THE PERSISTENCE OF STATE DISINTEGRATION
IN SOMALIA
BETWEEN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INTERVENTION

Settore Scientifico-Disciplinare: SPS/04 SCIENZA POLITICA

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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States African Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARPCCT</td>
<td>Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARS-D</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Djibouti</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARS-A</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahlul Sunnah wal Jama‘h</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWoT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Salvation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLF</td>
<td>Oromo People Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFDJ</td>
<td>People’s Front for Democracy and Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahanwein Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
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<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNRC</td>
<td>Somalia National Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SPM-O</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement-Ogaden</td>
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<td>SPM-H</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement-HARTI</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Alliance</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Council</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSNM</td>
<td>Southern Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TFI</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Institutions</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigray People’s Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC/SSA</td>
<td>United Somali Congress Salvation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC/SNA</td>
<td>United Somali Congress Somali National Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSLF</td>
<td>West Somali Liberation Front</td>
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Introduction
Research design

Twenty-one years ago, when the state collapsed in Somalia, competitive centrifugal and centripetal forces radically diverted the statehood trajectory of one of the most promising African countries, a country with all the adequate preconditions of state-building. In 1991, few analysts would have imagined that the conflict would be unending, and that a space where an organized political community lived, under a unique political system, could be replaced by a plethora of fragmented sovereignties. Since the state collapsed in Somalia, the enduring nature of the state crisis has been expressed through various paradigms: during the early 1990’s, Somalia came to represent the great hope of the humanitarian intervention, ‘the ideal test case’ for the United Nations in building a new world order (Bush 1990). After the failure of the international intervention Somalia was considered the epitome of the mantra assigning African solutions to African problems. However, following the events of 2001, the Darwish’s land in the Gulf of Aden has been portrayed as a prototype of the collapsed state that facilitates, sponsors, and nurtures international terrorism (Menkhaus 2003, Lewis 1994, Rotberg 2004).

All these paradigms have gradually contributed to build a picturesque framework of analysis where Somalia has been defined a nation without the state (Sorens 2000), a state of anarchy (Lorenz 1993, ‘Anarchy in Somalia’ 2008, Bahadur 2011) a shattered state (Harper 2012), a state of new barbaries (Murphy 2011), a nation driven to despair (Omar 1996), an invented state (Ali Jimale Ahmed 1995), etc. Against this metaphysical backdrop, this research emphasizes one empirical attribute, the enduring character of the state disintegration denoted by a permanent civil war in which Somalia has been embroiled for twenty years. Whilst the war rages, the central sovereignty hibernates in a protracted state of implosion, and the integrity of political authority has been shattered by the bottom-up process of territorial fragmentation.

My empirical data is surprising and particularly remarkable, for at least three reasons. Firstly, considering that the state collapsed in 1991, Somalia has been paralyzed
by the longest-running instance of complete state dissolution, which has now continued for almost 20 years. Between 1991 and 2010 the state achieved very few results in terms of *de facto* sovereignty: even if during this lapse of time the Republic of Somalia never disappeared from the map of recognized states, efforts pursued to revitalize the central authority have failed. Since 2000, governments of national or federal unity have emerged in Somalia and have preserved *de jure* attributes of statehood rather than rebuilding *de facto* conditions of statehood. As a result, these governments have been perceived of as operating at different levels of illegitimacy that stems from a lack of ability to exert territorial power, which is often clearly emphasized by the incapacity to claim a monopoly of force within the territory under jurisdiction.

This data is also significant because the responses to sovereignty dissolution have emerged from local initiatives, implying a bottom-up spatial transformation: in 1991 political and clan leaders in the north-western regions of Somalia declared the independence of the Republic of Somaliland, while in 1998, the Puntland State of Somalia declared its regional autonomy as part of a future federal state of Somalia. Beyond these two cases, the former Republic of Somalia has effectively come apart into several fragments: since 2002, a plethora of states, mini-states and autonomous regions have appeared (Jubaland, Galmudug, Azania, Kathumo), and also suddenly disappeared (Southwestern Somalia, Maakir).

Finally, the enduring character of state disintegration in Somalia matters because contrary to the ‘abandonment syndrome’ often evoked by humanitarian workers to denounce the International community, quite the opposite is the case: the contemporary stalemate has become stagnant within constant, continuous and pervasive international intervention. In twenty years, Somalia has experienced three forms of external intervention: the UN peace making (UNOSOM) and peace enforcement (UNITAF) operations (1992-1995); the Ethiopian-Eritrean proxy war (1998-2000); and the glocal counter-terrorism (2001-2010). Despite these interventions, the international dimension of the Somali crisis has been overlooked in recent years due to the pre-eminence of the postulate which links state failure with terrorism. But a closer look at the history of foreign intervention reveals that the dynamics protracting conflict may be less exceptional and indigenous than conventional wisdom suggests.

My empirical data suggests that the processual disintegration of the Somali state has generated and protracted a series of competitive relationships extending over a wide spatial and temporal dimension. For this reason the analysis of *persistence* necessitates a concern
with longitudinal and spatial dynamics affecting the relationship between state-making and war-making (Tilly 1985). Asking whether the structure of an internal conflict has been actually internationalized by the presence of regional or global actors, isolating the disintegration within the boundaries of its internal insurgency, or limiting it to the deficit gap existing within the structures of the political system, may be myopic. Shifting the unit of analysis to long-term and spatial relationships could have serious implications for the way we approach the statehood crisis.

Therefore, this research focuses on these conceptual and empirical challenges, and bases its origins on one fundamental observation: since 1990 the administrative and governmental apparatus of many African states have collapsed. While the territorial integrity of some countries has remained intact, Somalia has begun suffering a long-running process of disintegration accompanied by territorial fragmentation and constant international efforts to resolve the crisis. Why does state disintegration persist in Somalia?

Considering that the literature revolving around determinants and outcomes of disintegration does not answer why disintegration can be protracted and often resists the most serious attempts at resolution, any attempt to answer this question must discuss the role of foreign intervention which can be very influential in changing the trajectory of civil wars. To some extent third parties can, resolve conflicts, reconcile belligerents and establish new regimes or forms of political authority, but too frequently they have encouraged hostilities, amplified internal tensions or altered the balance of power in a way that serves to protract war. During the last twenty years, three stages of intervention have afflicted Somalia. Depending on whether or not the International Community is engaged with state rehabilitation, the sovereignty’s dilemma can be intimately affected by the internationalization of the structure of war. Therefore, the recurrence of foreign intervention in Somalia actually stands out as crucial point in the evolution of the Somali history. This dissertation aims to answer one principal question: in which manner and under which conditions, did intervention prolong state disintegration in Somalia?

Our question has been approached through the following sub-questions: why are some disintegrated states reticent to being reintegrated in comparison to others? How can foreign intervention be influential in changing the direction of the statehood crisis? In which manner did the international intervention hamper or facilitate state reintegration? Given that contemporary intervention under multilateral mandate has been largely oriented at the rehabilitation of the target-country, why have foreign forces failed in Somalia, but succeed in other countries? This introduction presents the research design devoted to
answering my research questions. The first part presents the research problem and objectives, introducing the gap left behind by the mainstream literature. This section drafts the coordinated theoretical framework which I employ and introduces my research hypotheses. The second explains why a research question on the persistent of disintegration is significant, while the third part presents the research design and methodology. The fourth offers an overview of the structure of this dissertation.

1. Research objectives and theoretical framework

The concept of persistent disintegration denotes a process of losing unity and cohesion, where the former central state breaks down into smaller particles, while the relationship between belligerents is constantly punctuated by the use of force.

Enduring state disintegration is a long-term phenomenon during which all the distinctive elements of state disintegration (conflict, implosion and fragmentation) are protracted over a period of time in which no sustainable results in conflict resolution have been achieved, after an initial and consistent attempt at reconciliation has occurred. Persistence, in fact, reflects the tendency of disintegrated states to resist moving towards a reintegration of their political systems. Thus, what can explain the persistence of disintegration?

Within the academic debate much attention has been paid to questions of state weakness (Rice and Patrick 2008, Bruton 2010) and the potential security dilemma failed states represent for international stability. Traditionalist approaches have sustained that disintegration persists because of a congenital capacity gap impairing post-colonial states to follow the footprints of the Westphalian statehood: referring to the Somali case, many have posited clan-based organization as the catalyst of the enduring disintegration. A large interdisciplinary volume of literature has produced interesting readings on the nature of prolonged conflicts. Many analysts falling into traditionalist and primordialist positions have speculated about the immature, conflictual (Fearon and Latin 2003) or anarchical (Kaplan 1994) essence of the clan organization. Others have approached this phenomenon by appealing to reasons leading conflict resolution and state building to fail (Demetriou 2007). In parallel, many others have investigated why the process of institution-building fails in conflict prone societies (Crocker 1996, Zartman and Touval 2010). But this proliferation of studies has failed to establish a theoretical bridge between the disparate approaches, and is thus inadequate to effectively build a theory of protracted state
disintegration. My research question does not find a satisfactory answer in these approaches, for several reasons.

Firstly, the gradual incorporation of any statehood transformation inside the paradigm of the state failure has generated, at least a definitional confusion, and an ontological impasse. Terms such as weakness, failure, fragility and collapse have been used and abused without any clarification on the categories of statehood crisis. The employment of capacity-descriptive categories has inhibited the development of analytical strategies oriented towards evaluating disintegration in its empirical connotation: as result, the issue of disintegration has been entangled inside a highly normative discussion.

Secondly, even when disintegration has been empirically approached, the debate has been monopolised by the dichotomization between drivers and outcomes, ignoring processes, modalities and characteristics through which disintegration is usually expressed. The temporal dimension of the status of disintegration has remained largely un-scrutinized. Integration has been perceived as the unique law governing statehood and disintegration has been conceived as a temporary alteration of the everyday sovereign functions. Scholars have not sufficiently emphasized the permanent nature of state disintegration: they have generally considered state stability as the grundnorm of the political coexistence (Santoro 1992, Whight 1946, Macry 2009).

And thirdly, very little attention has been dedicated to the spatial variables influencing the long-running character of disintegration. There has often been a tendency to look for single, delimited causes and explanations, and similarly to propose single, quick-fix solutions, sacrificing interdisciplinary clarifications and comparative analyses. This attitude has eroded not only the temporal framework of the disintegration, but also its spatial dimension. Whilst the perimeter of weak sovereignties has been traced by the presence of foreign actors, and although intervention has been the preferred practice for containing statehood dysfunctions and promoting democracy, few analyses have evaluated manner in which the internationalization of internal war impinges the process of state making and re-making.

The international dimension of the statehood crisis acquires a priority in theorizing, not just because exogenous variables have been marginalised in recent studies. Rather, because the empirical evidence suggests that the Horn of Africa is an exceptional conflict zone where the formation of indigenous statehoods has been intense, and constantly accompanied by conflicts and foreign penetration. Thus, the study of any statehood transformations cannot reasonably underestimate the impact of spatial variables.
To investigate my research problem I present a framework that incorporates regional and global forms of intervention, considering two theories that must be mutually expanded and integrated: the theory of regional hegemony proposed by Ruth Iyob (1997, 2000), and the theory of the internationalization of internal war suited by Modelski (1964). Ruth Iyob has argued that studying transformations of sovereignty in the Horn of Africa means scrutinizing the relationship between hegemonic and diasporic forces (Ruth Iyob 1997, 2000) in perennial conflict for the conquest, consolidation and survival of their own statehood’s model. Ruth Iyob (2000) has argued that regional hegemony in Africa is not a simple form of domination, but rather a system of domination, built upon a normative framework that legitimizes exploitation and subordination, oriented to curb the sovereignty’s claims of revisionist populations: here, hegemonic and diasporic states tend towards two asymmetrical and conflictual visions of their own national project.

The theory of *International Relations of Internal War* elaborated by Modelski, sustains that internal war is not a pure internal drama, but an international affair, as the structure of the conflict always acquires and attracts international components (Modelski 1964). This theory postulates that a foreign party will choose a precise strategy of external intervention on the basis of the relevance that the outcome of war has for the international system, following a single and linear law: ‘The international system favours those parties to internal war which accord with the current formula and which reinforce the current structure of authority; and it discourages their opponents’ (ibidem 61).

On the basis of these theoretical positions two factors have been individuated as *explanatory variables* of the enduring disintegration: the regional hegemonic competition and the international intervention. Two hypotheses stipulate plausible relationships between the enduring disintegration and the outcome of intervention. The *first hypothesis* postulates that global intervention in Somalia has transformed the internal conflict into a wider international conflict, fomenting and complicating the perpetual renewal of hostilities. While the *second hypothesis* sustains that the regional mutual interference, generated by the competition between diasporic and hegemonic states in the Horn, has amplified the level of political fragmentation in Somalia. Thus, the international dimension of the statehood crisis needs to be reconsidered as being at the core of these two geopolitical circles: the regional and global one.
2. The significance of protracted disintegration

The implications of protracted disintegration for the study of conflict resolution and state-building are potentially numerous and often underestimated. Considering the framework delineated above, there are two categories of good reasons for studying the protracted nature of state disintegration in Somalia.

Firstly, exploring the enduring disintegration offers a significant addition to political theory, since existing approaches are increasingly unable to congruently explain the processes and features of contemporary statehood crises. On one side, the concept of disintegration implies a clarification between categories of statehood crisis, while the attribute of persistence implies an analytical differentiation, since factors leading states to disintegrate must be conceptualised separately from those preserving them over time. On the other, we should move beyond the conventional idea that state dissolution is a temporary, internal and bounded shock. The trend considering state formation as the prevailing consequence of the institutional development must be reconsidered, strengthening the position by which the state is seen as Deus mortalis, ‘belonging to death and carrying death within’ (Esposito 2009: 38). And finally, the spatial analysis must be stimulated because state consolidation and disintegration occur inside a ‘network of external relationships which constitute the international system’ (Modelski 1964:15).

Beyond the vast significance for academic debate, this research problem also makes a twofold contribution to policy-agenda: firstly, this case study has specific relevance, since the Horn of Africa is a strategic region in crisis, and Somalia represents the Achille’s heel of the entire region. In fact, in 2008 the US installed in its African Command in Djibouti, and Somalia has become the epicentre of the US’s global war on terror in Africa. Secondly, and more generally, this research problem offers the possibility of investigating sovereignty’s paradigms that are emerging as latent challenges to the stability of the Westphalian system. The world today is torn by competing trends toward disintegration and integration (Lake and Rothchild 1998). The territorial expansion and temporal protraction of any kind of statehood crisis represents one of the most serious concerns of the International Community, as recent events in Syria are clearly demonstrating.

In summary, the contemporary state of research on the topic of disintegration requires reworking on several different levels of analysis, by incorporating international variables that have been too long marginalised by the traditionalist approach.
3. Research Methods

In order to test the validity of the hypotheses outlined above, this research will be conducted through a case-study. There are two important reasons explaining why a case study methodology has been adopted. Firstly, this research is intended to achieve high concept validity (George and Bennet 2005): the current debate is dominated by comparative and quantitative cross-case studies which have interpreted the Somali experience as the archetype of the failure accomplished by post-colonial states in following the modern pattern of statehood\(^1\). As is clearly summarized by Hagmann and Hoehne (2009: 42), this position is subject to conceptual stretching and dangerous over-generalizations:

- it ignores the variegated types of empirical statehood that exist on the ground,
- it conflates the absence of a central government with anarchy,
- it creates an unhelpful distinction between ‘accomplished’ and ‘failed’ states,
- and it is guided by a teleological belief in the convergence of all nation-states.

The aim of this research is to recalibrate the attention paid by the academic debate on high contextual analyses, by bringing the international dimension back into the analysis of the statehood crisis.

Secondly, this research is motivated by the desire to capture details which are able to provide insight into complex mechanisms standing behind the relationship between intervention and disintegration. If we are to make sense of the fatal marriage between foreign intervention and state consolidation, we need to move beyond cause and effect explanations in order to understand in which manner and under which conditions some states are successful in stopping conflict and rebuilding the state whereas others are not.

This research will adopt the method of process tracing in order to define ‘the causal chain and causal mechanism’ (and then the intervening causal variables), existing between likely causes (regional conflict and international intervention) and outcomes (persistent disintegration). The definition of this causal mechanism is the core analytical aim of the entire dissertation. The most appropriate way to conduct a case study oriented to trace causal mechanisms is represented by the employment of comparative focus explanations within the case (Yin 1994: 120).

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\(^1\) The debate on state failure can be considered a legacy of the modernization approach, because state weakness is measured on the distance existing between Western and local governance, but also because it is based on the assumption that all states will converge towards a model of Western liberal democracy (Hagman and Hoehne 2009).
The testing procedure involves a two-pronged approach. First I develop a longitudinal analysis using controlled focus comparison (George and Bennett 2005) to systematically explore similarities and differences within the interventionist practice. The case study selected contains ‘many potential observations’, three key events caused by independent variables form the caesuras of the entire analysis: the international intervention by UNOSOM and UNITAF mission (1992-1995), the Ethiopian-Eritrean proxy war (1998-2000), the glocal counter-terrorism (2001-2010). As a result, this case study has been partitioned into six observations (N=6): the value of the dependent variable can be observed before, during and after each intervention, in order to see what actually changed after each foreign operation.

As a second step, a comparative analysis of the impact of intervention is proposed, evaluating to what extent the hibernation and deterioration of the disintegrative status has been enhanced by the international intervention. By identifying critical changes that occurred inside each component of the state disintegration it is possible to trace causal patterns and compare these outcomes with earlier and later observations, in the presence or absence of intervention.

To strengthen the validity of this dissertation, changes have been observed not only across time (longitudinal analysis) but also across space (cross-sectional). In order to refute the validity of an alternative hypothesis that takes into consideration only the destructive role played by clan organization, this dissertation evaluates the variance of impact generated by the relationship between clan organization and state disintegration in Somalia and Somaliland.

This research employs the analysis of both primary and secondary sources: scholars of IRs have often stressed the importance of relying on primary sources and fieldwork, especially when a systemic level of analysis has been privileged. This research sustains that the system level of analysis offers the advantage of discovering causal processes, but it also has the disadvantage of building interpretations that neglect historical particularities and details. Keeping in mind these trade-offs, this research relies on primary sources, and tries to counterbalance the trend of stressing structure over agency (Wendt 1987). Primary sources include: Interviews conducted in Hargeisa, between October and November 2011 with Somalilander ministerial, political and academic figures\(^2\). Official

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\(^2\) Somaliland Minister of State for foreign affairs, Mohammed-Rashid Sheikh; Abdullahi Odowa, chair of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa; Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Somaliland Civil Aviation Minister; Abdillahi Ibrahim Habane, General Secretary of
documents, government documents, statements and public speeches. Reports released by the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and non-governmental organizations. Conference talks including local, regional and national peace charters, agreements and other official documents. Secondary resources indeed have been collected from different archives: the British Library, the library of School of African and African Studies (SOAS) and the London School of Economic Library in London, the Academy for Peace and Development and the Guurti House in Hargeisa.

4. Structure of dissertation

The dissertation proceeds in five parts. Chapter 1 sets forth the theoretical foundation for the issue of state disintegration. The first section provides a definitional clarification between state disintegration and other forms of statehood crisis. Therefore, the chapter presents an historical overview of state disintegration, reviews the existing literature and explains why our question on enduring state disintegration remains unanswered.

Chapter 2 focuses on the specific subclass of ‘persistent disintegration’. This chapter provides a definition and operationalization of enduring state disintegration. Therefore, it presents a survey of the existing literature that explores the factors hampering or facilitating conflict resolution. This chapter presents my theoretical framework, focusing on the regional and global dimension of the international intervention. After this literature review, the chapter builds and adopts an integrated model of external intervention based on

the Guurti, House of elders; Abdi Yusuf Bobe, Academy for Peace; Muhayden Saed and Mohamoud, University of Hargeisa; Farah Mohamoud Jama, Nagaad; Abdulkadir Khalif, Mogadishu; Faisal Ali Waraabe.

two major theoretical contributors: the theory of regional hegemony defined by Ruth Iyob (1997, 2000), and the theory of international intervention in internal conflict established by Modelski (1964). The chapter individuates the structural, contextual and typological factors leading intervention to resolve disintegration or not.

Chapter 3 presents the peculiarities of state disintegration in Africa, and in doing so explores the regional background in which Somalia is located. This exploration is undertaken with the aim of explaining why the international dimension of statehood crisis is the critical factor for explaining enduring disintegration. After the regional overview, the chapter presents an empirical analysis of the status of disintegration in Somalia, grants a measurement of its persistence, and presents the case of Somaliland to evaluate why the traditionalist-clanist hypothesis cannot completely explain the persistence of disintegration.

Chapter 4 traces the causal process leading disintegration to persist. The chapter identifies mechanisms and intervening variables that enable foreign intervention to prolong the duration of state disintegration. Each stage of intervention is evaluated describing the structure, the historical trajectory and causal chain connecting disintegration with global and regional forms of intervention.

Chapter 5 evaluates the impact of each stage of intervention on the three constitutive dimensions of state disintegration. This chapter also provides a comparative analysis of the structure of intervention in order to trace similarities and dissimilarities. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of this case study. Thus, it defines how this thesis contributes to our collective knowledge of contemporary international relations. And finally, it clarifies the implications of my findings for further academic research and international politics.
Chapter 1
Theoretical framework: the state of disintegration

He felt like a drunken giant
walking with the limbs of a mosquito.
Whenever the thought of his father’s weakness and father troubled him,
he expelled it by thinking about his own strength and success
(Achebe 1958: 44)

In the early 1990s the concept of state disintegration witnessed a burgeoning of attention on the academic backstage. The dissolution of multinational states and federations that accompanied the end of the Cold War turned the attention of the academic debate towards a set of changes dealing with: the demise of communism, the transition towards democracy (Visegrády 1992), the rising territorial ambitions of nationalist groups (Kaldor 1993), new reconfigurations (Villalon and Huxtable 1998), as well as the steep increase in conventional civil wars (Kaldor 1999) and ethnic conflicts (Shultz 1995).

Decades before disintegration gained momentum, the state of debate was informed by a theoretical quarrel between state- and society-centred theorists (Nordlinger 1988, Hobson 2000). After Marxists, pluralists and structural-functionalists had attributed ontological primacy to social formation in studying the state (Skocpol 1985), other scholars converged on the idea of ‘bringing the state back in our studies of social change and politics’ (ibidem), re-orienting the politological inquiry towards a state-centred perspective. In the introduction to Bringing the state back in, Skocpol called for a convergence between studies sharing the notion that the state is an autonomous organization (Block 1980, Trimberger 1978, Skocpol 1979, Levi 1981), not reducible to class interests. Even if the state is embedded in a contested relationship with society (Migdal 1988, Evans 1989, Katzeinstein 1979), this approach assumes that the state preserves the ability to formulate interests of its own, independent of those expressed by particular (or dominant) groups. Therefore, the state also adopts a passive-adaptive attitude towards the international system: ‘It is the anarchic international system that determines state behaviour, not a state’s relationship with its society’ (Seabrooke 2002:9).

From the disagreement between societal and state-centred positions it derived a second debate contended between capacity and autonomy-oriented scholars (Skocpol
When explaining state stability or breakdown supporters of the capacity-oriented analysis, moving against the ‘unwillingness of pluralists and Neo-Marxists to speak of states’ (Skocpol 1985: 6), focalized on the state’s developmental performance. Supposing that a state’s integrity derives exclusively from a set of functions¹⁰ executed by the bureaucratic, political and administrative apparatus, the autonomy of the state was here regarded as secondary and analytically separated from the sphere of ‘capacity’. This approach nurtured the idea that modernizing the political process would be sufficient to implement effective developmental policies. As result, during the 1990’s, the academic community began to use terms like diminished, defective and hollow to refer to problematical countries lacking in regulatory capacity or administrative ability to efficiently manage the tasks of development (Hobson 2000).

State-autonomy theorists responded by arguing that any statehood transformation is a function of relationships existing between the state and the dominant interests (Evans 1989) of influential classes (Poulantzas 1973) and interested groups (Evans 1995), within and outside the society. While neo-structuralism affirmed that states cannot be independent but only ‘relatively autonomous’ (Poulantzas 1973), the school of dependency pointed out that an function of imposition (Halliday 1994) constantly affects the relationship between state and society in Third World countries. Therefore, the proper understanding of the nature of the post-colonial state warrants an analysis of its relation to internal class configurations, as well as to its external relations of mutual development and underdevelopment (Frank 1975). This view was enforced by the proliferation of post-colonial studies that claim the impossibility of attributing heuristic functions to western theories of state formation in non-western countries.

