INVISIBILE AMONG THE MARGINALS; SOCIAL INEQUALITIES AND VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL HAZARDS FOR AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS IN TEHRAN METROPOLITAN AREA

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PH.D) IN SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

Tehran, the capital city of Iran, is located on one of the highest seismic zones of the world. Although the physical dimensions of earthquake hazards in Tehran has been well studied, little research examines the underlying social patterns and power relations that shape the population’s differential vulnerability and coping mechanism in the face of seismic hazards. An integrated vulnerability analysis is proposed to consider the inter-connected factors and relations that influence and affect people differently; from conditions of normal life to vulnerability and coping capacity in face of the disasters.

With the aim of understanding processes behind differential vulnerability of certain groups, this research focuses on a population Afghan women and girls residing in Tehran. Qualitative methods are used to collect the empirical data of the research by means of deep interviews with thirty Afghan women and girls’ living in district 12 of Tehran. The vulnerability paradigm of natural hazards and disasters is used as the basis for an assessment of differential progression of vulnerability for Afghans in Iran. Access to financial, human and social resources are viewed as an important indicator of differential levels of vulnerability and coping mechanism; in conditions of normal life as well as in the case of the predicted earthquake of Tehran. Processes of marginalization and upward mobility are used to explain for the impact of social relations and power structures on access patterns and hence choices and decisions of Afghan women and girls and their households. Synergies and intersections between two demographic factors of gender and migrant status are investigated for Afghan women and girls.

The research findings show that a combination of social relations and power structures at various levels influence processes of marginalization or upward mobility for Afghans in Iran.
Iranian government’s short term focus on repatriation polices along with lack of consideration of the substantial population of first and second generation Afghans in Iran has created conditions of structural discrimination and unequal access to various resources for Afghans and has limited their spaces of agency. These conditions are reinforced by unfavourable treatment of the public, limiting access levels of Afghans to different resources and adding to their marginalization through time. Immigrant networks as well as centers of civil society and NGO’s play an important role in balancing the effects of social- inequalities and hence are important coping mechanisms in lives of Afghans in Iran. However, agency of actors in creating coping mechanisms and improving livelihoods can be limited by social, economic and political conditions. Afghan women and girls in particular face conditions of double discrimination resulted by intersections of “gender” and “migrant status”; which reinforce their marginalization and invisibility and limit their chances of mobility and integration.

As a result Afghans in Iran have weak livelihoods which represent conditions of everyday hazard and risk. In the longer term, normal life vulnerability of Afghans can be translated into earthquake vulnerability by limiting their options for coping with and recovering from the loss and damage caused by a possible earthquake in Tehran. Moving beyond the direct risk of environmental factors and catastrophic hazards is an important requirement for gaining a holistic understanding of factors underlying earthquake vulnerability in Tehran as well as enhancing coping mechanisms.

**Keywords:** Afghan, livelihoods, normal life, disasters, vulnerability, earthquake hazards, Tehran.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 URBAN AREAS AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF DISASTERS

“The city” has long been a site for the exploration of major subjects confronting society and sociology. Some topics of interest in studies of urban areas include domination and power relations, public policies and citizen rights, social mobility and education, ethnic, economic or gender inequalities and segregation. At the same time the world is facing high levels of urban growth. The expansion of metropolis has been accompanied by increased heterogeneity of urban structures. Phenomena such as social and spatial exclusion and urban marginalization are among outcomes of urban growth. Tehran, the capital city of Iran, follows the same patterns. Extremely rapid urban growth along with high levels of socio-economic stratification and a growing migrant population are some common features of the city. The outcomes of these conditions can be seen through differences in distribution of resources as well as residential patterns among the residents of Tehran. Sociologists have historically examined the relationship between social stratification and people’s susceptibility to crime victimization, poverty, and other social problems. Recent studies suggest that disasters, too, are social phenomena that discriminate (among others Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin 2007; Enarson and Morrow 1998; Fothergill and Peek 2004; O’keefe et al. 1976).

Despite their destructive power disasters do not impact everyone equally. In the recent years, major urban centers of the world have increasingly been sites of natural hazards and disasters. A few examples can be recent earthquakes in India, Japan, Turkey, and Iran which have resulted in tens of thousands of death or the Tsunami and earthquake in the Indian Ocean which took lives of nearly a quarter of a million people. The frequency of such events and the severity of their impacts have been reminders that urban centers are not immune to natural hazards. Moreover the un-equal patterns of lose and damage caused by the disasters have attracted focus and attention on the differential vulnerability to natural phenomena. Inequalities in the distribution of disaster risk and loss are evident at the global, national, city and even individual levels (Webb 2007). On a global scale people’s levels of vulnerability are much higher in poorer countries. Accordingly on national and city levels catastrophic impacts of disasters exacerbate pre-existing problems and inequalities; with vulnerable parts of the population often disproportionately impacted. At the individual level also, disaster impacts vary according to social differentiation. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the Gulf
Coast region of the United States in 2005, is just one example of how conditions such as exclusion and marginalization manifest themselves in relation to natural hazards and disasters. Subsequently there is a growing consensus that the impacts of disasters are not randomly distributed but are instead patterned along race, class, and gender lines. Based on this view, vulnerability to disasters easily falls within issues of interest to urban studies, namely exploring politics and policies, social aspects and economy of the city.

In a recent article published by the Guardian in March 2014, Tehran is introduced among the world’s 10 riskiest cities when it comes to natural disasters (Michael 2014). Being on the foothills of the Alborz mountain range, Tehran is located on multiple active faults. In addition to the ever present seismic risk, additional factors such as a high population density, incohesive city planning and uncontrolled construction in the city have increased the overall vulnerability of the city's population to earthquakes (Ashtari Jafari 2010). While residents are aware of the possibility and resulting consequences of an earthquake hazard, the general preparedness, levels of loss and damage and also means of recovery and regaining one's livelihood are not equal among them.

Awareness of the centrality of the social and natural phenomena in human-environment interactions is now emerging in the social sciences. Accordingly social vulnerability to disasters has been introduced as one of the most important factors at work on the human side of the society – environment relationship (among others Adger and Kelly 1999; Blaikie et al 1994; Cutter et al. 2003; Hewitt 1997; Pelling 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). However until quite recently there has been a general failure in incorporating the depth, diversity, and complexity of the human side of these transactions (Oliver-Smith 1996, Wisner and Uitto 2009). Failure to consider the human factors in understanding natural hazards is visible in studies of disasters in Iran and also Tehran – where vulnerability to environmental hazards is viewed as separate from social and economical processes.

As a result, aside from a few considerations of socioeconomic factors as relevant indicators of vulnerability to earthquakes (Amini-Hosseini et al. 2009; Lotfi and Koohsari 2009; Zebardast 2013), the discourse of disaster research in Iran seems to be neglecting the social vulnerability component and instead tends to focus on the investigation of “vulnerable urban fabric” (Asef 2008; Ashtari Jafari 2010; Hosseini et al. 2009; Nasiri Amini and Vaseghi Amiri 2008; Nateghi-A 2001; Omidvar et al. 2010).
Differential disaster vulnerability however, is an attribute of people, not places. Tehran, in addition to being a densely populated megacity with over 12 million residents (Iran Statistical Center 2011), is highly stratified in terms of socio-economic status. Many of the neighborhoods that are mapped as “vulnerable urban fabric” based on their physical indicators host populations that have fewer resources and options to prepare for, and recover from hazards. By focusing on vulnerability of places rather than people, the prevalent discourse of disaster studies in Iran fails to consider the social, economical and political processes that are important in shaping people’s differential vulnerability and coping mechanisms. Disasters are not segregated from everyday living conditions and therefore should not be viewed as phenomena unique from people’s daily circumstances. In order to analyze the risks involved in disasters one needs to understand the processes through which conditions of vulnerability are created through peoples’ normal existence (Cutter et al. 2003; Enarson and Fordham 2001; Wisner et al. 2004). Therefore disasters need to be perceived within the broader patterns of society and not only in regards to their geo-physical components. To do this, one should focus on the nature and roles of the social order and investigate whether and how material life and institutional and cultural conditions enter into and affect risk, protection and preparedness of different groups of people. In other words the key question should be how people’s social profiles, gender, age, status, belief systems, (lack of) resources and capacities and (absent) protections are critical for who is at risk, to losses and survival in disasters (Hewitt 2009). An example of the ways in which social structures influence differential vulnerability of people and groups can be seen through lives of immigrants. Conditions of daily life can create situations of marginality and powerless positions for immigrants where they commonly face restrictive legislation, participation difficulties in labor markets and civic activities as well as lack of access to basic services and formal social protection and, at times, discrimination (Wang et al. 2010). These conditions can be seen in case of Afghan nationals living in Iran. Despite the long history of movement between Afghanistan and Iran and the considerable population of second generation Afghans in the country, the Iranian Afghans live excluded and marginal lives.

By focusing on vulnerability of ‘people’ rather than ‘places’, and understanding processes that result in differential levels of vulnerability, this research argues for the need for an integrated vulnerability assessment in Iranian disaster studies. In order to better understand geographies of risk one needs to tackle how power relations on macro and micro levels make certain groups of people more disaster prone than others. People’s vulnerability and their capacity to cope with hazardous
conditions are often viewed as two sides of the same coin. Thus placing the genesis of disaster in a longer time frame is important from the perspective of intergenerational equity (Wisner et al; 2004), as well as from an environmental justice perspective. That means it is important to have an understanding about conditions that facilitate or reduce people's ability to avoid environmental hazards. The impact of structural factors and power relations should be analyzed along with acknowledging actor’s agency and will to enhance their own life conditions. At the same time it is important to consider that individual action or agency – and in case of disasters, individual hazard perception and choice of behavior in the face of hazards – is constrained not just by imperfect information, but by the whole complex give-and-take relationship between agency and structure (Wisner 1993).

1.2 PROBLEM BACKGROUND; ASSYMETRIES OF DISASTER VULNERABILITY IN TEHRAN

Quarantelli (1992) introduces industrialization and urbanization as two major elements explaining for increasing trend in disasters. The former assures that disaster incidents will worsen in quality and quantity. Introduction of new hazard types is an example of such impact. The latter process - urbanization; on the other hand enlarges social risks and vulnerabilities. Changes in lifestyle and demographic patterns are some of the traits that come along with increased urbanization and can in turn increase risk and vulnerabilities through a wide range of ways. Increased heterogeneity of urban areas by migration, increased number of older people or new forms of family are some examples.

Since becoming the capital of Iran two hundred years ago, Tehran has grown to be one of the large cities of the world. During this period, it has attracted people and resources from a vast territory and has become a considerable node in the global economy. Within a century, its population grew from 15,000 to 250,000 people. Towards the end of the twentieth century, it has become a city of 6.5 million populations in the middle of a province of 11.1 million (Madanipour 1999). Currently the City of Tehran has a population of 8,293,140 while The Greater Metropolitan Area of Tehran (also referred to as the Tehran Province) hosts 12,183,391 people (Iran Statistical Center 2011). Following the national trends, the population of Tehran has had a boom in the last decades. During 1960–1975, Tehran grew more rapidly than cities such as Calcutta, Bombay, Mexico City, and Manila (Zebardast 2006). At the same time, Tehran has experienced the highest urbanization process of any
city in Iran in the recent years. Large influx of people into Teheran took place after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (UNDP 2002). Tehran is the largest concentration of most forms of economic activity and the largest market in the country (Madanipour 1999). These attributes along with its higher standards of provision of services, turn Tehran into a major attraction for migrants. As a result Tehran has a heterogeneous population consisting of internal (rural) and international migrants, creating a population with a wide range of backgrounds, norms, values and ways of life.

Like many mega-cities around the world, Tehran’s tremendous growth in the past years, has created a broad spectrum of social and environmental challenges for residents of the greater metropolitan area (Lewis and Mioch 2005; UNEP 2007; World Bank 2011). Traffic and congestion, high fatality due to road accidents and alarming air pollution and concerns about water quality are just some examples of daily events in people’s lives. These adverse effects have affected the quality of life of the population. Besides problems resulted by Tehran’s rapid growth, the city is located in one of the world’s highest seismic risk zones. Nevertheless the city is growing rapidly while following the patterns of social stratification that have been present in Tehran historically. Having subsumed flatlands to the east and west and seventy villages on its adjacent mountain slopes, today’s Tehran varies 800 meters in elevation from south to north. The city’s topographical variation is paralleled by the marked differences in class and life-style of its inhabitants (Shahshahani 2006). Teheran is divided into 22 metropolitan districts and the population is much more concentrated in the southern part of the city. The urban structure and the way in which the city’s various districts have been developed indicate major socio-economic differences with a high north to south stratification. The northern parts of the city show considerable differences from the southern parts in regards to wealth, facilities, [better] climate, built environment and living conditions.

Historically used as the summer resident for the monarchs and the affluent, north of Tehran is characterized by higher income groups, higher literary rates, smaller households and lower population density. The streets are often wider and tree-lined and have lower noise and traffic levels. It should be noticed that rapid urban growth and increased value of assets and land is clearly
making a shift in conditions of the streets in northern parts. Especially in backstreets and allies, where numerous high rises have been build and are under construction, the traffic and congestion is becoming a tangible problem. However the northern parts of the city are still home to higher socio-economic levels. The central districts have a richer cultural heritage, as a number of cultural buildings are located in this part of the city. These areas have the highest concentration of the public buildings and are considered to be Tehran’s main business districts. Day-time population can be significantly higher due to the concentration of public buildings. On the other hand, the southern parts of the city attract industries and working class populations and new immigrants. These areas are characterized by a poorer population, higher population densities, narrow streets and older and building structures (UNDP 2002). The population mix in the urban areas can affect disaster preparedness and response in a variety of ways (Quarantelli 1992). There will be increasing risk for those already at social disadvantage in a community; the poor and the marginalized. These groups often have lower resources to prepare for and recover in case of disasters. Elements such as various perceptions towards risk will consequently result in different behavior in mitigation and preventative measures. There are also differences evident in security and safety provided through social networks, as some groups tend to have higher relations with kin and own networks (and thus higher chances of support in the event of a disaster) than others (Quarantelli 1992; Wisner et al. 2004) Eventually there is also often the risk of minorities not receiving enough amounts of attention and help in an aftermath of a hazardous event as they might not be socially visible to those providing help (Bolin 2007; Enarson et al. 2007; Quarantelli 1992).

History of Tehran indicates strong earthquakes of magnitude 7.0 and higher with approximately 158 years as a return period (Nateghi-A 2001). As can be seen through Table 1-1 the last major earthquake in the province occurred in 1830. Seismologists believe a strong earthquake will strike Tehran in the near future (Asgary et al. 2007; Hosseini et al. 2009; Nateghi-A 2000; Nateghi-A 2001).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Fault</th>
<th>Magnitude Richter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>300 BC</td>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>Parchin, Ray</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>743</td>
<td>Caspian Gate</td>
<td>Garmsar</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>855</td>
<td>Ray</td>
<td>Kahrizak</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>958</td>
<td>Taleghah</td>
<td>Mosha</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1117</td>
<td>Karaj</td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>Damavand</td>
<td>Mosha</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Damavand</td>
<td>Mosha</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Damavand</td>
<td>Mosha</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Historical earthquakes in Province of Tehran (Nateghi-A 2001)*
With catastrophic outcomes in event of an earthquake hazard, Tehran Disaster Mitigation and Management Organization (TDMMO) - a sub section of Tehran's Municipality - has a range of ongoing projects focusing on participatory actions of citizens and volunteer groups. These projects however mainly target post disaster help and relief exercises along with some pre-disaster awareness rising activities. At the same time TDMMO's activities acknowledge the physical differences of neighborhoods of Tehran and try to plan in accordance with risk levels in each district (TDMMO n.d). These attempts mainly focus on physical structures and therefore undermine the differential vulnerability patterns of inhabitants of each area. The same approach is visible among academic research on earthquake and disasters in Tehran. The geophysical aspects of natural hazards in Tehran have been the focus of thorough research (see for example Ashtari Jafari 2010; Nateghi-A 2000; 2001 and Omidvar et al. 2012 among others). The majority of these studies focus the risk assessment on the economic damages as a result of building and infrastructure losses.

High emphasize on technical and engineering issues tends to overlook or downplay political, economic and social forces that influence people’s differential patterns of vulnerability and coping mechanisms in cases of an earthquake. Addressing this research gap is of importance. Theoretically speaking, all parts of Tehran are in danger of seismic activity. As can be seen through Map 1-1; Districts of Tehran Metropolitan area and distribution of Active faults the city is distributed over six main and sixty subsequent faults. This means that on most given physical location it is possible for one to be directly over a fault or just a few meters away from it (Khatam 2010, p. 29). Even though a threat to everyone, not all residents of Tehran are symmetrically vulnerable to the hazard. The asymmetries of risk are reinforced by social inequalities that pertain in employment, income, wealth, legal protections, and the availability of secure housing (Bolin and Stanford 1998; Dreze and Sen 1990; Wisner et al. 2004). Therefore the levels of physical damage and the consequential life and financial loss differ in different parts of Tehran, and so do the aid and relief options. In case of disasters caused by earthquakes, social processes in progression of vulnerability are particularly important. Contrary to phenomena such as flood or drought, human action has little role in triggering an earthquake through direct modification of the environment. Yet at the same time, human action (and or inaction) is highly influential in the outcomes of an earthquake (Wisner et al. 2004, pp. 237). Nevertheless such elements are highly undermined in Iran’s earthquake – as well as general disaster research.
The Vulnerability analysis of the city is based on three criteria introduced by the High Council of Urban Development and Architecture, related to the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. They include vulnerability of buildings, size of houses and width of existing road network in each block. Based on this method, an urban fabric will be considered vulnerable if it meets one, two or all of these criteria. Accordingly the most vulnerable fabrics in Tehran are old parts, located mostly between narrow streets in the central or southern parts of Tehran with insufficient emergency response facilities (Hosseini et al. 2009). Employment, income, legal status, and ethnicity all bear directly on where people live, the kinds of structures they live in, and whether they have the resources to cope with hazardous events in their lives (Bolin and Stanford 1998). The lower cost of rent and residence in these areas, as well as the proximity to the Bazaar or factories and warehouses has turned these areas into suitable destinations for migrants and lower income residents. It can be argued that the neighborhoods -which only based on their physical indicators; are mapped as ‘vulnerable urban fabric’ host the population of residents who are in fact more vulnerable in terms of means of preparation and recovery from an earthquake. Afghans constitute such a vulnerable population. Due to Iran’s refugee and migration policies they face severe restriction in terms of access to labor market, social institutions and services. In general Iranians are – to different extents-aware of the unfavorable life conditions of Afghans in Iran. These conditions however are more than often attributed to legal matters of residence status and therefore a considered to be specific to those Afghans who live in Iran as irregular migrants. In the recent years increased attention has
been diverted towards Iran’s restrictive legislations regarding “foreign nationals” or the Afghans. Accordingly a few international agencies have published reports voicing their concerns about the structural discrimination that Afghans face in Iran (HRW 2013a, Justice for Iran 2012). Despite the slow rise of awareness about conditions of social inequality, Afghans in Iran are still an invisible population; a condition that is more severe in case of Afghan women. The Afghan population of Tehran is one example in which nationality, occupation and socioeconomic level have a marked effect on access to information and services as well as on resources available to people for self-protection and recovery (Wisner 1998).

Earthquakes are the most discussed natural risk in Tehran; however the city is exposed to a growing range of other hazards which can impact the city’s diverse inhabitants unequally. A recent example shows how daily lives of different people can possibly increase their exposure to different hazards. In June 2014, Tehran was stroke by a huge sandstorm and record winds that drove the capital into darkness during rush hour and forced thousands to run for cover. Sand storms are not a normal feature of Tehran’s climate and by no means are an expected hazard. As a result of the event power supplies were knocked out, windows were smashed and masonry fell off buildings (BBC news 2 June 2014).

IMAGE 1; SAND STORM IN TEHRAN

Note. Sand storm hitting Tehran, June 2014, retrieved from: http://www.radioemrouz.com/

The media announced that five people lost their lives during the storm. Three of the victims were reported to be Iranian and other two were Afghan. The cause of death of the Afghan victims was announced to be falling from a high elevation (ISNA 3 June 2014). While the media did not expand more on the subject, it is a well known fact that Afghans in Iran are highly represented in
construction work. This example can give an idea of how daily lives of different people can possibly put them in space and time situations that are more vulnerable to others.

Gaining a deeper understanding of disasters in Tehran will not be possible without consideration of the heterogeneous population of Tehran. Processes involved in unequal distribution of resources among the city residents are an important element in this regard. Such a view is important from multiple perspectives. Social relations and structures can influence different people’s access patterns and hence the range of choices and decisions. Therefore they are important in shaping people’s daily lives. Moreover from a long term perspective factors resulting in differential vulnerability shape people’s capacity for avoiding risks as well as abilities to recover after the impacts of a hazard. This can be best understood through people’s livelihoods, comprising of the command they have over different assets and resources. Financial credit, savings, possessions, information and also networks of informal support all play a major role in facilitating or reducing people’s ability to avoid hazards; or to recover from their impacts. The case of Afghans is just one example of how constraining political-economical conditions impact reproduction of vulnerability and coping potential among different groups of people. By using the case of Afghan women and girls in Tehran, this research tries to highlight the importance of integrating the human and social factor in understanding disaster vulnerability and coping capacity in Iran’s disaster discourse as well as social studies. This is important to mention that Afghans in Iran are not the only marginal and disadvantaged group in the country. There are many others among Iranian nationals who face high levels of marginalization, powerlessness and vulnerability in their everyday lives. Afghan women and girls are chosen as the group under study as their social standing in the society offers interesting insights on how social structures and relations interact with different demographic variables.

### 1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This work is a study of urban life and challenges that accompany it. The research thus has a twofold objective; that is to carry out a sociological study of conditions of daily life for Afghan women in the light of their differential levels of vulnerability and coping mechanisms in normal life conditions. The reason behind such an approach is the multidisciplinary nature of the topic under study. The idea is that differential vulnerability to disasters should not be viewed separate as conditions of vulnerability in normal life. In fact the social relations and structures that influence people’s choices
and decisions in their daily life conditions are the same as those factors that eventually determine people’s differential levels of vulnerability and coping capacity in cases of a given disasters.

Following Wisner et al. (2004) conceptual model for progression of vulnerability; daily life conditions of Afghan women and girls are viewed as results of choices and decisions which eventually determine their levels of access to different resources. These choices and decisions are an outcome of the interplay between social relations and power structures that function both on macro and micro levels and the agency of individuals in taking -or not taking- certain actions. Macro level factors include socio-economic and political structures at the institutional levels; that by means of policies, right and entitlements impact groups of people and individuals, as well as impacts of social networks and organizations. On the micro level then the focus of the research is on household level relations and power asymmetries which influence further decisions and activities of the members of the households.

The other objective of this research is to analyze the daily life conditions of Afghan women in the light of their vulnerability as well as capacity for security in case of a given natural hazard; the long expected earthquake of Tehran. The two objectives of this research are connected through an analysis of resources and livelihoods of Afghan women. The idea is that the amount of access that groups and or individuals have to different resources can be viewed as an indicator of differential vulnerability in conditions of daily life as well as in case of a given disaster. Accordingly the research will initially focus on synergies between macro and micro level structures and their outcome trajectory of differential access patterns for Afghan women. This part of the research tries to explore the dialectics of structure and agency with a focus on two main variables: gender and immigrant status. The point of focus is the ways in which livelihoods influence Afghan women’s capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. Keeping that as the context of analysis, the research will focus on the range of possible options available to Afghan women for enhancing their levels of safety.

As for my theoretical framework I will use the concept of marginality as a useful tool for explaining differential vulnerability through limited access to resources. Respectively the concept of social mobility is viewed as a means of increasing access to resources and thus a measure of reducing marginality. Theories of migration and gender studies are utilized to highlight dominant patterns of daily lives of Afghan women and girls and their consequential choices and decisions. These concepts
are used to explain the ways in which social inequalities—resulted by social relations and structures—shape differential levels of vulnerability and coping capacity for Afghan women in Tehran.

### 1.3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research tries to offer an integrated view on differential progression of vulnerability for a particular group; Afghan women and girls in Tehran. In a broad way, the research tries to understand the relationship between daily lives of people and their differential levels of vulnerability and coping capacity in case of a disasters. In particular the research aims to understand how existing social inequalities—resulted by social structures and relations at various levels, influence Afghan women and girls in their everyday life choices and options and the ways in which these conditions could impact their levels of preparedness and recovery in case of an earthquake.

To achieve the objectives of this research, the empirical and secondary data collected for this study tries to answer two main research questions. Each of these questions then shall be broken down in multiple sub-questions to cover various factors of livelihoods and choices of Afghan women and girls.

1. **What are the influential factors in shaping daily lives of Afghans in Iran in general and Afghan women and girls in particular?**
   - How do state level legislations and allocation of rights and entitlements impact daily lives of Afghans in Iran?
     - How do these factors influence the range of choices and options available to Afghan women in their everyday activities?
   - How do social structures and power relations between individuals within a household form patterns of resources allocation and rights?
     - How do intra-household relations influence Afghan women and girls in terms of division of labor, education and taking part in important decisions about themselves and the household?
   - How do Afghan women try to enhance or change their daily life conditions?
     - What are the influential factors impacting Afghan women and girls’ choices and decision making patterns?
     - What are the dynamics between Afghan women’s agency and structural factors at macro and micro levels?
2. How do daily life conditions of Afghans manifest themselves in regards to differential vulnerability and coping capacity in case of a disaster?
   - In what ways the interactions between macro and micro level structures influence allocation of rights and access patterns for the sample group due to being an immigrant?
   - In what ways the interactions between macro and micro level structures influence power relations and access patterns for the sample group due to their gender status?
   - How does the final outcome of synergies between macro and micro level relations and structures influence the ability of the sample group to anticipate, cope with and recover from an earthquake hazard?

1.4 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS AND SCOPE

This research is based on one key argument in studies of vulnerability to natural hazards; that analysis of disaster vulnerability should not be segregated from everyday living conditions. It is therefore trying to show how disasters can be perceived within the broader patterns of society, and indeed how their analyzing in this way may provide a much more fruitful way of building policies, that can help to reduce disasters and mitigate hazards, while at the same time improving living standards and opportunities more generally. Application of this perspective in the case of Afghan women and girls in Tehran – a distinctly invisible group - can bring about various implications and points of further investigation.

On a broad term, and from an academic perspective, an interdisciplinary outlook towards social studies and vulnerability to disasters is needed, as disasters are logical byproducts of human societies. The discipline of sociology has historically played a prominent role in studying disasters and providing essential conceptual and methodological tools for understanding their causes and consequences (Quarantelli 1994). However over the time sociology of disasters has developed in ways that have weakened its ties with mainstream sociology (Tierney 2007). An integrated vulnerability assessment would recognize the significance of the interaction of disasters and risk with gender, class, and other axes of inequality. Such a perspective is recommended and encouraged by scholars as a possible way for further development of the research field (Webb 2007; Tierny 2007)
Iran’s policies towards Afghans shows little levels of reception and instead a high emphasis on repatriation. Accordingly the legislation in regards to Afghans is highly restrictive and structurally discriminatory. Despite Iran’s repatriation goals, Afghans constitute the largest share of migrants and refugees in Iran. As a result of the constant inflow of Afghans to Iran during the past decades, there is now a considerable population of second generation Afghans living in the country as well. Iran’s refugee and migration strategies seem to undermine the long term influences of the current patterns of social and structural inequality on lives of this growing population. Despite their high numbers, length of stay and a clear reluctance for repatriation, Afghans of Iran are a marginal and excluded group, either in regards to rights and entitlements or their incorporation with the native Iranians. An integrated vulnerability perspective, can be a useful point of entry for highlighting how the social inequalities influence the daily life conditions of Afghans while putting it in a more justified research agenda; that of a vulnerability analysis.

The aim of the current research is not to provide policy implications and suggestions to the Iranian government, but to highlight the importance of consequences of some of the current structural factors in light of future events. This view seems to be lacking among the current research on the Afghan community in Iran, which is rather limited and in most cases focuses on the impacts of Iranian legislation on current trends and patterns among Afghans in Iran (Abbasi Shavaze et al 2008; 2012; 2014; Hugo et al. 2010). While such research is much needed and required, applying it to a long term research plan can bring about ideas about inter-generational consequences of the current conditions. Such a perspective is more likely to consider matters of social justice and human rights.

The recent years has witnessed a growing debate about reason behind high toll of earthquakes in Iran. Ever since the catastrophic Bam earthquake in 2004 discussions about damages and hazards of earthquake have gone beyond solely technical fields to matters of interest to the public debate (Khatam 2010, p. 17). This growing public concern is even more evident through reactions to several recent earthquakes through social platforms and media. At the same time substantial post disaster aid and relief studies show how particular groups in society (e.g women, elderly and immigrants) are in need of particular post disaster treatment. While the checklists of vulnerable groups provide important insights for humanitarian processes after a disaster, they still cannot explain for how certain groups become more vulnerable. From a disaster studies perspective, there definitely is a lack of consideration for societal factors in understanding disasters and the ways they impact different groups of people in Iran. The fact that Iran has a reoccurring history of disasters and the
knowledge that the unfavorable conditions and consequences of the disasters last for months or even years after such events is further reason for shifting the focus to people and processes that make those people vulnerable. A deeper understanding of the mechanisms of differential vulnerability- and accordingly means of generation of safety are important aspects when viewed through social justice and human security perspectives. Environmental justice refers to the impact of material inequalities on our built environments and affirms individual and community’s right to fair and equal access to resources and protection from environmental hazards. The right to safety require for people to have the ability to undertake activities which enables them to respond to and minimize the impacts of hazards. It is a proposed right for citizens to assert their human right to protection from avoidable harm in extreme natural events.

By highlighting the processes behind marginalization and vulnerability of certain group of people, an integrated vulnerability perspective allows for implementing measures to develop and increase the coping capacity of groups at risk. Again this is an important step towards achieving environmental justice as the heaviest burdens of disasters are borne by those with the least power.

The research focuses on daily lives of a group of Afghan women and girls as a sample group to investigate the processes behind differential progression of vulnerability. In doing so, special focus is put on synergies and intersections of two variables of gender and migrant status. This is achieved by means of qualitative research methods. The research therefore does not aim to quantify levels of vulnerability for Afghan women and girls nor does it cover issues of disaster impact for the group under study. Disaster impact is measured by a range of external and objectively verifiable indicators, such as mortality, morbidity, damage to property and physical assets, reduction in savings and so on. As the major hazard under study (the long predicted earthquake of Tehran) has not occurred yet, investigation of disaster impact will not fall within the scope of the current research.

Instead this research tends to understand why and how certain characteristics have come to be associated with a higher probability of injury, death, livelihood disruption and greater difficulty in the process of recovery. This task, if carried out successfully can highlight various drivers of differential vulnerability for Afghan women and girls. Identification of the drivers and reasons behind differential vulnerability of certain groups can be a first step for addressing the problem.

Afghan women and girls are selected following two demographic indicators of vulnerability; gender and migrant status. This does not mean that the group under study is the most vulnerable group in
Teheran or even within the Afghan community in Teheran. In fact the southern borders of the same
district in which the research was conducted is home to some of the most marginal and excluded
residents of Teheran. With a mixture of internal migrants and Afghans, these areas are characterized
by high levels drug and alcohol abuse, child marriages, prostitution, low hygiene and children lacking
national identification cards. Or the suburbs of Teheran, where the brick making and brick baking
factories are located are another example of some of the most vulnerable of Teheran. Again a mix of
internal migrants and Afghans, the workers in these sites live in housing and areas without a
minimum of living standards, sometimes for years or even most of their lives. It is therefore
important to emphasize the group under investigation by no means represents the far end of the
vulnerability spectrum.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

This thesis is made up of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the main topic of investigation; reasons
of importance of the topic are introduced with a particular focus on Teheran and its characteristics.
The section then continues to discuss the aim and objectives of the research. The chapter finishes by
a brief consideration of implications and scope of the research. The introduction is followed by
chapters two and three which together make up for the theoretical section of the research. Chapter
2 introduces the main ideas and concepts about disasters – and in particular vulnerability to
disasters – from the perspective of natural hazard and disaster studies. Accordingly disasters and
their relevance to human life are introduced from academic and practical perspectives. This is
followed by a historical background on evolution of the social studies of disasters and especially
vulnerability to disasters. The evolution of the vulnerability concept is briefly viewed through
different research fields. This is followed by a detailed account of the vulnerability paradigm as it is
viewed from the perspective of natural hazard research; this is the perspective adopted by the
current research. In chapter 3 theories of vulnerability are applied to a sociological perspective.
Using social theories of gender and migration, patterns of marginalization and or social mobility are
examined in regards to two variables of gender and immigrant status. In doing so, the section offers
a theoretical framework for progression of vulnerability in daily lives of women and migrants. Based
on theories of gender and migration studies, the framework incorporates views from the field of
natural hazard studies. The empirical data of the research introduced in chapter 4 will eventually be
assessed using this framework to explain for progression of vulnerability in daily lives of Afghan
women. This is followed by the empirical chapter. Here the methodology and the context of the research area are explained, limitations of the research are discussed and the data gathered through secondary and primary data sources are presented. Data collected from secondary sources is used for framing a general picture of Afghan’s life in Iran. This is complemented with primary data collected through interviews and applied to the particular case of Afghan women and girls in Tehran.

Chapter 5 is the discussions section which applies the research findings to the theoretical framework of the research and hence presents the research results. Finally chapter 6 links the main ideas behind conducting the research together with the findings and results and offers a few suggestions for further points of investigation.
2 CHAPTER TWO: MAIN CONCEPTS AND TRENDS

The chapter starts with an introduction of ‘disasters’ and their relevance to human life from the academic and practical perspectives. A historical background on evolution of the social studies of disasters is offered. In doing so, the chapter briefly introduces the early behavioral paradigm that was emerged as a post world war II research application among American sociologists of disaster. Shortcomings of the dominant view paved the way for a paradigm shift towards inclusion of multidisciplinary perspectives in studies of disasters. The chapter continues by focusing on the concept of vulnerability. The evolution of the vulnerability concept is briefly viewed through different research fields. This is followed by a detailed account of the vulnerability paradigm as it is viewed from the perspective of “natural hazard research”. This is the perspective adopted by this research. Livelihoods are introduced as an indicator of vulnerability and are applied to ‘access model’ introduced by Winser et al. (2004). Following the access model, differential levels of access to livelihood assets is used to explore societal processes that create differential vulnerabilities for different groups of people.

2.1 UNNATURALNESS OF NATURAL DISASTERS; EVOLUTION OF PERSPECTIVES

*Overall, all disasters are basically natural in that their consequences are socially rooted, and, indirectly, always stem from human and group actions. Put another way, there were no disasters before human beings evolved despite the cataclysmic physical upheavals in the evolution of the planet!* (Quarantelli 1987)

Disasters have affected human –and civilizations- all through the history and are frequent phenomena in current times as well. During the past years only, the Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011, Haiti earthquake in 2010, Myanmar’s cyclone Nargis in 2008 and Hurricane Katharina in New Orleans in 2005 among many other disasters, were reported vastly by the media. Iran also has had its own share of disasters. Being an earthquake-prone country, Iran has a history of more than 20 major earthquakes and a number of other calamities within the last 100 years, causing large-scale physical damages and human casualties (Shakib et al. 2011). These reports share several elements, including the “natural event” causing the disaster and the following economic loss and human costs. While often times the main focus is on the natural elements and the damage created
by the forces of nature, it is important to emphasis that disasters share another factor; the existence of an affected human population. This is particularly important given the increase in frequency of natural disasters. Quarantelli (1992) believes that “the environmental disasters of future will be worse and more”. Indeed in comparison to 1960s, the frequency of severe natural catastrophes has increased by a factor of three and the direct economic costs have increased by a factor of nine (Iranian studies group at MIT, 2004). At the same time natural and geophysical sciences show no major shifts in trend of occurrence of natural hazards. The reason for increased negative impacts caused by disasters should be sought for in the structures of modern life. Social analysts suggest that modern development and social upheavals have brought multiplying risks notably in relation to urbanization, and industrialization. They involve a worsening of conditions through inequities and prejudice by wealth, class, (un)employment, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. (Bankoff et al. 2003; Hewitt 2013; Middleton and O’keefe 1998; Quarantelli 1992).

During time viewpoints on disasters; what a disaster is and what causes it, has undergone shifts and changes. Initially the word disaster was used for major physical disturbances –such as floods or earthquakes, or what was traditionally known to be “acts of God”. In time with the spread of more secular ideologies, “nature” was increasingly substituted for the supernatural forces, hence the prevalence of the terminology “natural disasters”. In the recent years however it has become progressively impossible to attribute all responsibility to God or nature. Instead drivers of disasters are sought for in acts of men [and women] or more generally through the society (Quarantelli 1987)

**DIAGRAM 2-1; AGENTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS AND RELATED INVESTIGATIVE DISCIPLINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOD</th>
<th>NATURE</th>
<th>SOCIETY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theology</td>
<td>Natural Sciences</td>
<td>Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Adopted from Quarantelli (1987)*

Along with recognition of different agents in a disaster event, the topic has become focus of attention of different disciplines and research fields. Given the social nature of disasters, various disciplines have developed subfields devoted to the study of extreme events. For example economists (e.g. Dacy and Kunreuther 1969) have attempted to estimate the financial impacts of large scale crises; anthropologists (e.g. Oliver-Smith 1996) have studied the impacts of disasters on
cultural life; political scientists (e.g. Sylves and Waugh 1996) have assessed the administrative challenges brought on by disasters; and geographers (e.g. Cutter 2003), have examined the vulnerability of people living in hazardous places. The above mentioned schools of thought do not work in isolation from each other.

Similar to alternations in academic approaches to study of disasters, changes are evident in ways that international organizations and aid and relief agencies try to tackle and deal with such phenomena. This change of perspective corresponds with the frequency and scope of occurrence of disastrous events as well as paradigm shifts about causes of disasters and means of reducing their impacts and has important practical implications. Supra national organizations such as the United Nations and its agencies and the World Bank can possibly play a role in regards to the way different nations tackle the problem of increased disasters and their socio-economic and political attributes.

From the 60’s to the beginning of the 90’s United Nation’s role in disasters was mainly limited to offering aid after occurrence of a natural hazards. A perception change is visible during the 90’s with shift of focus to Disaster Reduction activities. Hence the designation of the 1990’s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). Accordingly great emphasis was put on promoting a “global culture of prevention” (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 18). International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction was followed by its successor: the “International Strategy for Disaster Reduction” (ISDR). In accordance with the goals of “Sustainable Development Agenda” the ISDR was provided by a concrete set of objectives for integrating and mainstreaming risk reduction into developmental policies and processes. Eventually the final objectives of ISDR (in compliance with the Hyogo Framework for Action) focus on building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters. These goals in particular cover areas such as socio-economic factors that aggravate the vulnerability of societies to natural hazards and put a special focus on integration of a gender perspective in vulnerability reduction and enhancing resilience (UN General Assembly 2009; for a detailed account of the framework for action see UNISDR 2007).
Note. Transformation of the UN approaches towards disasters during the past 50 years

The Frameworks of Action that are introduced by the UN and accepted and adopted by the member countries are important, as they encourage adoption of integrated measure for disasters reduction. Even if not legally binding, such agreements require the member states to act along with the adopted strategies and action plans. At the very least, adoption of such action plans indicates that the member countries have a basic knowledge about the core problem and the ways for solving it.

In accordance with the international approaches towards disasters, Iranian government's approach towards natural disasters (with a particular focus on earthquakes) has undergone similar transformations. Iran’s seismic history has played an influential role in this regard, as many of the focal points in Iran’s disaster management strategies correspond with occurrence of a high impact earthquake.

The 1960's mark the transition from provision of aid and relief towards preventative action in Iran, triggered by the fatal earthquake of Buin Zahra in 1962. Consequently, assuring immunity of buildings and infrastructures fell within the responsibility of the government and the public administration. As a matter of fact by 1963 Iran was among the 22 countries in the world following seismic codes of practice (Khatam 2010). These plans however were interrupted by occurrence of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. The revolution was shortly followed by the First Persian Gulf War; resulting in eight years of war (1980-1988) between Iran and its neighbor country Iraq. Disaster mitigation and seismic codes were by no means a priority any more. As Khatam puts it during the time “Dying had become an easy task, and earthquakes and building safety were just some subsidiary causes of death” (2010, p. 26). This trend kept on until the war ended and the substantial death and loss due to it was over. Fatal impacts of earthquakes were not forgotten for long. 1990, the initiation of United Nation’s International Decade for Natural Disaster Risk Reduction (IDNDR) coincides with Manjil-Rudbar earthquake in Iran. The event caused widespread damage in urban
and rural areas and caused extensive fatalities and injuries (50,000 and 60,000 respectively) and left 400,000 or more people homeless. Highly influenced by the earthquake and following United Nation’s IDNDR framework, Iran prepared its own national plans for disaster reduction; the Integrated National Disaster Management Plan (INDMP). The plan’s general objective claims to increase the national capacities and abilities regarding preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery in a disaster situation (UNDP 2002). The plan however was not accompanied with the required enforcing social and institutional power. What happened in reality was devotion of resources and time to identification of hazardous zones rather than institutionalization of safety codes for buildings. Consequently attention was diverted towards quality and endurance of old buildings while neglecting the high rate of urban growth of the past decades. Moreover these plans undermine socio-economic factors that exacerbate the vulnerability of societies to natural hazards. Currently and more than a decade past the third development plan earthquake toll is still high in Iran; In fact Iran is considered to rank second in the world in regards to earthquake fatalities (Khatam 2010, pp. 19-29).

### 2.2 SOCIAL RESEARCH ON HAZARDS AND DISASTERS

Dramatic events have been a point of concern for sociologists since the inception of the discipline. Disasters being among such events; resulted by combination of physical conditions with social definitions of human harm and social disruption; are no exception. Even though firmly based in the discipline, sociology of disaster is a relatively young field. Some isolated studies were done prior to the 1950s, but disaster research mainly emerged as a post-World War II research specialty within the social problems literature in sociology (Bolin and Stanford 1998; Kreps 2001; Webb 2007). Initiated during the early days of the Cold War, sociological research on natural disasters and other extreme events began in the United States with a focus on a relatively limited set of questions that were of concern to government and military leaders, centering mainly on potential public responses in the event of a nuclear war (Quarantelli 1987, Tierney 2007). While the greatest concentration of disaster social research has been done in the United States, the research community in recent years has become increasingly international. In addition, the research area has become increasingly multidisciplinary with strong intersections among the natural, social, and policy sciences (Dynes and Darbek 1994; Kreps 2001; Quarantelli 1987; Stallings 1997). There remains, however, a very strong sociological core within ongoing research.
In characterizing social research on hazards and disasters, Smith (1996) suggests that the literature can be divided into two general approaches; behavioral and structural paradigms (Smith 1996 in. Bolin and Stanford 1998). The former conceives of disasters as events caused by physical hazard agents and views human behaviors primarily as responses to the impacts. It emphasizes the application of science and technology, usually directed by government agencies and scientific experts, to restore order and control hazards. In contrast, the structural paradigm stresses various political and economic factors which unequally place people at risk to hazardous environments. In this view, disasters are not discrete events but are part of the larger patterns and practices of societies viewed geographically and historically.

Elements of the behavioral paradigm -often referred to as the dominant view- appear with some frequency in US disaster research; reflected in its ongoing concern with defining unique features of disasters and how they differ from other types of social phenomena (e.g. Kreps and Drabek 1996; Quarantelli 1995). This perspective, in combination with the applied concerns stemming from military funding, led researchers to study certain types of events and to focus on a limited range of issues. Specifically, research in the dominant paradigm studied rapid onset events and focused on the maintenance and transformation of social structure in response to those events. Over the past 50 years, sociologists have learned a great deal about disasters, and findings from their studies have been summarized at various times. Works of Barton 1969, Dynes 1970, Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, Kreps 1984, Drabek 1986 and Mileti 1999 and Tierney et al. 2001, are some of the well known examples on disaster literature (in Kreps 2001; Webb 2007).

Along with development of the disaster research, points of inquiry and frameworks of analysis have undergone changes. Having covered the initial areas of concern –social order and human behavior in times of extremes events; the contemporary research has undergone dramatic changes giving more attention to disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and long-term recovery (Kreps 2001). At the same time the behavioral paradigm has been questioned by researchers outside of the US (Wisner et al. 2004). A major criticism is the scholarly isolation that accompanies the behavioral disaster discourse. The early disaster research in the US context is overly concerned with the search for abstract universals regarding social action in disasters. This view undermines history and geography and tends to neglect human agency and human experience in specific socio-political contexts (Bolin and Stanford 1998, pp. 60-62). Compared to the dominant discourse, the structural paradigm stresses various political and economic factors which unequally place people at risk to
hazardous environments. In this view, disasters are not discrete events but are part of the larger patterns and practices of societies viewed geographically and historically. This structural approach encompasses much of the recent vulnerability work by anthropologists and social geographers (Cannon 1994; Wisner at al. 2004), and traces its roots in the publication of Kenneth Hewitt’s edited volume, *Interpretations of Calamity from the Perspective of Human Ecology* in 1983. Structural approaches tie the study of disasters to more general work on society/environment issues and draw from conceptually richer theoretical traditions than those that view disasters as unusual events requiring their own specialized theory (Bolin and Stanford 1998, p. 27). These variations on one hand reflect dominant perspectives on societies as well as the relationship between social systems and disasters.

A major change in the field of disaster research in recent years has been the introduction and expanded use of conflict and political economic approaches to studying extreme events (Tierney 1989; Stallings 2002). These approaches have strongly influenced the direction of disaster research, calling attention to various social patterns and processes that have largely been overlooked in the past. The paradigm shift on disaster studies is most clear through two criteria; the way disasters are framed and the main research inquires. Instead of viewing a disaster as a “social problem” (Kreps and Drabek 1996) and “unique events that strain or disrupt established behavioral norms” (Quarantelli, 1994), disasters are conceptualized as one effect of many in larger political economic and ecological processes associated with capitalist development and under-development (Bolin and Stanford 1998). Following this perspective disasters are viewed as complex conditions that require more than a limited and specialized theory to be understood. Consequently the main focus of inquiry has undergone some changes. Instead of the focusing on responses to disasters causes of disasters are sought in the inter-relations between social, economical, political and historical contexts.

An important attribute of this paradigm shift is the resulted differentiation between terms “Hazard” and “Disaster” and the critical role that a “vulnerable population” plays in this regard. Even though these words are frequently confused and used interchangeably, natural hazards and disaster are two very different terms. For example earthquakes are a form of natural hazard. Depending on their scale, earthquakes can be highly destructive; however, they do not necessarily cause a disaster. An earthquake in an uninhabited desert cannot be considered a disaster, no matter how strong the
intensities produced. An earthquake is only disastrous when it directly or indirectly affects people, their activities and their property (Maskrey 1989).

Following this view a disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces: those processes generating vulnerability on one side, and the natural hazard event (or sometimes a slowly unfolding natural process) on the other (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 46). The concept of vulnerability then becomes a major element in understanding the dynamics of a disaster. It can be viewed as the social side of the disaster equation which is distinct from the natural hazard aspect. In order to understand why disasters occur, how they impact people and how people react and recover from them, one need to understand the processes and drivers that form conditions of vulnerability.

**DIAGRAM 2-3; DISASTERS AS INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND A NATURAL HAZARD**

Progression of vulnerability takes place through different stages. Wisner et al. indentify these stages as three linked realms: root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions (2004). Following this view, the box indicated as “Progression of vulnerability” in DIAGRAM 2-3 can be broken into three sets of links that connect the disaster to processes that are located at decreasing levels of specificity from the people impacted upon by a disaster. The root or underlying causes are the most distant of these links. Root causes refer to the wide historical, political, economic, demographic, and environmental factors that produce unequal distributions of resources among people. They reflect the exercise and distribution of power in a society, and are a function of economic, social, and political structures, and legal definitions and enforcement of rights, gender relations and other elements of the ideological order. Root causes affect the allocation and distribution of resources, among different groups of people. This creates often mutually reinforcing sources of vulnerability. If people only have access to livelihoods and resources that are insecure and unrewarding, their activities are likely to generate higher levels of vulnerability. Secondly they are likely to be a low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazardous mitigation. The most
important root causes that give rise to vulnerability; and which reproduce vulnerability over time, are economic, demographic and political processes.

Dynamic pressures are more contemporary or immediate interrelated manifestations of general underlying economic, social and political patterns. They are processes and activities, including, for example, population change, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, global economic pressures, and political conflict. These processes translate the effects of root causes by creating unsafe conditions under which some people in a given place and time must live (Bolin 2007; Wisner et al. 2004, p.54). While unsafe conditions may involve both the spatial location and the characteristics of the built environment, they also include fragile livelihoods, resource dependency, inadequate incomes, legal and political inequities, and a lack of preparedness for emergencies (Bolin and Stanford 1998).


Root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions are all subject to change through time. Actor’s agency and their ability to uptake coping mechanism are particularly important elements of such change.

2.2.1 CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY; EMERGENCE AND APPLICATION

Based on its common place meaning, vulnerability refers to being prone or susceptible to damage or injury. According to Wisner, The term “vulnerable” was popularized by the developmental scientist Robert Chambers in his 1983 book Rural Development: Putting the Last First (2009,p. 177). Based on his definition vulnerability; interlocked with five other elements, produces conditions of integrated rural poverty that is very difficult to extract oneself from. The other elements were political
powerlessness, physical weakness (ill health), isolation, and income poverty. Chambers’ conceptualization of vulnerability is not popular among contemporary users of the term vulnerability any more (Wisner 2009). However the terms vulnerable and vulnerability are being used among a wide disciplinary range. Economic, political, cultural, and educational vulnerability are some indications of the vast disciplinary focus of the concept. While each of these disciplines has a different point of focus, the common point of all these terms is the core notion of potential for disruption or harm (Wisner 2001). The concept of vulnerability is also commonly used as an analytical tool in different fields of current research and policy communities such as public health, humanitarian Assistance, development studies, hazards and disaster research and climate change (Wisner 2009). Each field adopts the notion in accordance to its focus and application. Table 2-1 briefly presents these categories and along with their respective definitions and units of analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Main risk</th>
<th>Point of focus</th>
<th>Definition of vulnerability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>Epidemiological models</td>
<td>• Individuals with certain measurable characteristics (age, sex, etc.)</td>
<td>Relationship of individuals to specific and definable threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Post disaster emergencies and recovery</td>
<td>• Individuals with certain characteristics (age, sex, etc.)</td>
<td>Being Subject to immediate or immanent harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development studies</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Livelihoods security &amp; insecurity</td>
<td>Vulnerability as opposed to resilience, ability to return to the state before a shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazards and disaster research (early 80s)</td>
<td>Hazards and disasters</td>
<td>• Household livelihoods</td>
<td>Characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Blaikie et al 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Dynamics of survival strategies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Household coping patterns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change (late 90s)</td>
<td>Impacts of climate change</td>
<td>• Systems</td>
<td>‘The extent to which climate change may damage or harm a system’ (IPCC 1997).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Table based on Wisner’s categorization of disciplines that use the vulnerability concept (2009).*

As can be seen from the chart, main difference between these different research communities is the unit under study and the way they approach the notion of vulnerability. Fields of Public health and Humanitarian assistance tend to take a utilitarian approach which does not attempt to unravel or analyze the reasons why people are at risk for certain diseases or in need of aid (e.g in case of rapid displacements or other emergencies). Instead the both notions are highly focused on the relationship of individuals with certainly measurable characteristics (age, sex, etc.) to specific and
definable threats and thus produce taxonomical checklists for vulnerable groups. The approaches taken by Development studies and Hazard and disaster research are somewhat similar to each other as their focus is on livelihoods—mainly in the global south. Vulnerability is seen as a character of only people and not systems, regions or nations. One major difference is that in development studies vulnerability is seen as equivalent to poverty, whereas the hazards approach takes a more situational perspective and analyzes a range of social, economical and political conditions that give rise to vulnerable characteristics. Perhaps the (1985) work of Piers Blaikie *Political economy of soil erosion in developing countries*—a pioneering contribution to political ecology, is the best known example for such an approach. The fifth research community introduced in the chart as the Climate change research, mainly refers to the mainstream notion of vulnerability introduced in 2001 (and further developed in consequent years) by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The unit of analysis in this notion is a “system” and vulnerability is defined as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with diverse effects of climate change. This definition has been criticized by some scholars as confusing, inconsistent, or impractical (Fussel 2011).

While Table 2-1 provides a distinct categorization between different approaches, in reality much over lapping between these notions occurs. However the notion of vulnerability as introduced by Hazards studies is the one most relevant to the scope and focus of this research and will be further developed in the next sections.

### 2.3 THE VULNERABILITY PERSPECTIVE IN HAZARDS AND DISASTER STUDIES

A two decade old research approach within the natural hazard’s studies, the vulnerability perspective questions the ‘naturalness’ of natural disasters. The idea is that environmental calamities are shaped by the already existing social, political, environmental, and economic conditions and thus should not be considered as “natural” occurrences (Cannon 1994; O’keefe et al. 1976; Wisner et al. 2004). Indeed, following the words of Quarantelli “there can never be a natural disaster; at most there is a conjuncture of certain physical happenings and certain social happenings” (Quarantelli, cited in Bolin 2007).

Different perspectives on vulnerability can be categorized in respect to different stages of theoretical evolution of hazard studies: (1) Biophysical viewing of vulnerability. By focusing only on
vulnerability or degradation of biophysical conditions this view highlights the fundamental role of environmental variability in determining the extent and patterns of human vulnerability. This perspective overemphasizes extreme events while it neglects social, political and environmental factors; (2) Human ecological perspective, being among earliest attempts of integrating social factors into the analysis of vulnerability, this paradigm viewed environmental variations as a casual force influencing social change and vulnerability; (3) Political economy paradigm, focuses on dynamics of social structure in their explanations of vulnerability (McLaughlin and Dietz 2007).

Major emphasis is put on the role that inequality and differential political and economic power play in increasing the vulnerability of poor and marginalized groups. Amartya Sen’s (1983) entitlement theory as well as Susman et al.’s (1983) theory of marginalization show political economists’ contribution to the field of vulnerability. However, similar to the early work in human ecology, essentialism has hampered the further development of this tradition (as cited in McLaughlin and Dietz 2007). The political economy view then developed into political ecology to combat increasingly subtle forms of environmental determinism (Wisner et al 2004, p.10). The term Political ecology was initially coined by anthropologists and geographers working on questions of development and underdevelopment in the global south. The outlook describes the linkages between political economy and cultural ecology or broadly, the relations between human societies and their natural environments (Gregory et al 2009, p. 200). Through the political ecology paradigm, constructivist insights of agency and culture are incorporated into analysis of vulnerability (McLaughlin and Dietz 2007).

Following the paradigm offered by political ecology disasters -by definition- mark the interface between an extreme physical phenomenon and a ‘vulnerable’ human population (O’Keefe et al. 1976). It is of importance to recognize both of these elements, as without [vulnerable] people there is no disaster.

In their 2004 book “At risk, Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters” Wisner et al offer “the most systematic statement of hazard vulnerability to date” (Bolin 2007, p. 114). According to their definition vulnerability is seen as “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard, an extreme natural event or process” (Wisner et al. 2004, p.11). The definition implies varying magnitudes; some people are more vulnerable than others. This approach to vulnerability begins from the empirical observation that different groups of human beings often suffer from
different degrees of death, injury, loss and disruption in the same event, and also experience different degrees of difficulty, success or failure, in the process of recovery (Blaikie et al. 1994; Enarson and Morrow 1997; Hewitt 1996; Maskrey 1989). Some groups are more prone to damage, loss and suffering in the context of differing hazards. Key variables explaining variations of impact include class (which includes differences in wealth), occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability and health status, age and immigration status (whether ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’), and the nature and extent of social networks. This definition of vulnerability has an inherent time component. Vulnerability to hazards is a process not an end result. It should not only be seen through the cost and damage at the time of disaster, but also needs to be measured in terms different people’s capabilities- or lack of them- to recover after the hazardous event (Bankoff et al. 2004; Cutter et al. 2003; Wisner et al. 2004). This inherent time factor allows for different components of vulnerability (i.e. capacity for anticipation, coping with, resisting and recovering from the hazard) being equally important. Capacity of individuals to cope with and recover from extreme events is reduced by several constraints. Among others these include lack of access to resources such as income, assets and social support as well as information, financial credit and services. There is evidence that people with certain social characteristics are more likely than others to be affected by lack of access and lack of resources (Wisner 1998). To focus analysis Wisner (1993) identifies three core components of vulnerability: livelihood security, self protection, and social protection. The livelihood component refers to people’s abilities to command resources through employment, subsistence activities, or related means that can be used or exchanged to satisfy needs. Self protection and social protection pertain to issues of hazard preparedness and mitigation at household and broader societal levels. Together self protection and social protection constitute capacity for ‘Safety’ or ‘Security’.

#### 2.3.1 LIVELIHOODS AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES

Livelihoods play an important role in assessments of vulnerability. A livelihood refers to the command an individual, family or other social group has over an income and or bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs as well as facing, resisting ad recovering from hazards. This may involve knowledge and information, social networks and legal rights as well as tools of the trade, property or other physical resources (Bankoff et al 2004; Wisner et al. 2004). Household vulnerability is seen as an outcome of cycles of resource accumulation and expenditure.
Whether or not a household can gain sufficient resources to maintain its members and offer sufficient buffering to prevent or absorb disaster losses is determined by the household’s access to assets and decisions made about their use (Pelling 2003, p. 57). A focus on livelihoods has broadened the scope of disaster mitigation policy to include questions of social structure and social agency. Social structures are important. The labor market, access to skills, training and credit, access to social protections and political organization all play a part in shaping livelihood opportunities. These are important factors that can influence the scope of people’s agency and at the same time are -whiten limits- subject to the outcomes of people’s active choice and decisions.

Households earn their livelihoods in normal times. The process of earning a living is influenced through a set of decisions made at the household level as well as the political economy in which people live in. Wisner et al (2004) view the political economy in two related systems. The first is called “Social relations” and encompasses the flows of goods, money and surplus between different actors (e.g employer and employee, land owner and tenant). The second system is termed “Structures of domination” and refers to the politics of relations between people at different levels (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 81). These relations shape, and are shaped by, existing rights, obligations and expectations that exist at different levels and which affect the allocation of work and rewards. DIAGRAM 2-5 shows how social relations and structures affect conditions of daily life at different levels and the ways in which they interact with decisions and choices that are important in shaping a household’s livelihood.
On the macro level, politics of relations consist of relations between individuals and groups and the state seen through their [citizenship] rights and entitlements. These relations create the pattern by which many decisions can or cannot be taken. Examples may include work permits, or gender based quotas for educational systems and labor market. In case of the immigrants, the macro level structures can also impose restrictions on jobs within the labor market, choices of educational paths and possession rights.

On a community level, social structures and relations are visible between classes that are defined economically and between members of groups that are defined based on the social, demographic and ethnic or national characteristics. The community level relations to some extent reflect patterns of the relations between the state and the individuals. For example patterns of gender (in)-equality that are visible through the state’s policies are usually manifested in ways in which women are treated in the society. The same applies to immigrant status.
At the household level the power structures include relations within the household, between men and women, children and adults, seniors and juniors. It is these relations that define different household member’s rights, obligations and responsibilities. These relations indicate the power hierarchies of the household, and the ways in which important intra-household decisions are taken. These structures also include the wider family and kinship ties of reciprocity and obligation at a more extended (and usually less intensive) level (Winser at al. 2004, pp. 79-93). Similar to community level power structures, the power relations within the household can be reinforced by (and reinforce) the state level inequalities.

