



**The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies Canada (IMESC)**

WORKING PAPER SERIES - IMESC | FEBRUARY 2013  
Canada, Ontario

ISSN: 2291-322X (Print)  
2291-3238 (Online)

## **Ottomanization or Miscalculation? The new role of Turkey in the Middle East.**

**Abdalhadi M. Alijla \***

**ISBN: 978-0-9918971-0**

---

\* Abdalhadi Alijla, an IMESC Associate Fellow and Research Coordinator. Currently a Doctoral Researcher at State University of Milano, Italy.

IMESC: is an independent non-profit, non-governmental organization founded as an initiative of a group of academics and activists in the academic, research and community work to develop policies and strategies for academic work and development in Canadian society; the idea of establishing the Institute has emerged to be the foundation of scientific information for those interested on region and the world at a time when Canada playing an important role in the international relations. The establishing of the IMESC also to have a safe place that encourages researchers in the region, as well as for the development of scientific research and studies relevant affairs of the region and their curricula; and provide analysis and future vision and strategy for service oriented international issues of fair and world issues of common interest, as well as work on building conscious generation that is faithful to the issues of humanity. For more information on IMESC, please contact [info@imesc.org](mailto:info@imesc.org)

**Abstract:**

*Turkey has increased its role in the Middle East in the past two years. The Arab spring introduced one more element into the wavering foreign policy of Ankara. This poses a challenge for Turkey's power and diplomacy, not only because of its huge investments in the region but mainly because of its cultural, political and historical bonds to the region. However, Turkey is not trying to shift its strong and close cooperation from the EU and USA to close corporation in the Middle East region. But rather, it would like to improve its role as a member of NATO and become the most influential power in the region. This paper examines the new role of Turkey in the Middle East and how this will influence its relations with the west, especially the European Union and the United States. I argue that Turkey is not trying to export its model to any of the Middle East countries; rather it seeks to extend its influence upon a growing number of actors. In general, Turkey has been a popular mediator between many actors in the Middle East and uses its close relations with these actors to improve its position as a stronghold in the Middle East. This paper argues that Turkey's new role will bring about more coordination and cooperation between Turkey on one hand, and the EU and USA on the other hand.*

**Turkey, the new regional super power:**

As the Arab Spring spread throughout the region, Ankara, the self-styled regional leader, actively seeks to take this opportunity for its regional and international agendas. The recent events of the quick and unpredictable fall of Tunisia's Ben Ali and of Egypt's Mubarak, followed by a bloody conflict in Libya and Syria, have increased the complexity of the Turkish political position as a regional power. This can be realized from the first speeches of Erdogan in which he called for a democratic and smooth transformation to real democracy. He called for the needs to listen to the voices of the people and their demands, 'You should listen to the people and their rightful demands. ... You should take the necessary steps to satisfy the Egyptian people's demands first without providing an opportunity for those who have other plans for Egypt. Demands for freedom cannot be postponed and cannot be neglected,' (TodayZaman 2011).

The exceptional position that Erdogan took in DAVOS Economic forum against Israel's president, the political openness with non-state actors, such as Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah and the many attempts of Turkey to break the siege on Gaza led to huge waves of popularity in the Arab World. Turkey won the unbreakable trust of the Arab people which made it more credible than many Arabic governments. However, Turkey's position has varied from one country to another and has changed its policies and positions depending on its regional and international interests. Many scholars and writers have dubbed Erdogan as Machiavelli and his Turkey politics during the Arab Spring as Machiavellian (Lutfi 2013; alsabaah 2011). Diverse interests of Turkey have given rise to conflicting positions simultaneously. It is my contention, firstly, that the Turkish leadership observed the changing Middle East and reacted in a slightly different way to each particular situation, based on their regional and global interests. Secondly, by adopting a Machiavellian approach, Turkey is upgrading its regional and international interests. Turkey wants to improve its position by having political leverage with respect to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah and non-state and state actors in the region. This leverage would enlarge the cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the Middle East. However, this will not improve the relations between the United States and Turkey which is becoming more powerful, politically, economically and culturally. At the regional level, while the U.S. and Western's influence in the Arab world have suffered in the wake of the uprisings, regional states such as Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt have been demonstrating a capacity to defuse regional tensions and act as credible mediators (Dessi and Huber 2012).