As a result, early research into state disintegration has frequently found itself caught in the horns of these ontological dilemmas. However, the pluralism of this debate has never been considered an ‘indication of a healthy discipline’ (Halliday 1987), and in the early 2000’s this heterogeneity drastically disappeared when the US State Department proclaimed failed states to be potential global security threats because they were potentially aligned with the ‘Axis of evil’. The term ‘failure’ has subsequently become the permanent gravitation centre of any discussion concerning the state. In a very brief lapse

¹⁰ These ‘abilities’ usually refer to the authority to raise revenue, enforce and regulate contracts, extract material resources, exert a territorial control, enforce a system of direct (or indirect) taxation, as well the provision of security functions.
of time, the centrality of the state-society and capacity-autonomy dichotomies has disappeared and any discourse concerning the state has come to be incorporated within the ontological structure of ‘state failure’. Whilst the pluralistic and often chaotic debate of the 1980s had stimulated the analytical polarization of two statehood attributes (capacity and autonomy) that are not antithetic but complementary, the contemporary debate embodies a monochromatic research field in which the pluralist approach to the study of state has been completely banned.

This chapter aims to overcome much of the constraints associated with the contemporary debate. The first section provides a terminological clarification of the patterns of statehood crisis. The second presents both a definition and operationalization of the concept of state disintegration. Countering this, the third section proposes an alternative way to conceptualise state disintegration, presenting a brief historical overview of the twofold process associating disintegration with integrations. The fourth section reviews the existing literature with regard to the following questions: what are the drivers of the state disintegration? What are its outcomes? Finally, the fifth section explains why my question on the enduring state disintegration remains unanswered.

1. Patterns of Statehood crisis: a neo-colonial epistemology

At the beginning of the 1990s, state breakdown had received little attention from scholars and policymakers. However, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th and the declaration of a global war on terror, ‘state failure’ has become increasingly prevalent in both academic and public debate (Rice and Patrick 2008, Bruton 2010). The sudden break-up of the previous theoretical tradition, the proliferation of terms and the subsequent overlap of concepts and patterns of crisis have generated, at least, a definitional confusion and an ontological impasse. Scholars have often used and abused terms such as weakness, failure, fragility and collapse, without attributing typological differences or imparting empirically verifiable information. Providing a clarification of the categories of statehood crisis, therefore, constitutes a prerequisite for theoretical development. This section tentatively attempts to move toward conceptualization by defining the matrix of terms and meanings surrounding the concept of state disintegration. The aim here is not to arrange a taxonomic hierarchy, fixing artificial trade offs between ‘species of crisis’. Since academic contributions on the statehood crisis have remained largely unconnected, this conceptualization aims to lend order to our vocabulary by establishing which meanings ought be associated with the most commonly used terms.
In this essay, I adopt the term statehood crisis in reference to a great variety of situations in which the state experiences a serious, intense and often conflictual difficulty which draws into question, at different levels, the effectiveness and integrity or survival of the sovereignty’s status. Before identifying which cases encompass the statehood crisis, we must first consider that the debate on state fragility is so wide that it can be divided, at least, into qualitative and quantitative analysis. The first group focuses on conceptual analyses that have identified and emphasized several qualitative criteria for distinguishing between weak, failed, or collapsed states. Arguably, the most influential pieces in this literature are the seminal works of Rotberg, When states fail (2003) and State failure and state weakness in a time of terror (2004). Other important qualitative researches include, at least, the following three research programmes; the Weak states reports, provided by the Centre for global development, the list of Fragility states published by the U.K. Department for international Development, and the Harmonized list of fragile situations developed by the World Bank Licus initiative.

The quantitative analyses include six major indexes: the State Fragility Index published by Marshall and Goldstone (2007), the Sovereignty Index elaborated by Ghani et all (2005) at the Brooking Institution, The Country Indicators for foreign policy project (2006) provided by the Canadian International Development Agency, the Political Instability Task Force launched by the Centre for Global Policy at George Mason University (Goldstone at all 2005), the Index of Weakness state in Developing world published by the Brooking institute (Rice and Patrick 2008), and the Failed States Index produced by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy (Messner et all 2012).

Confronting these contributions, five variants of statehood crisis have been identified and are illustrated inside the following Table 1: fragility, weakness, failure, collapse and disintegration. The state fragility accounts for a general impossibility to deliver core functions. According to Pavanello and Darcy ‘Fragile states are characterised by very weak policies, institutions and governance. Aid does not work well in these environments because governments lack the capacity or inclination to use finance effectively for poverty reduction’ (Pavanello and Darcy 2008: 12). Whereas state fragility indicates the absence of the essential capabilities to implement general functions, state weakness is concerned with the absence of essential capabilities to implement ‘critical government responsibilities’ (Rice and Patrick 2008: 3).

State failure is instead ‘a serious political crisis’ (Esty et all 1998): its seriousness varies depending on the escalation of a military conflict. The state fails, in fact, when the
central authority loses its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Rotberg has described failed states as ‘tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions’ (Rotberg 2003: 5. With regards to understanding the transition from weakness to failure, Rotberg has argued that ‘The typical weak state plunges toward failure when this kind of ruler-led oppression provokes a countervailing reaction on the part of resentful groups or newly emerged rebels’ (Rotberg 2003: 6). Whereas state weakness assumes ‘a temporarily or situationally’ connotation (Esty et all 1998), state failure holds a more serious, structural and enduring character (Rotberg 2003).

The state collapse represents an extreme case of state failure, where the complete erosion of public authority and legitimacy accompanies armed conflict. A collapsed state differs from a failed state in its institutional character (Milliken and Krause 2003): when a state fails, the central authority is still existent but extremely weak, whilst a state collapse reveals a ‘complete vacuum of authority’ (Rotberg 2003:5). According to Rotberg (ibidem):

A collapsed state (…) is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants.

Once clear criteria have been established for distinguishing state failure from weakness, and state collapse from failure, state disintegration needs to be strictly defined. According to Zartman (1995), state disintegration departs from a permanent status of implosion and evolves into a process of fragmentation of the previous territorial unit that transforms the state’s configuration and often corresponds to ‘an exhaustible production of weak States, soft States, permeable States’ (Vitale 2007: 4). State collapse is like a long-term degenerative disease, culminating into two basic outcomes, rehabilitation or fragmentation: disintegration occurs when the state collapse reaches a particular level of intensity that leads to ‘the crisis of internal homogeneities’ (ibidem). As pointed by Zartman:

Collapse occurs when centralized institutions of penetration are unable to ‘tame’ the contiguity periphery. This culminates most often in fragmentation and the emergence of countervailing power centres. Collapse at this level becomes the disintegration of overarching governmental structure, which establishes and maintains order, coordination, and security (Zartman 1995: 35).

According to the framework delineated above, the contemporary literature has interpreted the statehood crisis as a unilinear and progressive degeneration of the core aspects of the Westphalian sovereignty. As summarised inside the Table 1, state fragility
denotes a partial provision of core functions, while state weakness entails that critical
government functions are not properly carried out. In the case of failure, the state itself
suffers a qualitative worsening which is marked by the loss of the monopoly of violence,
progressively conducive to the implosion of the central authority taking place when states
collapse, or to the territorial fragmentation occurring when states actually disintegrate.

Table 1. Definitions among patterns of statehood crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of statehood crisis</th>
<th>Focus on</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fragility</td>
<td>Partial provision of core functions</td>
<td>‘A State is fragile if the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’ (UK DFID 2008:7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>Partial operation of critical government functions</td>
<td>‘Inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constrains; basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attack; and a mixture of the two. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent’ (Rotberg 2003: 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Incompleteness: The loss of the monopoly of violence</td>
<td>‘Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state’ (Rotberg 2003: 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Implosion</td>
<td>‘A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens)’ (Rotberg 2003: 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>‘Collapse occurs when centralized institutions of penetration are unable to “tame” the contiguous periphery. This culminates most often in fragmentation and the emergence of countervailing power centres. Collapse at this level becomes the disintegration of overarching governmental structure, structures that establish and maintain order, coordination, and security’ (Zartman 1995:35).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whilst this literature appears to gain momentum, it remains ill-equipped to address major epistemological problems. Firstly, the terminology employed is noticeably vague since scholars have frequently adopted similar terms to cover different phenomena and conditions without much apparent recognition of the heterogeneity existing between variants of the statehood crisis. Furthermore, the proliferation of analyses has never been harmonized by an attempt to find common instruments of research and the entire body of literature has remained largely unconnected. For example, Wolf (2006: 4) has conceptualised the state failure as a matrix capturing the other sub-categories: ‘state failure is a gradual process and that states engulfed in it fall into four broad categories: weak, failing, failed and collapsed states’. However, there is not scholarly agreement about the relationship existing between statehood crises, as demonstrated by the fact that certain indexes have described different cases adopting the same attributes. Within this debate terms are used in very contradictory ways: while many have equated weak states with ‘poorly performing states’ (Crisis States Workshop 2006), others have measured ‘a state’s strength or weakness is a function of its effectiveness, responsiveness, and legitimacy across a range of government activities’ (Rice and Patrick 2006:3). Secondly, tautology often affects the vocabulary, since the relationship between cause and effects remains ambiguous. As pointed by Bhuta (2012: 11): ‘A common feature of all of these definitions is that they derive the meaning of state failure and fragility from its symptoms, but are vague in the specification of relationships between symptoms and causes (or between symptoms and underlying illness)’.

Thirdly, this debate is based on a ‘capacity-oriented’ conceptualization which reflects the normative values embedded within the modernization approach, according to which there exists a linear pattern of development, and any form of statehood deviance represents the distance elapsed by non-western countries in fitting the model of political development established by the Westphalian sovereignty. The road towards disintegration has been drafted as essentially unilinear: state fragility, weakness, failure, collapse and disintegration have been codified as progressive stages of political underdevelopment. Each step is determined by a specific deterioration of sovereign functions: these steps are

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11 As once noted by Bhuta (2012: 4) ‘the Failed State Index (FSI) describes weak and failing states as having ‘common attributes. These include loss of physical control over territory, lack of monopoly on the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, an inability to provide security or social services to its people, and, frequently, a lack of capacity to act as a full member of the international community.’
linked together by a law of progressive decline, or cumulative deficiencies. As a result, the state has become polarized between a positive (Western) and negative (non-Western) image, where the compound of state capacity is envisioned as the sufficient analytical enterprise to evaluate state consolidation. This approach has ignored the vast consequences deriving from the state- or society-centred theories, such as those deriving from the relationship between autonomy and capacity. Furthermore, only domestic factors have been considered to be responsible for state deficiency, differences in the structure of society or international factors are here considered of little importance.

This thesis posits that a proper analysis of state disintegration requires a focus on the interaction between autonomy and capacity dysfunctions, rather than state capacity alone. Since the concept of disintegration directly entails the territorial domain of the state, spatial variables must be reconsidered and incorporated into statehood analysis.

2. State disintegration: definition and indicators

Since concept refinement (Bennett 2005) requires reducing conceptual stretching, this paragraph proposes an alternative conceptualization, collocating disintegration inside the reign of ‘integration,’ as is suggested by the Latin root, integer, from which the term derives. Thus, let us consider that when the state collapses, the central authority is unable to exercise effective control over the territory, but it is still able to ensure the state’s enclosure. Indeed, when the state disintegrates, the central government loses the capacity to secure national boundaries and safeguard the integrity of the political space. The power’s centralization and its redistribution after the state implosion is here crucial, as clearly explained by Li (2002):

Territorial disintegration as it involves the collapse of the state organization that is charged with maintaining control and stability in a territory, resulting in openings that allow elite and other groups to contend for control over the territory. There are two aspects of territorial disintegration. One is the breakdown of the political institutions, so that the rulers and values that govern conflict among groups are no longer followed or accepted as legitimate. The other is the contention for power by various groups mobilizing and controlling resources in a part or parts of the territory (Li 2002: 2).

Considering this definition, the concept of state disintegration entails a process of losing unity and cohesion, where the former central unit breaks down into smaller particles. At the beginning of the crisis, centrifugal forces provoke the collapse of central authority (implosion). The dispersion of power to these peripheral forces produces, not only a growing destabilization, but moreover, a division of the national political-identity that escalates into a ‘contestation for power’ (Li 2002) between rival groups interested in
mobilizing and controlling resources (*contention for power*). The absence of a central power induces political forces to a re-aggregation inside ‘overarching governmental structure(s)’ (Zartman 1995: 35). As a result, separated groups reclaim their sovereignty’s right (independence or autonomy) from the central state (*violation of territorial integrity*). Applying the approach formulated by Goertz for concept formation (Goertz 2006), state disintegration can be defined as a multi-level statehood’s change, composed by three specific conditions: the state implosion, the power contention and the violation of territorial integrity.

Since the first empirical task of this dissertation is to evaluate whether in Somalia there has been a significant change in the level of disintegration, this concept must be operationalized. To provide the critical juncture between empirical observations and theoretical definitions, we use 8 indicators.

Three indicators have been provided for the state implosion: state legitimacy, political authority and regime durability. The first indicator, ‘legitimacy’ derives from the *Failed State Index*, while the level of political authority and regime durability have been provided by the variable ‘polity2’ and ‘durable’ both available inside the Polity IV project.

Four indicators of armed conflict are taken into consideration: type, intensity, party composition and duration of armed conflict. All these indicators are provided inside the dataset *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, version 4-2011* (Gleditsch et all 2002). The indicator of the intensity is provided by the variable named *Intensity (Int)*, which is coded in two categories: minor conflict and war\(^\text{12}\). The type of conflict consists of four categories: extra-systemic, internal, interstate and internationalized armed conflict. The party composition derives instead from the compound of each ‘government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of organizations’ involved in the conflict (ibidem: 2): the primary parties to the conflict (*SideA* and *SideB*) and the supporting secondary parties (*SideA2nd* and *SideB2nd*).

Finally, one indicator has been provided for the violation of territorial integrity: the variable *Fragment*. This indicator is codified inside the dataset of the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2009) and includes: ‘separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority’ (Marshall and Jaggers 2009: 12).

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\(^{12}\) Minor conflict (codified as 1) comprehends military fights where the battle-related deaths in a given year are comprised between 25 and 999. War (codified as 2) comprehends military battles where the battle-related deaths per year amount at least to 1,000.
All 8 of these variables have been operationalized using continuous values (state legitimacy, political authority, regime durability, fragments and duration of armed conflict), ordinal level variables with multiple measurable dimensions (intensity of conflict) and nominal scale (type of conflict, party’s composition). The multi-level concept of state disintegration can now be resumed, as is illustrated by the following Figure 1.

*Figure 1. Three-level concept of state disintegration*

![Diagram of three-level concept of state disintegration]

Before illustrating the state of arts of the contemporary literature, the following section will trace an historical contextualisation in which state disintegration must be necessarily located.

### 3. The historical framework of state disintegration

A perspective that prioritises searching for the historical significance of events taking place within a ‘short time span’ (Braudel 1982) tends to interpret state disintegration exclusively as a post-colonial drama. A perspective that emphasizes history as a working progress (ibidem) interprets contemporary state disintegration as the dark side of the process leading states to integrate, moving the origin of this phenomenon beyond the tale of the contemporary state system. The aim of this paragraph is to demonstrate the validity of this statement.

Numerous examples of territorial decompositions have occurred during ancient and medieval history. Since the fourth century B.C. Greek poleis went into decline; the city-states system became too weak, the autonomy of small leagues or confederations was compromised and the Greek territory was gradually incorporated within the Roman
Empire. Indeed, the Roman Western Empire was eclipsed in 480 a. C., when barbarian invasions reduced the Empire to a proliferation of Roman-Barbarian Kingdoms. After almost one century, the fall of Constantinople under the Ottoman Empire inaugurated a decomposition of sovereignty that eclipsed the Byzantine Empire.

More recently, the formation of the modern state system established with the Westphalian peace, has been constantly accompanied by disintegrative pulls. According to Tilly (1975) European state making has never been a linear pattern of political development. Coercion has been the critical factor both in establishing central states - ‘war and preparation for war’ 'produced the major components of European states’ (Tilly 1990:28) - and in dismantling them -‘as the large military states began to feel the stimulus of capitalist expansion, the advantages of the small mercantile states began to disappear’ (Tilly 1992: 76). Therefore, the law governing state formation in Europe has often been conducive to state failure rather than consolidation: ‘Most of the European efforts to build states failed’ (Tilly 1975: 38) and paradoxically, the theory of Western state making represents a sophisticated model of political development viable for a restricted number of cases. Italy and Spain, for example, are two of the most important instances of hybrid state formation. During the XV century, the Spanish territory was a constellation of reigns where ‘disorder reigned supreme and all-pervading’ (Lea 1988: 7). The Spanish state emerged under the pressure of the Moor’s threat, when the alliance between Castile and Aragon prompted the formation of a central authority.

Furthermore, the process of state formation in Italy exhibits elements of ambivalence and heterogeneity. Italy, in fact, was an extraordinary case of territorial fragmentation continuing until the nineteenth century, when the unitary formation was formally realized through the gradual transformation of a fragmented ‘imperium of cities’ (Chittolini 1994) into regional states. The protagonists of the Italian state formation have been, in fact, the city-states, that given the absence of a superior territorial organization, ‘from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries (…) inspired and pursued conquest and state formation’ (Chittolini 1994: 29).

During the short twentieth-century (Hobsbawm 1994) the mutual essence of state formation and disintegration was converted into a twofold mechanism featuring the simplification (Poggi 1991) and fragmentation of the political organization. In the early 1900s, the European geopolitical map was simplified: after the 1st World War, central empires collapsed (German, Austria-Hungarian and Ottoman Empire), and a unique statehood configuration, the nation-state, supplied a variety of sovereignty’s forms.
At the end of the century, in the twilight of the Cold war, the territorial order established in Eastern Europe, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa began to be dismantled. Socialist federations and post-colonial states have become the epicentres of a high magnitude earthquake: fifteen new independent states replaced the Union of Socialist Republics, two states replaced the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic and seven states replaced the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Three of the post-soviet republics, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, have been embroiled in a violent process of sub-disintegration: between 1990 and 1993 the republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Pridnestrovie declared their independence and after 20 years of conflict the former soviet republics still remain in a limbo status.

On the other side, newborn states in Africa and the Middle East began to experience disintegration only a few decades after they gained independence from colonial rule. When conflict in Lebanon escalated into a civil war in 1975 the state was divided into more than five territorial entities (Kliot 1986). The civil war that erupted in Afghanistan in 1978 ended after fourteen years with the disintegration of the central authority (Rubin 1995). In 1970, the secession of Katanga inaugurated the season of instability in Congo, which culminated with the assassination of Lumumba. During the mid 1990’s, disintegrative pulls resurged in the Great Lake region, after the Rwandan genocide and the collapse of Zaire, came to a head with the formation of a new instable state, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the escalation of a continental war in 1998, and the continuous conflict between separatists groups in peripheral regions and the central authority. Finally, the entire Horn of Africa represents the region that best captures the mutual essence of integrative/dissolutive mechanism: since 1955 until now, three states, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia have been twisted by armed conflicts and disintegration. The collapse of old regimes has led to their replacement by new sovereignties, more (Eritrea, South Sudan) or less (Somaliland) internationally recognized.

From empires to monarchies, from city-states to principalities and kingdoms, state disintegration has been the dark side of the process leading states to be integrated into unitary political organizations. It is beyond the scope of this research to do justice to the various cases of political disintegration that have been conceptualized as a separate momentum from the process of state formation. The remainder of this paragraph seeks to demonstrate that comparative analysis is crucial to locating state disintegration in its right place.
4. The academic debate on state disintegration

Towards the end of the XX century, scholars of IRs devoted major attention to describing and explaining the expansion of disintegrative pulls spread out from Western boundaries towards the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The disintegration of three socialist federations (Soviet Union, Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) had encouraged a discussion on whether disintegration was generated by systemic (the end of cold war) or regime changes (the end of real socialism). While the statehood impasse that erupted within the margins of the post-colonial order raised the issue of how capable third world countries are of fitting the elegant image of the Westphalian state. A revival of this study occurred when the surge and resurge of state fragility had become central to explaining the security paradigm of the new world order, sealed inside the threat of international terrorism. From the crisis of real socialism to the crisis of the African political system, the mainstream debate approached the issue as a capacity deficit along the linear pattern of the modern political system. Based on this critical understanding of the theoretical interpretations of state disintegration, this chapter presents an examination of the most significant debates surrounding this phenomenon. Following this the existing literature will be here reviewed with regard to two main questions: what are the driving forces of the state disintegration? What are its outcomes?

4.1 The drivers of state disintegration

No general agreement exists among scholars as to whether disintegration is fomented by economic, political or social factors. And no agreement has ever been reached in actively breaking down the artificial distinction between epistemological levels of analysis. Scholars have tended to treat state disintegration as an instance of singular causal factors (ethnic conflict, security dilemma, economic underdevelopment or social backwardness). However, very few have considered disintegration as a product of interacting factors. Thus, the literature review will present a set of fragmented explanations, both empirical and theoretical studies, on the causes of state disintegration. The literature can be divided using two levels of analyses: internalist and internationalist perspectives. The first comprehends contributions focused on state or societal factors affecting the ability of the institutional/administrative structure to realize governmental objectives and functions. The internationalist approach includes set of studies that have assigned great relevance to factors acting behind the scenes of domestic politics, looking at
the way in which the structure of the International System actually affects the state’s integrity.

4.1.1 Capacity-oriented analysis

The capacity-oriented analysis is based on methodological individualism that explains facts by scrutinizing the behaviour of substantial individual actors: states, or other institutional decision makers. The core analytical endeavour of this approach has been that of describing the linear relationship existing between capacity deficit and state consolidation. Rationalist approaches have estimated state dissolution following the principle of cost-benefits analyses and pointing to group fears and individual gain as main drivers of state disintegration (Geddes 1999). By the early 1990s, neopatrimonialism was considered the most accurate concept explaining the dysfunctions affecting ‘post-traditional’ societies in Latin America, South Asia, Middle East (Eisenstadt 1973) and Africa (Bach and Gazibo 2011). Here, several scholars supported the notion that states have failed to produce ‘public’ policies because of the perverse relationship existing between bureaucracy and the development of a patrimonial logic. Kholi reasoned that state dissolution is due to the ‘absence of an ‘effective public arena’ clearly differentiated from private interests, organizations and loyalties’, whilst Englebert affirmed that dissolution occurs when the ‘privatization of the public sphere is carried to such extremes’ (Englebert 2000). Many have stretched the original concept of patrimonialism equating neopatrimonialism with when ‘personal rule and resource control reach a paroxysmic level, with a consequent ‘failure of institutionalization ... and thus of the state’ (Me´nard 1991: 339).

Bach (2011) has recently confuted the linear relationship often taken for granted between state integrity and patrimonialism. He points out that the neopatrimonial rule cannot be automatically equated to predatory and anti-developmental forms of power, since ‘In Africa, regulated forms of neopatrimonialism have been usually associated with the introduction of a policy of ethnoregional balance’ (Bach 2011: 277) where ‘The emphasis laid on cooptation and redistribution, rather than coercion, contributes to promote a culture of mutual accommodation’ (ibidem: 278). Thus ‘the coexistence of

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13 According to Bratton and van de Walle, ‘In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status’ (Bratton & van de Walle 1994: 458).
patrimonial and legal-rational elements with a political system – does not predetermine outcomes’ (ibidem: 290). Others, indeed, have moved beyond the neopatrimonial matrix, to include the privatisation of war, the warlord politics (Bollig 2001, Reno 1998, Rich 1999), the politics of patronage (Leftwich, 2000) and the predatory attitude within governments and leaderships (Rotberg 2003) inside the capacity discourse.

From another theoretical perspective, the Society-centred perspective views disintegration arising from the basin of the social organization. Numerous scholars have focused their attention on the schismatic nature of the society (Lewis 1999), the relationship between conflict and ethno-nationalist mobilization (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the clash of civilizations (Huntington 2011, Cho et al 2007) and ethnic tensions (Horowitz 1985). The Yugoslavian disintegration, for example, has been largely investigated through the lens of the rising nationalism. Several scholars considered the conjunction between ethnicity and federalism as a catalyst for disintegration along nationalist lines, both in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Walker 2003). Horowitz has advanced one of the most important analyses of ethnic mobilization, based on the idea that separatist or secessionist struggles can be triggered by competition between opposing groups, reclaiming the right to control a distinct territory (Horowitz 1985). The unequal distribution of resources and the competing claims to self-determination (Trbovich 2007) are the focal elements of this kind of mobilization.