Social relations and structures and their interactions at different levels constantly influence and shape people’s daily lives. Daily lives are results of choices and decisions made by the household or the individual in regards to management of their different assets and resources. Social relations of gender, ethnicity, age and status differentiate people’s level of ‘access’ to assets and resources and hence influence the strength of weakness of their livelihoods. These assets include financial, human, social and physical capitals as well as capabilities and livelihood opportunities. The sum of these assets will constitute the ‘access profile’ (Wisner et al 2004, p. 90). Often time access to one asset increases the chances for access to other types of resources. Therefore a households’ amount of ‘access’ to resources –i.e. access profile- enables them (or not) to reduce their vulnerability and avoid disasters.

The processes that generate vulnerability are countered by people’s capacities to resist, avoid, adapt to those processes, and to use their abilities for creating security, either before a disaster occurs or during its aftermath (Wisner et al. 2004, pp. 12-13). Capacity for safety as viewed in the vulnerability paradigm is the ability of a group or household to resist a hazard’s harmful effects and to recover easily. Same as vulnerability being influenced by social, economical and political forces in power within a given context, capabilities and capacities are also dependent on the context. Similar to the concept of vulnerability, capacity for safety implies varying magnitudes; not all people have equal capacities for securities. In case of capacity of safety; similar to differential vulnerability; livelihoods and access profiles can be viewed as important indicators. Capacity to cope and recover from extreme events is reduced by several constraints. These include lack of access to information, financial credit or services and lack of resources such as income, assets and social support (Cutter et al. 2003; Wisner 1998). Capacity for safety can be broken down to two elements of ‘social protection’ and ‘self-protection’ functioning at macro and micro levels respectively. Social
protection against hazards is (or should be) provided by entities that operate on levels above the household, especially the state, or community, or through collective action. This type of safety is a function of both non-monetary social relations (for example, mutual aid in community, neighborhood, or among extended kin), and the provision of preventive measures by government and other institutions. The social protection component of safety is determined by the social relations and power structures. They are a function of the relationship between the members of the household as citizens with rights, claims and entitlements in relation to the state. These entitlements extend to the citizens’ right to know seen through awareness of risks, warning systems and protective measures (Cannon 2000; Wisner et al. 2004).

Self-protection on the other hand is provided by and for the household (to the extent that its assets make this possible, or its attitude makes it willing to do so. There may also be an intra-household variation in self-protection between men and women, children and adults, and elderly and the youth). Usually, almost everyone has some capacity for self-protection and group action. Important factors here are amount of knowledge and information (human capital), networks of support and social relations (social capital) as well as financial security and ability of recovering one’s livelihood after the event of a hazard (financial capital and credits) (Cannon 2000; Wisner et al 2004). Similar to social protection, capacity for self protection can be influenced by social relations and structures that facilitate or limit decisions, choices and access patterns to various types of resources.

2.3.1.1 ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND DIFFERENTIAL VULNERABILITY

In an urban context, important livelihood assets for households in coping with vulnerability or moving out of marginality include labor, housing, possessions, tools of the trade and social networks (Pelling 2003, p. 58). There is usually a reinforcing relationship between access to different assets and uptake of more resources. For example access to different types of capital can facilitate people’s chances of entering the labor market and uptake of an income opportunity (job). For example access to social and financial capital can facilitate access to human capital, which in turns increases one’s qualifications and skills and improves their livelihood chances. According to the access model of Wisner et al., each household makes choices, within constraint to uptake of one of more income opportunities (2004,p. 90). Range of income opportunities – and their consequential pay offs- determines how secure a household’s livelihood is. Income opportunities usually have a set of requirements or “access qualifications”. Access qualifications are a set of resources and social attributes (skills, age, gender, membership of a particular group) and permits and rights (work
permit) which are required in order to take up an income opportunity (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 90). These requirements are to a great extent set through social structures. Consequently Livelihood security also varies by social relations and power structures which include state actions to promote or restrict livelihood opportunities (Bolin 2007).

There is typically a direct relationship between access qualifications and the returns of a given income opportunity. Those jobs with highest requirements (skills, capital or physical infrastructure) are available to a smaller part of population but also have the highest returns. Accordingly less specialized access qualifications (e.g casual labor) are usually oversubscribed and often ill paid. Jobs –or income opportunities; have a crucial role in makeup of livelihoods. In the commodified economy of the city, where little can be obtained without access to money, labor becomes a critical asset (Pelling 2003, p. 58; Winser et al. 2004, p. 90). Any loss of labor power through illness or injury (or through a cut in the market value of labor) is likely to have a disproportionate impact on the urban poor, who are less likely than their rural counterparts to be able to turn to alternative sources of entitlement (transformation of common resources or claims on the moral economy). Similarly, any damage to productive assets such as the dwelling or tools of the trade can cause the abandonment of a livelihood, potentially pushing a household into debt and closer having a direct impact on its level of vulnerability. Research on urban poor and marginalized have identified housing ownership to be an important asset in shaping urban livelihoods (Pelling 2003, p. 58). This is followed by other types of possessions such as sewing machines or motor vehicles that can contribute to the household’s livelihoods especially when households are involved in some sort of home-based productive activity. The payoffs from jobs along with other resources make up the household’s final budget.

Diagram 2-6 indicates how social relations and structures influence people’s access patterns differently and hence affect people’s livelihoods, choices and decisions. The idea is that in conditions of ‘normal life’ people earn a livelihood with differential access to material, social and political resources. Additionally households and individuals are constantly making choices within constraints that can impact their livelihoods. These decisions –made for the future of the household- can impact all household members. A household’s budget is an important factor in making further choices and decisions. For example in times of hardship, household’s coping strategies may cause one or more members to opt for working instead of schooling in an attempt to
increase the household’s budget. The decisions made by the members of the household to a great extent reflect the socio-economic and political structures that shape the context of people’s normal lives. At the same time these decisions are also highly influenced by people’s agency and active choice to change or improve their daily life conditions. And therefore in long term they have the ability to change social relations that indicate patterns of resource allocation and result in different relations in regards to gender, ethnicity or status (Wisner et al. 2004).

Diagram 2-6; Access Profiles and Every Day Life Choices

Note. Idea based on the Access model introduced by Wisner et al. (2004).

This conceptual model is adopted from ‘Access model’ for vulnerability to disasters introduced by Winser et al (2004). Originally the model has been used as an explanatory device in understanding differential disaster vulnerability for different groups of people. This is done by focusing on socio-economic relations that cause disasters or map their outcomes. While it focuses on those at risk of disasters, it also includes the relations they have with others that keep them in that unfortunate state, independently from any disaster. The model is chosen as a reference point for the conceptual framework of this research as it covers most of the areas under investigation. It provides a general outline of the material conditions of life for a population, and most aspects of society can potentially be included in that. It does not explicitly include national policies but impacts of national actions can be incorporated in the model (Wisner et al 2004, p. 106). Moreover the model covers relations at
the household level and among different individuals as well as at the level of society and among different groups of people. Eventually the model incorporates all the various levels in understanding the dynamics in which household choices and decisions are made. As a research framework, therefore, the model is useful in charting impacts of policy and social relations for identifying vulnerable populations and for predicting the probable outcomes of extreme natural events.

An important factor in the concept of vulnerability is the time dimension of it; that is people’s ability to recover from impacts of a disaster. Those who are most vulnerable often time find it hardest to reconstruct their livelihoods following a disaster (e.g. due to lack of financial resources, insurance and credit systems, or networks of support) and this in turn makes them more vulnerable to the effects of subsequent hazard events. A household’s capacity in coping with the impacts of the hazard is an important component shaping the household’s ability to retain normal life conditions after a disaster.

2.3.2 STRUCTURE AND AGENCY SEEN THROUGH THE VULNERABILITY PARADIGM

Following Wisner et al.’s definition and conceptualization of vulnerability to natural hazards, the approach adopted in this research views vulnerability as a final outcome of dynamics between structural factors—that at different levels shape patterns of resource distribution, and agency of individuals in changing these pattern.

A major risk in taking a vulnerability approach is portraying people as victims and passive receivers of hazards and risk. This is not the case. To avoid such assumptions it is important to recognize that vulnerability is balanced by peoples’ capacities and coping strategies (Cannon, 2000). The notion of vulnerability adopted in this research tries to carry out an analysis of structural constraints on people’s lives with an appreciation of the individual’s agency and freedom.

People’s access patterns to resources and their consequential quality of livelihoods are important indicators of how structural factors (at different levels) impact unequal distribution of vulnerabilities among different groups and individuals. Following this viewpoint, structural elements are indeed an important determinant of vulnerability patterns. This focus however should not imply that people are passive recipients of a profile of opportunities, shaped by constraints of the political economy of which they are a part. As Winser et al (2004) put it; the structural factors can be viewed as the “external” part of the vulnerability equation. People’s agency on the other hand, is what shapes the
“internal” aspects of it. A comprehensive understanding of vulnerability requires identification of both the external (structural), and internal (agency) components of vulnerability as well as developing an understating of their dialectics with one another. Viewed in this light, the access patterns on one hand are a function of the historical processes and the political economy that governs lives of different people, and on the other hand are shaped by people’s agency and freedom of choice. Thus the patterns of access in any society are subject to (and the result of) agency, decision making under externally created constraints, struggles over resources and also cooperation by people of different gender, age, class, and so on (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 99).

Agency is viewed as capacity of human actors to project alternative future possibilities, and then to actualize those possibilities within the context of current contingencies. Agency is realized by recalling, selecting, modifying and appropriately applying “the more or less tacit and taken-for-granted schemas of action that they have developed through past interactions” (McLaughlin and Dietz 2007, p. 105). Actor’s agency is often manifested through non-tangible assets such as creativity, experience and inventiveness. Acknowledging people's agency and choices should not undermine the fact that their choices and decisions are influenced by the social relations and power structures. It is the dialectics of agency and structure that at the end shape’s individual action and in particular individual hazard perception and choice of behavior in the face of hazards (Wisner, 1993).

This research adopts Wisner et al.’s ‘Access model’ to offer a conceptual model for establishment and trajectory of vulnerability and its variation between individuals and households at a micro level (see DIAGRAM 2-6). The model however does not explicitly incorporate the notion of actor’s agency. It is indeed very difficult to model, predict or find regularities in agency or inventiveness. Instead it picks up the state of ‘normal life’ and explains how people earn a livelihood with differential access to resources. In this sense, the economic and social means to secure livelihoods are not ‘handed down’ to people in an economist and deterministic manner. Individuals and the household’s are constantly making choices and decision. These decisions and choices are not always restricted to possible options available, but more than often try to make up for lacking resources and limiting conditions. ‘Normal lives’ of people are comprised of different examples of ingenuity, resourcefulness and struggles for improving one’s situation (Wisner et al. 2004, pp. 87-89). Thus the model implicitly, rather than explicitly, allows for people to develop strategies to try to achieve these ends.
A good way to incorporate the notion of agency in assessments of vulnerability is through exploration of coping strategies. The coping strategies are a result of people’s active choices and attempts for dealing with conditions of daily life; and in a broader perspective with possible disasters. Thus the coping mechanisms provide a suitable ground for understanding and tracing people’s agency.

2.3.3 COPING MECHANISMS

Strategies and actions that people take to secure their livelihood conditions constitute an important part of their daily lives. Coping is the manner in which people act within the limits of existing resources and range of expectations to achieve various ends. In general this involves no more than ‘managing resources’, but usually it means how it is done in unusual, abnormal and adverse situations (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 100). Thus coping can include defense mechanisms, active ways of solving problems and methods for handling stress. In discussing conditions of vulnerability and coping mechanisms, it is important to distinguish between individual and collective vulnerability and to break down the coping potential into measures used for increasing capacities for coping, resisting and recovery.

Like vulnerability, people’s opportunities for coping with or adapting to hazards are influenced by livelihoods, social structures and institutions and relations between groups and inside the household. Factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, historical time and physical/psychological health can be viewed as some indicators (Pelling 2003). While vulnerability and coping mechanisms usually lead to opposite end results, the relationship between vulnerability and coping is not necessarily reinforcing. For example, whilst age may increase vulnerability, experience can enhance coping. Nevertheless, assets for coping tend to be less common when vulnerability is already high. This situation results in a condition that Chambers (1989) refers to as the ‘ratchet effect’ of vulnerability. In words of Winser et al. the “ratchet effect” is a viscous cycle that continuously reproduces vulnerability of the most vulnerable (2004). This can be seen in conditions in which with every new hazardous event, those people impacted the most become more vulnerable to future events.

Coping strategies are often complex and involve a number of sequenced mechanisms for obtaining resources in times of adversity and disaster. They grow out of recognition of the risk of an event, and of established patterns of response. Almost all coping strategies consist of actions before,
during and after the event (Winser et al. 2004, p. 102). These mechanisms can be categorized into four generic types that can be applied to the actions of actors from individuals to the state. They include preventative and impact minimizing strategies, diversification of production strategies, development of social support networks and post event coping strategies (Wisner et al. 2004, pp. 100-110; Pelling 2003, p. 54).

Preventative and impact minimizing strategies respectively refer to attempts to avoid the disaster happening at all and seek to minimize loss and facilitate recovery. Many require successful political mobilization at the level of the state. Examples of such measures include large-scale engineering schemes and warning systems. Informative action and awareness raising about particular types of hazards and safety measure for during and after the event can also fall in this group. Prevention and impact minimization at the individual and small group level is also important; this can be seen through household adjustments (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 102).

Diversification of production strategies refers to strategies taken to maintain command of resources in risky situations. Under the terms of the Access model, this involves broadening the access profile and seeking new income opportunities. This strategy is mostly tailored to fit rural contexts as diversifying production may be difficult in a city whose productive sectors are increasingly constrained by global competition. Investing in a skilled labor market and diversifying strategies for accessing the market could raise possible options to increase coping potentials in an urban context. Strategies that enable individuals to get back to work or to re-establish a livelihood are most essential in preventing disasters to deepen structural poverty (Pelling 2003, p. 54).

Social support networks include networks of informal reciprocity or state welfare. These can cover a wide variety of rights and obligations between members of the same household (e.g. wives and husbands, children and parents), with the extended family and with other wider groups with a shared identity. Networks of social support are also important in post-event coping strategies. These mechanisms often rely on common property resources or calling on resources from others (usually family and kin) that can be obtained without threatening future security. This usually involves reciprocal social interactions, and avoids extorting rates of interest, therefore preserving the longer term access position of the individual or household (Winser et al. 2004, p. 104-105).

Coping mechanisms are an important part of understanding differential progression of vulnerability. Vulnerability assessment is often an externalist approach, in which vulnerability is defined based on
the view points of researchers and relief agencies. A good way to achieve a more holistic understanding of differential vulnerability is to include actor’s definitions of well being and preferences for enhancing their lives. This can be done by incorporating the notion of agency through exploration of coping strategies. People’s agency – seen through the strategies taken by different people- can indicate priorities for well being that may diverge from those of researchers and relief agencies. Different people have different coping mechanisms. As chambers (1998) have noted coping strategies vary by region, community, social group, household, gender, age, and time in history. Understanding how different groups of people ‘frame’ issues such as well-being and deprivation are crucial for developing a comprehensive perspective on vulnerability and risk (McLaughlin and Dietz 2007).

2.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

Chapter 2 offers a brief summary of the theoretical evolution of the vulnerability concept. Livelihoods are introduced as an important variable in assessments of vulnerability. Patterns of access to resources are used as a conceptual model to explain progression of vulnerability in daily life conditions. The model takes note of the ways people’s rights and entitlements in accordance to their relations with the state as citizens (or noncitizens); their status in the society and power relations and decision making patterns within their household, can influences their daily life conditions. It looks at the way people’s access to different resources enables them to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a disaster. In doing so, the model focuses on how social relations and power structures; present at different levels from macro level state policies to micro level household relations, affect people’s access patterns differently. Coping capacity is introduced as a point of entry for understanding people’s agency in dealing with conditions of vulnerability. Coping strategies are categorized as actions before, during and after occurrence of an event. Finally, preventative and risk minimizing activities, livelihood diversification strategies, reliance on social networks and post event coping strategies are explained as the four generic types of action, available to different actors from policy makers to the individuals.
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework offers a sociological perspective of progression of vulnerability. Conditions of vulnerability are viewed as an attribute of normal and everyday life conditions rather than a unique situation confined to times of disaster. Concepts of marginalization and social mobility are used to explain the everyday progression of vulnerability in lives of different groups of people. The process of marginalization is seen through systemic inequalities; as a socially constructed condition resulted by unequal distribution of socio-economic resources. Upward mobility indicated through educational attainment and social ranking is viewed as a possible means for empowerment and breaking through the condition of marginality. Acknowledging the synergies and inter-dependencies between the indicators of migrant status and gender, this chapter aims to show the ways in which prevalent social structures and institutions influence – and are influenced by- the lives of women and migrants, separately and combined. Following the vulnerability paradigm, these findings will form the analytical framework of this research. It is based on this framework, that conditions of daily life will be examined in case of a group of Afghan women in Tehran. The findings will subsequently be applied to the conceptual model of the research –access to livelihood assets- to map the progression of vulnerability as well as possible coping strategies for the group under study.

3.1 PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY IN EVERYDAY LIFE

The daily life of many people alive today is a permanent emergency (Maskrey 1989)

Experience of research in situations where “normal” daily life was itself difficult to distinguish from disasters, further rejected the assumption that disasters were caused in any simple way by external natural events (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 10). Following this perspective, vulnerability is viewed as a condition progressing through the events of everyday life. Therefore risks that people face through a disaster should not be viewed as separate from the vulnerability created through their normal existence.

Daily life comprises a set of activities in space and time during which physical hazards, social relations and individual choice become integrated as patterns of vulnerability. These patterns are guided by the socio-economic and personal characteristics of the people involved. Here are found, sometimes (but not always), the effects of gender, age, physical disability, religion, caste or
ethnicity, as well as class. All of these may play a role, in addition to poverty, class or socio-economic status (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 32). Studies of vulnerability to natural hazards often use the process of marginalization to explain for unequal patterns of access to resources that affect people through their daily choices and decisions and accordingly put them on different stages on the continuum of vulnerability. These processes can be seen are the “external” or “structural” factors in progression of vulnerability. This perspective was initially elaborated through studies of how the least powerful social groups in Third World countries are made vulnerable to socio-environmental changes (Collins 2007).

Marginality is a complex condition of drawbacks that individuals and communities may experience because of disadvantages which may arise from unequal or inequitable environmental, ethnic, cultural, social, political and economic factors (Mehretu et al. 2000). Within the vulnerability paradigm, marginalization is a mid range concept provided by [early] political ecology (Gregory et al. 2009), that states that under certain circumstances the conflict of interests in society creates groups of people pushed to the limits of subsistence in urban or rural spaces (Winser et al. 1993), these people are those groups with higher levels of vulnerability.

In a broad way marginality can be defined through economic characteristics (e.g. access to resources and poverty) and power. Acknowledging that some people are more vulnerable in the context of a specific hazard, the concept of marginalization connotes how the social inequalities limit the livelihood options of the least powerful social groups and hence influence their vulnerability as well as their coping capacity to hazards (Collins 2007; 2010). While marginality is not necessarily seen as equal to vulnerability, it is often the case that the marginal groups (the poor, the minorities or women) are also the more vulnerable populations. People’s marginality is defined in terms of economic characteristics; including access to resources and poverty (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987); as well as physical, spatial, social, and political criteria. In other words, marginal households are often spatially isolated and have relatively little power in national and political decision making processes (Wisner et al. 1993).

Concept of marginality can be viewed as a suitable point of entry for social inquiries into studies of natural hazards and disasters. This can be achieved by analysis of social stereotypes and inequitable social relations and power structures resulted by socio-economic and political systems. Economic and socio-political marginalization influences people’s levels of exposure to hazards as well as their capacities for coping with disaster loss (Hewitt 1997; Wisner et al. 2004). This social theory presents
a picture of human action constrained, but not determined, by structures. In fact social structures are simultaneously constraining and enabling. Structural constraints preclude the possibility of making certain choices, they also provide the basis of human thought and action, and therefore offer the very possibility of human choice (Hays 1994). The impact of structural factors (at various levels) is constantly being modified, balanced and challenged by people’s active choice and agency; constituting the internal dynamics of vulnerability (Winser et al. 2004). Such impact is made possible by the enabling features of social structures. At the same time bounds of structural constraint create limits to agency. The capacity of agents to affect social structures therefore varies with the accessibility, power, and durability of the structure in question (Hays 1994). Thus social structures do not dominate all actions of individuals; they should only be viewed as limitations to human choice (Winser et al. 1993).

Many vulnerability situations are temporary, and change as life stages do (marriage, child bearing, and old age) or with changes in occupation, immigration status or residence (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 15). Social mobility is a suitable tool for understanding the changes in the position of an individual or a group in the structure of inequality. Social mobility is not a neatly defined concept, but it is widely recognized as an important one (Miller 1960). During time, studies of social mobility have focused on different concepts. Social stratification and class, processes of status attainment, social justice and it’s close attributes of inequality of opportunities and conditions are some examples (Kreckhoff 1984; Breen and Jonsson 2005; Marshall et al. 1997; Miller 1960). Mobility can be studied from the point of view of its rates, causes, processes or consequences. Each of these perspectives are revealing about the nature of social structure and the influences upon attitudes and behavior (Miller 1960).

Social mobility is a multi-dimensional concept. It points to variations in the background of individual members of the same class or can refer to a change in income, political power, social relations, or occupational prestige. In a broad way social mobility can be viewed through a change in social, political and economic orders or dimensions. Among these dimensions, the economic or occupational dimensions have often been the focus of much of the studies of social mobility. Consequently educational attainment becomes a central indicator of social mobility, as it is often viewed as a per-requisite for occupational attainment and hence status (Kreckhoff 1984; Miller 1960). It is important to note that the relationship between educational achievement and the labor market is not a direct one; that obtaining education does not necessarily result in upward mobility
(Brown and Lauder 2009). Nevertheless education and specifically literacy are often viewed as an essential asset for empowerment of the marginal groups – and specially women- which spans through all areas of human endeavor. Literacy is claimed to have an increasing effect in economic and social empowerment, awareness about rights as well as political participation of groups of people (Olufunke 2011). Other important indicators for economic mobility include occupational indicators of income, skill, power (over employees) and prestige. Thus social mobility can be enabled to varying extents by economic, cultural, human and social capitals.

Besides the economic dimensions, social mobility can be viewed through indicators of change in social ranking or of changes in patterns of association (as in the friendship cliques and voluntary associations) or of changes in the consumption style (Miller 1960). The social dimensions of mobility (e.g changes in lifestyles) are especially interesting in the Iranian context. Historically, Iran is a country with a strong sense of class structure. In the contemporary Iranian society, status recognition is encoded in, and a crucial part of, language, behavior and social etiquette. Appearance and behavioral patterns in Iran are an aspiration for showing one’s social class (Olszewska 2013). Thus, particularly among the youth, portraying specific looks and engaging in certain activities is often used as a strategy for indicating social rank.

With the growth of international migration, much focus has been put on upward mobility among migrants. Social mobility of migrants concerns both intra-generational as well as inter-generational patterns. In both cases social mobility is viewed as a central process in adaptation and integration of immigrants, and as a measure for reducing conditions of exclusion and marginality that migrants mostly face. Through these impacts, social mobility is believed to affect social cohesion and economic performance. As for the intergenerational mobility, issues of fairness and justice put more emphasize on importance of social mobility for the second generation migrants, “children born in the host country should not suffer simply because their parents were born abroad” (Papdemetrilos et al. 2009). The concept of “segmented assimilation” was coined to describe how second generation immigrants confront a series of challenges to their successful adaptation that will define their long term position in the host society. Originally the model studied second generation immigrants in the United States. Following the model immigrants’ success depends on the economic and social resources that they, their families, and their communities can master (Portes 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993). Dynamics of upward mobility are useful tools in understanding conditions of integration and exclusion of migrants in the host country. Moreover by having the potential to help
break through marginalization, the dynamics and mobility can be used to understand interactions of structure and agency.

3.1.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK; SYNERGIES AND INTERSECTIONS

Vulnerability analysis as adopted in this research uses the concepts of marginalization and social mobility to examine the dialectics of social structures and human agency in shaping people’s vulnerability and coping capacity in everyday life and in occurrence of a disaster. In this view, conditions of inequality; structured by social relations and institutions; limit people’s patterns of access to different resources and hence influence people’s vulnerability and capacities for coping with risks (Watts 1991). In particular socioeconomic status, occupation and nationality have a marked effect on access to information and services as well as on resources available to people for self-protection and recovery. Thus certain status, occupation and nationality groups suffer increased vulnerability because their capacity to cope and to recover has been diminished (Wisner 1998).

In taking such a perspective, it is of importance to acknowledge that sole identification of “vulnerable groups and populations” does not offer a thorough understanding of differential vulnerability that many people face. It is true to that certain minority and marginal groups (such as women, immigrants, the elderly or the disabled) are often categorized as the “vulnerable” groups in studies of hazards and disasters and especially in post-disaster aid and relief checklist. It is also true that often time’s people belonging to these groups suffer higher levels of loss and have lower means of recover. Nevertheless there is much more to the social geography of vulnerability than sole demographic indicators. To fully understand such factors, the main question should not be “who is vulnerable?” but instead research should focus on “How does society create differential vulnerability?” In other words, it is not important what groups a family or individual belongs to, but it is the nature of their daily life and their actual (dynamic) situations that matters (Wisner, 2001). For example while the checklist approaches tend to introduce gender as an indicator of vulnerability; it is not female gender itself that marks vulnerability, but gender in a specific situation. Gender does not gain meaning through socialization into a discrete gender role, any more than social class or ethnicity are taken on as roles, but is a primary organizing principle of social life. It significance arises in a complex matrix of ethnicity, culture, class, sexuality and age and is changed through life experience and political struggle (Enarson and Morrow 1998). Therefore not all women are vulnerable equally, there are obvious difference between for example a woman of a higher
socio-economic status, living in northern parts of Tehran and an Afghan woman living in southern parts of the city in terms of vulnerability and security; or in other words means for reducing vulnerability and increasing safety. In order to avoid “checklists” and taxonomic categorizations one needs to view the indicators of vulnerability in a relational view.

The current research, studies how society creates conditions of vulnerability for Afghan women in Tehran. Following the vulnerability paradigm (adopted in this study), gender is not seen as incidental or derivative but contextualized in relation to other social markers of dominance and subordination. In order to fully understand the everyday life conditions of Afghan Women, there is need to understand the synergies between gender, migrant status and also other indicators of vulnerability in relation to social relations and power structures at various levels.

DIAGRAM 3-1 illustrates how determinants at macro (state), meso (society) and micro (household) levels influence two variables of Gender and Migrant status separately and combined. Each variable is influenced by social relations and power structures prevalent at macro level (i.e. rights and entitlements in relations to the state) and meso level (i.e. relations with other community members). This means different factors may influence the daily life conditions of women and immigrants each. Indicators of vulnerability do not function in isolation from one another and neither do the social relations and power structures. Gender relations should be viewed as historical and cultural constructs within which gender is experienced relationally with race, class and other social relations of dominance. The same view applies to migrant status. Accordingly migrant women face different conditions than for example non-migrant women and also migrant men.
The macro level determinants are viewed through the relationships that individuals have with the state as citizen. Rights and entitlements as well as particular legislation regarding a certain group of the society are indicators of how the macro level factors influence different groups. These structures are the drives of social inequalities and its consequential unequal distribution of resources that eventually leads to marginalization of certain groups in the society. In regards to the current research, the synergies between gender and migrant status should be viewed as Iran’s migration/asylum polices towards Afghans and their respective rights and entitlements, along with Iranian state’s viewing of women (as a general group) and their citizenship rights. Besides general strategies regarding Afghan population, particular policies in regards to Afghan women should be sought for.

At the community level, relations between different groups of people are important. These relations are to some extent shaped by the macro level rights and entitlements that different groups have. The ways in which Afghans are treated in society and the types of relations they have with other
groups should be analyzed in the light of how these same patterns apply to women. These synergies exist at the micro (household) level as well. Here, in case of the focus group of this research, the point of interest is the norms and values and social relations inside an “Afghan family”; as opposed to an “Iranian family”, and the ways in which these relations influence women and girls in the power structure of the household. Interactions of the above mentioned factors shapes the conditions of normal life for Afghan women and girls. Depending on the circumstances, the relations at the society and household level can add to marginalization of people or enhance their social mobility. Social networks and relations are particularly important at these levels as based on their type and nature they can restrict or enhance people’s agency.

Following the model of access to resources introduced in chapter 2, different structural elements influence people’s patterns of access to resources (see DIAGRAM 2-6). These elements impact and are impacted by individual’s agency and actions. The amount of access to resources (financial, human and social capital) shapes people’s differential level of vulnerability; in normal life conditions as well as in case of a hazard. Accordingly the amount of access that people and households have to capabilities, assets and livelihood opportunities will enable them (or not) to reduce their vulnerability and avoid disasters and hence shapes their level of safety. The next section; by focusing on two variables of “Gender” and “Migrant status”; explains how daily lives of women and migrants are influenced by these factors.

### 3.1.2 SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF GENDERED VULNERABILITY TO DISASTERS

*Disaster vulnerability, impact and recovery are as profoundly gendered as wives and husbands (Enarson 1998.*)

Women are often categorized along with the “most vulnerable” populations (e.g. extremely poor, migrants and refugees, subordinated racial populations and the disabled or frail elderly) in disaster or aid and relief literature. However these categorizations undermine the specific patterns of relations in social institution, cultures and personal lives. Intersecting with economic, racial and other inequalities, these relationships create hazardous social conditions placing different groups of women differently at risk when disastrous events unfold (Wisner et al. 2004).

Gender is a pervasive division affecting all societies, and it channels access to social and ecological resources away from women and towards men (Enarson and Morrow 1998). Cross culturally, gender power and privilege shape the division of labor in everyday routines and in the global economy,
control over properties, access to training and formal education and practice of science and art, control over one’s body and time, housing conditions and transportation patterns, the use of public spaces, nutrition and health services and of course religious, political and economical institutions. Women are often denied the vote, the right to inherit land, and generally have less control over income-earning opportunities and cash within their own households. Normally their access to resources is inferior to that of men (Enarson et al. 2007; Enarson and Morrow 1998). Following the access model and the vulnerability paradigm, differential vulnerability of women -under certain social, economical and political conditions, should be sought through material conditions of their daily lives. Factors such as gendered division of labor, women’s domestic responsibilities, productive labor, community roles and mobility patterns include some aspects of daily lives of women that contribute to their marginalization.

Household size and structure and its consequential power relations in kinship and marriage are important aspects of women’s lives. These factors also have proven to have a noticeable impact in shaping women’s differential vulnerability; both in everyday life conditions as well as in pre and post disaster situations. Household is a distributive system in which different actors supply and take advantage from different resources. The amount of resources available to the household indicates the household’s relative state, in relation to everyday life conditions as well as capacity to prepare for disasters and recover from their effects. Thus marriage, divorce and inheritance patterns affect family size and structure and are likely to affect women’s vulnerability and capacity for safety (Enarson 1998; 2007). The household power structures as well as the norms and beliefs practiced within the household can affect women’s autonomy, to act independently from men, to be active in the community and to move beyond the house and household and into the society. Women’s presence in the community and their social life is also influenced by their patterns of presence in the public space. Women and men use urban space differently. Moreover cities are spatially segregated areas, limiting mobility of the residents not only by class and race, but also by gender. Patterns of segregation, can in effect limit women’s options and choices for different social activities and engagements and result in social isolation of women. Social isolation is an important component of vulnerability.

Class status is an important determinant in women’s degree of vulnerability. Global statistics show that in most countries, in comparison to men, women are less likely to participate in the labor market and have lower literacy (ILO 2012; UNESCO 2013). Occupational and educational
attainments are both important factors for social mobility. Lower rates of literacy and employment rates can act as impediments to economic mobility for women. Intra-household power structures often result in women having fewer entitlements than men to household resources. Thus within urban households it is often the women who experience the greatest burden of poverty. Women also carry a greater burden of poverty when they are forced into the labor market as a household coping mechanism (Pelling 2003, p. 59). Due to community restrictions and intra-household power structures, lower income women and girls are more likely to work at home. Home-based work reduces women’s ability for income diversification, while it still adds to their burden of domestic work. There they earn income or otherwise support themselves and their families through direct care for dependents (paid and/or unpaid), food preparation (for consumption and/or sale), and home-based production and service work of all kinds (Enarson et al. 2007). Such type of labor is categorized among “vulnerable jobs” by the International labor Organization (ILO 2009) and does not entitle women to work related benefits and services offered through formal labor. At the same time, the need of women’s participation in the household’s economy can at times result in shifting social norms that restrict women to the home-based jobs and thus create new opportunities and options (Pelling 2003).

Vulnerability is not synonymous with poverty; however it is clear that economically insecure, low-income, and poor people are most often exposed to hazards and have less social choice, more practical constraints, and fewer recovery resources. Because women are generally the poorest of the poor (Enarson et al. 2007), this is most true for women. Women’s Limited livelihoods choices increase the risk of loss and damage associated with disasters. For those women who earn their living from home-based labor, losing their house in case of a disaster also means a loss of the site of their livelihoods. The low income /poor women do not have the economic resources (i.e., insurance, land, and access to labor, tools) needed to reconstitute their lives and homes following a catastrophe. Thus disasters frequently leave poor women even more impoverished and they have a harder time to recover from the impacts of a disaster (Enarson et al. 2007; Wisner et al. 2004).

Conditions of daily life not only lead to more vulnerable situations for women, but due to social relations and domain of responsibilities and power relations, put women in more vulnerable conditions in pre and post disaster situations as well. Responsibility towards children and other dependent household members has important implications for preparedness, evacuation and other key disaster decisions (Enarson and Morrow 1997). Domestic violence is largely unexamined in
disaster studies but field reports from evacuation shelters and from battered women’s shelters and responding agencies suggest that some women are at greater risk of male violence in the aftermath of disaster. Equally, women living with disabilities tend to be more economically and socially marginalized than disabled men and at the same time women’s life-expectancy rates expose them on balance more than men to the physical disabilities of advanced age (Enarson 1998; Fordham 1998).

The intersection of poverty and race/ethnicity may combine to disadvantage women. Metropolitan centers hide significant concentrations of women migrants and refugees, many of whom are employed in underground sweatshops, home-based work or waged domestic work (Enarson 1998). International research shows that in the event of disasters women in subordinated ethnic and racial groups face numerous obstacles, including lack of affordable housing, slow repair of their residences in public housing units, interpersonal violence in the temporary housings in which minority women disproportionately resided, increased “kin work” as ethnic families combined resources, and unnecessarily complex aid applications. Moreover women already marginalized by racial/ethnic bias or economic exclusion are less likely than more privileged women in dominant racial groups to take an active part in long-term recovery efforts (Enarson et al. 2007).

### 3.2 WHY ARE MIGRANTS MORE VULNERABLE TO DISASTERS

Immigration status is one of the most subtle factors of susceptibility to marginalization and exploitation worldwide. Immigrants, legal or undocumented, who arrive seeking employment, face a variety of discriminatory pressures. Those without a residence status are subject to random cruel treatment by immigration authorities and law enforcement bodies as well as those who employ them. Immigrants also become convenient scapegoats for causing local problems and are often subjected to stereotyping, exploitation and even violence (Mehretu 2000).

Much of the current migration patterns are based on economic incentives. Generally the decision to migrate is most frequently based on the wish for improving one’s life conditions and livelihoods. Urban areas, specially, are thought to offer more income opportunities and better services such as health and education that might serve as pull factors for migration. However the conditions of daily life for new comers can in effect create situations of marginality and powerless positions which eventually might lead to conditions of multi-dimensional vulnerability. Many economic migrants experience larger gains in income than in their country of origin. Nevertheless first-generation
immigrants typically experience downward mobility when they migrate. Compared to the natives of the host country, first generation immigrants often rank lower in regards to occupational status or their relative position in the earnings scale. The immigrant’s downward mobility can mainly be attributed to barriers into their educational attainment and labor market integration (Papademetriou 2009). First generation immigrants are often over-represented in low-skilled or low-earning jobs. They often face conditions of limited access to job opportunities, social security, information, and other resources. These barriers facilitate marginalization of immigrants and hence put them in more vulnerable conditions (Wang et al. 2010). Part of these obstacles can be overcome with time. To some extent the conditions that the newly arrived migrants face in the host country can be attributed to language barriers, unfamiliarity with the new environment and differences in cultural and religious backgrounds. In fact migrants who are new in the destination country might encounter different lifestyles as well as values and priorities for getting ahead. These factors in particular, along with lower levels of risk knowledge about specific hazards associated with their new living area, contribute highly to migrants’ higher levels of vulnerability to a given disaster. Nevertheless, Portes (1997) argues that focus on issues such as language; cultural habits and spatial patterns do not address the fundamental problems of migration.

The fundamentals of migration are grounded in political economy and are among the focus points of contemporary immigration theories. These are factors such as the sustained demand for supply of labor, the pressure and constraints of sending Third world economies and the microstructures of support created by migrants themselves across political borders (Ambrosini 2008; Portes 1997). Following the vulnerability paradigm, these factors can be viewed as the structural constraints that function through social relations and institutions. When applying the lens of vulnerability analysis to migration studies, the fundamental problems of migration constitute the external part of the vulnerability equation. Contemporary immigration theory has also gone beyond the fundamental forces driving the process of migration and has sought to explore how social networks, community normative expectations and household strategies modify and at times subvert the structural determinants (Portes 1997). These elements can be seen as manifestations of actor’s agency, when conducting a vulnerability assessment.

An important factor influencing the lives of the immigrants in the host country is the context of reception they face in their destination. These are entangled patterns of economical, political and legal contexts that form more or less coherent patterns that organize life chances of the newcomers
(Portes and Borocz 1998). Important determinants are the stance of the host country’s governments, employers, the surrounding native population the pre-existing ethnic community. Based on their reception level, countries will have different stands and policies towards immigrants and hence will apply different measures of external and internal control. Measures of external control are often applied at the borders or through visa policies and agreements with the host country whereas strategies for internal control tend to pressure the migrants by limiting their access to services and labor market (Ambrosini 2008).

Sabates-Wheeler and Waite (2003) identify four categories as determinants of vulnerability in the lives of migrants: Temporal, Socio-political and Socio-cultural and Spatial. These conditions influence the daily lives of immigrants by shaping their patterns of access, legal representation as well as economic opportunities and eventually shape their livelihoods (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003; Tanner and Mitchel 2008). At any point in the migration process a migrant may (or may not) be affected by one or more of these conditions. Furthermore, these factors may reinforce each other.

Temporal determinants of vulnerability are related to different stages of the migration process and to a large degree are determined by the migrants’ lives. They can be a function of different points in the migration process (migrants in transit, migrants at destination, and the migrant’s family at source) or defined by the length of migration (temporary, seasonal, long-term, daily, and temporary, lifetime). Temporal vulnerability can also be inter-generational. Socio-political and Socio-cultural determinants on the other hand are respectively functions of macro level institutional constraints and micro level local constraints resulted by differences in the norms, values and customs. These factors can in turn interact with temporal determinants of vulnerability for migrants at different stages of their lives (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003).

Socio-political determinants of vulnerability refer to the institutional constraints facing migrants and typically reflect the lack of political commitment from the destination government/society to the migrant. This type of vulnerability is especially pronounced for irregular migrants, who by definition are excluded from participation in political life, from access to legal institutions, and also from social and economic benefits. The exclusionary processes resulting from this determinant of vulnerability often causes the irregular migrant to become further marginalized over time and prone to exploitation and discrimination, leading to a spiral into poverty (Sabates Wheeler and Feldman 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Macauslan 2007). In this sense, socio-political determinants can be
viewed as structures that impact differential vulnerability by limiting patterns of access and coping capacities of groups of people.

Socio-cultural determinants of vulnerability for migrant’s reflect differences in the norms, values and customs which constitute local constructions of the “migrant”. These constructions are often interwoven with culturally held notions of race, gender and illegality, which can constrain the nature of migrants’ participation in labor markets or social groups (Bolin 2007; Sabates Wheeler and Feldman 2011). That is, social constraints may hinder against their uptake of certain occupations or engagement in civic activities and public life. The impacts of socio-cultural factors might vary depending on different categories of migrants and demographic characteristics. Based on the access model socio-cultural constraints may be categorized as society-level social relations and structures influencing access profile and income opportunities. At the same time, not all the interactions at this level are constraining. Much of informal strategies for countering conditions of exclusion, resulted by structural constraints and legal restrictions, can also stem from interactions at this level.

Spatial determinants of vulnerability refer to remoteness and dislocation of migrants through the migration process. This includes both geographical remoteness as well as restrictive legislation, participation difficulties in labor markets and civic activities, lack of access to services and formal social protection (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003; Wang et al 2010; Wisner et al 1993). Dislocation and remoteness hinders migrants’ access to information systems, basic services (health care and education) and income and social opportunities. As a consequence migrants become more vulnerable to exploitation and poverty. These conditions are reinforced in case of irregular migrants. Constant need to remain hidden and unidentified leads to further exclusion from livelihood-promoting possibilities (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman 2011). Conditions of spatial remoteness not only limit the migrants’ coping strategies and ability to recover in case of a given hazard, but by excluding them from forms of social protection reduce their levels of safety and security as well.

Temporal determinants are determined by the migrants’ state in life. In each of these states, socio-political, spatial and socio-cultural factors interact with daily life conditions of the migrant. The interactions –separately and in relation with each other- shape access patterns of the migrants to different resources and affect their income opportunities. The effects of such conditions have been well studied in the lives of migrants themselves as well as through generations. Studies on the second generation migrants have identified that the human capital that immigrant parents bring
with them, the social context in which they are received and the composition of the immigrant family as factors influencing the integration of the second generation (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2008). Social context is seen through the receptiveness of the host country. It is based on this receptiveness that the first generation migrants can optimize their human capital (formal education and occupational skills) for integrating the host society’s labor market and achieving desirable positions. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) refer to this tripartite of government, society and community as ‘modes of incorporation’. If applied to the vulnerability framework of this research, modes of incorporation can be seen through social relations and power structures functioning at state and society level.

Spatial remoteness, in shape of restrictive legislation, and socio-political discriminations control migrant’s ability to fulfill access qualifications for different income opportunities. Institutional discrimination resulted by socio-political factors limits the amount of social protection available to migrants. Socio-cultural limitations impact migrants’ decisions and choices in regards to their livelihood improvement and measures of self protection. The impacts of all these factors together are translated into strength of migrant’s livelihood. A livelihood’s weakness or strength is an important determinant of differential vulnerability.

As a consequence migrants tend to rely on informal measures of social protection such as migrants' networks to enable them to better manage the outcomes of their spatial remoteness (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003). The importance of social networks as a support mechanism for low-income individuals and households has long been noted in urban studies (Portes 1998; Pelling 2003). The relationship between vulnerability and social capital is dependent upon context (Pelling 2003). High reliance on in-group social networks and relations results in strong bonding social capital within the migrant community. Putnam (2000) refers to bonding social capital as being "good for getting by". This type of social capital lays the structure for specific reciprocity and mobilizes solidarity. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that bonding social capital can lead to strong in-group loyalty but also increase isolation from the out-group community. This can be seen through differences in lifestyles, norms, values and priorities for going ahead in life between the migrant and the host societies. Such differences are most prevalent among the first generations but can also affect the second generation through household dynamics. Bridging networks on the other hand lead to the formation of a broader identity and reciprocity through making linkages to external assets and diffusion of information. They are thus "good for getting ahead" (Putnam 2000).
Survival in marginal urban communities frequently depends on close interaction with kin and friends in similar situations. Individuals may hold latent social capital in relationships with many people, but only in selected relationships is social capital actualized and made manifest through cooperative relationships. Amongst marginal communities variety and quality of social interactions is likely to be restricted and communal stocks of positive social capital will consequently be low (Pelling 2003). Migrants, especially the newly arrived ones, tend to rely highly on their own in-group social networks and relations. This helps them to learn about ways of living in the new country and gain the information that is critical for mobility opportunities (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). In this way, usually migrant communities have a high stock of bridging social capital (relations and networks with other migrants) while their stock of bridging social capital (relations with other groups and the main society) is low. Loss of interaction between groups (bridging capital) inhibits the flow of information among them.

An important function of social networks and relations is their role as information channels (Coleman 1998; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000). Risk knowledge and perception about a given hazard is one type of information that can be distributed through social networks. Risk perception is an intuitive risk judgment that can be considered as the primary risk assessment to evaluate hazardous events. Although risk perception does not equate to people’s preparedness or response to early warnings, it can be considered as a significant determinant for the action and behavior of individuals or social groups when they encounter a hazard. An accurate consideration of actual risk is likely to lead to appropriate preventive measures, warning compliance, impact mitigation and response strategies. Conversely, biased or distorted perceptions may increase vulnerability due to inaction or inappropriate actions (Wang et al. 2010) According to the hazards-of-place model of vulnerability utilized by Cutter et al. (2003), risk perception and community experience with hazards are crucial factor affecting social vulnerability.

Social networks are also influential factors in post-disaster events. It is frequently stated that a disaster brings people together, increasing bridging capital. This may be the case during emergency response, but as goods start to flow into disaster-impacted neighborhoods social networks tend to re-coalesce around old allegiances of race, caste, gender, religion or ethnicity (Pelling 2003, p. 60). This puts the migrants in positions of higher vulnerability in post-disaster events as well as everyday life conditions.
3.3 MIGRATION AND GENDER; A BRIEF PICTURE OF POSSIBLE SYNERGIES

The previous sections gave a detailed response to the question of “How does society make women and migrants more vulnerable?” Influential social structures and power asymmetries were identified and their outcome trajectory of vulnerability was explained for variables of “gender” and “migrant status” separately. In order to fully understand how conditions of vulnerability and coping capacity impact the indicators of gender and migrant status, the intersection of grounds within the group “Afghan Women and Girls” should be taken into account.

The theorization of the intersection of multiple inequalities has become a central issue in social theory and specifically in gender studies. As opposed to examining gender, race, class, and nation, as separate systems of oppression, intersectionality explores how these systems mutually construct one another. In doing so intersectionality provides a set of theories useful for handling indirect and multiple discriminations (Bello 2011; Wallby 2012). There are different ways of studying intersectionalities. In a categorization of approaches in studies of intersectionalities, McCall introduces three intersectional approaches, depending on the stance they take towards categories. The anti-categorical approach deconstructs analytical categories; the intra-categorical approach focuses on particular social groups at neglected points of intersection and the inter-categorical approach adopts existing analytical categories, such as gender, race/ethnicity, religion, etc. to analyze relationships of inequality (2005). The third approach is recommended by McCall, for its power in engaging with the larger structures that generate inequalities (McCall in Walby 2012). The inter-categorical approach is used as a guiding outline to understand the synergies, relations and intersections of the variable gender and migrant status in progression of vulnerability.

Studies of disasters and natural hazards have managed to take gender into consideration. Gendered disaster social science rests on the social fact of gender as a primary organizing principle of societies and the conviction that gender must be addressed if we are to claim knowledge about all people living in risky environments Theoretically, researchers in this area are moving toward a more nuanced, international, and comparative approach that examines gender relations in the context of other categories of social difference and power such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and social class (Enarson et al. 2007). The same patterns have been developed in contemporary theories of migration. Portes argues that as in the case of class and race, the multiple configurations found in
different social contexts are what make the study of gender relations interesting and capable of yielding new findings (1997).

Following the vulnerability paradigm adopted in this research, structural (external) determinants of vulnerability work through relations at state, society and household levels. Guided by the power structures and social relation, the interactions between these levels influence the amount of access that different groups have to different assets and resources. Access to resources and assets influences the weakness or strength of one livelihood and hence their differential vulnerability.

The macro level structures are shaped by the relationship of people with the state as citizen. These relations set the amount of rights and entitlements that groups of people can have in the society. The relations at this level are much more pronounced in case of immigrants. It is at this level that the distinction between regular and irregular migrant takes place. Based on their status then migrants will be entitled [or not] to various rights and services. Social structures at this level will eventually indicate the migrants access levels to economic opportunities (e.g. work permits, occupational limitations), as well as access to service (education, health care). Following the access model, it can be argued that the relations at this level highly influence the income opportunities and access profiles of the migrants. The state level structures also indicate the rights and entailments of women in the society. If the state does not follow the idea of equality for men and women, these can result in discriminatory regulations that can have an unfavorable effect on women’s access profiles. The state-level structures also provide an image of different groups of people. The way the state level policies consider women and migrants to a great extent influences the way they are portrayed- and treated- in the society.
At the society level, the impacts of social structures are viewed based on the relations between different groups of people with one another. At this level, discriminatory views towards both women and migrants can be manifested. Moreover women face the community role and responsibilities that are expected from them at this level. This might include certain [accepted] behavior or activities and can influence the daily life choices and decisions of women. Migrants can face discrimination from the native population. It is also important to notice the society level relations are not all uniform. Along with limiting attitudes and behavior, this level can be the source of useful social relations and networks that can work in favor of both women and immigrants.

Perhaps the impacts of intra-household structures are the most pronounced for women. At this level women are faced with gendered division of labor as well as reproductive and care giving responsibilities. In case of migrant women, this can include care giving to the extended kin and relative as well. The power relations at this level are also important in shaping the choices and decisions.
To understand the intersection of migrant status and gender, the effects of these three levels should be viewed in combination with each other. In all these three levels, the effects of actor’s agency are manifested through the ways they try to improve or change the structures that are influencing their lives. If the structures shape and outline of differential vulnerability (by limited access to resources) the actions of individuals based on their agency shape their coping capacity and strategies.

3.3.1 EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY FOR SAFETY

Understanding the vulnerability of people to an earthquake in a particular area, both ex ante (potential) and ex post (what happens after the initial shock and in the process of recovery), involves two related tasks. Broadly, earthquake vulnerability can be viewed from the perspectives of space- and time related characteristics of the earthquake with the socio-economic characteristics of the population at risk. The combination of these two characteristics defines “who was where when” as the earthquake struck, and “how” they were affected by it. Thereafter, the structure of access to resources, and the capability of applying knowledge to the seeking out and utilization of these resources, is crucial for the recovery of affected people after the earthquake (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 239). Overall, there is an urban ecology which is expressed in terms of access to resources before and after an earthquake.

Space and time characteristics of the earthquake can be assessed through different determinants such as the location of the earthquake, characteristics of the building and unsafe structures at the site of the earthquake, and protective measures. These measures include structural and non-structural regulations and, in more general terms, policies that officials have taken [or not], in advance to reduce any seismic risk. The temporal dimensions of an earthquake are also of importance on many scales. Depending on “when” the earthquakes occur they can affect individuals differently. Examples include differences of an earthquake event between day time and night time (during which people are most likely to be inside their houses and asleep) or during warm or cold seasons. Socio-economic characteristics of the people at risk are determined by social patterns and institutions, society level and intra-household social relations, and economic activity (gender and migrant status), and the psychology of risk. Political economy causes people to be differentiated by degrees of vulnerability. In the case of earthquakes, housing design, quality of building and the degree of maintenance are of crucial importance. In turn, these characteristics are shaped by the patterns of ownership of buildings, the level of rents and the distribution of income among urban
dwellers, which interact to determine where people live and the degree of hazard associated with those locations (Wisner et al. 2004, pp. 240-241).

The effect of the earthquake can be considered in two overlapping ways; the destruction of property and the impact on lives (what happens at the time of the earthquake) as well as the ways in which lose of property and resources influences people’s capacity to cope with and recover from the earthquake impacts (what happens after the earthquake). Issues of recovery and rehabilitation cannot be separated from the profile of vulnerability. Four generic types of coping mechanisms are identified in case of earthquakes. These strategies can be applied to the actions of actors from individuals to the state. These mechanisms include preventative and impact minimizing strategies, diversification of production strategies, development of social support networks and post event coping strategies (Pelling 2003, p.54).

Social structures and institutions influence lives of people at different levels. Citizenship rights and relations between the individuals and the state determine their entitlements and hence shape people’s access to different types of resources. At the same time society–wide and intra-household relations also have a determining effect on people’s access patterns as well as final choices and decisions. Gendered division of labor, women’s domestic responsibilities, and productive labor and community roles are some determinants of women’s differential vulnerability. In regards to migrants, restrictive legislation, exclusion from institutions and discriminatory behavior (at multiple levels) contributes to their marginality. In the particular case of vulnerability to earthquakes, these factors shape patterns of residential distribution, and ownership status.
Physical conditions of the residential unit are an important indicator of loss and damage at the time of an earthquake. People’s residential patterns are a function of their access profiles. A household’s budget for example (which is a function of the available income opportunities) is a great determinant of type and location of dwelling. So are the intra-household relations in making the decision for where to live. Social networks also influence residential patterns, as especially in case of migrants- reliance on informal networks and relations can as a substitute for lack of formal protection measures.

Social relations and power structures affect people’s coping strategies in regards to earthquakes. Access profiles can determine the amount of economic lose that different people are likely to go through as well as the ability to recover from the loss. Information is also an important determinant in coping strategies. Awareness about the risk and knowledge of the safe behavior in the event are important preventative measures that can reduce the amount of cost and damage to lives. Such information can be gained through formal channels such as education, or informal networks and social relations.

3.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical basis of this research. By offering a sociological perspective of the concept of vulnerability, this chapter tries to create an inter-disciplinary framework for analysis of progression of vulnerability in lives of immigrant women. The processes of marginalization and social mobility are chosen to explain for the ways social relations and power structures impact people’s final levels of access to resources; as well as their consequential choices and decisions; differently. These processes are discussed in details in regards to their impacts on daily lives of immigrants and women; as two demographic categories that are susceptible to having higher levels of differential vulnerability. This is seen through the ways in which social relations and power structures at different levels of state policies, societal level interactions and intra-household dynamics, influence the range of choices and options available to women and migrants, and hence impact their access patterns. Patterns of upward mobility seen through educational, occupational or social mobility are seen as possible strategies for breaking through conditions of marginalization and are viewed as a manifestation of actors’ agency; within the limits of the structure they live in.

The synergies and interactions between the indicators of gender and migrant status shape the basis of the analytical framework of this research. Following theories of intersectionality the research
adopts an inter-categorical perspective to analyze the relationships of inequality between the indicators of gender and migrant status. Accordingly the theoretical framework of this research will include the synergies between migrant status and gender to describe for the patterns that result in differential vulnerability of Afghan women and girls their normal life conditions in Tehran.

The chapter then describes the process behind differential vulnerability and coping capacity in the particular case of an earthquake. Preventative and impact minimizing strategies, diversification of production strategies, development of social support networks and post event coping strategies are introduced as influential factors in studies of earthquakes. These measures are viewed in the light of the theoretical framework of the research.

The next chapter tries to investigate how social structures and institutions and their interactions with each other at different levels, shape progression of differential vulnerability for Afghan women in daily life conditions as well as the special case of an earthquake.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS

This research aims to gather in-depth understanding of how social and structural factors influence the daily lives of Afghan women. The main idea of this research is that daily lives of people are a result of the choices and decisions made in accordance with their resources and household budget. The level of access to resources are to a great extent indicated (or limited) by social and structural factors at different stages. At the macro level, lives of Afghans are influenced by their rights and entitlements in relation to the state. At the meso level, Afghans - same as others-are influenced by relations between different groups and members of the society. At the micro level the power structures and social relations inside the household influence lives of Afghans. The macro, meso and micro determinants are not isolated from one other. Dynamics of each level impacts (and is impacted by) other scales. The goal of this research is to draw a picture of daily lives of Afghan women based on interactions between these three levels. Information needed for such analysis is gathered using secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources are used to gather information on macro and community level indicators. The secondary data sources then will be used to draw a picture of general conditions for Afghans in Iran. The data is chosen in accordance with different levels of analysis and the theoretical framework of the research. Primary data aims understanding the household level interactions and their impact on lives of Afghans women and girls. The general image of conditions of daily life for Afghans in Iran will be complimented with the primary data in particular case of Afghan women and girls in Tehran. The combination of the secondary and primary findings then will be used to understand the synergies between state level policies and societal relations with intra-household relations of Afghan Women and girls.

4.1 SECTION ONE: SECONDARY DATA SOURCES

The secondary data sources aim to provide general information on socio-economic and demographic conditions of Afghans in Iran. This is done with consideration of state (macro) and societal (meso) level social structures and power relations in lives of Afghans in Iran.

Secondary data sources for the macro level factors include academic papers and reports from international organizations such as UNHCR; The Human Rights Watch, Norwegian Refugee council (which is very active in regards to Afghan refugees in Iran) as well as Norwegian Immigration center; and an Iranian NGO based outside of Iran named Justice for Iran. Academic papers are used to
clarify the Iranian refugee policy while the reports from the international agencies (in particular the Human Watch Report of 2013) are used to draw a picture of Afghan lives in light of their rights and entitlements in relation to the Iranian state. At the community level, academic papers and news articles are used to draw a general picture of integration of the Afghan population and their portrayal in the Iranian society. The news articles are also a source for tracing Iranian strategies and policies towards Afghans.

General facts on Afghan households in Iran including their population and demographics and level of socio-economic development will be gathered through a literature review of academic papers and research projects. Afghanistan Research Unit–AREU (an independent research center based in Kabul) serves as a particularly helpful source. The research unit has carried out systematic researches on integration and return migration of Afghans in different Iranian cities. These projects, combined with reports from International Labor Organization (ILO) constitute the data on socio-economic conditions of Afghans. Much of the demographic information is based on academic papers in the field of public health. These papers focus on fertility and family planning trends among the Afghan community and the ways in which Afghan’s family structure have been influenced by living in context of Iran. The UN reports (especially the United Nations Population Fund –UNFPA) were also used for obtaining particular statistics. Table 4-1 offers a list of secondary data sources along with their targeted level of analysis and the criteria which is under investigation. The collected information then is used to apply the theoretical framework of the research to conditions of life for migrants and women in Iran.
Understanding daily life conditions of Afghan Women in Iran will not be possible without having some background knowledge of conditions of life for Women in Iran. Such information will be a basis for understanding Iranian women’s relationship with the state as citizens and their consequential rights and entitlements. Moreover this information acts as a reference point in comparison of lifestyles and priorities for Afghan and Iranian women. Finally this information allows for understanding the meso level (societal) interactions between the two groups and the outcomes of such relations on lives of Afghan women. Therefore the next section tries to offer a brief explanation on daily life conditions of women in Iran. Distinctly impotent factors include the gap between the traditional views of Iran’s state policies and regulations; in particular in regards to women, and the society’s much more modern take on lifestyle choices. Evident differences can be seen in Iranian women’s participation in labor market and higher education as well as Iran’s average family formation/marriage and fertility trends with the encouraged patterns by the Iranian state. A mix of Secondary and primary data sources and are used for drawing a picture of daily lives of Iranian women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Topic of investigation</th>
<th>Secondary data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General facts on Afghan households</td>
<td>• Demographic information</td>
<td>• Academic papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Household size and structure</td>
<td>• Research projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Socio-economic information</td>
<td>• Reports from ILO and UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro level (relations with the state)</td>
<td>• Iranian migration and refugee policies in regards to Afghans</td>
<td>• Academic papers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Historical and political factors in Afghan migration regimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso level (society wide relations)</td>
<td>• Restrictive legislation</td>
<td>• Reports from UNHCR, Human Rights watch, Norwegian refugee council, Justice for Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Afghan’s rights and entitlements</td>
<td>• Academic papers</td>
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<td>• Access to institutions and services</td>
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<td>• Measures for Social support</td>
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<td>• Gender based differences</td>
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<td>• Image of Afghans</td>
<td>• Iranian newspapers</td>
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<td>• Attitudes towards Afghans</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Social integration</td>
<td>• AREU research papers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Social networks and relations</td>
<td>• Academic papers</td>
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4.2 WOMEN IN IRAN; FROM DAILY LIVES TO POLICIES

As mentioned in 3.1.2 women—in many societies—are more likely to face social inequality in regards to unfair barriers to education and achievement, cultural devaluation of women as well as the gendered division of labor, gendered violence, and limitations on reproductive choice. As a result women and girls may not have access to equal resources and information in a disaster situation or face discrimination in the aftermath (Enarson et al. 2007). These factors can be easily applied to the current conditions in Iran where state policies do all their best to limit women’s active participation in the public sphere and the labor market and instead try to push back the women in the private realm of the family. These discriminatory policies in many cases contradict with choices and desires of Iranian women. In order to fully understand the controversial conditions of Iranian government’s policies towards women one needs to take a step back and look at the broader picture of Iran's history of modernization, its impacts on people’s life styles and the way in which such impacts are viewed and treated within the context of the Islamic regime of Iran.