This new activism is generally welcomed by Western powers — especially given that the United States has been pushing for a greater degree of Arab/Turkish "ownership" in regional affairs. The fact that these countries enjoy good relations with both Hamas and Washington further highlights the benefits of this increased activism, given that these countries could serve as important counterweights to Iran's more subversive influence over the Islamist Palestinian resistance movement in Gaza and therefore help moderate Hamas's positions toward Fatah, Israel, and the peace process (Dessi and Huber 2012). There are many settings that can be seen as major determinations for the new Turkish role in the Middle East. This includes political and historical, economical and security.

Soon, after the Justice and Development Party (JDP) won the elections and assumed power, they started new agenda for developing their relations with the Arab world and their neighboring countries. Turkey was present in the heart of events; it intensified its presence in conflict areas such as Gaza. In 2007, after the EU suspended talks with Turkey over Turkey's application for accession to the EU, Turkey shifted its weight from Europe to the Middle

East. As F. Stephen Larrabee argues, 'Turkey is now emerging as an important diplomatic actor in the Middle East. Over the past few years, Ankara has established close ties with Iran and Syria, with which it had tense relations during the 1980s and 1990s; it adopted a more active approach toward the Palestinians' grievances; it improved relations with the Arab world more broadly' (Larrabee 2007).

Ahmed Daoud Oglu, Turkey's foreign minister, invited the Arab leader not to stand against the waves of change and democracy, calling the Arab Spring as natural path of history. These events initiated Turkey's the new foreign policy agenda towards the Middle East. Ahmed Daoud Oglu, as an academic and advisor, is making sure that Turkey will benefit strategically from any move (SHADID 2011). However, many scholars and experts inside Turkey, echo fears that the Arab Spring may cause a decline in the Turkish-Arab relations. In my opinion, during the post-cold war era Turkey has enhanced its relations with the West and has become a strategic partner for the EU and the United States. This role is going to increase, especially if Turkey is put forward as a model for the Middle East countries (BBC 2012; Alarab 2011).

Ibrahim Khalil, chief policy adviser to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasized the new role of Turkey. He expressed his optimism that the new transformation will enhance Turkey's role as a regional and international power through a more democratic Middle East (Kalin 2011). This indicates that Turkey is the country that has benefited more than any other player in the region. Moreover, many scholars in Turkey and in the Arab World are open to discuss the new "Ottoman agenda." They argue that this time it is not through military means, but through soft power and advancing relations equally with Middle Eastern governments and people/ (AbdelQader 2012). For instance, the Turkish language has begun to be taught as a third language in public schools. Many universities, research laboratories and institutions receive funds from Turkish organizations as well (AnadoliaNews 2012).

The lightning fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, and then Qaddafi encouraged Turkey to adopt a three-level strategy to save its investments in the region and enhance its international position (EU and USA). This strategy focuses on 1) strengthening Turkey-EU and Turkey-USA relations by emphasizing and employing the new Turkish role for regional stability. Turkey-USA cooperation and coordination have increased exponentially in the last year over Syria's crisis and as how to engage the Islamic groups such as Muslim brotherhoods and Salafists in power. Turkey initiated and assisted in opening channels between Islamic movement and Washington; in promoting relations with the new regimes, and ending tensions with the Egyptian government. Turkey's new strategy is to re-arrange the regional security pattern. However, its role is not only a political one. In the post-Qaddafi period, Turkey has signed dozens of economic and political agreements with the new regime in Libya. In Syria, Turkey decided to stop supporting the Al-Assad regime after ascertaining that he would not initiate any serious reform towards a more democratic regime. Therefore, Turkey is strengthening the position and influence with respect to post-Assad actors and enhancing relations with the new political Islam parties. Turkey is trying to assist the Muslim Brotherhood to adopt a pragmatic approach in their politics. This gives Turkey the possibility to work as a bridge between the West and the Muslim Brotherhood including the Salafists.