4.1.2 International-oriented analysis

Within the internationalist-oriented analysis, many theorists have scrutinized to what extent conflicts increase or reduce the stability of the state building process. Many scholars, even those who recognize that interstate conflicts have contributed towards European state formation (Tilly 1975) have seriously questioned the validity of this hypothesis in non-western countries. Particular attention has been devoted to the African continent (Elbadawi 2000), where, according to many, today’s internal wars do not make states, ‘but rather unravel them’ (Leander 2004: 69). Whereas neo-realists have recognized the existence of a linear Hobbesian law of nature, by which states die simply because they lack the capabilities to advance their own survival, other scholars have focused on different factors. ‘New conflict’ theorists have argued that ‘new states’ are still entangled within the ‘paradoxical nature of state-making’, and thereby see destructive conflicts as necessary to ‘create order’ and increase the level of state power (Cohen and Organski 1981). African scholars have supposed that the ‘African peace’ (Henderson 2008), defined
as the absence of interstate wars (Herbst 1990), and ‘Darwinian processes of inter-state competition’ has endorsed fragile or failed states to exist (Hendriks 2012: 61). Consequently, the contemporary prevalence of intrastate wars and the absence of interstate competition have inhibited the development of strong nations (Mazrui 1986).

At the same time, other scholars turned their attention to security dilemmas (Herz 1951, Jervis 1976, Posen 1993), connecting state disintegration to the emergence of insecurity and anarchy (Posen 1993:27) resulting in a vicious cycle of armament (Herz 1959), often accompanied by destabilizing misperceptions (Jervis 1978). One state, by striving to increase its own security (focused on military capabilities) can inadvertently make others feel less secure, stimulating a reaction which decreases the first state’s own security. Here, state dismemberment is most likely because the emerging anarchy creates a situation where no neutral central authority is able to govern the territory and each group attempts to take care of its own security and ‘even defensive actions, taken by groups with no interests other than maintaining their security, can set off an action-reaction spiral that leaves all parties worse off’ (Kahl 2006: 47). According to Posen (1993:28), ‘The competition will often continue to a point at which the competing entities have amassed more power than needed for security and, thus, consequently begin to threaten others’.

A third important argument, anchored to the structure of the International System, was introduced to this debate during the twilight of the cold war, when disintegration in non-western countries was largely conceived as a function of the withdrawal of foreign support to Third world states (Ignatieff, 1993, Holm 1998, Ayoob 1998). According to Santoro, the decline of bipolar competition reduced the amount of international assistance towards peripheral states, as a consequence peripheral conflicts previously contained come to the fore generating disintegration (Santoro 1981). Indeed, Buzan introduced the concept of mature anarchy to define a structural dimension of security dilemma (Buzan 1993)\textsuperscript{14} where everybody is against everybody (Nagel 220) and norms of the international order are weak or non-existent. When the international anarchy is immature, states are weak actors in the IS, plagued by a variety of security threats and lacking cohesion in domestic politics. Here we see state disintegration as directly generated by the immaturity of the international system in which states are embedded (Buzan 1993, Lipschutz 1998, Kipp and

\textsuperscript{14} Buzan has defined two kinds of anarchy existing in the IS: the immature (with the characteristics of the Hobbesian state of nature) and the mature anarchy (where the state holds a major degree of security). These two typologies represent two extremities (stability and instability) in which the international system is located.
Attempting to move beyond the analysis of the global structure of power, during the 1970s various researchers began to question the relationship between the structure of the international system and geopolitical space, introducing new spatial variables and evaluating under which conditions the regional structure of power affects state consolidation. The debate on ‘Old regionalism’ increased the awareness that theories about great powers could not effectively explain the behaviour of regional powers, or third world countries. Following this the international system came to be conceptualised and investigated as a set of regions, sub-systems, hierarchical regional systems (Zimmerman 2009) and subordinate state systems (Binder 1958, Brecher 1963, Bowman 1968, Zartman 1967). Contributions belonging to separate area studies have produced similar interpretations, according to which the internal stability is deeply influenced by the balance of power existing inside a contiguous environment: regions are continuously shaped by intrusive systems (Cantori and Spiegel 1970), subordinate system (Binder 1958), forms of imperium (Katzenstein 2005) or dominant states (Brecher 1963). Zartman, in particular, has applied the concept of subordinate system to the African continent, where the regional system was able to perform two typologies of functions, self-maintenance and problem-solving. Therefore, when Africa is subject to external aid and penetration, the problem solving function prevails on self-maintenance and provokes instability. The integrity of the national system is undermined when the autonomy of the system decreases, and ‘the capabilities of the system are overburdened and the system can no longer perform its functions’ (Zartman 1967: 549).

The internationalist perspective has tended to emphasize a fourth approach, that of the role played by historical and normative legacy in influencing state trajectory. From the historicist perspective, Yugoslavia’s dissolution for example, has been explained in the light of both the imperial rule and nineteenth century Slav nationalism (Cohen and Dragovic-Soso 2007). While in the African case, colonialism has been identified as the root matrix of any contemporary form of statehood crisis (Clapham 1995, Ottaway 1999, Young 2002). From the normative point of view, constructivists have explored the manner in which international law and institutions have dealt with intra-state fragmentation. The theory of Quasi-states elaborated by Jackson (1982), for example, has provided one of the most comprehensive analyses of the relationship between state stability and destructive historical and normative legacy. Jackson has argued that quasi-states are deformed creatures, ‘abstractions’ without any empirical legitimacy (ibidem), which persist in their
weakness only because of a negative form of sovereignty granted by their international recognition. Okafor lends weight to this view with a precise account of the guiding principles endorsed by International law. Arguing that these principals are conducive to exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy in postcolonial states as they include: ‘the persistent oscillation and deference to peer review, deference to the effectiveness doctrine, the glorification of empire-like or centralise statehood, the homogenisation of sub-state groups\textsuperscript{15}, and the domestication of sub-state groups’ (Okafor 2000: 180).

A fifth interpretation emerged from International Political Economy (IPE) scholars who have associated state disintegration with micro or macro-economic dysfunctions. On one hand, theorists of war economy have argued that disintegration derives fundamentally from the belligerents’ willingness to profit from the perpetuation of lawlessness and armed conflict (Menkhaus 2003, Reno 2003). Whereas others sustain that global economy has an essential role in consolidating states, liberals and neo-liberals have perceived state disintegration as a shortfall in the prerogatives of modernity, a ‘natural outcome’ determined by the failure of traditional societies and modes of production to adapt to the integrative pushes of the globalized economy. Modern liberal theories are based on the theory of modernization postulated by Rostow, according to which backward societies are condemned to underdevelopment if they are unable to follow all the steps conducting towards mature capitalism (Rostow 1953). Contemporary theorists of the modernization school, in fact, affirm that states collapse when investments in the maintenance of the social complexity decrease (Tainter 2005): the diminishing return on investments in energy, education and technological innovation is the main predictor of disintegration. Using different words, but in a very similar way, Bates suggests that state dissolution depends on the level of public revenue and valuable natural resources (Bates 2008): ‘Societies with lower income are more prone to political disorder, poorer states are more prone to fail and when people in power have access to resources then the state is more likely to experience state failure’ (Bates 2008: 279).

In contrast, Marxists and neo-Marxists have pointed out that factors leading peripheral states to disintegrate depend on the development of underdevelopment (Franck 1975), according to which the formation of strong states inside the centre of the capitalist system is determined by the subordination of weak states in peripheral countries. The law governing this unequal balance is that of capital accumulation, the systematic transfer of

\textsuperscript{15} The term ‘Homogenization’ means the construction of as single unitary nationhood, often conducted through a coercive suppression of socio-cultural differences (Okafor 2000).
surplus from peripheral to industrialized core countries (unequal exchange). The school of dependency has interpreted each event occurring within the statehood’s realm as a consequence of the development of the world-capitalist economy. Furthermore, differences in the level of statehood consolidation are interpreted as being caused by the position occupied by each nation within the international division of labour (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1969, Frank 1975, Amin 1985). All the positions expressed in this debate have been grouped inside the following Table 2.

**Table 2. Drivers of state disintegration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Focus on</th>
<th>Drivers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rational choices, group fears and individual gain (Geddes 1999)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The politics of patronage (Leftwich, 2000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Neo-patrimonialism (Bach 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Schismatic nature of the society (Lewis 1999)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The clash of civilization (Huntington 1996, Cho and Dragovi-Soso 2007)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic mobilizations (Horowitz 1985)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internationalist</strong></td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Conflict (Santoro 1981, Cohen and Organski, 1981)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Historical legacy (Clapham 1995, Ottaway 1999, Young 2002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Normative legacy (Okafor 2000, Jackson 1990)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development of underdevelopment (Frank 1975, Amin 1985)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>War economy (Menkhaus 2003)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subordinate state system (Binder 1958, Bowman 1968, Brecher 1963, Zartman 1968)</td>
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4.2. The Outcomes of state disintegration

The spiralling of violence and dramatic events occurring during civil wars led many scholars to emphasize the importance of the social, humanitarian and economic consequences determined by political instability. This emphasis is illustrated by the proliferation of studies connecting humanitarian emergencies, famine, diaspora, Internally Displaced People and refugees (Lindley 2009) to state collapse. In particular, assessing the impact of state disintegration upon social economic and environmental equilibrium has become a recognizable stage of state-building strategic development and planning mechanisms, oriented to advance ‘lessons learned’ and ‘strategic analyses’ for future agendas. Bypassing these social effects, this section aims to re-politicize the consequences of disintegration, devoting much attention to those interpretations that recognise the significance of changes occurred to the political sphere of both, the internal and international political system.

Firstly, from a purely quantitative perspective, the proliferation of sovereignties represents one of the most important outcomes generated by state disintegration. During the XX century the number of recognized sovereign states has increased from 69 in 1920, to 192 in 1995 (Alesina et all 2000). This proliferation of sovereignties has posed a qualitative dilemma concerning the nature of the state, encouraging a serious rethinking of traditional theories. State disintegration has generated two institutional changes; the transition towards new systems of government, and the emergence of outlaw states. The new wave of state building has assumed an important role within the academic debate as it has been accompanied by conversions towards the capitalist economy (Przeworski 1991, Eyal Szelenyi and Townsley 1998, Colton and Holmes, 2006), the transition towards democracy (Ghosal and Proto 2007, Collier 1999, Visègrady 1992, Obydenkova 2011) and by the process of Europeanization (Drumea 2008). On the other side, state disintegration has multiplied the number of outlaw, fugitive, or pariah states (Rywkin 2006, Kuzio and D’Anieri 2002). Outlaw states are de facto sovereignties, holding all the prerogatives of domestic legitimacy necessary for the statehood’s claim (positive sovereignty), albeit without international recognition (negative sovereignty). These states exist in a sort of limbo since the International Community does not formally recognise their sovereignty and neither have they been integrated inside the jurisdiction of the state from which they want to separate. In many cases, limbo states have been reintegrated inside the ‘statehood’s normality’, as occurred in Kosovo, Eritrea, and most of the Soviet republics. But, in many others, outlaw states persist in this limbo for decades, without any juridical
status. This is the case for Somaliland, South Ossetia, Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Cyprus, all of which area studies has extensively debated (Lynch 2004, Raic 2002).

Beyond this impact, IRs scholars have also investigated state disintegration as an explanatory variable for a large amount of global and regional phenomena. Early researches have discussed the systemic consequences of the bipolar demise and regime changes taking shape across third world countries (Halliday 1995, Webber 1992, Ma 1998). Particular attention has been paid to the spirit of non-alignment (Ma 1998) and national liberation struggles, while different scenarios have been developed about the future of global and regional interactions. Some scholars have converged on the idea that the dissolution of the Soviet Union preluded a unipolar Western domination of the Third World (Campbeld 1994). While others have argued that the fall of socialism would remove the premises of the US engagement not only in Europe (Lukic and Lynch 1996), but also elsewhere.

After this first stage, IR scholars have tended to abandon this focus in favour of an analysis anchored to contemporary security challenges. On the global scale, after September 11, a growing number of studies began to scrutinize state failure as a source of international insecurity (Milliken 2003). Although scholars connected state disintegration with terrorism intensively, declaring failed states as potential safe havens for jihadist and Al-Qaeda (Bruton 2010, Wyler 2008), very few have defined how this mechanism effectively works and even fewer have empirically tested the relationship between poverty and state failure as predictors of terrorism (Piazza 2006, Abadie 2006, Lisanti 2010). Arguments opposing this approach (Lisanti 2010) have claimed both that, disintegrated states are inhospitable to foreign terrorist groups, who need some kind of complicit central authority for their own security (Menkhaus 2004), and that terrorism flourishes where democracy is well-established and a functioning state is existent (Marchal 2007, Hagman and Hoehne 2009).

On the regional scale, theorists of ‘New Regionalism’ feared a domino effect of disintegration and secession, postulating a ‘contagious theory’ concerning the possibility that state failure could spread across borders by political osmosis, regionalizing conflicts (Ayoob 1995, Väyrynen 1984) and eroding state authority in neighbour countries. Since the 90’s, the increasing involvement of regional actors in internal wars came to the fore in the Balkans, Middle East, Horn of Africa (Cliffe 1999, Plaut 2004, Abbink 1998) and West Africa (Prunier 2009). Consequentially, many scholars have treated the
regionalization of conflicts as the phenomena best capturing the way in which state failure affects regional space and politics. In Africa, for example, many conflicts that culminated with the collapse of the central authority have also precipitated a ‘profound regional insecurity dilemma’ (Orogun 2002). Civil wars in Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have had serious ramifications and spillover effects across the boundaries of neighbouring states. According to Orogun, the regionalization of internal conflicts occurs when boundaries are easily permeable to rebel groups. State fragility in one country severely compromises the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-interference inside the internal affairs of a foreign country. This occurs because the inability of central authorities to effectively enforce the rule of law in peripheral areas inevitably facilitates the ramifications of internal wars across the regional space, which becomes subject to ‘frequent rebel cross-border raids and accusations of state-sponsored counter insurgency by adversarial neighbouring countries’ (Orogun 2002).

One of the most important cases of regionalization of conflict includes the Great Lake’s region, where in 1996 Rwandan troops invaded Zaire (now the Republic Democratic of Congo) to fight the Hutu militia who had escaped into the Northern provinces of Zaire (North Kivu) after having perpetrated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Since that time Rwanda’s political instability has spilled into Zaire, and also contemporary conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been stimulated and aggravated by regional spoilers, as is demonstrated by the ongoing tensions between the Congolese government and rebel militia (today grouped inside the M23 movement), who are alleged to be supported by Rwanda. The array of studies presented above has been summarized in the following Table 3.
Table. 3 Outcomes of state disintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Focus on</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition to democracy (Ghosal and Proto 2007, Collier 1999, Visegrady 1992, Obydenkova 2011)</td>
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<td>EU transformative power in state-building (Borzel 2011)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human condition</td>
<td>Refugee, diaspora, violence (Lindley 2009).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Spirit of non-alignment (Shuyun Ma 1998)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>National liberation struggles (Campeld 1994)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Role of socialism (Vilas 1990; Hinkelammert 1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>International terrorism (Piazza 2008; Bruton 2010, Wyler 2008)</td>
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5. Omitted answers to omitted questions

This literature raises a set of difficulties. State-societal theorists have emphasized the impact of domestic factors compared to international ones, formalizing arguments built on the assumption that disintegration is a purely internal phenomenon. Whilst Internationalist theorists have incorporated disintegration into the box of events generated by the dynamics of the international system, without tracing modes, mechanisms and processes according to which the international political system actually affects the state’s integrity. The ontological shortfall undermining the capacity-oriented analysis and the shaky empirical foundations supporting the internationalist approach has relegated this research to the practice of punctuating events without offering an insightful framework for improving theory-building.

Secondly, this debate does not offer reliable answers to questions that have never been seriously raised. The issue of state disintegration has witnessed a burgeoning of research, concentrating especially on the relationship with phenomena that emerged during the post-cold war era: the demise of Socialist Federations, the emergence of a de-territorialized international terrorism, the return of nationalism and spread of fragmentations in western and post-colonial states. But all these factors have tended to
decrease the relevance of the state disintegration in se, increasing the significance of the state disintegration per se: many broad questions have been explored extensively, but little attention has been paid to explaining how disintegration is actually configured, or how disintegration may, or may not be converted, into new state formations.

Thirdly, theorists have made starkly contrasting claims about disintegration causing the concept to remain the hostage of a fragmented debate. The analytical partition between domestic and international levels of analysis, such as the division between social, political and economic factors, has proved to be insurmountable. Even recognising that no single explanation can be sufficient to clarify scale and magnitude of state disintegration, scholars have not made enough efforts to break down analytical boundaries.

Fourthly, contemporary research has been compromised by a deficit of comparative analyses with other cases of statehood crises taking place within and outside the contemporary state system. As a result of this, state disintegration has been caught in a twofold empiricist trap. On one side, disintegration has been absorbed in the context of an exotic drama, the diffusion of disintegrative pulls in the southeast has reinforced the widely shared observation that disintegration has surged beyond the margins of the consolidated European state system. On the other side, disintegration has been treated as exceptional, state integration has been considered the grundnorm of the political coexistence (Santoro 1992, Whight 1946, Macry 2009) ignoring the fact that contemporary ‘systems of conflict’ have generated latent ‘transnational diffusions of instability’ that play a major role in the history of some countries. Theorists have failed to recognize the challenges that latent disintegration poses to the ‘normality’ of the state theory, and much of the theoretical discussion has turned around the concept of exceptionality.

The literature review presented above revolves around determinants and outcomes of disintegration, but it does not answer why disintegration can be protracted and often resists the most serious attempts at resolution. An elementary question remains unanswered: why does disintegration persist? Our research question, indeed, is pertinent because during the entire XX century, important and latent fracture lines have crossed the myth of sovereignty.

Highly conflictual and protracted disintegration occurred in Yugoslavia (Fritz 2007), separatist movements and partitioned governments in Russia (Chechnya), Caucasus (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia), Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Western Sahara) Asia (Pakistan, Timor East) and the Middle East (Lebanon, Palestinian territories) have posed a serious and pervasive
threat to the state’s integrity. Often, states have dismembered in a conflictual way and over prolonged periods of time, as is illustrated by the fact that the contemporary International System is populated by 192 recognized states, while a plethora of shadow sovereignties increases the number of pretending sovereignties to 250.

In conclusion, great emphasis has been devoted to describing patterns of disintegration while very few efforts have been made in rebuilding a theory of state-making capable of managing the crisis of spatial identity that contemporary conflicts are producing. For all these reasons, the long-term degenerative performance of the former Republic of Somalia cannot be considered a Somali peculiarity: the persistence of state disintegration, thus, matters, and must be investigated inside an appropriate analytical and empirical context.

Considering all these lines of critique, the next chapter pursues a different strategy affirming that incorporating the international system into the analysis of state disintegration is critical for understanding the evolution of statehood transformations.
Chapter 2
The persistence of state disintegration

Despite the existence of a consistent volume of studies narrowly or strictly related to state disintegration, our research questions remain unanswered: why does state disintegration persist in Somalia? Does state disintegration represent a temporal crisis or a permanent black hole? Why have efforts towards reconciliation failed?

Many politologists, worried about the ‘unnatural’ offspring of the post-colonial statehood, have tended to confine state disintegration within a labyrinth of Knossos, built upon a temporal and spatial barrier. The exceptional connotation contrasts with the empirical evidence as states that persist in disintegration for long periods of time pose an interesting challenge to the primacy of state consolidation, given that in many post-colonial states, the duration of dismemberment represents a considerable portion of the modern state’s experience. New-born states in Africa and the Middle East began to experience disintegration only a few decades after they gained independence from colonial rule. This is the case of Somalia, which has performed as an independent republic for 30 years, and for 20 as a disintegrated state. Also Pakistan, after 24 years of independence precipitated in three wars with India, a civil war and a gradual disintegration that is still on-going since the formation of the Republic of Bangladesh, to the Kashmir and Afghan wars.

Secondly, the indigenous interpretation is without empirical support: the sovereignty’s earthquake which generated the breakdown of territorial boundaries in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Asia, the Middle East and Africa has never been a spatially bounded phenomena occurring inside each country-political system. The nation-state as an
exclusive unit of political organization is being challenged and redefined in the vortex of processes connecting emerging conflicts with the reformulation of communities and political identities, strictly connected to the International System in which single states are located. The International Community is constantly called upon to stop conflicts or to resolve disintegrative pulls. But often, the International Community faces huge difficulties with the notion of external force serving as a peacemaker and Leviathan (Seybolt 2008, Matternich 2011, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). However, little attention has been given to the importance of international factors as predictive explanatory variables. Evidence on recent cases of prolonged disintegration shows that the greater the influence of international interaction in affecting and framing the conflict, the greater the possibility of reverting to state disintegration. Research evidence shows that states already collapsed are more sensitive to the erosion of state autonomy than that of capacity. Thus, the less international factors affecting the conflict resolution, the less disintegration occurs.

Two instances of prolonged disintegration must be considered. The Middle East, faced one of the most important instances of ‘disuniting’ which have persisted along a consistent period of time and within a dynamic international context. The Lebanon state, for example, since 1975 has suffered a form of territorial disintegration. Following the civil war and the Israeli-Syrian occupation, the state was partitioned into five ‘proto-states’ inhabited by the ‘Christians, Shites, Druze and Israeli and Syrian-occupied areas’. These ‘ethnic communities’ have replaced the function of the weak central government (Kliot 1986) and eroded the sovereignty of the Lebanese central government. The term ‘Lebanization’, in fact, has acquired the meaning of a protracted civil war where the state is partitioned into separate forms of authority. Since the 1989 analysts have been using this term with its changed sense when reporting from the West Bank. Several scholars have used the term ‘Lebanonization’ referring to both the Palestinian conflict (Rabbani 2012) and the Palestinian authority (Byrne 2010). According to the first use, the Lebanonization of the Palestinian conflict simply implies the adoption of Hizbullah strategies by the Palestinian intifada, where ‘the activities of effective armed cells have

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16 This concept, however, was coined by Shimon Peres, to refer to the Israel removal from Lebanon and the returning of Lebanon to the Lebanese: ‘Our policy should be maximum Lebanonization of the territory and minimum permanent Israeli army presence’. As argued by Safiri (1991), ‘However, the Israeli withdrawal was followed by what seems to be a permanent state of civil war among the religious, ethnic and political factions within that unhappy country; as a result, the word gained a pejorative sense of ‘unending internal strife, fueled by arms sales from abroad.’ Speaking in San Salvador in 1985, Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas sadly said of his country: ‘Here is where we reach the theme of Lebanonization’.
been supplanting civil forms of resistance’ (Rabbani 2012). However, according to Ron, the ‘Lebanonization of Gaza’ instead refers to a process of the gradual politics of expulsion oriented to cut off Gaza from the ‘Israeli integrated system’, moving Gaza toward frontier status and reproducing in Gaza what the Israeli’s had already done in Lebanon: ‘The Israeli public debate almost completely ignored the suffering and injustice inflicted on Lebanese civilians, suggesting that unlike the Palestinians in the OPT, Lebanese civilians were not part of the collective Israeli consciousness’. According to Byrne, this Lebanonization corresponds to a process of state building sustained by external actors that have gradually destroyed and fragmented the institutions of a Palestinian authority: ‘What we have and are seeing in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is the development of neo-occupational structures under the guise of state-building... the deconstruction of a state under the guise of counter-terrorism - fragmented and outsourced to external actors’ (Byrne 2010).

The second example focuses on the Great Lakes region in Africa. In Zaire, political turmoil began in July 1960, at the same time as independence, when the Force publique mutinied, refusing to obey the orders of Belgian officers and president Lumumba supported the mutineers. The state began to disintegrate when the regions of Katanga and South Kasai proclaimed their independence. The autonomy of these newborn states was immediately violated: ‘Without permission from the Congolese government, Belgium dispatched paratroopers to restore order and assist in the evacuation of civilians who wanted to leave’. Congo got trapped in the Cold War rivalries and the political crisis was actively complicated by Belgian and UN international intervention that culminated with the assassination of Lumumba by Belgian and US intelligence forces (Soderlund 2008), following this Mobutu seized to power. Whilst ONUC was considered to be successful in converting the Katanga secession and avoiding Zaire’s disintegration, turmoil actually re-emerged in the mid 1990s. As it transpired that previous interventionist practices were far less successful in establishing the conditions for the maintenance of internal order than had been widely assumed. Between 1996 and 2003 a regional conflict escalated in the Great Lakes, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex Zaire) experienced a second period of political disintegration, during which the eastern provinces were divided into different zones of control (RDC–Kinshasa vs. Ugandan and Rwandan zones of control), provoking a total fragmentation of the political-military landscape.

