each of these categories, variables/conditions were chosen based on the original theories and what literature considers impacting factors in influencing the level of generalized trust. These variables measured the institutions in the original theory, discussed previously. The impact of these conditions was rated based on the discussion of the main theories in Chapter five.

Mixed methods were used in this study. Firstly, QCA was used in comparing the different cases, and afterwards a statistical model was used for a thorough examination of the Lebanese case study.

The dependent variable in both models is generalized trust. The variable generalized trust is the outcome in the QCA model. csQCA was used to avoid possible deficiencies of the variable-oriented and cross-sectional methods that focus on different cases, not within cases. Therefore, a logistic regression model was used afterwards in a specific case study (Lebanon) to measure the different effect of these institutional conditions on generalized trust.

The main finding of the QCA analysis is that the achievement of different levels of generalized trust is attributed to various paths in each country. In other words, the analysis shows different combinations of conditions among the divided societies, proving that there are different degrees of influence for each condition in each case study or group of case studies, and differences in terms of whether these are sufficient or necessary for the outcome.

The results show that the absence of inequality is key to a higher level of generalized trust in South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, Macedonia and Kyrgyzstan. High levels of generalized trust reveal that the level of fractionalization in a society has no value in accounting for a high level of generalized trust. Moreover, the results show that entry and exit of civil society is

important in three out of five models, which shows that civil society is an important condition in accounting for a higher level of generalized trust.

Inequality in Turkey and Lebanon is found to be a determinant of low levels of generalized trust. Moreover, monopoly of political power in Lebanon is a condition of a low levels of generalized trust. The results show that not having a decentralized policy destroys the level of generalized trust in divided societies. In all countries where policy-making is not decentralized, there is a low level of generalized trust.

According to the QCA analysis, the presence of one condition does not indicate a higher level of generalized trust while its absence in other cases may lead to a low level of generalized trust. We can deduce that generalized trust is easily destroyed while its maintenance is more difficult.

This means that destroying or maintaining the level of generalized trust is a multi-causal process and a result of different paths as well as a combination of a variety of conditions. Moreover, it shows that the same condition may contribute to higher level of trust, yet its presence in other countries may not yield the same result, resulting in low trust based on the presence or absence of other conditions. To achieve a high level of generalized trust, all models show that the absence of equality is a necessary condition, but the absence of other conditions such as policy-making decentralization may lead to a low level of generalized trust even though its presence does not guarantee a high level of generalized trust.

After analyzing the different conditions that influence generalized trust comparatively within different divided societies and considering the most influential condition, this study then analyzed one case study in depth. Lebanese society was examined historically and using regression methods, drawing on available data from the Arab barometer. Variables were selected based on the findings of the QCA analysis and the theories discussed in

Chapters 4 and 5. The variables focused on equality in public administration, bureaucracy, the effect of particularistic spending on living conditions compared to others, how safe and secure one felt in the society, their ability to complain against personal rights violations, performance of civil society, trust in the judiciary and corruption and clientelism, which represent accountability of authority and trust in representatives.

The main findings of regression analysis in the case of Lebanon show that all variables have a correlation with the level of generalized trust, yet some are significant in their P-value, which reveals they have a stronger correlation than others. Based on four different models, Model 4, which includes all variables, has the highest P-Value, while other models have consistency in demonstrating the effect of conditions with significant P-value. The factors that play an important role are trust in civil society performance, equality in receiving public services, capacity to complain in cases of rights violations and a feeling of safety and security in the society.

The regression analysis of the Lebanese case study supports the original theory of Rothstein and Stolle where they argue that equality and fairness are linked to generalized trust from an institutional perspective. As generalized trust is gained by cognitive inference, two major channels influence it: experience and observations.