### **Turkey's foreign policy:**

After the accession talks between EU and Turkey fell into disarray, followed by the economic crisis of 2008, then by the economic crisis of the Euro in 2010 and 2011, Turkey started to re-organize its agenda and change its foreign policy. In 2011, the Arab Spring started, giving Turkey an unexpected and unpredicted opportunity to take up the role of a mediator, leader,

and political model as well as an economic investor. As Mohamed S. Younis argues, ‘the uprisings in some MENA countries and revolutions in others have offered Turkey a golden opportunity to engage quickly and forcefully on hard-core political, economic, and democracy-promoting policies across the Mediterranean’ (Younis 2012).

The Arab Spring occurred while Turkey’s foreign policy was experiencing some troubles with Israel. This came after the crisis of Gaza in 2008 and the Israeli attack on the Turkish flotilla in 2010, for which Turkey’s foreign policy was criticized by many EU states and the United States. This created the impression that Turkey was joining Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel (FRIEDMAN 2012).

In addition, the Arab Spring shifted the core question in the West from, “Who lost Turkey?” to “Is Turkey a Model?” Turkey, as a democratic and secular state with the vast majority of its population Muslim, called for a democratic and soft transformation of power in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. Even in Syria, where Assad’s regime had significant relations with Turkey—after a long period of diplomatic disarray—Turkey has criticized Syria’s regime, supporting the rebels and setting up a base for them in Turkey. Of course, the ruling party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), plays a significant role in coordination with other Islamic parties in the region. Since AKP came to power, its policy has changed dramatically and its image in the Arab world as a westernized and secular state has improved /changed to better off. Prior to its rejection of el-Assad, Turkey started to move into another direction, the direction of strengthening its relations with its historical partners, the Arabic and Islamic countries. It reformed its foreign policy towards all states and actors in the region as well as towards its trans-Atlantic partners. Turkish policy is based on what the current foreign minister; Ahmet Davutoğlu calls “zero-problems” with neighbors.

However, Kemal Kirişçi argues that after the Arab Spring and Turkey’s engagement, ‘zero problem’ collapsed. He argues that this policy was presented as a major source of Turkey’s soft power in international relations, leading Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to talk about Turkey becoming an “order-setter” (düzen kurucu) in its neighborhood. However, as noted by a prominent observer of Middle Eastern politics, Turkish foreign policy “is now beset with grave problems on almost every front”. (Kirişçi 2012; Seale 2012).

Despite that, Turkish activism and its newly established foreign policy focus, particularly with respect to former Ottoman territories, has led to some analysts referring to this new policy as ‘neo-Ottoman’. ‘Neo-Ottoman’ is a term that includes more than Turkish engagement. It is broader in the sense that Turkish people look at the former Ottoman territories as if they belong to Turkey. In 2010, the Turkish prime minister, in one of his speeches on Gaza, dubbed Gaza as an Ottoman territory and said it belonged to “our ancestors and fathers.”. Neo-Ottomanism sees Turkey as a regional superpower and the center of actions in the region. “According to this vision, Turkey, as a pivotal state, should play an active diplomatic, political, and economic role in a wide region of which it is the ‘center’.” (Tocci et al. 2011).

However, Turkish foreign policy will face many challenges in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. The first is the fragility of democracy and states in the Middle East. For instance, in Egypt, protests are still ongoing, the president’s power is increasing gradually, and the abuse of public media is empowering the Muslim Brotherhood at the expense of parties and in violation of human rights. However, this could challenge the concept of ‘zero-problems’ if they criticized or collaborated with the regimes, which as a result will not please the EU and the US.

The second challenge has links with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey has tried to work closely with Israel for the last three decades. However, Israel-Turkish relations have been

deteriorating since 2010. Last year, Turkey halted a military drill with Israel and stopped drones 'deal as well. These steps were not welcomed, particularly by the EU. This challenge could be a barrier with respect to institutionalized relations between Turkey and the USA.