The process of modernization started in Iran at the beginning of the twentieth century and resulted in many changes in population dynamics (Ezazi, 2013). Since then population of the country has increased by more than 7 folds (from 10 million to more than 75 million at the current time) along with a huge increase in urban growth. Currently the urban to rural population rate in Iran is 85% to 15%. Changes in population and urban growth have influenced people’s participation in the economic sector as well. Currently the majority of the employed population (44.8%) works in the service sector, followed by the industry (31.8%) and agricultural (23.4%) sectors (Iran Statistical Center 2011). Modernity is not only about changes in population number, size of cities or amount of factories, but also about transforming people's beliefs and norms, as well their acceptance for change. Iran's history of modern times shows a shift in people's beliefs and attitudes; most clearly regarding family and family life (Ezazi, 2013).

National surveys of Iran show changes in attitude, behavior and traditional role systems of family in the last decades (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2003; Ezazi 2011; 2013). Compared to the traditional extended family common in the past, now people live in nuclear families. The average family consists of 3 to 4 members (Iran Statistical Center 2011). The extended family was the economic unit and the base of society. All members lived together and had their role in the family production. The family bands were very important. Although family relations are still very important in Iran, many
changes have happened. During the last decades, society has developed more acceptances for new social roles of women, and men have lost their absolute power in the family. An example is how the traditional family relations have changed between husband and wife. Men are not as powerful as before, they live in an “equal” family, not a patriarchal one. These changes are indicators of moderation of patriarchy in normal family life, especially for young educated people. Polygamy is refused by over 90 percent of the population (Ezazi 2013). Age of marriage is higher now; 23.4 for women and 26.7 for men (Iran Statistical Center 2011) and childbirth rates are lowered. The rate of working women is increasing and also is men's contribution in the household chores. Divorce rates are very high and the tendency to remain single is observable (Ezazi 2011, pp. 75-79). Young people have different values, norms and priorities in life. Plans for further education and entering the labor market have replaced marriage and family formation. The limits of gender differences are fading; both sexes believe that women have the same abilities as men. Women are active in social, economic and cultural life, especially in big cities such as Tehran. Despite the legal restrictions women are active members in social, cultural and family life. There is a conflict between the ideas of modernity and tradition in Iran (Ezazi 2013). Regardless of the transformation in people’s views and ideas, the Islamic regime of Iran still holds the traditional image of the family unit: men as the head of the family and women as responsible for household duties (Kar 2008). According to legislative laws and traditional cultural norms the systematic patriarchy still exists. In fact the regime views the changes in norms and values as a manifestation to decline of patriarchy.

In regards to the issue of “gender”, the Iranian regime holds the view of “equity” not equality. This ideology implies that men and women are different from each other, they have different potentials and abilities, and therefore they have different rights and also duties. Following this view a woman's place is at home; as mothers and house wives, while men's place is outside as the breadwinner. The woman is responsible for household chores, and it is the man who is responsible for all decisions, as he is head of family and holds the power in the family (Ezazi2013; Kar 2008). The decline of control over women is seen as a threat for social stability by the regime. If the institution of family is no longer able to control women, then it will be the duty of public to regain the power of men (Ezazi 2013). Thus there have been attempts to create changes in the changes in private and the public sphere. Both changes are interrelated and eventually give men more power in the society and family while they limit the rights of women in both sectors.
4.2.1 MARGINALIZATION OF IRANIAN WOMEN IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE

“Correct” type of family structure – as encouraged by the Iranian traditional government, has a distinct patriarchal nature. The ideal family type would be one in which the father or the husband is in charge of all the major decisions and the mother or the wife is in charge of children and household chores. This viewpoint is clearly evident in Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitutional law, where women’s rights are only discussed within the realm of family. In other words women are considered to be second degree citizens whose rights and value can only be realized through their [maternal] role in the family (Kar 2008). The discriminatory nature of the Iranian family law creates limitations for women in many realms. As a result women’s choices and decisions in regards to their place of living, occupation, or even decision to not continue their marital relationship are very limited. BOX 4-1 gives a detailed account of the Iranian family law under the Islamic regime and the ways in which it impact daily lives of women. The plans that target the private sphere are mainly based on creating an imbalance of power and rights between men and women in the Iranian society. This imbalance of power and rights is problematic. Even though in their normal life systems men in Iran are modern and believe in equality of genders, they still have the legal measures to impose power over women. And as it happens, many times in facing problems in life, Iranian men feel justified to do so referring to the rights that they are given by means of law.
Another example is the state’s most recent attempts of advocating a strategy of population growth; a strategy which directly impacts women as child bearer and tampers with their productive labor. As of 2012 there have been recurring discussions about reversing the population policy and elimination of the population control program; initiated by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s call on women to have more children indicating that the country should have a goal of reaching the population of 150 millions. Such discussions were followed by removal of sexual education from university syllabus and pre-marital education from community clinics. Accordingly advertisements encouraging larger size families have been set in many public areas. IMAGE 4-1 is an example of a very controversial advertisement set up in November 2013. The image raised huge waves of...
criticism, not the least for the fact that “the mother in charge of reproduction of all the many children is nowhere to be seen at the family fun day”.

IMAGE 4-1; POPULATION INCREASE ADVERTISEMENT


Eventually as of 2014 new polices eliminate distribution of free birth control and also propose a ban on permanent means of contraception (i.e. female or male sterilization). While the reverse population policy would eventually impact men and women of Iran, on the first place it directly increases the burden on women as child bearers. These policies encourage the retirement of women from the labor market, and instead encourage their roles as mothers. Having more children is an attempt to keep mothers at home as they are expected to take care of their children and often kindergartens are costly. These attempts clearly aim women’s choices and decisions in regards to their livelihoods and can be viewed as additional drivers of women’s marginalization.

4.2.2 MARGINALIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Orders about public sphere are another strategy to make women powerless. Currently women are very active in social and economical spheres. The last decades also shows an increase in the number of women active in social and cultural activities. The university attendance rates are particularly high for girls in Iran and for the first time there are more female students than male students with over 60% female students (Ezazi 2013). Girls are also majoring in disciplines that are traditionally known to be “male subjects”; such as different branches of engineering. Despite the slogan "educated
women should stay at home because they make better mothers", the young educated girls are actively seeking jobs. Unfortunately the unemployment rate for educated women is double as high as for educated men; 40% unemployment among women vs. 20% among men. Many women are working in unofficial sectors, as street traders or as housekeepers or domestic workers in small enterprises. Overall many women work in the precarious tertiary sector. During the past years several bills have been submitted (introduced or presented) to the parliament in order to restore men's power over women and reduce women's freedom in making their own life choices. These attempts are now being complemented by a new strategy based on gender segregation and exclusion of women from the public sphere. These strategies can be seen as collaboration between the public and private patriarchy – a partnership with historically deep roots in the society. Their final attempt is to vitalize subordination of women and turning them invisible by excluding them from the public sphere while pushing women back in the private sphere of family (Ezazi 2013).

Gender segregation has many faces; from separation of girls and boy at schools –since the Islamic revolution- to more recent attempts of gender segregation in universities. The latter is especially important, regarding its consequences. The educational segregation started from spatial limitations and has expanded to limitations on choice of the subject of study. During the academic year of 2012 women were excluded from many disciplines in different universities as these disciplines received a 100% quota for male students. In Iran’s current society, higher education is a requisite for finding jobs with higher pay offs or at times even entering the labor market. Such limitations reduce women’s ability for improving their access profiles and accordingly negatively impact their livelihoods assets. The latest attempt in gender segregation and exclusion of women from the public sphere is carried out by Tehran’s mayor; Mohhamad Bagher Ghalibaf. In a recent attempt in July 2014, the mayor of Tehran introduced a plan to separate male and female public employees in municipal offices. This plan that if implemented will reduce the role of women in office-management jobs is introduced as an attempt to “honor the dignity of women” and “strengthening the structure of family by preventing women spend more time than needed with men that are not related to them” (Deutshce Welle Farsi, 17, July 2014).

Spatial factors also influence daily lives of women and their levels of vulnerability. Patterns of gender segregation are also visible in Tehran. For the majority these patterns are designed and implemented by the state based policies. These attempts claim to facilitate movement and activities
for women. Examples include certain female designated areas on vehicles of public transportation such as busses and the metro. Women only parks are another example of gender segregation in public space. Currently there are four women only parks in Tehran (Tehran Parks and Green Space Organization n.d.). Men and boys are not allowed in these parks. As a consequence women have the possibility to carry on different activities (cycling, playing games, relaxing, etc.) freely and without having to wear the Hijab in these parks. Suggestions for creating women's coffee shops were another attempt in increasing the gendered segregation; however those suggestions were not accepted.

IMAGE 4-2; ONE OF THE FIRST “WOMEN PARKS” IN TEHRAN


Many women are content with these activities, as the female only spaces allows them to escape from limitation of social and public life. Indeed besides the state policies, women –especially in lower socio-economic neighborhoods, face social pressures in regards to their behavior and freedoms. Tehran’s informal rules of gender segregation require the same attention as the state induced ones, if not more. Certain streets and areas of Tehran are characterized by a dominantly male population. In these areas presence of women- or at least women not accompanied by a man; is rare. These conditions could be partially explained as a matter of safety; especially at later hours of evenings. But at the same time the role of beliefs and values should not be undermined. Many of the residents of those neighborhoods perceive the unaccompanied commuting of women and girls as a negative trait and a sign of lack of virtue. Thus women tend to keep indoors. This limits their
interactions with others and can negatively impact their awareness and knowledge about possible hazards.

4.3 AFGHAN MOVEMENT TO IRAN; A BRIEF BACKGROUND

Iran has been seemingly isolated from much of the outside world since the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979, its borders, however, have by no means been closed. To the contrary, the country has produced and hosted abundant flows of emigration and immigration, a steady coming and going mainly driven by key political events. What makes Iran's migration story unique is that it has experienced simultaneous emigration and immigration to extreme degrees. In its recent history, Iran has laid claim to producing the highest rates of brain drain in the world while simultaneously topping the list as the world's largest refugee haven, mainly for Afghans and Iraqis. Iran also exhibits one of the steepest urban growth rates in the world, largely driven by internal migration from rural areas (Hakimzadeh 2006).

Afghan’s in Iran are a marginalized group living under precarious condition (HRW 2013a, Justice for Iran 2012). Most frequently lack of residence documents and regular status is viewed as the reason behind Afghans’ precarious life conditions in Iran. This view is a simplification of the multiple factors that in relation with each other define levels of marginalization and vulnerability for the Afghan population. Portes (1997) advocated for consideration of economic and societal structures in migration research. Such studies will offer a broader theoretical explanation of the structural causes of migration and the structural determinants of the patterns of incorporation of the migrants in different types of societies. A comprehensive understanding of processes that marginalize Afghans in Iran requires consideration of historical and political as well as social and economical aspects in Iran and Afghanistan.

Afghan populations are historically highly mobile; continuous multidirectional cross-border movement can be seen as a key household survival strategy through which Afghans can spread risk and diversify their livelihoods (Saito 2009). The trend of mobility between Afghanistan and Iran has changed visibly during the past decades. Starting from the conflicts of 1978, the conditions of political unrest and the subsequent events; resistance, civil war, and repressive theocratic government, resulted in new waves of population movements (Hugo et al 2012). As a result Afghan outmigration in the recent years is considered to be one of the largest displacements of people with
about a third of Afghanistan’s population (more than six million people) abandoning their country. Sharing land borders with Iran and also Pakistan, these two countries have been among the main targets of the Afghan flux of movement; hosting more than 96% of the Afghans migrants (Abbassi Shazavi and Sadeghi 2014). The Afghan flight to the neighbor countries of Iran and Pakistan continued through 1980s and 1990s. The choice of the destination country followed ethnic and religious patterns. Those Afghans who fled to Pakistan were predominantly Pashtuns from rural areas, many of whom settled in Pashtun-dominated locations in Pakistan. Afghans who moved to Iran were mostly non-Pashtuns from either Herat city or rural areas to the west, north and central region of Afghanistan. Pashtun Afghans in Pakistan mostly settled in refugee camps. In Iran, contrary to Pakistan, only less than 2.5 percent of Afghans settled in refugee camps; the majority resided among Iranians in urban areas. According to Iran’s 2006 census the majority of [documented] Afghan national are resided in urban areas (72%) with one third (32.7%) of them residing in Tehran (Saito 2009).

![Map of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan](https://afghanhindsight.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/iran-afghanistan-pakistan-map.jpg)

**Note.** Retrieved from https://afghanhindsight.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/iran-afghanistan-pakistan-map.jpg

Trends of movement between Afghanistan and Iran date further back than the instabilities of the late 1970s. Citizens of Afghanistan have historically been visiting Iran as migrant workers, pilgrims or merchants. During the late 19th century, the rise of Sunni Pashtuns in Afghanistan triggered the exodus of numerous Shi’a Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority, to Iran. In 1937, this group who had mainly settled in Iran’s north eastern province of Khorasan was officially categorized as a tribal group called Khawari (for a detailed map of Iran and its provinces see Appendix 1). From the 1960s
onwards, large numbers of Afghans sought employment in Iran. A terrible famine stuck North West of Afghanistan in 1971–1972. A combination of the severe draught in Afghanistan and the oil boom and growth in the construction industry in Iran prompted further movements to Iran. During that period thousands of Afghans lived and worked in Iran legally. Thousands of others did so without proper legal documentation. The authorities, aware of the situation, welcomed this source of cheap labor, as many Afghans worked on building sites, in brick factories and on farms for much lower wages than their Iranian counterparts (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Accordingly at the time of the 1978 coup several hundred thousand Afghans were already living in Iran as migrant workers at and remained in the country (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007).

4.3.1 IRAN AS A HOST COUNTRY; ASYLUM POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

Based on UNHCR global trends report of 2012, with close to 2.6 million refugees in 82 countries, Afghanistan has remained the leading country of origin of refugees for 32 consecutive years. On average one out of four refugees in the world originates from Afghanistan, with 95% of them located in Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly Pakistan and Iran are known identified as countries hosting the largest populations of refugees in the world; respectively hosting 1,638,500 and 868,200 refugees (UNHCR, 2012). However the exact number of Afghans refugees living in Iran is unknown. Efforts to control migration are defeated by the 1,200 km border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, the inhospitable terrain between Iran and those two countries and a very active and longstanding border trade and ethnic links between the communities on both sides of the border (Piran 2004). Official figures are only available for the registered Afghans with residence cards. In 2012 Iran’s Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant’s Affaris (BAFIA) had estimated the Afghan population in Iran to be about 3 million. 1 million Afghans out of the total of three million were considered to be registered (with a residence permit) while the other two million had no residence documents (Mrs. F. Ashrafi 2012, pers.comm. 24 June).Iran’s official statics of 2011 indicate the majority of registered Afghans in Iran live in the province of Tehran (436, 190) followed by the province of Khorasan (205, 859) which is located at the border with Afghanistan (Iran Statistical Center 2011).

In the contemporary world, having one’s human rights protected and enforced is usually dependent upon one’s status in a state (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldham 2011). Depending on their status, aliens can be granted (or denied) different rights and entitlements. These rights vary according to the state
within which the migrants find themselves, and how they are categorized or classified in those states; for example, whether they are refugees or migrant workers, and according to the state’s current policies about these groups (Portes and Borocz 1989; Sabates-Wheeler and Feldham 2011). It is therefore important to clarify the status of the Afghan population in Iran. This is not an easy task as there are many ambiguities about the status of the Afghan aliens in Iran. This condition is resulted by several trends. On one hand Iran’s refugee policies are somewhat confusing, in that they are based on the Islamic Rules of Iran and not based on the global trends of refugee policy and regulations. Furthermore, along with the country’s ideological and economical transformations, Iran’s migration/refugee polices have undergone constant and dramatic changes during the past 30 years. On the other hand, in case of the Afghan asylum-migration nexus, similar to much of the forced refugee movement in other parts of the word, it is difficult to distinguish between asylum seekers and economic migrants. In fact many migrants have multiple reasons for mobility and it is impossible to completely separate economic and human rights motivations (Ambrosini 2011; Castles 2003).

Following the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees, a “refugee” is a person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a “well-founded” fear of persecution on account of race, religion, and nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion (UNHCR 2010). Iran signed the 1951 refugee convention and its associated protocol in 1976, but the country had little experience in dealing with uprooted populations crossing its borders. Therefore the Iranian government did not develop lasting legal and social measures or a coherent protection policy to deal with refugees (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Signatories to the Convention undertake to protect refugees by allowing them to enter and granting temporary or permanent residence status (Castles 2000). The convention is a rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement. This means convention provisions are to be applied without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin, sex, age and etc. Non-penalization means that subject to specific exceptions, refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay. Most importantly the Convention contains various safeguards against the expulsion of refugees. The principle of non-refoulement is so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made to it. It provides that no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or
she fears threats to life or freedom. Finally, the Convention lays down basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees. Such rights include access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision for documentation, including a refugee travel document in passport form (UNHCR 2010). After the 1979 revolution, Iran’s commitment to granting protection to those who request political asylum was reiterated in the Islamic Republic’s constitution (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). Although Iran was a signatory to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, it did not accord Afghans the legal status of refugees, long regarding its hospitality to Afghan refugees as a religious and humanitarian duty rather than a legal obligation. Perhaps these changes can partially explain for contractions between Iranian government’s treatments of Afghan refugees and the protocols of refugee rights and protection, in particular in areas related to non-penalization, non-refoulment and provision of basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees.

The final outcome of policies taken by Iranian officials towards Afghan nationals and their settlement in Iran can be categorized into four phases, with considerable differences from one another. Policies and strategies of each phase reflect the country’s political and economical conditions during the respective time period.

### 4.3.1.1 PHASE ONE: 1979 - 1992, OPEN DOOR POLICY

The soviet coup and the consequential bigger waves of Afghan movement to Iran coincide with Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. During the 1980’s acceptance and sheltering of the Afghan refugees and migrants was as much an ideological stance as a humanitarian gesture by the Iranian state. Taking in the Muslim Afghan brethren fleeing persecution was viewed as an obligation of Iran’s Islamic state. Following Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration that “Islam knows no boarders” many Shi’a Afghan nationals fled their country and freely moved to Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al.2005; Adelkhah and Olszewka 2007; Hakimzadeh 2006; Saito 2009). While these Afghans were not officially recognized as “refugees”, they were effectively treated as refugees with access to basic health care and education and were permitted to work, although employment opportunities were mostly restricted to manual and construction labor. Such conditions were in accordance with Iran’s domestic advantage and served to fill the need for cheap manual labor which was aggravated by Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. They were also able to take advantage of subsidies on gasoline (petrol), natural gas, electricity, and food items which were at that time provided by the Iranian government. During this time, Afghans had
the opportunity to receive “Blue cards”. Blue cards were issued on a *prima facie* basis and confirmed the status of Afghans as *Mohajerin*; literally translated into migrants. However, the term *Mohajerin*, has etymological roots in *hijra*, which marked the exodus of the prophet Muhammad and companion believers from Mecca to Medina (Safri 2010), therefore rather than the term simply translating to mean migrants, in the context of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it referrers to “religious migrants” (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). Despite the simplicity of the process of receiving a “blue card” many Afghans neglected to clear their legal status and did not update their residency cards due to political pressure, especially after the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1988) when ration coupons that they had benefited from were withdrawn (Adelkhah and Olswezka 2007). During these time periods different asylum documents were in use. As can be seen in BOX 4-2 some of these documents were used to grant staying permits of different lengths. Others were used for purpose of leaving; either the country or a refugee camp.

**BOX 4-2; ASSYLUM DOCUMENTS USED DURING THE 80S AND 90S IN IRAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asylum documents granted to Afghan aliens in Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documents granting stay</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These documents grant Afghan aliens a permit to stay in the country under different legal status and terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee booklet</strong>: this, in continuation of a pre-1979 practice, is granted to Iraqi Kurds and to well-connected Afghans. The booklet, renewed every three months, is the only document that uses the term “refugee”. It also provides the holder with an alien’s passport for travel abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent card</strong>: this is issued to Afghans and Iraqis (blue for Afghans, green for Iraqis) and describes the holder as a <em>mohajer</em> (migrant) or as someone who is on the move for religious reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temporary card</strong>: issued to about 530,000 individuals in 1995 through UNHCR intervention, this card legalized the status of undocumented Afghans with a view to assisting their eventual repatriation (In 1996, the card was declared no longer valid and the holders were identified as illegal aliens).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documents granting leave</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These documents are issued for the purpose of granting leave to the Afghan aliens either from the country or from a refugee camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laissez-passes</strong>: Documents issued and valid for a one-way journey out of Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leave permits</strong>: Documents that grant leave from refugee camps for a certain period of time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Based on Ashrafi and Moghissi (2002)

The application of “group status determination” to the mass of Afghan refugees, and the government’s decision not to involve the UNHCR in their protection reflected the Islamic Republic’s ideological outlook in the 1980s. Iran, then, neither requested nor permitted the UNHCR to register Afghan refugees. As a result Iranian government managed to reserve for itself unilateral control over
the refugee situation and the lives of refugees (Ashrafi and Moghissi 2002). However, by the late 1990s, Iran had largely given up an ideological project that revolved around the mimicking of the Iranian Revolution, and moved on to other macro political actions, such as emerging as the leading donor at the Tokyo International Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan in 2002 (Safri 2010).

4.3.1.2 PHASE 2: 1992-2000, REPATRIATION STRATEGIES

The number of refugees in Iran and Pakistan climbed steadily throughout the 1980s until it peaked in 1991 with three million refugees in Iran, according to the Iranian government’s estimates. During this time, in the early 1990s, particularly after the fall of the communist government of Najibullah in 1992 and Iran’s shifting domestic economic and social concerns such as unemployment, Afghans began to be harassed by Iranian law enforcement authorities.

In 1993, the mood towards refugees shifted and the Afghan Mohajerin in Iran were newly and officially articulated as Panahandegan; a word implying impoverishment (Safri 2010). During this time period repatriation strategies were highly favored by Iranian officials. In order to achieve those goals, various measures were taken including the implementation of difficult procedures for renewing refugee papers, refusal to register newly arriving Afghans as refugees, and, increasingly, denial of public services to recognized refugees (HRW 2013a). By withdrawing health services, primary and secondary education, restricting refugees to designated residential areas and refugee camps and preventing them from opening bank accounts or owning businesses Iran sought to make life increasingly difficult for the Afghan population (Safri 2010). Even holders of Blue cards who were legally entitled to residence and social benefits began to have their ID cards confiscated in conjunction with the repatriation program. Eventually some of the Afghans whose cards were confiscated returned to Afghanistan and the rest received a temporary permit, valid for a month, which was not supposed to be renewed. In some cases, the temporary permits could be renewed for a substantial fee, but only for a month at a time (HRW 2013a). Regardless of these measure Afghans continually entered Iran throughout this period, and do so to the current date.

4.3.1.3 PHASE 3: 2000-2003; SEALED BORDERS FOR AFGHANISTAN

In 2001, the Iranian government announced that it had sealed its border with Afghanistan and that it was practically impossible [for Iran] to accept new refugees. All Afghans who have arrived in Iran after 2001 were considered to be “illegal” immigrants by the Iranian authorities based on the justification that Afghanistan was a country with a lawfully elected government and that Afghans
therefore did not need protection (Safri 2010). Accordingly Iranian authorities do not assess the protection needs of Afghans who have arrived since 2001. At a meeting in Tehran in November 2010, UNHCR stated that it does not have a mandate to work with this group and cannot officially conduct assessments of whether Afghans who contact the organization meet the conditions pursuant to the UN Refugee Convention (HRW 2013a).

4.3.1.4 PHASE 4: 2003- PRESENT, AMAYESH SCHEME AND RE-REGISTRATION

In 2003 new attempts to facilitate repatriation and refugee management were carried out by Iran’s Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants’ Affairs (BAFIA). These registration exercises known as Amayesh (Farsi for logistics or preparation) largely intended to facilitate repatriation and refugee management by standardizing refugee statuses. The aim of this scheme was to re-register all Afghan nationals then in Iran who had been granted residency rights in Iran based on their Afghan nationality in the 1980s and 1990s (HRW 2013a). Since 2003, UNHCR has officially recognized Amayesh card holders to be registered refugees. This means that the cardholder refugees cannot be terminated by Iranian government without a good reason. Despite UNHCR’s view, there are still confusions about the status of Amayesh cardholders among Iranian officials. While some officials are of the idea that Amayesh card holders cannot be considered refugees under Iranian law, others have specifically referred to card holders as refugees (HRW 2013a). At the same time the vast majority of Afghans arriving in Iran since the registration exercise in 2003 have not been allowed to register for an Amayesh card (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007).

Amayesh card-holders face an increasingly complex and bureaucratic process with the Iranian authorities to retain their status, in which the smallest mistake can result in the permanent loss of refugee status. Frequent re-registration requirements, a lack of assistance to help understand procedures which particularly affect people with limited literacy and onerous fees which many poor refugees cannot afford are some examples of difficulty of the process. The cards, which refugees must pay for, are generally valid for one year. When cards expire, the card holder is considered to be unlawfully present in Iran and may be deported. If a card holder fails to register for a new card as soon as the old card has expired, he or she becomes undocumented and is subject to deportation (HRW 2013a).

The Amayesh plan only covers those Afghans who had entered Iran in the 80’s and held a “Blue card”. In 2011 the Comprehensive Regularization Plan (CRP) is introduced by the Iranian
government. This scheme enables the irregular Afghans to obtain a residence visa. The holders of a valid visa can also obtain a work permit. This regularization process; which has been taken up by many Afghans, also has its own difficulties and dilemmas. In total acquiring the proper documents is both expensive and logistically difficult for many Afghans. In order to obtain the visa, Afghan nationals are required to have a valid Afghan passport; either in the form of a family passport (for those Afghan nationals who are married and live in Iran with their family) or an individual passport (for single Afghan men living in Iran). The application process for obtaining a family passport can be done through the Afghan embassy in Iran. In order to obtain an individual passport, however, single Afghan men need to obtain an exit permit, go to Afghanistan and apply for the passport there. Similar to Amayesh cards, the residence visa needs to be renewed regularly (every 6 months) and the renewal process is costly and expensive (HRW 2013a, LandInfo 2011). No particular framework seems to be considered for Afghan women.

Researchers have noted that the attempts by Iran - and also Pakistan to complete repatriation efforts ultimately rely on the false premise that this historical and contemporary movement of Afghans can indeed be stopped (Safri 2010). In truth however, this is highly unlikely to happen. On the first place Afghan migration regime has not simply been one outward flow of migrants, but rather multiple flows both in and out of the country. Especially after 2002, many Afghans who had repatriated back to Afghanistan returned back to Iran this time with economic incentives. Among those Afghans who returned back to Iran, a substantial amount came in as irregular migrants. From a general point of view clandestine movement emerges out of the clash between attempts to enforce borders by receiving states and the mutually supportive forces of migrant motivations, their network and employer demand for low-wage labor in host societies (Portes 2007). From a more particular point Ambrosini explains how, in the Italian context, the continuation of irregular migration can be explained through the tension between the country’s political sovereignty and the market requirements (2008). To some extent, this condition can be seen in the case of Iran as well. Afghans provide cheap man power for menial labor that otherwise Iranians are not willing to take over. As a consequence Afghans are the dominant work force in some of the low skilled occupations. An interesting and ironic example is seen in the aftermaths of Iran’s 2003 Bam earth quake. The earthquake has been among the deadliest phenomena in Iran’s recent disaster history as well as globally. During post-event aid and rescue activities, the municipality of Bam had to turn to Afghan well-diggers (moqanni) for searching under the debris, as this profession seemed to have
disappeared among the working Iranian population. While the case of Bam might be an exception in being a most extreme condition, as a rule the essential part in unskilled labor in the cities is played by immigrant labor, and it is now rather unimaginable that Iranians might one day take over these tasks. This is equally true of agriculture and animal husbandry. Livestock herding, pistachio shelling, and removing the stamens of saffron are entrusted to Afghan families, as is the production of prayer beads, which is attaining industrial proportions at pilgrimage sites (Adelkhah and Olszewka 2007). These conditions point towards the fact the underpaid Afghan labor force has become an indispensable to many sectors of the Iranian economy. Not only Afghans in Iran work more houses with fewer earnings, but also they are not provided with safety measures and especially a working insurance. A working insurance and safety measures at the workplace are often perceived as external costs for the employers to be reduced by hiring Afghans. As it has been seen in other countries clandestine employment, especially in the case of immigrants who cannot claim any rights because they are irregular, offers considerable cost savings and so helps to put the public finances back on track (Ambrosini 2008). This can explain the reason that presumably all municipalities, despite the regulations, employ Afghans for rubbish collection, gardening, and the maintenance of public roads through subcontracting to private companies which are relatively less subject to controls despite the recent increase and the tightening of regulations (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007). The demand for Afghan workforce is complemented by the importance of remittances in lives of Afghans. Remittances are largely sent through the informal and paperless hawala system; a system of money transfer based on trust relationships between distant brokers. Therefore the total quantity of remittances is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in the Afghan context (Safri 2010).

4.3.2 AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN; SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Afghans have lived in Iran for more than two decades and contributed much to its economy; however there is a clear divide between the Afghans and the main Iranian society. Lack of integration of Afghans into the Iranian society is caused by a mixture of legal and social practices and attitudes (Afshari and Moghossi 2002; HRW 2013a; Olszewka 2008). In total, Afghans in Iran live precarious lives (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007; Justice for Iran 2012). Socio-legal discrimination towards Afghans can be seen through various aspects of their daily lives. Iran and Afghanistan are two countries with many commonalities as well as differences. The shared traits are mainly resulted by the two countries intertwined historical background. The differences are a result of the current
states of each country, in regards to developmental and modernization level. These trends are in
turn a function of the wider political economy. The final outcome of the similarities and differences on lives of Afghan in Iran is an important factor in explaining the interactions of social relations and power structures at various levels in lives of Afghans in Iran.

Being new in the destination country, is an important time reference in lives of migrants. Newly arrived migrants are often unfamiliar with the new environment of the host country and have problems in acquiring adequate housing or entering the labor market (Wang et al. 2010). Socio-cultural determinates of vulnerability are highly visible in lives of newly arrived migrants. They are faced with Language barriers, different cultural and religious backgrounds and also different values and priorities are common factors that make the transition even more difficult for the migrants and can lead to initial downward mobility (Papademetriou et al. 2009). Contrary to common trends of international movement, Afghan’s in Iran do not face many of cultural and linguistic obstacles. Iran and Afghanistan share commonalities in regards to language, religion and culture. An important example is the Nowruz festival, which is the celebration of [Persian] New Year at the beginning of spring. Originating from ancient Persian Empire, currently Nowruz –literally meaning new day- is practiced in Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and some other countries in central Asia. Literature, mainly manifested in the form of poetry, is another bonding aspect between the two countries. Iran has a long history of well-known poets and poetry is well intertwined with lives of people. The same applies to Afghanistan which shares much of this history with Iran. Accordingly poetry (both oral and written) has a long tradition in Afghanistan. To the extent that literature is claimed to be the most prominent art form among Shi’a Afghans in Iran (Olszewka 2007; 2008). The cultural commonalities between the two countries go beyond classic forms of art and literature and extend into popular forms of music and also literature. Afghanistan is a market for Iranian publishers, with 95% of the books in Afghanistan book market coming from Iran (IRNA 5 May 2014). These shared literary values derive from the shared language between the two countries. The Farsi Persian of Iran and Dari Persian of Afghanistan are two different dialects of the Persian language. Nevertheless Afghans distinct way of speaking distinguishes them as “non-Iranian” as and more than often initiates a discriminatory behavior. Dialectal variation between Farsi and Dari has been described as analogous to that between European French and Canadian French (Iran Chamber Society n.d).The yellow color in .

MAP 4-2 indicates the prevalence and distribution of Persian dialects of Farsi, Dari and Tadjik.
‘Dari’ along with ‘Pashto’ are the two official languages in Afghanistan. Dari is spoken by the majority of Shi’a Afghans, while Pashto is more widespread among those Afghans of the Suni faith. Iran’s official religion is Islam and Shi’ism is the prevailing faith followed along with a small percentage (5-10%) the Sunni faith (CIA Factbook 2014). The majority of Afghan’s who move to Iran are also of the Shi’a faith of Islam. Shared religion is another important commonality between the two countries. The impotence of religious beliefs is visible through Iran’s post revolutionary open door strategy towards the “Muslim brothers” in Afghanistan (see 4.3.1.1). Sunni groups and Pashtuns on the other hand, have migrated to Pakistan, which is a predominantly Sunni country (Abbsi Shavazi and Sadeghi 2014; Saito 2009).

Afghanistan is a multi ethnic country with strong tribal relations as well as ethnically based rivalries (Ahmed-Gosh 2003). Afghan’s in Iran are mainly from the Hazare ethnicity (47%), followed by Tajiks at (30%), Pashtuns at (13%), and small numbers of Baluch, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and others making up for the remaining 10% of the Afghan population. Among these groups Hazara people are most distinct from Iranians due to their Central Asian features. Those Hazara’s that live in rural areas speak ‘Hazaragi’. ‘Hazaragi’ is a dialect of Dari, and while it is ineligible for Dari speakers in Afghanistan, for a Farsi speaker it is difficult to follow this dialect.
Iran and Afghanistan might be neighbor countries with shared land borders and a long history of cultural exchange, but in regards to levels of development and modernization they are far different from one another. Afghanistan is a country of approximately 23 million which, after three years of severe drought, thirty years of war and devastation and five years under the Taliban authorities, has been left as one of the poorest countries in the world. The Human Development Report of 2013 (UNDP 2013) puts Afghanistan among countries with low HGI. With a Human Development Index of 0.374, Afghanistan is positioned it at 175 out of 185 countries. Iran on the other hand, is among counties with high HDI, with Human Development Index of 0.742 and ranks 72 among 185 countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index (HDI)</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>(GNI) Gross national income per capita</th>
<th>GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Iran (IRI)</td>
<td>0.742</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>10.695</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. UNDP (2013)*

Iran is classified by the World Bank as a middle income country while Afghanistan is emphatically a low income nation. Income levels are more than 10 times higher in Iran (Hugo et al. 2012). Thus despite the limited range of jobs available to Afghans, Afghan national who work in Iran manage to have higher wages compared to what they would have earned back in Afghanistan. Many of the Afghan male labor migrants send remittances back home to their families.

Afghanistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. After three decades of war and the extremes of the Taliban regime, the education sector in Afghanistan has been beset with severe problems. Despite improvements over the last decade, education levels remain very low in Afghanistan. Only 28.7% of the population over 15 years old is able to read and write (Hugo et al. 2012). Compared to Afghan men, women have a much lower level of educational attainment. Only 5-8% of the female population over the age of 25 has secondary level education. The workforce in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly agricultural and low-skilled (Hugo et al. 2012). Accordingly the Afghan nationals who move to Iran also have lower rates of educational attainments. Following the normal trends of migration, lower rates of literacy could limit Afghan’s range of occupational options. In the current conditions however, Afghans choices in the labor market are extremely restricted by Iran’s labor policies. The jobs available to Afghans are different types of low skilled and menial labor. They
do not require any educational skills at all. Nevertheless Afghans’ lower levels of educational attainment can make their transition into the Iranian society more difficult.

Compared to Afghanistan Iran has higher levels of development and a long history of modernization, with most of its population residing in urban areas. Concentration of higher portions of the population in urban settings resulted in a shift in the economic sector. The workforce in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly agricultural and low-skilled (Hugo et al. 2012). Contrary to Afghanistan, agriculture constitutes only a small portion (23/4%) of Iran’s work force while the majority of the employed population works in the service sector (44.8%) and the industry (31.8%) (Iran Statistical Center 2011). Compared to Afghanistan, literacy rates are much higher in Iran. Adult literacy rate is 85% (2012) for the whole population and 89.3% and 80.07% for male and females respectively (UNICEF 2013a; CIA Factbook 2014). Same applies to levels of educational attainment. Women in particular are highly represented in higher education. As of 2011, Iran’s population percentage with of people with higher educational level (university level) was 18.2% for men and 18.4% for women (Iran Statistical Center 2011). Women are active in the cultural and social scenes. Higher rates of educational level for Iranian women are followed by a shift of values for Iranian women. Accordingly young educated girls are actively seeking jobs. However still the rate of unemployment is much higher for women compared to for men (Ezazi 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social and demographic indicators</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population in Millions (2011)</td>
<td>25.99</td>
<td>75.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population living below national poverty line</td>
<td>36.0 (2008)</td>
<td>18.7 (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Urban population</td>
<td>23.5 (2011)</td>
<td>69.1 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total adult literacy rate age 15 and over</td>
<td>28.1 (2000)</td>
<td>85 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (deaths/1,000 live births)</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (Children/Woman)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Modern contraceptive prevalence rate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of births attended by skilled birth attendants</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data collected from UNFPA (2010); UNFPA (2011); Iran Statistical Center (2011); Hugo et al (2012); CIA fact book (2014)

As can be seen in Table 4-3, there are marked differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of the two countries. With a birth rate of 48 and a death rate of 22, Afghanistan is among very few countries in Asia which is in the pre-transitional stage with respect to population dynamics (Moghadas et al. 2007). During the early 80’s Iran’s population increased by double. The Baby boom was followed by a period of population control and family planning. Thus since the 90’s the fertility
level of Iranian women; particularly those living in large urban centers such as Tehran, decreased to a very low level. In fact Iran is known as a family planning success story. The country’s dramatic decline in fertility from an average of 7 lifetime births per woman in 1986 has now reached replacement level at 1.96 nationally, with only a minimal gap between urban and rural areas (UNFPA 2012). Contraceptive use has increased to about 75 percent with very minimal differences between urban and rural women. Sterilization methods are very popular among all classes as a method of preventing more pregnancies (Moghadas et al. 2007). Conditions in Afghanistan are much different from those of Iran. Current total fertility rates are 6.3 children born per women (UNFPA 2011). It is suggested that Afghan women have very high fertility level as they marry young and continue to have children through the end of reproductive period (Moghadas et al. 2007). Women are expected to become pregnant immediately after marriage. Delay in pregnancy decreases the woman’s position in her home and might lead to accusations of sterility from her husband and his family. Sterility is a common excuse for men to marry another women (Piran 2004) Contraceptive use is very rare and except for a small portion of women, cultural and social barriers are the only instrumentation for preventing pregnancies (Moghadas et al. 2007).

The differences between the two countries also exist in regards to family formation and household structure. The legal age of marriage is very low in both Iran and Afghanistan. In fact the Iranian law allows for marriage of girls and boys at an earlier age than that of Afghanistan; 13 for girls and 15 for boys in Iran as compared to 16 for girls and 18 for boys in Afghanistan. Despite the legal differences the Afghan costume allows for younger Afghans girls to marry; or be forced to marry (UNICEF 2007).

In Iran, over the past decades the average age for getting married has increased to 23.4 for women and 26.7 for men (Iran Statistical center 2011). The household size has also shown a reduction to 3.6 persons per household (UNFPA 2012). While traditionally arranged marriages still exist in Iran, most young people tend to marry their peers and based on their own choice. On the contrary, Afghanistan’s traditional society has highly shaped its family structure. Average age of marriage is very low in Afghanistan. By 2002, 54 per cent of girls under the age of 18 were reported to be married. Arranged marriages are very common and so are forced engagement and marriages. In fact According to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, between 60-80 per cent of all marriages in Afghanistan are forced (HRW 2013b; UNFPA 2011,).

These differences can be explained through the institution of marriage and its expected outcomes in Iran and Afghanistan’s socio-cultural environments. Gender roles are one important example of
these differences. Afghanistan is a country with powerful ethnic and tribal relations. Throughout the Afghan history tribal and community leaders have had the power to define women’s role in the society while strongly resisting any modernization that would influence their patriarchal authority (Ahmed- Gush 2003). As a result tribe and family are significant identifiers of Afghan women.

The institution of marriage is central to the social lives of Afghans. Decisions and practices of marriage among Afghans are not only the result of desires and ideals but are also dependent on economic and social needs and strategies. More than being an agreement between the couple, marriage is viewed as a mechanism for both procreation and social reproduction. This is particularly important as ethnic and tribal power structures and rivalry are influential factors in Afghanistan political scene. The impact on women has been especially harsh, since women’s lives have often been used as the raw material with which to establish ethnic prominence (Ahmed-Gosh 2003). Therefore the process of marriage consists of agreements based on negotiation between two families, or in the examples of marriage among relatives, members of the same family (Smith 2009).

Afghan parents then are those in charge of their daughters –and son’s- marriage age and often they decide for the earlier ages, if the opportunities come for the children’s marriage. In many cases the decision behind the early age of marriage can be resulted by fear of an unknown future and insecurity, or concerns about sexual deviance of their children. Nevertheless practical issues such as needing the “bride price” (for the family of the bride) or the need to have a daughter-in-law in the house to do the domestic work (for the family of the groom) have an important role in decisions behind marriages in the Afghan networks (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012).

Marriage patterns in Iran show visible differences with those in Afghanistan. During the 60’s and 80’s the institution of marriage in the Iranian society endured a visible transformation. These changes were in accordance with the urban lifestyles, higher educational levels and economic independence of the younger generations. Until then –similar to the current trend in Afghanistan-marriage was a strategy for strengthening the economic, political and social needs of the two families. Known as the “traditional” marriage pattern, the views and preferences of the families were prior to personal feelings and emotions of those who were to marry one another. The societal changes resulted in marriage being viewed as a choice between the couple and a means of uniting them, as opposed to the families (Ezazi 2011, pp. 99-100). It can be seen the traditional marriage –seen through the decision making power of families-has lost its popularity in Iran. However it should be mentioned that while marriage is increasingly turning into a personal choice of the couple, still
some attributes of the traditional marriage, such as “Mehriye”- the money the bride asks for from the groom- are still prevalent (Ezazi 2011, pp. 55-56).

4.3.2.1 LIVES OF AFGHANS IN IRAN; SOCIO-CULTURAL DETERMINANTS

While on a University-sponsored ‘public health tour’ of Iran, I asked officials, physicians, health workers, and people on the streets: “What’s the biggest health problem facing Iran?” Overwhelmingly, the answer was “Too Many Afghans.” (Tober 2007)

While Afghans are undoubtedly a part of the social landscape in Iran, they continue to suffer both legal and social discrimination, disdain, and racism, often stirred up by populist forces seeking to link them to high unemployment figures (Afshari and Moghossi 2002; Olszewka 2008; Saito 2009). Racial discrimination against immigrant populations is a common phenomenon in many recipient societies, and it has often been noted that religious, linguistic and cultural affinities between the migrants and the people of the host country are no guarantee against institutional discrimination and overt and covert prejudice (Afshari and Moghossi 2002). Despite all the similarities in backgrounds, there is little memory of the two nations' shared history, cultural heritage, and language among many Iranians. Instead, there is a growing sense of exclusionary nationalism (Olszewka 2008). Discriminatory and racist behavior against Afghans is manifested in various forms. It can range from Iranian national’s attitudes to their behavior in regards to Afghan aliens. Afghans are blamed for drug smuggling, crime, and the entry of infectious diseases into Iran. The derogatory term “Afghani” (implying lack of culture, understanding and manners) is often used in social encounters with Afghans and more recently as a degrading term for non-Afghans as well. Such discriminatory behavior is especially evident in case of Hazare Afghans (constituting the majority of Afghans in Iran), who’s central Asian phenotype looks distinctly different from the Iranian features (Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi 2014; Olszewka 2008; Saito 2009). As a result of such treatment Afghan aliens have developed a tendency to keep a lower profile in public.

Discriminatory and derogatory attitudes are also visible through the country’s media such as newspaper articles. Table 4-4 shows a few of the news titles related to Afghans in 2014. All these articles have been published in Iranian newspapers related to the government or in favor of the government. These examples are just a sample of the common image of Afghans portrayed by the media. In particular the media coverage of Afghans tends to deal with three main issues; Afghans as criminals, Afghans and illegal residents and the economic threat of Afghans as cheap labor force.
It is interesting that in all these three criteria, “Afghans” automatically refer to Afghan men while Afghan women are completely invisible in the media portrayal of Afghans. The only instances in which the media pays attention to households and families related to Afghans are cases of Afghan men marrying Iranian women. Such news often implies the threat of mixed marriages and los of Iranian culture do to Afghan men marrying Iranian women.

Besides unfavorable treatment by the public and negative framing through the media, in the past years several instances of racism against Afghans have been direct consequences of decisions and actions of high Iranian officials. Particularly important were two events in 2012 which caused waves of protest from the public. The first was denying Afghan nationals entry into a park in Isfahan during an Iranian national holiday on the basis of “maintaining the welfare of the Iranian citizens” and “to preserve security of the families”. The second was announcement of Mazandaran province- one of the two northern provinces of Iran and a highly popular seaside destination- as off limits to Afghans on the basis of “ maintaining the touristic image of the province” (Justice for Iran 2012). The director of the Bureau of Alien and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA) office in Mazandaran Province called…
this decision a “cleansing” process. He stated that “today, existence of Afghans is considered to be threat for the province of Mazandaran” (BAFIA 2012).

### 4.3.2.2 LIVES OF AFGHANS IN IRAN; LEGISLATIONS, RIGHTS AND PERMITS

Socio-cultural elements described in the previous section can explain for the social aspects of the marginalization that Afghans face in Iran. The legal aspects can be explained through spatial and socio-cultural determinants of vulnerability. These elements cover restrictive legislation as well as institutional constraints for migrants in the host country (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003; Wang et al 2010; Wisner et al 2004). These are the conditions that impact the daily lives of Afghans in Iran the most and can be seen as indicators of marginality (Wisner et al. 1993). This happens through the ways in which legal constraints limit migrant's access levels to basic services; such as health care and education, as well as income and social opportunities and thus eventually increase their levels of vulnerability.

For Afghan residents of Iran, possession of a residence permit sets the line for entitlement to basics rights and services. In theory, registered Afghan “refugees” enjoy widespread social benefits, including access to free education, adult literacy training, health care, and employment (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007; Hugo et al. 2012; Justice for Iran 2012). In practice, however, the conditions are different. Due to Iran’s shifting policies, claiming asylum or obtaining a regular and registered status is already an over complicated procedure. In addition to difficulties in claiming such status, Afghan refugees, asylum seekers, and others lawfully present in Iran face severe restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as arbitrary limits on access to education, employment, Iranian citizenship, and marriage rights (Adelkhah and Olswezka 2007; HRW 2013a).

All Afghans and other foreign nationals are subject to travel restrictions in many areas of the country. Out of 31 provinces of Iran, 17 are off limits to Afghan nationals; regardless of their status (ISNA 11 Aug 2013; Sazman e Amoozesh va Sanjesh Keshvar 2012) Iranian law prevents Afghan nationals who do not hold an Iranian Identification card, valid passport, visa and work permit from buying or selling land, enjoying socialized governmental healthcare, opening a bank account, registering a cell phone, or any other activity that requires official registration (HRW 2013a; Justice for Iran 2012). Property ownership is an important indicator of vulnerability in urban settings and an important component of coping strategies. A 2009 survey on socio-economic status of Afghan
households in Iran reveals that the majority of households (83%) live in rented houses with only 7% of the households having their own accommodation (Wickramasekara et al. 2009).

### 4.3.2.3 AFGHANS INTEGRATION IN LABOR MARKET

Exclusionary processes often cause the irregular migrant to become further marginalized over time, prone to exploitation and discrimination leading to a spiral into poverty. In order to provide economic safety and improvements in livelihoods for themselves and their families for the long time, migrants may be willing to endure the temporary undermining of their capabilities and rights (Sabates-Wheeler 2009). Afghans in Iran are no exception to this. As a rule Afghan’s supply low-cost, low skilled labor in a narrow range of sectors. Most Afghans are employed without any written contract or any type of work related benefits such as accident, unemployment and retirement insurance. Even those Afghans in possession of an Amayesh card do not have the same access to health insurance and unemployment benefits as Iranian citizens (Hugo et al. 2012; LandInfo 2012; Wickramasekara et al. 2009). In an International Labor Organization (ILO) study on situation of Afghan workers in Iran, Wickramasekara found that less than 3% of the Afghan employees had written contracts, 77% had only an oral contract, and the remaining 20% had no clear defined contract. More than 99% of Afghan employees did not have any type of work-related insurance (accident, unemployment and retirement insurance) and only 5% were entitled to paid annual or sick leave (2006). The same research showed that compared to Iranian workers, Afghans’ work hours are around 10% longer, but they earn about 12-20% less. Lack of employment authorization and exclusion from the formal sector are largely responsible for the evident lack of upward mobility in employment despite Afghans length of stay (Hugo et al. 2012; Wickramasekara et al. 2009).

As of 2008 Registered Afghan refugees were entitled to apply for temporary work permits. But acquiring work permits is difficult for many because it is expensive and the Iranian government has not consistently and freely issued them in recent years. Since 2008 until 2013 the price of temporary work permit for a registered Afghan refugee has shown a seven fold increase (HRW 2013a ; LandInfo 2012). These cards are issued on a temporary basis and permit Afghan workers to be employed in 14 provinces of Iran and in narrowly defined occupational fields. The policies followed by the government for much of the period 1980 to 1992, had already effectively restricted Afghans to low skilled occupations. These restrictions have increased in recent years (Wickramasekara 2006). Currently Afghans are permitted to work within four occupational categories. These include brickwork, construction work, and agriculture and a fourth group titled ‘other’ including a mix of
jobs in relation to waste disposal (BAFIA 2013). Job examples from all four categories include: plaster manufacture, making acid for batteries, well digging, mining, brick making, laying asphalt and concrete, herding sheep, tinning and leather making, slaughtering animals, burning garbage, loading and unloading trucks, stone cutting, road building and farming (HRW 2013a).

The introduction and implementation of the job permit / worker’s card seems to be done with considerations for only Male Afghan workers. There seems to be no contemplation about working rights for Afghan females, nor does it seem to be an issue of concern to policy makers. Accordingly there seem to be very few resources dealing with working permits of Afghan women. Only in one instance during a 2009 press release Iran’s deputy minister of labor announced that Afghan women are not entitled with the right to work. The press release dealt with penalties for Iranian employees who would hire Afghan workers “illegally”. In this context, the deputy minister announced that “Afghan women are not given permission to work. In order to hire Afghan women domestic work [in Iranian households], they must have a work permit. As Afghan women are not permitted to work in Iran, hiring them for domestic work is illegal” (BBC 9 May 2009; Jam e Jam 9 May 2009). This is one of the fewer instances in which Iranian officials talk about Afghan women. It is interesting to see that the deputy minister views domestic work as the only possible occupation for Afghan women.

4.3.2.4 BASIC SERVICES; EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE

Educational attainments, especially for the second generation migrants are an important indicator of upward social mobility. The national policies have created many obstacles regarding education for Afghans in Iran. These restrictions are a measure of internal control and are in accordance with Iran’s repatriation policies. Registered Afghan children are entitled to public schooling in Iran, nevertheless they face numerous limitations. Children of undocumented Afghans are not allowed to enroll in state-run schools at all. Since 2004 Afghan students are asked for paying a mandatory extra fee for attending school (Wickramasekara et al. 2009). The high tuition fees are reported to be an important reason why many of the Amayesh-registered children do not go to school (LandInfo, 2012). Registered Afghans also can take attend Iranian universities. They are however required to give up their refugee status prior to entering university and are barred from a variety of degree programs (HRW 2013a). After completing their education, they forfeit their refugee status and are required to return to their home country (LandInfo 2012).
Beside these restrictions, there seems to be arbitrary rules and regulations regarding subject matters and types of schools that Afghan students can attend. In July 2011 the Director of International Affairs of the Ministry of Education announced that Afghan students were not allowed to attend three types of schools. These include schools specialized for highly talented students (enrolled on a basis of IQ tests), High quality public schools, and vocational arts and technical schools. The latter type of schools, offers an easy path to the university. Afghan students enrolled in Iranian schools are also banned from participation in official sports and scientific competitions, nationally and internationally (Jamejam online 2011). Deliberate exclusion of Afghan students from high quality education results in educational segregation between Afghan and Iranian nationals and can impact further opportunities of Afghan students. Iran’s educational system, especially for higher education, is highly competitive and one’s educational background plays an important factor in admission to universities. Banning Afghan students from participating in sports events and competitions, is not only unfair to them, but also highlights the racial differences at the school environment and will further encourage racial discrimination.

Afghans have developed different strategies to compensate for the lack of educational provision. One of such alternatives is the schools run by international NGOs or educational provision organized by the Afghans themselves (LandInfo 2012). The self administered schools (Madares e khod garden) were established in 1996 with the closing of primary schools for Afghan children (most of whom were born in Iran). These schools were held by Afghans and for Afghan students. In 2006–2008, the self regulatory schools came under attack by the Ministry of Education and the Bureau of Alien and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA), which ordered the closing of the schools as part of a state effort to pressure refugees to return to Afghanistan (Safri 2010).

Limited access to health care is one form of the internal controls applied by the governments to combat the unwanted waves of migration (Ambrosini 2008). Afghans in Iran have a very restricted access to health care services. A 2009 UN report reveals that “the majority of Afghan refugees refrained from going to hospitals due to financial problems; resulting in the gradual spread of chronic diseases” (as cited in LandInfo 2012, p. 9). Registered Afghans can obtain health insurance and thereafter have access to public health services. However Health insurance is expensive and it only covers 80% of the expenses in the event of illness or injury. As a rule, those who do not have insurance must pay the full cost of treatment themselves. Unregistered Afghans do not have the
right to obtain health insurance (LandInfo 2012). Exclusion from health services not only is against basic humanitarian values, but also is against hygiene considerations.

4.3.2.5 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY FORMATION

Afghan citizens cannot marry each other pursuant to Iranian law, regardless of whether or not they are registered. Marriages between Afghan citizens will thus not be registered in public marriage records. Nor, as a result, will Afghan married couples be able to obtain documentation from the Iranian authorities that they have entered into marriage. Afghans in Iran are often married by a mullah. Afghan Foreign Service missions in Iran can issue confirmation of a marriage between Afghan citizens (LandInfo 2012).

Exclusionary policies against Afghans also cover Iranian-Afghan relationships. Marriages between Iranians and Afghans are relatively unusual. There are little statistics that can determine the extent of such marriages. But it seems to follow the general pattern of Iranian woman and Afghan man forming the mixed couple. The occurrence of mixed couples between an Iranian man and Afghan woman seem to be much less frequent. The Iranian government views inter-racial marriages between Iranian women and Afghan men as a point of concern and has made it difficult for many mixed Iranian/Afghan couples to marry. The situation of children from intermarriages between Iranian women and Afghan men – while not the focus of this research- is a concerning conditions that implies multiple paths of exclusion and discrimination. The least to say this condition is a great violation of the rights of children.

Currently marriage between an Iranian women and non-Iranian man –regardless of nationality- is subject to acquiring governmental permissions. In any case Iranian law denies citizenship to Afghan husbands of Iranian women, and creates barriers to citizenship for the children of such couples. Consequently the children of an Iranian woman and an Afghan man will not receive an Iranian ID card. If the Afghan fathers lack an Iranian residence permit, these children would be considered irregular. On the contrary, Iranian men can easily marry women from any nationalities and religions. Based on Iran’s Civil Code a foreign woman who marries an Iranian man acquires Iranian citizenship. Any children of such a married couple will be Iranian citizens with the rights pertaining thereto (HRW a 2013; LandInfo 2012). In practice however, at times this procedure also proves to be more complicated.
4.4 SECTION TWO: PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

The empirical findings gathered through the interviews will build upon the secondary data collected through the literature review of various sources. The data collected through the secondary sources gives a picture of the lives of Afghans in Iran in relation to their rights and entitlements as well as their image and portrayal in Iranian society. In other words, the secondary data helps to gain an understanding of the ways state and societal level societal relations and structures influence daily lives of Afghans in Iran. The primary data seek to understand the how macro and meso level structures interact with the intra-household relations of the sample group; afghan Women and girls. The outcomes of such interactions will be used to draw a picture of everyday life conditions for Afghan women and girls. Intra-household relations are a good point of entry for understanding how the variable “gender” (viewed through the household’s gender relations, roles and responsibilities) interacts with the variable “migrant status” (viewed through the migrant’s rights and entitlements). Eventually the secondary and primary data in combination will be applied to the theoretical framework of the research to explore progression of vulnerability in daily lives of Afghan women. Thereafter, the results will be used for assessing differential vulnerability and coping capacity of Afghan households in case of an earthquake.

4.4.1 COLLECTION OF DATA; PRIMARY SOURCES

The primary data of the research were collected in two phases. Initial interviews were conducted with informants during the summer of 2012 in Tehran. The information gathered through these interviews served as an outline in understanding important issues in relation to the research topic and selection of the research location. Also these interviews aimed sketching a basis for conditions of women and girls in Tehran, regardless of their nationality. These interviews were conducted with the informants in person and in Tehran. The informants contacted in the first phase include Professor Shahla Ezazi, Professor Guiti Etemad; Fateme Ashrafi as well as a social worker whose name is disclosed for privacy reasons. They were selected based on their knowledge, authority and experience in topics related to this research.

Dr. Ezazi is a sociologist and a well known figure in Iranian gender studies. She is the director of the women’s studies group at the Iranian Sociological Association. Interviews with her, as well as my
personal assistance to her for translating and formatting some of her seminar presentations into English provide much of the data used for daily life conditions of women in Iran.

Dr. Etemad is a prominent architect who has a long history of working with vulnerable urban fabric in Tehran, and leads urban renewal projects. She follows the idea that urban matters should not be seen separate from people living in the urban area, and thus applies a social perspective to her urban projects. One deep interview was conducted with her in her office in Tehran. The collected information was used as a basis for understanding Tehran’s earthquake scenarios; socio-economic structure of the city and relations between “vulnerable urban fabric” and the “vulnerable populations” residing in those areas. Such data then served as a starting point in understanding the human-environment relations in particular case of Tehran.