When formal institutions treat people equally, people feel secure, are able to complain against violation of basic rights and receive the same benefits compared to others in society, they will expect others to behave as they do and will not try to exploit the different types of institutions. The results show that trust in civil society performance is also a strong indicator of generalized trust. This is because civil society in Lebanon reflects sectarianism. As civil society organizations are politically and religiously affiliated with different sects and do not defend people's rights and discourage participation in political and societal life,

they become crucial in determining if one trusts others or not. The rationale behind this is that civil society is a third party in society and works as a link between people and formal institutions. As they become sectarianised, showing loyalty and providing services to their sects, thereby increasing gaps/divisions and inequality within the society, there is less trust in people and other sects, as individuals expect that others are not only exploiting the system but also supporting it at the expense of others.

In summary, the more an individual feels insecure and has unequal access to public services compared to others, the less trust he has in civil society and representatives (sectarian leaders) and if he is not able to file complaint against rights violations, then he will be more prone to distrusting others.

These findings suggest several implications, which are discussed in the next section.

Outlook: Generalized Trust in Divided Society

Comparative analysis of the eight divided societies here points to the following generalization:

1.Incremental and Predictable

Generalized trust in divided society is predictable in the long run. It is an incremental and slow process in which the realization of low generalized trust manifests itself in many ways, resulting in violence and possibly physical partitions of societies. In the societies examined, very low generalized trust did not show up directly in the aftermath of war but rather years later. However, low generalized trust continues as long as institutions remain ineffective and exploitation of formal institutions by ethnic and sect leaderships continues. The violence either stops completely, such as in South Africa, or intensifies, as in the case of Iraq. However, in some cases, violence does not completely stop and tensions continue to

smolder e.g. Lebanon, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan. There are small but noticeable events that show the destruction of generalized trust as a result of institutional failure. These events occur as a result of bad performance of institutions, high rates of arrests and crimes in specific ethnic groups (insecurity), ineffective and politically affiliated civil society, arbitrariness in public administration, abuse of power sharing (central or local governance), particularistic allocation of expenditures, corruption and widespread bribery. These are present in many cases such as Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Pakistan and South Africa.

2. Generalized Trust is Context-Dependent

Generalized trust is not an unchanging mechanism that is maintained or destroyed. Low generalized trust is not always a result of violence or conflict, rather other events act as catalysts. Destabilizing circumstances, combined with unjust institutions and policies, can result in heavy destruction of generalized trust. While the scale and nature of institutions are different in each society, culture and tradition influence the level of trust in some societies in times of war or other crisis events.

Moreover, a context-dependent view takes into account historical events that have an impact on the shape of societies and always put generalized trust at risk. Such historical events in Lebanon include the Occupation of Palestine in 1948, which changed the demographic shape of Lebanon, the Israeli invasion in 1982 and the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006. In Iraq, there were the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the first and second Gulf wars between 1981 and 1991. In Kyrgyzstan, the fall of the Soviet Union was such an event while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the end of the cold war is coupled with the Bosnia Referendum and the foreign affairs crisis.

3. Institutional Deprivation

Inter-ethnic violence in divided societies usually coincides with a low generalized trust between the different groups. It also coincides with relative deprivation on an institutional level such as legal restrictions on employment, building homes, inequality of services, absence of consultation in decision-making processes, monopoly of power, education and health inequality. Typical examples of exclusion are Iraq, Lebanon and South Africa where there are policies that disqualify certain ages, ethnic sects or groups from participating in political life. For instance, as indicated in the last chapter, in Lebanon some educational services are not accessible to all groups, but rather to only a few groups. Moreover, institutions provide room for sectarian employment and marginalization and prevention of other sects from accessing private companies under the pretext of keeping sectarian balance. Inequality in resource allocation, with limited accessibility to information and awareness of injustice in societies will always result in lower generalized trust, which in turn makes the society more vulnerable to violence.

4. Territorial Segregation/Division

Low generalized trust in divided societies results from a failure and inequality on the part of institutions and reflected in policies that distribute resources in a disproportional way. This eventually leads to deeper segregation among ethnic groups where people prefer to live closer to others of same ethnicity. This pattern is easily demonstrated with the fast wave of immigration from violent areas in Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia and Pakistan. The move of immigrants from rural areas to urban areas increased their segregation as they prefer to live close to each other, which builds isolated areas within the city (physical partition). This is also fueled by sectarian decentralization of local municipalities and local authorities that provide the means to prohibit non-similar ethnic individuals from ownership of land or rent from one another. Such trends generate a feeling of insecurity in the native residents of the

city of a different ethnic groups, which then results in a political push to use formal institutions to deprive the new immigrants of resources, a move that ultimately results in low generalized trust. The long-term effect of such institutions is hazardous, leading to corrosion of generalized trust and eruption of violence.