The third challenge is mediating between Israel and the Arabs and between Hamas and Fatah. Turkey's role in the conflict in the region has many aspects and acts like any individual EU state in this matter. Unfortunately, Turkey cannot guarantee Israel's security and provide attractive incentives as the USA provides for Israel. The core problem is that Turkey or individual EU states cannot give security guarantees to Israel, Iran or other states in the region. Only the USA can do this. Once Turkey accepts this limitation, namely that in every instance, the United States will have to be brought in to guarantee a deal which Turkey or others may have brokered and prepared, its contribution can be enormously helpful (just as occurred with respect to the Gaza ceasefire in November 2012). The fourth challenge is the Kurdish dilemma. It is a domestic dilemma which has regional and international implications posing the question as to how Turkey will reform and eliminate the reasons behind PPK violence. At a time when the Arab world is striving for transformation, Turkey's own reform process needs to be reinvigorated. Moreover, this problem is a human rights problem. It bears directly on EU-Turkish relations and USA-Turkish relations.

The fifth challenge concerns EU- Turkish relations. The EU and Turkey are moving towards a cooperative mode. The challenge remains on how this mode will sustain itself even as Turkey has not foregone the hope of becoming an EU member state, a hope which is powered, at least in part, by the Arab Spring crisis.

### **Turkey, EU, US and the Arab Spring**

After the "Gaza Flotilla" incident in 2010, EU and Turkey were closer than ever before in their assessment of the situation in the Middle East (Siddique 2010). However, even prior to that incident, Turkey and Europe had been in coordination since the Gaza war 2008 as well as during the last Gaza attack at the end of 2012. Despite the heavy criticism of Turkey vis-à-vis Israel, in its official statements the EU tries to be as diplomatic as possible. Although the EU has been emerging as an unbiased mediator in the Middle Eastern conflict, it still fears the risk of high involvement in order not to adopt positions that do not satisfy Israel. At the same time, however, if the EU wants to play the role of a mediator, it needs to have good relations with all powers in the region, including Turkey. Moreover, both Turkey and many EU states have lost confidence in the Israeli decision makers, especially after the vote at the UN General Assembly on upgrading the status of Palestine as an observer state. The tension between the EU and Israel reached its peak when Israel declared further expansion of its settlements in the West Bank in the E1 area around Jerusalem (Somfalvi 2012; The Australian 2012; Dean 2012; Lavid 2012). This incident put EU and Turkey in the same field as external players and regional powers. From a European perspective, the question is what role should Turkey have in the Middle East? And from a Turkish perspective, how could Turkey upgrade its relations with EU based on its new role as a regional power in the Middle East?

Based on the EU's foreign policy which welcomes any efforts to ensure security and prevent conflict, the Turkish engagement is viewed positively. Turkey's role with respect to the Middle Eastern conflict resolution is similar to that of individual EU states, which have attempted to move things forward in the Middle East (Perther 2012). On the other hand, the US views Turkish growing role with skepticism. The US has often criticized the Turkish role in the Middle East, more specifically on Gaza and Palestinian issues. In contrast, the EU



seems more favorable than Washington with regards to Ankara's activism in the Middle East. Stephen Kinzer, a foreign policy analyst, stresses that the U.S. will alienate countries such as Turkey if it continues to pursue what he views as a Cold War-era foreign policy that is no longer relevant to modern problems and regional dynamics. The EU welcomes the Turkish approaches to involve Hamas, Hezbollah and others as well. Moreover, the EU expressed its pleasure with the Turkish role as a truce broker between Hamas and Israel during the November 2012 escalation.

Turkey's role in the Middle East has been perceived as an opportunity for the EU which can be understood to mean that Turkey is taking the same path of the EU in the region, and considering the religious and historical relations with Middle Eastern people and countries, it gives Turkey an advantage of trust. This, of course, does not mean that Turkey is looking forward to shifting its alliance to the East or to make new allies at the expense of its bigger project, accession to the EU. In the future this could be an incentive and an added positive element for Turkey to be a member of the EU. One should emphasize the commonality of interests and seek to explore the chances for EU-Turkey cooperation in the region (Perther 2012).