Fateme Ashrafi is a member of board of trustees at the Association for Protection of Refugee Women and Children (HAMI). Based on the organization’s definition HAMI is a non-governmental volunteer organization, however it works in partnership with Iran’s Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affair (BAFIA). Therefore the goals of this center are in accordance with the long term repatriation strategies of the Iranian state. This is done through empowering women and youth by means of provision of educational facilities, family planning and vocational training. The center only covers those Afghans who are in possession of an Amayesh card which would be the equivalent of a refugee status. Mrs. Ashrafi was contacted in her office in Tehran. The main aim of the interview was to collect information about conditions of lives of Afghan girls and women in Tehran. As the center works in collaboration with BAFIA, the information collected through the interview was only limited to registered Afghan women and girls. One of the main reasons behind this interview was to find possible research locations, this was not possible. However the interview contributed to my deeper understanding of the divide between registered and non-registered Afghans from the view point of the Authorities.

The fourth informant [name disclosed] is a social worker and women’s rights activist. She has experience in areas of child labor and “street and work children” and offers consultancy services and holds training workshops for women and children at risk of abuse. She was contacted due to her knowledge of the disadvantaged neighborhoods of Tehran; those which usually have a higher immigrant population. She also acted as my main contact person and reference for gaining permission to carry out my filed work at one of the research location; “Khane i Baraye Ayande”.
The second phase of the data collection consisted of qualitative interviews with the respondents and other informants. This was carried out from early February to mid March in 2014. The sample groups of respondents were interviewed in parallel with other informants. Information gathered from informants at the second phase, served as a data source in regards to the centers in which the interviews were conducted and general knowledge about the particular group of respondents.

The collection of primary data is conducted with consideration of ethical codes of qualitative research. The use of the empirical material is based on the consent of the respondents and the informants. The research uses the respondents’ first names – with their own permissions- in regards to quotations and remarks made by them. The reason for such a decision is that using the first names facilitates the process of remembering the interview procedure and helps differentiating different respondents from one another. At the same time the research avoids revealing the names of the informants who were contacted at the centers for safety reasons. This includes the manager and organizers of each center as well as teachers and social workers working there. Instead, interviews with the informants at each of the centers are referred to as “personal communications” (pers.comm.) following the name of the respective center. The pictures from the centers are taken and displayed with the consent of the managers of each center.

4.4.2 COLLECTION OF DATA: RESEARCH LOCATION AND METHODS

Afghan women and girls are not a common sight in many parts of Tehran especially in comparison with Afghan men and boys. A vast majority of Afghan men work as construction workers or caretakers at residential buildings in more well off neighborhoods. As a result Afghan men are a very visible population group on the surface of the city and also in most residential units especially in northern parts of Tehran. Contact with Afghan women on the other hand is much less frequent. Especially in more affluent parts of Tehran, besides the occasional Afghan domestic worker who is often times the wife of the Afghan caretaker, encounters with Afghan women are extremely rare incidents. Research suggests that registered Afghans are located in suburbs of Tehran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005). This corresponds to the general image that the public has about residential distribution of Afghans. In my early attempts of locating a site for data collection, I encountered many conversations with peers and acquaintances about this matter. In all cases I was suggested to move outside of city of Tehran and divert my focus on the suburbs. The suburbs of Tehran –while still parts of Tehran Metropolitan area- are outside of the City of Tehran. Accordingly livelihoods and
income choices in those sites are different from the city, with an emphasis on agriculture and industry; such as metal turning factories and stonemasonry workshops.

Interviews with informants however revealed that despite lack of official data, several neighborhoods in the city of Tehran have higher populations of Afghan families. These neighborhoods are mostly located in the southern parts of city and characterized by a lower socio-economic population mostly consisting of internal immigrants as well as an Afghan population. Based on this information district 12 of Tehran’s municipality was chosen as the sight for data collection. MAP 4-3 shows the location of Tehran’s district 12 in comparison to the three well known residential sites of Afghans in districts 20, 18 and the very suburbs of district 5.

MAP 4-3, LOCATION OF THE DATA COLLECTION FIELD


Located in the center/south of Tehran, district 12 is the oldest part of the city consisting of 6 zones and 13 neighborhoods. The district is characterized by lower socio-economic conditions of its residents. With 8.2 % illiterate population, this district has one of the highest illiteracy rates of municipal districts of Tehran (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm., 3 February).

The district has a strategic location with many governmental organizations and several embassies being located in it. The most distinct feature of the district, however, is Tehran’s Grand Bazaar (old Market). The hub of all businesses, the Bazaar is known as the economic pulse of Tehran. As a result deistic 12 have a different resident and commuting population rate. In addition to 365,000 residents of the districts, the Bazaar and the businesses related to it, brings an estimated population of
1,400,000 in the district on a daily basis (District 12-Tehran Municipality n.d). The Bazaar is a provider of labor in the area and a pull factor for immigrants. Accordingly district 12 is characterized by a high migrant population; mainly consisting of internal migrants with an especially high Kurd population. The district however has a high share of Afghan residents as well (Ayande Center 2014, pers.comm., 30 January).

Proximity to the Bazaar can be an absorbing factor but also is a source of problems for the residents. Higher costs of accommodation compared to the surrounding districts, prevalence of child labor and unsafe conditions – especially for women- due to continuously changing population of the Bazaar area are some common disadvantages. Participatory research methods among the districts residents have identified poverty, addiction and violence; especially against women, to be among the pressing concerns of the residents of this district (Khane I Baraye Ayande n.d). District 12 is among the busiest areas in Tehran. Two metro lines run through the district and the district is under strict traffic restrictions, limiting the number of private cars. Still the area is known by its noise, pollution and traffic. In general Tehran; and also Iran, has one of the world's highest fatality rates due to traffic incidents. The traffic conditions of the Bazaar area add to the risk of Traffic accidents in district 12. From an urban planning perspective, while the Bazaar is definitely a place of touristic attraction, its narrow streets and old constructs turn it into a major hazard zone in the event of an earthquake (District 12-Tehran Municipality n.d.). The same conditions of narrow and curved streets with low quality housing also apply to other residential areas of the neighborhood.

Higher populations of marginal and disadvantaged residents, and in particular higher prevalence of “Street and work children” in the area has attracted the attention of many social workers and activists. In order to combat the unfavorable conditions of the residents, NGO’s and voluntary organizations are established in the area with the goal of providing educational and health services.

Based on the information collected from the informants, two such centers were selected as contact points with Afghan women and girls; “Khane i Baray e Ayande” – a house for future and “Khane Koodak e Naser-Khosrow”- The house of children at Naser-Khosrow. These are both non gobernmental centers aiming empowerment and capacity building in marginal groups. The centers were purposively chosen due to the higher population of Afghan women and children attending them.

Selection of the centers as sites for data collection, offers advantages as well as a disadvantage. The services offered by the centers (educational courses and extracurricular activities), absorb a variety
of age ranges. This allows for a more diverse group of respondents. Many of the services offered at the centers serve as a substitute for legal and institutional exclusion that Afghans face in Iran. By attending the center, the Afghan women [indirectly] show their agency in improving their livelihood conditions. The third research question of this study, aims to understand the limitations of Agency in relation to structural constraints. The attendants of the centers can be a good case for exploring such dynamics. Moreover, the centers themselves are non-governmental and voluntary organizations that often times face legal restrictions and difficulties due to their range of services (especially when it comes to offering services to the Afghan nationals). This allows for another level understanding of the ways structural elements impact life choices of the individuals.

This type of sampling however minimizes the chances of contact with those Afghan women who face severe intra-household restrictions that limits their social activities and keeps them confined to their houses. Contacting that part of the population would have been a much more time consuming procedure, requiring a wider range of contacts, activities and research permits. Given these factors, the centers were chosen as the optimal solution in regards to time and scope of this research. In order to –slightly– make up for the lack of access to the missing population, the interview questioners are conducted in a way to gather all possible information about other family members who are more limited and restricted in their social activities.

**MAP 4-4; TEHRAN’S DISTRICT 12- ZONE 2, LOCATION OF THE RESEARCH FIELDS**

![Map of Tehran's District 12 Zone 2](http://region12.tehran.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=93)

Both of the centers are located at zone 2 of district 12. This increases the socio-economic homogeneity of the participants of the centers. Zone 2 is surrounded by some of the older streets of Tehran and contains places of historic interest as well as many governmental buildings such as municipal and administrative buildings and many ministries. Thus the area is populated and crowded with an average of 400,000 daily commuters. The main streets in the areas are recently renovated and indeed an attraction. Naser-khosrow street; the name sake for Naser-Khosrow house of children, is one such street. Abundance of historic sites and old buildings, as well as the recent renovations give a pleasant look to the area. Underneath its appearance however, Naser-Khosrow Street is the main black market for pharmaceutical drugs and medicine. Compared to the wide and recently renovated main streets, the side streets; some of which are well known parts of the Bazaar, have a very different fabric. Narrow and dingy allies characterized by many curves and low quality housing offer a picture that is very different from the normal view of Tehran. As can be seen in MAP 4-4 vulnerable and old urban fabrics (indicated by color brown on the map) are spread throughout zone 2 of district 12 including the locations of the centers.

IMAGE 4-3; URBAN FABRIC IN DISTRICT 12, ZONE 2

Note. Naser-Khosrow street (left) retrieved from http://static.panoramio.com/photos/large/91309124.jpg ; Neighboring structures viewed from balcony of Ayande Center (right)

Commuting from District 1 of Tehran, my daily commute to either of these locations took around one to one and half hour, using the metro service.
4.4.2.1 KHANE I BARAYE AYANDE- A HOUSE FOR FUTURE

*Khane i Baraye Ayandeh* is a non-governmental, non political and non-profit organization. The center started its activities in 2011 with the goal of awareness rising in individuals and families and enhancing life standards in the neighborhood. The main target groups of the center are the neighborhood’s marginalized residents especially and women and youth (*Khane o Baraye Ayande n.d.*). Activities of the center cover economic, cultural, social and health areas. Economical capacity building, creation of jobs and vocational training are some of the goals of the center. In accordance with its social and cultural goals, the center has a strong emphasis on reduction of gender, ethnic and racial discriminations. Thus the center also offers services to the Afghan residents of the neighborhood. The center is open to residents of the neighborhood and free of charge. Identification Cards or residence permits (in case of the Afghan residents) are not a requirement. The members of the center, however, will be registered at the center and have a registration file. The registration file also serves as their “social worker’s case” and especially covers the member’s mental and physical health background. According to the center’s manager the center has around 300 registered participants with social worker files. The participants are mostly Iranians, mainly Kurds and Lurs (From western provinces of Iran) as well as other internal migrants from the eastern provinces followed by Afghans and a few Iraqis (*Aynde Center 2014*, pers.comm., 30 January).

This center offers classes and lectures for both adults and youth. The adult classes are held in the mornings and include literacy lessons as well as book clubs and round tables once every two weeks. The center offers limited day care facilities for the mothers attending lessons as well as other mothers of the neighborhood who would want to take advantage of the service.

*Note.* A respondent volunteering at the nursery while the children play.
The adult literacy and school classes are certified by Literacy Movement Organization of Iran (Nehzat e Savad Amoozi), a public developmental organization aiming to eradicate illiteracy by conducting adult literacy courses as well as offering education to children in disadvantaged areas. The way this works is that teachers at Ayande center are in fact employees of the Literacy Movement Organization (LMO) in the sense that they get paid by the LMO based on the number of the students announced by the teachers themselves. LMO also provides the students with course material such as books. At the end of the academic semester (or year, based on the level of education) the students would go to the local office of education in their district, take part in the final exam and finally receive a certificate of having completed the respective educational level.

The certificates offered in this way are valid educational certificates and accepted by educational system of Iran.

LMO is a governmental organization; therefore it does not issue degrees for unregistered Afghan students or offer educational services to them. This seems to be the least of the problems on the way of schooling for Afghans at the Ayande center. According to the director if the center, during a short period when Ayande center was bound to allow municipal observations, the problems were more severe, as the municipality was against giving services to Afghan members. The problem seemed to be caused by the idea of the center allocating of resources to Afghan children instead of Iranians. During that time the social workers and teachers of the center used multiple strategies to continue offering educational services to their Afghan members. For example pretending that they were in other courses (such as seamstressing) rather than school, or in case of participants who did not have the distinct Afghan features, they would simply conceal their nationality and pretend that they were also Iranian. Currently, the center has managed to reach an arrangement with the districts’ organization of education to offer educational services as well as a certificate for the Afghan students. Following this arrangement the teacher educating the Afghans will not get paid for teaching them; nor can the Afghan students publicly take part in the final exam (Ayande Center 2014,pers.comm.,30 January). It should be noted that such an arrangement is to a very high extent resulted by the organizer’s own perseverance as well as strong networks.

The youth classes are mainly held in the afternoon and cover a wide range of tutorials –helping with school curriculum- to extracurricular activities such as language and music lessons. These classes are open to young girls and boys and also cover more creative matters such as general discussions,
environmental issues and skills of life. The latter course offers advice and strategies for improving one’s character and achieving goals in life and is particularly popular among the youth.

The center also offers a range of vocational training courses with valid certificates. These include seamstress workshops and hair styling. Both adults and young girls are free to attend these classes. After finishing the course, the attendants receive a certificate that qualifies them as skilled seamstress or hairstylist.

The center also holds celebrations and gatherings in accordance with Iranian festivities (such as Nowruz celebrations for new years, or celebration of winter solstice, as well religious occasions such as Ramadan. Occasionally the center holds charity markets.

In regards to physical shape and characters, Ayande Center is a somewhat spacious but old two storey building that is transformed into a community center. On the first floor, there is the main office of the center, a small library and a big seamstress workshop and a kitchen. Volunteer mothers prepare lunch at the kitchen on a daily basis and offer it to children who attend later classes in the evening. The second floor contains the nursery, and 2 other rooms that are used for lectures or the meetings and seminars.

**IMAGE 4-5; AYANDE CENTER**

*Note. The seamstress workshop (Left) and the library (right)*

**4.4.2.2 KHANE KOODAK E NASER-KHOSROW; NASER-KHOSROW HOUSE OF CHILDREN**

*Khane Koodak e Naser-khosrow* is a subfield of Society for Protecting the Rights of The Child, an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organization that has a long history in advocating children’s rights in Iran. The Naser-Khosrow center started as a project aiming education and empowerment of children in vulnerable situations; emphasizing on urban children. The target
groups of this project are children and youth (under the age of 18) and those who are in contact with them, such as their parents or teachers. The center mainly targets the “street and working children”; those children who are kept out of school and are forced to work, mainly on the streets and often time through selling small items or simply panhandling and begging.

The center’s activities aim awareness rising among their target groups in issues regarding to children’s rights, matters of personal hygiene, mental health and citizenship rights. The programs offered at the center cover areas of education, health care and social working. The social working activities are particularly important. Each member has a social workers case, based on which their needs and priorities are identified. The social workers help those children lacking Identification Cards and Birth Certificates to obtain the needed documents. The center offers its services to children regardless of their nationality. This however, has caused levels of dissatisfaction and at time complaints among the residents of the neighborhood. According to an informant who is in charge of the center’s affairs, the neighborhood residents feel the “Afghans are using the renounces that could otherwise belong to them”. She also emphasized that in most cases there are obvious patterns of racial segregation within the center seen through the rigid forms of the friendship groups and power hierarchies among the participating children. At the same time she mentioned that participation in certain engaging and interesting group activities often helps with the children going beyond these boundaries and in fact results in conditions that racial differences are set aside (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm., 3 February).

Currently Naser-Khosrow center offers literacy classes to adults as well. These classes were not among the initial plans of the center and were merely developed as response to the need of the illiterate Afghan mothers whose children studied there. Due to limitations of space and staff the literacy classes for mothers (who were in their second grade of studies at the time of the interview) were held jointly with the children’s classes. Unlike Ayande center the classes in Naser-Khosrow center do not offers any sort of educational certificates (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm.,3 February).

In terms of physical characteristics, the center recently renovated. While the lecture rooms and classes are limited in number and small, the center has a vast yard, a football pitch and some green space. In comparison to Ayande center, Naser-khosrow house is much better equipped for needs of the children and in fact has a much higher rate of young participants, many of whom are Iranian.
Compared to the other center, Naser-Khosrow center is better funded and supported. In fact it seems to be one of the success stories of the “Society for Protecting the Rights of The Child” and it is frequently visited by charity donors and is recognized by UNICEF.

4.4.3 THE SAMPLE AND COLLECTION OF DATA

Primary data of the research is collected through participatory observation as well as Interviews with informants and respondents. A total of thirty respondents and five informants were interviewed between both centers from February to March of 2014. The informants were chosen based on their role at the center (manager, teacher, social worker) and were selected based on the information they could offer in regards to dynamics of the center, backgrounds of the participants or differences between the two centers. Interviews with informants were carried out in form of deep non-structured interviews and were conducted at different occasions during the visits to the centers.

Interviews with the respondents were in form of deep semi-structured interviews and on average took between 30 to 45 minutes. In some occasions when the respondents were more willing to discuss different matters and were not restricted by time (for example to go home and prepare food), interviews took up to one hour. This was more often the case with the younger respondents who in general were much more willing to participate in the interviews.

The selection criteria for the respondent group were their nationality and gender. From early February to late March of 2014, Afghan women and girls who were present at either of the centers and agreed to be interviewed were contacted. This included Afghan women attending literacy
courses in both centers, younger girls attending classes, and both Afghan women and girls who were at the center for other reasons. Along with the main sample of respondents (i.e. Afghan women and girls) a few interviews were also conducted with Iranian women as well as Afghan boys who were present at the center. The results of these interviews are not incorporated in the primary data of this research, but are used as a base line for having a relational and comparative understanding of everyday life conditions for other groups.

Participatory observation was carried out in both centers during the same time period. I spent whole working days in the centers, attending different classes and activities. This helped me to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the centers, different traits of their respective participants and relations between participants as they occurred in their natural setting. Also becoming a regular face helped with gaining the respondents trust for conducting the interviews.

The differences between the two centers created different patterns among groups who frequented the centers. For example, many young girls spent many hours of their free time in Ayande center. They attended different classes in the afternoon, or just helped out with the general chores at the center. This seemed to be influenced by the manners of the manager of the center; Mrs. Akabari, who had established close relationships with the girls and had put them in charge of different responsibilities; for example being in charge of the nursery and the day care or running errands for the center. Quiet often the young girls would just be sitting in the office room of the center and discuss their everyday life issues. On the contrary the adults who attended the literacy classes left immediately after the lessons finished; as they had to go home and prepare lunch for their husbands or attend to their children. In the latter case, their children attended school or day care at places other than the center.

The situation was reverse in Naser-Khosrow center. Married women who attended the literacy classes did not seem to be in a rush for leaving the center. In fact they would stay and socialize frequently after their lessons finished. They also seemed to have a much closer bond with their teacher. In case of many of the mothers, their children were also attending the same center as a substitute for school. This would eliminate the need for these mothers to go home immediately to take care of their children. Also there were cases that Afghan women would only come to consult the social workers at the center or get assistance in different issues. These differences could to some extent be an attribute of variations between the two centers, their management styles and also funding and assistance abilities as well as lifestyles of their attendants.
Even though the two centers are in one district and even one zone, slight socio-economic differences were evident among the participants of the two centers. These variations were more visible when participants travelled further distance, and thus would be coming from further and more disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Family relations and ties were quite common between the attendants of the both centers especially those who attended Ayande center. Accordingly, some of the respondents were siblings. This limits the generalizability of the sample, but allows for incorporating a temporal perspective through different occasions in one household. An example can be the limitations the first sister might have faced for attending the center, which did not apply to her siblings, or difference in access patterns based on changes in the household’s residence status.

The sample is divided in two groups of “Married” and “Single” respondents. The idea behind such division is that intra-household’s relations and the consequential distribution of roles and responsibilities could be an attribute of the marital status. No particular measures were taken for selection of respondents from either group. After consenting to be interviewed, they would be asked if they were married or single. Despite the random selection methods, married and single respondents had different niches at the centers. Even in cases that they were of the same age, the range of activities they took part in was different and was even conducted at different times of the day. This can be explained due to their respective responsibilities at the household.

The married group consists of 16 respondents between the ages range of 21- 48. The majority of the Married group was interviewed in Naser-Khosrow center. The Single group consists of 14 respondents in the age range of 13- 23. Contrary to the Married group of respondents most of the Single group was contacted in Ayandeh center. While the adult Afghans in the two centers did not seem to be much different in socio-economic terms, the single young girls showed distinct differences. These were obvious in many aspects, from their appearance and outfit to lifestyle choices and values and priorities. For example the few young girls at Naser-Khosrow center were only attending school classes there, whereas the girls at Ayande center were there for other activities such as the music class.

Besides the Afghan adults attending the “Mother’s literacy course”, and the few young girls I interviewed at Naser-Khosrow center, the rest of female Afghan population at the center was too young to fit my sample criteria. They were mainly children (or children of relatives) of the women
attending the Mothers classes. These children took part in pre-school or early elementary classes held at the center.

The questionnaires used for the interviews were conducted with consideration to the main research questions of this study. Questioners for the Married and the Single group of respondents are different in the areas related to household decision making and power structures. In the married group the focus is on the husband while in the single group the focus shifts to parents and in particular the father.

Very broadly the research questions intend to cover the following topics:

1. What are the daily life conditions for Afghan women?
   Demographic factors and socio-economic conditions of the Afghan women and their households are used as an indicator of their lifestyles and daily life conditions.

2. What are the influential factors in shaping daily lives of Afghan women?
   Identification of various social relations and power structures helps with understanding factors that shape Afghan women and girls’ access patterns and have the ability to influence their choices and decisions. These contextual factors include the impacts of rights and entitlements at macro level, societal relations at meso level and intra-household relations at micro level.

3. How do daily life conditions of Afghan women manifest themselves in their differential vulnerability to earthquake hazards in Tehran?
   Viewing Afghan women’s life conditions in the light of determinants of vulnerability and capacity for safety in case of earthquakes helps to understand how conditions of normal life can in the longer term be translated into vulnerability to a hazard.

As can be seen in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 Each questioner consists of 10 sections aiming to cover different variables needed for the analysis. These variables are chosen based on the conceptual framework of the study. The questions intend to investigate the respondents (and their household’s) access profiles, how their access profiles are influenced by social structures and institutions at different levels and the ways in which their daily lives are influenced by their access patterns. Variables of vulnerability and coping mechanisms to earthquakes are incorporated in the questionnaire design. The next section offers the empirical findings of the research based on the interviews with respondents.
4.5 GROUP ONE: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY GROUP

This section examines basic social and demographic characteristics of respondents. These are useful background data for helping to interpret the qualitative data. Note that the term “household” refers to those people sharing the same residence and may include kin and non-kin. The section describes the respondents in terms of their age, marital status, appearance and the type of their activity in the center. Respondents are asked about their background and history of migration. This includes their migration path, reason for migration, length of their stay in Iran (and also Tehran) and residence status. The data presented in this section contributes to understanding the relationship between length of stay in Iran with residence status and behavior and lifestyles. One other point of interest is the possible differences between residence statuses of members of the same household. This can contribute to understanding the importance of intra-household dynamics within the sample.

4.5.1 DEMOGRAPHICS, APPEARANCE AND ACCENT

The married group of respondents consists of 16 respondents. Their ages vary between 21 to 47 years old, with the majority of them being in their 20’s. From the total of 16 respondents 10 of them were in the age range of 21 to 26 and another 5 were in their 30’s. Two respondents over 40 make up for the eldest respondents among the married group and are 41 and 48 years old respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>11:30-12:15</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>12:30-1:15</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>5 Feb 14</td>
<td>11:00-11:30</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme B</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5 Feb 14</td>
<td>11:30-12:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10 Feb 14</td>
<td>10:00-10:30</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>10:30-11:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>11:00-11:30</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ZeinabA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>11:30-12:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>~24</td>
<td>4 Mar 14</td>
<td>11:00-11:45</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4 Mar 14</td>
<td>12:00-12:40</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4 Mar 14</td>
<td>12:45-1:30</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4 Mar 14</td>
<td>01:45-2:15</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5 Mar 14</td>
<td>1:30-2:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17 Mar 14</td>
<td>10:40-11:15</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Accompanied children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17 Mar 14</td>
<td>11:30-12:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Accompanied children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17 Mar 14</td>
<td>12:40-1:20</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Consultancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In case of some respondents, their facial features indicated a much older age than their claimed age. This condition could possibly be a result of their [possibly harsher] lifestyles at a point of time. In
one case least, the respondent (Fateme A) clearly mentioned that she was not sure about her age; “[I should be] about 24 to 28, I do not know. I assume it to be 28, but we could not figure out the exact date”. A few other respondents (Nasrin and Anis) gave approximate ages (about 24 and 26) but did not mention any particular doubts about their ages, nor mentioned any difficulties in calculating it.

Outfits and clothes are an important indicator of status in Iran, especially for women. At the basic level the choice of the Islamic cover indicates level of religious tendency, or simply traditional values. As a rule a head scarf is the more modern and least religious option, whereas a Chador is the most traditional choice opted by those who are more religious. Naturally each of these choices can vary in style, color and combination and accordingly indicate differences in the presented image. When encountering the sample group, the outfits and appearance of Afghan women and girls was particularly important and interesting to me. As mentioned before, Afghan women are not a usual sight in the streets of Tehran. The general image of an Afghan woman –given their expected household limitations and lower socio-economic status- would indicate a more traditional choice of the Chador. IMAGE 4-7 shows examples of how the choice of clothing could differ between different women and girls on the street.

Note. Woman wearing the Chador and a young girl with the school uniform (up left), Women in casual/modern outfits with colorful headscarves (up right), mixed group of girls wearing modern outfits and Chadors (bottom).
Contrary to what would have been expected, most of the Married group respondents (11 out of 17) wore headscarves and not the Chador. Among those, 4 respondents wore very trendy and colorful scarves (with matching jackets for the season), while the outfit of the other 4 was less distinct. Only 2 respondents among this group wore the more conservative simple black scarf. The respondents wearing headscarves were distributed among all age groups including both respondents over the age of 40. The 5 respondents wearing the traditional chador were in their mid 20’s and thirties. Again variations existed in the level of strictness of their Chador with some respondents displaying a less conservative look. Fateme A, who was not sure about her age and her friend who also seemed to be much older than what she indicated were among the respondents with the most conservative choice of outfit; Black Chador complemented with the black headscarf.

While Iranians and [shia’] Afghans both speak Farsi, the languages spoken by the two groups are different in terms of the accent, choice of words and to some extent sentence formation. Based on my previous encounters with Afghan sample groups in Sweden as well as Afghans in a training course in Kabul these differences were often easy to detect and adapt to with a little attention. The majority of the respondents in displayed a spectrum of slight to more distinct accents. In all cases though it was very easy to understand and follow what they were saying. The exceptions to this condition were seen among 3 respondents (Faride age 24, Khalede age 26 and Shanaz A age 48) who spoke without any trace of Dari accent. In contrast 3 other respondents (Fateme B age 31 and Zeinab A age 36) seemed to be speaking in Hazaragi dialect; which was extremely difficult to follow and understand.

Besides three respondents who did not attend the literacy courses, all the other respondents in the married group were attending the adult literacy course. Those who went to Ayande center, were all doing their first years of adult literacy and those at the Naser-Khosrow center were in their second year. These levels were the only levels available that the centers were offering at the time. Most of the women in Naser-Khosrow center had their children along with them. While they were leaning, their children would also be at classes, or just played with other children in the yard. One of the respondents Nasrin (age ~ 24), brought her baby to class with her. Among those respondents who were not taking part in lessons, Malake (age 37) and Shahnaz B (age 30), accompanied their children who studied at the center, and spent the day there without attending the classes. Shahnaz A(38) was a resident of the neighborhood, who had known about the center for a long time through her
children and used to attend the classes the previous year. The day I contacted her, she had visited the center to consult one of the social workers about family related matters. Other women at the center would also consult the social workers about issues of their lives frequently. Family ties and relations were common among both Married and Single respondents. In these cases, an interview with one respondent would always be followed by an interview with their relative or “acquaintance”. In fact the respondents often explained their relations with others through the fact that they were acquaintances. The term acquaintance was interchangeably used with the term relative. According to the respondents themselves “we are all somehow related”.

The Single sample group consists of 14 respondents in the age range of 13-23. Most of the respondents were within the ages of 14-18, with only two of the respondents over the age of 20 (21 and 23 respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single Group</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>12:25-13:10</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Regular at the center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>13:45-14:20</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Helps out in Nursery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>5:30-6:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Music class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>6:00-6:30</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Music class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 Feb 14</td>
<td>6:30-7:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Music class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5 Feb 14</td>
<td>10:00-10:55</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Music class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6 Feb 14</td>
<td>4:00-4:30</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Music class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6 Feb 14</td>
<td>5:30-5:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Regular at the center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10 Feb 14</td>
<td>10:30-11:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Hairstyling class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10 Feb 14</td>
<td>11:30-12:00</td>
<td>Ayandeh</td>
<td>Visits regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>12:00-12:30</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>12:30-1:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4 Mar 14</td>
<td>10:30-11:00</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>Adult Literacy class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3 Mar 14</td>
<td>1:00-10:30</td>
<td>Naser</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to choice of outfit, neither of the respondents in this group wore the traditional Chador. Instead, by standards of normal middle class young girls in Tehran, all the girls at Ayande center displayed a very modern and fashionable look. The situation was somewhat different in Naser-Khosrow center. Two of the respondents contacted there, Shakila (13) and Rahime (14), wore their school uniforms. Parvin (16) was the only respondent interviewed (at Naser-Khosrow center) that followed the conservative patterns of wearing darker colors and being more covered. Among all respondents Parvin has spent the least amount of time in Iran as she had arrived only 8 months prior to the time of the interviews. In addition Parvin was the only respondent among the single group who had a very distinct Dari accent. The other 2 respondents at Naser-Khosrow center also
had a very slight accent. Neither of the respondents contacted at Ayandeh center spoke with a recognizable Dari accent.

Among the single group of respondents, out of 14 respondents who attended Ayandeh center, 5 were initially contacted through their music class, where they would learn how to play the guitar. The music class indeed seemed to be a very popular class among all attendants of the center; regardless of their gender and nationality. Besides 2 of the respondents who had been to the center for the first time, the rest visited the center frequently and attended different activities. Most girls contacted at Ayandeh center were attending public school or had already finished school. However it seemed that encountering problem with the public school was easy. According to the manager of the Ayande center both Afghan also Iranian students seemed to get expelled from school regularly (Ayande Center 2014, Pers.comm. 30 January). When that was the case, the respondents would use the educational options of the center to keep up with their studies until they managed to go back to school. Going back to school usually involved intervention of the social workers or the manager of the center. The respondents in Naser-Khosrow center attended the center on a daily basis and took part in the school classes offered there.

### 4.5.2 ORIGIN, REASON FOR MIGRATION AND LENGTH OF STAY

This part of the data deals with the origin of sample group in Afghanistan, their reason for moving to Iran, their length of their stay in the country and their residential status. Points of particular interest are reasons behind migration as well as possible relationship between residential status and length of stay.

Among the married sample group, most respondents were from provinces of Kabul and Daykundi followed by Ghazni and Heart and provinces of Kandehar, Bamian and Nangarhhar (located south of Kabul). The respondents who were related or “acquaintances” all came from the same province. This includes Faride and Khalede (friends), Fateme A and Fateme B (old acquaintance) as well as Zeinab B and Reyhane (acquaintance) and Zeinab B and Arefe (sister in law).
The respondent’s length of stay in Iran varied for from 3 to 22 years. The majority of respondents had been in Iran less than 10 years and between 4 to 9 years. The exceptions were 3 respondents who had been in Iran for only 3 years and 2 had been here for 18 and 22 years. The respondents who had lived in Iran the longest were also the eldest in the sample. The respondents who were related to each other had been in Iran for more or less similar amount of time, with 1 to 3 years of time difference regarding their arrival.

Most of the respondents in this group have moved due to family reunification reasons. This means they moved to Iran to join their husbands. In many cases their husbands were Afghan men who had lived in Iran for many years. Some examples include Khalede (age 26): “My husband was here [in Iran], he came to Afghanistan and we got married and came here”. Maryam (age 32): “The husband was here [in Iran] seven years before me, he came [to Afghanistan] got married stayed for a year and came back”, and also Nasrin (age about 24) “I got married, he was already in Iran. There was no safety [in Afghanistan], there are no facilities, life is difficult, and we lived in the mountains. We really like our country but we have stayed here. There [in Afghanistan] life is difficult, we don’t have fuel and piped [natural] gas, there was not enough fire wood, and we didn’t have electricity”. In one case, the respondent was the second wife. For her reason for moving to Iran Malake (age 37) said: “my husband was in Iran, I was alone in Afghanistan, along with my child I came to my husband”.

Malake was the only case that of polygamy among the contacted respondents, however, according
to the informants at Naser-Khosrow center polygamy was a rather normal trend among the Afghan residents of the neighborhood.

Other reasons for moving to Iran included conditions of war and unrest in Afghanistan (3), lack of jobs and economic hardship (2) and medical treatment for self or parents (2). In these cases the husbands had arrived in Iran only a few years prior to their wives or together with them. Examples include Shahnaz (age 48) who moved to Iran 22 years ago: “There were the civil wars, I came with my husband and two children, and the third was also on the way”. Hoseine (age 41) who had been in Iran for 18 years says “It was the time of war with Taliban, there were no facilities, and we ran away from Afghanistan and took refuge in Tehran. My husband had come prior to me. He has been here [in Iran] for 20 years”. Faride (age 24): “Afghanistan is not good, there is war and suicide attacks, there are no jobs, I got married and came here”, Fateme: “we had little money and Afghanistan was not good for [manual] labor”, And finally Soraya (age 25): “I came to Iran for treatment, I was sick, I had kidney stones, we came here [to Iran] to treat it”. The reasons given by the respondents for leaving Afghanistan correspond with UNHCR data previously collected on registered Afghan households in Iran. Among the sample group of that research 40% of the Afghans born in Afghanistan had given escaping from war and insecurity as the reason for migration to Iran, while 54% were accompanying their household and relatives (Wickramasekara 2006).

The husbands of the respondents had been in Iran from 4 to 25 years, with the majority having been in the country for over 10 years. At least 7 of the husbands had been in Iran for 20 years and more. One of them was born in Iran and the other had lived in Iran since he was 1. Some of the respondents did not know for sure how many years their husbands had been in Iran, but just mentioned that he was already in Iran when they got married. In all cases but one the husbands came from the same province and region as of their wives. In the exceptional case, the respondent (Hoseine 41) had once been married to a man from Kabul. But he died in Afghanistan. Later on Hoseine moved to Iran with her parents (due to war conditions) and met her husband and got married in Iran. Unlike Hoseine who is from Kabul, his husband is from Bamian. Still according to Hoseine her husband was related to her and that “he is from our people”.

Most of the respondents had been living in Tehran ever since they moved to Iran. This however does not mean that they arrived directly in Tehran. Some of the respondents also had lived in cities other than Tehran for duration of several months to several years before they moved to Tehran. In most
cases the reason for moving to Tehran was the husband’s job. In one case also having a community and network of relatives and acquaintances was mentioned as the reason behind moving back to Tehran, after the respondent’s family had moved to city of Saveh (about 100 km southwest of Tehran) for work purposes. Shahnaz A (age 48) explained the situation as “there was no one [that we knew] in Saveh, I was all alone. My brother and sister are here [in Tehran], therefore we came back”.

The respondents were asked about their residence documents. The different scenarios for residence permits include: having an Amayesh card (a residence permit that is the equivalent of a refugee card), an Afghan Passport and a valid residence visa, an expired residence visa or having no documents at all. Only 2 respondents (Hoseine 41, and Shahnaz 48) had Amyesh cards. These respondents have lived the longest in Iran (18 and 22 years). 5 respondents had a family passport and a valid residence visa. A few of them had recently obtained their documents. All respondents with residence visas mentioned that obtaining a passport and valid visa is a very expensive procedure. This group had lived in Iran between 4-8 years. Another 7 respondents had a passport but they lacked a valid visa. This means the respondents entered Iran with a passport and a valid visa, but then their visa expired and they did not extend it. One respondent Malake (37) had no types of documents at all.

The situation of residence documents shows a different pattern among the husbands of the respondents. The majority of the husbands have some sort of a valid residence documents. 5 husbands hold an Amayesh card and 5 other have passports and visas. 3 of the husbands had no documents at all, and the rest had expired visas.
An important factor is the difference between the number of husbands and wives with an Amayesh card. As can be seen 5 husbands hold an Amayesh card. Among the wives of the card holder husbands, only Shahnaz A and Hoseine have a card while Khalede and Fateme A only have a residence visa and Faride has nothing yet. Following Iran’s migration policies, there was a short window of time during which the husbands could have obtained a card for their wives with less difficulty and complications. According to the respondents however; by the time their husbands realized that the wives needed cards as well it was already very difficult to get one. In order for the children to obtain an Amayesh card, both parents need to be card holder. As can be seen through the table, the children of Khalede and Fateme A only have residence visas (that needs to be renewed every 6 months) and children of Faride have no documents yet, despite the fact that their fathers have the Amayesh card.

Another point is the situation of Hoseine (41) and her husband who both have residence cards. However not all their children have it and they are still trying to get cards for all of them. The reason for this situation – despite the fact that both parents have valid cards- is that her three youngest children (aged 12, 10 and 7) were born at home and not in a hospital. Therefore they have no birth certificate to prove these children are in fact theirs. Hoseine was trying to solve the problem but it had proven to be very difficult. For one child she had obtained a DNA test as proof of the child

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years In Iran</th>
<th>Residence status</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme M</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; Visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pass no Visa</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Nothing valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>One son has visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pass and visa</td>
<td>Visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Card and pass</td>
<td>Card and pass</td>
<td>Card besides Grand daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Raised here</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>Maybe card</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Born here</td>
<td>Pass no visa</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
<td>Pass &amp; visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Trying to get card</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
belonging to her. This process was very expensive for her, and she was not able to afford it for other children, so instead she was collecting a local petition from neighbors as proof. And finally in case of Shahnaz (48), both she and her husband have residence cards. In this case; according to herself, all her children have cards as well. However her granddaughter - Bita, whom Shahnaz was taking care of at the time, did not have any type of residence documents. Her case is really complicated and strange. Bita’s parents were both raised in Iran and both have the Amayesh card. However her father’s card is issued from the city of Saveh whereas her mother’s card is issued from Tehran. It seems that the difference between place of issue of the residence cards is preventing their daughter; who would be considered a 3rd generation Afghan in Iran, to obtain a residence card.

Another interesting point is the relationship between the length of stay and residence status of husbands of Zeinab Band Arefe. Zeinab B’s husband had moved to Iran when he was one years old and husband of Arefe was born inside the country. Despite their duration of residence in Iran, Arefe’s husband had no documents at all and husband of Zeinab B only had the residence visa. According to their wives, the reason for such condition is the fact that their husbands had both given their cards back at a point to go and visit Afghanistan. In case of Arefe: “At the beginning [my husband] used to have a card, he gave it back to go [to Afghanistan] and visit his sister who has a heart disease. But at the end he did not go and he did not manage to get his card back. Now we want to get passports. We prepared everything, but it needed 600-700 [thousand] Toman that we did not have”. The same story more or less applies to Husband of Zeinab B. He also gave back his card since he wanted to go back to Afghanistan. Even though he did not go back at the end, he did not manage to get his card back; however he managed to obtain the residence visa. Maryam’s husband also has no documents. He has lived in Iran for 10 years now and according to Maryam, he used to have a card. His story of losing the card is different as according to Maryam “when he went back to Afghanistan his mother tore it [the card] up so he would not return to Iran”.

In case of the single group, respondents were asked about their origin back in Afghanistan, regardless of their place of birth. In this way their place of origin was defined as the place their parents come from in Afghanistan. Most of respondents originated from Provinces of Ghazni (6) and Kabul (4). However 3 of the respondents who were from Ghazni were sisters. The rest of the respondents were from provinces of Kunduz (2) at the northern borders of Afghanistan and Nangarhar (1) and Parwan (1). Again same as the married group those respondents with family ties came from the same province and were also contacted in the same location.
Equal shares of the respondents were born in Iran (7) and outside of Iran (7). Among those born outside of Iran, one was born in Pakistan and the rest were born in their respective place of origin in Afghanistan. Accordingly the respondents had been in Iran from less than a year (8 months) to their whole lives. Only 4 respondents had been in Iran less than 10 years, the rest had been here between 13-23 years.

For nearly half of the respondents, Tehran was their first destination in Iran. The other destinations included Karaj (a neighbor city of Tehran) where Farzane and her sisters (Parvane and Fahime) were born and raised. Their family moved to Tehran about 7-8 years ago. Masoume (20) and her family also spend a few months in Qom staying with their uncle who was already there before moving to Tehran. The family eventually moved to Tehran where their father worked. Kobra (23) was born and raised in Mashhad, until her family decided to go back to Afghanistan. They did not end up staying there for long and moved back to Iran and Tehran. Also in case of Soheila (13) her family had a gradual move of a city called Mamounie (80 Km southwest of Tehran and on the highway to Tehran) to a suburban area of Tehran and eventually Tehran itself.

Except for Parvin (16) whose parents were dead and had recently moved to Iran to live with her sister and her husband, the rest of the respondents lived with their own parents. However not all respondents had arrived at the same time with their Parents. For example Masuome (20) arrived in Iran with her uncle and one year prior to her parents. She said “When I was 5 my uncle came to Afghanistan to get married. When he came back he brought me with himself and a year after that my parents arrived as well”.

In regards to reason for moving, family ties and war seemed to be equally important reasons. 5 respondents explicitly mentioned having family members in Iran as the reason behind their move. The family members comprised of uncles and brothers already working in Iran or sisters who were married or engaged to Afghan men in Iran. It seems that family ties such as a sister/daughter getting married here in Iran can mobilize a bigger group of relatives. According to Rahime (14) “My sister was engaged with one boy, the boy was here [in Iran]. The boy’s family wanted to come here and my father decided to come as well”. The respondents also mentioned economic reasons and lack of jobs as reasons behind their parents moving to Iran. The respondent’s parents had been living in Iran between 4-40 years. Besides 2 cases the respondents parents have been in Iran for more than 15
years. The two exceptions were cases of Shakila and Rahime, two cousins from Kunduz province. Accordingly both their families moved since already their brother and sister were here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years in Iran</th>
<th>Residence status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pass and visa – Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pass and visa – Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Card since 7-8 years ago – Card since 7-8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pass and visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Card since 8-9 years ago – Now have Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pass and visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nothing – Only brother has pass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8 months Dead</td>
<td>Pass no visa – Sister nothings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pass and visa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to residence status, same as the previous group the respondents tend to follow their mother’s residence status. Among the Single group, 7 respondents held Amayesh cards. Among these 7, Masoume and Kobra grew up without cards despite the long duration of their families stay in Iran (28 and 35 years respectively). Similar to the previous examples, their families had given their cards back at a point to travel to Afghanistan and had not managed to get it back until around 8 years ago. The date corresponds with introduction of the new registration system and allocation of Amayesh cards to those Afghans who could prove they were in possession of a residence card (blue card) in the 80’s. According to both girls, the process of obtaining the new Amayesh cards took around 3-4 years. Another example is about Farzane, Parvane and Fahime who were sisters. Their father had a residence card but their mother lacked one. Eventually the mother and the children obtained a passport and residence visa. However according to one of the sisters “at that time [when their mother came to Iran] they issued the card easily. Every time my father went to renew his card they would tell him to also get cards for his wife and children, but my father was very busy and didn’t have time to do it”. Parvin and Shakila – who have been in Iran the shortest- were the only respondents who lacked any type of residence documents.
4.6 GROUP TWO: HOUSEHOLD’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

This section covers the socio-economic aspects of the lives of respondents. Levels of educational attainment for respondents and their other family members and their financial resources such as income and non-monetary assets are investigated. Household financial resources include earnings and savings, costs of the household and possessions. In order to have a better understanding of the earnings of the respondents this section also offers some information on their working conditions indicated by their working hours.

4.6.1 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND JOBS

The Married group of respondents was contacted through their adult literacy courses. This means the majority of have some ability to read and write. The exceptions to this condition were three respondents who were not attending the lesions and could not read and write respectively. Reasons such as ‘inability to learn’ or being busy with children and household hold responsibilities were mentioned for their lack of attendance. The rest of the respondents, depending on the center, were in their first or second years of adult literacy course.

See for example Hoseine: “I came for two years. One year I didn not learn anything at all, and the other years I learnt a little bit. But we have many problems in our lives, there are little children at home, I stopped coming to classes. It will be very good if I could come”. Malake :” I have twin babies and I cannot come to school”. And finally Shahnaz B: “I cannot learn”.

The rest of the respondents, depending on the center, were in their first or second years of adult literacy course. With different achievement levels, they had learnt to read and write and knew the numbers. The majority of them said they could read to some extent, but that writing was more difficult for them. However a few said they still could not read or write at all. Nearly all of the respondents were very satisfied with learning and claimed that they could already see the effects of it in their lives. For example Fateme A: “everyone should be able to read, if not you cannot do anything, [for example] pay your bills”. Soraya: “I learnt [everything] here, [before] I did not know anything. I could not write my name, or read the numbers. Now I can read the name of the streets, my daughter also now has learnt and can read”. Nasrin: “it is really good now. Where ever I go, I can find my own way. Before, on the metro I could not read the name of the stops. Now I can. Now I know which busses I should get on. It is really good that I am studying”. Zeinab and Reihane also
mentioned another advantage of being able to read and write; Zeinab said “I do not have much problem with reading but my writing is not so good. Before I would send text messages to my husband but when he would come back home, he laughed at me. Now it has gotten better”. Reihane also had a similar experience “Writing is difficult for me, but sending a text message is easier. I also sent a text message to my husband. He understood what I had said – to buy salt, pepper and potato chips”.

Among the husbands of the respondents 6 were illiterate. The rest had different levels of literacy/education ranging from being able to only read the Quran to different levels of schooling. 2 of the husbands had high school diplomas and one had studied till the 11th class. One had obtained his high school diploma in Afghanistan and the other in Iran. Those husbands who had higher levels of educational attainment had been born and raised in Iran. Nevertheless, the length of stay in Iran did not seem to have a noticeable relationship with educational achievement of Afghan men. The illiterate husbands had been in Iran between 6 to 25 years. The respondents were also asked about the educational achievements of their children. Only children of 4 respondents attended public school, those were the respondents who had a valid residence visa or an Amayesh card. In one case the children had gone to school in a mix of public school and other means, depending on their household’s residential status. In all other cases the children were attending school or preschool in alternative schools.

In regards to jobs and income, the only type of occupation known to the respondents and discussed by them was home-based activities in the field of bag making and also embroidery on clothes and gowns. Bag making, however, seemed to be more common. The Afghan men of the Bazaar area seem to be highly represented in the bag making industry as well; as owners or workers of the bag making workshops. It seemed that the home-based work mainly entailed adding the final touches; such as gluing the bags or attaching the ornamental parts on them. The majority of the married respondents (9) however said they were not working at all. 3 of them explicitly mentioned that their husbands did not like them working and therefore did not give them permission to work. The others mainly mentioned that due to having children they had no time for working. Other reasons for not working was being sick or simply not working any more. Among the rest of the group, 3 respondents were actively doing home-based bag making projects. The rest said they would work if they would get assignments, but they had nothing at the moment.
Equal number of husbands worked in construction and bag making and as porters in the bazaar. The rest were caretakers (of residential or office buildings), guard at a shopping center (1), street vendor selling dates in the Bazaar (1) and doing domestic work (1). These jobs correspond to the list of authorized occupations for Afghans and also follow the distribution of occupations among Afghan households in Iran (BAFIA 2011, Wickramsakera et al. 2009). In some cases, the husbands mixed different jobs with each other. For example Soraya (age 25) mentioned her husband’s job as a porter, but later on it became clear that she and her husband were also caretakers to a residential unit. While the amount of data is too little for detecting patterns and making generalizations, it is interesting to note that it seems that the respondents (and their husbands) who were related to each other have similar occupations. For example Husbands of Fateme A and Fateme M -who were acquaintances- both worked as construction workers while husbands of Zeinab B, Reihane and Arefe who were acquaintances and related (sisters in laws) all worked in bag making workshops. In the same way neither of the husbands of Fateme A and Fateme M permitted them to work or both Zeinab B and Arefe did home-based work.

The occupational disparities between Afghan women and men (seen through working patterns of the respondents and their husbands) correspond with the findings of International Labor Organization (ILO) on occupational conditions of Afghans in Iran. According to their 2009 report the labor force participation of Afghan men and women showed a marked divergence of 69.1% participation rate for men and 10.4% participation rate for women (Wickramsakera et al. 2009).
The respondents from the single group showed very different patterns of educational attainment. No one in this group was illiterate; however 3 respondents had dropped out during middle school. Among the rest, different patterns were visible between the two centers. Respondents contacted at the Naser-Khosrow center were all taking elementary level classes (2<sup>nd</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> grade) at the center, even though they were in the age range of attending middle school (the respondents were between 13-16). Among the respondents in Ayande center, Farzane (age 18), Masoume (age 20) and Kobra (age 23) had already received their high school diploma. At the time of the interviews Farzane and Kobra had been admitted to university level and were planning for preparing their needed documentation for enrolment. This would require them to travel back to Afghanistan and obtain a student visa. Both of them were born and raised in Iran. The rest of the respondents were at different stages of middle school and high school. Among the whole group of single respondents 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Husband’s Educational level</th>
<th>Husband’s Job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Vendor- Sells dates in Bazaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaled</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>If available, not now</td>
<td>Can read a little- Iran</td>
<td>Guard at shopping center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fateme A*</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No, Husband does not permit</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fateme M*</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No, Husband does not permit</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No- No time</td>
<td>Quran studies - Pakistan</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>If available, Not now</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Porter in bazaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>If available, Not now,</td>
<td>Reads a little- Afghanistan</td>
<td>Porter in Bazaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>No, Sick</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Construction worker. Now in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No, No time</td>
<td>3-4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade- Afghanistan</td>
<td>Care taker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahnaz A</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No, not any more</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grad- Afghanistan</td>
<td>Porter in Bazaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeinab B*</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>Yes, bag making and Embroidery</td>
<td>Diploma- Iran</td>
<td>Bag maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reyhane*</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>No- Husband does not permit</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade – Iran</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arefe*</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; grade adult literacy</td>
<td>Yes, bag making and Embroidery</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade- Iran</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>No , no time</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Domestic work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>If available- Not now</td>
<td>Diploma-Afghanistan</td>
<td>Care taker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Works with husband, Bag making</td>
<td>Reads Quran</td>
<td>Makes bag at home</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of them had been to public schools at least for part of their studies. The rest had studied in different locations and with different methods including self-tutoring, attending Afghan self-regulatory schools and also taking lessons at Ayande center. The detail of their educational patterns offers interesting insight on dynamics of schooling and learning for Afghan youth.

Farzane who is now admitted to the university studied at an arts school. She explains her experience as: “I had many problems for going to school. We had to pull many strings and get help from many people to finally be able to get in”. She had assistance from a social worker who helped her get into the school. Her sister Parvane (age 17) is also facing the same situation, but with a bit more of complications. Parvane was studying at the 1st grade of high school. According to herself: “Now I should be in the second grade, but I am not. I enrolled in high school last year, but in the middle of the year I got suspended for applying cosmetics and makeup. The principal made it difficult for me to enroll in other high schools as well. Eventually I went to an arts school. After a while a new regulation was passed that the alien nationals cannot attend arts schools. Now I am studying on my own and taking classes here, but I am not sure if I can do the final exams anywhere or not”. In case of Parvane, eventually her problem was solved with a lot of insistence and persuasion from manager of Ayandeh center. This happened during the period of my participatory observation and I personally followed how much time and effort the manager put into finding a school –and persuading its principals- to allow Parvane to take the final exams there and hence be certified. She still could not attend the lessons at that school, but she had to pay the tuition fees for Afghan students. These fees are higher than the normal fees for Iranian students. At the time the manager of the center was searching for a source of funding to cover her tuition fees.

Masoume (age 20) had recently received her high school diploma and worked as a volunteer with the Society for Protecting the Rights of the Child (SPRC), in which she used to be a student herself until the previous year. SPRC is the same society that the Naser-Khosrow center is part of. However Masoume worked in other centers that were located in other –and more disadvantaged– neighborhoods compared to the Naser-Khosrow center. In regards to her education she said “I studied first and second years of elementary school with the Literacy Movement Organization of Iran. My sister, who is older, also took lessons with me. Then a regulation was passed that no Afghan is permitted to study anywhere. So we could not attend the classes anymore. I finished my second year at SPRC and I continued there until second year of middle school. By then the public schools would not accept us Afghans. After that the rules changed and they accepted us. I switched to public
school, but I still went for tutorials to SPRC”. Masoume and her family had a residence card from the beginning. However, when they arrived in Iran they initially settled in Qom (125km southwest of Tehran), where her uncle was living. They therefore registered themselves and got their residence cards from city of Qom without knowing the limitations that it would cause them. Her father ended up working in Tehran and moved the family there, but the fact that their residence permits were issued from Qom continued to cause difficulties for them.

Fahime (age 16) is the youngest sister of Farzane and Parvane. She also went through a labyrinth of different systems till she eventually managed to attend public school.” At first I studied at Afghan schools in Karaj (a neighbor city of Tehran). At that time, I was very afraid of Iranian schools! After two years I started going to Afghan schools in Tehran and I started over again. Then I attended the classes at “Shoosh house of children”; another center similar to Naser-Khosrow house of children, after that we got our passports and visa and I entered the Iranian school. It was a bit difficult at the beginning, the school was bigger and there were many more students there” Shokoufe (age 23) dropped out of school when she reached the second grade of middle school. She did not give a reason for why she had dropped out, but instead described her study path”I started studying when I was about 14-15 at an institute. I learnt the first and second year through Literacy Movement Organization of Iran. Then I moved to the Afghan school and studied there for three years and finally I went to another center for two more years”. 

Perhaps the case of Kobra is the best example of educational complications and personal agency to combat them. Kobra (23) who has recently been admitted to university said” When we went back to Afghanistan, we had to give up our residence cards. When we came back [after 9 months] we had nothing. Until the 3rd or 4th grade of elementary school, I used the residence card of someone else; who was a distant relative. Her name was Fateme. This means at the same time that I went to school, someone else with the same name was studying in another school in Shahr e Ray (suburbs of Tehran in district 20)! Later they announced that they were issuing residence cards and my father applied for them.”
## Table 4.12: Single Respondents - Educational Attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Years Iran</th>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Admitted to University</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; high school – Between schools</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Drop out 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; middle school</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; high school – Public school</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>High school Diploma</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Drop out 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; middle school</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; middle school- Public school</td>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; middle school- Public school</td>
<td>8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Drop out 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; middle school</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home-based bag making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Admitted to University</td>
<td>Traditional school</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; elementary- Naser center</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home-based embroidery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; elementary- Naser center</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8 months</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; elementary- Naser center</td>
<td>Parents: Dead</td>
<td>Sister: Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home-based bag making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; elementary- Naser center</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home-based bag making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only a few respondents worked personally as well. In case of Kobra, her father owned a seamstress workshop and thus the whole family worked together at the workshop. Shokoufe—who had dropped out of school, made bags at home and was taking hair styling classes at the center to be able to work as a certified hair stylist. Rahime and Soheila both attended school at Naser-Khosrow center and also did home-based embroidery and bag making respectively.

In regards to their parents’ literacy, clear differences exist between their fathers and mothers. Except for one, all of the mothers were reported to be illiterate. The one literate mother had studied in adult school till the 5<sup>th</sup> grade, however according to her daughter, Kobra: “she had forgotten it all”. Among the fathers only 4 cases were reported to be illiterate. Interestingly those respondents who had illiterate fathers had either dropped out school or were among those with lower educational attainment levels at the Naser-Khosrow center. The rest had educational levels between 3<sup>rd</sup> grades to having finished middle school.

The occupational choices of the respondents’ fathers were more or less similar to those of the husbands of the Married respondent group. Bag making, clothes manufacturing, being a porter and vendor in the bazaar, manual labor like construction work or glass cutting and finally working at
industrial slaughter houses were among their jobs. Only one of the mothers did home-based bag making. The others did not work and were ‘housewives’.

## 4.6.2 Earnings, Savings and Costs

The respondents in the married group were asked about the finances of their household in regards to earnings made by them-if they worked- and their husbands.

According to the respondents, their husbands earned between 500,000 Toman to 1,000,000 Toman per month. This will be approximately the equivalent of 145-290 Euros/month (as of the currency rate of August 2014). Resulted by various controversies, official sources tend to be vague about Iran’s average poverty line. Following the expert views by academies, poverty line in the urban areas can range between 1,000,000 Toman to 2,230,000 Toman per month (Fararu 12 July 2014; IRNA 12 July 2013). From another perspective, the average earning rate of the urban households in year 2012 is estimated to be 1,800,000 Toman per month (Iran statistical Center 2012). This rate is likely to be used as a base line for entitlement to the national subsidy scheme for Iranian families (Fararu 3 March 2014). Following either of these two estimates, the respondents’ households’ income levels is below the average income needed for living in an urban area as well as the poverty line.

Among the respondents, three of them clearly stated that their [husband’s] earnings was not enough to cover the household costs and that they would always need to borrow money. For example Faride, whose husband sells dates in the Bazar said “we do not have enough earnings. The life of six people cannot go by with selling dates. The gas, electricity and water bills are very expensive and they are getting worse now”. Fateme also mentioned that her husband who is a construction worker earns too little; “He earns very little, we often have to borrow money to pay for our expenses”. In neither of the cases the respondents mentioned the exact amount of their husband’s earnings, but insisted on the fact that it was too little and not enough. Also some respondents said that they did not know how much the husband earned exactly. For example Anis (age 26) whose husband is a porter in the Bazaar said that “It is not clear [how much he earns]. I do not know, sometimes it is little, sometimes it is more”. Reihane, whose husband has his own bag making workshop, did not seem to know the exact amount of her husband’s earning: “So far I have never asked him [the husband] how much he earns. He earns well and we are comfortable. It more depends on the market, if the market is good they do well as well”.
The respondents who were involved in home-based jobs could not give an exact estimate of their own monthly earning, as their assignments were temporary. Based on what they said, it seemed that the price of making a bag could vary between 200 Toman (0.06 Euro) to 1200 Toman (0.35 Euro). Hoseine (age 41) was the only respondents who earned her living solely from home based bag making. She and her [old] husband prepared 300-400 bags a week. The rest of the respondents, with variations, made between 4 to 10 bags a day. In general they kept emphasizing that they earned very little from their home based jobs.

### TABLE 4-13: MARRIED RESPONDENTS- HOUSEHOLD'S EARNINGS AND SAVINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M #</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Husband job</th>
<th>Husband Earnings</th>
<th>Saving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>Sells dates in Bazaar</td>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>No, only the house deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>Guard at shopping center</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>No, all used for expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme B</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>Not enough</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>500k Toman/month</td>
<td>No, not possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>Porter in bazaar</td>
<td>40-50K Toman/month</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>400-600K Toman/month</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>Care taker</td>
<td>700K Toman/month</td>
<td>A little, in bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz</td>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>600-800K Toman/month</td>
<td>A little in bank and deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab</td>
<td>Bag maker</td>
<td>1M. Toman/month</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>Is enough</td>
<td>Not much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>1M. Toman/month</td>
<td>Nothing at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>30-45K Toman/day</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz</td>
<td>Care taker</td>
<td>600K Toman/month</td>
<td>10 Million Toman deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Rangine</td>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>15-20k Toman/day</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>Makes bag at home</td>
<td>900-950K Toman/month</td>
<td>12 Million Toman deposit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most of the cases the respondents were employed by Iranian employees. Besides the husband who sells dates and those who are porters and do not have an employer, most of the other cases were employed by Iranian employers. However the husbands who worked in the bag making business were employed by Afghan employers from Ghazni, and in one case the respondent’s husband owns his own bag making workshop. In general the respondents seemed to prefer to work for Afghan employers. Arefe whose husband works as a bag maker said “*previously my husband worked somewhere (for seven years) with an Iranian employer. There he earned 750 thousand Toman per month which was very little. At that time an Iranian worker who was just employed earned 1million and 500 thousand Tomans. Now [that the husband wokrs for an Afghan] he earns 1million Toman per month*”. 