5. Long-Term Harm

Studying trust in divided societies exposes the long-term impact of unnoticed institutional failures that are negative and continue to harm the level of generalized trust among the residents, even though a reconciliation process is enforced.

It is encouraging that the results of institutional failure in divided societies along ethnic divisions can be predicted. The value of such a model is especially high in light of the fact that the world appears to be on a trajectory toward similarly divided societies as those studied in this research. As the world witnesses more inter-ethnic and intra-state conflicts, cities and societies are becoming more politically, ethnically and religiously divided. The list of cases includes societies from the Middle East to Latin America, South East Asia, Center Asia, Europe and North American (USA where African-American, Whites and Latinos are divided at many levels within the society).

Final words

These findings demonstrate the importance of mixed methods in examining sensitive questions in an interdisciplinary approach. Using different methods is necessary for finding the appropriate approach and also for testing the results of analysis in a variety of ways.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Questions from V-Dem and QoG

Variable	Description:	Raw Coding Rules
v2dlencmps	Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how “particularistic” or “Public Goods” are most expenditure?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Almost all of social and infrastructure expenditure are particularistic. 1. Most Social and Infrastructure expenditures are particularistic but a significant portion is public-good. 2. Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs. 3. Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion is particularistic. 4. Almost all social and infrastructure expenditure are public-goods in character. Only small portion is particularistic.
VCLRSPCT	Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?(in regard to ethnicities)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Public officials do not respect the law. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law rampant. 1. The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law widespread. 2. The law is modestly by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law moderate. 3. The law is most respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
V2PEPWRSOC	Is political power distributed according to social group?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Political power is monopolized by one social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized. Not subject to frequent change. 1. Several social groups comprising a minority of the population monopolize political Power. This monopoly is institutionalized. i.e. not subject to frequent change. 2. Several social groups comprising the majority of the population monopolize political power. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e not subject to frequent change. 3. Either all social groups posses some political power, wit some groups having more power than others, or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
Fe_etfra	To which extend the population of the country is ethnically fractionalized?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Perfectly homogenous. 1. Highly fragmented.
dpi_auton	Authority of Sub-national Governments on taxation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. No authority. 1. sub-national governments have extensive taxing, spending or regulatory authority.
v2lgotovst	Oversight and Regulation: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body <i>other than the legislature</i> , such as a comptroller general,	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Extremely unlikely. 2. Unlikely. 3. Very uncertain. 4. Likely. 5. Certain or nearly certain

	general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?	
v2dlengage	When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed. 1. Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2. Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas. 4. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas. 5. Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.
v2cseeorgs	To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1. Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2. Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience. 3. Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4. Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.
v2cscnsult	Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1. To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2. Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.
V2dlunivl	Is there a means-tested or universal social policies?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. There is no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (Education, Unemployment, poverty programs).

		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested. 2. Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion is universalistic and potentially benefit everyone in the population. 3. The Welfare State policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic. 4. Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion is means-tested. 5. Almost al welfare state policies are universal in character. Only small portion is means-tested.
p_xconst	Executive Constraints	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Unlimited authority. 1. Intermediate Category. 2. Slight to Moderate limitation on executive authority. 3. Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority. 4. Executive Parity or Subordination

Clarification of the variables

V2DLENCMPS: particularistic spending is narrowly targeted toward specific corporation, sector, social group, region party or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork”, “clientelistic,” or “private goods”. Public goods are intended to benefits all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituencies. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-tested are allowed to receive the benefit. The value of this question considers the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending.

VCLRSPCT: This indicator focuses on the extent to which public officials abide the law and treat like cases alike despite of the ethnic origins or geographical area or racial group. This indicator shows if the public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and if it can be characterized by nepotism, cronyism or discrimination.