One could argue that Turkey is using the same instrument that EU is using. However, Turkey has more opportunities in the Middle East than the EU in general and the EU individual states in particular. First of all there are the historical and religious bonds. They link Turkey with the rest of the Middle Eastern countries, people and governments. Secondly there are the economic incentives. Turkey, like the EU, is using trade, investments, or easing travel restrictions as a tool to promote its own interests. The third is the cultural cooperation. Turkey has started massive and intensive cultural programs in the Middle East through Turkish development agencies and Islamic charity organizations. Turkey's strategy of 'zero problems' with the neighbors is similar to the EU approach of not engaging itself in troubles in the Mediterranean. Turkey, following the EU steps, is a democracy promoter. They are using a model combining Islamic society, secularism and democracy simultaneously.

Turkey is also a model in the region with its 'soft power approach'. Decision makers in Turkey have been reducing the influence of military on policies. This means that such steps could contribute to the changing political dynamics in the region, meeting the goals that the EU and USA have been trying to achieve for long time. Considering that EU and Turkey have similar approaches when it comes to the Mediterranean, these are good reasons to think that Turkey-EU relations are going to improve. This will not definitely push Turkey's accession to the EU, but may help in advancing Turkey's candidature for the EU as a regional super power.

In contrast to the EU, the United States' foreign policy agenda depends on its experience of the Cold War. American administration rejects the fact that USA is not the only superpower on the planet. Therefore, US relations with Turkey, still greatly, defined by this agenda. After 2011, United States was not pleased with the way Turkey was dealing with the developments in the Middle East. Turkey, as a regional power, has managed to prove itself as trustworthy partner for the people and the governments. In particular its alliance with Egypt has not been welcomed by the US administration. Since 2008, Turkey has been criticizing Israel and the biased US role in the Middle East conflict. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan criticized the double standards of the United States (Beker 2012). Erdogan, to emphasize his message reminded the US of Israel's action against the Turks in the Mavi Marmara incident. He noted that "I gave a detailed file to President Obama on Israel's atrocities, but he ignored it." (Radikal 2012). There are two recent developments that may have great influence on Turkish-American relations. The first is the military conflict between Hamas and Israel; and

the second is the U.S. rejection of the Palestinian appeal for statehood with non-member status in the United Nations. Turkey supported Palestinian and mobilized other countries to vote, letting Palestinian to gain a political victory in the United Nations, slapping the United States in the face at UN General Assembly.

Historically the US-Turkish relations, in contrast to EU-Turkish relations, have not been institutionalized. They lack pre-determined binding principles. As Gökhan Bacik argues, 'Turkish-U.S. relations are not a fixed constellation of political archetypes. Rather, it is a function of domestic and regional developments. So Turkish-U.S. relations produce dazzling oscillations of temporary ruptures and harmony. The only permanent and well-grounded aspect of the alliance is based on the partnership through NATO'. (Bacik 2012).

Turkey and the United States have different agendas on very primary issues in the region with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation of new alliances in the region. And Turkey's alliances might push the Americans to change their policy towards Turkey. However Obama by courting Egypt's President Mursi, and advancing the American approach toward Syrian crisis, is sending a message of pragmatism. This means that American foreign policy in the region will not be institutionalized. 'The present U.S. priority is focused on short-term tactics that are seen to secure vital interests. Given the tumultuous pace of the post-Arab Spring Middle East, adding cooperative actors is the U.S. diplomatic priority. The United States is becoming a tactical actor'. (Bacik 2012). Therefore, the American administration will work to end Turkish monopoly in the region as the regional super power. The United States will be pleased to create and have other actors who can work jointly with them rather than have only one regional super power. This strategy may weaken the relations between Turkey and the United States. The divergence in agenda, goals and approach to the region do not contribute to their sustaining n institutionalized relations instead of the tactic-based policy.

## **Conclusion**

Turkey's relations with the Middle East countries, EU and USA are experiencing some dramatic changes, mainly since the Arab Spring. Instead of being only security-oriented, Turkish-Arab relations have started to flourish through political, economic and cultural benefits. Since 1980, Turkey started to discover potential economic benefits from trade relations with the Middle Eastern countries. In the last few years, and more specifically in 2008, Turkey changed its foreign policy. The new Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East influenced its relations with the EU and the United States. Turkey has emerged, as its leaders believe, as a political and economic leader in the Middle East. Turkey is seeking the leadership role in the Middle East. This may happen through forming an alliance with Egypt or it may strive to be the sole superpower of the region, taking the political and economic malaise in Egypt into consideration. Turkey considers itself as the center of the Middle East politics to which all other players must pay attention to its existence. Readings suggest that Turkish Foreign Policy is finding adequate space in the Middle East, not by military and democratization, but by economic and cultural ties.