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The respondents were asked about their household’s savings. The majority of them claimed it was not possible for them to save any money. 10 respondents clearly mentioned that they had no savings at all. For example Fateme A: “Nothing [to save], only to cover the costs of the house and children’s school and pay the water and electricity bills”.

Some respondents used to have savings, but had to use it for emergencies or for paying back debts. In case of Shahnaz (age 48) whose husband is a porter at the Bazaar “yes [we have savings]. How will it be possible not to have savings, we should save. We have a little in the bank and a little through the deposit for the house. My son had a store but got bankrupt, so we spent all our savings on him, since last year we started to save a little again”. Husband of Zeinab (age23) works in a bag making store and earns one million Toman per month. This is among the highest rates among the respondent group. When asked about savings, Zeinab said: “we do not have any savings now since we had to borrow money for our deposit. Now we are using our savings to give our debt back”.

Some respondents however had some savings. Three of the respondents also mentioned that they have a little money saved in the bank. The rest of the respondents’ referred to the deposit for their residential unit as their possible savings. For example Hoseine (age 48) said: “No we don’t have savings, only the deposit of the house; 12 million [Toman]”. Or Shahnaz B (age 30): “No, not any [savings], but 4 out of 10 [million Toman] of the deposit is our own”.

In Iran in order to rent a residence the tenant and the owner settle a sum of rent to be paid through an advance deposit and a monthly rent. Those who pay higher initial amount of deposit pay less monthly rent and the other way round. During the rental contract, the owner will be able to use the deposit as for investments or other needs. However, the initial deposit should be returned to the tenant at the end of the period of the lease contract. Paying a larger sum of deposit and less rent, seems like a good initiative for keeping some money saved. This condition is actually part of their reason that having a higher initial deposit is more beneficial to the land owner. As the sum of money he should pay back after the certain years of the contract is worth less than what it used to be at the start of the lease period. While some respondent’s considered their rental deposit as their saving, some other had been forced to borrow money in order to pay the deposit. Therefore for some respondents the deposit was seen as added debt.

Savings in terms of gold and jewelry also seems to be common among the respondents (and is also common among Iranian women). While the respondent’s did not have any gold savings any more,
they did mention having sold their “wedding gold” to help with expenses and in particular the deposit. Examples can be seen through Faride (age 24): “with six people in the house, it is very difficult to have savings, there was a little bit of wedding gold [that belonged to me] which we added on to our “deposit” for the house”. And also Arefe (age 21) who had recently separated her house from her mother in law: “we do not have any savings at all, during the month whatever we earn we give to the land owner. We wanted to separate our house and we had no money. So I sold all my gold and I borrowed some money from my sister as well. My sister told me not to sell my gold, as its value would increase, my husband said the same as well, but I said no”.

Neither of the respondents among the married group had a bank account personally. In three cases their husbands had a bank account and one respondent was not sure, but thought maybe her husband could have an account. Hoseine (age 41) also mentioned that while she and her husband did not have a bank account, their sons did: “they [the sons] are young and should have things as such [bank accounts]”.

The single respondent’s household economy also showed similar patterns to those of the married groups. However the respondents in this group seemed to be less aware about the exact amount of their household’s savings and earnings. Their fathers (or in cases the father was too old or dead, their brothers and brothers in law) earned between 400K Toman- 1 Million Toman per month. Mothers of the respondents were mainly housewives and rarely carried out home-based work. An exception was seen in Kobra’s case. Her father owns a clothes manufacturing business and therefore Kobra’s mother and sisters in law do home-based work in the form of adding the finishing touches on the clothes.

The Single respondents who did home based work often worked along with another sister and mainly did embroidery work, which they would receive from Iranians and other Afghans employers. For example Shokoufe and her sister do home-based work during the days: “we get the assignments from other Afghans, we do the final work on shirts and get 200 Toman per each one. During the day we make around 20 -30 shirts”. However these assignments are not constant and she only gets them every other week or even less frequently. Rahime along with her older sister does embroidery work on wedding and night gowns. “We [me and my sisters] get the gowns from an Iranian woman who has a clothes making workshop, I earn about 100- 160 thousand Toman per month.” Parvin and her sister do a variety of home-based works including embroidery, packaging of clothes and gluing bags.
Among the single respondents, similar to the married respondents, the majority of employers were Iranians. An exception is Kobra’s family. Her father owns a clothes manufacturing business in which their whole family works together. As Kobra describe the situation “the year we arrived back in Iran, my brother was already working in a seamstress workshop and took the rest of my brothers there. At that time we didn’t have any capital. Then an Iranian person [who was in the same business] told my father and brothers that he would provide them with textile and they could produce clothes, then my father’s business progressed”.

The Single respondents also did not have much knowledge about their household’s savings; a few respondents thought “maybe they had a little saving in the bank”. The rest simply did not think they had savings. Rahime and Shakila both mentioned how their households had recently spent all their savings, due to health problems in the family. In case of Rahime (age 14) “my father’s leg was broken and he could not work for two years, therefore we could not have any savings as we spent all we had, now we are saving again but we are in debt and have to pay it back”. And Shakila (age 13) “we lost everything; my brother was hit by a car. We had to pay a lot to the hospital”.

The frequency of having a bank account was higher among the Single group, but still more than half of the respondents lacked one. Five respondents out of 14 respondents had their personal accounts. Two other respondents also mentioned that their father’s and sisters had a bank account but they had not one yet. Parvin who had been in Iran for the shortest amount of time did not know what a bank account was used for and how one could have one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father’s job</th>
<th>Father’s earning</th>
<th>Saving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>Enough for rent and utilities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>Enough for rent and utilities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>Seamstress workshop</td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>Seamstress workshop</td>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>Glass cutter</td>
<td>400k Toman/month</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>800-900k Toman/month</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>Enough for rent and utilities</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>Bag making-brother</td>
<td>600-700K Toman/month</td>
<td>A little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>Seamstress workshop</td>
<td>Enough for rent and utilities</td>
<td>A little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>Chicken slaughter house</td>
<td>250K Toman/week</td>
<td>Not any more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>Chicken slaughter house</td>
<td>250k Toman/week</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4-14: SINGLE RESPONDENTS - HOUSEHOLD'S EARNING AND SAVINGS
4.6.3 WORKING CONDITIONS

Working hours are an important aspect of the Afghan’s unfavorable condition in Iran. A complete understanding of their earnings needs consideration of the working hours spent for it.

Based on the interview results with the married and single groups of respondents, their husband and fathers worked between 6 – 17 hours per day. Among those working the least hours, one worked as a porter in the Bazaar and did not have an employer. The other two cases worked at the chicken slaughter house. Those working in manual labor and construction worked full days from 6:00 or 8:00 am to around 8:00 pm. Those working in clothes manufacturing workshops and bag making workshops had the longest work hours, commonly starting at 7:00 or 8:00 am and finishing around midnight or by 1:00 am. According to Fahime around the time of Iranian new year when there is more demand for clothes and bags, her father would sleep in the workshop and work from 6:00 am to 4:00 am.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Working hours</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Working hours</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sells dates in Bazaar</td>
<td>7:00 am-9:00 pm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Makes bag at home</td>
<td>8:00-00:00am</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard at shopping center</td>
<td>8:00 am- 10:pm</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>8:00am- 00:00am</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>8:00 am-8:00pm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>8:00am- 00:00am</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>7:00 am-8:00 pm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>10:am- 8:00 pm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Clothes manufacturing</td>
<td>7:00am-11:00pm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter + Care taker</td>
<td>No schedule</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Clothes manufacturing</td>
<td>7:00am 11:00pm</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>8:00 am -8:00pm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Glass cutter</td>
<td>8:00 am -7:00 pm</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>6:00 am- 7:00 pm</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Porter in Bazaar</td>
<td>8:30 am-7:30 pm</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care taker</td>
<td>All week</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>8:00am-00:00am</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>No schedule</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bag making- brother</td>
<td>7:00 am- 9:00pm</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag maker</td>
<td>8:00 am – 11:pm</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Clothes manufacturing</td>
<td>8:00 am-10:00pm</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>8:00 am- 12:am</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Slaughter house</td>
<td>6:30 am- 1:00 pm</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>7:00 am- 00:am</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Slaughter house</td>
<td>8:00am-4:00 pm</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>8:00 am – 6:00 pm</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>7:00 am- 00:00 am</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care taker</td>
<td>Works all week</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Construction worker</td>
<td>5:30 am-8:00 pm</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter in Bazar</td>
<td>8:00-4:00</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of the husbands and fathers of the respondents had any source of work insurance and unemployment benefits. The same would apply to all the respondents in regards to health insurance.
4.6.4 HEALTH CONDITIONS AND MEDICAL CARE

The respondents were asked about prevalence of any type of sickness or health problem in their household. 5 respondents answered that no one in their household had any problems. The rest mentioned a range of health issues such as: blood pressure and high cholesterol (4), pain in the back and legs (3) digestive problems (1), problems with vision and hearing (3), kidney problems (1), heart problems (4), asthma (1), nervous problems due to stress and shock (3), broken arms and legs (4), pregnancy (1) and special conditions such as unwanted pregnancy and abortion (1) or circumcision of the sons (1). Among these some would take medication and had visited a physician. In cases that the cost of treatment was very high (for example the heart operation required for the sister in law with heart problems) the only available option would be to wait and try to get by, as the respondents could not afford the costs. Trying to not getting sick therefore avoiding medical care was another strategy suggested by Hoseine (age 41): “We don’t need the doctor that much. From the beginning we didn’t let the kids to get used to going to the doctor that often, we raised them in a way that they would be though”.

For receiving medical care and treatment, the respondents used different options. A common point seemed to be trying to find the cheaper options. Some areas had charity clinics that would be practically free. However the respondents seemed to only rely on the charity clinics for very minor problems, in other cases depending on the severity of the problem the choices would be small [non-charity] clinics, public hospitals and finally specialized doctors. On average the hospitals and clinics the respondents referred to charged between 7,000 Toman – 12,000 Toman per visit. That would be the equivalent of 2 to 4 Euros. In cases they had to go to the specialist the cost would rise as high as 30,000 Toman to 75,000 Toman per visit, or about 9-21 Euro.

Some respondents had never referred to any health facilities so far. For example Shahnaz (age 30) who had been living in Tehran for three years claimed that: “I have not been anywhere [for getting medical care] yet, I don’t know any clinics at all”. And Fateme A (age 24-28) who had lived in Tehran for 9 years said that in case they needed medical care they would go to the clinic, but “we have not been yet”. Some of the respondents mentioned going back to Afghanistan for receiving medical treatment. For example Khalede (age 26) had a case of uterine prolapse and went back to Afghanistan for treatment purposes.
Having limited access to health care and medical services is not limited to Afghans. Many Iranian residents of the neighborhood also lack health insurance. According to the informants at the centers, in order to help the residents of the neighborhood Aynade and Naser-Khosrow centers bring in volunteer specialists such as optometrists and dentists at least once per year to offer services to the center’s participants. Also the social workers in the centers often tried to help the younger respondents through their own connections and with reliance on their social working files. This was the case for Shakila (age 13) who had her arm in the cast during the time of the interviews: “The social worker took me to the hospital and did everything for me, at the end it cost me nothing”.

### 4.6.5 Possessions

The respondents were asked about their possessions. Sewing machines, cell phones and motor vehicles were the main point of inquiry. Sewing machines were included as a possible means of livelihood and a resource. It seemed a plausible asset as the Ayandeh center offered vocational seamstress courses with a valid work certificate. Neither of the women however possessed a sewing machine, nor even used one. Accordingly they did not take part in the seamstressing courses. An interesting point that only came up during further conversations was the fact that there are minimum literacy requirements for the seamstressing courses, as the participants should be able to read and follow the sketches. At the same time the type of home based work the respondents were mainly involved in – bag making – did not seem to require much use for a sewing machine.

Besides four respondents all the rest had cell phones. Afghan’s in Iran can obtain pre-paid sim cards; however in order to have it registered they need a valid identification document such as an Amayesh card or a passport. Among the respondents, only one respondent had registered her cell-phone herself. The rest had equally had it done by their husbands (who had cards) or by Iranians; who at times they knew and at other times did not know. A few respondents had also asked their friends with passports and cards to register their phones for them.

Registration of possessions using the identification documents of an Iranian is a common strategy among the Afghan community. In case of a cell-phone, no risk is associated with such a procedure. Accordingly some of the respondents did not know the Iranian persons that had registered their cell phones for them closely or personally. Nevertheless, the respondents had not faced any problems so far. Some of them however knew the Iranian person, usually through their husband’s or son’s
work relations. In one case, the respondent’s son had also bought a car and had it registered using the Identification of his Iranian colleague. However all the respondents emphasized that in cases of registering valuable assets, for example a car or a house; as they had seen being done by their relatives, the Iranian person must be well known and well trusted. Usually it was the husband who knew Iranian’s through means of work. In one case one respondent said that a distant relative of her was married to an Iranian woman. That was the same person who registered the respondent’s phone for her.

The household expenses for all respondent’s consisted of rent and utilities, followed by food and clothing and if still money was left other possible expenses. In one case part of the household expenses was also sending money back to Afghanistan, for the relatives of the husband. Depending on the initial amount of the deposit and also size of the accommodation the amount of rent varied between no rent at all to 700,000 Toman per month with the average of 150,000 - 250,000 Toman/month. Among those respondents who did not pay any rent at all, 2 respondents were caretakers and their accommodation costs were covered by the employee. The rest had paid higher down payments; ranging from 20 Million to 30 Million Toman. Also expense sharing strategies in cases of extended households seemed to be common among the extended family, as for example one respondent mentioned that her husband paid for the deposit and instead her brother in law (husband’s brother) pays the rent. The amount of utilities seemed to be more or less the same for all households and around 40K-50K Toman (11-14 Euros) per month. Most respondents seemed to buy their food supplies in bulk, in most cases every 3-4 months. This bulk shopping would be done by the husband, and at times the wives would accompany him or along with the husband. Costs of education for children who attended public schools (were in possession of a valid residence permit) were another major monthly cost. The respondents paid between 135,000 Toman – 450,000 Toman per year as school fees for each of their children. This fee is broken down to monthly payments.

Among the Single group a few respondents (3) had a computer or had a family member who was in possession of a computer. Some of them however mentioned that their computer was very old and not really functional. Most of the respondents had a cell phone. Two of the respondents had registered their cell phones themselves using their passports. Two other had also had their cell-phones registered through their sisters and friends. The rest had their phone registered with the help of Iranian employers of their brothers or fathers.
Besides one case, no one in either of the groups owned a car or had a driver’s license in the respondents’ household. The one exception was the son of one respondent who had an international driver’s license and also had a car; registered in the name of an Iranian. One respondent mentioned that her sister’s husband has a car now and her own husband would like to buy one as well if he could save enough money. Iranian law prevents Afghans from obtaining a drivers license in Iran, but according to the same respondent it is possible to take driving lessons just to learn how to drive without taking the final certificate test. The lessons however are expensive. In response to if the respondents’ household was in possession of a car or not, Hosseine (age 41) who had lived in Iran with her family for a long time responded that: “no, we are not ambitious as such, we live the immigrant life”.

4.6.6 RESIDENTIAL AREA AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF THE HOUSE

Location of the house, type of tenure, quality and conditions of the housing and the size of the house are factors that can affect people’s vulnerability and coping capacity in earthquake events. This section of the data deals with the physical aspects of the respondents accommodations.

The respondents were asked about their type of tenure, nationality of their land owner, size of their residential unit and quality of their accommodation. None of the respondents owned their accommodation. They were all tenants to Iranian land owners. Among the Married and Single groups of respondents size of the residential unit varied form one room to four rooms, with two and three rooms being more common trend. The respondents had varying degrees of access to private bathrooms (showers) and kitchens. For example Anis and her family (5 people) lived in two rooms without a bathroom and hot water. Or Shahnaz B and her household (5 people) lived in two rooms without a kitchen.

The two respondents who were care takers lived in newly built but small structures. In particular case of Nasrin, her husband is a care taker for an office building. His employers have built a small container house of 12 square meters in which he and his family of 6 live together. As Nasrin mentioned their small residence has a small kitchen and a small bathroom as well. The other example is Soraya whose husband is a care taker. She and her family of six live in two roof top rooms in the same building that her husband works at.
### TABLE 4-16: MARRIED AND SINGLE RESPONDENTS, SIZE AND RENT OF THE ACCOMODATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># M+S</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Household size</th>
<th>Residence size</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>150k T/m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>No rent - High deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme M</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 room</td>
<td>30k T/month- 10M deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>700Kt/M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 rooms</td>
<td>No rent - Care takers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 room- no hot water &amp; shower</td>
<td>Brother in law pays rent We pay very little</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>4 rooms</td>
<td>No rent- 30 M T deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 room</td>
<td>No rent-Care taker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>~10</td>
<td>4 room</td>
<td>170K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 room 2 floors</td>
<td>No rent - High deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>400K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>No rent- 22M T deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3 rooms</td>
<td>No rent- 22-23 M deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 room- No kitchen</td>
<td>170k T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>No rent- Deposit 12 M T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>200-300K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>200-300K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4 room</td>
<td>350k T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4room</td>
<td>350K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 room</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>200K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>200-300K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>150K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4room</td>
<td>530K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3 room</td>
<td>No rent - 23M T deposit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>150K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>400K T/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 room</td>
<td>170 K/month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some respondents shared the rooms with their in laws among two different floors. For example Zeinab B, her husband and two children share three rooms between two floors with her in laws. As she puts it “we got a two floor place, my mother and father in law are on the first floor and we are on top. My sister in law is also with them, and there is a brother in law who has been here [in Iran] for a few months now”.

Malake lives in a household consisting of 9 people. She has 5 children and lives with her sister in law, her husband and her husband’s first wife and her one daughter. Malake is the second wife. Their residence has three rooms. Malake describes the distribution of the rooms as “There are two rooms, one for us [she and her children] and one belongs to her [the second wife] and her daughter, there is also a big living room and kitchen and bathroom”.
Respondents were asked about the physical characteristics of their accommodation. Most of the respondents described their homes as “old”. In most cases these old structures were associated with narrow streets, stained and cracked walls and old and problematic pipelines and taps. Some common statements included “Walls are falling”, “Taps are leaking”, “walls are ruined” and “windows are broken”.

The age and condition of the residences varied from being categorized as old and vulnerable urban fabric to “old but fine and clean”. Arefe described her current residence as average built, and compared it with her previous accommodation “It is around 10 years old and newly painted. The house is good for now, in our previous home, the ceiling fell over our heads”.

In regards to the required repairs, respondents mostly mentioned pipelines and heating. More or less equal numbers of respondents would have their repairs done and paid for by the owner or had to do it and pay for it on their own. However, it seemed that in the former condition there was always a risk associated with the owner’s reimbursement of the repair costs. Examples include: Hoseine “we pay for the repairs ourselves. We paid 250K [Toman] for broken pipes and the owner never gave us our money back”. Arefe “in our previous place we fixed the ceiling, then it was very difficult to get the money [cost of repair] back from the owner”. Or Zienab B “We paid 30-40K Toman to repair the door and now owner does not pay us back”. As a result, it seemed that the respondents preferred to tolerate the problems (e.g. dysfunctional heating, problematic pipes, sewage problems) and not pay extra for repairing it. Also chances of getting repairs done were much lower in units categorized as vulnerable and old urban fabric. In an attempt to encourage urban renewal, governmental subsidies are available to owners of such structures, for complete reconstruction of their structures. Since the owners of such structures plan to eventually destroy and reconstruct their units, they do not spend any extra money on repairs and renovation needed on their structures.

Respondents were also asked about their neighbors. All respondents distinguished their neighbors based on their nationality. Most of the neighbors seemed to be Iranians. Some respondents however mentioned having Afghan neighbors. Neither of the respondents seemed to be much familiar with their neighbors. For example, Zeinab B: “there are two Afghans and the rest are Iranians”. Fateme M: “Most neighbors are Iranians but I don’t know them”. Anis: “Most neighbors are Iranians. I do not know them much as they don’t have children’’. Hoseine: “I don’t know them [the neighbors] well, they are Iranians”. Yasaman “They the neighbors are mostly Iranian, so far I
have not seen any Afghans”. And Khalede whole lived on a street that held many bag stores: “Afghans live on the second floor of our building, but I do not know much about the Iranians”. Some of the respondents claimed that they did not have neighbors as they did not live in residential areas; Shahnaz A: “We don’t have neighbors. All other buildings are storages”. Malake: “We don’t have neighbors. Below us are seamstress workshops. There is only one single man across from us, who is very nice. [He is] Iranian” and Nasrin: “No, we don’t have neighbors, there are only office buildings.”

The respondents were asked if they knew about the conditions of the accommodations of their neighbors or their tenure type. Type of housing tenure seemed to be the major cause of difference in housing quality of Iranian and Afghan neighbors. Apparently the Iranian neighbors frequently owned their residential unit. It seemed as if the housing structures were similar for all who had rented their homes, however most respondents mentioned that Iranian neighbors who owned their own housing unit, had renovated it. Some examples include Farzane: “The neighbors are mainly Iranian house owners, their houses are all nice houses, they are painted and clean, but there are also some Afghan tenants”. Maryam: “they [the neighbors] are Iranian and owners. It is their own house, so of course has better conditions”. And Finally Rahime: “The neighbors are mostly Iranian owners and 2-3 Afghan tenants. Afghans have old places but Iranians bought new houses”.

4.7 GROUP THREE: STRUCTURE OF THE FAMILY

This section offers information about the sample group’s household structure through data about size and type of their household indicated by number of the people living in the household and their relations with the respondents. In addition number of working members in each household is also investigated. Data about family formation norms such as relations between respondents and their husbands as well as their age of marriage are collected as an indicator of lifestyle patterns and a measure of comparison between lives of Iranian and Afghan women in Iran. Intra-household dynamics are explored through asking about decision making patterns and power relations in the family.
Respondents were asked about their age when they got married and their number of children. The marriage age for respondents varied between 12-23; with most of the respondents falling within the age range of 14-18. The marriage age of respondents correspond with the general patterns of early marriage among Afghans. Age of marriage for Afghan women; both in Afghanistan and also in Iran, is much lower when compared to age of marriage for Iranian women.

Besides one all the other respondents were married to people they had ethnic and familial relations with. The exception was the case of Shahnaz B who said “My husband is a stranger”; she further explained that “we are not related in any way”. For the rest of the respondents, the majority were married to their first cousins (13 cases), a distant relative (1 case) and a neighbor living in the same town/village (1 case). For example Arefe (age 21) who got married at age 14: “My husband is my cousin, my aunt called my mother and asked her for my hand. My father in law came and brought me here with my mother and father. They stayed here for three months and went back”. The marriage patterns of the respondents corresponds whit findings of Abbasi-Shavazi et al. on marriage patterns among the first and sometimes the second generation Afghans in Iran (2012).

The respondents in the married group had between 2 to 8 children. The majority of the respondents have 2 and 3 children (11). Only two respondents, Hoseine age 41 and Zeinab age 36 had 7 and 8 children respectively. Besides one respondent (25 years old) who had 4 children the other respondents in their twenties had two or three children. It is likely to imagine lower numbers of children for the younger respondents; compared to the general patterns among Afghans, can be a result of their age and that in time they would have more children as well. It is interesting that during the initial interviews an interesting point of linguistic confusion occurred about the respondent’s number of children. The Farsi term used for children “Bache” refers to all children and includes sons and daughters equally. However the same terminology in the Dari accent is only used for referring to the male children, or sons. This point of confusion however was discovered quickly when I would ask the respondents about the exact number of their daughters and sons.

Equal numbers of respondents lived in households consisting only of the nuclear family (husband and children) and extended family structures. The extended family consisted of mother in law; sister in law; bother in law and also sons and daughters in law for those respondents who were older. For example Zeinab A (aged 38) said that her pregnant daughter in law (aged 18) lived with her. The
daughter in law had come from Afghanistan and is the wife to Zainbab A’s son who is 16 years old. In some cases (for example Nasrin aged 24) the respondents were taking care of children of their relatives (husband’s brother or sister) while the parents of those children had been back to Afghanistan. Besides one respondent who used to live with her mother in law for 4 years and had recently moved to a separate place, the others all who lived “alone” mentioned the reason for their living situation as: “we do not have any one here; all our relatives are in Afghanistan”.

Household size for Married respondents varied from 4 to 10 members, including the extended family. It seemed that the household size had a quick turnover, as the extended family members were likely to change frequently. Especially in cases when new family members would arrive from Afghanistan. In general in most cases the husband was the only working member in the family. In one of these cases, while the respondent herself was not working due to caretaking of her children, her sister in law worked as a domestic worker. Also older respondents mentioned their daughters in law to be involved in home-based jobs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Age of marriage</th>
<th>Number of children and age</th>
<th>Other people in the household</th>
<th>Household Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>~18</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>Mother and Sister in Law</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>~17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mother, Sister &amp; Brother in law</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>~19</td>
<td>4, 6, 8</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme B</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>~18</td>
<td>8,12</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6,7,8</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,6,8</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>~26</td>
<td>~18</td>
<td>2,8, 5</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9,14, 16, 11,12,16</td>
<td>Daughter in law</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>~24</td>
<td>~17</td>
<td>8m, 5</td>
<td>Sister in law’s children (5, 13)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>~18</td>
<td>13,19,22, 24, 28</td>
<td>Sons and wives and children</td>
<td>Min 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>~16</td>
<td>1,4,5</td>
<td>Mother, sister &amp; brother in law</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>~17</td>
<td>2, 5</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13,7 months</td>
<td>4,10,11</td>
<td>Sister in law &amp; Husband’s first wife</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>~18</td>
<td>7,10,12,18,22</td>
<td>No one</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Compared to the married respondents, the number of children seemed to be much higher in the households of single respondents. This can be due to the higher ages of their parents, especially in the cases that the respondents were the youngest children. In general the respondents in this group had between 3 to 6 other siblings, with the majority having 6 siblings and only one having 3 other siblings. Similar to the married group, the respondents had equal patterns of living in the nuclear family or having extended family structures. The difference with the married group however is that in most cases the added member to the household would be their sister in law (wife of the brother) coming from Afghanistan. In case of Rahime (age 14) her married sister and her husband also lived with the respondent’s family. In most cases the wives of the brothers had recently arrived from Afghanistan. Including parents, siblings living at home and their spouses the household size for the single group varied from 5 to 11 members. In these households it seemed that the fathers and brother were the main members contributing to the household’s economy. Sisters –when living at home- were reported to be carrying out home-based work. However the sisters were mainly married and lived with their own husband and his family.

In one case (Shakila age 13); the household members were not part of an extended family. Instead her family lives together their distant relatives, who are a family of seven themselves. This was not the case in regards to any other respondents, even though some of them reported sharing kitchen and bathrooms with their neighbors. Among all the respondents, Shakila’s household seemed to have the least resources. He father has passed away when she was very young and her mother –the second wife of the father- is already old and does not work. The only bread winners of the household seem to be her older brother (ages 15 and 18) who work in the industrial slaughter house.
The respondents were also asked about their sibling’s educational achievements and occupations. In general it seemed that the boys of each household tend to enter the labor market and start working while the girls seem to be more involved in studying. Among the siblings, most sisters were reported to be students (up to the age of 19), while brothers of the same age range were already working. However, this pattern could be more a result of different socio-economic conditions associated with the two centers rather than different patterns between girls and boys in Afghan families. It should be noted that the younger working boys were brothers of Rahime, Shakila, Parvin and Soheila who have all been contacted in Naser-Khosrow center. While still in the same district and zone of Ayande center, the participants in Naser-Khosrow center seem to be having a lower socio-economic status. Also the three respondents themselves were among those involved in home-based jobs, a condition that; except one respondents, was not that common among the participants in Ayande center. In regards to older siblings, brothers above the age of 20 all worked and seemed to have lower educational attainments; if any. With two exceptions, all sisters over the age of 20 were married. The exceptional cases were the sisters attending the university. The married sisters were mostly housewives. Only one sister (age 18) worked outside of the house as a seamstress.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Brothers</th>
<th>What they do</th>
<th>Sisters</th>
<th>What they do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8, 22</td>
<td>8: Student 22: School dropout, works in bag making- married from Afghanistan</td>
<td>16, 17</td>
<td>Both are students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8, 22</td>
<td>8: Student 22: School dropout, works in bag making- married from Afghanistan</td>
<td>16, 18</td>
<td>16: student, 18: has Diploma – admitted to university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23, 26, 29</td>
<td>23 &amp; 29: Married and work in Iran 26 is a shoe maker in Afghanistan</td>
<td>19, 21, 24</td>
<td>19: Student, 21: University, 24: married with children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8, 10, 12</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>14, 20, 23</td>
<td>14: Student, 20: Diploma, 23: University student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8, 10, 12</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>14, 15, 23</td>
<td>14 &amp; 15: Student, 23: University student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25, 29</td>
<td>25: Construction worker, single 29: unemployed, single, drug addict</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Married and separated. She and her children work with aunt’s husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Construction worker in Karaj, comes home once a week</td>
<td>10, 17, 21, 22, 26</td>
<td>10 &amp; 17: Students 21 &amp; 22: married housewives in Tehran 26: married housewife in Karaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8, 23</td>
<td>8: Student 22: School dropout, works in bag making- married from Afghanistan</td>
<td>18, 17</td>
<td>18: Diploma- admitted to the university, 17: High school student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27, 32, 33, 35, 36</td>
<td>27: unemployed in Turkey, 32, works in restaurant in Turkey, 33 and 35: Sell dates in Bazaar in Iran, 36: has a shop in Afghanistan 33 married in Afghanistan, the rest in Iran- all married relatives</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 36</td>
<td>All in Iran, all work in father’s seamstress workshop. Have studied a little but not much</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Works in slaughter house</td>
<td>8, 10, 18, 20, 26</td>
<td>8: public school, 10 studies at Naser, 18: works out as a seamstress, 20: married and housewife, 26 married and lives at home does home based embroidery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15, 18, 29</td>
<td>15: knows how to read and write, 15 and 18 work in chicken slaughter house and live at home, 29: In Afghanistan, recently married</td>
<td>19, 20, 30</td>
<td>All sisters are in Afghanistan, married housewives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Works with brother in law in bag making workshop</td>
<td>20, 23, 25</td>
<td>20 and 23: In Afghanistan, married and housewives, 25 married in Iran- home based bag making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Works in bag making</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only case of divorce mentioned by all the respondents is the sister of Omide was separated from her husband. According to the respondent, the divorced sister and her children had moved to Isfahan (about 340 km south of Tehran). The sister (age 27) and her children worked in clothes manufacturing workshop that belongs to the husband of their aunt.
Among the respondents – as well as the Afghan community in general- there is a strong emphasis on divorce and separation being culturally unacceptable choices. Even the younger girls emphasized that “we Afghans never get a divorce”, however they also acknowledged that it is becoming more common: “Before divorce was really rare, but in the past years I have seen some cases” In fact spread of the phenomena of divorce in the Afghan community is viewed as a negative side effect of living in Iran, where divorce rates are pretty high. The fact that “getting a divorce is so normal and common in Iran” was used repeatedly by the respondents in explaining why the Afghan girls do not marry Iranian men. The statement “we Afghans marry Iranian women, but we never give our girls to them” is clearly visible in mixed marriage patterns in Iran as well. The existing data deals with Iranian women who had married Afghan men and not the other way around.

In response to the question “What if the husband is very bad to his wife and for example constantly hits the wife and makes life difficult for her?” the respondents answer; with varying degrees of approval, was that: “If the woman is from a good family and respects her family’s honor, there is nothing to do but suffer and carry on. As we [Afghans] view divorce as a very bad thing”. Arefe (age21) talked about her sister’s domestic affairs and situation in her household: “Even here in Iran, they [the husbands] hit their wives. My sister’s husband is a very good man, but my sister is stressed and argues with him, so he hits her often”. After mentioning the problems that her sister (age 30-35) has with her husband she continued “my father used to say it is better for a woman to die than to get a divorce. If my father finds out that my sister argues with her husband he will be very upset”.

4.7.2 INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS; DECISIONS AND PERMISSIONS

The final part of data about the respondents’ households deals with power relations and patterns of decision making in the household. The respondents were asked about decision making patterns in their households as well as their liberties in regards to uptake of different actions.

In general among the married group it seemed that the major household decisions were taken by the husband and sometimes the sons. It was more common for the respondents (the wives) to be in charge of daily choices, especially in regards to food and daily supplies. The same patterns were visible about the deciding for the household’s expenses. The respondents were in charge of the minor shopping whereas the husbands would attend to the more substantial costs and needs. The wives however would accompany their husbands in a few cases.
TABLE 4-20; MARRIED RESPONDENTS- DESCISION AND PERMISSIONS WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

| #M | Name        | Who decides for household expenses? | Who buys the household goods?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>We do not have big expenses</td>
<td>Together, every 3-4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>We decide together</td>
<td>Together every few months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>Husband provides and decides</td>
<td>Husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme B</td>
<td>Husband pays and I decide</td>
<td>Myself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>Husband pays</td>
<td>Myself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>Husband decides, I do not understand these issues</td>
<td>Husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>Husband makes the decisions</td>
<td>Mostly husband. I do the little shoppings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>Husband and Sons</td>
<td>Husband and sons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>Husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>We all decide</td>
<td>We all decide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>I say what we need and husband decides if we will get it or not</td>
<td>If the shopping is little I do it, if not together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>I decide for what we need in the house, and my husband decides for other things</td>
<td>Before I did the shopping myself, but now that I am pregnant my husband does it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>My husband gives me 300KT/m for monthly costs and I decide about them. But he decides about the main costs</td>
<td>I buy everything myself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>Whoever who has the money decides how to spend it</td>
<td>Whoever has worked and been paid does the shopping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>Myself</td>
<td>I do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>No one in particular, we all spend together</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents were asked if they were allowed to work, go to classes and go out with their friends or with other women. It was very interesting to see that in case of all respondents, even those who did not attend the literacy class, the husbands were in favor of their attending the lessons. Lessons, however, were often limited to just learning how to read and write and did not cover vocational trainings and other sorts of courses. A good example is Fateme A who said “my husband does not permit me to do anything besides studying. He tells me to go learn how to read and write, but does not let me come to other classes. He does not like any of those; neither seamstressing nor hair styling; nothing. He just likes me to study”.

In some ways there seems to be a fine balance between working and studying. The respondents frequently knew other women whose husband’s did not permit them to attend the literacy courses. For example “last year, there was a woman who attended the classes and really liked to study, but her husband wanted her to stay in and do home-based work, she had many problems with her husband”. Or “One of our relatives went to classes for a while, but her husband said, no, don’t go anymore. Here everyone is working, where you want to go instead of working, so she stopped going”. The respondents mentioned location and distance of the educational center as another
factor that could influence permission patterns: “My sister in law likes to come to classes, but her husband says no, it is far away and you should not go”.

In regards to working, five respondents clearly mentioned that their husbands “do not like them to work” or “do not permit them to work”. Among those is Arefe (age 21) who makes bags and does embroidery at home. She says “if I do not have other chores, I do embroidery or make bags. The money [from the work] will belong to me. But my husband does not let me do this. This last time that I brought some bags he argued with me. An Afghan man brings me the bags and my husband says he does not like stranger men to come and bring bags for me”. In addition six other respondents mentioned that they do not work, not because their husbands do not permit them but since they do not have the time, or do not know the type of works that are done in Iran. Some of them however mentioned that they really liked to work and it is only due to having kids that they cannot. Some of the respondents, who were not permitted to work, also did not have the permission to go out alone or with their friends for example to the park or market or other places for entertainment. However a larger number of the women mentioned that they do not like to care for going out with other women themselves. Hoseine (age 48) said “my husband does not like me to go out with other women, but I don’t go myself in any case, I am not the type of women who wants to go out all the time”. Shahnaz (age 48) who goes out with other women in summer time says “but in the neighborhood I try not to go out much, here [in the neighborhood] we have a lot of relatives and I do not want them to say I am a woman who goes to places a lot”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#M</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Does your husband permit you to</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Go to classes</th>
<th>Go out with friend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme M</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab *</td>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, only goes out with husband</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz *</td>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but not much in neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Only with husband, or Zeinab’s house (#11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe *</td>
<td>No, but works</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, with goes out with sister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>Does not work</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not alone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not go anywhere at all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No and I do not like to go out myself as well</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Compared to the married group, the respondents from the single group did not have much detailed information about the decisions making patterns in their household. In six cases the father or brother in law; in case there was no working father, was the only person making the decisions. In case of Rahime (age 14) the situation was slightly different. In her household her married working sister was also involved in decision makings. This could be due to the fact that the sister was in Iran already and Rahime and her family came to Iran to stay with her. In two cases the respondents mentioned that the father would discuss his decision with them (the children). These were the cases of Masoume and her sister Somaye who claimed their father and mother both made the decisions but they ask the children’s opinion as well. The other case was Farzane and her sisters Parvane and Fahime. Farzane who was the eldest of the sisters said her father would also ask for her opinion in some decisions. This was not the case with her two younger sisters. She also claimed that “mother does not know anything; she cannot make decisions at all”. While not in the same words, her sisters had more or less the same view. In two cases the decision making was shared between the two parents. Among those Yasaman (age 15) gave a clear explanation of the dynamics of it “My father decides the amount of money. And my mother decides what to buy with the money”. It was only in the case of Shakila (age 13) that her mother made the decisions in the household. However the father of the family was dead.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Does your father/family permit you to</th>
<th>Who makes the decisions at home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Come to the Center</td>
<td>Go out alone/with friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>Yes, mostly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasamn</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to permissions (for studying and going out), compared to the married group, the respondents seemed to face more flexible conditions. Some of the respondents were not permitted
to go out with their friends, but they could do activities with the centers and school. The rest of the respondents were allowed to go out with their own friends with some conditions like a brother accompanying them or remaining in public and crowded places.

### 4.8 GROUP FOURS: SOCIAL RELATIONS AND NETWORKS

This section covers social networks and relations of the respondents. The information consists of their networks and relations in Afghanistan and in Iran. Networks in Afghanistan consist of respondents’ relations ties to Afghanistan, their properties and possessions there and possible remittances they might send back. Traveling back to Afghanistan or having visitors from Afghanistan is also among the data offered in this section. The data also covers the respondents’ social networks and relations in Iran. It focuses on the daily activities and entertainment options of the respondents personally and with their household members. This will be used for understanding the respondent’s own and family social capital.

Information is an important side product of social relations. Respondents are asked about the way they received information about the center. Moreover they are asked about their general access to news and information through the media such as newspapers, Television and Radio. The interesting aspect here is the type of news they follow, if it is related to Iran or they are more engaged in news and events of Afghanistan.

#### 4.8.1 TIES WITH AFGHANISTAN; SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS

The married group of respondents had most of their relatives in Afghanistan. Nearly all of the respondents’ parents were there as well as their first degree relatives. In regards to relatives in Iran, the respondents mentioned their in-laws. In some cases they had no relatives at all in Iran. Seven of the respondents also had relatives (brothers and cousins) in Turkey and Europe.

The respondent’s from the single group, show different traits in regards to their ties to Afghanistan. Besides those who were born in Afghanistan, nearly all the rest had never been there. The only exception is in case of Kobra whose family moved back to Afghanistan when she was 4-5 years old but returned to Iran after 8-9 months. Those respondents who had been born in Afghanistan also had never gone back since they arrived in Iran. Most of the respondents had relatives back in Afghanistan such as grandparents and aunts and uncles. The respondents also had relatives in Iran,
mainly sister in laws (wives of their brothers) or their grandparents. Similar to the married group, respondents had relatives (including cousins or more distant relatives and a brother in one case) in other countries such as Turkey and Greece, as well as Australia, Canada, the United States, and some parts of Europe.

The respondents were asked if they had any type of property back in Afghanistan. Except four respondents who had nothing at all, the rest had some sort of property ranging from a small cabin to land, orchards and houses. Among the married group half of the respondents mentioned that their belongings in Afghanistan were not worth much and that they were not gaining any benefits from it. Examples include Anis: “No, we have nothing of our own [back in Afghanistan]; if we did we would not be here”. Faride: “Not much, there is a little room with my five brothers all sharing it”. Maryam: “we have [property] in the villages, but it is of no use, when the owner [referring to her husband] is not there having a place does not mean much” and Soraye “my husband has a house, but it is not worth anything”. Zeinab A: “I had a piece of land, it was big, and I gave it to my daughter (age 16) when she got married”. and finally Nasrin: “Not much, there is a little house and a piece of land in the mountains, but there is no water and it is left useless”.

In case of the other half of the respondents, they were actually gaining some profit from their possessions back in Afghanistan. In most cases family members such as brothers or in laws or cousins were attending to their land or living in their houses. Examples were seen in cases of Shanaz A: “Yes, we have property. There are 5-6 orchards; there is also a house in my husband’s village. My husband’s cousin looks after them”. Zeinab B “We have land and orchard. My brother is there taking care of them now”. Malake: “Yes, we have everything; land, orchards and a house. Now the uncle of my children (Her brother in law) looks after them.” Yasaman:” A house in Kabul. Now my aunt lives there “. And finally Shakila “There is a lot of [agricultural] land, now our relatives farm there, we have rented it to them”.

The majority of the respondents in the married group said they did not- and could not- send any money back to Afghanistan. A few mentioned that if their family in Afghanistan really needed money they would try to help, but they could not do much. Only one respondent said if she has money she will send it some back to Afghanistan. However it seemed that sending money or giving financial assistance to the family was a duty of the men of the family. This means that the respondents’ husbands would send money back to support their own family. Also the respondent’s
brothers would send money back to help their parents. The respondents themselves, if they wanted to send something, would most commonly send “gifts” and not money. The same patterns existed among the single group of respondents. Nearly all respondents said that their families send money back to Afghanistan for their grandparents and other relatives. The respondents clarified that that it is their father who sent the money back. Also in one case among the single respondents, the parents send money to their son who had moved to Turkey.

Examples can be seen through Fateme A: “No, is not possible, we don’t have enough money and my husband does not give me any to send back”. Reihane: “I am not allowed to send money back. But my husband sends money for his own brothers and mother”. Nasrin: “No, we cannot afford it at all. My husband sends money for his parents and sister. Also for his older brother who has broken his leg, and has 6 children”. Zeinab A: “My husband sends money for his relatives (uncles and aunts). I sometimes send gifts (souvenirs) for my brother’s children”. And finally Arefe: “I don’t send money, as I have no money. But I send little gifts. But my two brothers who live here send money back”. The same patterns were seen among the Single respondents. Examples can be seen through Kobra: “Not my mother, but my father helps his own relatives”. Somaye: “Yes, for grandparents and uncles”. And Shokoufe: “Yes, we send for my brother (turkey) and also aunts but not much”. The only exception was Malake who said: “Yes, if I have money I send some (100K-50K Toman) for my father. My husband also has a brother and helps him if he can. But now, with all these kids we have a lot of expenses and cannot help”.

Besides Khalede who had been back to Afghanistan for medical reasons, none of the other respondents had gone back since they had arrived in Iran. In one case the husband of Shahnaz (age 48) who has been in Iran for 22 years and had an Amayesh card, went back for a visit. However in order not to give his card back he went by land and also entered the country back by the help of human traffickers. Also Nasrin’s sister in law had gone back to Afghanistan. As the sister in law did not have any entry documents and the embassy was not issuing visas by the time of the interview it was not clear when the sister in law could return to Iran. During this time Nasrin was taking care of her sister in law’s children. She explained the situation as: “My husband’s sister is gone back to Afghanistan, her husband is a drug addict and now she is gone to Kabul to look for him. It is not clear if she will come back or not. Now they [the embassy] do not issue passports any more”. Finally case of Arefe (age 21) her mother had came to visit her during the previous year. “Last year my sister died. A car hit her and she went into a coma and never recovered. My mother came here after that”.
Similar to the married group, travelling back to Afghanistan was not common among the household members of the respondents. Only in case of Farzane (and her sister’s Parvane and Fahime), their father had gone back to Afghanistan four years ago as he really liked to go back and see the country. The girls said that it was a very difficult procedure. Also their brother had recently been back to Afghanistan, where he got married. During the time I was conducting the interviews, the brother and his wife had just gotten back from Afghanistan.

4.8.2 NETWORKS IN IRAN; DAILY ACTIVITIES AND ENTERTAINMENT OPTIONS

Respondents were asked about their usual activities during the day. The married group of respondents more or less had the same pattern; coming to the lessons in the mornings (in both centers), going back home, preparing lunch and attending to children and then doing the housework. Those who did not come to the center also had the same routine minus the lectures. The respondents who came to the centers had heard about the center from other Afghans they knew and some initially used the services of the center for their children and then they found out they could attend classes there. In two cases the husband and brother in laws of respondents were told about this center and the literacy courses for Afghan women by their Iranian employers. In both of these cases the husbands were working in the northern areas of Tehran care takers or doing domestic workers. Following Tehran’s socio-economic stratification, the northern parts have a higher socio-economic level.

Among the single group of respondents, it was common for the respondents to spend the days at school, at Ayande center and in the library for those who were preparing for exams. Masoume (age 20) and Kobra (age 23) also volunteered in the society for protecting the rights of the child (SPRC). The single group of respondents had learnt about the center through other Afghans or by attending other centers of this sort. Many of them have been a regular at the sister branch of the Ayande center (called Koosha center) from a very early age, and had told many others to come to the center themselves. They attended many classes at the center and in general felt a lot of gratitude to the help and support they had received there. The organizers of the centers and the teachers there have a very important role in offering a positive image of the centers and persuading the respondent’s parents and husbands to permit their daughters and wives to participate in the activities of the center. Parvane explained her experience when she first joined the center:” before, my father was much stricter. At the beginning he would not let me and my sisters to come here, but the manager of
the center called him and talked to him many times until he finally believed this center is a good place”. Her older sister Farzane also adds that in her opinion “his father changed after he went to Afghanistan for a visit, at the beginning he did not think studying is important for girls, but after he went to Afghanistan and saw the situation of women there, it became very important for him”.

Kobra who was a member in Koosha center had a similar experience “at the beginning my father and brothers did not let me go to the center. There was a social worker there who was my mentor, he asked for my mother and talked to her. My mother then took my father and brothers to the center and they saw the place. After that one of my brothers started studying there and I did not face any more problems for going”.

4.8.2.1 ENTERTAINMENT OPTIONS

Entertainment options for the married respondents varied from going to the park or attending religious ceremonies, visiting relatives or simply not having any entertainment options. The neighborhood park seemed to be popular with the respondents who would go there with other women, or in company of their husbands and relatives. All respondents said that during the religious festival of Muharam, they would attend the Afghan religious centers (Tekieh) of their neighborhood.

Some examples include; Faride: “Sometimes, we go to the Park (Basij park), and Sometimes to the mosque. My husband does not like to go to movies or people’s houses”. Khalede: “I go to Basij Park, on Thursdays I go to religious sessions (less during the summer)”. Maryam: “I go to the park and also I visit my friend (who is also from the same city as I am) twice in the month”. Hoseine: “For entertainment I take the children to the park or to my sister’s house, but the park is better! ” And Nasrin: “I go to the city Park with my husband. I have never been out with other women.” Or Soraya: “We do not go out that often. Sometimes I take the children out for a walk”. And Anis: “No, we do not go out anywhere at all. If we really want to go out, we go to my brother in law’s”.

Visiting relatives seems to be the most common type of socialization and entertainment: Malake: “We do not have any place to go. When I get lonely I go to my brother in law’s (the uncle of the children) house. The days the weather is nice we go to the park with my father in law and sister in law”; or Arefe: “Every 3-4 months I go visit my sister and brother who live in Damavand- [a recreational area in the suburbs of Tehran]. With my sister I always have a great time; we go to the market or by the river (Jajroud) together.” Zeinab B: “I go to my father’s house. They live in Karaj. Or
I go to my sister’s place”; and Zeinab A: “I go to my relatives’ houses. We leave on Thursdays and come back on Fridays. In the summer time we make plans with the other women and take our tea with us and go out in the evenings”.

In case of the Single respondents entertainment options consisted of going out with their own friends (for those who were permitted to do so), visiting relatives and attending activities organized by schools and the centers. Similar to the married group, all respondents in the single group would also attend the religious festival of Muharam and would go to Afghan religious centers. Examples include: Prvane (age 17): “I am not allowed to go out with my friends. But if I do, we go to the neighborhood’s park or traditional restaurants”. It should be noted that Parvane had a wide range of strategies to be able to spend time with her friends, while she gave the impression that she was involved in activities that were permitted to her. Or Somaye (age 15): “I go out with my friends often. We go to the park”; Yasaman (age 15): “I go out with my friends. During Muharram I go to the religious center” and finally Kobra (age 23): “I go with my friends to the Park (Baharestan or Basij Park). Usually one of my brothers comes with us. If it is us girls only we go through the week and during hours that the park is not crowded.”

Some of the respondents were not allowed to go out on their own, examples include: Farzane (age 18): “We are not allowed to go out with friends, but if the school or the center organizes something we can go. My school used to take us out a lot to the movies, parks and hiking”; Rahime: (age 14) “I go to the park with my mother and father, but I am not allowed to go with my friends”, and Shakila (age 13): “I go to the park with my mother, I cannot go alone”. Contrary to the other respondents, Fahime (age 16) had different interests and options for entertainment: “I do not go out that often, I like to go to [art] museums or the movies with intellectual people, but my friends are not like that and I do not like to hang out with them. They go to the park and the swimming pool but I find it boring and do not like it”.

4.8.2.2 RELATIONS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

Most of the Married respondent’s only had relations with their relatives (their own and their husband’s siblings). Khalede (age 28) has a childhood friend that lives in another neighborhood and sometimes visits her. Besides Maryam (age 32) who knows and has relations with her Iranian neighbor, the rest of the respondents only had relations with other Afghans. The situation was different for their husbands, who often had social relations with other Iranians they knew from
work. Examples include Maryam:” My Husband has more relations with Iranians he meets on the construction site”; or Faride:”My husband has many friends, they are mainly Afghans but there are some Iranians as well”.

This situation could be seen among the family ties and networks of the Single respondents. Their social networks and relations through their family mainly consisted of their relatives: Farzane: “My family mainly hangs out with our relatives. My father is the elderly of the family and also in the neighborhood. He conducts religious activities and gatherings (Tekieh) during Muharam. He has many friends both Iranian and Afghan.” Or Rahime: “We do not have friends. We only have relatives (aunt and uncle and etc.)”. Parvin: “the people we socialize with are my brother in law’s brother, sister, he wife and relatives. They are all Afghan”. And Kobra: “They [her parents] rarely go out and socialize with relatives; instead they stay at home and rest. During Muharram they go to the religious center every night.” There were cases in which the respondent’s family did not have many relations. Examples include; Omide “They do not entertain that much anymore. My brother has an addiction problem and he really bothers my mother. Therefore she is often tired and stays in and watches TV. Before we used to go to Darake on Thursday noon and not come back till after midnight.” Somaye and Masoume: “Our parents do not go out that often. Mother is always at home.” Farzane and Parvane: “They do not socialize much. My mother is mainly at home as she is sick. On Fridays we hang out with my uncle.”

When compared to social relations and networks of the Married group, relations and networks of the respondents in the Single group were more diverse. Their network of friends contained both Iranian and Afghan nationals, and they were involved in different activities and organizations; including the Ayande. The impact of the school and the socio-cultural environment of the Single respondents can be seen in their daily relations. The most visible distinction is the amount of Iranian or Afghan friends, which has a direct relationship with the amount of time that the respondents have spent in public schools or at Afghan schools and other centers.

Masoume who did most of her studies through Afghan schools and also through the Society for protecting the rights of the child said “My friends are Afghans that I met through Association for protection of child laborers”. Her younger sister Somaye had been to the public school for most of her education. She says her friends are “Mostly Iranian. I met them at school. There are also two Afghan girls at school and I know them a bit.” Shakila (age 13) who studied at the Naser-Khosrow
center says that her friends were” mainly Afghans. I know them from school and the neighborhood. There are not many Iranians at school”. Fahime (age 16) and her sisters show a strong preference for having Iranian friends. “When I was at elementary school everyone was an Afghan, but now all my classmates are Iranian. I know a few (maybe two or three) Afghans but I am not close with them”. Her middle sister Parvane (age 17) explains that “Since we are raised and grown in Iran and have studied here, we are more similar to Iranians. Sometimes among my compatriots, I feel they are not as aware as myself. Some of the Afghans really do not know what is going on. Afghanistan has not been a country to teach us much”. In regards to her friends Parvane says: “My friends are all Iranian. I am more comfortable with them. There is only one other Afghan among all my friends.” Their older sister Frazane (age 18) also shows the same pattern “I have many friends both at school and here at the center. They are all Iranian. I cannot get along with Afghans that well”. This situation is not so common among the rest of the respondent group. Kobra (age 23) went through a mix of all possible educational options; she describes her friends as “Iranian and Afghan both. I have met them both through school”. Yasaman (age 15) describes her friends as “Mostly Afghans. I have met my friends at school or here (Ayande center). But I have a good relationship with Iranians that I have met”. And finally Rahime:” My friends are both Iranian and Afghan. But I am closer to the Afghans and we go to each others’ houses.”

The social circle of the respondents who had a lower participation is social activities (such as school or educational centers) showed different patterns. The best example is Shokoufe, who had dropped out of close when she was in middle school and instead did home based work with her sister. In describing her social relations Shokoufe (age 23) mentioned that she socialized with “mainly relatives. I do not have stranger friends”. And finally Parvin (age 16) who had arrived in Iran 8 months prior to the interview said she does not have any friends yet but “at school there is this little girl (3rd grade, probably 9-10 years old) that sits next me and we study together”.

4.8.2.3 INTERESTS AND WISHES

The respondents showed different interests and priorities compared to those of the married group. Most of the respondents who came to Ayande center were also members in another empowerment neighbor in the neighborhood as well. Fahime (age 16) was interested in music and also creative writing. Yasaman (age 15) took English lessons at a language school and had enrolled in a volleyball
training class; Masoume (age 20) was interested in Drama and literature and was a member of Afghanistan’s association for arts and theater.

The Married and Single group of respondents were asked if there were activities they wished to carry on (for example attending a course to attend, or joining a social group) but they could not at the moment. The responses to this question were an interesting reflection of lifestyle patterns and their daily activities and interactions. The respondent’s from the Married group identified their level of literacy as the biggest impediment to their desired activities. In case of the Single respondents, the limiting factor was the cost of the activity. The range of activities also varied distinctly between the two groups. The married respondents mentioned they were interested in attending Quran lessons and also going to Seamstress courses. The Single respondents on the other hand liked to take piano and dancing lessons, join fitness centers or become a go swimming. In one case the limiting factor was announced to be lack of time, and that was in case of Masoume who liked to join the Afghanistan Literary Association, but could not at the time, as she was busy preparing for the university entrance exam.

The Single respondent’s wishes and desires can be a reflection of their intra-household dynamics. A difference in this regard can be seen in case of those Single respondents’ whose family had a much more traditional and patriarchal pattern. An example can be Rahime (age 14) who at the time of the interviews was attending the 5th grade of elementary school at Naser-Khosrow center: “I just wish to be able to finish my studies, I really like to continue studying, but my father says that 6th grade is enough for me”. Education seemed to also be the top priority of Parvin (age 16) who had recently moved to Iran and was living with her sister and brother in law. During the eight months of being in Iran, she had been attending the school at the Naser-Khosrow center along with doing home-based work with her sister. Back in Afghanistan she used to live with her uncle and his wife as her parents had died when she was a small girl. When talking about her wishes, Parvin said: “Studying is what I really like to do, I had studied until the second grade in Afghanistan, after that my uncle did not permit me to learn any more. His wife told me to stay at home and work. She said what do you want to do with learning? You did not learn while you were a child, what good will it do to you now?”

Regardless of the differences between lifestyles and priorities of the Married and Single group, there seemed to be one particular desire the two groups seemed to have in common; to obtain a drivers license. Iran’s regulations ban Afghan nationals from obtaining a drivers license. The respondents
mentioned that they would be just as happy with only learning to drive, but the high cost of the
driving lessons seemed to be hindering fulfillment of this wish.

4.8.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

News and information sources are important factors in understanding daily life conditions of the
respondents. Sources and types of news that the respondent’s follow can show their level of
interest in Iran or Afghanistan’s’ affair as well as offering a general level of their awareness about
global events. Moreover in particular case of earthquakes and hazards in Tehran, news sources; TV
or the newspapers, are some common sources for awareness rising and informative action. The
respondents were asked about their information about news and events of the world or Iran and
Afghanistan as well as their news sources. Eventually the respondents were asked to give an
element of a recent piece of news they have heard.

The Married respondents, in accordance with their level of literacy, rarely read books or
newspapers. Their main source of news was the TV. However five respondents that they did not
follow the news at all, the rest would watch both Afghan and Iranian TV. The number of the
respondents following the Afghan TV channels was higher than those following the Iranian TV. In
regards to recent news also most of the respondents referred to suicide and explosive incidents in
Afghanistan as well as the upcoming presidential election of Afghanistan. Neither of the Married
respondents mentioned any news related to Iran.
Compared to the Married respondents, the respondents from the Single group read books and newspapers more often. Those who read books were mostly interested in fiction and novels, with a few cases who liked to read life-coaching and social books. The majority of the respondents did not read the newspapers at all; those who did mainly followed the social and entertainment sections of some of the morning newspapers. In regards to news, four respondents mentioned that they did not follow the news at all. The others mainly watched the news on TV when their father’s did. They were mostly interested in news related to Afghanistan. In regards to recent events they referred to Afghanistan’s upcoming elections, suicide bombings and explosions in different parts of Afghanistan. Two respondents also mentioned news about affairs of Iran and Syria.