V2PEPWRSOC: a social group is differentiated with a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, religion, or some combination. Social group identity are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood- by those residing within that society-to be different, in ways tat may be politically relevant.

Fe_etra: Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and “ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries. This variable reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).

p_xconst: According to Eckstein and Gurr, decision rules are defined in the following manner: "Superordinate structures in action make decisions concerning the direction of social units. Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded, especially "properly" concluded. An indispensable ingredient of the processes, therefore, is the existence of Decision Rules that provide basic criteria under which decisions are considered to have been taken." (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p.121) Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Any

“accountability groups” may impose such limitations. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many state a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.

V2dlunivl: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested. A universal program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than other from these programs. The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is evaluating the quality of the state policies on cash-based or social policies based programs exists.

Note: Data on Macedonia have been extracted from different sources and transformed into the measurement model based on the surrounding countries for the fractionalization of the country, Delphi Method for the dpi_auton and p_xconstant

Appendix B

Interview Questions

Contextual Factors

(To explore the ethnicity and legal framework)

- To what extent are ethnic differences considered within the **legal bureaucratic framework** and administrative policies?
- Is there a different treatment of such policies (Administrative politics, e.g. power sharing, expenditures for specific region or ethnical-majority areas, facilitation of civil society establishment/ political parties) directly legalized? Indirectly facilitated?
- To what extent does ethnic conflict/ diversity affect the level of trust in the society?
- Do the legal framework and policies affect the trust between different ethnic groups? How?

(To explore policy outcomes and generalized trust)

- What is the geographical distribution of spending and services (Equal, biased)? How does it affect the level of generalized trust?
- To what extent do local policies intensify conflict among ethnic groups?
- In what circumstances does policy increase/lessen generalized trust?

(To Explore procedural policies and generalized trust)

- Is there public deliberation when it comes to policy change? To what extent does it increase the trust among the different ethnic groups?
- To what extent does the governmental control over civil society (inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic groups) affect the trust in the society?
- Is the government consulting civil society organization on policy change and initiations, will that affect the trust among the different ethnic groups?

(To explore the substantive policies and generalized trust)

- Are particularistic spending (Social services, education, health)/ expenditure by center government of local government affect the trust among ethnic groups? Citizens? How?
- To what extent do public officials discrimination (if it exist) against ethnic groups affect trust among ethnic groups and citizens? How?
- When greater autonomy (e.g. shared political power or decentralized policy making), how does the level of trust change? Does that facilitate policy making intra and inter-ethnic groups?

(Policy Change and Generalized trust)

- How have changes in policies, if any, affected the level and nature of generalized trust in a divided society?

(To examine the institutional differentiation)

- Is there ethnic-based differentiation of society's institutions or organizations?
- Are there formal or informal efforts to integrate competing ethnic groups?

(To Examine basic values)

- In the society is there any conflicting/ shared values concerning policy issues across the participation in policy designation, administrative issues and planning? (any example?)
- Does the conflicting value cause less trust between the ethnic groups?
- How can you describe the trust in general between the different ethnic groups?

Policy issues and Goals

(To explore ethnic issues in policies)

- What is the major policy manifestation of ethnic conflict? Is it possible to classify different policy areas based on their degree of conflict?(e. g civil society, expenditure, power)
- To what degree do development goals and objectives differ between ethnic/racial communities?

(To examine citizen's participation)

- What is the degree and quality of citizen participation in policy making?
- Are there inter-group collaborative policy processes used?
- What are the characteristics of community organizations within contested urban environments?

Generalized Trust and Policies

(To explore generalized trust and policy agenda setting in general)

- How inclusive is the identification of alternative policies that might increase the level of generalized trust and further inter-community objectives?
- To what extent ideological and ethnical ideologies factors limit local and regional policy setting?

(To explore decision-making rules)

- What decision-making criteria are used to allocate public goods? Functional-technical? Ethical? Partisan? Equity?
- In any way does such criteria affect the trust among citizens or different ethnical groups?