Of course, this new strategy will not be welcomed by other players, especially the United States. The United States sees itself as the superpower of the world. The main concern for the United States is not its relation with Turkey, rather, ensuring Israel's security. The establishment of the continuing relations between Turkey and Israel which, consequently, means sustained relations between Turkey, US, and the EU. Through these relations, Turkey was able to gain military know-how 'to some extent', and the military hardware while 'real



Western' embargo still going on as a result of different reasons(Nachmani 2003).

Current debates suggest that there are two practical scenarios for Turkey-EU relations. One is for Turkey to be a member of a more flexible, multilayered EU; the other is that Turkey become a democratic partner deeply integrated with the EU and allied in spreading positive values and governance standards in the neighborhood(Göksel 2012).

The Turkish support of the democratization process with no internal interference is evidence that Turkey, like EU, is approaching the Middle East with its zero problem strategy. Besides that, the Turkish support of Palestinian statehood, combined with great mobilization efforts to vote pro-Palestine, comes in line with the EU and many individual EU states that support Palestinian state, and tries to isolate Israel internationally for turning its back on the global community. Turkey and EU cooperation allows Turkey to function as a partner in EU foreign policy, with some cautionary public statements from the EU concerning Israel. The Arab Spring has revealed both weaknesses in and opportunities for Turkish foreign policy. In order to minimize the former while maximizing the latter, Turkey, the EU, and the United States could explore ways of institutionalizing a strategic foreign policy dialogue between them.

Turkey's recent focus on the Middle East, however, does not mean that Turkey is about to turn its back on the West. Nor is the shift evidence of the "creeping Islamization" of Turkish foreign policy, as some critics claim. Turkey's new activism is a response to structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War. And, if managed properly, it could be an opportunity for Washington and its Western allies to use Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East.

The Turkish sees the growing role of the Islamic powers in Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Libya and Syria will ensure a leading role for Turkey in the region. As mentioned before, this will help the neo-Ottoman strategy. However, what Turkey must recognize is that Arabs sees Turkey as the country that has developed itself as a democratic, secular with an Islamic identity. This made the Turkish model as a visible one and not the neo-Ottoman model. Moreover, any attempt to be the dominant actor in 'neo-Ottoman' model will not be favorable for the EU or the United States, leading to conflict of interests that may harm the relations between them. This suggests that Turkey may play a complementary role for the EU and USA and be one among other active players in the region, namely, Egypt.

Turkey as a young nation has the capacity to have a leading role in the region. However, this depends on many factors, which require the Turkish government to continue an effective foreign policy strategy, not only focusing on the Arab Spring's countries, but further to other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and the Maghreb as well. Turkey must sustain its economic growth and further democratization process and reform, especially reconciliation efforts with the Turks-Kurds and Alvis-Sunnis.

Turkey and the EU will increase their coordination in post- Arab Spring time, of course, not only in Syria, but also elsewhere, yet, the level of cooperation is still inadequate. This cooperation should be extended to develop a joint strategy in the Middle East; otherwise, both EU and Turkey efforts will not gain the demanded results. High level of cooperation between EU and Turkey is the most foreseeable results in the coming future. On the other side, Turkish foreign policy in relation to the USA will not change. Moreover, it may reach a level of no coordination, especially after US administration neglected Turkey's role in comparison to that played by Egypt in the 2012 Israel's attack on Gaza. The recognition of Palestine as an observatory state revealed their different and conflicting agendas. This will continue, and the relations will be tactic-based.