This research supports the notion that state disintegration not only occurs, but also continues to exist over a sustained period of time, because of the devastating influence
exerted by international interactions. However, much of the contemporary debate has devoted marginal attention to the manner in which international variables affect the reversibility of disintegrative processes. Against this common backdrop, this chapter seeks to remedy the gap existing inside the theoretical stand by outlining an analytical framework that understands the persistent disintegration at the core of the international states system.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first provides a definition and operationalization of the concept of persistent disintegration. The second presents a survey of the existing literature on the enduring disintegration. Since many theoretical approaches have identified conflict non-resolution as the intervening variable leading disintegration to persist, this survey explores which factors hamper or facilitate conflict resolution. The third part discusses our theoretical framework focusing on international intervention. This section presents an analytical narrative built around three fundamental questions: why, when and how does intervention protract disintegration? Three levels of factors are taken into consideration: structural elements, typologies of intervention and condition for success. From this evaluation the conditions under which intervention protracts conflict instead of disarming it will emerge.

1. Definition and indicators of enduring disintegration

A definition of persistent disintegration requires a huge effort of concept building, as there is no explicit criterion for distinguishing state collapse from disintegration. A pioneristic work introducing the persistence of Africa’s weak states was introduced by Jackson (1982), according to which weak states persist in Africa only because a negative form of sovereignty justify the ‘formal’ existence of these political organizations as sovereign entities.

More recently, other scholars have turned their attention to the reasons leading states to remain weak without necessarily failing (Englebert 2000, Kostovikova and Dzelilovic 2009). But very few works have distinguished weakness from disintegration, even when referring to clear and unquestionable examples of disintegration. On the other hand, many contributions have become entangled in an empiricist trap. The majority of these studies consist of policy-analyses or historical narratives that describe the characteristics of the persistent disintegration in specific countries, without providing any systemic organization of that field of inquiry. To actively contribute towards a resolution of the existing confusion, an initial definitional effort must be pursued.
A reliable definition of persistent disintegration can be found in Forrest’s work, *State inversion and Nonstate Politics*, edited inside the volume of Villalon and Huxtable (eds.) *The African state at a critical juncture* (1998). Forrest describes the *enduring disintegration* as, one of the possible outcomes deriving from state dissolution. When states fail, two outcomes can be postulated: reconstruction or nonstate politics. The term ‘Nonstate politics’ connotes an anarchical process of non-governmental decentralization that is unfamiliar to the pattern of state policy. Whereas the term ‘anarchy’ has been usually associated with the concept of disorder, according to Forrest the equation with instability is misleading: ‘there is order within chaos, and Africa may be well served by its many acephalous societies lacking state oversight. State and societal fragmentation are likely to result in various levels of social banditry and militia-type violence in the short-term, but communities in this nonstate realm may achieve more stable and enduring patterns of self-government in the long run’ (Villalón and Huxtable 1998: 55).

Forrest defines the perpetuation of disintegration as an acute stage of the ‘state inversion’, connoted by ‘a continual fragmentation’ and proliferation of area without authority’ (Forrest 1998). Following this idea, the protracted disintegration can be conceptualised as the extension of disintegration through a consistent period of time that cannot be considered a transition from one condition (disintegration) to another (reintegration). Persistence, in fact, represents the more compelling representation of non-state politics, as is exemplified by the tendency to resist the processes of sinking back towards the reintegration of the political system.

The definition of persistent disintegration involves two crucial dimensions: conflict and fragmentation. The implosion of the central authority alone, *in se*, is not necessarily conducive to disintegration: several African states persist in state weakness without being automatically doomed to disintegrate. Also conflict alone is not sufficient to protract disintegration: conflict may last for a long time, without generating territorial fragmentation. Disintegration persists when belligerents try to affirm their territorial authority by protracting a violent contention for power. And lastly, fragmentation alone is also insufficient to extend disintegration: without an armed conflict and a legitimacy dilemma, the violation of territorial integrity can be solved and converted into a form of political divorce recognized by international law (incorporation, annexation, secession, or unification).

In order to individuate the persistence of state disintegration it is necessary to evaluate if: a) fragmentation is protracted on the road of shadow sovereignty without any
legitimate recognition; b) the claim for legitimate authority is still contested; c) the process is a violent one. By persistence of disintegration we mean a statehood’s limbo where the dissolution of government structures endures along a period of time in which no sustainable conflict resolution has been achieved and the proliferation of decentralized authorities have not be integrated into a legitimate jurisdictional change.

What is, then, the threshold according to which state disintegration is prolonged or not? State disintegration is oriented towards two outcomes: state reconstruction or crisis stagnation. The threshold employed to establish when disintegration persists can be found at the crossroad of the conflict resolution. If parties agree to a cessation of hostilities and sign a peace agreement they will support a plan of reconstruction. If conflict resolution fails, reconstruction will never take off. Even in cases in which parties agree on a first negotiation but further violate the peace conditions, the state falls back into a disintegrative trajectory.

Figure 1. Threshold from state reconstruction and persistent disintegration

Following the scheme represented in Figure 1, attributing a standard value to the segment AB is not indispensable to affirming that a state persists in disintegration, since this length varies according to the total duration of each, single, conflict. The qualitative threshold defining the persistence of disintegration can be established by observing whether or not the belligerent parties pursue disintegration after a first (and consistent) attempt to mediate has been made.

Since 1989 several state building operations have tried to support the transition from war to peace. When reconciliation has been completed, like in Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the establishment of self-sustaining institutions has occurred in a brief, but variable, lapse of time. In Mozambique, the civil war ended in 1992 and the country’s first multi-party election was held in 1994. The transition to democracy occurred
within two years, and after 1994 Mozambique consolidated its institutions. In Bosnia, shortly after that Dayton Agreement was signed, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina assumed direct control of the territory. In Kosovo the transition began in 1999, after the end of the civil war, and up until 2008 the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) administrated the territory. Whilst these examples cannot be considered paradigms of complete state consolidation, they are usually considered successful examples of state reconstruction, with a series of reservations concerning their fragility, or dependence on foreign aid. What is relevant for our purposes is that, in these instances, the phase of institution-building has coincided with the end of war. In no one of these cases has there been an ongoing and pervasive military conflict, or a prolonged fragmentation of the sovereignty’s authority. State reconstruction has occurred immediately after the cessation of hostilities, even if taking several years to consolidate. Disintegration persists when a credible cessation of hostilities does not occur, and thus disputant parties are not drawn into negotiations.

Once the concept of persistent state disintegration has been clarified, how can it be measured? The analysis of the persistence implies a temporal evaluation of the indicators of state disintegration already mentioned in the first chapter. Firstly, I analysed the protraction of state implosion, to find out whether over a defined period of time, there has been a shift from the initial status of implosion towards restoration. To achieve this, I looked to the trend of three indicators: state legitimacy (Failed State Index), political authority and regime durability (Polity IV project). Secondly, a measure of the conflict trend is provided through a diachronic analysis of four variables Type, Intensity, Party Composition and Duration of Armed Conflict, derived from UCDP/PRIO Armed conflict dataset. Thirdly, I looked at the political fragmentation in order to evaluate whether a violation of territorial integrity has occurred, and for how long. Taking into consideration the indicator Fragment, provided by the Polity IV project, I counted the number of fragments and for how long they persisted. The list of indicators is summarized into the Table 1.

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17 For the list of indicators provided for state disintegration see the Figure 1, Chapter 1, pag. 22.
2. Approaches to permanent disintegration

Although the literature dealing with persistent disintegration is quite extensive and contains a wide variety of arguments and positions, many scholars share the central assumption that disintegration persists when conflict resolution fails (Demetriou 2007): when civil wars create conflict traps, the hostility becomes pervasive and intractable. According to Walter, ‘Societies that have experienced one civil war are significantly more likely to experience a second or third civil war than other societies with no prior history of violence’ (Walter 2004: 371). The conflict intractability has an immediate effect on the possibility of reverting to disintegration since ‘Large-scale conflict inevitably shapes subsequent state-building efforts and the resulting contours of reconstituted institutions’ (Demetriou 2007).

Thus, the ferocity of civil war, urgently calls for an analysis of what went wrong in conflict resolution. Despite over a decade of sustained international engagements with the issue, post-conflict reconstruction remains a significant challenge for those attempting to build strong and accountable government institutions. This is especially pertinent because no consensus has emerged on explaining why conflict persists. Within the academic polarization between internalist and externalist theorists, four factors may be identified. These are the conflict’s nature, the fallacies of conflict management, third party intervention, and the increasingly intrusive roles of regional powers.

Firstly, conflict resolution depends on a set of subjective factors: the internal causes of conflict, its social identity or legacies such as long-standing ethnic differences, the territorial ambitions of separatist groups. The second group of factors accounts for the existence of technical constraints that erode the correct employment of instruments of reconciliation and mediation. The third factor exacerbating disintegration is third party intervention, while the fourth factor is the regional interference exerted by regional pivotal states that, especially in recent decades, have played a central role in managing and
influencing conflict resolution.

The aim of this research is not to establish an ontological supremacy between internalist or internationalist hypotheses by claiming that international variables alone can explain the enduring disintegration. Given the fact that only the interaction between domestic and exogenous factors can explain the complexity of the state non-consolidation, the purpose of this research is to demonstrate that international variables and interactions have a significant and peculiar impact that ought no longer to be underestimated. The following sections will investigate each factor hampering or facilitating conflict resolution.

2.1. Political capacity

Which are the subjective factors determining whether stopping a war will be more or less attractive then prolonging it? The research literature on conflict theories has been concerned with the conditions that predispose or prevent conflict resolution. Psychologists, anthropologists, economists and politologists have extensively debated both on the determinants of unresolved conflicts and on the catalysts which prolong the duration of the original conflict (Nye 1973, Pondy 1967). In much of the contemporary literature two elements have been operative.

Firstly, social psychologists have focused on behaviour or subjective reasons influencing how the different parties understand the conflict. Morton Deutsch has theorized that conflict resolution depends on the possibility to shift the attitude of belligerents from hostility towards cooperation. The level of communication stimulates collaboration depending on, the ‘perception of shared beliefs or similarity, size of conflict, availability of threats and weapons, and power difference’ (Deutsch 1983: 438). Burton and Azar, through the theory of the deprivation of essential needs, have noted that conflicts persist if the incumbent parties do not satisfy basic demands18. The provision of essential needs is indeed indispensable to assuring a peaceful coexistence within post-conflict societies. Otherwise, the people’s unyielding drive to satisfy unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level (Azar and Burton 1986) push belligerents to continue fighting. This theory affirms that conflict resolution can be advanced only though a partitioned process oriented towards adopting different strategies, power-bargaining or problem-solving, to meet the different needs and interests at stake. Since there are some

value based interests that are non-negotiable but needs that can be treated, conflict persists when needs are transformed into interests that traditional negotiation is unable to settle.

The second set of explanations, instead, supports the notion that barriers to conflict resolution arise from rational motivations and self-interest calculations. Game theorists have defined the propensity to resolve conflict on the basis of players’ preferences and payoffs: The utility expectation is contingent to the propensity of local actors to maximize their own short-term outcomes. Thus, the possibility of finding a solution to civil conflicts depends on the utility to belligerents of preserving conflict. The game-theoretic model elaborated by K. Deutsch and V. Marma amongst others, supposes that protracted conflicts can be explained as a sort of survival game, where the successful result is achieved by continuing war (Deutsch 1988: 157). Without a party able to fight competitors, there is not certain winner, and the incumbent’s legitimacy is weak. Several scholars have explained the protracted nature of conflicts referring to a zero-sum game (Kriesberg et al 1989), where victory means that the sum of all payoffs is equals to zero, and one player’s victory corresponds to the total defeat of the opposite player.

These arguments meet one fundamental constraint: conflict is treated as the mythological snake Uroboros, which eating its own tail reproduces the sources of conflict. These hypotheses assume indirectly that conflict is merely fomented by the parties’ capacity to reproduce the same tensions. Conflict is here conceived of as a static process, in which resolution merely depends on the eradication of the factors that escalated the original hostilities. Even if conflict resolution, is naturally hampered by specific historical legacies and the tensions which escalated the original tension, conflict is never a static process. New agents, new behaviour and mechanisms can influence the trajectory of each single conflict: Resolution, thus, is hindered by difficulties matched in establishing a new social cohesion (Demetriou 2007:7), rather than in establishing the equilibrium existent before the conflict. In order to avoid tautological explanations of the relationship between conflict and persistent disintegration other factors must be investigated.

2.2 Technical capacity

The technical factors that facilitate or hinder conflict resolution concern the way in which procedural elements dealing with conflict management affect the final aim of stopping the war and rebuilding the state. According to Demetrious (2007):

Frequently, even well thought-out strategies and transition frameworks can be undermined by a lack of attention to the operational requirements and the implementation
challenges that exist in post-conflict environments. Underestimating or neglecting these can delay transitions, or even catalyse new sources of tension and conflict, both of which threaten the overall transition and state-building project. For this reason, managers of transitions require not only strategic vision but also the technical knowledge and capacities required to address the operational challenges.

Several scholars have pointed to the idea that resolution depends on the conflict’s transformative power (Azar and Burton 1986): ‘The issue of transformation means that the political constellation supporting the previous agenda will have to change’ (Väyrynen and Council 1991:5). For conflict de-escalation to happen, a transformation should be encouraged which makes the conflict less intractable (Kriesberg et all 1989). Transformation, in turn, depends on the parties’ willingness to negotiate: inducement is the key factor in transforming the parties’ attitudes to cooperate. Following the transformative approach Lederach provided a pioneristic work on indigenous methods of peacebuilding discussing the relevance of privileging peace from the grassroots (Lederach 1997). The author sustains that if the key peacbuilding is conducted from below, the major resolution is enduring. Bottom-up approaches are affected by exogenous pathogens: when actors that are not directly affected by conflict lead efforts at peacebuilding, they juxtapose their own interests inside the internal dilemma, deteriorating the possibility to resolve conflict in a short period of time.

Others have sustained that barriers to conflict resolution arise from organizational or institutional factors (Crocker and Hampson 1996, Zartman and Touval 2010). Zartman has focused on one aspect, ‘ripeness’: the ripe moment represents a particular form of deadlock that parties perceive as a mutually satisfactory moment to achieve their own goals (Zartman and Touval 2010). Since perceiving a stalemate is the key moment in the decision to continue conflicts, ripeness is also diametrically crucial in de-escalating them.

Without underestimating the role played by procedural factors in influencing the intractability of civil war, these arguments suffer from the ambiguity of attributing a genealogical power to procedural aspects. As already argued by Menkel and Meadow the techniques of dispute resolution are never neutral instruments: especially externally imposed dispute resolutions which are often designed to colonize conflicts (Menkel-Meadow 2003). When the form of conflict management is perceived as an external imposition, procedural elements can also constitute an obstacle to the foundation of a constructive approach (ibidem). Conflict management is crucial in resolving conflict, but it cannot be conceptualised as separate from the political process of reconciling belligerents.
2.3 Third Party intervention

The firm political stand and the technical ability to manage conflicts are not the only factors playing a critical role in prolonging disintegration. The international context has also decisively shaped the course of conflicts. Third party interventions are typical responses to persistent social conflicts (Chang and Luo 2011), and third parties are central to the civil war process, especially when conflicts show no signs of ending. The international community has played critical roles in many different post-conflict countries, with varying degrees of success. (Demetriou 2007:15). Within the IR debate, several scholars have investigated whether the presence of a third party enhances the prospect for conflict resolution (Stevens 1963, Walton 1969). There are two schools of thought on this. Some authors support the notion that third party actors are pivotal in promoting dialogue and accommodation (Crocker and Hampson 1996, Licklider 2001), or even in stopping wars (Diehl 1985). Others instead suggest that third party intervention has limited capabilities (Carment and Harvey 2001, Carment and James 1995), is inefficient (Regan 2002) and protracts conflict (Walter 2002, Kriesberg 1992, Pearson 1974, Gurr and Duvall 1973, Mitchell 1970).

Advocacies of the positive impact have argued that third party involvement can promote a conflict’s resolution in two ways: stimulating cooperation or facilitating a winner. Carment and James (1998: 591) have noted that cooperation is facilitated by an initial and intensive intervention, but it is also dependent on the rebel group’s salience for conflict. The third party strictly acts as peacemaker to reduce the level of conflict, regardless of the stakes involved in a specific conflict (Siqueira 2003). While many have suggested that external forces are useful to guarantee peace enforcement if they act as neutral forces, others instead have argued that interventions can efficiently end a conflict if ‘the intervener takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win’ (Bett 1994: 21). Regan also sustained that only non-neutral interventions shorten the internal conflict: third parties in fact tend to intervene on behalf of a relatively strong faction when winning probability is directly related to combative efforts or when two parties share similar abilities (Amegashie and Kutsoati 2005). A neutral intervention instead creates a stalemate (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Regan 2000) that leads to belligerents prolonging conflict.

The supporters of the negative impact have pointed to the idea that international intervention can increase the intensity and duration of civil war hampering the ability of both parties to achieve military victory and to negotiate (Regan 2002, Walter 2000,
Kriesberg 1973, Pearson 1974, Gurr and Duvall 1973, Mitchell 1970). Pearson (1974) has proposed one of the most interesting analyses that investigated the relationship between peace and foreign intervention during a defined lapse of time and found that, between 1948 and 1964 conflicts reached their peak in three months following the external intervention. However, little consensus has been reached in identifying the causes of the dissolutive impact: many scholars have pointed that the introduction of new interests into a civil war (Mitchell 1970) has often complicated the pursuit of resolutive agendas, making negotiation less likely (Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999). Others have emphasized that when a third party commits financial or logistic support to one of the two rival factions, the introduction of an exogenous political agenda prolongs the war (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Regan 2002). Modelski has introduced a systemic explanation arguing that internal conflicts are part and parcel of the international system (Modelski 1964): when a third party intervenes supporting one party, it increases the disparity in the balance of power between adversaries, but it also reinforces or weakens the stability of the international system.

In sum, international theorists have devoted a great deal of attention to issues of intervention and conflict intractability, but this debate raises some difficulties dealing with the lack of ‘empirical comparability and theoretical explicitness’ necessary for developing a scientific concept of international intervention (Rosenau 1969). The epistemological status of the internationalist research is thus still precarious: many studies have recognised the significance of international intervention as an explanatory variable for protracted conflicts. Scholars have articulated various explanations that are both compelling and comprehensive about the possible inadequateness or failure of interventionist practices (Jenkins and Plowden 2006, Chandler 2006). However, too many works have been satisfied with a descriptive orientation, and only a handful of scholars have elaborated specific causal mechanisms accounting for the possible impact of intervention on state consolidation. Many contributions have limited their analytical endeavour to deducing ‘lessons learned’ with the aim of establishing guiding principles assisting further foreign interventions (Dobbins et al. 2003, Pei 2003, Orr 2004, Diamond 2005, Dobbins Crane and Jones 2005). But few efforts have been made to harmonize theoretical development with empirical work, as demonstrated by the ontological separation in which globalist or regionalist discourse has been confined in recent decades.

Theoretical reflection on the relation between sovereignty and intervention in fact, has been anchored to a globalist perspective, misconceiving the extent to which regional
relations actually impact on the relationship between conflict resolution and state consolidation.

2.4 Regional hierarchies of power

As separated from the globalist discourse, during the last decades, many observers have devoted great attention towards the international relations moving across the regional space. The ‘New regionalism’ has emerged as theoretical answer to the changing relationship between global and local, and many scholars began to involve civil society, non-state actors and emerging markets in the analysis of contemporary world politics. The discussion on conflict resolution and state re-integration has also been influenced by this new development. New regionalism recognizes that regionalism has a significant impact on conflicts and peace making (Grant and Södebaum 2003, Shaw 2011): whereas state disintegration has been traditionally conceived as a hindrance to any form of regional process, many scholars have considered regionalism as a viable solution to contemporary instability and a viable theoretical answer to the inadequacies of the globalist discourse. A wide consensus on this matter has inspired regional approaches in fomenting local, regional, and international security. Recent studies have explored to what extent the formation of regional organizations positively affect the management of regional orders and convulsions, these explanations can be divided into two groups according to whether both foreign policy’s strategies and structure of power affect state consolidation.

The first group includes a growing body of research that evaluates how the structural dimension of power, within the regional context, affects conflict resolution and state reintegration. Several scholars have evaluated the hegemonic, imperial or dominant postures (Destradi 2008) that regional powers adopt in order to exert influence. From the function of primus inter pares, to the formation of middle powers, pivotal states and regional hegemons, regional states can act as managers and guarantors of the regional order. This intrusiveness may have a significant impact upon the internal stability of the weaker actors of the regional system. Lemke, for example, has argued that the contemporary international system is composed by a series of sub-systems, in which dominant states try to direct regional politics. The sub-system is not without great power’s interference: ‘when the dominant power (…) feels strongly about the issue at stake in a dispute within a local hierarchy, interference might be expected’ (Lemke 2002: 51). Deyermos (2009) has applied the concept of matrioskha to portray the multi-levelled hegemony existing in the post-soviet Central Asia, where there coexists a global (US), an
emergent global (China), a regional (Russian Federation) and sub-regional (Uzbekistan) hegemon.

The second group instead emphasizes that the strategies of foreign policies played by pivotal states in regional crises. For example, Prys has investigated the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of South Africa in Zimbabwe which sheds light on the ‘ambivalence and ambiguity we often find in case studies of regional powers or regional hegemons and their foreign policy within their respective region’ (Prys 2008: 26).

Lemarchand has presented one of the most comprehensive analyses of the argument that regional structures of power affect conflict resolution, applying the concept of regional hegemony to the Libyan foreign policy in Africa. In the book *The Green and the Black. Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa* (1989) the author explores Libya’s role in the Maghreb, Chad and Sub-Saharan Africa to explain the quest for regional hegemony, defined here as a dynamic relationship with a ‘varying degree of control and form of influence, from which force is not to be excluded’ (Lemarchand 1988).

Dehez and Ruth Iyob have investigated the Ethiopian hegemonic posture in the Horn of Africa in order to explain its involvement with both the Somali and Eritrean national question (Dehez 2008). Ruth Iyob (1993, 1997, 2000), in particular has adopted the concept of regional hegemony to explain the relationships of dominance and resistance, and of consolidation and disintegration, existing between hegemonic and diasporic states.

The regionalist perspective has thus provided a strong empirical contribution to the field of conflict resolution. But the lack of theoretical explicitness, necessary for integrating the analysis of the regional structure of power with the global one, undermines its analytical potentialities. Many scholars have investigated the influence of regional structures of power on state consolidation without considering, that states are usually born and die within spaces which interact with each other without much respect for the analytical boundaries postulated between regional and global politics. Given that the contemporary challenges to state sovereignty are generated within a consistent geopolitical fluidity, any form of international intervention needs to be interpreted within this fluidity. The approaches to conflict resolution as intervening variable to explain the persistent disintegration are illustrated in the following Table 2.
Table. 2 Approaches to conflict resolution as intervening variable of persistent disintegration

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<th>Approach</th>
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<td>Internal</td>
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3. International Intervention

Attempts to answer the question of persistent disintegration have helpfully identified the proximate intervening variable, conflict’s irresolution, causing states to prolong the statehood limbo in which they are embedded. Scholars have proposed a wide array of hypotheses to explain conflicts intractability: although international variables have been constantly overlooked by the mainstream ‘failed state debate’, they actually stand out as crucial points in the analysis of statehood evolution. However, IR theorists have not yet integrated their hypotheses into a coherent theoretical framework, and the IR alternative arguments have proved to be very weak. This research identifies both the global and regional component of ‘International Intervention’ as the dimension best capturing the way in which conflict has affected state integrity. The theoretical purposes of this research are to re-assign relevance to the international dimension of the statehood crisis, bringing the international system back into the study of the state by mapping and specifying how International intervention affects the fate of disintegration.

Our theoretical framework starts from the assumption that the International Community is constantly invoked to stop conflict and contain disintegrative pressures: foreign powers typically intervene with the intention of changing the trajectory of civil war or sponsoring a regime change, but different outcomes are produced. Often, external interventions have promoted conflict resolution and the establishment of new forms of political authority. Third parties are useful to get on top of constraints and hostilities, and they can make positive and direct contributions ‘by certifying the benefits of an agreement (guaranteeing), or providing insurance against the risks of the failure of an agreement (leverage)’ (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 849). But too frequently intervention has negatively changed the direction of conflict, triggering hostilities, amplifying the internal tensions, or altering the internal balance of power in a way that protracts conflict rather than resolving it.