Appendix C

Interviewee


1. Ahmd Choufi November 2015, Beirut, Lebanon.
2. May Nabhan February-April 2016, Beirut, Lebanon
3. Rabea Debs, March 2016, Beirut, Lebanon
4. O. Kassar , October 2015, Beirut, Lebanon
5. Rodine Mahmoud Janaury- February 2016, Beirut, Lebanon
6. Fadi Daou October 2015, Beirut, Lebanon
7. Suzzan Abboud April 2016, Beirut, Lebanon.
8. Asma Khawaja December 2015, Pakistan.
9. Huma Shugtai, January 2016, Islam Abad, Pakistan.
10. Luay Al Khatib, Janaury 2016, Baghdad, Iraq.
11. Velma Saric, November 2015, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12. Zlatan Music, November 2015, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13. Medhet Tuilgrov, October 2015, Bishkek, Krygzstan,
14. Illina Mangova, February 2016, Skopje, Macedonia.
15. Gulnaz Isckkova, January 2016, Bishkek, Krygzstan.

Appendix D

Logit Results

User: Abdalhadi Alijla

(R)



Statistics/Data Analysis

Special Edition

13.1 Copyright 1985-2013 StataCorp LP
 StataCorp
 4905 Lakeway Drive
 College Station, Texas 77845 USA
 800-STATA-PC <http://www.stata.com>
 979-696-4600 stata@stata.com
 979-696-4601 (fax)

130-user Stata network perpetual license:
 Serial number: 401306225295
 Licensed to: Abdalhadi Alijla

Notes:

1. (-set maxvar-) 5000 maximum variables
2. New update available; type `-update all-`

1 . use "/Users/abdalhadiAlijla/Desktop/StataWorkingDirectory/Arab_Baro .dta"

2 . tab 2013
 2013 invalid name
 r(198)

3 . tab q2013

q201.3 I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
I trust it to a great extent	34	2.92	2.92
I trust it to a medium extent	185	15.91	18.83
I trust it to a limited extent	219	18.83	37.66
I absolutely do not trust it	718	61.74	99.40
Don't know	7	0.60	100.00
Total	1,163	100.00	

4 . logit gtrust q102a q105 q106 q2055 q2033 q2017 cor q2013 q213

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -435.50062
 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -406.65674
 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -403.89434
 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -403.8839
 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -403.88389

Logistic regression	Number of obs	=	1163
	LR chi2(9)	=	63.23
	Prob > chi2	=	0.0000
Log likelihood = -403.88389	Pseudo R2	=	0.1726

gtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
q102a	-.0380191	.1134441	-0.34	0.738	-.2603655	.1843272
q105	.4187625	.1175024	3.56	0.000	.1884621	.6490629
q106	-.1368478	.0751078	-1.82	0.068	-.2840565	.0103609
q2055	-.152768	.0752477	-2.03	0.042	-.3002507	-.0052853
q2033	.2180659	.0911579	2.39	0.017	.0393997	.3967321
q2017	.4145849	.0903024	4.59	0.000	.2375955	.5915743
corruption	1.38253	.7520553	1.84	0.066	-.0914712	2.856531
q2013	.0723441	.1097823	0.66	0.510	-.1428253	.2875135
q213	.2604344	.169835	1.53	0.125	-.0724362	.5933049
_cons	-1.974328	1.064346	-1.85	0.064	-4.060407	.1117504

5 .

```
5 . tab Q13
   variable Q13 not found
   r(111);
```

```
6 . tab q13
```

q13. Urban/rural	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Urban	1,026	88.22	88.22
Rural	137	11.78	100.00
Total	1,163	100.00	

```
7 . logit q103 q13
```

```
outcome does not vary; remember:
                                0 = negative outcome,
                                all other nonmissing values = positive outcome
r(2000);
```

```
8 . tab gtrust q13
```

gtrust	q13. Urban/rural		Total
	Urban	Rural	
0	120	24	144
1	906	113	1,019
Total	1,026	137	1,163

```
9 . logit gtrust q13
```

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -435.50062
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -433.81659
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -433.77269
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -433.77268
```