TABLE 4-23: MARRIED GROUP- NEWS SOURCES AND INTEREST IN NEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Do you read</th>
<th>Do you follow the news</th>
<th>What is a recent news event you know about</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Husband - sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- TV</td>
<td>Elections - Suicide bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>24-28</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme B</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes-Afghan TV</td>
<td>Elections - Suicide bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Yes - for school</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Afgha TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No- I don’t like to</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ZeinabA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes-Afghan TV</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>~ 24</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Husband- Afghan TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Iranian TV and Afgha TV and BBC</td>
<td>22 soldiers died in a Taliban attack- News of Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ZeinabB</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Iranian and Afghan TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Yes, stories</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Iranian TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>No never</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Nothing special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Afghan new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Iranian TV</td>
<td>Could not hear it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to the Married respondents, the respondents from the Single group read books and newspapers more often. Those who read books were mostly interested in fiction and novels, with a few cases who liked to read life-coaching and social books. The majority of the respondents did not read the newspapers at all; those who did mainly followed the social and entertainment sections of some of the morning newspapers. In regards to news, four respondents mentioned that they did not follow the news at all. The others mainly watched the news on TV when their father’s did. They were mostly interested in news related to Afghanistan. In regards to recent events they referred to Afghanistan’s upcoming elections, suicide bombings and explosions in different parts of Afghanistan. Two respondents also mentioned news about affairs of Iran and Syria.
### TABLE 4.24: SINGLE GROUP- NEWS SOURCES AND INTEREST IN NEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Do you follow the news?</th>
<th>What is a recent news event you know?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Fiction</td>
<td>Yes-Hamshahri entertainment pages</td>
<td>Yes-Iranian TV (for news about Afghanistan)</td>
<td>A hacker boy has found the account numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fiction</td>
<td>Yes-Hamshahri; Iran Entertainment pages</td>
<td>Yes – TV</td>
<td>Bombing in a bank- Rouhani had met Obama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sometimes- TV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fiction</td>
<td>What my dad buys</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Social fiction</td>
<td>Yes- Arman newspaper</td>
<td>Yes – TV</td>
<td>Geneva Convention News of elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sometimes Afghan TV</td>
<td>Suicide bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasaman</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fiction</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Life coaching</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>My father does</td>
<td>Afghanistan-US affairs Scientific news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Historical fiction</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes- Afghan TV</td>
<td>The election news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sometimes-Afghan TV</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s football team won- There will be elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Sometimes-Afghan TV</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>I look at them</td>
<td>Some newspapers- don't know the name</td>
<td>Yes-Iran and Afghan TV</td>
<td>The events of Syria, The elections have not started yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.9 APPEARANCE AND TREATMENT BY IRANIANS

Relations and encounters with Iranians in public spaces, on the streets and in school constitute part of the daily encounters of Afghans and are important factors in shaping modes of receptions for Afghans in Iran. The respondents therefore were asked about the way they were treated by Iranians on the streets or on places that they knew them. Discriminatory behavior towards Afghans in Iran is not a rare phenomenon. Such a behavior is often based on physical characteristics, such as having the central Asian features. Such a feature is often known as an Afghan look in Iran. Public treatment and behavior towards the respondents will be investigated in the light of their physical appearance, choice of outfit and accent.
As can be seen in Table 4-25 and Table 4-26, nearly all respondents had experienced some sort of discriminatory behavior or at least knew of others who had such an experience. Such a behavior for the Married respondents usually entailed being called by the derogatory term of *Afghani* as well as unpleasant encounters in the public, especially in the bakery or on the bus. In case of the married respondents, at times the abusive behavior targeted their higher number of children and larger size of the households. There seems to be a direct link between the respondent’s appearance and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># M</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Outfit and Appearance</th>
<th>How do people treat you on the street?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Faride</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Casual style – “Iranian” looks, slight accent</td>
<td>People treat me good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khalede</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Casual style- “Iranian” looks, slight accent</td>
<td>No particular problem yet. At school first they said they would not accept my son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fateme A</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chador- “Afghan” looks, Dari Dari dialect</td>
<td>Is okay, not bad, Some say things like <em>Afghani</em> why do you buy so much bread. But better people are more than bad people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fateme M</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Chador- “Afghan” looks, Very strong Dari dialect</td>
<td>Sometimes shout at me. Call me <em>Afghani</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maryam</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Casual style- “Afghan” looks, slight accent</td>
<td>Nothing special. Nowadays no one is nice to any one anyways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks, Dari dialect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Anis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chador- “Afghan” looks, Dari dialect</td>
<td>On the streets people call me <em>Afghani</em>. A woman screamed at me and my children.” <em>Afghani</em>, why do you have so many children?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zeinab A</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Iranian” looks Very strong Dari dialect</td>
<td>It is fine. I stand up for myself and people cannot do much with us. But maybe if I am not with my children, people will tell things to them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nasrin</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks, Slight accent</td>
<td>No one has ever told me anything. Since I never go out, my husband does all the shopping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shanaz A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Casual style, “Iranian” looks, No distinct accent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zeinab B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Black scarf and maybe a chador, “Iranian” looks, No distinct accent</td>
<td>Sometimes people treat Afghans bad. But it has not happened often to me. It happens more for my relatives; in the bakery or the stores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reyhane</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Distinct “Afghan” looks, slight Dari dialect</td>
<td>It happens a lot. People always look down at us, say bad words.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arefe</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Colorful scarf and Chador- “Afghan” looks, Dari dialect</td>
<td>Here, people keep calling us <em>Afghani</em>. Two years ago a woman picked an argument with me in the bus and then said “<em>Afghani</em>, you live in our country and still say nonsense as well?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Malake</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Casual style—“Iranian” looks, Dari accent</td>
<td>Have not noticed anything special.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shahnaz B</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chador- “Afghan” looks, slight Dari dialect</td>
<td>People treat me fine. I have not had a problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hoseine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Chador- “Afghan look”, Dari dialect</td>
<td>I do not have a problem. Unless you are bad yourself, no one will treat you bad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
frequency of discriminatory behavior. Those respondents who look more similar to Iranian’s were rarely harassed in the public. Another interesting point is that it seems those respondents whose choice of outfit was less conservative and more causal or even trendy had experienced less discrimination as well. While the size of sample and amount of the data do not allow for making generalizations, this condition can be contributed to the fact that these respondents did not portray the expected image and picture of Afghan women; that of a completely covered woman perhaps in a black chador.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Appearance and accent</th>
<th>How do people treat you on the street?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Farzane</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks, No accent at all</td>
<td>They (boys) call me Afghani or Chinese. There is a lot of bad treatment but I try not to get upset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Parvane</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks, No accent at all</td>
<td>People treat Afghans badly. They ask my [Iranian] friends why they are friends with an Afghan. Boys call me Afghani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nazi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Casual style, “Iranian” look No accent</td>
<td>I have not experienced many problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somaye</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Casual style, “Iranian” look No accent</td>
<td>I personally have not experienced anything, but I see on the street that people treat Afghans bad, for example if they are seated in the bus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Masoume</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Casual style, “Iranian” look No accent</td>
<td>People do not treat me bad, but I know they treat other Afghans different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Omide</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks No accent</td>
<td>On the streets people say stuff. I try to control myself and not respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yasmin</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks No accent</td>
<td>Some people treat me nicely, some not. Before it happened more often, but lately it is better.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fahime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Iranian” looks No accent</td>
<td>I have many friends and they all treat me well, also on the street is the same. It depends on one’s personality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shokoufe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Casual style, “Iranian looks” No accent</td>
<td>Boys say things and I don’t like it but they do not say anything in particular about being Afghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kobra</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Trendy style, “Afghan” looks No accent</td>
<td>Depends on the neighborhoods. No matter how comfortable I still feel like an Afghani here. Always someone might come and say something to you.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rahime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>School uniform, “Afghan” looks Slight accent</td>
<td>Boys on the street say different things call me Afghani, but I do not mind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shakila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>School uniform, “Iranian” looks Not much accent</td>
<td>It’s fine. Nobody says anything to anyone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parvin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Conservative/religious style “Afghan” looks, Dari dialect</td>
<td>I try to not to be noticed to avoid problems. But sometimes it happens in buses or such places. There is nothing we can do, these things just happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Soheila</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>School uniform- Afghan looks No accent</td>
<td>No particular problem so far.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Single respondents also showed similar patterns. Most of the respondents were familiar with discriminatory behavior. In their case however, due to their younger age and type of activities the
harassment was mainly from younger boys who would see them on the streets. Similar to the Married respondents, facial features and looks had an important role in the respondent’s treatment by Iranians. Some of the respondents mentioned that in their experience such a treatment would highly vary based on different locations of the city. Kobra for example mentioned that “If I lived slightly more up-town I would not even face half as much of the discrimination that I face now”.

4.10 GROUP FIVE: RISK AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS

The respondents were asked if they knew anything about occurrence of an earthquake in Tehran, or if they had ever heard any one talk about it. In particular the respondents were asked of any municipal officials had conducted awareness rising activities in their neighborhoods and communities. They were also asked about possible safety measures and action at the time of an earthquake.

Neither of the respondent groups had ever seen officials coming to their neighborhood and teaching them about earthquakes or safety measure. Among the married group of respondents half of the group had heard about earthquakes in Tehran or experienced light ones since they had moved to Tehran, while the rest had either not heard anything about earthquakes in Tehran at all (6) or had hears something a long time ago and did not remember it well (3). Those who had not heard anything about earthquakes also mentioned that they never listened to the news, and moreover they did not have any contacts with anyone so they would not know about it anyways. In words of one Hoseine (age 41), “I don’t remember much about Earth quakes. It is because I don’t have many relations with people. If I am with people at a [religious] session or something like that or if I go somewhere I will hear news. But now I am busy and do not go anywhere”. Or Fateme A (age 24-28) “I have not heard about earth quakes. I don’t listen to news and therefore I do not hear about things”.

Those who knew more about earthquakes had heard about it from news and especially on TV. For example Shahnaz (48) said “Yes I have heard about it on TV, if an earth quake happens in Tehran the water will raise”. Having heard about earthquakes however, does not mean that the respondents would take it seriously. When talking about earthquakes, Arefe (21) mentioned that “Yes I have heard. It happens more in cities as they dig wells. But I am not afraid of earthquakes. A few years ago before having my child I had argued with my husband and I was nervous. Then I saw the walls
are shaking and thought it was due to my stress levels. Later I noticed it was an earthquake. They also announced it at the news later”. Also many of the respondents who had heard about possibility of an earthquake did not take it that seriously. For example Soraya (25) says “Yes, I heard about it a long time ago. They just say there will be an earthquake. They just say so.”

In regards to what should be done in an event of an earthquake, most respondents were not so sure about what to do. Some simply mentioned they did not know how to act at the time of an earthquake. Others suggested that they should either run out (7) or hide inside (3). A few respondents had also heard that it is safer to take shelter under a table or the door frame. Examples include Maryam (32): “Every place is dangerous in the house. One has to go out. If I am out, then I should stand still”. Khalede (26): “Hide if you are inside. My son has heard at school that one should go under chairs”. Shahnaz (48) “One should go under the table and door frame” and Zeinab (23) “Go under the table, next to the wall or go out. Avoid glass and lamps”. Besides these measures some respondents mentioned that one should read the proper Sura of Quran and the earthquake related prayers. When asked what the Sura and Prayer were, they admitted that they did not know it. For example Zeinab (36): “They say do not go out, there is also an earthquake prayer (Earthquake Sura) that one should read to reduce the impacts of the earthquake. But I do not know the prayer well”.

The Single respondents showed a different pattern of risk information and safety measures. Only one respondent who had recently arrived in Iran had not heard anything about the earthquake. The rest of the respondents had heard about the possibility of an earth quake. However some of them thought it was just a rumor. For example according to Farzane (18) “Yes I have heard about it. It is just a rumor. An earthquake will not happen in Tehran” or Prvane 17 “I have heard. But it was not true. It has happened before though”. Some respondents however had more in depth knowledge about the reasons behind and consequences of the earth quake. For example Masoume (20) knew that “I have heard Tehran will be destroyed in case of an earth quake as there is a fault under Tehran. The only safe neighborhoods are Enqelab Street and Milad Tower” And Fahime said “Yes I know. Every certain amount of years an earth quake happens in Tehran. Now 5-6 years has past and still it has not occurred”. Kobra (23) believed different reasons to be behind an earthquake, she said that “If an earthquake happens in Tehran no one will remain alive. Some say it is due to sins and gods punishment”.

The respondents who had attended public school all knew the correct earthquake drill in case of an earthquake. They had learnt it during the earthquake drill at school or at the center from other teachers. The earthquake drill is an emergency practice repeated on a yearly basis at all public schools. Those respondents studying at Naser-Khosrow center however did not exactly know about the safety measures at the time of an earthquake, however they had a general idea about safety measures, as people from the fire fighting department had visited the center a few times. The only respondent who had not heard anything about the possibility of an earthquake and the related safety measures was Parvin who had recently arrived in Iran. When asked what should be done in case of an earthquake Parvin said “If an earth quake happens I should go out and if it is terrifying I should read the Quran and do the earth quake prayer”.

4.11 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

The methods and finding section introduces the secondary and primary data sources and explains the reasons behinds such a choice. The secondary data sources are categorized based on their application at various levels of the analysis. These data sources are chosen and selected following the theoretical framework of the research and aim to highlight the social relations and power structures that influence daily lives of Afghan women at state and society levels. Therefore this level of data aims to shape a picture of daily lives of women as well as Afghans in Iran. Iran’s sate policies and regulations in regards to both women and Afghan immigrants are introduced and their impacts on daily lives are described. In case of the daily lives of Afghans, this is done through an introduction of Iran’s migration polices and it’s variations during the past thirty years as well as measures of internal and external control that are adopted and implemented by the Iranian state.

The findings of the secondary data sources will be complimented with empirical findings from the primary data sources; Afghan women and girls. The empirical data is collected using qualitative methods of interviews as well as participatory observations. The methods data introduces the sites of data collection as well as the sample group. The chapter then advances to present the findings of the interviews. The empirical findings are presented under five main groups; general characteristics of the respondents, socio-economic conditions of the Afghan households, structure of the family among respondents, respondents’ social networks and relations and finally risk awareness and preparedness in case of an earthquake. These findings aim to draw a picture of daily life conditions
of the respondents (Afghan women and girls) with a particular focus on their intra-household dynamics.

Together the findings of the secondary and primary data sources will be used to gain an understanding of structural factors shaping daily lives of Afghan women and girls and the ways in which these factors influence their levels of vulnerability in normal life conditions as well as in case of a given disaster.
5 CHAPTER FIVE: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Discussions chapter tries to bring together the theories and data discussed in chapters 3 and 4 and conduct an analysis of how social inequalities influence vulnerability and coping capacity of Afghan women in conditions of daily life as well as in the case of a disaster. The idea is that the existing patterns of social inequality – seen through effects of social structures and institutions at different levels- influence the process of marginalization or the ability for social mobility for different groups and individuals.

The outcome of these conditions is translated into the amount of access different groups have to resources that shape their livelihoods. Access patterns shape the amount of access Afghans have to different resources and therefore are an indicator of livelihoods of the Afghan women and girls and their households. The command a household has over a bundle of resources is an important determinant of the household’s ability to prepare for, cope with and recover from the impacts of a given hazard. In other words, livelihoods and access patterns can explain differential vulnerability of various groups of people in conditions of everyday life and in the face of a hazard. Iran’s context of reception is assessed to see how the combination of state policies, native society and the immigrant community of Afghans inside the country influence marginalization or potential for upward mobility of Afghans in general and Afghan women and girls in particular. The impact of structural conditions is studied with consideration of manifestations of agency of Afghans women and girls and various strategies they opt for to improve their livelihood conditions. The interactions of structure and agency for Afghan women can outline their eventual levels of marginalization and or mobility. These factors are then used to explain for progression of vulnerability in daily lives of Afghans in Iran.

A focal point of the discussions is to find the intersections between the ways gender and immigrant status; in combination with one another, impact the inequalities or opportunities that the sample group faces. The discussions chapter therefore tries to offer a multi-level perspective of the impacts of the contextual factors on daily lives of Afghan women; from the impact of policies and legislation, to access to services and finally intra-household relations.

Finally livelihoods of Afghans and the command they have over their resources and assets are used as to assess their ability to prepare for and cope with the effects of a given earthquake in Iran. This is done through an assessment of Afghan’s level of access to several important coping mechanisms
in earthquake hazards; namely those of impact minimizing and post event recovery. Eventually, the final conditions of Afghans livelihoods will be used as an indication of how social inequalities and structural limitations in the daily lives of Afghans—including Afghan women and girls—are translated into their disaster vulnerability and coping mechanisms.

5.1 IRAN AS A HOST COUNTRY; CONTEXT OF RECEPTION

The context of reception at the host country is an important factor influencing the lives of the immigrants; and consequently their level of integration and mobility or marginalization and exclusion, at their destination. Based on their reception level, countries will have different stands and policies towards immigrants and hence will apply different measures of external and internal control. Receptiveness of the host society is operationalized in terms of reception—or hostility—of government authorities and the native population as well as existence of social networks among the migrant’s groups. These are entangled patterns of economical, political and legal contexts that form more or less coherent patterns that organize life chances of the newcomers (Portes and Borocz 1998). Marginality, on the other hand, is a complex condition of drawbacks that individuals and communities may experience because of disadvantages which may arise from unequal or inequitable ethnic, cultural, social, political and economic factors (Mehretu et al. 2000).

If applied to the vulnerability framework of this research, context of reception can be seen through social relations and power structures functioning at state and society levels. In each of these conditions, personal choices are made with consideration of the contextual factors such as Iran’s policies and regulations towards Afghans as well as community and personal networks which constitute the microstructures of migration. Society level relations between Iranians and Afghans are also important as they can facilitate or limit choices and opportunities of the Afghan nationals and hence impact their possible marginalization. The combined impacts of the state and societal level factors also have the ability to influence the intra-household dynamics and power asymmetries for Afghan women and girls.

On the first level, the receptiveness of the host country can be seen through its migration policies and strategies for enhancing or limiting inflow of migrants. Although a continuum of possible governmental responses exists, the basic options are exclusion, passive acceptance, or active encouragement (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). These strategies are often manifested through
measures of external and internal control. Measures of external control are often applied at the borders or through visa policies and agreements with the host country whereas strategies for internal control tend to pressure the migrants by limiting their access to services and labor market (Ambrosini 2008). Iranian refugee/migration policies for Afghan nationals have shown many fluctuations and variations during the past thirty years. From the open door policy to sealed borders and introduction of residence visas, these strategies have undergone a tremendous amount of change in their receptiveness, affecting the population of Afghans already inside the country as well as the new waves of Afghan inflow. Iran’s levels of reception and migration policies towards Afghans can be seen through four different phases. Each of these phases, as indicated in Table 5-1, has different characteristics in regards to measures of external and internal control applied by the Iranian government, and therefore has different implications in lives of Afghans.

Depending on the timing of their arrival and context of reception, immigrants can find themselves confronting dramatically different situations, and hence face different choices and options in their lives in the host country (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). In fact the respondents (both married and single) have shown different patterns in their length of stay in Iran with the least being 8 months and the most being 23 years. The same variations were visible among their parents and or husbands; whose length of stay varied between 4 to 39 years in the country. This means the respondents had arrived in Iran during various phases of Iran’s migration polices; from 1991-2013 for the respondents and 1975-2010 for their husbands and parents. The variations in time of entry can be viewed as a temporal factor in analysis of marginalization or social mobility of Afghans. Based on their time of arrival, Iran’s respective level of reception have affected the respondents and their household members differently. This condition was especially visible among the second generation respondents whose parents had entered the country through the phase of “Iran’s open door policy”.

TABLE 5-1: IRAN’S REFUGEE AND VISA POLICIES TOWARDS AFGHANS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee/Visa policies</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1: Open boarders</td>
<td>1979-1992</td>
<td>Automatic granting of permit to stay</td>
<td>Access to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Work permits (limited jobs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2: Repatriation</td>
<td>1992-2000</td>
<td>Repatriation is encouraged and then pressured through measures of internal control</td>
<td>• Confiscation of work permits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Withdrawal of health care and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Restrictions on mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Restrictions on investment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3: Sealed border</td>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>Entry restrictions for Afghans</td>
<td>• Consideration of newly arrived Afghans as “illegal”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4: Re-registration &amp;</td>
<td>2003- now</td>
<td>Granting of:</td>
<td>• UNHCR considers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Regularization</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Amayesh cards (mostly in 2003)</td>
<td>Amayesh card holders as refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Work permits (2008)</td>
<td>• Many Afghans obtain passports and visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Residence visa (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first phase (1979-1992) can be seen as a limited period during which Iran had high receptivity for Afghans with practically no measures of external control. This is the time period in which the first big wave of Afghan’s arrived in as a result of the soviet occupation (Wickramasekara et al. 2006). During this period Afghan’s were entitled to access to basic rights and services, while they still faced masseurs of internal control in regards to the labor market. Perhaps in regards to modes of incorporation, Iran could be considered a neutral country towards Afghans during that period. This situation changed tremendously from 1992 with the implementation of the repatriation policies. This phase can be seen as the beginning of a long process of institutionalized exclusion of Afghans in Iran. In order to achieve the repatriation strategies and encourage -if not pressure- return to Afghanistan, severe measures of internal control were implemented during the second phase and the residence cards (Blue cards) of many of the registered Afghan “refugees” were confiscated. This does not necessarily mean that they left the country. Moreover the repatriation period coincides with the period of civil wars in Afghanistan. Accordingly the second largest wave of Afghan inflow to Iran has taken place during this era (Wickramasekara et al. 2006). Large inflow of Afghans along with confiscation of the residence cards of those Afghans already inside the country are both important elements in raising the irregular Afghan population in Iran. Lack of residence documents is an important factor in marginalization of Afghans in Iran, as irregular migrants are excluded from access to basic rights and entitlements, and in constant risk of arrest and deportation. Iran’s
repatriation policies serve as determinants of socio-political exclusion and vulnerability in lives of Afghans. Moreover the idea of “illegality” of Afghans in Iran is often used as the rationale behind discriminatory by the public towards Afghans in Iran. Institutionalized constraints therefore are likely to causes the irregular Afghans to become further marginalized over time and prone to exploitation and discrimination, leading to a spiral into poverty (Sabates Wheeler and Feldman 2011; Sabates-Wheeler and Macauslan 2007). In addition, as part of the repatriation strategies, increased restrictions were imposed on the documented Afghans limiting their access to basic services and rights and hence minimizing Afghans’ range of livelihoods promoting strategies.

From the year 2000 onward, Iranian policies incorporated strong measures of external control along with the already established internal restrictions. The most severe phase was seen in the duration of 2000-2003, when Iran announced its borders to be closed to Afghanistan. As of 2003, Amayesh cards were re-introduced. These cards were only available to those Afghans who had been registered during the 80’s and the 90’s. The Amayesheh scheme does not cover those Afghan aliens who arrived during the second phase. Eventually as of 2011, with the introduction of Comprehensive Regulation Plan (CRP) Afghans were able to obtain a residence visa provided that they had a passport; either in the form of a family passport (for those Afghan men who are married and lived in Iran with their family) or an individual passport (for single Afghan men).

Introduction of Amayesh cards and residence visas seem to create a margin of opportunity for regular stay of Afghans in Iran and can be interpreted as signs of tolerance of Afghans by the Iranian state. In effect however, Amayesh cards and residence visas can act as an extra measure of exclusion for Afghan aliens. These permits are valid for short periods of time and the process of renewal of the documents is complicated and expensive. High cost of the visa renewal was reportedly mentioned by the respondents who had valid residence permits, and at times was the reason behind their selective approach for renewal of the residence permit based on the household’s financial priorities. Besides the costs of the process, the needed documents and requirements keep changing constantly and information about the process is distributed poorly. As a result of such complications, Afghans –who are in possession of a residence permit- are likely to lose possession of their permit during a period in their lives; as it was the case with some of the respondent’s husbands or fathers. This is an important factor as Afghans in possession of a residence permit are those who have spent the longest time in Iran; having arrived during the 80’s.
Being likely to be deprived of the residence permit, regardless of length of stay and having established a livelihood, increases the precariousness of lives of Afghans in Iran.

An example of impacts of such complications can be seen in regards to regulations for exiting Iran. Amayesh-registered Afghans lose their status in Iran if they leave the country, provided that the Iranian authorities are aware of it. As mentioned by the respondents, one common reason for loss of the residence cards of their husbands or father was complying with Iran’s polices in regards to visiting Afghanistan. An Afghan citizen who leaves Iran is obliged to hand in his or her Amayesh card to the authorities in order to apply for a laissez-passer. If a person then returns to Iran, he or she will be considered an illegal immigrant (LandInfo 2012). Despite long durations of stay in Iran (over 20 years) and the fact that many of the respondents had not even left Iran after giving their cards back, reclaiming the cards was a complicated and time consuming procedure for the respondents fathers and husbands. For those respondents who managed to revalidate their cards, the process took around 9-10 years during which they lived with an irregular status.

The extra complicated procedures for keeping a residence permit might be a strategy of internal control by the Iranian government and an indirect measure of encouraging repatriation. In response to this condition, while not universal, there seems to be a visible relationship between the lengths of stay of the respondents’ households in Iran with their success in regaining their “legal” status. This process is not resulted by Iranian policies and regulations about Afghans, but instead is a result of the accumulation of knowledge and transfer of information among the Afghan population. It seems that length of stay is likely to increase knowledge and information about the bureaucratic procedures needed for keeping a residence permit and staying within the legal requirements of its validity. The collected empirical data indicates that those respondents, who had lived without a permit for a certain period of their lives, were initially deprived of their permits due to lack of enough knowledge and understanding of the difficulties imposed by the Iranian regime. The results also indicate that those respondents, who were more knowledgeable about importance of a permit and had more information about the required official measures, had finally managed to regain their permits and cards even though the process had taken a long time. An interesting outcome of this situation is the way in which poor distribution of information and data by the government is substituted by informal sources initiated by Afghans themselves. This is most visible through numerous websites and blogs that run by Afghans and aim to provide the latest updates, information and instructions about processes related to renewal of residence cards, visas and work
permits (for a few examples see Khavari 2014; Nazari 2014; Rezaie 2014). This is important as many of the Afghans seem to be reluctant to trust the vague instructions for renewal of the permits, especially when the process of entails giving up the permits and instead receiving a receipt. There seems to be a strong network of support among Afghans that has become possible through access to the internet technology. Access to such networks of support however requires a minimum of skills (literacy) as well as ability to access the websites which at the very least requires access to a computer and internet.

Experience of living in Iran and gaining familiarity with Iran’s complicated regulation about maintenance of residence permits, has increased the range of strategies adopted by the Afghan national to resume their regular status. For example to avoid complications of exiting Iran without losing their residence documents, a common counter strategy has gained popularity among the Afghans in Iran. According to the respondents whose husbands or other relatives had made a trip back to Afghanistan, it was much more common to take the irregular path; referred to by the respondents as “Azad” literally meaning free, rather than following the legal route of giving up one’s permit and obtaining exit documents. While this strategy helps with maintenance of the residence permit in the long term perspective, in the short term results in “irregularity” if the regular migrants This means that even the documented Afghans who are in possession of a valid residence permit, are likely to live under the conditions of an irregular migrant. The “transit stage” then becomes a recurrent stage in lives of Afghans in Iran; even for those who are already established in the destination country.

The mentioned counter strategy can be seen as a sign of agency of the Afghans in dealing with structural restrictions imposed on them through Iran’s migration policies. At the same time, such strategies are highly likely to act as an additional measure of marginalization and disadvantage. The option of human trafficking for the purpose of a visit can result in arrest and deportation or at the very least unknown periods of stay in Afghanistan for those who happen to travel back for various reasons. These conditions not only influence the “irregular” migrant in transit but are also intertwined with the daily lives of the household members remained in Iran. Many of the resources accumulated in the daily life can be devoted to the migrant’s transit stage in case of a visit back to Afghanistan, or the savings of a family can be used up while the bread winner is in Transit, coming back to Iran from Afghanistan. Moreover such conditions can add up the care taking responsibilities of the household members in Iran, while the person visiting Afghanistan is in the transit stage. This
was seen in case of Nasrin who had been taking care of her sister in law’s two children since her return back to Afghanistan.

5.1.1 CONTEXT OF RECEPTION; IMPACTS OF IRAN’S MIGRATION POLICIES

So far Iran’s severe measures of internal and external control have not been successful in forcing Afghans to repatriate or stop the inflow of the new arrivals. Instead by creating conditions of structural discrimination and social inequality, these policies have increased marginalization and under-representation of the Afghan population. In fact the legislative complications and difficulties in complying with such regulations are serving as an internal source for increasing the number of irregular Afghans in Iran. This means that it is likely for Afghans who hold a residence permit and hence a “legal” status to fall into the irregular status easily at least for some period of their lives. The “status” of a foreign national is an important determinant of the contextual elements influencing his or her life. Depending on their status, aliens can be granted (or denied) different rights and entitlements (Portes and Borocz 1989; Sabates-Wheeler and Feldham 2011).

It seems that policies and ideas behind setting the regulations for Amayesh cards have been only focused on controlling and limiting the Afghan population – in terms of mobility patterns, occupational possibilities and access to services without having any long term considerations for lives of first generation Afghans and the growing generations after that.

One example is the dependency of Afghan women’s residence documents in relation to their male family members, namely husbands and the fathers. Ironically, Afghan citizens cannot marry each other pursuant to Iranian law (LandInfo 2012). This means that marriages between Afghan citizens will not be registered in public marriage records. Otherwise Afghans still can and do get married following the Sharia’ law and through a clergy man. Nevertheless Afghan married couples will not be able to obtain documentation from the Iranian authorities that they have entered into marriage. It seems that in the eyes of the policy makers existence of Afghan women in Iran should only be explained and justified through the institution of marriage. Afghan women come to Iran as they are wives or daughters to Afghan men who are in Iran. Such a perspective completely undermines the fact that some Afghan women move to Iran not for the reason of marriage or reunification with their parents but for other reasons; for example to live with other relatives such as a married sister as was the case of Parvin (age 16).
The place based validity of Amayesh cards is an example of such a short term perspective. According to the respondents’ experience; with the exception of Tehran, depending on the place of issue some Amayesh cards are only valid in the city they have been issued. Amayesh cards issued in Tehran are supposedly valid in all cities of Iran. However the regulations in this regard tend to be flexible and more dependent on the personal choices of the officials attending to the process.

An example of such legal was seen in the case of the granddaughter of one of the married respondents who had been living in Iran for 22 years. In this condition her granddaughter who was born from parents- as well as grandparents- with valid residence documents denied a residence permit. The reason for this condition was the fact that the parents’ Amayesh cards were issued from two different cities (for details see case of Shahnaz in section 4.5.2). As a result the third generation granddaughter was living as an “irregular” at the time of the interview. More examples of difficulties resulted by the place based validity of the cards were seen in cases of other respondents from the single group had not been able to attend public schools in Tehran despite having an Amayesh card as their card was issued from another city. As a result they have faced many discontinuities in their educational path, and were forced to drop out of public school and try alternative forms of education through their study period.

Iran’s repatriation strategies seem to be similar to conditions that Ambrosini and Caneva refer to as institutionalized forms of intolerance drawn up and enforced by legitimate bodies (2012). These policies act as institutional obstacles to the rights of Afghans and hence create patterns of social inequality and structural discrimination against Afghans. Iran’s migration policies and particularly repatriation strategies result in prevalence of various forms of exclusion. Ambrosini introduces five categories of exclusionary measures through civil, economic and social, security and cultural restrictions in regards to migrants (2013). These policies of exclusion –with some degrees of difference- can be traced in through Iran’s repatriation strategies for Afghans. Perhaps lack of citizenship rights is the best example of civil exclusion of Afghans; resulting in exclusion of Afghans from different institutions, services and rights. Ban on property ownership or ability to obtain a drivers license are some practical consequences of this measure. Measures of economic exclusion seen through occupational restrictions were present even through the phase of open door policy towards Afghans; however with introduction of no-Afghan zones in 2009 these restrictions have become more severe. The no-Afghan zones were accompanied by other restrictions on mobility – and at times even gathering- of Afghan nationals in different parts of the country and cities; adding
up to exclusion of Afghan. Introduction of the official list of permitted occupations for Afghans in 2011 along with more strict measures against employment and offering services to irregular Afghans adds a new limiting dimension to income opportunities for Afghan nationals as well as their daily life vulnerability. Perhaps the only difference between the Iranian case of exclusionary measures and the Italian condition introduced by Ambrosini is in regards to measures of cultural exclusion. In the Italian context, cultural exclusion is viewed as barriers on religious activities of minority religious groups (2013). This condition however does not apply in case of Afghans in Iran, as the majority of the Afghan population belong to the Shi’a faith of Islam; Iran’s official religion. Nevertheless Afghans in Iran face conditions of socio-cultural exclusion by the Iranian native population.

5.1.2 CONTEXT OF RECEPTION; RELATIONS WITH HOST SOCIETY

The acceptance level of the host society is another important factor in settlement and integration of immigrants in the destination country. A well-established sociological principle holds that the more similar new minorities are in terms of physical appearance, class background, language, and religion to society’s mainstream, the more favorable is their reception and the more rapid is their integration (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Despite the commonalities in regards to language, religion and many cultural traits, Afghans in Iran are not received favorably by the general public. On the contrary Afghans in Iran repeatedly face conditions of abuse and discrimination in a wide range of situations from personal interactions with the native Iranians in public spaces to relations with [Iranian] employers and landlords and finally in encounters with authorities and officials. It seems that while there is sympathy for plight of Afghans in Iran, there is also a sense that Afghans are competitors for limited social services and resources” (Olszewska 2008). Most respondents had at least some experience of discriminatory behavior, even though they believed the discriminatory behavior to vary based on different parts of the city. Based on the patterns explained by the respondents the unfavorable treatment of Afghans would increase in neighborhoods which are characterized by the lower socio-economic conditions, and conversely decrease in higher socio-economic neighborhoods of northern Tehran. A common example of discriminatory behavior- also experienced by the respondents- is various types of verbal abuse. Perhaps the derogatory use of the term *Afghani*; originally referring to the Afghan nationality but currently used as a reference to people from a lower status, is the most prevalent instance. Other instances that were commonly reported by the respondents were verbal harassment due to their
Afghan features and hostile behavior in public areas due to being Afghan (for details see Table 4-25 and Error! Reference source not found.). Such discriminatory behavior seems to be directly related to appurtenance and features of the respondents. Those whose features had the least resemblance to the “typical” Afghan features were those with the least experience of discriminatory behavior.

Part of Iranian’s unfavorable treatment of Afghans can be viewed as a reflection of the relations between the state and the individuals. These relations are to a great extent responsible for shaping the “image” of Afghans in Iran and can be viewed as socio-cultural determinants of vulnerability for the Afghan population. In fact institutionalized forms of intolerance that are practiced by the Iranian government have the ability to legitimize xenophobic behavior and attitudes. They mark the boundaries between "us" and "them", between the legitimate "owners of the land" and newcomers who expect to settle (Ambrosini and Caneva 2012). For example, much of the current public negative view on Afghans is based on claims regarding their “illegal” status and their unfair economic share at the labor market. Being susceptible of criminal action is another frame in which Afghans are often portrayed in the Iranian society. Both these ideas are constantly being re-emphasized by the Iranian state and reflected through a portion of government related newspapers (see Table 4-4 for some examples). A good example of how institutional complications and confusions in regards to residence documents of Afghans pave the way for societal abusive behavior towards Afghan nationals. A good example is the fake “appointment slips” for the Afghan consulate and embassy to apply for residence cards and visas. These tickets were offered by the [Iranian] shopkeepers in Afghan populated neighborhoods as a substitute for the official online registration process. Illiteracy and lack of access to internet services along with confusions about the process of visa renewal had turned many of the irregular Afghan nationals as suitable targets. Interestingly the police –while present in the area- would not stop such an activity, based on having no protocol against shop keepers actions (Mehr news agency 29 Sep. 2014).

It is interesting that the reflection of state’s view on Afghan women can also be detected among the Persian public. Similar to invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration polices and strategies, women and girls seem to be an invisible portion of the public “image” of Afghans. In other words, there appears to a large portion of the residents of Tehran who are unaware or vaguely aware of existence of neighborhoods and residential areas in Tehran in which Afghan families – including Afghan women and girls- live and conduct their daily affairs. Same patterns of invisibility of Afghan
women can be detected in news articles and media portrayal of Afghans in Iran. Afghan women – and also children - do not constitute any share of the news related to Afghan in Iran.

There seems to be a reinforcing cycle of racial discrimination against Afghans in Iran. The structural discrimination and institutionalized forms of intolerance that Afghans face reduces their chances of inclusion in the Iranian society. Exclusion of Afghans from various activities decreases the chances of contact and shared activities between Iranians and Afghans. Moreover, the portrayal of Afghans in the media in combination with lack of personal contact – and hence knowledge - about the Afghans in Iran increases the chances of discriminatory behavior of the Iranian public towards Afghans. The harassment and abuse of Afghans in the public areas in turn reinforces the already existing patterns of exclusion of Afghans from Iran’s social life. Moreover in particular case of the Afghan girls and women, the insecurity caused by such abusive behavior, adds up to the limitations they face in regards to their mobility (for leaving the home without a male family member) and lowers their amount of activities outside of their own households. In long term these conditions add up to invisibility of Afghan women and decrease their chances of integration into the Iranian society.

It is important to emphasize that the above mentioned conditions do not apply to the whole population of Iran. The discriminatory behavior towards Afghans - at any level- is being criticized more and more by Iranian citizens. Nevertheless such discrimination is present in Iran’s society. The continuation of such behavior towards Afghans; among all other consequences, can result in problems of identity for second generation who are raised among Iranians and have the same lifestyle and values.

5.2 DAILY LIFE CONDITIONS FOR AFGHANS

Patterns of migration, settlement and integration can help to offer a better understanding of everyday life conditions for Afghans in Iran. Usually economic and educational achievements are important in analysis of settlement patterns. These factors can be viewed as indicators of the migrants’ income opportunities and access profiles. Asylum-migration nexus and the role of immigrant’s networks and microstructures in migratory flows are another point of focus. Immigrant networks and relations are especially important in conditions that the state policies provide little or no social protection for the foreign nationals.
As can be seen, Iran’s migration polices and measures of internal and external control result in conditions of structural discrimination for Afghans in Iran. These factors can be seen as mediums through which the impacts of social institutions are reflected in patterns of migration and settlement and eventually daily lives of Afghans. It is therefore important to analyze migration flows and settlement patterns of Afghans given Iran’s low reception levels as a host country. To do so, special attention should be paid to Afghans intra-household dynamics as well as immigrant networks and groups. On the one hand, restrictive legislation and lack of political commitment from the Iranian state towards Afghans increases their reliance on the inside group relations and networks. Networks of kin and relatives as well as the household members, therefore, become particularly important in lives of Afghans; as means of informal support as well as provision of rights and services.

On the other hand, the household is the unit in which choices and decisions about further actions and plans of the household members are taken. This is particularly important in regards to Afghan women and especially the second generation Afghan girls who are born and raised in a different context compared to their first generation parents. The traditional and patriarchal view on the institution of family and structure of the household believes the men (Husband or father) to be the head of the household and in charge of the main decisions, and the female members to be in charge of the household affairs and domestic activities. This was the prevalent view among the respondent’s households and moreover it is the view encouraged by Iran’s traditional government. Consequently Afghan women –and especially the second generation Afghan girls- need to tackle through the barrier of gaining permission from their husbands and fathers in order to be able to actualize choices and decisions they take for improving their livelihoods; such as attending school, working outside of the house, or simply going out with their friends and peers. Intergenerational differences regarding beliefs, priorities and values, along with the imbalance of power distribution inside of the household can be can be viewed as a temporal determinant of vulnerability for Afghan girls.

Consequently the final outcome of the intra-household dynamics of Afghan households in combination with spatial, socio-political and socio cultural factors can influence Afghan women and girls differently based on various stages in their lives, as well as in their migration process.
5.2.1 MIGRATION FLOWS; PATTERNS AND CONSEQUENCES

By making living conditions more difficult and limiting the differential of advantage between Iran and Afghanistan, Iranian migration policy tends to stop the flows of migration from Afghanistan to Iran and trigger a return movement among those Afghans in Iran. This does not seem to be a likely scenario. Migration flows, once established, tend to continue with relative autonomy from fluctuations in differential advantages (Portes and Borocz 1989). Such movements have a long history between Afghanistan and Iran, dating much longer before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its refugee/asylum policies towards Afghans. The country has been the long term residence for many Afghans including those who have been born and raised there. Despite the low reception of Iran towards Afghans, there is a substantial population of Afghan nationals living in the country, comprised of first and second generations who have established permanent livelihoods in Iran. Moreover despite the difficulties of obtaining entry documents there seem to be a constant inflow from Afghanistan to Iran. As has been shown in other parts of the world legal and bureaucratic obstacles to migration and settlement have been seen not as absolute barriers, but as factors to be taken into account in personal strategies, migration networks and community infrastructures. In other words, rather than subjecting themselves to the constraints imposed on their mobility by receiving countries, many migrants have sought out alternative methods of entering and seeking out job opportunities in the advanced economies, backed up by networks of contacts linking them to migrants who arrived before they did and who are now permanently settled (Ambrosini 2008). The migrant networks and contacts across countries, “family chains” and new information and interests which they promote are important factors in continuation of migration flows. The microstructures of migration permit the survival of recent arrivals and also constitute a significant undercurrent often running counter to broader economic trends. Through these arrangements, variations in wages and employment opportunities are evened out so that, over time, the size and destinations of the migrant flow become relatively insensitive to fluctuations in the economic cycle (Portes 2007; Portes and Borocz 1989).

Based on the data collected from the interviews, the most visible migration trend among the married group is the path of family reunification and marriage. The respondents who announced marriage as the reason behind their move to Iran portrayed a similar pattern. In all cases the husband had lived in Iran for some duration of time varying between just a few years to most of his life. He then would go back to Afghanistan, marry the wife (the respondents) spend some time in
Afghanistan and come back to Iran with his wife, or the wife joining him later in time. The alternative to this situation would be the case in which instead of the husband a close relative—mostly father in law—would go and bring the wife. These narratives show a clear pattern of continuation of the migration flow for Afghan women through migrant networks. It is also important to consider that in all but one case the husbands were either a first degree cousin of the respondents (13 cases) or relatives (2 cases) from the same town or village.

Ties of kinship and family relations seemed equally important among the single group of migrants especially among those who had arrived more recently. In their cases, reasons for coming to Iran were announced to be having a family member (often times a brother or a married sister or uncles) in the country. In those cases, it was common for the respondents (and their families) to be living with the aforementioned family member. These conditions correspond with the ways that community infrastructures and ties of kinship act as support systems for the newly arrived immigrant.

While marriage or having a relative was mentioned as the reason for moving to Iran, the common motivation for moving out of Afghanistan displayed a mixture of economic motivations as well as safety measures. These motivations reflect the socio-political and economic conditions of Afghanistan through different time periods. Civil War and Taliban were mentioned by those respondents who had spent the longest times in Iran (18-22 years) and also by the second generation Afghans among the single group of respondents whose fathers and grandfathers had arrived in Iran 20-30 years earlier. The other respondents mentioned lack of security, explosions and suicide attacks, social unrest, as well as lack of living facilities and economic opportunities as reasons behind moving out. While distinctions can be made in regards to family reunification and escaping insecurity, the fact is that in case of the respondents; similar to other cases of asylum-migration nexus; the line distinguishing the asylum seekers from the economic migrants is very blurry. These findings apply to Monsutti’s argument that the case of the Hazara Afghans moving to Iran and the Gulf countries is a perfect illustration of both the difficulties in distinguishing between economic and political motives for migration, and the way it has become embedded in cultural values and practices (Monsutti, cited in Adelkhad and Olswezka 2007).

The structure of Afghan households can highlight interesting aspects of the dynamics of the Afghan inflow. The results of the interviews show that families of the respondents mostly consist of three generations living together; the respondent and her husband, their children and often times the in
laws of the respondent. Depending on the age of the respondents, the in-laws could be the parents of the respondents’ husbands (or less frequently their own parents) or the wives of their sons (and less frequently the husbands of their daughters). In case of the former, it was often the respondents who had moved to Iran from Afghanistan to join the family of their husbands and in the latter case it was common for the wives of their sons to have arrived from Afghanistan. In case of the single respondents, in fewer cases their household composition included their grandparents but the more frequent pattern was for the brother’s wife to be living in the respondents’ households. In these cases it was common for the brother’s wife to have arrived from Afghanistan after marrying the brother. It can be argued that a reoccurring trend can be detected through the respondents’ household structures. Young Afghan men living in Iran are the source for in-flow of young Afghan women as their wives; most of whom are their own relatives. This pattern applies to the second generation young Afghan men as well. As a result a very heterogeneous population of young Afghan girls; in more or less the same age cohort, lives in Iran which consists of second generation Afghan girls who have been born and raised (or have spent most of their lives) in Iran and first generation Afghan brides who enter the already established household structures of the husband. These two groups have different characteristics in regards to marital status, educational attainment and values and priorities. The inflow of Afghan brides as well as growing population of second generation Afghan girls with different viewpoints and values can be seen manifestation of the ways in which temporal determinants of vulnerability; in combination with socio political, spatial and socio-cultural elements impact lives of Afghan women and girls differently.

5.2.2 INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS AND INTERGENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES

As mentioned before, time of arrival is an important temporal factor in understanding daily life conditions of Afghans in Iran. This means that depending on their time of arrival Afghans in Iran would be exposed to different regulations and policies which would impact their access patterns differently. The largest wave of Afghans arrived in Iran during Iran’s open door policy stage; or following Table 5-1 the first phase of Iran’s migration policies. The parents –or even grandparents– of the second generation respondents were among this wave of migrants. As a result of their access to Iranian public services, hundreds of thousands of Afghan children and adults became newly literate or even well-educated. Many of those Afghans who graduated during that period are those who are running the self regulated schools today. Exposure to the Iranian socio-cultural milieu of the
time; which was very different from Afghanistan’s context of post soviet war and Taliban era, along with relative access to resources resulted in spread of different lifestyles and patterns among Afghans in Iran. In words of Olszewka “the Afghans absorbed modern ideas about hygiene, health and reproduction; began to dress, live and eat Iranian-style; and transformed their views and practices of religion, civic participation and the public role of women” (2013). The outcomes of the so called Iranian lifestyles of the first waves of the Afghan immigrants were detectable through choices, decisions and attitudes of the second generation respondents. An example is the way the second generation respondents’ viewed their future success and goals through continuation of their education and achieving economic independence. In words of Fahime (age 16) when she talks about her future: “An Afghan girl in Iran only has one way for achieving a good future, and that is to study. If not she has to sit at home and change her children’s diapers”. Such a view is in correspondence with young Iranian women and girls views and preferences (Ezazi 2013). When talking about two of her brothers who have married young Afghan women from Afghanistan, Kobra (age 23) explains the common marriage criteria for Afghan families in Iran and the process of selecting a suitable bride for Afghan men as following: “Since the Afghan families are traditional and often look for well behaved and hardworking girls who will not complain or talk back to them (mostly a girl who is not educated) they often bring their brides from Afghanistan. So they can always have the upper hand and the power over the bride”. Consequently one could assume that the inflow of Afghan brides to Iran through the second generation Afghan men could be partially related to shift of values and lifestyles of the second generation Afghan girls. The second generation respondents who were contacted at Ayande center were young active girls who were conducting their studies at various stages along with some possible other activities and had a relative clear ideas about what their priorities and future plans. Interestingly some of the same respondents described their sister in laws who had arrived from Afghanistan – the “brides”- as being unfamiliar with Tehran and Iran, not knowing what to do and how to do things (in the city and out of the house) and also having different priorities and hence not caring for education nor understanding the value of a degree.

A brief comparison of marriage and family formation patterns between Iran and Afghanistan reveals that compared to Iranians, marriage in Afghanistan particularly for girls usually takes place at much younger ages. The patterns of earlier age of marriage were visible among the married group of respondents with the majority of cases varying between ages of 13-19 (see Table 4-17). Marriage at such an early age can be explained through different views on marriage and the role that the
institution of marriage plays in Iran and Afghanistan’s societies. While the Iranian socio-cultural context is putting a higher value on personal choice and decisions of the couple (Ezazi 2011), in the Afghan context marriage is viewed as a mechanism for both procreation and social reproduction (Ahmed-Gosh 2003). More than being an agreement between the couple, it is the family and the tribe who determine the marriage pattern. This traditional view seems to be prevalent among the first generation Afghans in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi 2012). The impact of such a view has been especially harsh on women. Women have few liberties in the process of marriage and choosing their spouse, and are [traditionally] not allowed to divorce. Oftentimes total obedience to the husband and his family is expected, and women are prevented from getting any education (Ahmed-Gosh 2003). These conditions are in clear contradiction with lifestyle choices and desires that were portrayed by the second generation respondents. Neither of the second generation respondents was married at the time of the interview, even though some of them were in the same age group with some of the respondents from the married group. Perhaps continuation of studies and admission to the university – as was the case with some of the second generation respondents- was the reason for divergence from uptake of the more traditional paths of family formation and marriage. Nevertheless, while some of the respondents were admitted to the university neither of them had actually started their studies. In order to attend Iranian universities, Afghan students who are in possession of a valid residence permit need to return their residence card, move back to Afghanistan and apply for a student visa in Iran. The student visa can be renewed for the duration of the study permit and after that the graduate will be left with no residence document. Besides the fact that the respondents had not been to Afghanistan in their entire lifetime, the whole process seems to be very complicated. It will be a highly likely scenario for the Afghan girls to marry at a point in order to be able –or permitted- to go through this whole procedure of moving between countries.

The traditional view on the role of women in Afghan households and the way such structures impact women and girls can be particularly highlighted in cases that the bride is new in the country and living with the extended family of her husband. At the very least they will be responsible for the burden of the domestic labor of the household. Based on the interview results, having a daughter in law at home was an acceptable reason for the [older] respondent’s (or alternatively mothers of the younger respondents) not to do housework as well as home-based work. This means that the brides are also more likely to be prevented from attending school/ literacy courses in favor of domestic
work. As a result of these conditions, Afghan brides are less likely to achieve the similar levels of social and educational mobility that the second generation Afghan girls portrayed, despite the fact that they are more or less in the same age cohort. The inflow of Afghan brides, their domestic duties and responsibilities and their dependence on their intra-household conditions can be seen as a driver for continuation of the patriarchal norms among Afghans in Iran. Such a trend increases the chances of exclusion of Afghan women and girls, and in turn can enhance their marginalization.

5.2.2.1 STRUCTURE OF THE HOUSEHOLD; IMPACTS ON AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

The patriarchal view on women, puts women in a lower position regarding the power hierarchy in the family, defines their roles within the household and also sketches the range of activities that are traditionally accepted for women. Such a view results in multiple disadvantages for women ranging from drastic threats to women’s safety to restrictions on daily life activities. A common outcome of such view is violence and abusive behavior against women. Examples in the Afghan context range between various degrees of domestic abuse, forced marriages and at the very extreme level “honor killings” (Graham-Harrison 2014; Hashemi 2012, UNFPA 2012). Other consequences of the patriarchal view include limitation to the range of choices and options available to women and girls, restrictions on participation in the labor market and engagement in social activities. These conditions can limit the assets and resources available to women to enhance their livelihoods, while increasing their dependency to other male members of the household such as their father, brother or husbands. The dependency of Afghan women to their intra-household relations can be better understood in the context of Iranian migration policies, which views the Afghan women as responsibility of their male relatives and not as independent individuals requiring rights of their own outside of the framework of the household.

A direct way in which dependency of Afghan women to their male guardians impacts their lives is through their residence status. This conditions impacts Afghans women and girls in several ways. On the first place, in order to be eligible for obtaining residence documents, Afghan women and girls need to be wives or daughters of male Afghans in Iran who themselves are in possession of a valid residence permit. Moreover the husbands and fathers need to be willing and able to apply for residence documents for their wives; based on the interview results, this is an unlikely scenario to happen (for examples see Table 4-8 and Table 4-10 ). Among the respondents, instances in which husbands had not obtained a valid residence permit for their wives [or wives and
children] were commonly seen, even in cases that the husbands themselves were in possession of a residence card. This condition not only adds to exclusion and marginalization of Afghan women, but impacts the second generation Afghans as well. Only those Afghan children whose both parents are in possession of a valid residence permit can apply for residence documents.

Lack of citizenship rights for Afghans in Iran and their exclusion from the Iranian society are some factors that in combination with the patriarchal norms of the households affect lives of Afghan women. A traditional Islamic view on marriage allows for polygamy. Compared to the Afghan households who show a higher rate of polygamous cases (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm., 3 February) having multiple wives –while legally possible- is not a socially accepted phenomena in Iran. Moreover, for a man to marry a second wife, under the Iranian family law, the permission of the first wife is needed. The traditional structure of Afghan households along with their exclusion from Iran’s family law and legal structure, allows for polygamy without any possible resisting power on the side of the wife. One of the most common reasons for obtaining a second wife is often the inability of the first wife to conceive and more precisely have male children. Having multiple wives changes the power relations within the household and can often result in unfavorable conditions for at least one of the wives as well as the children. Women in polygamous marriages are in a greater risk for harmful effects (Brooks 2009).

Another example of how the combination of Iranian policies towards Afghans and the intra-household patterns and norms of the Afghan community impacts Afghan women and girls is in Iran is through issues related to divorce. It was repeatedly mentioned by the respondents that divorce is not culturally accepted among the traditional Afghan household and not a decision to be taken if one wants to preserve the honor of the household. Instead the wife is expected to tolerate the possible unfavorable conditions – most commonly domestic violence or addiction of the husband- and continue with the marital life. The current socio-cultural milieu of Iran does not favor such a perspective. Despite all the legal restrictions, divorce is a fairly common phenomenon in Iran. In fact the high rates of divorce are often viewed as a point of concern by Iranian officials who see it as a risk factor for the institution of marriage and structure of family in the Iranian society. Interestingly according to the respondents the prevalence of a “divorce culture” within the Iranian society was one of the main reasons for the Afghan community to not marry their girls to Iranians; a process that is one of the fewer ways in which Afghan women can obtain an Iranian nationality along with citizenship rights and entitlements.
Even if the Iranian family law makes it very difficult for women to file for a divorce, now there are ways to ask for such a right through pre-marital agreements. Husband’s addiction as well as proof of domestic violence is among the limited legally accepted reason for a divorce by court. In Iran domestic violence is not a hidden phenomenon restricted to the private sphere anymore and during the past years widespread awareness has taken place against it. Compared to Iran, Afghanistan has a much higher rate of domestic violence. Based on the interviews with the informants most of the Afghan women in the two centers (Khane Ayandde and Khane Naser-Khosrow) faced at least some sort of physical abuse in their households “without considering it to be violent behavior” (Naser-Khosrow center 2014,pres.comm.,3 February). Also according to the informants addiction was a common phenomenon in the district 12, and the respondents occasionally mentioned relatives (brother, son in law, uncles or husband of aunts) who had a drug abuse problem. Having no type of access to legal measures, Afghan women are bound to the power relations and intra-household relations that are reinforced through the bigger networks of kin and relatives. As a result, in cases of domestic violence, addiction of the husband or other unfavorable intra-household conditions, Afghan women are less likely to be able to improve their living circumstances.

The combination of Afghans intra-household power structures, their exclusion from Iran’s civil law and institutions and their high reliance on networks of kin and ethnicity are likely to increase women’s marginality through domestic labor, reproductive responsibilities and limited choices and options for improving their livelihoods. The limiting effect of the structural factors in lives of Afghan women in Iran and their consequential marginal position can be better understood when they are compared with choices and options of the Iranian women and girls.

### 5.3 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS; LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION

Social relations and power structures at various levels influence the amount of access different groups have to resources. In particular case of financial capital, income opportunities (jobs) play an important role in regards to final levels of financial resources. State level structures as well as social relations of production, gender and race are important contextual factors that influence occupational choices and options of the Afghans in Iran.

Following Iranian law, having a work permit is the basic access qualification for any type of job. Those who have a job permit however can face another filter based on their nationality. Afghan’s
work permits restrict them to low skilled, menial jobs. In this way, their nationality acts as a marker that prevents them from fulfilling the access qualifications for higher skilled jobs which often are the jobs with higher returns. Consequently the Afghans community in Iran is also vastly employed in the secondary sector, as can be seen in the case of the respondents. The secondary sector is commonly characterized by jobs which require little or no prior training, which cluster at the low end of the wage scale, and are subject to rapid employer turnover with little or no mobility opportunities (Potres and Borocz 2008). Moreover the available jobs to Afghans are often hazardous and dangerous. Lack of access to health care and work insurance along with the high rate of work related incidents results in precarious life conditions for Afghans.

High representation of Afghans in secondary sector not only impacts the livelihood options of the Afghan community in Iran, but also impacts modes of incorporation and settlement patterns for the newly arrived Afghans. The immigrant community’s networks and relations are the most immediate contextual factor influencing reception of immigrants and play an important role in understanding migration and settlement patterns in the destination. In most cases immigrants arrive into places in which a community of their co-nationals already exists. Such communities can cushion the impact of a foreign culture and provide assistance for finding jobs, or help with immediate living needs. While all such communities help their own, they do so within the limits of their own information and resources. The economic performance and social status of the immigrants in the host country are also influential factors in adaptation and settlement patterns of the second-generation youth (Portes and Borocz 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). This is particularly important in case of the Afghan migrant communities in which ethnicity and ties of kinship are very strong.

For purposes of future socio-economic mobility, the central difference is whether the co-ethnic group is mainly composed of working-class persons or contains a significant professional and entrepreneurial element. For newcomers in working class communities, the natural thing to do is to follow the path of earlier arrivals into the host labor market. The help that ethnic communities can offer for securing employment in these situations is constrained by the kind of jobs held by their more established members (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Following Iran’s labor policies and occupational limitations for Afghans, the male members in the respondent’s household were mainly employed in the secondary sector doing low skilled labor with long working hours (see Table 4-15) and no types of benefits such as insurance or ability of sick
leave. In addition with the exception of two occupations - bag making and clothes manufacturing - The Afghan men were dominantly employed by Iranian employers. Table 5-2 shows the frequency of occupations among the respondents by gender and employers nationality. The highest numbers of the Afghan men were employed in bag making and construction work while the female respondents - if working- were mainly involved in home-based occupations; particularly home-based bag making. The low skilled jobs of the respondents along with occupational restrictions of Iran extremely reduce chances of being incorporated into the mixed labor market or having the option for upward occupational mobility for Afghans.

The exceptions to this condition however were seen in the three cases in which the husband and fathers owned their own business in bag making and clothes manufacturing. These are also the jobs with the highest working hours. The respondents reported their husband (or fathers and brothers) to be working between 13-17 hours a day in these occupations (see Table 4-15).

Certain occupational patterns seem to be prevalent among the Afghans in Tehran following particular ethnic and geographical patterns. While Afghans living in the suburbs of Tehran are mostly reported to work in shoe-making and tailor workshops (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008) those Afghans in the sample group of this research were mostly in the occupation of bag making. In fact “Chahar Rah e Cyrus”, located on the main street close to Ayande Center (see MAP 4-4) was referred to as the hub of Afghan bag makers by the respondents. Following the ethnic distribution of occupations, the bag making industry seems to be dominated by Afghans from Ghazni province.

Family ties and networks of kinship are therefore not only important for reception and settlement patterns for Afghans in Iran, but are among pre-requisites for possible occupational mobility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Employer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bag making</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghan/Iranian / Own business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction work</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter in the Bazaar</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Self employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care taker/ Guard</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes manufacturer</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iranian/ own business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken slaughterhouse</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vendor at Bazaar</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Self employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass cutter</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic work</td>
<td>Male/ Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home based bag making</td>
<td>Female /Male(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Afghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home based embroidery</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamstress work in a workshop</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales person in Store</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the same time Afghans are a very diverse group in regards to their ethnicity and kin. The respondents clearly mentioned that their social circle consisted of people from their town and area. This means that the inside group social relations and ties are much more specific than referring to all Afghans. Following the importance of ethnic differences in the Afghan context, reliance on networks of kin for occupational mobility is likely to exclude other groups of Afghans who are not from the same ethnicity. Therefore it can be assumed that the facilitating role of Afghan ties in occupational mobility of Afghans follows similar ethnic patterns. By adding to the importance of ethnic relations in lives of Afghans in Iran, the Iranian restrictive legislations are likely to encourage tribal and or ethno-centric sentiments. This is particularly important as ethnic and tribal power structures and rivalry are influential factors in Afghanistan political scene. In the context of Afghanistan, women have been important measures of establishing ethnic prominence. Tribal laws and sanctions have had a key role in deciding gender roles, especially through kinship hierarchies in the rural regions. In this context women are perceived as the receptacles of “honor”, hence they stay in the domestic sphere, observe the veil and are voiceless. The honor of the family, the tribe, and ultimately the nation is invested in women (Ahmed- Gosh 2003). Reliance on norms of reciprocity and in-group solidarity of the ethnic ties and relations can act as a measure of informal support for Afghans in Iran. At the same time, strong ties and relations are likely to strengthen the norms and traditions of the tribal law and hence further limit choices and options of Afghan women in Iran. In this way networks of ethnicity and kin, besides being possible networks of support, can act as measures of social control. This was seen through the respondents’ claims on how having many relatives working in the Bazaar area prevented them from going out that often, as the respondents did not want their relatives and acquaintances to think badly of them. In the words of Shahnaz (age 48) “in the neighborhood I try not to go out much, here [in the neighborhood] we have a lot of relatives and I do not want them to say I am a woman who goes to places a lot”.