Violent ethnopolitical conflicts, separatist movements, rivalry for autonomy or political power, territorial control, economic dislocation, among others, assail the integrity of the developing state, thereby impelling hegemonic actors (major states, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and International Financial Institutions - IFIs) to intervene in order to: (I) uphold state integrity/sovereignty; (II) promote/enforce human rights practices; or (III) forestall/contain the negative and dysfunctional aspects of the globalization processes in developing countries.
International Intervention constitutes the core *problematique* of state disintegration, because the integrity of the state does not merely depend on internal equilibria defined by the effectiveness of domestic governance. The relationship between independent and sovereign states, specifically one country’s intrusion into the domestic affairs of another, actually shapes the integrity of the state through its impact on the military and diplomatic dimension of each conflict. The political expansion of the nation-state is the criteria making the contemporary state system subject to destabilizing pressures. As is clearly pointed out by Arrighi: ‘The impact of Nationalism on pre-existent territorial political entities had in some cases been to increase their cohesion, in others to lead to their disintegration’ (Arrighi 1983: 36).

Before exploring the foundations of this relationship, a clarification on the meaning of International Intervention must be advanced. Intervention generally refers to one state’s intrusion into the domestic affairs of another state (de Mesquita 2006). While economic intervention is a category that captures all non-military forms of assistance (including finance, food, and humanitarian aids), military intervention concerns the direct or indirect employment of foreign military forces inside a foreign civil war. Direct military intervention involves the foreign power’s own military units entering into a civil war in support of one side (Lockyer 2008). While indirect military intervention concerns the supply of military resources (funds, weapons, ammunitions, equipment, intelligence reports and military advisors or personnel) in support of the recipient’s own forces (ibidem). This dissertation employs the term ‘International Intervention’ in reference to ‘International military intervention’.

A controversial mutual dependency exists between the concept of intervention and sovereignty. The right of interference has been historically constrained by the ‘sovereignty clause’ established by the UN Charter (Chapter I, Article 2, paragraph 7), which prohibits interventions in matters that are essentially cordoned off by the domestic jurisdiction of any state (UN). Intervention, in turn, redefines sovereignty (Bothe O’Connell and Ronzitti 2005), as it establishes exceptions to the rule granting the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The practice of intervention is, paradoxically, both a violation of the sovereignty’s rule, and one of the sites where sovereignty is constantly reproduced.

A double regime of responsibility fortifies the *mutual dependence* between intervention and sovereignty: the responsibility to protect human rights, and that of rehabilitating failed states. The doctrine of modern intervention is based on a new form of global justice (Brock 2009), which establishes the priority of defending human rights
above the territorial rights of nation-states. Therefore, the responsibility to protect human rights has provoked the International System to attack and redeem failed states, which are conceived of as the ultimate source of human violations. This responsibility has supplied the International Community with a legitimating force to disregard the rules of state integrity, exposing a fault within the UN system (Soderlund 2008). The ‘democratic military intervention’ (Carati 2010) has become the best practice to reverse disintegration and eliminate state dysfunctions, where the success rate of intervention is judged not only on the ability to end conflict, rather on the capacity of establishing conditions in which democratic political reforms can proceed (Lounsbery and Pearson 2011). Scholars and policymakers have backed many of their assumptions on the belief that military intervention might improve conditions for democracy over time. As a consequence, post-Cold war interventions moved towards a binary and controversial direction, as they authorize force to ‘protect civilians’ and democratize non–democratic regimes. In some circumstances, conflict has been settled and the crisis resolved. However in many others, interventions have left the state far weaker and conflict-ridden than prior to the arrival of intervening forces (Huria 2009).

Even if the academic debate has drawn into question the relationship between international intervention and state consolidation, this relation has scarcely been scrutinized in a systemic way. This is a curious omission. Intervention is justified on the promise of its Leviathan function even if historical records had show that foreign interventions have not consistently consolidated fragile states19. In sum, conflict resolution has been identified as the intervening variable between international intervention and state disintegration, where foreign actors add to the recipient’s pre existing capabilities and thereby trigger changes in the balance of capabilities, promoting either state reintegration into a legitimate form of government, or the persistence of the dissolutive condition. For clarity, the causal argument is summarized in Figure 2.

19 Minxin Pei (2003: 52) has calculated that during the late nineteenth century only the 26% of American led reconstruction efforts have been successful. See Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006.
This mechanism, however, does not explain how intervention challenges conflict resolution. When and in what manner is intervention more prone to promote the resolution of disintegration or its persistence? What explains the variation in the impact of different types of foreign intervention on state rehabilitation?

A proper analysis of intervention requires a ‘theoretical integration and empirical disaggregation’ as a way of exposing casual mechanisms that are usually obscured. Firstly, this research needs to map the mechanism leading different forms or levels of international intervention to protract disintegration (empirical disaggregation). Secondly, some attempt at finding a middle ground between geopolitical levels must be advanced, moving beyond the dichotomy between global and regional intervention (theoretical integration). The following paragraphs will illustrate the mechanisms upon which foreign intervention impacts upon the belligerents’ capabilities to solve the civil war.

4. When does international intervention prolong disintegration?

Foreign intervention can considerably change the direction of the relationship between conflict and state consolidation but no clear criteria exists to define how civil war and types of intervention can combine to affect state disintegration. Similar types of intervention have had different impacts on the overall capabilities of recipients to settle conflict and rebuild states. At different times, different forms of intervention have produced similar outcomes. What explains this variation in the impact of foreign intervention on conflict resolution and state consolidation? Under which conditions does foreign intervention affect the course of state disintegration?

A number of questions have been raised about the conditions under which third party intervention is most likely to be successful. Third parties intervene in external conflict for various reasons (opportunistic vs. constructive reasons) with desperate aims (termination agreement, providing an agenda and/or manipulating the timing of the
negotiation process), operational strategies (peace supporter operations) and methods (bilateral negotiation, arbitration, mediation). Given this disparity, intervention produces varying outcomes in the scale of conflict resolution and state building.

We can distinguish three levels of analysis: firstly, there are structural factors related to the manner in which the global and regional distribution of power influences interventionist practice. Secondly, there are typologies of interventions, which are grouped here according to the forms and aims of intervention. Thirdly, there are conditions for success, which refer to a set of attributes (credibility, Economic sustainability, homogeneity, legitimacy, resoluteness) that define the manner in which intervention is pursued. This ensemble of factors is summarized in the following Table 3.

Table 3. Factors propelling disintegration or reintegration

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<th>Factors</th>
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<td>Global intervention</td>
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4.1 Structural factors

The internationalist approaches to state disintegration have remained largely unconnected, especially in reference to geopolitical levels of analysis: global and regional spaces have often been considered competitive variables for analysing the state and its transformations. This dissertation supports the notion that these separate routes to explaining persistent disintegration must be reconciled. With a unified conceptualization we could proceed with a synthesis of the regional and global model of enduring disintegration. The regional route is extracted from Ruth Iyob’s work on regional hegemony in the Horn of Africa (1993, 1997, 2000), while the global component is extracted from Modelski’s theory of the internationalization of internal war (1964).

4.1.1 Global distribution of power

Modelski has developed one of the most influential theories of foreign policy, arguing that the internationalization of internal war endangers the stability of internal
political systems and that interventionist practices generally ‘strike at the very roots of the
development of states’ (Modelski 1964: 39). However, two questions must be answered.

*Why does Intervention impinge upon conflict resolution?* Given that a stalemate is
the most important condition for resolving disputes and that the combatants’ enduring
incentives to fight and pursue victory directly increases the duration of conflict. If
combatants are in a fairly equal position, they will be more likely to negotiate: the more
unequally matched combatants are on the battlefield, the less likely they are to pursue
negotiations. The presence of foreign forces can actively change, in one direction, or
another, the belligerents’ perceptions of where the power lies. Third-party intervention
could be a strategic way to overcome limits connected to the traditional approach of
internal resolution (Mitchell 1981), encouraging belligerents to accept the negotiation. Or,
in the opposite case, intervention can alter the internal balance of power, since the foreign
presence clearly advantages one party at the expense of another.

*In what manner do intervening forces actually hamper conflict resolution?*
According to Modelski, the mechanism leading third parties to intervene in a foreign civil
war can be defined using three stages: the indigenous call for foreign aid (I), the
indigenous countermeasures (II), and international intervention (III). At the beginning,
one of the contending parties calls for foreign aid (I): here, international forces can
actively influence the structure of the internal war since ‘The presence of an international
component in one of the internal war structures sets up pressure for ‘internationalizing’ the
other three structures’ (Modelski 1964: 18).

If the insurgents demand help the incumbent will take some international
countermeasures (II), and the internal war is soon transformed into a struggle between two
political systems. The search for external aid leads parties to exacerbate the internal
rivalry.

The response of the third party (III) to the indigenous call for foreign assistance
depends on the decision of the third party to help the weaker or the stronger of the
protagonists, or to remain neutral. Three instruments of foreign policy can be employed:
subversion, foreign aid, or mediation. The decision is strictly influenced by the third’s

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20 Both contending parties, in fact, establish international relations: the incumbent holds
legitimate forms of cooperation and alliances with external actors, while the insurgent establishes
foreign relation in form of solidarity or group of interests (ibidem).

21 Four types of structure must been considered: authority, political solidarity, culture and
communications, resources (Modelski 1964).

22 The ‘second state’ in Modelski’s words.
party own self-interest and by the danger of rebellion, calculated on the basis of the insurgent’s ability to challenge three conditions: the formula of the international system, the structure of authority and the ‘ruling class’ of the international system (Modelski 1964: 33). The general law designed by Modelski’s theory affirms that a third party will choose the strategy of external intervention (diffusion, isolation or reconciliation) on the basis of the relevance that the outcome of war holds for the international system: thus ‘The international system favours those parties to internal war which accord with the current formula and which reinforce the current structure of authority; and it discourages their opponents’ (Modelski 1964: 35).

The response of the third party thus follows one of three general strategies: diffusion and encouragement of the insurgents (I), isolation and suppression of the insurgents (II), reconciliation (III). Diffusion (I) occurs when the third party encourages insurgents and demoralizes incumbents. Modelski has pointed out that during the 1970’s, the most striking examples of diffusion were the colonial wars. Indeed, in the contemporary world order the most controversial justification of the use of force on behalf of insurgents occurs when humanitarian violations are invoked. The US intervention in northern Iraq during the Kurdish Crisis in 1991 was formally legitimated by the responsibility to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq, who were sustaining and organizing Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein. Two striking examples of diffusion have occurred in 2011: the war in Libya, where NATO has encouraged the diffusion of internal conflict in favour of the insurgents, ending with Gaddafi’s capture and assassination; and UN-French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire, culminating with the capture of the country’s incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo.

Isolation (II) occurs when foreign actors want to weaken the insurgents: they reinforce the incumbents because the insurgents’ claims seriously challenge the international system. Modelski illustrates this with reference to the intervention of the European powers during the Boxer rebellion in China in 1899, when a nationalist movement revolted against foreign imperialism and missionary evangelism. In response, there was an international deployment of forces (the Eight-Nation Alliance) culminating in the siege of Beijing for more than one year, and the war finally ended with the rebel’s defeat. Two examples of isolation have occurred within the last decades: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, oriented to support the incumbent government against the mujahedeen guerrilla, and the US assistance to Turkey to demobilize the PKK and enable Öcalan’s capture in Kenya (Kirisci 2004).
Reconciliation (III) occurs when ‘the outcome of the war itself is less important than the very fact of the occurrence of violence’ (Modelski 1964: 34). This form is often invoked by international organizations trying to mediate in conflicts that are not particularly hostile to the stability of the International System. Modelski refers to the attempt to settle the Laotian question, when in 1962 an agreement was signed establishing the country’s neutrality between Vietnam and Cambodia. More recently the practice of reconciliation constitutes the formula in which humanitarian operations have been formalized: the UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), Angola (UNAVEM, MONUA) and Cambodia (UNTAC) represent some of the most important operations which combined reconciliation and peace enforcement with humanitarian aims.

This extensive survey of Modelski was undertaken for one reason: when we ask why intervention provokes disintegration, the structural level of analysis that comprises the distribution of power within the global context must be taken into account. However, this distribution is not sufficient to explain the varying impacts of foreign intervention on state consolidation. The regional distribution of power must be integrated within this theoretical framework.

4.1.2 Regional distribution of power

To examine the regional route to the persistent disintegration in the Horn of Africa, it is best to focus on the work of Ruth Iyob, 'Regional Hegemony: domination and resistance in the Horn of Africa' (1993) and The Ethiopian–Eritrean conflict: diasporic vs. hegemonic states in the Horn of Africa, 1991–2000 (2000). The author supports the notion that studying the transformations of sovereignty occurring in the Horn of Africa during the post-colonial era, requires a deep scrutiny of the relations of domination and resistance lying at the core of the regional hegemony. Drawing on Lemarchand’s contribution (1988), Ruth Iyob has postulated that regional hegemony (RH) is a system of dominance constructed upon a normative basis that legitimizes exploitation and subordination, as it is oriented to curb the sovereignty’s claims on diasporic populations.

In the Horn, the dichotomy between hegemonic (Ethiopia) and diasporic states (Eritrea, Somalia) or populations (Ogadeni, Oromo) is both products and producers of the prevailing relationships of power. Hegemonic and diasporic states tend towards two asymmetrical visions of their own national project in their economic, political and social spheres. The hegemonic state tends to incorporate multi-ethnical populations within its own boundaries, while the diasporic state results from the dispersion of its own population:
this asymmetry leads states to externalize a regional clash of interests. In order to fully understand this theory of regional hegemony, its systemic, hegemonic and regional components must be addressed.

Firstly, the regional hegemony in Africa is not merely a form of domination, but rather a system of domination. The systematic character is evident within the structure of power established during the post-colonial era: Ruth Iyob conceptualizes the regional hegemony ‘as a logical outgrowth of the consolidation and codification of regional and international norms and values’ (Ruth Iyob 1997: 29). The post-colonial order, born during the age of African independence, had introduced important insights into the rules of regional cohabitation, for example it illustrated that the principle of self-determination was anchored to the concept of self-determination, from European colonial rule.

Once the African continent gained independence national liberation movements were supposed to disappear, definitively. To protect the recently established national conquests, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) stated that: ‘any attempt made at the partial or whole disintegration of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ (OAU). Territorial inviolability was designated as the supreme law governing contemporary African IRs: the OAU established that African people would reject the use of violence, the unity of the territorial space and the firms condemnation of form of revisionism:

Invasions, purchase of territories, and gunboat diplomacy had once been fully legitimate norms of conduct, justified by the need to “expand empires” and “civilize” the native during the colonial era. The demise of colonialism was marked not only by the exodu of the foreign colonial administrative, but also by a growing body of norms and regulations that emphasized the new anti-colonial consensus (Ruth Iyob 1997:30).

Secondly, this system of domination holds a hegemonic character, because power is exerted using the norms and values that have a constitutive function in defining the consensus within the contemporary African state system. Ruth Iyob utilizes the concept of hegemony to differentiate between two forms and practices of imperialism: colonialism (direct rule), and post-colonialism (indirect rule). When colonialism was banned by the morality of international cohabitation, the use of force and its legitimation necessitated new forms of domination. The most important characteristic of hegemony is the possibility to exercise expansion within consensus: ‘all hegemonic relations are based on domination and the creation of consensus (…) The legitimation of domination and delegitimation of any opposition to the terms of order envisioned by the hegemon is a crucial component of its power base’ (Ruth Iyob 1993: x).
Ruth Iyob also explains how the hegemonic face of the Ethiopian expansionism has been legitimated by astute moves inside the international concerto. Ethiopia enjoyed an exceptional status into the history of colonial Africa as the only heroic country able of resisting and defeating colonialism. This historical legacy has increased the Ethiopian prestige and fostered the interpretation of Pan-Ethiopianism as a regional expression of Pan-Africanism. All these principles contributed to strength the Ethiopia’s ‘regime of truth’, an ‘organization of knowledge in justification of a given distribution of power’ (Ruth Iyob 1997: 27).

But consensus is not exclusive. The hegemonic expansion has also been perpetuated though military means: ‘opposition to hegemonic domination which threatens the status quo is militarily contained and/or diplomatically isolated from regional and international institutions (…)’ (Ruth Iyob 1993: 260). Key alliances have led Ethiopia to a rapid modernization of the military sector, and a general improvement into the acquisition of military instruments and techniques. The resistance of the Somali people inhabiting the Ogaden, the Eritrean guerrillas and the Oromo rebellion in Oromia, have been constantly repressed by the military superiority of the Ethiopian army. In order to explain this duality, Ruth Iyob defines the methods of hegemonic power, using an important dichotomy already developed by Lemarchand: the diplomatic antagonism and the politics of destabilization. Within the first dimension there prevails a major reliance on diplomacy, and regional hegemonic claims are understood as an extension of domestic policies. This phase is characterized by the activity of national diplomacy and global or regional organizations. In the second dimension the use of force prevails. In this instance the hegemonic claims assume a specific regional basis and the hegemon makes a sustained effort to destabilize its neighbours through proxies and violating international obligations.

Thirdly, this system of hegemonic dominance is regionally based. The formation of regional hierarchies of hegemonic power has been encouraged by the principle that self-determination must be subordinate to the rules of territorial integrity. The UN’s identification of subjects entitled to self-determination was comprised of only the ‘existing states’, while the rebel groups contesting statehood, without being part of a pre-existent jurisdiction, were pushed towards the sphere of illegitimate claims (separatist or irredentist people). This rationality has facilitated the formation and consolidation of regional pivotal states that, with the aim of protecting their national interests (territorial integrity), have begun to exert influence in neighbouring countries accused of threatening their own stability. In the Horn, ‘territorial integrity (…) was used by Ethiopia to nullify the guaranteed rights
of all peoples to the right of self-determination without incurring expulsion as provided in chapter II, article 6 of the Charter’ (Ruth Iyob 1997:33). Post-colonial order has perpetuated ‘the pre-existing stratifications which enables stronger powers to maintain their privileged positions’ (Ruth Iyob 1997:31).

In conclusion, according to the regional route to persistent state disintegration, regional fights between hegemonic and diasporic states have a destabilizing effect on the entire region. However, it is important to note that persistent disintegration does not result from regional conflict alone, but rather from the diasporic and hegemonic virulence that can engulf and undermine the integrity of entire region.

4.2 Types of interventions

Why do similar structures of intervention tend to have varying impacts on state re-integration? And why may different structures of intervention have the same impact? While most of the literature on conflict studies has proposed complex typologies of intervention, this paragraph presents a simple typology that takes into account two main factors: the aim of the intervention, and the extent to which interventional action is taken collectively.

4.2.1 Risolutive or dissolutive aims of the intervener

Successful intervention depends on the reasons motivating a third party to intervene (Fisher 2001). Ideally, foreign military intervention should only be pursued with the aim of restoring peace. Concretely, an international intervention can be oriented either to constrain or foment the existent crisis. This choice depends on the equilibrium between opportunistic (informal) and constructive (formal) motives.

Constructive motives are internal to the conflict’s political agenda and concern the desire to settle the civil war. Third parties also frequently enter into external conflicts, for opportunistic reasons, internal to the intervener’s political agenda. Military intervention can be ordered in direct relation to national interests, or domestic political imperatives, as the military commander receives specific directions from political authorities. Both global and regional actors may enter into conflict simply to advance their own unilateral interests, with no intention of compromise or joint problem-solving (Fisher 2001: 7). The balance between constructive and opportunistic motives determines whether intervention holds a resolutive or dissolutive aim.

Interventions clearly oriented to defeat the insurgents have significant consequences,
as demonstrated by the permanent Israeli intervention in Lebanon and Palestinian territories, which is oriented towards dismantling forces or hostile regimes. In 1982, Israeli troops invaded Lebanon with the aim of driving the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) out of southern Lebanon and creating a cordon-sanitaire forty kilometres from the Israeli border. The consequences of the Israeli intervention were dramatic in terms of destabilization: the Israeli Army carried out massive killings in the Palestinian camps in south Lebanon (al-Rushaidiya, ‘Ayn al-Hilu, al-Miya Miya), and it was under the Israeli control of Beirut that Phalangist militia massacred Palestinians in Sabra ans Shatila. The invasion provoked the polarization of the Lebanese opposition, the emergence of Hezbollah as main military resistance army, and the protraction of the civil war until 1989, when parties signed the Taif Accord.

Interventions oriented towards a genuine resolution of internal crises have been resolutive in the cases of East Timor, or Mozambique, but there are few exemplary cases of successful intervention. The relationship between aims and outcomes of intervention, however, has never been linear. Intervention has had a negative impact even when it was oriented to dispel conflicts. One of the most exemplary cases is that of the recent foreign intervention in Afghanistan: while the initial aim of the coalition was that of containing the crisis, intervention actually fomented the state disintegration. American troops have been unable to stop the efficiency and growing position of the Taliban guerrillas. Sustained by the spiralling civilian casualties, the Taliban have stigmatized foreign presence in the country, increased their legitimacy among the local population, and reorganized the guerrilla fighters in the entire region.

4.2.2 Multilateral or Unilateral action

The effect of intervention on the probability of prolonging state disintegration also depends on whether the interposition is organized and deployed as a form of collective (multilateral intervention) or individual security action (unilateral intervention). Unilateral intervention refers to ‘organized and systematic activities directed across recognized boundaries and aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the target’ (Young 1974: 111). Multilateral intervention refers to ‘a concrete action, be it political or military, undertaken by a coalition of states supported by a regional and/or international organization. Its purpose is principally to affect the direction, duration and outcome of an internal conflict, whether the target state consents to the intervention or not’ (Bercovitch and Derouen 2011).
In this case the relation between outcomes and types of security action is also not linear: supporters of unilateralism, invoking the stabilizing impact of interventions that occurred during the Cold war period, sustain that unilateral operations, are more efficient then multilaterals. Advocates of multilateralism indeed consider the forms of collective security as the instruments best promoting peace, given the greater opportunities for ‘trade-off, sequencing and packing’ (Seybolt 2007).

Overall the empirical analysis does not support a coherent association between these theoretical expectations. Beyond the optimistic previsions embedded within the multilateral option, numerous empirical findings ‘only slightly support assumptions about the superiority of multilateral interventions in promoting post-intervention peace, reform, and stability’ (Lounsbery and Pearson 2011). In a similar vein, unilateralism has not reached better results during its ‘golden age’: recent researches have shown that military interventions since 1945 made democracy less likely, increased the risk of coup d’état, and produced deleterious effects on economic development.

There is no consensus among researchers because the effectiveness of interventions has often been subordinated to the legitimacy of the form of intervention. Multilateralism holds a major reputation because it is undertaken by a coalition of states and it is supported by international organizations. Unilateralism, indeed is entangled with a legitimacy ambiguity, since only the inviting state can legally justify external interference. Beyond this polarization, the review of this debate reveals that the probability that multilateral or unilateral interventions might promote or hamper conflict resolution depends on other factors.

4.3 The conditions for success (or failure)

Under which conditions does external intervention - in its regional or global form, multilateral or unilateral typology, integrative or disintegrative aim - hamper conflict resolution or state re-integration? Why do similar types of intervention tend to have varying impacts on the cumulative capabilities of recipients to reintegrate sustainable authority?

A large set of attributes, pertaining to the manner in which intervention is performed, influences its development. These attributes can be defined as contextual factors, or ‘conditions for success’, whereby ‘successful intervention’ means both lasting peace and developing new structures of self-government. I have identified five factors that should be considered in order to assess the likelihood of successful intervention: intervener’s
credibility, economic sustainability, homogeneity, legitimacy and resoluteness.

These factors have a transformative impact on the way intervention succeeds in pursuing its mandate, but the significance of this impact depends on precise circumstances that are not generalizable.

4.3.1 Economic sustainability

The past literature has largely scrutinized the costs and level of resources which affect the likelihood of a successful intervention, and various competing explanations have been postulated. Firstly, a quantitative problem emerges: many researchers have argued that costs of managing military operations are too high while the benefits appear to be almost non-existent or marginal. In particular, the aid flow creates dependency, facilitates the access to weapons and protracts conflict (Ilorah 2011). According to others, instead, the external aid protracts conflict only when the amount of resources employed is not adequate (Amegashie 2007); when intervention does not provide direct economic gains to the intervener, it holds a negative impact on resolution. On the contrary, when interveners care sufficiently about the net resources that will be reaped after the conflict, intervention is more resolute (ibidem).