```
Logistic regression                                Number of obs =      1163
LR chi2(1) = 3.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.0630
Log likelihood = -433.77268                        Pseudo R2 = 0.0040
```

gtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
q13	-.4722142	.2448536	-1.93	0.054	-.9521184 .0076901
_cons	2.493762	.2970935	8.39	0.000	1.911469 3.076054

```
10 . logit gtrust q1003 q1010 q1012 sex q1004
```

```

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -431.04934
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -426.35754
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -426.30516
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -426.30515

```

```

Logistic regression                Number of obs =      1159
                                   LR chi2(5)         =       9.49
                                   Prob > chi2        =      0.0911
Log likelihood = -426.30515        Pseudo R2         =      0.0110

```

gtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
q1003	.0109589	.0560339	0.20	0.845	-.0988655 .1207834
q1010	.0183639	.129719	0.14	0.887	-.2358806 .2726084
q1012	-.2569169	.1830769	-1.40	0.161	-.615741 .1019073
sex	.4779542	.1945681	2.46	0.014	.0966078 .8593006
q1004	-.3719314	.2005588	-1.85	0.064	-.7650193 .0211566
_cons	2.057776	.538916	3.82	0.000	1.00152 3.114031

```
11 . logit gtrust q1003 q1010 q1012 sex q1004 q102a q105 q106 q2055
```

```

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -431.04934
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -416.97079
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -416.38359
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -416.38296
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -416.38296

```

```

Logistic regression                Number of obs =      1159
                                   LR chi2(9)         =     29.33
                                   Prob > chi2        =      0.0006
Log likelihood = -416.38296        Pseudo R2         =      0.0340

```

gtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
q1003	.0212894	.0573104	0.37	0.710	-.0910369 .1336157
q1010	-.0018157	.1318837	-0.01	0.989	-.2603029 .2566715
q1012	-.2510643	.1856824	-1.35	0.176	-.6149952 .1128666
sex	.4846305	.1984132	2.44	0.015	.0957478 .8735132
q1004	-.3532168	.2030219	-1.74	0.082	-.7511323 .0446987
q102a	-.0387832	.1103829	-0.35	0.725	-.2551297 .1775632
q105	.4867872	.1109842	4.39	0.000	.2692623 .7043122
q106	-.1018126	.0749986	-1.36	0.175	-.2488072 .045182
q2055	-.0879436	.0761411	-1.16	0.248	-.2371774 .0612902
_cons	1.244223	.7626159	1.63	0.103	-.2504771 2.738922