## References:

- AbdelQader, Mohammed. 2012. Turkey and the Arab Spring. *Alahram*.
- Alarab. « النهضة » وتونس.. بين نموذج تركيا وشبح إيران "Tunisia, between Turkish Model or Iranian ghost" 2011. Available from <http://www.alarab.qa/details.php?issueld=1425&artid=158290>.
- alsabaah. تركيا وسياسة تعدد الأبعاد في الشرق الأوسط "Turkey and politics of multi dimension" 2011. Available from <http://www.alsabaah.com/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=5721>.
- AnadoliaNews. افتتاح مركز لتعليم اللغة التركية في غزة. *Turkish language Center in Gaza* 2012. Available from <http://www.aa.com.tr/ar/news/115258>.
- Bacik, Gökhan. 2012. Turkey and the United States: What to Expect in Obama's Second Term. edited by G.M.F. Wshington: G.M.F.
- BBC. 2012.
- اردوغان: الحزب الحاكم في تركيا نموذج للعالم الإسلامي "JDP is a model for Islamic World". *BBC news*.
- Beker, Emere. *Turkey Labels Israel a 'Terrorist State'* The World Street Journal 2012. Available from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323353204578128880612421650.html>.
- Dean, Jim W. *Lieberman plays his EU Holocaust Card* 2012. Available from <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2012/12/18/lieberman-plays-his-eu-holocaust-card/>.
- Dessi, Andrea, and Daniela Huber. 2012. Palestine and the UN, from Challenge to Opportunity. In *Op-Med*. Rome: German Marshall Fund and Istituto Affari Internazionali.
- FRIEDMAN, THOMAS L. 2013. *Letter From Istanbul*. The new York Times 20122013]. Available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/opinion/16friedman.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/opinion/16friedman.html?_r=0).
- Göksel, Diba Nigar. 2012. Turkey and the EU: What Next?
- Kalin, Ibrahim. *Turkey and the Arab Spring* 2011. Available from <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-and-the-arab-spring>.
- Kirişci, Kemal. 2012. The EU, Turkey, and the Arab Spring: Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Integration. edited by IAI and I. P. Center: IAI  
Istanbul Policy Center.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen. 2007. Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs* (July 2007).
- Lavid, Barak. *EU: Lieberman's Holocaust reference is inappropriate and offensive to Europeans* 2012. Available from <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/eu-lieberman-s-holocaust-reference-is-inappropriate-and-offensive-to-europeans.premium-1.484438>.
- Lutfi, Manal. أردوغان... ميكافيلي مخيف "Erdogan, a smart Machiavellian". *kassioun news paper* 2013.
- Nachmani, A. 2003. *Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts*: Manchester University Press.
- Perther, Volker. 2012. Turkey's role in the Middle East: An outsider's perspective.
- Radikal. *Obama'ya yanıt: Bu nasıl bir yaklaşımdır*. Radikal 2012. Available from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1108522&CategoryID=77>.
- Seale, Patrick. *The Collapse of Turkey's Middle East Policy*. Middle East Online 2012. Available from <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=54209>.
- SHADID, ANTHONY. 2013. *Turkey Predicts Alliance With Egypt as Regional Anchors*. The New York Times 20112013]. Available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/middleeast/turkey-predicts-partnership-with-egypt-as-regional-anchors.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/middleeast/turkey-predicts-partnership-with-egypt-as-regional-anchors.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0).
- Siddique, Haroon. 2013. *Gaza flotilla attack: UN report condemns Israeli 'brutality'*. The Guardian 20102013]. Available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/22/gaza-flotilla-un-condemns-israeli-brutality>.
- Somfalvi, Attila. *EU slams Gilo housing plan. Lieberman: They're clueless*. Ynet News 2012. Available from <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4294505,00.html>.

The Australian. *EU inaction reminds Israel of Nazi camps, says Avigdor Lieberman*. The Australian 2012. Available from <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/gaza-conflict/eus-jewish-policylike-1930s-says-avigdor-lieberman/story-fnge5zl9-1226535046837>.

Tocci, Nathalie, Ömer Taşpınar, Henri J. Barkey, Eduard Soler i Lecha, and Hassan Nafaa. 2011. TURKEY AND THE ARAB SPRING IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE. G.M.F.

TodayZaman. *Erdoğan urges Mubarak to heed people's call for change* 2011. Available from [http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=234212](http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=234212).

Younis, Mohamed S. 2012. TURKISH DELIGHT? THE FEASIBILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” FOR EGYPT. 10 (4).