Secondly, there is also a qualitative dilemma; the maintenance of a sizable multilateral military force can turn out to be a significant economic burden, generating both direct and indirect costs. ‘In cases of protracted intervention, the costs of hardware, spare parts, and ammunition can, according to Neuman, become a decisive factor in determining the intervener’s capacity to maintain the level of military activity required for success’ (Mortlock 2006: 93). Thus there is the problem whether the cost of intervention should be ‘input-based’ or output-based’ (ibidem). The third party adopts an ‘input-based’ approach when it specifies the general level of resources it will devote to the conflict, while an ‘outcome-based’ approach prevails when the amount of resources dedicated to conflict are declared in order to achieve specific goals. This second option implies that third parties must have a credible strategic capability for their intervention. These strategies have a different impact on intervention. This debate has been particularly significant to evaluate the U.S. commitment in Iraq. Miller has posed an interesting question:

how the U.S.’s commitment in Iraq should be cast? Should the commitment be outcome-based, specifying goals that must be reached before we withdraw, or should it be input-based, specifying the resources to be devoted to the effort and/or the amount of time we are willing to spend, without setting out particular goals? (Miller 2008:1).
Questioning the US’s involvement in Iraq, Miller has argued that outcome-based approaches fail to give the Iraqi government strong incentives to provide for their own security, since the outcome-based strategies have weakened the government and made the insurgents more aggressive.

4.3.2 Homogeneity: Unitary or Competitive orientation

Another important factor that affects the successful realization of international intervention concerns the degree of homogeneity existing between strategies and aims of the interveners. Foreign parties adopt collaborative or competitive attitudes on the basis of the homogeneity existing between interveners among goals and operational strategies. When intervention is homogenous third parties conduct intervention working together, and together establishing aims and operative plans: in this instance, foreign parties display a unitary form of interposition, which allow them to pursue common purposes. When intervention is affected by disparity in its aims or strategies, third parties strive to gain or win something by defeating or establishing superiority over others who intervene in the same country. Here competition prevails over the original interests of stopping the internal conflict.

The relation between homogeneity and the outcome of intervention seems to be more linear than that established by the previous factors. Many empirical cases have supported the theoretical expectation that when intervention is homogeneous it achieves positive results, while competitive intervention tends to prolong conflict. Multilateral intervention, for example, represents a crucial case of competitive action. Since multilateral actors are guided in their decisions by their respective national interests, if these aims are antagonistic, interveners will bring these rivalries into the internal conflict. Also the strategy of intervention can be subject to competitive tensions. A bargaining style, aimed to restrict contacts amongst parties can collide with a therapeutic style, aimed to stimulate the reciprocal understanding, or to equalize power relations between disputants (Bercovitch and Jackson 2001). Conflict may become dangerous and complex when multiple actors with multiple goals and plans are involved: when interveners do not agree on which issues and priorities must be addressed, multilateral complexity may hinder intervention. The lack of homogeneous purposes produces an important and deleterious effect: the incongruence between long term and short-term strategies.
Several cases of multilateral intervention with a competitive attitude have produced deleterious consequences. In Bosnia there was a multiplication of competing objectives, and the overlap of divergent priorities increased tensions within the peace process: international agencies intervened with the official aim of curtailing ethnic cleansing but they actually ‘accepted ethnicity as the primary organising principle of political life’ (Belloni 2007).

However, multilateral interventions cannot be generally associated with competitive orientations: during the Persian Gulf War, the multinational force adopted a unitary attitude. According to Calkins:

In the Persian Gulf War, the will of the international community was united around a very strong military force, the bulk of which were US forces. This powerful combination of will and power easily overwhelmed the Iraqi military forces; in truth, Iraq’s army would have had great difficulty in overpowering the UN forces (Calkins 2000).

On the other side, unilateral intervention assumes a competitive attitude when external actors unilaterally enter into a conflict pursuing different aims, though antagonistic strategies. This is the case for the mutual interventions that have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, during the post-colonial era (Clapham 1998).

4.3.3 Third party credibility

The credibility of the interveners is a key aspect to understand how third party intervention affects the probability of resolving conflicts and crises. The credibility of a global third-party in conflict resolution is determined by the degree of acceptance among combatants and civilians23.

The interveners degree of creditability can hinders intervention in different ways: if the third party is too intimately involved in the game, it will be seen as an ‘agent of agitation’ rather than a ‘supporter of stability’ (Thyne 2010). On the contrary, the more the third party is reliable as a ‘sponsoring peace party’, the more peace will endure. Criteria establishing credibility however are subject to different specific, not generalizable, considerations, especially in cases of regional or global intervention.

Within regional interventions, credibility is undermined by geographical proximity and institutional consolidation. This occurs because countries in close proximity have vested interests in the internal affairs of their neighbours (such as in stabilizing favoured

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23 As borrowed from labour relations, the ‘Credibility depends on the two disputant parties being confident that the third party is independent of government (or any other political) influence and therefore totally independent’ (Gennard 2005:168).
leaders) and therefore struggle to remain neutral when intervening. Furthermore, regional intervention also suffers from a lack of institutional consolidation. The ‘strength of member states has a major bearing on the effectiveness and efficiency’ (Crisis State Research Centre 2012: 3) of the regional peacemaking: ‘A regional body might be able to utilize and build on the strength of its members (eg the EU) but it will almost certainly inherit the political and institutional weaknesses of its members (eg SADC and IGAD)’ (ibidem).

Global intervention also suffers a credibility trade off. The amount of interests involved in foreign policy decisions, together with the overlap of roles and responsibilities, often undermines the credibility of global actors to facilitate resolution. When a third party who adopts the role of arbitrator in an internal conflict also assumes the role of mediators, or facilitators, the credibility of the third party intervention is hindered by the existence of a possible conflict of interests. Credibility holds a significant impact on the outcome of intervention, but its definition is subject to constant adjustments. What is influencing the combatant’s attitude is not the intervener’s credibility per sé, rather the liability of that intervener to maintain its promises and to conduct negotiations.

4.3.4 Resoluteness

The strength of Intervention does not merely depend on the material investment, but also on the interveners’ ideological awareness in pursuing their strategy. An organization’s effectiveness in peace making depends on the willingness and resoluteness of third parties to be effectively engaged. Resoluteness, defined as the firm determination to accomplish the mission, depends on the level of third party’s commitment to the conflict. This involvement, in turn, depends on the relative importance foreign actors place on this conflict and the relative consensus existing around this cause (Ancas 2011). According to Nathan

There must be more than just a simple external consensus that peace in the region is worth pursuing. For intra-regional peacemaking to be successful, states must share an internal logic with a normative consensus that allows them to operate with close political cooperation on a set of shared and enforceable norms (Nathan 2010).

The issue of resoluteness answers the question of whether or not the international community has the willingness to induce the end of fighting. As pointed out by Belloni with regard to intervention in Bosnia, ‘it is the vision and strategic commitment of international interveners that improve the chances that intervention will have a deeper and
more lasting impact’ (Belloni 2007). External actors must be persuaded to enter into a foreign conflict, but often this persuasion decrees when difficulties arise on the ground.

A strong linear relationship exists between commitment, resoluteness and outcomes of intervention. Two exemplar cases must be mentioned: in East Timor, in 1999, a strong regional and international commitment established UNTAET with the purpose of administering the territory during the period of transition to self-government. In Bosnia the commitment of foreign actors was scarce: each intervener ‘wanted to share the benefits of international stability and the glory of providing peace to the Balkans but none wanted to pay the costs that this entailed and hoped that others would produce the public good’ (Belloni 2007). Andreatta has employed the metaphor of the Buridan’s donkey to illustrate the commitment dilemma in Bosnia: the international community has continuously oscillated between pursuing justice and promoting peace:

After three years of war and suffering, the peace which was finally agreed upon in Dayton at the end of 1995 was by the same standards less just than any of the draft agreements proposed earlier. Like the donkey of Buridan, by not choosing decisively between peace and justice, the “international community” failed to achieve either and undermined both (Andreatta 2008).

4.3.5 Legitimacy

Legitimacy represents one of the crucial requirements for a successful foreign intervention. As argued by Smith and Dee, ‘the most important condition for successful intervention is legitimacy, which influences the other factors and significantly affects the final success or failure of a mission’ (Smith and Dee 2003: 98).

Three sources of legitimacy must be mentioned: the legal authorization provided by the Security Council, the normative imperative and the societal acceptance of intervention.

Firstly, the legal aspect of legitimacy depends on the UN authorization: mandates sanctioned by the UN Security Council provide a legal authorization that is a significant catalyst in convincing other states that military action is appropriate and legally sustainable. However, recent interventions have opened a breach within the UN system: NATO intervened in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without any Security Council mandate. The US intervened in Iraq in 2003 without international approval, since the UN voted to not sanction the proposed intervention. In the case of the Yugoslavian war the legitimacy of intervention was justified on the basis of a moral imperative (responsibility to protect) more than a legal cover. A second source of legitimacy is based upon a

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24 It is not accidental that many official statements requiring foreign intervention to stop mass human rights violation call for a ‘resolute international response’ (Waxman 2009).
normative justification. Humanitarian and ethical considerations, structured by the ‘responsibility to protect’, have played an important role in modern international intervention (Soderlund 2008, Seylbot 2008). But, there is also a political dimension informing the concept of legitimacy: the transgression to the sovereignty’s integrity in Bosnia was justified on the basis of an abuse of sovereignty perpetuated by Milosevic. The NATO armed intervention was illegal under international law, but widely regarded as legitimate, as it was motivated the political needs to sanction a violation of the international law (Milosevic’s violation of sovereignty) (Belloni 2007). Thus there is the political form of legitimacy that was also adopted by the US for justifying the 1991 invasion of Iraq.

The third source of legitimacy, and its most controversial, derives from the societal acceptance of the interventionist practice. According to a comparison with previous and successful cases of UN and US nation-building, Azimi and Chang have argued that successful nation building depends on the society’s susceptibility to change (Azimi and Chang 2005). Many studies, supported by much empirical evidence, have sustained that the higher the level of legitimacy the higher the probability to succeed. Legitimacy is directly associated with the effectiveness of intervention in terms of post-conflict state consolidation: if intervention leads to political transition, the legitimacy of a foreign mission enforcing institution-building is essential for establishing peace and stability. In fact, the denial of the UN authority in Iraq made post-conflict operations harder. Instead, when one or more levels of legitimacy accompany intervention, the prospects for success improve. This case has been illustrated by intervention in East Timor, were the UN’s legitimacy was enforced by Indonesia’s agreement: in this case, the moral legitimacy coincided with the legal one.

5. Hypotheses

This chapter has sought to develop an international approach to persistent disintegration: focusing on how international armed interventions are deployed, the previous sections have illustrated the importance of moving beyond the domestic compound of state disintegration. Since state disintegration is largely considered a deviant case to traditional theories of state consolidation, new hypotheses must be introduced.

I hypothesize that these important sources of variation in the way International Intervention is structured and deployed have the potential to alter conflict resolution and to prolong disintegration. Firstly, the international distribution of power may affect state
consolidation: Modelski’s theory of military intervention has been integrated with Ruth Iyob’s theory of regional hegemony in order to illustrate the manner in which global and regional interventions might protract disintegration. Both these theories have been refined identifying ‘whether and how the scope conditions of competing theories should be expanded or narrowed’ (George and Bennett 2005: 115). But the structural level of analysis is not alone sufficient to explain variation in outcome. For this reason, typologies and contextual elements have been investigated. Consistent with the theoretical framework above delineated, two hypotheses can be advanced at this stage.

The first hypothesis postulates that global intervention in Somalia has transformed the internal conflict into a wider international conflict, fomenting and complicating the perpetual renewal of hostilities.

The second hypothesis sustains that the regional mutual interference, generated by the competition between diasporic and hegemonic states in the Horn, has amplified the level of political fragmentation in Somalia.

Taking into consideration the amendments to basic theories, a specific casual mechanism must be defined: persistent disintegration did not result from third party intervention by itself. Intervention affects disintegration through two potential channels. Firstly, a Global Intervention increases the duration of disintegration, when third party intervention transforms the internal war into a war where international causes are fought. Both global and regional interventions can prolong disintegration if they ‘simply’ act as conflict catalysts: a prolonged conflict erodes peace and rehabilitation, because ‘a country consumed by a civil war is weak and powerless to ward off the designs of outside powers’ (Modeski 1964). Secondly, the regional intervention reduces the already eroded sovereignty’s integrity, if diasporic and hegemonic tensions are actively brought into the internal conflict of the disintegrated state.

There is no linear relation between strategies, forms and types of intervention and the final outcome. Under a specific combination of contextual factors, and within the interaction and hybridization of global and regional strategies of intervention the original conflict can proliferate. The aim of this dissertation is to explore the impact of intervention in Somalia, identifying the causal mechanism working behind it.
Chapter 3
The case of Somalia:
caught between the African state system and the Horn of Africa

The African state may disintegrate,
not because of the failure of Africans to adapt to the world system,
but because the state itself
has become inadequate for the realities of the current world system
(Villalón and Huxtable 1998: 279).

Scholars began to associate the problem of persistence to the statehood crises in Africa in 1982, when Jackson and Rosberg questioned the reasons why weak African states persist without disintegrating:

In spite of the weakness of their national governments, none of the Black African states have been destroyed or even significantly changed. No country has disintegrated into smaller jurisdictions or been absorbed into a larger one against the wishes of its legitimate government and as a result of violence or the threat of violence. No territories or people—or even a segment of them—have been taken over by another country. No African state has been divided as a result of internal warfare. In other words, the serious empirical weaknesses and vulnerabilities of some African states have not led to enforced jurisdictional change (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:1).

Jackson and Rosberg advanced the theory of a mutually exclusive relationship between the concepts of state weakness and disintegration, pointing out that African states did not disintegrate because the juridical statehood allows weak countries to survive instead of disappearing (ibidem). Yet contrary to this prevision, events during the mid ‘90s disconfirmed the hypothesized African immunity from disintegration: at least three states in the Horn of Africa (Etiopia Sudan and Somalia) have disintegrated into two smaller jurisdictions (Eritrea and South Sudan) and non-recognized authorities (Somaliland, Puntland and other regional states). Other violent disintegrative pushes even without enforcing jurisdictional changes have promoted de facto territorial modifications that have eroded the authority and the integrity of the central governments in Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams 2011).
Four of the most recent crises escalated inside the continent are associated with the issue of disintegration. Mali became engulfed in disintegrative dynamics when two Tuareg groups (The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA, and Ansar Dine) militarily contested the sovereignty of the central government in the northern part of the country. In April 2012, the MNLA declared the formation of an independent state, Azawad, which comprises the regions of Kidal, Gedo and Timbuktu. Meanwhile, in August 2012 the group Ansar Dine ‘had driven out government forces from Konna, about 700km (435 miles) north-east of Bamako’ (‘Mali crisis: UN calls for 'swift deployment' of troops’ 2013). Also in Nigeria, policy analysts have begun to warn against the threat of disintegration (Olawuni Akintola 2012): even if the rise of Boko Haram has been associated with the destabilizing force operated by Al-Qaida’s influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, the crisis of northern Nigeria is ‘part of the larger conflicts over access to power and relations to the Nigerian state’ (ibidem: 30), where politics rather than religion is at the heart of the legitimacy impasse. While in the 90’s the Nigerian ability to avoid disintegration was widely recognized (Suberu 1998), the precarious nature of the Nigerian federation is actually reinstating its vulnerability to split into fragmented authorities (Haruna 2012).

Therefore, disintegration in Africa matters and this research amends the argument proposed by Jackson and Rosberg two decades ago. Clearly standing on the feet of giants, I agree with the emphasis placed on the fact that the ‘serious empirical weaknesses and vulnerabilities of some African states’ has enforced very few juridictional changes. However, a series of de facto changes have occurred: the persistence of state weakness in Africa has not been sufficient to avoid a disintegration that persists without allowing the reintegration of fragmented sovereignties into recognized juridical forms. As recently suggested by Robert, ‘The national boundaries drawn across Africa in the 19th century (...) may not represent, or contain, the future’ (Robert 2012). Thus this chapter moves from the emphasis on ‘Why Africa’s Weak states Persist’ towards that questioning ‘Why Africa’s Disintegrated States Persist’.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part presents a brief overview of the theoretical and practical challenges posed by state disintegration to the African state.

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25 The reticence to enforce juridictional changes in the African continent has not been determined by the absence of national separatist movements. Secessionist movements exist today in Angola (Cabinda), Marocco (Western Sahara), Senegal (Casamance), Somalia (Somaliland) and Tanzania (Zanzibar).
system (I). The second part discusses the regional context in which Somalia is embedded, the Horn of Africa (II). The chapter moves towards a two-step empirical analysis of the state disintegration in Somalia: the third part presents a brief historical overview of the state breakdown (III), while the fourth measure the persistence of disintegration (IV). The fifth part provides evidence from an alternative path to state rehabilitation, presenting the case of Somaliland (V). And the sixth paragraph summarizes the contribution provided by this chapter.

1. The African state system and disintegration

Before the 1990s the threat posed by disintegration to Africa was only partially and occasionally addressed, while African states had begun suffering disintegrative pressures immediately after the celebration of their independence. During the OAU founding conference in 1963, Nkrumah prophetically warned about the dangers for the integrity of the African Union (Nkrumah 2012:27)

This conference should mark the end of our various groupings and regional blocs. But if we fail and let this grand and historic opportunity slip by, then we shall give way to greater dissension and division among us for which the people of Africa will never forgive us.

The first challenge to the newborn African state system occurred in 1960, when Katanga’s separatist claims plunged Congo into five years of political crisis and civil war. Shortly after, in 1967, the secession of Biafra shook Nigeria’s stability though two and half years of civil war, provoking one of the most disastrous famines in the history of the continent. The Western Sahara represents one of the most important cases of permanent resistance and prolonged disintegration of the continent. Often referred to as ‘Africa’s last colony’, in 1971 Saharawi guerrilla fighters began to claim the liberation of the Western Sahara from Spanish control. Successively the Polisario front has fought against the post-colonial partition between Mauritania and Morocco: conflict with Morocco endured for almost 16 years, and in 1991 a cease-fire was agreed. The UN deployed a mission (MINURSO) oriented to prepare a referendum on the territory’s status, but in 1996 the mission was suspended and no referendum has ever taken place.

Two peculiarities must be evaluated in order to shed light on the African route to disintegration. Firstly, whether state dissolution generally culminates in state reintegration or in descent into non-state politics (Forrest 1998), what has been particularly relevant in Africa is that state dissolution has been almost exclusively anchored to an illegal set-up.
Few secessionist wars have occurred in Africa during the last 60 years (Katanga and South Kasai in the DR Congo, Biafra in Nigeria, Casamance in Senegal, Western Sahara in Morocco, Southern Sudan, Ogaden and Oromo regions in Ethiopia, The Enclave of Cabinda in Angola) and fewer still have been converted into new sovereignty structures (Eritrea, South Sudan). While ‘few conflicts in Africa have pitted state against state’ (Carbone 2004: 172) many conflicts have pitted the inhabitants of the African states against one another (Henderson 2008). The less the African states have fought against one another, the more people within the African states have fought intensively. The ‘relative scarcity’ of African separatism (Englebert and Hummel 2003), in conjunction with the relative scarcity of African interstate wars, has transposed the threats to sovereignty to coming from within the boundaries of the state. However, in few African countries state dissolution has been converted into a positive jurisdictional form.

The second peculiarity of the African route towards disintegration arises from a controversial relationship existing between the principle of self-determination and the legacy of colonial boundaries. As suggested by Bach (1997), demands advanced by separatist movements in Africa were not based on the refusal of colonial order, rather on ‘the reinstatement of colonial frontiers which were erased during or soon after the end of the colonial rule’ (Bach 1997:100). The Eritrean claim for independence invoked the existence of the Italian colony of Eritrea. Also Somaliland actually bases its claim to sovereignty on the fact that on 26 June 1960 Somaliland protectorate gained independence as the Republic of Somaliland, before merging with the Italian Somaliland to become the Republic of Somalia (Englebert and Hummel 2003). While in the Horn this trend finds some kind of regularity, in other regions similar demands have also appeared. As pointed out by Bach (1997: 101):

Other demands for the reinstatement of colonial administrative or inter-imperial boundary-lines have so far been unsuccessful: in Cameroon (Buea declaration for the re-establishment of a federal state in 1993), in Tanzania (constitutional steps towards a separate government for the mainland), in Uganda and Madagascar (establishment of federal systems) or in Nigeria (South-eastern pressure for a transformation of the federation into a confederacy). To these, add the more violent Tuareg rebellion in Niger and Mali, or the Casamance independence movement in Senegal.

But how have scholars explained the multifaceted nature of state disintegration in Africa? When the decline of the post-colonial state began to compromise the territorial integrity of the African countries, scholars interacted with research that proceeded from related, yet distinct theoretical premises, such as the quasi-state theory (Jackson 1993), the
discourse on state legitimacy (Englebert 2000), the administrative and bureaucratic dysfunctions, the political opportunism and economic inequality (Bates 2008). The Africanist literature during the last two decades has associated state disintegration with two general lines of explanation: the artificiality of the post-colonial state (I) and the perverse relation existing between state and society (II).

Proponents of the first argument (I) have pointed to the artificiality of the African state to explain why central states have dissolved (Cornwell 1999). Several variants of this artificiality have been addressed, from the territorial to the institutional and systemic asset. For instance, Herbst in States and Power in Africa (2000) supports the notion that disintegration in Africa depends on the arbitrariness of its national boundaries, therefore the central authorities are not able to exercise control over parts of the territory. Ottaway, affirms indeed that a regime of artificiality actually affects the entire statehood structure (Ottaway 1999), not only its territorial boundaries. Jackson and Rosberg have anchored the concept of artificiality to juridical sovereignty, introducing the term ‘quasi-states’ to define internationally recognized states that lack the empirical conditions of statehood (Clapham 1996, Jackson and Rosberg 1994); this argument is supported by Ravenhill (1988) according to whom disparities between de facto and de jure boundaries might increase conflicts and exacerbate the trend toward state disintegration.

For other scholars, the crisis of legitimacy might facilitate disintegration by hampering the process of complete institutionalization (Okafor 2003, Callaghy 1988, Englebert 2000): according to Callaghy, when the institutions are unable to transform power into authority and societal compliance with the public authority is absent, central government might disintegrate because state and society establish conflictual and competitive relationships (Callaghy 1988). Englebert (2000) has provided an interesting interpretation of the deficit of legitimacy that affects the developmental capacities of contemporary African states, pointing out that ‘the imported origins of colonial states’ has created structures of authority and governance which conflict with pre-existing political behavior, and customary sources of authority. According to Englebert (2000:6) in fact:

> When there is minimal conflict between pre-colonial and postcolonial political structure, leaders find greater power payoffs from choosing policies and forging institutions that foster development (...). Neo-patrimonialism is not an African cultural feature but rather the equilibrium outcome of a set of historical conditions, which I categorize as state illegitimacy.

While many scholars have emphasized the colonial genesis of the African artifact, Villalon and Huxtable (1998) have expanded the matrix of artificiality beyond the colonial
era, conceptualizing the gap between international legitimacy and domestic effectiveness as the result of the Cold War politics (ibidem 1998). In line with this reasoning, Clapham (2001) sustains that disintegration results from a critical combination of ‘the upheavals in the international system since the end of cold war and the crisis of the state in Africa’ (Clapham 2001: 53).

Proponents of the second argument (II) indeed, have emphasized a wider set of factors fomenting the incompatibility between forms of political organization and the societal structure that might facilitate disintegration. On the ‘agency’ level of analysis, numerous contributors have claimed that state integrity is vulnerable depending on the extent to which neo-patrimonial policies penetrate the society (Crouch 1979, van Zon 2001), through relations of authority based on interpersonal rather than impersonal interactions (Bach 2011:277). By the early 1990s, there seemed to be consensus between scholars in defining the African state as ‘the most demonized social institution’ (Mkandawire 2001), possessed by private interests competing with the exercise of public functions. The African state has been portrayed and conceptualized as a ‘lame Leviathan’ (Callaghy 1987), a client (Clapham 1982, Gardinier 2000), a shadow (Reno 2000) and a prebendal authority (Joseph 1983) acting like a vampire (Frimpong-Ansah 1991) or a criminal based system, governed by authoritarian regime, personal rule (Jackson and Rosberg 1984), predatory-elite autocracy (Geddes 1999, Rotberg 2004), patrimonial (Bratton and van de Walle 1994, Leftwich 2000), patrimonialized (Medard 1995) or neopatrimonial rules (Bach 2011, Young, 2002). All these terms have identified a state that is so penetrated by and dependent upon particularistic interests, that it cannot pursue the collective task of development, and indeed requires insulation from such redistributive demands. Within the same conceptualization, but from a different perspective, Doornbos (1990) has suggested that the political space separating the state from society has also been eroded by the rising influential role exerted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing some of the elementary welfare functions.