At the same time, lack of citizenship rights and exclusion from sources of financial credit such as investment loans increases the reliance of the Afghan population on informal networks and relations with the Iranians, especially their employer. Among the three examples of occupational mobility reported by the respondents, in two cases the initial financial credit for initiation of the business was provided by the Iranian employer, in exchange for a share of their profit. Such a relationship requires a certain amount of trust. These particular cases of partnership between the respondents’ husbands and fathers and the Iranian employer turned out to be a success story and
resulted in certain levels of occupational upward mobility for the respondents’ households. At the same time other respondents had stories of fraud—especially through an overdraft account—from the Iranian employer resulting in bankruptcy of their husbands/fathers.

Occupational restrictions not only limit chances of occupational mobility for the Afghan population, but also effectively reduce occupational options of those Afghans with higher levels of skill and education. In countries with lower reception levels towards immigrants, unfavorable official reception makes it difficult for immigrants with higher skills and qualifications to revalidate titles or obtain licenses. Therefore they are often forced to limit their practices to their own ethnic community or to other downtrodden minorities (Portes and Borocz 2008). This condition to some extent was visible through the voluntary—and unpaid—activities of the second generation respondents’ in centers for disadvantaged children. In these cases the respondents—who have also conducted part of their own education through such centers—were involved in teaching activities for other Afghan children. Another example of this condition can be seen in the case of high skilled Afghans who run the self regulated schools. It seems that the combination of occupational restrictions and social inequalities in the Afghan community have resulted in concentration of high skilled Afghans in favor of empowerment of other members of the Afghan community. These activities; while do not help with economic mobility of the high skilled Afghans; are important in empowerment and educational mobility of second generation Afghans in Iran. Unfortunately, the Iranian government views such activities as opposing the repatriation policies and thus the home based schools are at risk of being shut down and their organizers at risk of deportation or heavy fines. In this way, the higher skilled Afghans, who have a higher chance of upward mobility and moving out of conditions of marginality, are not only deprived from options for occupational mobility but are also put in a more precarious position in their daily lives due to the nature of their activity.

5.3.1.1 LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

Besides Afghan nationality (migrant status), gender also acts as a limiting marker of labor market integration. On a general level, women in Iran can face direct and indirect limitations in regards to accessing jobs. These restrictions reflect the Iranian government’s view on women and their “accepted” position in the society. The gender based elimination of higher education fields and majors, is already excluding women from obtaining qualifications in various fields (Ezazi 2013;
Shahrokni and Dokouhaki 2013). The currently under debate plans of gender segregation of the work force, if – or when- applied, can increase the occupational imbalance even more.

Compared to Iranian women, Afghan women face more severe restrictions in regards to labor market integration. In fact it seems that the labor market integration of Afghan women has not been on the agenda of the Iranian policy makers at all. This condition reflects the government’s traditional view on women; a woman belongs to the realm of the household, in the private sphere, where she attends to domestic affairs. There is a notable lack of data on work permits for Afghan women. Nevertheless in 2009 the Iranian Deputy Minister of Labor warned the Iranian employers against the charges associated with employing Afghan workers who lack a work permit. He explicitly mentioned that “Afghan women are not entitled with a work permit and thus should not be hired for domestic work by Iranians” (BBC 9 may 2009).

Exclusion of Afghan women from the labor market through Iran’s labor policies is an important determinant of increased marginality of Afghan women. Work permits are usually among access qualifications for jobs with higher pay offs. By denying Afghan women a work permit the young Afghan girls –who tend to have higher levels of educational attainment-, are effectively excluded from the labor market and deprived from chances of improving their own livelihoods. Moreover Lack of a work permit puts the Afghan women who want to work outside of their homes in a position similar to irregular migrants, regardless of their residence status. In this ways such a situation increases the chances of exploitation of the Afghan women by their employer. This is especially important given the prevalence of the public discrimination against Afghans and affects both Afghan men and women equally.

Gender and nationality might act as exclusionary markers limiting Afghan women’s access to the labor market. However they are not the only obstacles that Afghan women face. Intra-household relationships; manifested through the power relations between the husband and wife or father and daughters; as well as the traditional view on the role of women inside the household are factors that equally influence Afghan women’s access to labor market. Among those respondents in the married group who were not working, reasons for not conducting home-based work was either lack of permission from the husband or lack of time due to being occupied with having children. The gendered division of labor along with the expected care giving and child bearing responsibilities of women are important factors limiting women’s access to resources. These conditions correspond
with the traditional structures of family, where the woman’s activities and duties mainly revolve around domestic work, child bearing and caring responsibilities. The traditional perspective was also visible among decision making patterns inside the household in regards to major expenses and future plans. In most cases the major decisions were taken by the male members of the family, in particular the husband or the father. The exclusion of women and youth corresponds with social relations of gender in Afghanistan, were historically women and the youth are not involved in major decisions and plans (Wakefield and Bauer 2005).

In regards to intra-household decision making, two patterns were visible. One was the relationship between earning money and having the power to make decisions about expenses. In words of the respondents; the person who worked and earned the money (in nearly all cases the husband/father) would also be the one who decided on how to spend it. In nearly all cases the breadwinners were the husbands of the fathers and at times brothers and accordingly they would be those in charge of the major decisions and choices. The exceptions to this condition were two occasions in which the respondent’s sister and sister in law also had a job and therefore contributed to the household finances. In both cases according to the respondents they would be “included” in decisions about major costs, however still the male member of the family (father and husband respectively) was the main decision maker. Women’s contribution to the household economy usually allows them to breech the social norms that restrict them to home-based work (Pelling 2003: 59) and is likely to change the intra-household power relations and structure. By being excluded from the Iranian labor market, Afghan women have fewer chances of economic independence as well as contribution to their household budgets. Therefore formal exclusion of Afghan women from the labor reinforces the power imbalances within the structure of the household and also limits their access patterns.

The other visible pattern was the relationship between knowledge and information and making the household decisions. Many of the married respondents explained their husband is the one who makes all the decisions as “they themselves did not know what to do”. The same pattern was visible among the single group of respondents, explaining that their mothers were excluded from important household choices due to low levels of knowledge. The exceptions to this condition could be seen among those respondents who had lived in Iran for the longest terms and also had an active role in their household affairs, in particular in regards to their residence permits. Besides that The patterns of decision making seem to be slightly different in the second generation respondents, as those are the ones who reported both of their parents making decisions together (in one case), or
the father asking the opinion of the older children including the older daughters (in 2 cases). Perhaps higher levels of education and knowledge of the second generation respondents could be among reasons for their inclusion in decision making patterns.

5.4 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS; EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

In comparison between first and second generation Afghans in Iran usually differences are visible between their levels of educational attainment (Abbasi-Shavazi 2012; Hugo et al. 2010). These differences to a great extend follow the patterns of literacy in Afghanistan, where the rate of illiteracy is very high and so is the gender disparity in education. The first generation Afghans in this research can be divided to the parents of those respondents in the single group who were born in Iran and the respondents in the married group. With the expectation of the older respondents in the married group (i.e. Shahnaz A age 48, Hoesine age 41 and Zeinab A age 38) it should be kept in mind that these two groups are likely to have a significant age difference. The greatest educational disparity was visible among the parents of the single group of respondents. All mothers were illiterate while some of the fathers had some levels of literacy (see Table 4-12). Compared to the illiterate mothers of the respondents, the members of the married group showed a small difference in educational attainment in that they were all attending the adult literacy courses. Accordingly the educational disparity of the married respondents and their husbands was less than that of the parents (see Table 4-11).

Neither of these respondents had received any sort of education until the time they started studying at the centers. This is a very important factor. On the one hand, such a condition reflects the differences between Afghanistan – where they had been raised- and Iran and the respective requirements of each country for getting ahead in regards to lifestyles and labor market integration. For instance being illiterate was mentioned as an important factor preventing Afghan women from uptake of vocational training and trying to improve their livelihoods, as a basic level of literacy is among the pre-requisites of many of such courses. The requirement of being able to read the measurements and sketches for taking seamstress lessons is one example. Education and specifically literacy are often viewed as an essential asset for empowerment of the marginal groups and specially women (Olufunke 2011). In fact the ability to read seems to have increased the respondent’s range of options and their capacity to get adapted to conditions of life in a mega city.
like Tehran. Among the practical benefits of being literate, the respondents mostly referred to the ease of navigation and finding directions on the street, ability to read the name of the metro stops and finally knowing which bus to take. Another example is one that clearly shows the importance of literacy in the contemporary lifestyles; the respondents newly gained ability of sending text messages to their husbands. While these achievements might seem minor, their impact in daily lives of Afghan women cannot be denied. While the respondents were still at the beginning levels their literacy courses, they seemed to be very happy about their achievements and looked forward to improving their reading and writing skills. It seems that even being able to read and write can be a measure for expanding the social networks of Afghan women and a means of their socialization with the Iranian community. Many of the respondents mentioned they would have liked to join the Quran reading lectures and sessions that were held in their neighborhood, however due to being illiterate they could not take part. Such classes are in fact among the few “permitted” social activities which could contribute to inclusion of Afghan women and increasing their social relations with other Iranians. On the other hand the educational achievements of the respondents and the impact of being able to read and write in their lives, shows the importance of existence of such NGO’s and organizations as Aynade and Naser-Khosrow center. While the socio-political restriction imposed by the Iranian government has completely left the adult Afghan men and women out of the educational system, such centers provide the migrant population with alternative education and knowledge sources.

There seems to be a growing tendency for education among groups of Afghans. This trend was visible through the attitudes of the married respondents attending the literacy classes as well as through their husband’s support and the fact that the literacy classes at both of the centers were initiated due to the women’s own request. Human capital of the first generation migrants is claimed to have an influential factor in their children’s adaptation and assimilation. This married respondents who were attending the literacy classes were accurate about their children’s education. Their children, if they had reached the age of attending school, were already enrolled in public schools and pre-school centers [for those who had a valid residence permit] or were attending the substitute classes. This seems to be an important indicator of adaptation and perhaps educational mobility when compared with respondents from the single group. While these respondents were already attending school – and some had graduated- in most cases their actual age and educational
grade showed distinct differences, this can be contributed to their parents’ lack of knowledge about importance of education as well as possible educational paths.

It seems that in case of the respondents in the married group, gender status – seen as being woman-acts as a facilitator for education. While this trend is not universal among all the Afghan women in Iran, the husbands of the respondent group seemed to acknowledge the importance of literacy and having a literate member in the family. The husbands rarely attended the adult literacy, as their role as the household’s breadwinner and their long working hours would not allow them to spend time on education. Instead the wives were encouraged or simply not prohibited from attending the literacy classes. This condition should not imply that the patriarchal patterns and power structures were necessarily absent within the household dynamics of the married group of respondents. On the first place, the respondents’ attendance was due to the fact that their husbands had permitted them to go. However in most cases, the same respondents were prohibited from a range of other activities – such as working or going out alone- as well as attending other types of classes beyond literacy course.

It is also interesting to note there seems to be a negative relationship between prioritizing home-based work and education by the husbands. The most common reasons preventing other Afghan women from attending the literacy course seemed to be their husband’s preference for them to do home-based work rather than spending time at school. On the contrary the contacted respondents often mentioned their husband’s lack of consent as the reason for not taking up any kind of home based work.

Among the single respondents, besides three cases who had dropped out of school, the rest were all studying at various levels of middle and high school. The difference between educational attainments of the second generation Afghan girls with those of their parents as well as the married group of respondents matches the research findings on educational upward mobility of the second generation Afghans in Iran (Hugo et al. 2012). Very few of the respondents had conducted their entire education in public schools. In most cases, in accordance with the difficulties in resuming a legal status, the respondents had undergone time periods without a valid residence permit and had therefore attended Afghan schools or substitute schools offered by the Iranian NGO’s offering services to the disadvantaged children. The impact of length of stay in Iran and its relationship with solving problems related to lack of residential documents can be seen in comparisons of siblings from the same family and their educational path. It is interesting that among those families who had
put an effort in obtaining their residence permits, often times the younger siblings faced fewer upheavals in their educational path. This can be an indicator of how length of stay can be related to improvements—even if slight—in the conditions of the Iranian Afghans.

5.4.1 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT; VALUES AND PRIORITIES

An interesting impact of education can be seen through the way it has influenced the ideas and attitudes of the respondents. Such a shift was evident among some of the respondents from the married group, but was much more visible among the single respondents and especially those who belonged to the second generation (i.e. those who were born and raised in Iran or had spent the majority of their life there). Such an attitude change can mostly be attributed to education and social relations and networks associated with educational environments. Ideas about a suitable future seen through continuation of education and economic independence were among these attitudes. The most distinct feature of this attitude change is the way in which the second-generation respondents differentiated themselves from Afghans in Afghanistan, their parents and in some cases other Afghans of their own age group in Iran. Instead these respondents identified themselves with their Iranian friends based on the values and priorities they had for their future life. This shift of value and attitudes was particularly evident among those respondents who mostly socialize with their Iranian friends at school.

Following the concept of social capital (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998) social networks and relationships create shared norms and values and act as channels of information. An important attribute of social networks is the norms of reciprocity among their members. In this way, social networks can act as measures of inclusion and in-group bonding. This can be seen in the cases of those single respondents who attended public schools and had Iranian friends. While they still faced discrimination in the public, they saw it as behavior of “some Iranians” and not their own Iranian friends. It can be assumed that the same attitude change happens among those Iranian girls who were friends with the respondents. An example was seen in the case of Hediye (age 17), an Iranian girl who was among the participants of the Aynade cente. When talking about her friendship with Parvane (age 17) she mentioned “Until now I had never been friends with Afghans and I did not like them as well. But here [Aynade Center] I got to know Afghans and it is not the way that I thought before”. Hediye is just an example of many of the residents of Tehran who have not had many—if not any—personal encounters with Afghans, especially Afghan women and girls.
A trend that was visible only among the second generation respondents was their different perspective about their status in the Iranian society. The first generation respondents (both among the married and single group) portrayed a comparative outlook between Afghanistan and Iran when discussing their life conditions in Iran. When talking about their life in Iran and their satisfaction they kept mentioning the positive points of living in Iran such as higher living standards and better facilities as compared to that of Afghanistan. Moreover in discussing possible difficulties of living in Iran, they seemed to be very aware of their “immigrant status”. In other words, they viewed themselves as “immigrants” and seemed to have accepted that as immigrants they had fewer rights and entitlements. On the contrary when talking about their problems and difficulties, the second generation respondents often mentioned problems due to being a girl as well as problems due to being Afghan. The former covered issues related to limited liberties in various activities compared to boys and hence the limitations they faced from their families in regards to their choices and decisions. Concerning their migrant status, the respondents showed a clear diversion with the attitudes of the first generation. They did not view their “migrant status” as a reason why they should have different rights and entitlements in the Iranian society. In fact their main problem when talking about living in Iran seemed to be the structural discrimination towards Afghans and its consequential difficulties in their everyday life in particular in the ways they could not attend school. Other points of concern included bad treatment by people on the streets and in public, complications of renewal and obtaining permits and exclusion from the labor market. The impacts of their perspectives can be seen through the way the second generation was involved in different social and voluntary activities, assisting other Afghans with education or forming Afghan youth groups and conducting multiple cultural activities.

5.5 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS; SOCIAL REALTIONS AND NETWORKS

Institutional constraints and restrictive legislation that Afghans face in regards to residence status, citizenship rights, access to services and other types of entitlements, increases their reliance on networks of informal support. Ties and relations with other Afghans, often following networks of kin and ethnicity and at times relations with the native population, either through personal relations or by means of NGO’s such as the centers in which the empirical data was collected seem to be the major substitutes for the legal restrictions and their consequential exclusion from services and institutions that Afghans face.
Networks of cooperation between NGO’s and different institutions have proven to be a useful tool in balancing the restrictive legislation and exclusion from basic services that are an outcome of exclusionary policies towards immigrants (Ambrosini 2013). The examples of such cooperation can be seen through the respondent’s relations with the two centers. Besides the educational services offered in the centers, these NGOs have helped several of the respondents with basic health care and hospital services; medical professionals individually or in small groups of volunteers tend to frequent the NGO’s that give services to the disadvantaged people (regardless of their nationality) and offer their medical services there (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm., 3 February).

Networks of Afghans are also important information channels. The networks of immigrants become particularly important considering the exclusion of Afghans from the Iranian networks and social circles. An important example is the transfer of information about educational centers and alternative educational centers for Afghan children who face restrictions in attending public schools. Most respondents had heard about the center from other Afghans, who were either their close relatives (sister in law, sister) or were among their acquaintances, who they met at family gatherings and events. Interestingly in some occasions the initial information about the center had come from an Iranian, for example the employer of the husband of a relative. In this way the Afghan social networks act as a source of information and also a means of shared activities. The respondents started attending these centers since people they knew and trusted were already participating.

At the same time the empirical data show that lack of citizenship rights and exclusion from sources of financial credit such as investment loans increases the reliance of the Afghan population on informal networks and relations with the Iranians, especially the employer or landlord. While neither of the respondents personally reported having any considerable properties, they knew of other Afghans (brother in law or other relatives) who had managed to purchase a car or even a house by registering it through their Iranian contact, who often was an employer. These relations however entail a certain level of risk, of which the respondents were also aware. An example given by Arefe (age 21) indicates the high levels of trust and the high stake that can be put in such transactions: “one can buy a car or a house by registering it through an Iranian, however this can cause problems. Now our ‘relative’ have bought a house and registered it by an Iranian and now has rented it to the same Iranian and moved back to Afghanistan, but his tenant can claim that the house belongs to him”. In other examples the Iranian employer had provided the respondents’
husbands and fathers with the initial financial credit to begin their own business, in exchange for a share of their profit. Such reliance requires a certain amount of trust on the Iranian party. As it was seen among the respondents, in the success cases the outcome of partnership between the Iranian employer and the Afghan worker resulted in favorable conditions – and some degrees of occupational mobility- for the Afghan household. At the same time, other respondents had stories of fraud –especially through an overdraft account – from the Iranian employer resulting in bankruptcy of their husbands/fathers.

The respondents from married and single groups showed different patterns in regards to their own social networks and relations. Besides being in contact with the teachers and social workers at the centers, the married respondents had no other contacts with Iranians. Instead their social relations and networks mainly consisted of relations with kin and relatives. Following the theories of social capital; relations with people outside one’s group is referred to as bridging ties, while contact with the same group people constitutes the bonding networks. Usually the bridging ties are referred to those which are important for getting ahead in one’s life. Bridging networks lead to the formation of a broader identity and reciprocity through making linkages to external assets and diffusion of information. They are thus "good for getting ahead" (Putnam 2000). An important factor in realization of outcomes of social capital is the closure of the networks (Coleman 1988). Closure refers to existence of sufficient ties between a certain number of people to guarantee the observation of norms (Portes 1998). The bridging networks that the married respondents have with the organizers of the centers are important in providing them with information as well as access to education, a right that they are excluded from due to structural factors. However these relations do not fulfill the requirement of “closure”, as the connections between the married respondents and the teachers does not include any other people of the respondent’s family and group of peers. On the other hand the relations with kin and relatives have the factor of closure. In this way these relations, besides being possible networks of support, can act as measures of social control.

The situation among the single respondents seems to be slightly different in that their own networks of peers and friends seems to have reached the closure needed for shared of norms of reciprocity and shared values. This can be better seen in cases that the respondents were siblings and all shared the same social networks and relations. School’s ethnic composition can affect adaptation and integration of the migrants in the host society. Attending mainstream schools in the host society
provides bases for immigrants to interact with native students. They learn the values and norms of the new society. On the other hand, exclusion and isolation of migrants from such schools strengthen their own culture and may lead to separation (Portes and Hao 2004).

Among the group of single respondents, a trend was visible between the type of school they attended (public vs. substitute schools) and their group of associates and friends. Those respondents who had spent most of their education in public schools had Iranian friends and accordingly identified themselves with Iranians while clearly mentioning that they did not feel they belonged to the Afghan group. On the other hand those who had never been to public schools (those studying at Naser-Khosrow center) only had Afghan friends and did not socialize with Iranians. The third group consisted of those respondents who had more or less equally conducted their education between public schools and alternative centers. They identified themselves more with their Afghan peers, however mentioned that they also had Iranian friends. It was this third group of respondents who were socially active in issues related to other Afghans like teaching as volunteers at other centers or actively participating in Afghan youth groups. These findings also correspond with finding of Abbasi-Shavazi and Sadeghi on socio-cultural integration of second generation Afghan in Iran (2014).

5.6 CONDITIONS OF DAILY LIFE FOR AFGHANS IN IRAN

Modes of incorporation condition the extent to which immigrant’s human capital can be brought into play to promote successful economic and social adaptation. No matter how motivated and ambitious immigrants are, their future prospects will be dim if government officials persecute them, natives consistently discriminate against them, and their own community has only minimum resources to offer (Portes and Rumbaut 2001:49). Modes of incorporation for Afghan nationals in Iran; seen through Iranian government’s migration strategies and the native population’s unfavorable treatment of Afghans point towards Iran being a country with low receptivity towards Afghan immigrants. Lack of political commitment and unfavorable treatment from the Iranian government and society towards Afghans, institutional constraints, restrictive legislation and limitations in regards to labor market integration and participation in social life are some factors influencing everyday lives of Afghans in Iran. These factors together increase marginality of Afghans by limiting their access patterns to different resources and at the same time affecting their range of choices and options for improving their livelihoods. The outcomes of modes of incorporation can be
translated into various determinants of disadvantage and vulnerability for Afghans in Iran. As discussed in 3.2, these determinants of disadvantage create legal, institutional or social and cultural restrictions for migrants. The outcomes of these limitations translate into various types of exclusion, marginalization and exploitation, at different times of migrant’s lives (Sabates-Wheeler and Waite 2003). By controlling patterns of access or restricting legal representation and economic activity in everyday life conditions of migrants, these elements gradually impact their livelihood.

**TABLE 5-3: DETERMINANTS OF VULNERABILITY AND THEIR OUTCOMES IN EVERY DAY LIVES OF AFGHANS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of vulnerability</th>
<th>Influence on migrant’s lives</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spatial</strong></td>
<td>• Geographical remoteness</td>
<td>○ Unfamiliarity with new conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Restrictive legislation</td>
<td>○ Limited information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Participation difficulties in labor markets and civic activities</td>
<td>○ Limited access to economic and social opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of access to services</td>
<td>○ Limited access to basic services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of access to formal social protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-political</strong></td>
<td>• Institutional constraints that reflect Lack of political commitment from the destination government/society to the migrant</td>
<td>○ Limited Access to legal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○ Limited access to social and economic benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○ Exclusion from participation in political life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-cultural</strong></td>
<td>• Differences in norms, values and costumes</td>
<td>○ Language and cultural barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Culturally held notions of race, gender and illegality</td>
<td>○ Limits participation in labor markets and social and civic activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conceptual model described in chapter 2 explains that social structures and institutions constantly influence and shape people’s daily lives. That is, the dynamics of power structures at different levels (state, society or household) influences the choices and decisions made by the household or the individual in regards to management of their resources.

Lack of citizenship rights, limited rights and entitlements and reoccurring possibility of losing a residence permit are some effects of the Iranian government’s policies towards Afghans. By acting as determinants of socio-political and spatial vulnerability these relations create the current conditions of structural discrimination that Afghans face in Iran. Exclusion from citizenship rights, various sections of the labor market and limited chances of entrance into the educational systems limits the participation and representation of Afghans in the Iranian society. This conditions are more severe in case of Afghan women and girls, as following Iranian government’s traditional view
on women, Afghan women seem to be invisible in Iran’s migration polices as independent individuals and are instead only considered in relation to the their male guardians and family members; the husband or the father.

Socio-political marginalization and restrictive legislation that Afghans face in Iran increases their reliance on networks of informal support. These networks usually consist of kin and relatives and seem to be particularly important in regards to occupational mobility or offering financial assistance in times of need. Despite their role as support mechanisms, such networks of reciprocity have the ability to impose their own set of power structures and relations in daily life conditions of Afghans and especially that of Afghan women and girls. By increasing the importance of ethnic networks in lives of Afghans in Iran, the Iranian restrictive legislations are likely to reinforce the traditional intra-household structures and social relations that were seen among the respondents. As was seen in case of the respondents such networks are often times based on strict ethnic patterns and follow patriarchal norms and traditions. Accordingly networks of reciprocity –despite the support they offer- are likely to impose various socio-cultural limitations as well. An impact of the limiting norms
and values reproduced by reliance on networks of kin can be the respondent’s reluctance for commuting in the Bazaar area, as many of their male relatives worked there and the respondents did not want to be seen “out of the house” by them. The reason for such reluctance was explained by the respondent to be based on the values and norms of the traditional Afghan community, believing the women should be restricted to their own houses. The similar pattern is also viewed in the Afghan households. Socio-political and spatial remoteness that Afghans are subjected to through Iran’s migration policies, in combination with the Iranian government’s traditional view on women can enhance and induce prevalence of socio-cultural disadvantages in the intra-household dynamics of Afghans. The intra-household power relations then in turn can reinforce the state level inequalities. Iranian government’s traditional views on family structure and the power relations within the household are a good example. According to these views (that are constantly being advertised through TV programs, school books or and public advertising) the father is the head of the family and in charge of decision making, while the mother is in charge of children and the domestic work. Enforcement and implementation of gender based quota for employment and education as well as removal of family planning resources and encouragement of population growth are some attempts for encouraging the “traditional” household structure. Nevertheless, the structure of the household in the Iranian society is rapidly changing towards an equal structure with husband and wife having the same share of power and responsibilities. In fact the traditional form of family is rapidly fading among the younger generations and as of recent the phenomena of premarital cohabitation of young couples - referred to as “white marriage”- has become a major concern of the Iranian authorities (BBC NEWS 10 December 2014). On the contrary the traditional family structure; with the father/husband having the decision making power, was observed in the respondent’s households. An externality of such a power structure is the need for the female members to obtaining permission for conducting various activities. As was seen in case of the respondents, this condition can influence (or limit) a wide range of decisions and life choices for Afghan women; such as attending school and vocational training courses or having a job. Exclusion of Afghans from Iran’s social institutions and public sphere in combination with the government’s hegemony on institution of marriage and the added strength of the Afghans [traditional] networks of kind and relations are likely to further encourage the imbalance of power and distribution of rights inside the household unit and contribute to increased marginalization of Afghan women and girls. Moreover limiting Afghan women’s participation in various social and economic activities reinforces the already existing conditions of exclusion and
invisibility of Afghan women. Being marginal and also invisible limits circulation of knowledge and information about conditions of Afghan women, and therefore lowers the chances of uptake of counter strategies for breaking the conditions of marginality and exclusion that they face.

On the societal and community level also, relations and power structures with the native population can act as determinants of socio-cultural disadvantage and marginalization for Afghans. Perhaps it can be assumed that the structural discrimination that Afghans face (seen through Iranian government’s low reception towards Afghans) encourages public discrimination that is practiced by Iranians at different levels of contact with Afghans, resulting in integrated forms of discrimination against the Afghan population in Iran. Examples were seen in cases of relations of Iranian employers with Afghan workers and the lower wages of Afghans, the relations between Afghan tenants and their Iranian landlords in conditions when it comes to repairs and maintenance, or relationships between prospective Iranian students and school authorities in regards to tuition fees or even the ability of the students to study at public schools. On a more distant level also it seems that the encounters in the public sphere (on the bus or metro, in the bakery or on the street) entails a certain amount of racial discrimination, manifested through verbal encounters that either blame Afghans for being in Iran or degrades them due to their nationality. Such behavior could possibly influence further choices and decisions of the Afghan nationals in regards to their social activities and as was shown creates problems of identity and belonging for the second generation respondents. However not all outcomes of the social relations disadvantage the Afghan nationals. In other cases, such as the respondent’s relations with the centers, interactions at the societal level have helped the Afghan respondents to improve their life conditions, and go beyond the already existing restrictions they had been facing. Different values and priorities is another consequence of the societal level relations.

At the same time, one should not assume that the Afghans in Iran are passive recipients of a profile of opportunities, shaped by power relations and social structures at various levels. Social structures do not dominate all actions of individuals; instead they should be viewed as limitations to human choice (Winser et al. 1993). Various manifestations of the respondent’s agency were visible through their everyday life activities and attempts to improve their living conditions despite the various limitations they faced. At the very least, the respondent’s attendance at the centers – where they were initially contacted- is a sign of their active choice and decision for shifting the structural barriers they faced. Acknowledging people’s agency and choices should not undermine the fact that
their choices and decisions are influenced by the social relations and power structures. It is the dialectics of agency and structure that at the end shape's individual action and in particular individual hazard perception and choice of behavior in the face of hazards (Wisner, 1993) Unequal patterns of access to resources affect people through their daily choices and decisions and accordingly put them on different stages on the continuum of vulnerability. Social mobility on the other hand can be viewed through a change in social, political and economic orders or dimensions which can result in status change and improvements in living conditions.

5.6.1 AFGHAN’S AGENCY AND UPWARD MOBILITY

Dynamics of upward mobility are useful in analyzing the interactions of structure and agency. By imposing restrictions and limitation in access patterns of Afghans, the structural conditions can influence chances for upward social mobility of Afghan in Iran. The impact of structural elements can, to some extent, be balanced by individual agency. Actors’ actions can aim economic and social dimensions of mobility. In case of Afghans in Iran, personal attempts for economic mobility can be seen through actions to counteract restrictive regulations in regards to education, occupation as well as ownership rights. Social dimensions of mobility are often targeted by means of changes in lifestyle and consumption trends. Agency of Afghan’s- same as the rest of the population living in Iran- is visible in their daily activities and choices. In fact the decision to move to Iran; and to continue their stay here despite Iran’s pressures for repatriation can also be viewed as a sign of their active choice for improving their livelihoods. On a more general level, the choices and decisions of Afghan girls to continue their education and gain economic independence, their participation in different activities and volunteer positions and even their choice of outfit (which is a diversion from the “encouraged” Islamic cover of the black Chador) can all be seen as signs of their own agency for enhancing their livelihoods in the face of conditions of double discrimination is a result of Iran’s discriminatory views on women as well as exclusionary policies towards Afghans. Many of these struggles that aim balancing the gender discriminatory views are also common among Iranian women and girls (for an example of how choice of outfit can be seen as a manifestation of agency of actors see “Stealthy Freedoms of Iranian women” on https://www.facebook.com/StealthyFreedom). Acknowledging the agency of Afghans and their daily struggles to improve their livelihoods should not undermine recognition of multiple limits to their agency; resulted by the strong structural limitations that shape the context in which Afghans live and make their choice.
These conditions can be best explained through various elements that facilitate and hinder patterns of upward mobility among the respondents. Theories of segmented assimilation argue that among the second generation immigrants, a portion will follow the path of assimilation, while a great portion will show conditions of downward assimilation (Hirschman 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). Those who succeed are often those who are visible and on the ground, whereas the other portion often remains invisible. As was seen in the case of respondents in Iran, a range of macro and micro level structural factors limits the choices and opportunities of Afghans in Iran. Social networks and relations then find an important role in substituting these limitations and restrictions. Similarly social networks are also important means of social mobility for the Afghan population. Nevertheless the outcomes and benefits of the social networks are highly dependent on their context.

It can be assumed that those respondents who were contacted and interviewed—among both groups of married and single—are those who have followed the path of integration to some extent. Among these the second generation respondents in the single group fit the best with descriptions of adaptation and even upward mobility. Those respondents had; despite the many obstacles; managed to complete their education, or were about to finish it. Some had been admitted to the university, which is a distinct indicator of upward educational mobility, and some of them were volunteering in other centers and assisting with the empowerment of others. Educational attainment is a well-known indicator of upward mobility and while does not directly result in occupational mobility increases the range of qualifications and skills needed for jobs with higher payoffs. There are however other young Afghan girls, who were not attending the classes and activities of the centers. Half of the respondents in the single group claimed to know Afghan girls (among their acquaintances and friends) whom were not permitted to attend the classes at the center and school. The general consensus seemed to be that those are the Afghan girls who would join the traditional path of “growing up and getting married” or “were already married following the will of their families”. Despite the respondent’s different choices, it seems that the mainstream lifestyle pattern among the majority of Afghan girls follows patterns of marriage at an early age.

In understanding conditions of upward mobility of the respondents, some points should be re-emphasized. First is the location of field work. All the respondents were met at social centers aiming to empower and educate the disadvantaged residents of the neighborhood. As Portes and Fernandez-Kelly show organized programs sponsored by nonprofits to assist disadvantaged students
have an important role in successful cases of second generation assimilation and mobility (2008). Moreover civil society actors are shown to be influential factors in balancing the impacts of exclusionary policies against migrants (Ambrosini 2013; Ambrosini and Caneva 2012). Provision of education and literacy is perhaps the most visible example of such balancing effects. Other examples could be provision of a minimum of health services after entering the social working systems. Also these centers act as cooperation platforms with volunteer professionals especially medical experts. (Naser-Khosrow center 2014, pers.comm., 3 February). It should be kept in mind that in actors are themselves limited and at times pressured by the structural factors. Therefore, in the Iranian context activities of the NGO’s and other civil society actors are highly likely to face resistance by the authorities and officials. A good example is the shutting down of the Ayande center and summoning the manager of the center along with some other teachers and social workers to the local police station. Among the list of problems were admission of Afghan participants, having music lessons, mixed classes among boy and girls and having had multiple visitors from International organizations such as the UNICEF. The latter problem was categorized as possibility of receiving undocumented funding. The problem eventually was solved and the center was allowed to continue its activities due to the clever strategy adopted by the center’s director. By informing the police that the manager had lost a brother in Iran-Iraq war; a sign of loyalty to the Islamic republic of Iran, the manager was able to build common ground based on Islamic values and convince the police force who had accused the center of “un-Islamic conduct” to re-open the center (Ayande center 2014, pers.comm., 30 January).

The sole existence of such centers however is not enough for empowerment and progression of upward mobility among the respondents. Knowledge and information about such centers is another important factor. Most respondents had heard about the center from other Afghans, who were either their close relatives (sister in law, sister) or were among their acquaintances, who they met at family gatherings and events. Besides knowledge about existence of the centers and NGO’s Knowing, the respondents also knew the “right people” to assist them with participation in the centers and further on with other endeavors in their lives. As it has been showed through the interviews, not everyone who had heard about the center was able to attend. Intra-household dynamics, lack of permission for going to school, or the decision that working is more needed than studying, were reasons mentioned for why some other respondents had already dropped out. In the case of some of the most active and successful respondents in the single group (Farzane, Masoume
and Kobra) the initial resistance of their fathers and brothers against their participation was overcome through teachers and social workers who had convinced their elders to grant them permission to attend the classes. This is one example of the importance of “knowing the right people”. The more important impact of knowing the “right people” however is seen through how the social workers and the manager of the center solved many of the educational obstacles that would have otherwise made continuation of study much more difficult for the respondents.

This is not a unique condition. In studies of segmented assimilation patterns among second generation Mexicans in the United States, Portes and Fernandez-Kelly identify a reoccurring path of “appearance of a really significant other” (2008). That person can be a teacher, a counselor, a friend of the family, or even an older sibling. The important thing is that they take a keen interest in the child, motivate him or her to graduate from high school and to attend college, and possess the necessary knowledge and experience to guide the student in the right direction (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2008). The benefits of knowing the “right person” in case of the respondents would go beyond motivations and encouragements for choosing a particular path or even overcoming the barrier of the unwilling father. An important aspect in the “right person” the respondents knew was that she or he was Iranian or was an Afghan with strong connections with other Iranians. This is particularly important as it is the “Afghan” nationality that acts as the marker of the structural discrimination and exclusionary measures in lives of Afghans. In this way the centers and their educators can be considered as the “right” type of bridging social capital of the respondents. These are the types of connection that as argued by Coleman (1988) will enables the respondents to bypass certain regulations and gain access to profitable resources. Interestingly it seems that the binding social capital of the respondents could also have the same ability in limited cases. For example Kobra (age 23) used the Amayesh card of one of her relatives to attend public schools during her elementary level of education. In this case, it is the bonding relations that in fact have helped to the respondent to get ahead. Still patterns of the importance of “right” person can be traced in this example; the relative’s possession of the Amyaesh card.

The impacts of knowing the “right person” seen through bridging social capital between Afghans and Iranians is also visible through the lives of the male family members of the respondents’ household. Specifically these relations are used to bypass the restrictions on property laws that Afghans face in Iran. While neither of the respondents personally reported having any considerable properties, they knew of other Afghans (brother in law or other relatives) who had managed to
purchase a car or even a house by registering it through their Iranian contact, who often was an employer. As mentioned before, such arrangements require high amounts of trust on both sides of the agreement and entail certain levels of risk.

Social ranking and patterns of association are another indicator of social mobility, especially in the contemporary Iranian society, in which status recognition is encoded in, and a crucial part of, language, behavior and social etiquette. Appearance, behavioral patterns and changes in the consumption style can be seen as an aspiration for showing one’s social class in Iran (Olszewska 2013). The second generation respondents visibly showed different patterns of appearance, dialect, behavior, activities and goals compared to the first generation respondents. The most evident difference was seen in relations to their desired activities and wishes. The second generation respondents wished to attend [underground] dancing course, join fitness stadiums or learn to play different musical instruments. They indentified financial constraints as the main limit to achieving these goals. The desires of the first generation respondents had a more conservative nature and were more affected by their current levels of literacy. Accordingly they wished to be able to attend vocational seamstress courses or join Quran reading sessions.

Also among the second generation group themselves variations were visible between respondent’s whose social circles also included Iranian friends and those who only socialized with other Afghans (i.e. did not know any other Iranians) in regards to their choice of outfit and accent and way of speaking. These respondents spoke the Farsi dialect with a Tehrani accent, used many of the slangs and particular language of the Tehran youth, their choices of outfit were no different from the trend among other middle class Iranian girls and so were their choice of activities. Among the first generation respondents also variations were visible in regards to choice of outfit and dialect and accent. The Iranian society is a highly stratified one in which class and status are portrayed through lifestyles and consumption patterns, among other things. The derogatory image of Afghani also follows a set of pre-defined ideas about the looks, appearance and life choices of the Afghan population. The appearance and the image that the respondents at Ayande center presented were far away from this pre-set idea. Arguing that life style and consumption patterns can be seen as indicators of status change, Olszewska (2013) refers to this condition as a class differentiation within the Afghan community. The scope and extent of the empirical data of this research does not allow for examining this condition. Nevertheless it can be argued that the image the second generation respondents portrayed could indeed be considered as an indicator of upward social mobility.
The lifestyles of patterns of the respondents—especially those from the second generation—are in fact in accordance with the patterns and ways of living in Iran. Moreover when asked about future plans about staying in Iran or moving back to Afghanistan, neither of the respondents found moving back to Afghanistan a plausible scenario. Nevertheless the respondents did not seem to be much involved in events related to the Iranian society. This can of course be due to their exclusion of the Iranian social life. When asked about their news sources and the types of news they were interested in, all respondents mentioned following the news in Afghanistan. With varying degrees of knowledge the respondents could recall some ongoing events such as the elections, or recent suicide bombings. This trend was also visible among the second generation respondents who had never been to Afghanistan. However in their case, they also had some information about ongoing events in Iran.

5.7 PROGRESSION OF VULNERABILITY FOR IRANIAN AFGHANS

Based on the vulnerability paradigm, a disaster is the intersection of two opposing forces: a natural hazard event and the processes that generate a vulnerable population. While the natural hazard event can be sudden and onset (such as an earthquake), the processes that result in existence of a vulnerable population take place at different stages. As shown in DIAGRAM 2-4, Wisner et al (2004) have categorized different stages in progression of vulnerability as root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. Root cases refer to the historical, political, economic and demographic factors the produce unequal distribution of resources among people. In case of the Afghan population in Iran, root causes can be seen through different historical as well as political and economic factors. The history of movement between Iran and Afghanistan, and the constant conditions of social and economical unrest and wars in Afghanistan are some very remote examples that nevertheless are important in understanding the continuation of the flow between the two countries. Iran’s Islamic government’s stand on reiteration of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers based on the United Nation’s refugee convention is also equally important in buildup of the current policies regarding rights and entitlements of Afghans in Iran.
Added on these factors are the constant shift in Iran’s refugee and visa policies, resulting in an increase of undocumented migrants as well as a constant decline of rights and entitlements for the Afghans. These conditions constitute the “dynamic pressures” in progression of vulnerability for Afghans. “Dynamic pressures” are processes that translate the effects of root causes by creating unsafe conditions under which some people in a given place and time must live (Bolin 2007; Wisner et al. 2004:54). Current structural discrimination that Afghans face in many aspects of their daily life can be considered as part of the dynamic pressures in lives of Afghans in Iran. Induced by denial of citizenship rights, the Afghan population faces inequalities in different areas from restrictions to labor market opportunities, to limited access to education and basic services and lack of possession rights. In understanding differential progression of vulnerability “Unsafe conditions” are the last link in the chain of causation. These are specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time and space in conjunction with a hazard. From a natural hazard perspective and following a vulnerability paradigm unsafe conditions are often measured through people’s livelihoods and assets. This is possible through consideration of the ways in which social relations and power structures interact with one another at various levels and how the final outcome of such dynamics influences choices and options of the Afghan nationals in Iran.

The outcomes of Iran’s migration policies and rights interact with societal level relations and intra-household dynamics of the Afghan households. The ways in which Iranian government’s measures of internal and external control influences the residence status of Afghans, as well as their consequential patterns of access to resources (labor market, education, etc.), relationship with employers and official authorities and contact with the native population in the public sphere or through membership in the empowerment centers -used for this study- are some examples. As it
was shown in case of the respondents these relations can have diverse consequences and can ultimately reinforce or balance the conditions of social inequality and their consequential access patterns. DIAGRAM 5-3 explains the ways in which daily life conditions of Afghans in Iran interact with their access patterns and consequently impact their choices and decisions.

Social relations and power structures at different levels can shape and influence the range of access qualifications and potential to fulfill such qualifications for different groups of people. Access qualifications are often directly linked to a job’s pay off and hence an indicator of a household’s earnings and budget.

On the first level Iranian government’s policies towards Afghans set the patterns for Afghan’s [residential] status in Iran. Depending on their status as regular and “Amayesh cardholder”, regular and with a residence visa or irregular migrants, Afghan’s have different relationships with Iranian state in regards to their rights and entitlements. By setting the limits to Afghan’s rights and entitlements, these structures determine Afghan’s level of access to different institutions and
services. Examples include patterns for mobility [by indicating off-limit provinces], possession rights, allocation of work permits as well as range of occupational opportunities and entitlement to education and other services. The combination of these factors shapes Afghan’s income opportunities. This is done through limiting Afghan’s potential for fulfillments of access qualifications such as permits, skills and qualities required for uptake of different occupations.

Access qualifications are a function of state level structures as well as social relations of production, gender and ethnicity. Nationality and gender based restriction in regards to work permits- the basic requirement for having a job- are an example of how state level structures can influence access qualifications and hence the range of possible income opportunities. Other access qualifications include skills (education or particular training), or possession of tools of the trade. These requirements often depend on the access profile of different people. This means that the amount of access to different resources increases or decreases people’s chances to qualify for different jobs. Again, restrictions such as lack of property rights or the current limitations on education for Afghans can minimize their chances for accumulation of such assets.

Power structures and social relations are also visible at the community level. These can be seen between classes that are defined economically (such as employer and worker) and between members of different ethnic groups. These relations reflect patterns of the relations between the state and the individuals. Relations between Iranian employers and Afghan employees and their consequential [longer] working hours and [lower] payments of the Afghan workers can be an example in which relations at the community level restrict the livelihood options of Afghans. At the same time, these relations can help with promotion of livelihoods, for examples in cases in which the Iranian employer provided the respondents with investment capital for developing their own business. Informal support through networks of reciprocity are particularly important in shaping livelihoods of Afghans, as the current legal restrictions and lack of citizenship rights completely exclude the Afghan national from systems of financial credit and investments.

The same condition applies to gender status. Patterns of gender (in) equality at the policy and state level are usually manifested in ways in which women are treated in the society and in their households. The Iranian government’s traditional view on women seems to have resulted in invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration polices and accordingly in the eyes of the public. Such a view encourages the traditional and patriarchal power structures inside the household. An
example can be seen following the gender based exclusion of Afghan women from work permits. Since Afghan women have no legal right to work, it will be more difficult for them to transform the intra-household power relations that prevent them from working.

Ability to fulfill the access qualifications shapes the range of income opportunities that are available to people. Resulted by the occupational restrictions as well as discriminatory behavior towards Afghans, the respondent’s husbands were occupied in low skilled menial jobs. These are the jobs with lower payoffs. The respondents all reported their husbands and fathers to be working very long hours (average 10 hours per day) and having very low income levels. In fact the estimated income level of the respondents’ and their households (between 500,000- 1,000,000 Toman/month) falls below Iran’s poverty line for urban areas (approximately 1,000000 Toman/month) and much is lower than estimated 1,800,000 Toman/month average income level for an urban household (see section 4.6.2 for details). The payoffs of a job (income levels) are important determinants of a household’s budget. As was seen in the case of the respondents, their household budget consisted of the earnings of the household members and in most cases was barely sufficient for their needs. Neither of the respondents reported having any type of savings, assets and possessions in Iran or any other type of financial credit. This means that the household’s budget needs to be used for the immediate and urgent needs such as rent and housing utilities. Health care and medical costs were another major expense of the respondent’s households. However, trying to ignore health problems due to its high cost and expenses seemed to be a common pattern among the respondents and their household members.

As a result respondents and their household’s had a very limited range of choices and options to improve their livelihoods or increase their resources. The range of choices and decisions made within the household continues to define the social relations and structures of the household. For example based on the examples given by the married respondents, some of the Afghan women who wanted to attend the literacy courses were banned by their husbands in order to conduct home based work and contribute to the household’s finances. Or in other cases due to financial restrictions, the household had decided to only renew the residence visa of the father and older brothers who as the breadwinners required a work permit, without doing the same for younger and female siblings. These choices not only reflect the power patterns and distribution of responsibilities and roles in the household, but have the ability to impact access patterns of the household members differently. In addition, interview results show that at the current stage a clear difference
exists between the first and second generation Afghans that often times constitute the members of the same household. These are mostly highlighted in regards to different values and priorities and the respective lifestyles following these views. At the same time, as it was shown possession of different traits such as educational attainment or economic independence was likely to affect the power asymmetries among the household members. Examples were seen in cases in which Afghan women and girls – who earned money or had higher levels of education-, were included in the household’s decision making patterns. This condition is an interesting example of the ways in which state and societal level indicators can influence the intra-household dynamics and hence indirectly influence the choices and decisions of the actors.

5.7.1 INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN GENDER AND MIGRANT STATUS

In understanding the progression of vulnerability and its consequential impacts in daily lives of Afghan women one needs to pay attention to the ways in which the two determinates of gender and migrant status intersect with one another. As it was conceptualized in DIAGRAM 3-1 social relations and structures at various levels of state, societal or intra-household dynamics can affect women and migrants in regards to their access patterns and accordingly range of choices and decisions. Such patterns were also visible in case of the sample group.

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of this situation, contextual factors related to both Iran and Afghanistan and women’s respective conditions in each country should be taken into account. As mentioned in section 4.3.2 despite the geographical proximity, shared history and many commonalities in regards to culture, religion and language, Iran and Afghanistan are very different in regards to levels of development, patterns of modernization and lifestyles of people. These differences are particularly important –and also clear- in the case of Afghan women, who have perhaps been among the major victims of continuous conditions of unrest and war in Afghanistan; particularly during the civil wars and the reign of Taliban. For a detailed account of how Afghan women have been impacted through various times in history of Afghanistan see Appendix 4. These conditions started since 1979 (with the soviet occupation and increase in the power of Mujahedin) and reached their peak in the time period between 1989-2001 (Ahmed-Gosh 2003). These time periods match with the arrival time of the families of the second generation respondents and some of the older respondents from the married group during the first phase of Iran’s migration policies towards Afghans; the open border period. Decision to move under such condition, is a clear
sign of agency of Afghans in improving their living conditions as well as reaching a minimum level of safety. Despite noticeable changes in governance, security and policies of Afghanistan living conditions in Afghanistan are still far from favorable; especially for women and girls. Besides Kabul which shows patterns of modern life with women actively participating in different areas of social life; education and even jobs, in other parts of Afghanistan women still face many restrictions and at time violations, particularly in regards to child marriages and domestic violence (HRWb 2013). It can be argued that moving to Iran is still a measure of improvement in living standards and life conditions –especially in areas facing high limitations for women- for the respondents. In fact despite the initial adjustment difficulties, living in Iran has made it possible for Afghans to break away from traditional social institutions, many of which are unfavorable to gender equity. The different patterns in Iran have an influence on lives of Afghan migrants. For example exposure to a much lower fertility regime as well as availability free contraception through primary health care units, has increased the rate of contraception among Afghan women in Iran compared to those in Afghanistan (Moghadas et al. 2007). The impacts of different environments are more visible in case of second generation Afghans who have been raised in an arguably more liberal social and religious environment and are exposed to different values, attitudes and practices. In particular educational achievements, occupational skills and economic opportunities in Iran have inspired different values and aspirations (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008). These conditions can be seen through a comparison of the range of activities of the first and second generation respondents. The married respondents, while they were permitted to attend the literacy course, mentioned that they faced various restrictions in regards to attending vocational courses, working or going out with their friends. The second generation respondents, while still faced restriction in regards to going out with their friends, had much fewer restrictions in regards to educational activities and practices. Once they had overcome the initial reluctance of their fathers about attending the centers, they did not face many restrictions in uptake of various activities there; in fact the respondents attended a wide range of courses including music, computer skills and English lessons. As mentioned in section 4.2 Iranian women face many restrictions and limitations through discriminatory legislations and Iranian government’s constant force to push them out of the public sphere. Regardless of these attempts the daily life conditions of women in Iran show a clear contradiction with the traditional views of the government. Such a gap can be seen through women’s choices and decisions, their high participation in higher education and labor market and their active participation in the public sphere. While Iran’s violation of Afghan refugees and migrant’s lives has –rightly- been a point of
concern (Adelkhah and Olswezka 2007; HRWa 2013; Justice for Iran 2012), there seems to be a consensus among researchers that the socio-cultural milieu of Iran is likely to provide Afghan women with chances for improving their livelihoods, especially in the case of the second generation Afghan girls (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012; Hoodfar 2007; Piran 2004). This contradictory condition offers an interesting point of entry for gaining a deeper understanding of synergies between the two variables of gender and migrant status in progression of vulnerability in daily lives of Afghan women and girls as well as in face of a given disaster.

Following the chain of causes in progression of vulnerability for Afghans in Iran (see DIAGRAM 5-2) root causes play an important role in understanding the differential vulnerability and coping mechanism of Afghan women and girls. Root causes reflect the distribution and exercise of power in the society. People who are socially and economically marginal tend also to be of marginal importance to those who have the political and economical power (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987, pp. 21-23; Wisner et al 2004, p. 48). In the Iranian context both women and Afghan immigrants can be considered as marginal groups. The reproduction of vulnerability through the root causes manifests itself through a complete lack of consideration for Afghan women’s rights and needs. In accordance with the traditional view of the Islamic regime – and in contradiction with conditions of day to day life for Iranian women- Afghan women are considered to be the sole responsibility of their relevant male family members; father and or husbands. Such conditions influence daily lives of Afghan women from various perspectives.

To paint a general picture, lives of Afghan women in Iran are influenced through two sets of structures. One is the structural context of Iran as the host country, which by influencing the general living conditions of Afghans in Iran (residence permit, labor market options, mobility patterns, rights and entitlements) sets the limit for Afghan household’s (including Afghan women and girls) livelihood options. At the same time the patriarchal viewing of Afghan Women by the Iranian government, leaves them out of the legislative framework of Iran- a country with more progressive rules and practices in regards to women compared to Afghanistan- and instead bounds them to the intra-household relations and dynamics of the Afghan households. On a micro level, household size and structure and power relations in kinship and marriage can create risky living conditions for women (Enarson 1998; Fordham 1998). These constitute the second set of structures influencing lives of Afghan women and girls in Iran. These relations -as it was the case with the respondents- follow a more traditional form and at times tend to impose a patriarchal view on women. Moreover
Iran’s measures of internal control and migration policies do not entitle Afghans with citizenship rights and hence Afghan women are left out of any effective legal framework in regards to their household affairs. These conditions are particularly important in shaping differential vulnerability of Afghan women compared to Iranian women given the contextual conditions of Iran. It should be re-emphasized that the current position of Iranian women in the public sphere and their active participation in social and economical activities is a result of agency and day to day resistance against a background of gender based discrimination and exclusion imposed by the Iranian government. Awareness of Iran’s contextual factors in analysis of differential vulnerability of Afghan women is important. Otherwise, there is the risk of over-estimating the role of Afghans intra-household dynamics, or under-estimating Afghan women’s agency and active choice.

Enforcement of double structures in daily lives of Afghan women and girls influences and interacts with their ability to actualize their agency and improve their livelihoods. Not only Afghan women need to make their choices and decisions in regards to – or despite- the structural factors imposed through Iran’s exclusionary measures against Afghans, they need to also make choices with consideration of the power structures inside their households. “Permission” of the “head” of the family (i.e. father or husband) is an important factor in this regard. At the same time; despite the changing structure of the family and institution of marriage in the current Iranian society; the idea of the patriarchal power structure is not alien to the Iranian public. At the very least such a view is being advertised and encouraged by the Iranian government vastly from school books to Iran’s national television programs and even “informative” banners on the streets.

Following the Iranian family law (see BOX 4-1) the husband’s consent is required for a wide range of the wife’s actions; even though currently strategies (such as the premarital conditions) have been implemented to waive such a requirement. However, for the average women in Iran, it is not unlikely to face situation in which her actions will not be supported by the public, in case her husband/father is not approving of it. For example seldom the employers will be supportive of their female employee, if they are aware that the husband does not wish her to work. This reaction-which happens recurrently- is based on attempts to avoid trouble. In short, intra-household power structures in the [traditional] household usually result in a condition that all personal choices and decisions should go through the male “head” of family. This was visible among the respondents as well, who in many cases required their husbands/fathers permission and approval. It was also seen that the contacted respondents were those who had managed to gain such approval at least in
relation to their participation in the centers and advance of their education. The same respondents did mention that they were denied permission to do certain other activities such as working or going out alone.

Invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration policy as independent individuals is an exclusionary mechanism in lives of Afghan women and narrows down their range of options and choices as well as access levels to different resources. Besides the immediate impacts, Iranian government’s neglect of rights and entitlements of Afghan women has long term consequences for the Afghan community as well and therefore needs to be considered regarding its possible impacts on the second generation Afghan as well. Perhaps the best illustrations of the time dimensions of vulnerability of Afghan women can be seen through limitations in regards to a residence and work permits. As described in 5.2.2.1 the introduction of Amayesh cards and residence visa’s seems to have effectively left the Afghan women out of possible strategies for obtaining regular residence documents on their own; as single women who are not wives and daughters to other Afghan men. This condition is particularly concerning given the inflow of Afghan brides into the country- as was shown by the interview results. Not only this view extremely increases the dependency of the newly arrived brides on their husbands, but also impact’s the second generation Afghans living status as well. As for the children to have a regular status, both parents are required to hold valid residence permits. Lack of a residence permit then imposes many restrictions in access patterns of the second generation Afghan and can eventually impact their livelihood options. The intergenerational effects of this condition were clearly seen in regards to the educational options of the single respondents. While most of the single respondents in the sample group were conducting their studies or have finished it already, it was clear that lack of a residence permit had made their educational process a complicated and unsteady one. This condition is particularly interesting as education is a valued asset within the Afghan households. Moreover, as the interview results showed gender (being a woman) is likely to acts as a facilitator for educational attainment based on the structure of the Afghan households. This is resulted by a combination two factors; on the one hand the Afghan families seem to value education and be aware of importance of at least having a literate factor within their household. On the other hand due to their breadwinning responsibilities and need for entering the labor market from an early age Afghan men and boys are less likely to be able to spend time at schools and or literacy centers. Therefore in Afghan households which value educations- and also permit their wives/daughters to attend school- Afghan women and girls are the first candidate
for literacy. The balance between the limiting and facilitating roles of gender in the intra-household relations however is likely to be disrupted by added barriers in the way of women and girls educational path. Being excluded from attending the public school –due to lack of residence documents- could act as such a barrier to the continuation of Afghan girls’ educational path. As was the case, remedying such a condition first place requires a certain amount of knowledge and information about existence of alternative educational sources as well as well as convincing their families (mainly fathers) that the substitute center is a suitable place for a woman or girl to attend. In this way, exclusion of Afghan women from Iran’s measures of external control can in longer term result in exclusion of their children from institutions and services and hence reduce their access patterns.

Additionally, the Single respondents reported that they often faced restrictions for going out with their friends for entertainment such as going to the park, going to the movies, etc. unless the entertainment plan was organized by their schools. The intra-household restrictions that Afghan girls face decrease their chances of being present in Tehran’s public social scene. If the girls are not seen on the streets, in the parks or in the shopping centers, they become invisible to the public. Participation in the school activities –which are viewed as suitable and permitted by the parents- are one way to change this situation. Educational restrictions that Afghans face, not only influence their human capital but indirectly also limit their social relations and networks.

Denial of Afghan women from a work permit is another direct consequence of the Iranian government’s view on women and their accepted role in the society. Unlike Afghan men, Afghan women are not able to obtain a working permit, even with a regular status. Denial of a work permit to Afghan women extremely reduces their chances of integration into the formal labor market and instead limits them to home-based jobs. The home based jobs do not offer a high payoff however, and often these jobs seem to be as an extension of the husband’s jobs. Such restrictions on labor options of Afghan women have reduced their ability to contribute to the household budget as well as possible chances of economic independence. Moreover, it seems that exclusion of Afghan women from the labor market can indirectly reinforce the traditional and patriarchal intra-household dynamics of the Afghan households in Iran. Based on the interview results, Afghan women’s contribution to the household budget was one of the possible conditions for changing the intra-household power structures; especially in regards to decision making patterns. This was seen in case of a few examples that female members of the household who worked outside of the house (as
domestic worker and seamstress) were involved in the process of making important decision about household’s expenses and plans. Besides these examples, following the interview results, decision making in the respondents’ households was mainly limited to the male household members. As a result, exclusion of Afghan women from Iran’s labor policies can indirectly impact the power imbalances of the Afghan household and contribute to vulnerability of Afghan women.