```
12 . logit gtrust q1003 q1010 q1012 sex corruption q2013 q2033 q213
```

```

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -435.50062
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -419.51705

```


Appendix E

QCA analysis Results

 TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
 Model: outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

Rows: 18

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
 True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
 frequency cutoff: 1.000000
 consistency cutoff: 1.000000

	raw	unique	coverage	consistency
	coverage	coverage	consistency	consistency
equ*~ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*~ec*efr	0.285714	0.285714	1.000000	1.000000
equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*~ec*efr	0.285714	0.142857	1.000000	1.000000
equ*ppw*~asg*~png*eec*csc*efr	0.285714	0.142857	1.000000	1.000000
equ*~ppw*asg*~png*eec*~csc*~ec*efr	0.142857	0.142857	1.000000	1.000000
equ*~ppw*asg*png*~eec*csc*~ec*efr	0.142857	0.142857	1.000000	1.000000
solution coverage: 1.000000				
solution consistency: 1.000000				

 TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
 Model: outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

Rows: 18

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
 True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
 frequency cutoff: 1.000000
 consistency cutoff: 1.000000

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
equ*~ec	0.857143	0.285714	1.000000
equ*~asg	0.714286	0.142857	1.000000

solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
Model: outcome = f(efr, ec, csc, eec, png, asg, ppw, equ)

Rows: 8

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
True: 1
0 Matrix: 0L
Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 1.000000
Assumptions:

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
efr*~ec*~eec*~png*~asg*~ppw*equ	0.285714	0.285714	1.000000
efr*~ec*eec*~png*~asg*ppw*equ	0.285714	0.142857	1.000000
efr*csc*eec*~png*~asg*ppw*equ	0.285714	0.142857	1.000000
efr*~ec*~csc*eec*~png*asg*~ppw*equ	0.142857	0.142857	1.000000
efr*~ec*csc*~eec*png*asg*~ppw*equ	0.142857	0.142857	1.000000

solution coverage: 1.000000
solution consistency: 1.000000

 TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
 Model: ~outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

Rows: 18

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
 True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
 frequency cutoff: 1.000000
 consistency cutoff: 1.000000

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~equ*ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*ec*~efr	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
~equ*ppw*~asg*~eec*csc*ec*~efr	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
~equ*ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*csc*efr	0.181818	0.181818	1.000000
~ppw*asg*~png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
~equ*~asg*png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
~equ*~ppw*~asg*~png*~eec*~csc*~ec*efr	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000
~equ*~ppw*~png*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000
~equ*~ppw*~asg*eec*csc*ec*efr	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000
solution coverage:	1.000000		
solution consistency:	1.000000		

 TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
 Model: ~outcome = f(equ, ppw, asg, png, eec, csc, ec, efr)

Rows: 18

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
 True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000
 consistency cutoff: 1.000000

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~equ	0.909091	0.636364	1.000000
~ppw*ec	0.363636	0.000000	1.000000
asg*ec	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000
asg*~png*csc	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000
~ppw*eec*csc	0.363636	0.000000	1.000000
asg*eec*csc	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000

solution coverage: 1.000000
 solution consistency: 1.000000

 TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS

File: E:/Paper2015/Hadi/data - Copy.csv
 Model: ~outcome = f(efr, ec, csc, eec, png, asg, ppw, equ)

Rows: 15

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey
 True: 1
 0 Matrix: 0L
 Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000
 consistency cutoff: 1.000000
 Assumptions:

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
~efr*ec*~eec*~png*~asg*ppw*~equ	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
efr*csc*~eec*~png*~asg*ppw*~equ	0.181818	0.181818	1.000000
~efr*ec*csc*~eec*~asg*ppw*~equ	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
efr*ec*csc*eec*png*~asg*~equ	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
efr*ec*csc*eec*~png*asg*~ppw	0.181818	0.090909	1.000000
efr*~ec*~csc*~eec*~png*~asg*~ppw*~equ	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000
efr*ec*csc*eec*~asg*~ppw*~equ	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000
efr*ec*csc*eec*~png*~ppw*~equ	0.181818	0.000000	1.000000

solution coverage: 1.000000

Number and information of cases for causal model for predicting generalized trust

No.	id	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
1	KGZ9904	0	0	0	0	0
2	KGZ1014	0	<u>1</u>	0	0	0
3	IRQ9904	<u>1</u>	0	0	0	0
4	IRQ1014	0	0	<u>1</u>	0	0
5	LBN0810	0	0	0	0	0
6	LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0
7	ZAF8993	0	0	0	0	0
8	ZAF9904	0	0	0	0	0
9	PAK9498	0	0	0	0	0
10	PAK9904	0	0	0	0	<u>1</u>
11	PAK1014	0	0	0	0	0
12	BIH9498	0	0	0	0	0
13	BIH9904	0	0	0	<u>1</u>	0
14	MKD9599	0	0	0	0	0
15	MKD9904	0	0	0	0	0
16	TUK9498	0	0	0	0	0
17	TUK9904	0	0	0	0	0
18	TUK1014	0	0	0	0	0
Number of cases		1	1	1	1	1

Number and information of cases for causal model for predicting absence of generalized trust

No.	id	M 1	M 2	M 3	M 4	M 5	M 6	M 7	M 8
1	KGZ9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	KGZ1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	IRQ9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	IRQ1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	LBN0810	0	0	0	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	0	0	0
6	LBN1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	ZAF8993	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
8	ZAF9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	PAK9498	0	0	<u>1</u>	0	0	0	0	0
10	PAK9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<u>1</u>
11	PAK1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	BIH9498	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	BIH9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	MKD9599	0	0	0	0	0	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	0
15	MKD9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	TUK9498	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	TUK9904	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	TUK1014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of cases		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1