Within a ‘structural’ perspective, indeed, emphasis has been given to a ‘power deformation’ leading African states to disintegrate: since power in African societies is exercised through coercive and absolutist impositions (Olaitan 2005, Ake 1996), the perpetual abuses of power might be conducive to a disintegration of the frail social contract between governors and governed. According to Otayek, for example, there exists an ontological incongruence with the modern concept of sovereignty since ‘the state is not
always the most desirable magnet for social action and it constitutes one of many possible poles for social and economic exchange’ (Otayek 1994: 146). More directly, Suberu, has evaluated the federalist experiment in Nigeria pointing to the fact that the dissonance between the federal structure of government and policies of centralization has fomented a ‘centrifugal backlash’ leading to ‘disaggregation rather than aggregation’ (Suberu 1998: 92).

Particular attention has been received by the ethnic hypothesis. Many scholars have indicated that ethnical differences have made communities less prone to consolidate central authorities. Whereas conventional wisdom has considered ethnicity as a ‘natural’ destabilizing factor and predictor for statehood conflictual diseases (Shultz 1995), they actually failed to recognize that ethnic nationalism has not been a precursor to separatist demands: in Africa disintegrative pulls have emerged in homogenous countries and not in multi-ethnic states and ethnic conflict has often been the final outcome, rather than the cause of state disintegration (Baker and Austin 1996, Blagojevic 2009).

However, these lines of explanation, artificiality versus state-societal incongruence cannot really be understood as ontologically separate. For instance, a bridge between these ideal-typical categories has been built up by the theoretical quarrel escalated between theories of the imported and grafted state, which have integrated both elements of artificiality and incongruence within each argumentation. Badie (1992) introduced the concept of imported state for emphasizing that African states were born within an intricate frame of dependency relations between central and peripheral elites. Furthermore, Badie criticized the idea that modernization tendencies might promote a universal political process, starting from the artificiality of the African state Badie accounts for the incongruence of the modern sovereignty structure, where fragile institutions derive from a system of import-export that encourages patronimial policies rather than capacity building. Against this argument, Bayart has sustained that ‘African states have been grafted, and not imported, into existing social systems’ (Bayart 1993: 3). Debating against the concept of dependency, Bayart asserted that African ‘social groups instrumentalised new political

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26 Ethnic tensions have emerged in Rwanda between Hutu and Tutsi, in Congo between Bayanmulenge and Rwandan Tutsi, in Ethiopia between Oromo, Ogadeni Tigrinya and Amara, in Ivory Coast between Senoufo and Akans. But no one of them has advanced separatist or independents claims. The attempts of Katanga and Biafra to gain independence have never been based on ethnic claims, and also in Eritrea and South Sudan, other reasons have triggered secessionist demands.

27 According to Baker and Austin (1996): ‘The further a state disintegrates, the more potential there is for ethnic conflict to spread’.
institutions and economic resources in order to further their own ambitions of accumulating wealth and power, a project accomplished to the detriment of (or in contradiction with) other social groups or other political societies’ (Bayart 2008). However, according to Bayart, the grafted state also suffers a sort of non compliance with the societal demands when the government eats the state resources: the metaphor best capturing the ‘criminalization and the politics of governance’ is the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1993), which refers to a predatory practice incentivizing leaders to eat the resources of the state and to reduce the governability of their own state (ibidem).

The Africanist reading of disintegration, summarized inside the Table 1, has been passionate and intriguing, yet these findings raise more questions than they answer.

Table 1. Africanist theoretical approaches to state disintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Focus on</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artificiality</strong></td>
<td>National boundaries (Herbst 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I)</td>
<td>Artificiality of the colonial state (Ottaway 1999) and post-colonial state (Villalon and Huxtable 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quasi-states (Jackson and Rosberg 1994, Ravenhill 1988)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Imported (Badie 1992) and grafted state (Bayart 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-society relationship</strong></td>
<td>Lame Leviathan (Callaghy 1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shadow state (Reno 2000)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>criminal based system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>authoritarian regime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>personal rule (Jackson and Rosberg 1984)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>predatory-elite autocracy (Geddes 1999, Rotberg 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patrimonial (van de Walle 1994, Leftwich, 2000)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patrimonialized (Medard 1995) or neo-patrimonial rules (Bach 2011, Young, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Absolutist impositions (Olaitan 2005, Ake 1996),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissonance between decentralization and centralization (Suberu 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic mobilization (Baker and Austin 1996, Blagojevic 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imported (Badie 1992) and grafted state (Bayart 1993)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A set of theoretical shortcomings and controversies has emerged. Firstly, despite the variety of social organizations, geo-political and economic conditions, the African state has been treated as a uniform, monolithic category. Analyzing the peculiarities of the African state, scholars have tended to neglect the fact that the African state, defined by a fixed set of attributes, does not exists. Furthermore, African states have been constantly evaluated in comparison with a universal model of political evolution, dictated by the European state formation. Furthermore, hypotheses on the artificiality of the African state have tended to idealize the western state formation, implicitly presupposing that the European experience was a natural process, ignoring the fact that the state is an artificial construction in Africa as elsewhere. As a result, conventional explanations on the incompatibility of the state with societal structures have interpreted the African state as a solitary entity, weakened by its own endogenous pathogens, and which has deliberately chosen its own direction on the road of consolidation or disintegration. Since theorists have treated the formation of post-colonial states as an addition to the existing world and political theory, traditional theories have been somewhat inadequate when dealing with a number of principal aspects of state evolution and dissolution in post-colonial countries (Brown 2006, Neuman 1998).

But the most important shortcomings concern the policy implications connected with this conceptualization, which is the democratic intervention. The rising trend to represent the African decline as an African mistake in attempting follow the European footprints has been supported, especially during the last decades, by quantitative efforts to measure stateness. The representation of the African disintegration as a purely internalist phenomena has incentivized more intensive forms of democratic intervention in the developing world, interventions that have proved to be both unrealistic and detrimental in the long term (Duffield 2001, Bhuta 2012). Whereas the methodological authority granted by the employment of quantitative methods has often enforced the ontological posture of these approaches, several scholars have recently begun to criticize this approach. As pointed out by Bhuta:

the numbers are associated with global judgments about the quality and nature of political order in the territory: the numbers stand in for a judgment about a complex social reality (e.g., the ‘relationship between government and society’) but also tie in with beliefs, common sense notions and normative claims about what characterizes good and bad political orders and outcomes (Bhuta 2012: 18). In particular, the same ‘numbers’ have confirmed that the efforts sustained by the International Community have raised doubts as to whether democracy, once ‘imported’,
could really hinder state disintegration. When the post-colonial experiment fails\textsuperscript{28}, the search for peace has been subordinated to the imposition from outside of the ‘best institution’ by force. But disintegration has established a linear negative relationship with one of the preferred tools adopted by the International Community for promoting democratization, military intervention. Performances in matters of democratic military intervention in the last decades have been very poor in Africa: the experience of foreign interveners in Somalia, Rwanda, Eastern Zaire and Sierra Leone (Nuamah and Zartman 2001) has placed significant constraints on both conflict resolution and state or nation-building. But the exclusive focus on state failure and related security imperatives has prevented scholars from realizing how intervention can effectively improve or deteriorate the state of disintegration. As once noted by Ottaway, ‘democratization may involve the risk of accelerating state disintegration’\textsuperscript{29} (Mengisteab et all 1999: 9, Ottaway 1994), but when a finger points to the moon there is always someone looking at the finger instead of the moon.

An alternative conceptualization of the state disintegration in Africa requires subverting the notion that political development is a universal process. The African state system must be considered in flux (Harbeson and Rothchild 2000), and disintegration must be envisioned at a critical juncture of the modern political system. One seminal work must be considered here, in order to construct an alternative explanation of state disintegration.

During the second half of 1990s, Villalon and Huxtable in their book ‘The African State at a Critical Juncture’ coined the idiom of the ‘critical juncture’ to describe the \textit{periods of significant changes in which the African countries were entangled}, ‘a significant departure from past conditions and a moment that defines diverging evolutionary paths from roughly similar set of conditions’ (Villalon and Huxtable 1998:8). The authors define the critical juncture as the space encompassed between disintegration and reconfiguration. Within this space, the African state might assume five connotations:

\begin{itemize}
\item The original relationship between state formation and territorial integrity has been affected by a deep hypocrisy: post-colonial states have defended the legacy of the colonial order following promises of stability that have never been realized. Principles of state centralization and territorial integrity, once turned into instruments of inclusion and exclusion, have forced the African communities to restrict self-determination.
\item When democratization pushes its own society towards inclusive or exclusive policies the direction of state consolidation can be transformed, since the integration of ethnic groups ‘also implies that if such agreements are not reached, the option of secession is available to ethnic groups’ (Mengisteab et all 1999: 9).
\end{itemize}
the client state, the personalized state, the centralized state, the prebendal state, and the extractive state. Many African states have been reconfigured partly through democratization and structural adjustments, many others have failed, collapsed and disintegrated. But the majority of states have been protagonists of a statehood crisis: the 1990s has constituted a critical historical juncture, for both, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the political order.

Following this pioneeristic work, this chapter will evaluate if that critical juncture features as a punctuated equilibrium or a permanent façade in the political trajectory of the African state. Thus searching for ‘roughly similar sets of conditions’ is necessary in order to investigate the inner geopolitical circle in which Somalia is embedded, the Horn of Africa.

2. The Horn of Africa, an exceptional region

The Horn of Africa has been classified as one of the most militarized regions on the African continent, and most nations in the Horn have suffered from either intra-state or inter-state conflicts. Nevertheless, the ramifications and impacts of those violent conflicts are unevenly distributed across the nations and communities in the Horn, and Somalia has paid the heaviest price by losing its statehood (Abdullahi Mohamed Odowa 2012).

Despite the fact that the Horn of Africa has witnessed a high level of antagonistic external relations, the impact of exogenous factors on state consolidation has often been completely overlooked by internalist approaches, which have tended to privilege a capacity-oriented perspective. However, The Horn\textsuperscript{30} represents the African region with the highest incidence of sovereignty transformation and interstate-armed conflict (Gledtich et all 2002). Three reasons may be identified, that can in largely account for the importance of International Relations in the Horn: the magnitude of conflict (I), the relationship between interstate conflicts and statehood transformations (II), and the violation of territorial boundaries (III). Firstly, the Horn of Africa is an exceptional conflict zone (Clapham 1995) where there persists a long and pervasive trend of severe armed conflicts\textsuperscript{31}, illustrated by table 2.

\textsuperscript{30} The definition of Horn of Africa here employed comprehends four regions: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. The definition of ‘greater Horn of Africa’ includes also Sudan Uganda and Kenya.

\textsuperscript{31} As explained by Clapham (1995: 72): ‘No part of Africa (…) has been so riven with conflicts as the Horn. Secessionist, irredentist, regional, ethnic and ideological conflicts combine with straight-forward power struggles and the disorder resulting with the proliferation of imported...
Table 2. Armed Conflicts and statehood changes in the Horn of Africa (1950-2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Statehood’s change</th>
<th>Intrastate armed conflicts</th>
<th>Interstate armed conflicts</th>
<th>Transnational/Internationalized armed conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Author’s illustration based on Gleditsch et al. 2002

weaponry to form a bewildering variety of interrelated acts of violence which give the region, already the poorest in the world, one of the globe’s highest concentration of refugees.'
Between 1946 and 2006 there have been 8 interstate conflicts in Africa, 32 internal conflicts and 19 international conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Despite interstate wars being a rarity in Africa (8 in sixty years) two of them occurred in the Horn: the Ogaden war (1977) and the Ethiopian-Eritrean war (1998). However, the collective employment of armed violence is undoubtedly one of the most pervasive and enduring regularities in the history of the Horn, but attempts to establish regional typologies of conflict are doomed to failure because liberation wars, civil wars and internationalized conflicts have constantly occurred within different power configurations. Thus, the particularities of each singular conflict must be included by any consideration of the regions history.

Secondly, this region is an extraordinary example of indigenous statehood formation (Calchi Novati 1994, Clapham 1996), as the historical enmity between two asymmetric forms of statehood (empire and nation-state) has triggered an ongoing conflict between Ethiopia Somalia and Eritrea. In 1977 the separatist claims of the Ogaden guerrillas inside the Somali-inhabited territories of Ethiopia escalated into a major war, yet regional competition did not disappear during the post-bipolar era: as following this conflict the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) won their common battle against Mengistu, and they inaugurated two antagonistic processes of state-building. The Eritrean state, assumed a collective identity based on the idea of national unity (Plaut and Gilkes 1999), encouraging the formation of a ‘diasporic’ state (Ruth Iyob 2000). In contrast, the Ethiopia federation was born within the Tigrayan nationalism, in opposition to the Amhara ideology: the process of decentralization and gradual incorporation of ethno-nationalist movements inside a federal structure culminated in 1993 when the Ethiopian state adopted an ethnic connotation. The historical tensions existing between indigenous patterns of statehoods resurged in 1998, when an armed conflict escalated between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Badme.

Finally, the Horn is also the only region of the continent where the integrity of the colonial boundaries has been constantly violated and these violations have been legally recognized in the majority of cases. Eritrea’s independence in 1994 was the first secession in the African continent receiving an international recognition. Shortly after, with the collapse of the Republic of Somalia, Somaliland claimed for de facto sovereignty, opening the door to a territorial redefinition of the Somali landscape. While in 2011, South Sudan has gained independence from Khartoum, following two civil wars have endured for almost fifty years.
In sum, any statehood redefinition in the Horn has been intimately correlated with the level of animosity existing between states. To analyze the state disintegration in Somalia the international relations moving across the region must be taken into consideration. One of the most important challenges to stability in the Horn is the securitization of its own, often contested, boundaries, as is demonstrated by the fact that today five international peacekeeping operations are trying to contain conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa.

3. Somalia: the enduring disintegration

Somalia has become the most significant case of protracted disintegration inside and beyond the African continent. After the state collapsed in 1991, civil war has never ended and the central political authority has been replaced by a plethora of fragmented sovereignties. The humanitarian consequences of the protracted violence have resulted in massive death tolls, destruction of basic infrastructure and destruction of local community resilience (Abdullahi Odowa 2012). The political consequences of the protracted violence have received less attention. Menkhaus, already in 2003 had highlighted the protracted nature of this extraordinary case of state collapse, questioning ‘How is it possible that Somalia can remain so resistant to efforts to revive its central government?’ (Menkhaus 2003). Although there is strong intuitive evidence suggesting that in Somalia the state never has come back, little intuitive evidence has supported the notion that Somalia has become the paradigmatic case of ‘governance without recognized government’ (Menkhaus 2004) and recognized government without governance. In this paragraph I will provide first, a narrative description of the process of disintegration, and then move towards an empirical analysis of its persistence.

3.1 State breakdown: 1979-1991

The root cause of the Republic of Somalia’s breakdown must be found in the disastrous war to seize the Ogaden. The defeat of the national dream to unify the Somali people, together with the removal of the international assistance, which was determined by the shift of alignment and occurred during the bipolar setting, seriously undermined the survival of Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime.

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32 AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur, UNMEE in the conflict zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and EUFOR at the border between Chad Sudan and Central Africa.
In July 1977, Somalia claimed sovereignty over Ogaden, an Ethiopian region inhabited by Somali people. The war ended in March 1978 with tremendous implications for national stability: the defeat created strong rumors and on 9 April, 1978 Majeerten officials organized a military coup. Barre soon re-established the legal order, but the decay was progressive. In response to the political marginalization of the Northern provinces, two opposition groups emerged: the Somali Salvation Front (SSF, in 1976) in the eastern province inhabited by the Majeerteen clan\(^{33}\), and Somali National Movement (SNM, in 1981), in the north western provinces inhabited by the Issaq nomadic people.

The economic crisis, in conjunction with the refugee emergency compromised the stability of the Republic. In October 1980, Barre declared an emergency status and accepted the structural adjustment promoted by the International Monetary Fund, but these rescue packages were useless. In 1981, 700,000 refugees were located in the north through a great program of refugee resettlement: the government exploited local farmers by assigning land to refugees and the decision provoked a storm of protests from local peasants, and clashes between refugees, farmers and military forces (Calchi Novati 1994). The economic crisis increased the level of political turmoil. In April 1986, Somalia signed a peace treaty with Ethiopia provoking the chaos at home (Calchi Novati 1994): Mengistu and Barre established an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of their respective military forces and the cessation of mutual interference. Mengistu closed the training camp used by SSDF in Ethiopia, and the SNM radio station. Barre, in turn, suspended any support to Ogaden rebels and WSLF militants.

Barre’s decision to abandon Pan-somalism condemned his government to a dramatic capitulation. The first challenge to Barre’s regime occurred on 27 May 1988, when the SNM decided to occupy the northern cities of Hargeysa, Berbera and Burao, in order to escalate the offensive against the central regime. The entire Issaq population sustained the SNM, and Barre interpreted this revolt as a conspiracy against Somali unity, motivated by an anti-Darood feeling. The regime responded by bombing out and destroying Burao and Hargeysa: 50,000 people were killed and one million refugees fled their homes, meanwhile revolts against Barre spread out from the north across the entire country and in 1989 the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) began to attack government militia. In the central regions the United Somali Congress (USC) were operative\(^{34}\). In May 1990, a group of traditional leaders, intellectuals and former politicians signed a Manifesto calling Barre to

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\(^{33}\) In 1981 the party’s name was changed in Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).

\(^{34}\) The Hawiye political party was founded in Rome in 1987.
admit his responsibilities. The Manifesto group\textsuperscript{35} wanted to replace Barre with an interim government in support of a Conference of National Reconciliation\textsuperscript{36}. Barre tried to adopt government reforms: a new constitution was elaborated, and a multipolar electoral system was introduced, but it was, definitively, too late: in August 1990, the SNM, USC and SPM agreed to coordinate operations against Barre. On 30 December 1990, troops loyal to the government were pushed back to Mogadishu. Militias of the USC entered the capital in January 1991, forcing Barre to flee to his clan stronghold in the south.

An emergency council was elected, but after Barre’s departure from Mogadishu, separatism began to impinge the opposition front. When the ICU started to kill non-Hawiye residents of the capital and assuming anti Darood rhetoric, the SPM quickly split into two factions: the SPM Ogadeni, led by Ahmed Omar Jess, and the SPM Harti, under Aden Abdillahi Nur (Gabyow) and General Mohamed Siad Hersi (Morgan). In February 1991, conflict escalated between the USC and the SPM-Harti. The defeated SPM was forced to flee south to Kismayo, where it established an alliance with Barre’s clan militia. In March 1991 Barre regrouped his militia into the Somali National Front (SNF), an armed group seeking to control the southern coast and hinterland, and to recapture Mogadishu and reinstate his regime.

The temporary alliance between USC and USC/SNA forced Barre to withdraw: at the end of April 1991, the SPM/SNF alliance was pushed south of Doble. With the removal of the common enemy the cooperation also suddenly disappeared. Since January 1991 the USC has split into two factions: the United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance (USC/SSA) led by Ali Mahdi Muhammad, and the Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) headed by Mohammed Farah Aided\textsuperscript{37}.

In the meantime, the SNM established full control on the northern territories and from January to June 1991 SNM, Issaq and Dhulbante elders promoted a process of conflict resolution and reconciliation. On 18 May 1991, the ‘Brotherhood Conference of

\textsuperscript{35} Italy and Egypt attempted to reconcile Barre with the opposition fronts. Egypt called for a reconciliation conference, in Cairo, but it was never launched.

\textsuperscript{36} 114 persons signed this appeal, but they were largely discredited people: many of them adhered to the appeal only for personal antagonism against Barre. The Manifesto group pursued mediation without considering that major opponents refused any mediation with the collapsing government.

\textsuperscript{37} The first faction pushed for substituting the administrative power but without challenging the basis of the pastoral democracy. In contrast, the second faction wanted to radically subvert the entire structure of authority.
Northern clans in Burao’ established the formation of the Republic of Somaliland, and inaugurated a long process of peace and institution building.

3.2 Renewed civil war (1991-1999)

Since 1991 fighting intensified in the south, while the central authority largely disintegrated: a complex interaction of civil war and territorial fragmentation marked the first decade of Somalia’s disintegration.

In June 1991, Djibouti proposed a reconciliation conference and, on 14 July, Ali Mahdi was appointed president of a transitional government: in October the government was formed, but the decision of establishing a provisional government without consulting other parties escalated the second phase of the civil war. Aidid did not recognize Mahdi’s authority, declaring that the only legitimate government was that led by the USC/SNA. On 17 November 1991, war escalated in Modadshu between two factions of the USC. But in March 1992 the forces of the former régime, the Somali National Front (SNF), in alliance with the SPM-Harti, launched a big attack that forced the two USC factions to reconcile in order to face this renewed threat. Meanwhile, the SPM-Ogaden established an alliance with the USC/SNA: this combined force managed to push the alliance USC-I/SNF out of Kismayo and in April 1992 Barre was forced into exile in Kenya. Following this victory, Aidid (USC) and Jess (SPM-O) officially formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA).

Between 1991 and 1992, an estimated 280,000 lives were lost, and the number of refugees increased to 1 million. The deterioration of humanitarian emergency invoked the intervention of the International Community: since January 1992, the UN Security Council has imposed an arms embargo and began to prepare the military operation. The crisis forced the two leaders of the USC, Ali Mahdi and Aidid, to search for an agreement: in March 1992, a ceasefire was signed and in April 1992 the UN decided to enforce a peacemaking operation, UNOSOM (resolution 751/1992).

The UN decided to deploy 50 UN troops to monitor the ceasefire, and a 500-strong infantry unit. The first group of observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992, but the cease-fire was ignored and in August 1992 the UN decided to enlarge the mission. The Security Council endorsed sending of another 3,000 troops to the region to protect relief efforts (UNSC 1992a). Most of these troops were never sent and the Security Council authorized member states, under the guidance of the United States, to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) aimed at establishing a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNSC794/1992). In December 1992, Ali Mahdi and Aidid
accepted another cease-fire proposed by the UN, and the United States assumed the unified command of the multinational force composed of 38,000 troops. From December 1992 until May 1993, UNITAF’s mandate was to secure the airport and harbour to protect the delivery of food and humanitarian aid. Since UNITAF was a temporary mission, in March 1993 the UN declared the deployment of another operation, UNOSOM II, with a peace enforcement mandate aimed at disarming and demobilizing the warring factions (UNSC 1993a). This mandate was expanded in 1993, when the UN Security Council decided to provide concrete efforts ‘to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation’ (UNSC 1993a:1).

Concurrently, in 1993 a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference was held in Addis Ababa: representatives of 15 Somali factions signed peace and disarmament agreements, but by June the security situation had deteriorated, as result of the increasing hostilities between Aidid and UNOSOMII. In June, Aidid began broadcasting anti-United Nations propaganda and the UN decided to respond by attacking the SNA radio station. Aidid’s forces attacked the Pakistani peacekeepers sent to take the radio station: 24 peacemakers were killed, and the Security Council quickly authorized its members ‘to take all the necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks’ (UNSC 1993b) and ‘UNOSOM II responded by putting a price on Aidid’s head and actively pursuing Aidid’s organization’ (UN 1996).

Conflict with UNOSOM II culminated on 25 September 1993, during the Battle of Mogadishu, when a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter was shot down and 18 soldiers were killed. The disastrous American performance led the UN and the US to radically rethink peace enforcement; the withdrawal from Somalia was inevitable. In January 1994, the two contending factions signed a cessation of hostilities and in March American forces withdrew from Somalia. In 1996, Aidid died and his son, Hussein Mohamed Farrah took its place as leader of the SNA. In October 1996, Hussein Mohamed Farrah and Ali Mahdi agreed on a ceasefire. But in the meantime, another front emerged in the central regions of Bay and Bakool: the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, founded in 1995 by a group of Reewin people inhabiting the regions of Bay and Bakool. Following this, on 17 September 1995 the SNA invaded the territory where members of the digil and mirife clans had just established a local government (The Digil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council). This confrontation culminated in 1999, when the RRA, with Ethiopian support, defeated the SNA and established its own administration.
The period between 1991 and 1993 has been characterized by the civil war between the two wings of the USC (USC/SNA and USC) in the central regions of the country. The extension of the conflict into the rich agricultural lands between the Juba and Shebelle rivers devastated the food production of the largely unaffiliated cultivators. Since 1992, much of southern Somalia was in the grip of famine: according to the UN, 300,000 Somalis perished from war, famine and disease in the brief two-year period of 1991-92 and 700,000 refugees fled to Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as overseas.