Exclusion of Afghan women from the labor market is also problematic in regards to second generation Afghan girls. Particularly those who compared to the first generation show patterns of upward educational mobility. It is of course possible to imagine that the second generation Afghan girls could face possible difficulties in regards to gaining permission for working outside of the house. This is not an uncommon condition in Iran. Nevertheless as it was the case with one of the respondents, such resistance could be less in case of “acceptable” types of jobs; in her case she had the possibility of taking a secretarial position in a trading company. These are the jobs with higher access qualifications and also higher payoffs. Accordingly such jobs are those which more strictly require a work permit. Exclusion from the labor market effectively decreases chances of occupational mobility for the Afghan women. Not only exclusion of Afghan women from the labor market reduces their chances of economic independence, but also it reduces their chances of participation in Iran’s social and public life. Such conditions will reinforce the invisibility of Afghan women, both in the eyes of the public as well as in Iran’s migration and refugee policies.

Analysis of synergies between gender and migrant status shows that social relations and power structures at state, societal and household levels is likely to results in added marginalization and under-representation for Afghan women and girls. Separately, being a women or being a migrant in Iran connotes a certain level of structural discrimination and exclusion. The combined effect of these two increases the limiting power structures in lives of Afghan women seen in the form of intra-household relations and dynamics, while at the same time reduces Afghan women’s amount of access to facilitating structures such as access to civil rights, legal frameworks and social support.
5.8 EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITY FOR AFGHANS IN IRAN

How vulnerable someone is, is determined by weakness and strength of their livelihoods, their access to a range of assets that provide the basis for their livelihood strategy as well as their amount of access to different institutions and social protection (Cannon et al. 2003). Similarly livelihoods can also indicate differential levels of coping capacity for people. Coping is the manner in which people act within the limits of existing resources and range of expectations to achieve various ends. Like vulnerability, people’s opportunities for coping with or adapting to hazards are influenced by social structures and institutions and relations between groups and inside the household (Pelling 2003). In particular case of women, scholars of gender and disasters have identified different factors that influence women’s vulnerability and coping capacity in regards to a disaster. These factors are resulted and shaped by social relations and power structures at state, societal and household levels (Enarson et al 2007).

In case of an earthquake, livelihoods are important determinants in understanding ex ante and ex post hazards and conditions of vulnerability. The former refers to potential hazards of an earthquake whereas the latter refers to what happens after the initial shock and in the process of recovery (Wisner et al. 2004:239). Understanding these conditions involves two related tasks; that is to understand how the combination of time and space characteristics of a group as well as their socio-economic conditions defines their levels of differential vulnerability to an earthquake hazard. For the purpose of discussion, this task can be re-phrased as understanding “who is likely to be where at the time of an earthquake” and “how” they are likely to be affected by and recover from its outcomes. Coping mechanisms play an important role in understanding the latter question. These are often complex strategies that involve a number of sequenced mechanisms for obtaining resources in times of adversity and disaster. In case of an earthquake coping mechanisms can be categorized into four generic types that can be applied to the actions of actors from individuals to the state. Almost all coping strategies consist of actions before during and after an event. Similarly coping mechanisms for earthquakes include preventative and impact minimizing strategies, diversification of production strategies, development of social support networks and post event coping strategies (Pelling 2003, p. 54; Wisner et al., pp. 100-110).
Preventative and impact minimizing strategies respectively refer to attempts to avoid the disasters happening at all and seek to minimize loss and facilitate recovery. A large portion of these strategies should be implemented at the state level; such as enforcement of safety codes or warning systems. On a personal level coping strategies include household adjustments and diversification of livelihoods. Informative action and awareness rinsing about hazards and safety measure is another important strategy aiming to minimize the impacts of death and injuries at the time of an earthquake. Risk knowledge and information is often provided through educational institutions and other public organizations; such as each neighborhood’s municipal community center. Another means of obtaining such information is through social networks and relations.

Livelihood options of Afghan residents of Iran mostly resemble conditions of every day vulnerability and hazards. Constant exposure to everyday hazards and risk gradually lowers peoples' thresholds of coping capacity. Those who are most vulnerable often times find it hardest to reconstruct their livelihoods following a disaster and this in turn makes them more vulnerable to the effects of subsequent hazard events. Moreover living in situations of daily risk and hazard can create conditions that risks becomes an acceptable and normalized part of everyday life and can have a perverse effect on people's willingness to prepare for the possibility of catastrophic disasters (Pelling 2003, p. 15).
5.8.1 LIVELIHOODS OF AFGHANS; SPACE AND TIME FACTORS

Housing quality, Type of tenure and safety of the residential area are important spatial determinants. Such factors in turn are a function of a household’s livelihood, especially seen through income and financial resources. In case of immigrants, often times networks of kinship and relations with other immigrants are also an important determinant in choice of the residence location.

The interview results indicate towards the weakness of the livelihoods of the respondents and their households. Resulted by the occupational restrictions as well as discriminatory behavior towards Afghans, the respondents all reported their husbands and fathers to be working very long hours (average 10 hours per day) and having very low income levels (see section 4.6.2). Lower rental rates as well as proximity to the Bazaar seem to in correspondence with the income levels and range of occupations of the respondents’ households. At the same time, as indicated in MAP 4-4 the neighborhoods in zone 2 of the district 12- where the majority of the respondents lived- show a high concentration of the vulnerable and old urban fabric. This means the residential areas in this neighborhood are suspected to have very low resistance towards earthquakes due to their age and construction material. The residential location can be viewed as a spatial determinant of earthquake vulnerability, as it increases the likelihood of loss and damage during an earthquake. An even more important factor about district 12 however, is the narrowness of its side streets; a condition that was clearly observed at both of centers and mentioned multiple times by the respondents themselves. A major point of concern in old and vulnerable urban fabric of Tehran is the post earthquake aid and relief actions, as the debris and destruction along with the already narrow streets are likely to block outreach of ambulances and other emergency measures (Etemad 2013, pers.comm., 12 January 2013).

The age of the housing units is also an indicator of the quality of the structure and its level of maintenance. As can be seen in section 4.6.6 the respondents mentioned various problems in regards to their residence, old structure, cracked walls and broken glasses where common features of their residences, while at the same time most of their living units had more pressing issues such as piping and heating problems that required immediate repair. The respondents viewed these problems to be resulted by their type of housing tenure. In comparison to their rental residential units, the respondents seemed to believe that the quality of housing of their Iranian neighbor’s was
much higher as the Iranian neighbors “owned their own residences and therefore would keep up with its maintenance”.

A combination of state and societal level factors influence differential vulnerability of the respondents in regards to spatial elements. Iran’s measures of internal control towards Afghans; seen through migration and labor policies; limit Afghans income opportunities and hence influence their choice of residential area. This condition increases their likelihood of living in neighborhoods with a higher abundance of vulnerable urban fabric. These are the same neighborhoods that Tehran’s Disaster Mitigation and Management Organization (TDMMO) has identified as “vulnerable” areas based on their physical and engineering characteristics (TDMMO, n.d). At the same time Iran’s migration policies prevent Afghans from ownership rights and thus limit their type of housing tenure to only rental properties. Housing tenure is another important determinant of vulnerability to earthquakes. On one hand the residential unit can be seen as non-monetary asset and part of the financial capital of the household and on the other hand, ownership of the house is likely to increase the maintenance and quality of the residential structure.

Repair and maintenance of the houses, given the low income of the respondents and their households adds an extra burden to their living costs and is often likely to be undermined in favor of more urgent needs. Another reason for respondents’ reluctance in conducting maintenance and repair is the likelihood of being asked to vacate the residence anytime by the land owners; who in all cases were Iranian. Part of such uncertainty is caused by lack of formal lease contracts –especially in case of irregular Afghans. At the same time Tehran’s strategies of renewal of old urban fabric allocate a special construction bonus to those house owners who voluntarily reconstruction their old structures (Hamshahri online, 5 September 2014). Given the high cost of land and residential areas in Tehran, the bonus which comes in form of extra constriction rights will result in a very high profit for land owners. As a result the land owner is likely to evacuate the Afghan tenants when he is ready for re-construction. In this way, Tehran’s policies of urban renewal can add to the precarity of Afghan’s housing tenure. In addition some of the respondents mentioned that the due to knowledge of a complete reconstruction in near future, the landowner was not willing to spend extra money on required repairs and maintenances issues of the residence.
5.8.2 LIVELIHOOD OF AFGHANS; RESOURCES AND ASSETS

Another important role of the financial capital is in regards to recovery options after an earthquake. Savings, in the form of financial credit or assets are major determinants in coping and recovery from impacts of a hazard. Diversification of livelihoods is another strategy that reduces the reliance of the household’s on just one livelihood asset and hence minimizes risks of loss and damage at the times of a disaster.

Macro level factors impact savings and financial credits of the Afghans in Iran. This is either directly through lower incomes and unfavorable working conditions of the Afghans, or indirectly as a result of lack of other measures of social protection such as health care or working insurance. The respondents often mentioned lacking any type of savings, mainly due to the fact that the daily costs of living would not allow for that. In some cases the respondents mentioned having had savings, but being forced to spend it all due to medical expenses for their household members. Often time, it was the breadwinner who was in need of medical care – for example due to an accident- which meant not only the savings were spent on his health care, but the household had suffered from a period of no income as well.

A major monthly cost for the majority of the respondents is their monthly rent and utilities for their residence. The amount of rent paid by the respondents varied between 30,000 to 700,000 Toman/month. The huge difference in monthly rent, besides the size of the dwelling, is a function of a common method of rental payment in Iran known as the “deposit”. Following Iran’s lease contracts, the tenant is asked to pay a total sum of rent for the duration of his or her residence. This sum then is decided upon based on an agreement between the tenant and the landlord and is divided between an initial larger sum of “deposit” and the monthly rent. The deposit is often used as an investment capital for the land owner to use during the rental contract but should be given back to the tenant upon evacuation of the residence. In cases that the agreement entails no “deposit”, and then the monthly rental payment will be much higher, as it is the only monetary transaction between the landowner and the tenant. It is also possible to pay the whole sum of the “deposit” in advance and have no monthly payments. As can be seen in table Table 4-16, the deposit can be as low as nothing (in which case the rent was the highest 700,000 Toman/month) or as high as 30,000,000 Toman (in which case there was no monthly rent). For many of the respondents the deposit was an added burden on the household’s income as the funds for the deposit are already
borrowed from kin and relatives. At the same time, the deposit –or parts of it- are viewed as the only source of saving for the respondents. Savings are an important factor in post-earthquake coping and recovery. Having their only financial saving in the form of the deposit is a sign of vulnerability of the Afghans in case of an earthquake. Lack of any formal lease contract with the landlord –especially in cases of the residents who had an irregular status- along with the possible chaotic conditions resulted by post-earthquake damage and loss make the deposit a very unreliable source of saving. This condition can apply to all other types of savings that are hidden or left with trusted people, a condition which is more likely than using the bank, due to various restrictions that Afghans face in regards to opening a bank account.

Diversification of livelihoods is another important factor limiting the possible consequences of a hazard and helping with post-disaster recovery. The idea is broadening the access profile and seeking new income opportunities can help maintaining command of resources in risky situations. Limited income opportunities and low levels of earnings and savings of the Afghan households make it very difficult for them for them to have multiple livelihood assets and resources. Strategies that enable individuals to get back to work or to re-establish a livelihood are most essential in preventing disasters to deepen structural poverty (Pelling 2003, p. 54). As it is the case, many times all assets and resources of the Afghan household are based in one place; their residence. An example can be those respondents who conduct home-based jobs. For them, the place of work, their tools of the trade –for in case of embroidery and seamstress- and the place of residence are all concentrated in one physical location. In case of loss and damage due to an earthquake, the household will not only lose one asset but all will lose all means of their livelihoods.

5.8.3 RISK KNOWLEDGE AND SAFETY MEASURES

Besides the residential location and financial capital, knowledge and information about safety and strategies to minimize risk are another important factor in earthquake vulnerability. The interview results show a direct link between knowledge about safety measures in case of an earthquake and school attendance of the respondents or their children (see section 4.10). Those respondents who had gone through their whole education in public schools were completely familiar with the earthquake drill (practiced once per year at every school) and accordingly knew the exact safety measures and activities to be taken during the event of an earthquake. Those respondents who were studying at alternative centers (such as the Naser-Khosrow center) however were vaguely
familiar with the topic. In a given earthquake scenario their responses about safety measures showed much less consistency compared to those respondents who had attended the public schools. Among the married respondents, those respondents whose children were attending public schools and were exposed to earthquake drills, where more familiar with the idea of occurrence of an earthquake and the required safety measures compared to respondents whose children attended the alternative schools. Iran’s measures of internal control and the educational restrictions therefore can be influential factors in Afghans differential risk knowledge and awareness about safe behavior at the time of an earthquakes.

Another important factor in regards to vulnerability to disasters is the perception of risk. There seems to be a consensus among occurrence of an earthquake among Iranian residents of Tehran. Contrary to this condition many of the respondents seemed to lack any knowledge about earthquake risks in Tehran. Interestingly, among those who knew about the risk of an earthquake, many believed it to be just a rumor, a joke or an urban myth. Earthquakes in Tehran however are frequently discussed among people and through media. Iranian residents of Tehran- while rarely take active precautionary measures- do believe in occurrence of an earthquake in Tehran. Even at a few occasion of false earthquake warning people residents of Tehran have spent a night out in parks and open spaces in order to avoid risks of earthquake fatalities and injuries. Among the respondents those who seemed to be more knowledgeable about earthquakes in Iran in the sense that they had heard about them and also believed they were true, were those who were more involved in following Iranian media and news. The others mentioned not following the news and having much interactions with others as reasons behind their lack of knowledge about occurrence of earthquakes in Iran. This condition follows the general patterns of migrant communities which have a high stock of bridging social capital (relations and networks with other migrants) while their stock of bridging social capital (relations with other groups and the main society) is low. Loss of interaction between groups (bridging capital) is likely to inhibit the flow of information among Afghan women.

Part of risk reduction and post event aid and relief activities of Tehran Disaster Mitigation and Management Organization (TDMMO) is introduction of safe places for gathering after an earthquake event. These safe spots are often based in parks and open spaces close to various neighborhoods. The TDMMO claims to have conduct neighborhood based awareness rising and informative actions about their risk reduction and post event safety measures through neighborhoods community
centers. Neither of the respondents had heard of such activities or knew of safe gathering spots after an earthquake.

Conditions of vulnerability and coping capacity for Afghans resemble situations in which with every new hazardous event, those people impacted the most become more vulnerable to future events. Unless structural changes and modify the drivers of vulnerability –and accordingly lower levels of coping capacity- for Afghans, they are likely to reproduce viscous cycle that continuously reproduces vulnerability of the most vulnerable (Wisner et al. 2004). In regards to coping mechanisms, livelihood options of Afghans in Iran reduce their chances for uptake of household adjustments, diversification of livelihoods and reliance on state welfare.

5.8.4 AFGAHN WOMEN AND EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITY

Besides facing social inequality and marginality due to their “migrant” status, daily lives of Afghan women are influenced by another set of power structures as a result of being “female”. These conditions are likely to reduce their ability of preparedness for an earthquake, increase their risk of loss and damage and make recovery more difficulty in post disaster conditions.

On the state level, social inequality and unfair barriers to education and achievement as well as lack of access to formal labor are important determinates of Afghans women’s livelihoods. On the one hand by affecting Afghan women’s chances of risk awareness and knowledge about safe behavior, these factors limit Afghan women’s measures of preparedness and preventative strategies. Besides facing limitations in regards to their livelihoods and access patterns, Afghan women are also likely to be restricted by their intra-household relations. The traditional family structure and patriarchal norms in the households of respondents resulted in unequal distribution of resources within their households as well. The respondents had none or very few income sources, and often were excluded from main decisions and choices in the households. Their husbands were those who made were in charge of the household’s resources and at times respondents did not even have a clear idea about their level of income.

On the other hand by limiting the amount of resources available to Afghan women, the macro level structures limit their options for recovery and coping with the possible damage and loss. The importance of women’s livelihoods, assets and savings can be seen through post-disaster conditions after the Bam earthquake. As a result of the high number of fatalities and injuries, many women and
girls were left without their “male guardian”. Viewed as a burden on the rest of their household and relatives, marriage became a means for sustaining their livelihoods. Child marriages and forced marriages of women (for example to the brothers of their deceased husbands) are among some examples of how post-disaster conditions can increase women’s vulnerability (Ekhlas Pour et al. 2010).

Micro level factors seen through size and structure of the household and intra-household relations and dynamics can also impact the conditions of earthquake vulnerability for Afghan women. As can be seen in Table 4-17 and Table 4-18 the respondents’ had larger households and higher numbers of children, or siblings in case of the single respondents. Moreover the respondents’ households frequently were in form of extended families, including elder in laws who required care and attention from the respondents. Division of labor at home, particularly regarding care giving roles and responsibilities as well as limitations on reproductive choice, may increase women’s pre-disaster vulnerability and place additional burdens on women during recovery (Enarson et al. 2007). Structure of permissions and women’s activities outside of the house along with care taking responsibilities and domestic duties are among contributing factors to increased vulnerability of women.

Advocating and enforcing patriarchal norms within the structure of Iranian family, negatively impacts women’s vulnerability in conditions of daily life, as well as in regards to disaster and especially in post disaster conditions. Iranian post disaster aid and relief scholarship has carried out a substantial amount of research on post disaster needs of women and children (Ekhlas Pour et al. 2010). Empirical experience from previous disasters (in particular the Bam earthquake of 2003) shows post disaster conditions for women are even more dominated by power relations and limited by social and cultural norms and views. This can be seen through a wide range of scenarios where power relations play a clear role. In many cases the decision to flee the place at risk (i,e. the house) needs to be taken by the male head of the household, in other cases women’s role as caretakers of the children and elderly makes them reluctant to leave. Cultural/ traditional beliefs and values also play an important role, as there have been cases that not having the “proper” covering (Hijab) was the reason for not leaving the house during the event of an earthquake.
5.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The discussions chapter conducts a theoretical analysis of conditions of differential vulnerability for Afghan women and girls in Iran; in their everyday life conditions as well as in case of a given disaster. On the first place the secondary data presented in chapter 4 is coupled with the primary data collected from the respondents to draw a picture of modes of incorporation for Afghans in Iran and the ways in which the level of reception influences marginalization and or upward mobility of Afghan women and girls. The role of social relations and power structures at state, community and household levels are assessed in shaping access profiles of Afghan women and girls, through the ways in which these structures interact with, enhance or limit personal choices and agency of Afghans. Access patterns and structure of resources of the respondents and their households are used as the basis for analysis of livelihoods of Afghan women and girls. Livelihoods are used as an indicator for differential vulnerability and coping capacity in conditions of everyday life as well in the case of an earthquake.

Analysis of modes of incorporation reveals Iran to be a country with low levels of reception towards Afghans. The Iranian government’s migration policies and goals of repatriation limit access levels of Afghans to a wide range of rights and entitlements and accordingly limit their options of upward educational and occupational mobility. Along with the exclusionary policies, the traditional view of the government results in a complete neglect of Afghan women and girls, as independent individuals, in areas of residence and work permits. In both these areas Afghan women and girls are viewed as the responsibility of their male guardians; their husbands and or fathers; and therefore face added restrictions in regards to their life conditions. Invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration policy increases their marginalization by limiting their chances for improving their livelihoods; for example in regards to their regular status or economic independence. In addition by enforcing a second structure in lives of Afghan women and girls; that of the intra-household power relations; invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration policies restrains their chances for upward mobility. The intra-household dynamics of power relations of the Afghan households often follow patriarchal patterns in which the father/husband is seen as the head of the household and in charge of making the important decisions. Such patterns increase the dependency of Afghan women and girls’ participation in different activities to the beliefs and views of their male guardians. By limiting the range of activities of Afghan women, the intra-household power dynamics reinforce exclusion of Afghan women and make them even more invisible in the public sphere.
Modes of incorporation for Afghans – seen through relations with the Iranian government, native population and social networks of Afghans- give rise to various determinants of temporal, socio-political, spatial and socio-cultural vulnerability in lives of Afghans in general as well as Afghan women and girls. Structural discrimination in the form of restrictive legislation and institutional constraints along with discriminatory behavior by the public are among everyday life conditions of Afghans in Iran. These conditions have a limiting factor in access profiles and hence livelihoods of Afghans households. At the same time, Afghan networks and relations offer a margin of support and protection. These networks act as an information channels and are also one of the fewer means of occupational upward mobility.

Despite the exclusionary measures and process of marginalization that Afghans face in Iran, the respondents show signs of upward mobility in their lives. Especially important is the educational mobility of the second generation Afghan girls compared to the first generation Afghans and even second generation Afghan men. The upward educational mobility is to a great extent resulted by assistance from NGO’s and private organizations that aim helping and empowering residents of the disadvantaged neighborhoods and also extend their services to the Afghan residents; despite the risk of possible problematic encounters with the municipal authorities for offering services to Afghans. The mentioned centers and NGO’s were particularly important in upward mobility of the respondents, as they offer the resources and knowhow to reduce the impacts of the discrimination that Afghans face, either through restrictive legislation or behavior of Iranian authorities and officials. Knowing about existence of such alternative resources, and also convincing their fathers/husbands to gain them permission to attend the centers are some pre-requisites for upward mobility of Afghan women.

How vulnerable someone is, is determined by how weak or strong their livelihoods are, how good their access is to a range of assets that provide the basis for their livelihood strategy, or how useful different institutions are in providing social protection (Cannon et al. 2003). Macro level policies play an important role in limiting the livelihoods of Afghan residents by creating unequal access to labor market, basic services such as education and health care, and rights of possession. Weak livelihoods and in-equal access to resources and assets restrict Afghan’s livelihood strategies and negatively impact their coping mechanisms. Livelihood options of Afghan residents of Iran mostly resemble conditions of every day vulnerability and hazards. Constant exposure to everyday hazards and risk gradually lowers peoples' thresholds of coping capacity. Marginalization of the Afghan population
not only increases their everyday life vulnerability, but also limits their coping strategies and ability to recover in case of a catastrophic hazard. In regards to coping mechanisms, livelihood options of Afghans in Iran reduce their chances for uptake of household adjustments, diversification of livelihoods and reliance on state welfare. In addition social exclusion of Afghans from the Iranian society reduces their knowledge about earthquakes in Iran. This lack of risk awareness is reinforced through educational restrictions that Afghans face, as school is one of the few places in which they would learn earthquake drills and safety measures. Gendered division of labour, women’s domestic responsibilities, and reproductive labour and community roles are some extra factors influencing vulnerability of Afghan women to earthquake hazards.
6 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

This research has tried to draw a picture of inter-connected factors and relations that influence and affect people’s lives; from conditions of normal life to the case of disasters. By adopting an interdisciplinary perspective the research has tried to highlight the thin line which separates vulnerability of normal life conditions from vulnerability to disasters. The reason for doing so is the growing need for incorporation of social factors in studies of disasters and natural hazards.

While such a view is well accepted and adopted in the natural hazard studies framework, there is still a considerable need for its application in Iran’s disaster discourse. The dominant discourse in Iran’s disaster studies tends to focus on environmental vulnerability and geo-physical aspects of natural disasters. This view undermines the socio-economic and political forces that shape the mechanisms through which people gain access to resources and determine their entitlements and rights. Accordingly much of the vulnerability and disasters studies in the context of Tehran; and with the focus on Tehran’s predicted earthquake, take an engineering approach and focus on physical aspects of urban structures without considering the vulnerability of the people who inhabit those structures.

With a few exceptions of incorporating socio-economic indicators, the dominant disaster research criteria of Tehran is focused on earthquake predictions, identification of active faults, mapping of vulnerable and old urban fabric and eventually identification of vulnerable zones of the city based on physical indicators such as age and quality of building and width of the streets. In some few cases some attention has been given to socio-economic attributes of the city residents as well, mainly in regards to the relationship between income and type of dwelling. Such a perspective, while offers important insights on the characteristics of Tehran’s urban fabric, completely undermines the substantial and heterogeneous residents of the city whose residential patterns follow Tehran’s patterns of North-South socio-economic stratification. The southern parts of Tehran not only indicate higher quantity of vulnerable and old urban fabric, but also are home to residents who have fewer resources. Similar to other mega-cities of the world, immigrants constitute a large share of the lower socio-economic inhabitants of Tehran.
While most of the immigrant population of Tehran consists of internal migrants who have moved to Tehran as a result of Iran’s high urbanization rates, Tehran is also host to a high percentage of Iran’s Afghan population. Many of the Afghans in Tehran –and also in Iran- have been living in the country for over 20 years. They have established their livelihoods, and their children have been born and married in the country. Nevertheless Afghans are an under-represented part of the population. In Tehran, Afghan men are mainly associated with various construction sites; as manual laborers or construction workers or are known to be caretakers in more affluent houses of Northern parts of Tehran. Afghan women on the other hand are invisible on the surface of the city besides the proximate localities of their residence, in public areas and in the labor market.

Vulnerability to natural hazards is not only about the amount of damage and loss endured at the time of a hazard, but should entail the differential ability of people to prepare for, cope with and recover from the impacts of the given hazard. Therefore there is a need for going beyond physical characteristics of the urban fabric and include socio-economic attributes of the residents of the so called vulnerable areas. Following the vulnerability paradigm, differential levels of access to various resources (financial, human and social) can explain for differential levels of vulnerability and coping mechanisms for different groups of people. It is often those who have the least resources who find it the hardest to recover after the effects of a hazard; and therefore become more vulnerable to consequent hazards or in daily lives. Afghans in Tehran are an example of those groups with not many resources. Low income levels, long working hours, lack of access to means of social protection and in general low levels of integration and representation in the Iranian society are some attributes of the Afghan population. Understanding factors that shape and influence access patterns of different groups and individuals requires an analysis of the ways social relations and power structures at different levels impact and shape people’s choices and actions and guide their consequential decisions. Such an understanding requires a systemic and inter-disciplinary approach that traces the impacts of historical and current social, economical and political structures in daily lives of groups of people and assesses the different ways and different levels in which such structures interact with one another. At the same time such a perspective should incorporate the ability of actors to change –or at least try to change- and improve their living conditions in spite of the structural and contextual factors that influence their lives. These are the activities that constitute people’s coping mechanism in conditions of normal life as well as in the case of a disaster.
With the aim of understanding processes behind differential vulnerability of certain groups, this research has focused on a population of Afghan women and girls residing in Tehran. Afghan women and girls are chosen as the group under study as their social standing in the society offers interesting insights on how social structures and relations interact with different demographic variables. In particular, two processes were of interest in analysis of the ways in which interactions of social structure and power relations at various levels influence (and are influenced by) daily lives of Afghan women. First was the gap between the traditional views of Iran’s state policies and regulations in particular in regards to women and the society’s much more modern take on lifestyle choices. The other point of interest was the effects of structural discrimination against Afghan aliens, which can be seen through Iran’s migration policies and provision of rights and entitlements for Afghans. These conditions then were assessed in the relation to interactions and structures at the social and household levels. The former covers a range of different scenarios from discriminatory behavior to balancing mechanisms for reducing structural restriction. The latter includes power asymmetries and norms that can be resulted by the structure of family.

Following the vulnerability paradigm of the studies of natural hazards and disasters, access to resources are viewed as an important indicator of differential levels of vulnerability. The theoretical analysis of this research was built upon processes of marginalization and mobility to explain how social relations and power structures at different levels; separately and combined, influence the existing access patterns and hence choices and option of Afghan women. These constituted the important factors in shaping conditions of normal life for Afghans in general and Afghan women and girls in particular. Such an understanding served to respond to the first research question of this research; “what are the influential factors in shaping daily lives of Afghans in Iran in general and Afghan women and girls in particular”?

### 6.1.1.1 NORMAL LIFE CONDITIONS OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

Intersections between the demographic factors of migrant status and gender are of special importance in understanding the daily life conditions for Afghan women. In other words, to have a clear understanding of the progression of vulnerability for Afghan women, one needs to consider the relations and structures that influence them both as women and as immigrants and the ways in which the intersections of these structures influence Afghan women and girl’s final conditions of marginalization as well as chances of mobility.
The context of reception and modes of incorporation were used as a point of entry in analysis of structural factors shaping lives of Afghan women and girls and their households. These include the state level police and strategies in regards to Afghan immigrants, the treatment and behavior of the native population as well as networks and relations at the societal level; with the native population as well as with the immigrant community. In combination with one another, modes of incorporation shape patterns of settlement and [lack of] integration of Afghans in Iran. The analysis of the data indicated lower levels of reception for Afghans in Iran. In fact Iranian government’s migration policies and goals of repatriation create conditions of structural discrimination against Afghans; resulting in implementation of various exclusionary polices against Afghans. Such policies limit their levels of access to a wide range of rights and entitlements for Afghans in Iran.

Nevertheless Iran’s severe measures of internal and external control have not been successful in forcing Afghans to repatriate or stop the inflow of the new arrivals. Instead by creating conditions of structural discrimination and social inequality, these policies have increased marginalization and under-representation of the Afghan population. An example can the limitations imposed on options of upward educational and occupational mobility for Afghans. Iran’s migration policies and accordingly the repatriation strategies can be seen as institutionalized forms of intolerance that legitimize discriminatory behavior against Afghans. This can be seen through the public discrimination towards Afghans in various forms and at various degrees. Verbal abuse and harassment on the streets and in public spaces, unfair working conditions and arbitrary difficulties with officials and authorities at public institutions are some examples of the societal level relations and structures in lives of Afghans.

In the context of structural discrimination by the Iranian state and unfavorable treatment by the Iranian public, Afghans in Iran highly rely on their networks of kinship and ethnicity as means of informal support as well as measures for occupational mobility. Nevertheless, the amount of support that Afghan networks offer are also influenced by the contextual constraints of Iran. Occupational restrictions for Afghans; and hence representation of Afghans in a limited range of low skilled labor, are one example of how contextual factors can limit the role of Afghans networks in enhancing settlement and mobility of the newly arrived migrants.

Besides modes of incorporation, Afghan women are also influenced by another set of structures resulted by being a woman. Besides facing social inequality and marginality due to their “migrant”
status, daily lives of Afghan women are influenced by another set of power structures as a result of being “female”. In the particular case of Iran, state policies have increasingly attempted to impose restricting regulations on women, targeting both the private and public sphere. Along with the exclusionary migration policies, the traditional view of the Iranian government on women and their role in the society results in a complete neglect of Afghan women and girls as independent individuals; especially in processes of obtaining residence and work permits. On the contrary Afghan women and girls are viewed as the responsibility of their male guardians; their husbands and or fathers. For Afghan women to have a valid residence permit in Iran, they need to be wives of daughters of Afghan men –in possession of a valid permit- in Iran. No strategies have been implemented for Afghan women to obtain a residence permit independently form an Afghan man. In regards to work permits, Afghan women are simply denied the right to work in Iran. This view implies that there is no need for an Afghan woman to move to Iran, unless she has a male guardian in the country. And also there is no need for an Afghan woman or girl to be able to provide for herself, as that is the responsibility of their husbands and fathers. Invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration policy increases marginalization of Afghan women and girls by limiting their chances for improving their livelihoods; for example in regards to their regular status or economic independence.

Additionally, invisibility of Afghan women in Iran’s migration policies enforces a second structure in lives of Afghan women and girls; that of the intra-household power relations. Enforcement of double structures in daily lives of Afghan women and girls influences and interacts with their ability to actualize their agency and improve their livelihoods. Not only Afghan women need to make their choices and decisions in regards to – or despite- the structural factors imposed through Iran’s exclusionary measures against Afghans, they need to also make choices with consideration of the power structures inside their households. At the micro level the intra-household dynamics and power relations of the Afghan households often follow patriarchal patterns in which the father/husband is seen as the head of the household and in charge of making the important decisions. Such patterns increase the dependency of Afghan women and girls’ participation in different activities to the beliefs and views of their male guardians. The combination of the state level polices and intra-household relations can restrains chances for upward mobility of Afghan women and girls. Moreover the reliance of the Afghans on their ethic ties and relations as networks of reciprocity and informal support has the ability of acting as an extra source of social control for
Afghan women and girls. Patriarchal norms and traditional views tend to define the “acceptable” activities and conduct for Afghan women and hence have the ability to further limit their range of choices. By limiting the range of activities of Afghan women, these structures can reinforce exclusion of Afghan women and add up to their invisibility.

The detailed discussion of various structural limitations and contextual restraints that Afghans face in Iran should not imply that they are passive recipients of a bundle or resources, set and shaped by the structural patterns. In fact the impact of the structural restraints should be viewed as an added requisite for incorporation of one’s active choice and means of creativity for going beyond the various restraints and limitation. Agency of Afghan’s- same as the rest of the population living in Iran- is visible in their daily activities and choices. In fact the decision to move to Iran; and to continue their stay in the country despite Iran’s pressures for repatriation should be viewed as part of their active choice for improving their livelihoods. On a more general level, the choices and decisions of Afghan girls to continue their education and gain economic independence, their participation in different activities and volunteer positions and even their choice of outfit (which is a diversion from the “encouraged” Islamic cover of the black Chador) can all be seen as signs of their own agency for enhancing their livelihoods in the face of structural limitations and contextual constraints. Many of these struggles that aim balancing the gender discriminatory views are also common among Iranian women and girls. However compared to Iranian women, Afghan women and girls face conditions of double discrimination resulted by Iran’s discriminatory views on women as well as exclusionary policies towards Afghans. Acknowledging the agency of Afghans and their daily struggles to improve their livelihoods should not undermine recognition of multiple limits to their agency; stemmed from the strong structural limitations that shape the context in which Afghans live and make their choice.

Despite the exclusionary measures and process of marginalization that Afghans face in Iran, the respondents showed signs of upward mobility in their lives. Especially important was the educational mobility of the second generation Afghan girls compared to the first generation Afghans as well as second generation Afghan men. The upward educational mobility is to a great extent resulted by assistance from NGO’s and private organizations that aimed helping and empowering residents of the disadvantaged neighborhoods and extended their services to the Afghan residents as well, regardless of their residential status. The mentioned centers and NGO’s were particularly important in upward mobility of Afghans, as they offered the resources and knowhow to reduce the
impacts of the discrimination that Afghans face, either through restrictive legislation or behavior of Iranian authorities and officials. The empirical results showed that improving livelihood conditions through participation in such centers and NGO’s required a minimum knowledge about existence of such alternative resources, as well as knowing “the right people”. These were often those social workers and teacher in the centers who on one hand could convince the fathers/husbands to permit their daughters centers and on the other hand could help the Afghans to go beyond restrictions that they faced in relations with authorities and official, for example at schools or in hospitals.

Dynamics of upward mobility are useful in analyzing the interactions of structure and agency. By imposing restrictions and limitation in access patterns of Afghans, the structural conditions can influence chances for upward social mobility of Afghan in Iran. The impact of structural elements can, to some extent, be balanced by individual agency. Actors’ actions can aim economic and social dimensions of mobility. In case of Afghans in Iran, personal attempts for economic mobility could be seen through actions to counteract restrictive regulations in regards to education and occupation as well as ownership rights. Signs of upward occupational mobility were also visible among some of the fathers and husbands of respondents. Occupational mobility was limited to certain occupations (bag making and clothes manufacturing) which seemed to be predominantly owned by Afghans in Iran. In case of the respondent who owned their own business the initial capital for the investment was provided by the Iranian employer. It seemed that networks of social support, seen through ethnic ties and relations as well as relations with Iranians were influential factors in occupational mobility of Afghans.

Social dimensions of mobility are often targeted by means of changes in lifestyle and consumption trends. The respondents also showed sign of social mobility seen through their appearance, behavior, and consumption patterns and choices of activities. In the Iranian context, these factors are important indicators of showing one’s social class. The second generation respondents visibly showed different patterns of appearance, dialect, behavior, activities and goals compared to the first generation respondents. The most evident differences were seen in relation to their desired activities and wishes. For example the second generation respondents wished to attend [underground] dancing courses, join fitness stadiums or learn to play different musical instruments. The Iranian society is a highly stratified one in which class and status are portrayed through lifestyles and consumption patterns, among other things. The derogatory image of Afghani also follows a set of pre-defined ideas about the looks, appearance and life choices of the Afghan population. The
appearance and the image that the respondents at Ayande center presented were far away from this pre-set idea.

6.1.1.2 IMPACTS OF NORMAL LIFE CONDITIONS IN DIFFERENTIALLY VULNERABILITY

Following the conceptual model of this research, how vulnerable someone is, is determined by how weak or strong their livelihoods are, how good their access is to a range of assets that provide the basis for their livelihood strategy, or how useful different institutions are in providing social protection. The impacts of social structures and relations at macro, meso and micro levels were investigated in livelihood options of Afghans in Iran in order to respond to the second research question of this research; “how do daily life conditions of Afghans manifest themselves in regards to differential vulnerability and coping capacity in case of a disaster?” Accordingly the results of daily life conditions of Afghans were assessed in relations to their livelihoods as well as choices and decisions that could influence their livelihood assets.

Modes of incorporation impact Afghans livelihoods by shaping their access patterns. On the first level Iranian government’s policies towards Afghans set the patterns for their residential status in Iran. By setting the limits to Afghan’s rights and entitlements, these structures determined Afghan’s level of access to different institutions and services. Those Afghans who are in possession of a residence permit have limited access to certain rights and service such as ability to obtain a work permit; only in the case of Afghan men and for a limited range of occupations, or access to public educational system; in limited study areas and with added fees. At the same time, Iran’s migration polices impose many complications and difficulties in the way of maintenance and renewal of residence permits. In fact the legislative complications and difficulties in complying with such regulations are serving as an internal source for increasing the number of irregular Afghans in Iran. This means that it is likely for Afghans who hold a residence permit and hence a “legal” status to fall into the irregular status easily at least for some period of their lives. The status of a foreign national is an important determinant of the contextual elements influencing his or her life. Depending on their status as regular and Amayesh cardholder, regular and with a residence visa or irregular migrants, Afghan’s have different relationships with Iranian state in regards to their rights and entitlements such as access to a work permit or access to public educational systems.

Besides restrictions on residence status, Iranian governments’ internal measures of control impose various restrictions on Afghans potential to fulfill access qualifications required for different income
opportunities or jobs. Access qualifications are a function of state level structures as well as social relations of production, gender and ethnicity. Macro level policies play an important role in limiting the livelihoods of Afghan residents by creating unequal access to labor market, basic services (education and health care), and rights of possession. Nationality and gender based restriction in regards to work permits - the basic requirement for having a job - are an example of how state level structures can influence access qualifications and hence the range of possible income opportunities available to Afghans in Iran. Ability to fulfill the access qualifications is often a function of one’s access profile. This means that the amount of access to different resources increases or decreases people’s chances to qualify for different jobs. Again, restrictions such as lack of property rights or the current limitations on education for Afghans can minimize their chances for accumulation of such assets. Weak livelihoods and unequal access to resources and assets restrict Afghan's livelihood strategies and negatively impact their coping mechanisms. In fact livelihood options of the respondents mostly resembled conditions of everyday vulnerability and hazards. Constant difficulties in maintaining- or regaining- their residence status, low income levels for the households along with extremely long working hours, lack of savings and financial credit and lack of access to health insurance and subsidized medical care are some examples of daily life conditions of Afghans. Patterns of family formation and household structures were another factor influencing the daily lives of the respondents. Extended family structure of the Afghans along with higher numbers of children and or siblings results in larger size of their household. Higher numbers of people living in small and low quality accommodation was another common factor of daily lives of the respondents. These conditions were accompanied with living in residential areas that are already identified as vulnerable and old urban fabric adding to the risk of damage and loss in case of an earthquake.

In general unequal access to resources resulted by the structural discrimination and conditions of exclusion increases the marginalization of the Afghan population in Iran and adds to their differential levels of vulnerability in conditions of daily lives. Constant exposure to everyday hazards and risk gradually lowers peoples’ thresholds of coping capacity. While conditions of marginality do not increase the direct exposure of the Afghan population to an earthquake event, they in fact increase their overall vulnerability to disasters by reducing the capacity to avoid risks. Livelihood options of Afghans in Iran restrict their chances for uptake of household adjustments, diversification of livelihoods, accumulation of financial credits and reliance on support systems. This makes it more difficult to recover or regain their livelihoods after an earthquake disaster. In addition social
exclusion of Afghans from the Iranian society reduces their knowledge about earthquakes in Iran. This lack of risk awareness is reinforced through educational restrictions that Afghans face, as school is one of the few places in which they would learn earthquake drills and safety measures. In case of the Married respondents, marriage at an early age followed by reproductive labour and domestic responsibilities, care taking responsibilities in regards to children and extended family members and limited power in the structure of the household in regards to important decision makings as well as limited permissions for undertaking various activities were some extra factors influencing their differential levels of vulnerability in conditions of normal life as well as an earthquake event.

### 6.1.2 FINDINGS AND FURTHER POINTS OF INVESTIGATION

The research findings draw a picture of how the combination of social relations and power structures at various levels influence processes of marginalization or upward mobility for Afghans in Iran. On a general level it seems Iranian government’s short term focus on repatriation polices along with lack of consideration of the substantial population of first and second generation Afghans in Iran has created conditions of structural discrimination and unequal access to various resources for Afghans; adding up to their marginalization through time while limiting their spaces of agency. As a result of such limited access patterns Afghans in Iran have weak livelihoods which represent conditions of everyday hazard and risk. In the longer term, normal life vulnerability of Afghans can be translated into earthquake vulnerability by limiting their options for coping with and recovering from the loss and damage caused by a possible earthquake in Tehran. Moreover, the effects of repatriation polices can be seen as institutionalized forms of intolerance that encourage and further expand the discriminatory behaviour of the public towards Afghans. These factors have a reinforcing effect on further exclusion of Afghans from the Iranian society. This condition inhibits information and knowledge sharing between Afghans and the Iranian society and in longer terms can affect lives of Afghans, either in daily life interactions or in regards to an earthquake.

In regards to daily life conditions, social exclusion of Afghans can cause problems of identify for those second generation Afghans who have acquired the “Iranian” values and lifestyle patterns through attending public school. This can be problematic in the regards to relations with other Afghans who have been less integrated as well as in relation with the rest of the Iranian society which still treats them unfavourably. In relations to earthquake vulnerability and coping mechanisms, exclusion and marginalization of Afghans results in their lower levels of risk knowledge
and awareness about earthquake hazards in Tehran (as well as other types of hazards) as well as lower levels of norms of reciprocity between Afghans and Iranians. The latter condition can in longer term result in unjust treatment of the Afghan population in conditions of post-disaster aid and relief.

At the same time the intra-household dynamics of Afghans act as another set of limiting structures influencing lives of Afghan women and girls. The patriarchal and traditional norms that are prevalent among the Afghan households are in contradiction with the current lifestyle patterns and family structures among people of Tehran, especially for the younger generations. On the other hand such a family structure is in accordance with Iranian government’s traditional view on women and their role in the society. As a result, the intersections of Iran’s discriminatory policies against migrants and women and intra-household dynamics of the Afghan household result in conditions of double discrimination for Afghan women whose lives are affected by structural limitations at state and household levels. These are the contextual factors that impose limitations to the spaces of agency for Afghan women and girl and add to the difficulties of their daily struggles for improving their livelihood conditions.

The findings of the research shed light on various processes at macro, meso and micro levels that together and separately influence progression of vulnerability for a particular group of residents in Tehran; the Afghan women and girls. The interactions and dynamics of these various factors can be point towards the need to adopt of an integrated vulnerability approach in studies of disaster vulnerability in Tehran. Moving beyond the direct risk of environmental factors and catastrophic hazards is an important requirement for gaining a holistic understanding of factors underlying earthquake vulnerability in Tehran as well as enhancing coping mechanisms. By highlighting the drivers and forces behind processes of marginalization and differential vulnerability of different groups, an integrated vulnerability assessment approach will allow for implementing measures to develop and increase the coping capacity and strategies of groups at risk. As was shown with the Afghan community in Tehran, agency of actors in creating coping mechanisms and improving livelihoods can be limited by social, economic and political conditions. Consideration of how social structures and power relations impact people’s differential vulnerability to everyday hazards and disasters is an important (and a primary) component in achieving environmental justice.

The research finding also highlights interesting points of daily lives of Afghans in Iran which could lead to further points of inquiry. The differences in educational and social mobility of the second
generation respondents and their parents along with the constant inflow of first generation Afghan brides; who due to their earlier ages of marriage are more or less in the same age cohort as the second generation Afghan girls, calls for further a comparative investigation of the daily lives of young Afghan girls in Iran. It will be interesting to view the interactions –if any- between these two groups of Afghan women and girls and the possible ways in which the life styles and attitudes of the second generation Afghans can influence the life styles of their newly arrived sister in laws (the Afghan brides).

Another particular point of interest is the long terms effects of the educational disparity that exists among the second generation Afghan girls and boys. While the Afghan men and boys enter the labour market at a much earlier age (as was the case with the brothers of the respondents), the second generation Afghan girls seemed to be more capable of continuation of their education (as was seen in educational attainments of the second generation respondents). Currently the higher educational achievements’ of Iranian women compared to Iranian men –especially in higher education- seem to be a point of concern for the Iranian government, as they believe this condition hinders family formation and marriage patterns among the youth. It is interesting to investigate the marriage patterns of the second generation Afghan girls and the effects these patterns can have on the inflow of Afghan brides from Afghanistan. Particularly interesting would be two paths of marrying Iranian men (a condition which is not common at the current time) and hence naturalization of second generation Afghan girls in Iran, or marrying Afghan men already residing abroad (mainly in Australia and Canada) and hence a process of outmigration from Iran.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1: IRAN- MAP OF PROVINCES

### Questionnaire-Married #: Date: Time: Location:

**Personal notes about respondent (appearance: facial and outfit, accent, other traits)**

1. **What is your name?**  
   - How old are you?  

2. **Where are you from?**  
   - How long have you been living in Iran?  
   - When did you come to Iran?  
   - Why did you come to Iran?  
   - Where did you go first?  
   - How long have you been living in Tehran?  
   - Where do you live in Tehran now? (Address)

3. **Do you have an Afghan passport?**  
   - How about a residence card?

4. **Are you married?**  
   - Where is your husband from?  
   - Where did you get married?  
   - How long have your husband been in Iran?  
   - Does your husband have an Iranian passport?  
   - What does your husband do?  
   - Is his employer Iranian or Afghan?  
   - How much does he earn?  
   - How many hours per day does he work?

5. **Can you read and right? (Are you literate?)**  
   - Up to what level have you studied?  
   - Where did you study?  
   - Is your husband literate?  
   - How much has he studied?  
   - Where has he studied?

6. **Do you have children?**  
   - Daughters  
   - Sons

   - What do your children do?  
   - If they go to school, what school do they go to?  
   - Which level are they at?

7. **Who lives with you in your household?**

8. **Do you have relatives in Afghanistan?**  
   - Who are they?  
   - Do you go to visit them [in Afghanistan]? How often?  
   - Do you send money for your relatives in Afghanistan?  
   - Do you have property (land, house, farm and orchard) in Afghanistan?  
   - Do you have relatives in any other country than Afghanistan?

9. **Do you work/ have an occupation?**  
   - What is your occupation/ what do you do?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where is the place that you work?</td>
<td>Livelihood diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you work per day or week?</td>
<td>Rights/ social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much do you earn?</td>
<td>Financial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is your employee from?</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the expenses in your household?</td>
<td>Household’s financial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who decides on what to buy?</td>
<td>Household dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have any savings?</td>
<td>Financial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where do you keep your savings (bank or in the house)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what form are they (money, gold, etc.)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you do with your savings?</td>
<td>Household priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you spend it on?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have a cell phone?</td>
<td>Possessions/ rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it registered under your name or others?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone else; do you trust the person?</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your husband have a cell phone?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does your family own a car?</td>
<td>Possessions/rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you own your own house or are you renting?</td>
<td>Possessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If owning do you have a real contract or a verbal one?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many rooms are there at your residence?</td>
<td>Physical capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it old or recently constructed?</td>
<td>Physical capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it need much repair?</td>
<td>Physical capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who does the repairs, you or the owner?</td>
<td>Self/ social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are your neighbors mainly owners or tenants?</td>
<td>Neigh. Socio-economic stat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are they mainly Iranian or Afghan?</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What conditions are their residences in?</td>
<td>Neigh. Physical cap/ socio-economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does anyone in your household have any type of health issues? (e.g Diabetes, high blood pressure, chronic disease, etc,)</td>
<td>Health conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have health insurance?</td>
<td>Social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where do you go to get medical assistance?</td>
<td>Self/social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you usually do during the day?</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you do for entertainment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Movies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pilgrimage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Visiting others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the people you socialize with the most...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relatives?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Friends?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-workers?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where are they from?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do your children do during the day?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If they go to school, what do they do after?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Playing with friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extracurricular courses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is their friend’s nationality?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often do you come here (the related center)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did you learn about here?</td>
<td>Social cap/ information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What courses do you attend?</td>
<td>Lifestyle/ priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Movies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pilgrimage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Visiting others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- How long is it that you are coming here?
- What are the things you have learnt?
- Does your husband protest to your coming here? *Household dynamics*
- Does he come here himself as well? *Household priorities*
- How about your children? *Household priorities*
- What are the programs you like better, why?

17. Are you a member of any other group of organization? *Social capital*
   - Local mosque
   - Quran school
   - Neighborhood community center

- Are there any other classes/courses that you really want to go but for some reason you cannot? *Rights and entitlement*
- Do you know anyone among your friends and accountancies whose husband will not allow her to come to lessons/the center? *Norms - household dynamics*

18. Do you read (books/newspaper) in your free time? *Information sources*
   - What newspaper? What is the latest book you have read

19. Do you listen to the news?
   - What is the source of news you listen to (radio, TV, etc.)?
   - What is recent news you know about?

20. What do you know about occurrence of an earthquake in Tehran? *Risk awareness*
   - Have you ever been told about the earthquake [by some officials]? Where?
   - Do you know, in case of occurrence of an earthquake......
     - What parts of the house are more dangerous?
     - What you should do if you are at home if an earthquake strikes?
     - What you should do if you are outside?
     - Have you ever heard of safe places for after an earthquake?

21. Are you happy with living in Tehran?
   - What are the good and bad points about it? *Life priorities*
   - What are the particular problems for women and girls in your point of view?
   - For example what different problems do you think your son and daughter might have from one another? *Awareness of social matters/community level dynamic*
   - Do you think other cities in Iran are more comfortable than Tehran?
   - How is people’s treatment of you/have you ever had any unpleasant occasions? *Community level social relations/indicator of experienced discrimination*
   - If the situation changes [improves] in Afghanistan, do you go back there or do you want to stay here? Why?
# Questionnaire - Single Respondent Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire - Single #:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>Time:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal notes about respondent (appearance: facial and outfit, accent, other traits)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. What is your name?  
   - How old are you?  

2. Where are you from?  
   - How long have you been living in Iran?  
   - When did you come to Iran?  
   - Why did you come to Iran?  
   - Where did you go first?  
   - How long have you been living in Tehran?  
   - Where do you live in Tehran now?  

3. Do you have an Afghan passport?  
   - How about a residence card?  

4. How about your parents?  

5. What grade are you at school?  
   - Where do you study?  
   - Are your parents literate?  
   - How many years have they studied/ level of education?  
   - Where have they studied?  

6. How many brothers and sisters do you have?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sisters</th>
<th>Brothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

   - What do they do?  
   - If they go to school, what school do they go to?  
   - Which level are they at?  

7. Who lives with you in your household?  

8. Have you ever been to Afghanistan?  

9. Do you have relatives in Afghanistan?  
   - Who are they?  
   - Do you go to visit them [in Afghanistan]? How often?  
   - Do you send money for your relatives in Afghanistan?  
   - Do you have property (land, house, farm and orchard) in Afghanistan?  
   - Do you have relatives in any other country than Afghanistan?  

10. Do your parents work/ have an occupation?  
    - What is their occupation/ what do they do?  
    - Where do they work?  
    - How much do they earn?  
    - Where is their employee from?  

11. What are the expenses in your household?  
    - Who decides on what to buy?  
    - Do you have any savings?  
    - Where do you keep your savings (bank or in the house)?  
    - In what form are they (money, gold, etc.)?  
    - What do you do with your savings?  

   - Livelihood diversity  
   - Rights/ social protection  
   - Financial capital  
   - Social capital  
   - Household’s financial capital  
   - Household dynamics  
   - Financial capital  
   - Household priorities
11. Do you have a cell phone?  
   - Possessions/ rights
     - Is it registered under your name or others?
     - do you have a computer
     - If someone else; do you trust the person?  
       - Social capital
     - Do your siblings have a cell phone?
     - Does your family own a car?  
       - Possessions
     - Anyone has a driver’s license?  
       - Rights

12. Do you own your own house or are you renting?  
   - Possessions
     - If owning, what kind of a contract do you have?
     - How many rooms are there at your residence?  
       - Physical capital
     - Is it old or recently constructed?  
       - Physical capital
     - Does it need much repair?  
       - Physical capital
     - Who does the repairs, you or the owner?  
       - Self/ social protection
     - Are your neighbors mainly owners or tenants?  
       - Neigh. Socio-economic stat.
     - Are they mainly Iranian or Afghan?  
       - Social capital
     - What conditions are their residences in?  
       - Neigh. Physical cap/ socio-economic

13. Do any of your household members have any type of health issues? (e.g Diabetes, high blood pressure, chronic disease, etc,)  
   - Health conditions
     - Do you have health insurance?  
       - Social protection
     - Where do you go to get medical assistance?  
       - Self/social protection

14. What do you usually do during the day?  
   - Social capital

15. What do you do after school?  
   - Park
   - Extracurricular courses (Languages, computer training, etc.)
   - Using the internet (face book, emails, etc.)
   - Out with friends
   - Helping out with house chores

16. What do you do for entertainment?  
   - Park
   - Movies
   - Pilgrimage
   - Visiting others
   - Travel
   - Where are your friends from (Iranian or Afghan)?
   - What do your parents do during the day?
   - Who does your family usually socialize with?

17. How often do you come here (the related center)  
   - Social cap information
     - How did you learn about here?
     - What courses do you attend?  
       - Lifestyle/ priorities
     - How long is it that you are coming here?
     - What are the things you have learnt?
     - Doesn’t your father/brother protest?
     - Do they come here themselves as well?
     - How about your sisters?
     - What are the programs you like better, why?

18. Are you a member of any other group of organization?  
   - Social capital
     - Library
     - Culture house
     - Gym
- Local mosque
- Quran school
- Neighborhood community center

- Are there any other classes/courses that you really want to go but for some reason you cannot?

19. Do you know anyone among your friends and accountancies whose husband will not allow her to come to lessons/the center?

19-1. Do you know anyone among your friends and accountancies whose husband will not allow her to come to lessons/the center?

20. Do you read (books/newspaper) in your free time?

- What newspaper? What is the last book you read?

21. Do you listen to the news?

- What is the source of news you listen to (radio, TV, etc.)?
- What is recent news you know about?

22. What do you know about occurrence of an earthquake in Tehran?

- Have you ever been told about the earthquake [by some officials]? Where?
- Do you know, in case of occurrence of an earthquake...
  - What parts of the house are more dangerous?
  - What you should do if you are at home if an earthquake strikes?
  - What you should do if you are outside?
  - Have you ever heard of safe places for after an earthquake?

23. Are you happy with living in Tehran?

- What are the good and bad points about it?
- What are the particular problems for women and girls in your point of view?
- For example what different problems do you think your son and daughter might have from one another?

23-1. Are you happy with living in Tehran?
- What are the good and bad points about it?
- What are the particular problems for women and girls in your point of view?
- For example what different problems do you think your son and daughter might have from one another?

- Do you think other cities in Iran are more comfortable than Tehran?
- How is people’s treatment of you have you ever had any unpleasant occasions?
- Community level social relations/ indicator of experienced discrimination
- If the situation changes [improves] in Afghanistan, do you go back there or do you want to stay here? Why?
## APPENDIX 4: HISTORICAL EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN (1880-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Historical event</th>
<th>Impact on women’s situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1880-1901   | Amir Abdur Rahman Khan | • Birth of modern Afghanistan  
  • Influenced by wife “Bobo Jan” and her progressive ideas  
  • Raised age of marriage  
  • Gave women rights to divorce under specific circumstances  
  • Abolishment of the custom forcing women to marry their deceased husband’s next of kin |
|             | Amir Habibullah Khan | • Establishment of the first college  
  • Setting up of the first hospital  
  • First hydroelectric plant  
  • Factories and construction of roads  
  • Opened first school for girls with a British curriculum |
| 1919-1929   | Ammanullah Khan | • First Major epoch of change  
  • First constitution of Afghanistan  
  • Full fledged modernization  
  • Liberation from the British  
  • Liberation of women from tribal cultural norms  
  • Campaign against the veil,  
  • Campaign against polygamy  
  • Marriage age of the girls was raised to 18 years and for men to 21  
  • Freedom of women to choose their own partners  
  • Attempts to abolish bride price  
  • Encouraged education for girls also outside Kabul  
  • Young women were sent to Turkey for higher education in 1928  
  • First public participation of women:  
    o Formation of “Organization for women’s protection” or  
      “Anjuman-I- Himayat-I-Niswan” (1920)  
    o First magazine for women |
| 1928        | Protest of Tribal heads and Loya Jirga | Ammanullah was forced to reverse some of his policies and conform to a more traditional agenda of social change |
| 1950’s      | Massive foreign aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union | • Women’s issues were given some consideration  
  • Veiling declared as a “voluntary option”  
  • Women were encouraged to contribute to the economy  
  • 1940’s and 1950’s: women working as nurses, doctors and teachers |
| 1960’s      |                      | • Women were allowed to enter elected politics  
  • Gave women the right to vote  
  • The first woman was elected minister in health department  
  • Formation of the first women’s group: the democratic organization of Afghan women (DOAW)  
    o Of elimination of literacy among  
    o Ban force marriages  
    o Do away with bride price |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event/Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Late 1990's | Rise of power of PDPA Military coup in 1978 | - Rise in women's education,  
- Women as faculty in universities and Parliament  
- Women as representativeness in the Parliament  
- Mass literacy for women and men of all ages  
- Abolition of bride price  
- Raising of marriage age (16 for girls and 18 for boys)  
- October 1978 a decree was issued with the explicit intention of ensuring equal rights for women  
  - These activities caused protest by the conservatives, as the content of decree and the coercion of women into education were perceived by some as “unbearable interference in domestic life” |
| 1979    | Soviet occupation                                 | Mujahideen gathered forces to form their own revolutionary army. Battle of Mujahideen was a war in the name of Islam, emphasizing a reversal of all socialist policies including those that guaranteed women liberties through education and employment |
| 1989    | Start of Civil war                                | - The soviets left Afghanistan  
- Mujahideen took over Kabul  
- Afghanistan declared as “Afghanistan an Islamic state”  
- Women were increasingly excluded from public services  
- Women were forced to wear the burqa  
- Fewer women were visible on television and in professional jobs  
- Stories of killings, rapes, amputations and other forms of violence were told daily |
| 1996    | Taliban gets to power                             | - Establishmet of the department for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice (Amar bil Maroof wa Nahi an al-munkar)  
- Sweeping changes were made in social order  
- TV was baned  
- Radio sharia reminded the citizens on a daily basis of their duty to country and Islam and the changes men and women needed to make to conform to the new fundamentalist regime  
- Women were no longer able to go outside expect to buy food  
- Had to be accompanied by a Mahram(male relative)  
- Had to wear a burqa and no makeup or fancy shoes  
- Women and girls were banned from going to school and visiting male doctors  
- Forced marriages and raped still continued |
| 2001    |                                                    | Kabul was liberated by the Northern Alliance (mainly Mujahideen)                                                                      |