During this decade, Somalia experienced a dilemma of representation that has become crucial during the following decade: despite the complete loss of central authority, and the failure of a series of national reconciliations, a series of local authorities have emerged pretending to govern the ungovernable. In March 1995, the people of the Bay and Bakol regions formed the Digil-Merifle Governing Council. In June two governments without governance were announced in Mogadishu, led respectively by Ali Mahdi and Aidid. In 1996, Ethiopia organized another peace conference in Sodere, which reached an agreement establishing a National Salvation Council. However, the Ethiopian efforts to lead the Somali peace process was nullified by another diplomatic initiative, the Cairo Conference, held in 1998 by Egypt and Yemen. In May 1998, the northeast region inhabited by Majerteen declared the formation of an autonomous region, the Puntland State of Somalia (1998). In June 1998 a regional administration was formed in Benadir, while in September 1997 the Hargeisa conference in Somaliland put an end to the civil war that had begun in November 1994 and had been contested by the Somalilander government militia and Issaq sub-clans. Egal was reappointed president of the Republic and since that time Somaliland has undertaken an intense process of institution building.

After a decade of civil war, the political space belonging to the former Republic of Somalia was transformed into a set of regions controlled by local authorities, and with variegated levels of stability.

3.3 The extension of disintegration: 2000-2010

While the first decade of Somalia’s disintegration was characterized by an ongoing civil war, as different parties attempted to establish power in central regions, the decade 2000-2010 has been characterized by a conflict that has assumed a regional and global connotation, and in many ways has been much more destructive than the previous decade. During this period there have been two parallel antagonistic tendencies: the formation and consolidation of fragmented authorities (I) and the renewed reinvigoration of the central
authority (II). On the sub-regional level, local authorities have developed governmental structures in a way that has undermined attempts made at international conferences to establish governmental structure at the national level.

In May 2000, Djibouti proposed a new conference, at Arta (Djibouti-led Igad Peace Process for Somalia 2000), supported by Egypt, Libya, Eritrea and the Gulf states. Although a total number of 825 delegates were present in representation of each clan, other important protagonists (military leaders and warlords) were excluded from the meeting. The conference’s proposal to rehabilitate the central government met with opposition from the decentralized entities, Somaliland and Puntland, who refused to participate. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000, but it was soon boycotted by a coalition of forces, the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), who from the very beginning had waged a violent campaign against the newborn government. In 2002, a new conference was held in Eldoret, Kenya, with the support of Western allies to promote a cessation of hostilities between SRRC and TNG: the Eldoret Declaration was signed on 27 October 2002 (Somalia National Reconciliation Conference 2003a). The first article of the declaration claimed to create a federal structure of government. Despite Somali leaders officially stating to work for the formation of a broad government, ‘inclusive, representative and acceptable to all the parties’ (Somalia National Reconciliation Process Eldoret, SNRP 2002: art.1), the conference was plagued by deep disagreements. This round-table also fell apart: before the beginning of the meeting, some leaders had publicly stated that they would not participate\(^38\) and some delegates abandoned the process during the conference.

In September 2003, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sponsored the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi, which established the formation of a federal transition charter. In 2004 the TNG collapsed, and IGAD undertook a second attempt to stabilize Somalia, through the Mbgathi Peace Conference in Kenya (January 2004). The initiative led to the formation of a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG, Dowladda federaalka kumeelgaarka); a Transitional Federal Constitution Chart was adopted and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected interim president. The Transitional Federal Government included the executive branch of government, with the 275-member transitional parliament (TFP) serving as the legislative branch. The TFG enjoyed support from peripheral parts of the country, Puntland, Baidoa

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\(^{38}\) The most important absentee was Somaliland, which refused to participate because of its tensions with Puntland.
and Jowhar, rather than from the central regions it was supposed to control. In fact, the possibility of effectively governing the territory remained very low: for security reasons both the government and the parliament remained in exile in Baidoa. The legitimacy of this initiative was also undermined by the increasing popularity of an emergent political party in Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union\textsuperscript{39} (ICU).

As the ICU was alleged to be a radical wing of, and under the direct control of Al-Qaeda, in 2006 the US supported the formation of a warlords coalition, the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), to fight the Islamic Courts. This attempt to contain the expansion of the Courts was useless and the ARPCT was defeated by June 2006. The Islamic Courts extended its authority much further than the TFG, and achieved much in a short space of time, especially in establishing effective governance, as was demonstrated by their capacity to provide social services and protection to the population. ‘Between July and December a semblance of peace and stability returned to Mogadishu for the first time in over 15 years. Such peace, however, was shortlived’ (Bisset 2010: 12). The defeat of counter-insurgency initiatives, and the relative peace established by militant Islamists, increased US and allied concerns. In December 2006, fighting erupted in Baidoa between Ethiopian forces and the Islamic Courts Union. The Ethiopian intervention was justified as necessary to establish the TFG in Mogadishu. On the 10\textsuperscript{th} of January 2007 American raids, launched from the military base of Camp Lemonier, conducted air strikes against suspected Al-Qaeda fighters in Southern regions. The Ethiopian intervention, in conjunction with the US air attack, determined the withdrawal of the ICU from Mogadishu into a defensive jihad. For the first time, in January 2007, the TFG entered Mogadishu. In February the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an African Union mission (AMISOM), while a group of ICU fled to Asmara and Djibouti (ARS).

In June 2008, Djibouti proposed a reconciliation conference between TFG and ARS. The conference ended with an agreement on the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of hostilities. The agreement also established the formation of a new parliament (expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members). And the former ICU chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected president of the republic.

\textsuperscript{39} Islamic movements born in Mogadishu in 1996 and in 2002 they federated themselves inside the Union of Islamic Courts.
The militant wing of the ICU, Al-Shabaab, rejected any compromise with the TFG until Ethiopian troops were out of the country. Since 2009, Hizbul Islamya and Al-Shabaab have opposed the government of national unity, which is promoted by Sheik Sharif. After the Ethiopian withdrawal from Mogadishu in January 2009, AMISOM deployed 8000 troops to ‘conduct a Peace Support Operation in Somalia to stabilize the security situation, including the take over from Ethiopian Forces, and to create a safe and secure environment in preparation for the transition to the UN’ (AMISOM 2012). This mandate has been extended to contain Al-Shabaab, which conceived AMISOM in symbiotic continuity with the Ethiopian occupation. The number of AMISOM troops in 2011 increased to 9300, and this increase in numbers was accompanied by an enhanced offensive capability. On 6 August 2011, AMISOM and TFG launched a large attack that forced al-Shabaab to withdraw almost entirely from Mogadishu, ceding control over the strategic Bakara market. On 15 October 2011, the Kenyan army launched an incursion into the Somali-kenyota border (Operation Linda Nchi). The Kenyan offensive, in conjunction with an increased campaign of US drone attacks, has contributed to the rising pressure that al-Shabaab felt on the ground.

Concurrently, the TFG ‘has squandered the goodwill and support it received and achieved little of significance’ (ICG 2011). On June 9, 2011, the President of the Transitional Federal Government and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament signed the Kampala Accord to reach an agreement on the ending of the transitional institutions. In September 2011 Somali leaders inaugurated in Mogadishu a consulting meeting (the Garowe conference) led by TFG and attended by leaders of Puntland and Galmudug, the head of the Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaa’ah (ASWJ) militia, the UN envoy to Somalia, and foreign representatives. On 6 September, the ‘Somalia End of Transition Roadmap’ was announced, a list of prescriptions designed to terminate the transitional period in August 2012, providing political direction and promoting inclusivity and stability. And thus the circle of international conferences has gained new life.

4. Timing disintegration

The attempt to define and measure the actual level of state disintegration in Somalia faces some difficulties. Firstly, due to the lack of stable government, relevant statistical data on Somalia has been limited or absent for almost a decade. However, in the last years statistics have been collected by international agencies and serious efforts have been made
to rebuild the national statistical system\textsuperscript{40}. The scarcity of data presents a major implication: often, there are no reliable economic and social indicators covering the period comprised between 1991 and 2010. However, a reliable account of the phenomenon under scrutiny can be obtained by triangulating data deriving from different sources.

To operationalize my dependent variable I have introduced three ontological attributes of the concept of state disintegration (implosion, conflict and fragmentation) and six indicators (state legitimacy polity2 and durability; conflict intensity and conflict type; policy fragmentation) belonging to three separate datasets (\textit{Failed State Index, Polity IV project, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset}).

The first index I use is the \textit{Failed State Index} developed by The Fund for Peace, which measures the level of state stability and capacity. This is an aggregated index, compiled annually since 2005, guided by 12 social, economic and political indicators\textsuperscript{41}, each split into a set of sub-indicators. Each indicator is ranked from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most stable and 10 being the most instable. I have employed the version published in 2011.

The second dataset employed is the Polity IV, coordinated by the Societal-Systems Research Inc, at the Center for Systemic Peace, under the direction of Monty G. Marshall. This dataset examines the characteristics of political regime since 1880. The Polity Score captures regime authority ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). I have employed the version published in 2010.

The third dataset is the \textit{UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset}, a collaborative project between the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at PRIO. This project presents a conflict-year dataset in the period 1946-2010. In this research I have employed the most recent version 4-2011.

The choice to rely on different indexes derives from particularities inherent to the data. Each index covers only partial aspects of the broad definition of disintegration. For example: the Failed State Index provides a good indicator of state legitimacy, but for a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Author’s interview, Hargeisa October 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{41} The indicators are: Mounting Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally-Displaced Persons, Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance, Chronic and Sustained Human Flight, Uneven Economic Development, Poverty and Sharp or Severe Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Progressive Deterioration of Public Services, Violation of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Security Apparatus, Rise of Factionalized Elites, Intervention of External Actors.
\end{itemize}
limited range of time (2005-2011), which is not sufficient for a longitudinal analysis. This temporal partiality does not allow researchers to choose a parsimonious method of measurement, but these difficulties can be resolved by relying on different indicators belonging to different datasets. The heterogeneity of data employed can undermine the explicative sophistication of this descriptive analysis, but its absence would seriously undermine its ontological reliability.

4.1 Implosion of the central authority

The first measure of the persistent disintegration is given by the implosion of the central authority. Three variables have been employed: legitimacy of state, political authority and regime durability.

The first variable derives from the Failed states index, a useful instrument to evaluate in a time series whether the conditions of state consolidation are improving or worsening. State legitimacy is measured on the basis of four main categories: corruption, perception and monitoring of elections, popular confidence in government, leadership transition, armed insurgencies, riots and demonstrations. As represented inside the Figure 1, state legitimacy in Somalia reaches a very poor standard, since its value is always comprised in the last quartile (between 9.4 till 10).

Figure 1 Legitimacy trend, 2005-2011: Somalia (Failed state index 2011).

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42 Other indexes also meet the same bias: this timeline shortcut shows why the failed state debate has been criticized for having conceptualized state fragility without a consistent temporal dimension.
State legitimacy has improved from 2007 to 2008, but it rapidly deteriorated from 2008 till 2010, reaching the peak of complete state delegitimation in 2006, 2007 and 2010. Moving to percentage variations over time state legitimacy in the period 2005-2010 has oscillated between 0.2% and 0.6%. In 2008 the percentage of legitimacy increased by 0.6%, in 2008 it reduced by 0.5% and in 2010 Somalia again reached its negative peak of complete delegitimation. In 2011 legitimacy has improved by 0.2%. The trend of state legitimacy from 2005 to 2011 has followed a slightly rising parable, but the median percentage value of this change (0.4%) is not significant to disconfirm the hypothesis of implosion of the central authority.

Since the Failed State Index is an annual ranking of the nations’ levels of stability, it provides data for each year of evaluation, but a comprehensive time series analysis is available only after 2005, when the index was published for the first time. To evaluate the level of state legitimacy in Somalia along the entire period of state disintegration we can draw on the Polity IV project, which codes the states’ authority characteristics from 1880 to 2010. The variable polity2 available inside the Polity IV project provides a measurement of patterns of authority. This variable is computed by subtracting the original autocracy variable form the democracy score and the polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The trend of the polity2 variable illustrated in Figure 2, shows that in Somalia, from 1990 until 2010, there has been a period of ‘interregnum’ (score =0) defined as the complete collapse of the central political authority.

*Figure 2 Authority Trend, 1960-2010: Somalia (Polity IV project, 2010)*
This trend illustrates a significant fact: the establishment of transitional governments (in 2000 and further in 2004) even if legitimately recognized by the International Community, has not modified the degree of effective exercise of authority. The Transitional Federal Government established in Somalia in 2004 has consistently failed to govern the territory: from 2004 till 2006 it executed functions of government from outside of the capital. Even once the TFG entered in Mogadishu, in 2006, it has continuously failed to become operational: none of Somalia’s interim governments\textsuperscript{43} have ever been able to extend authority on the ground. The instability of the TFG has often been viewed as being due to internal wrangling between political leaderships (ICG 2010). The continuous schism between political powers has diverted attention away from the structural constraints affecting the TFG. Two factors indeed must be taken into consideration: the lack of a consolidated territorial control, and the hybridity of the structure of power.

Firstly, effective governance is dependent upon the ability of the political authority to grant people protection, security and access to basic resources. This goal has never been realized since the TFG does not hold the control of the territory, and TFG’s troops are unable to prevent or manage insurgencies. Even if the Transitional Charter has established the formation of a national armed force (art. 65), the lack of an adequate security sector, structures and strategies, has lead the TFG to externalize the security sector to foreign actors. The TFG’s military force is ineffectual, since its authority is completely dependent upon the presence of the African Union’s peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), whose mandate is to protect the transitional federal institutions (TFIs) and to prop up its National Security Force (NSF), a task the TFG has failed to accomplish. In 2010, the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia affirmed that:

\begin{quote}

despite infusions of foreign retaining and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt—a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials who profit from the business of war and resist integration under a single command (UNSC 2010:5).
\end{quote}

Secondly, the hybridity of the institutional apparatus has undermined the stability of the transitional government. The TFG is based on a semi-presidential system where the president holds an executive power while the prime minister exercises some of the functions usually exercised by the head of government. Since no delimitation of powers

\textsuperscript{43} Two presidents and five prime ministers have been elected inside the Transitional Federal Government since its inauguration, in 2004.
between president and prime minister exists, this ambiguity has fomented rivalries. The TFI have been constantly debilitated by internal splits, as is demonstrated by the alternation of prime ministers: 2 presidents have been elected since 2004 (Ahmed Yusuf and Sheik Sharif) and 8 prime ministers have been appointed in the same period. The endemic wrangling between president, prime minister and speaker have dangerously weakened the possibility of enforcing institutions, even if these splits cannot be explained exclusively by the weakness of the leadership, or clanic tensions. The Transitional Charter has created a flawed system (ICG 2011a), which is caught in limbo between the parliamentary and presidential systems. The instability of contemporary Somali governments is thus regarded as a constitutional process. Harking back to our analysis of indicators, the persistence of state disintegration can also be inferred by a comparative evaluation of the regime durability: the variable ‘durable’, in the Polity IV project, counts the years since the most recent regime changes have occurred. By the trend of the regime durability plotted in Figure 3 it emerges that in Somalia the time of interregnum (state collapse) endures from 20 years, and it represents almost the half of the post-colonial experience of the country, since democracy has endured for 9 years, and autocracy for 21s.

Figure 3. Regime durability 1969-2010: Somalia (Polity IV project 2010)

In sum, all the indicators of state legitimacy, polity regime and regime durability, illustrate that since 1991 in Somalia there has not been a substantial change in implementing political transitions from implosion towards state-building.

4.2. Violent armed conflict

This section moves towards an analysis of the conflict trend in Somalia, looking at the type, quality, intensity and duration of armed conflicts, to find out whether over the last two decades there has been a shift from conflict to resolution. For this analysis I relied on
the UCPR/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The study of the armed conflict provides interesting clues on the persistence of disintegration, since it is possible to evaluate whether there has been a significant change in the warfare intensity, typology of conflict and number of parties involved.

The UCPR/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset records that low intensity warfare began escalating in Somalia in 1982, when the SSDF began to fight against the central government in northeast. This guerrilla warfare grew in scale in 1983, when the SNM escalated guerrilla attacks against the Somali National Army: warfare reached a great intensity in 1988, when the SNM entered in the northern cities and the Somali Army replied with air strikes on Burao and Hargeisa. From 1990 to 1992 the Somali civil war reached new heights. The UCPR/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset does not capture the amount of this recrudescence, since it simply records that period as one in which the war produced at least 1000 battled deaths in one year. The World Bank has estimated that the number of battle-related date was 2710 in 1990, 8119 in 1991 and 1554 in 1992, while in the 12 months following January 1991, 300,000 Somalis died of starvation (Amnesty International 1998). Since 1993 Somalia remained locked in a low level of warfare, until 2006 when the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia escalated into a major war. From 2007 till 2010 the conflict again reached the highest level of intensity. The World Bank indicators have indicated that the number of battle related deaths increased from 1589 in 2007 to 2158 in 2010. The violent trend of the conflict is illustrated in Figure 4.

*Figure 4 Conflict trend, 1982-2010*
Shifting our focus to the typology of conflict, the *UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset* records that Somalia experienced an *internal armed conflict* for 24 years. In 2006 the civil war was transformed into an *internationalized armed conflict*, due to the Ethiopian occupation. Also, by turning our attention to the party composition, a major change can be addressed. Between 1982 and 1999 five parties were the major protagonists of the civil war: SNM, USC, USC-SNA SSDF and SPM. Once Barre was overthrown, these parties continued to fight their own civil war. From 2000 to 2010, instead, six new insurgent parties appeared: SRRC, ARS, ICU, Al-Shabaab, Harakat Ras Kamboni and Hizbul-Islam.

A combined analysis of these sub-indicators suggests that from 1989 to 2011 the warfare has exhibited an intensity-increase trend. Since 2000, new parties have protracted the conflict while in 2006 two substantial changes occurred: the armed conflict reached a new high, and the civil war was internationalized.

### 4.3 Territorial Fragmentation

To evaluate the level of territorial fragmentation in Somalia I rely again on the Polity IV dataset, where the variable ‘fragment’ codes ‘the existence of separate polity or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized border of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority’ (Marshall et al. 2011: 12). This variable is ranged from 0 (no overt fragmentation) to 3 (serious fragmentation) for the period between 2000 and 2011: the variable fragmentation in Somalia reaches the highest value (3). But the historical trajectory here represented is incomplete: fragmentation has spread out in Somalia since 1991, when Somaliland declared its independence, and the fragmentation was enforced in 1998 when Puntland declared the formation of a regional autonomy. Fragmentation reached its highest value after 2008, when other regions proclaimed their autonomy. Data presented in this dataset, on the contrary, does not illustrate this trend, because fragmentation is coded beginning only in 2000. Since the variable ‘fragment’ has not yet been historically coded, the omission can be fixed only by integrating data. To make the information reliable I have simply aggregated into the present range, the data on fragmentation that occurred in the first decade, 1991-2001. The adjustment on the variable fragmentation thus shows the trend illustrated in Figure 5.
This graph shows that the territorial fragmentation of Somalia was inaugurated in 1991, and reached its highest value in 2000, when at least, 1/3 of the territory definitively escaped the control of the central government.

At this point, a qualitative description of the territorial fragmentation of Somalia is required. Although Somalia has often been represented as an ungoverned territory, the opposite is actually the case: such a wide variety of governance systems emerged that the state collapsed. The multitude of authorities to emerge in the last two decades can be grouped within two categories: quasi-states (I) and state governments (II). Two quasi-states exist in Somalia, the Federal Republic of Somalia, corresponding to the Transitional Federal Institutions based in Mogadishu and the Republic of Somaliland. State governments comprise both autonomous regions recognized by the TFG as federal states inside the Federal Republic of Somalia, and smaller authorities that are not recognized, but aspire to become federal regions.

4.3.1 Quasi-States: the Republic of Somaliland

According to the definition of ‘quasi-state’ provided by Jackson (1990), the Federal Republic of Somalia represents the classical example of quasi-state, where a political organization continues to exists because of the formal recognition granted by the International Community, despite the clamorous absence of that material conditions necessary to establish sovereignty rights. The Republic of Somaliland (Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliland) indeed represents a particular, or inverted, case of quasi-state, since
despite demonstrating compliance with the basic requirements for statehood, and having worked hard to prove the ability to bring about conditions of a modern state, no country in the International Community has yet recognized the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state. Somaliland represents, however, the most consolidated and peaceful fragment of sovereignty existing inside the former territory of the Republic of Somalia, and extends over a land area of 137,600 km², which is inhabited by a population of 3.5 million of people.

Contrary to what happened in the Federal Republic of Somalia, in Somaliland a long and pervasive process of reconciliation has been operative during the process of state building: the initial stage of clan reconciliation culminated in May 1991, during the Burao conference, when political and clan leaders officially proclaimed the independence of Somaliland. After Burao, other local peace initiatives culminated in 1993 with national conferences (Erigavo and Borame) that established the formation of a national charter and administrative structures (SDRA 1994). In 1994 fighting again escalated between the government and members of the Garhajis sub-clan, but a new stage of reconciliation definitively settled the conflict in 1996, when the Hargeisa conference established the formation of an additional parliament house representing all the Northern clans and the the Guurti house, fulfilling both a legislative branch and peace’s safe-guarders. After 1997, Somaliland has been involved in an intense process of democratization: in 2001 a referendum approved a new constitution establishing a multi-party system. In 2002, for the first time in thirty years, Somalilanders went to the polls for local elections, immediately followed by the presidential (2003) and administrative (2005) elections where fair elections were registered by International observers.

4.3.2 State governments: Puntland, Galmudug

The Puntland State of Somalia (Majeerteenya) was established in 1998, at the Garowe Community Constitutional Conference led by Harti elders and comprises a territory of 212,510 km² inhabited by 3.9 million people (The Puntland State of Somalia 1998). Despite Somaliland’s example, Puntland never claimed for a separate sovereignty.

44 Indirect forms of recognition have been advanced by Ethiopia and UK. 45 The Republic of Somaliland includes six regions, Awdal, Hargeisa, Sahil, Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer. Somaliland comprises the territories of the former British protectorate, which on June 1960 gained independence from the British rule, but decided to unify with Italian Somaliland into the Republic of Somalia. 46 Author’s interview with Abdi Yusuf Bobe, Academy for Peace, 25/10/2011.
from the Republic of Somalia; rather it was the first regional entity to inaugurate a process of decentralization, given the absence of a central authority. In comparison with Somaliland, Puntland has not reached the same levels of ‘relative stability’.

In 1998 Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf (one of the SSDF founders) was appointed president, a federal charter was adopted, and a set of administrative functions were rehabilitated. The first government crisis became manifest in 2001, when Yusuf refused to recognize his electoral defeat and launched a military offence against the other candidate, Jama Ali Jama. Yusuf continued to govern Puntland until 2004, when he was nominated president of the TFG, in Somalia. In 2005, Adde Muse Boqor was appointed to the presidency, but the general situation rapidly worsened. The high level of poverty in coastal areas encouraged piracy, which has become a factor of instability, and Bosasso, one of Somalia’s most important ports, has become the center of piracy activity. Inside the region there has been a pervasive constitutional impasse, inaugurated by the former president Abdullahi Yusuf when he extended one more year of its mandate. In 2004, the Adde Muse administration opted for an extension of one more year: a constitutional reform was introduced, and since 2006 a constitutional review has been operative. In 2011 Puntland has been officially recognized by the TFG as a ‘founding federal state’, inside the Second Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference Constitution convened by the TFG in Garowe, in February 2012 (Second Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference: 2012).

Galmudug, instead, is an autonomous region established on August 14, 2006 formed by the two provinces of Mudug and Galgaduug. Together with Puntland, the region of Galmudug has been officially recognized by the Somali Federal Government as a potential federal state. Galmudug is enjoying legal recognition even if it is not exerting effective (and exclusive) control: parts of its territory are actually under the control of pirates, al-Shabaab, and Puntland forces.

4.3.3 Limbo State-governments

In the shadow of these two recognized authorities (Puntland and Galmudug), a plethora of ‘mini-states’ have emerged (Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Mohamed Askar 2012).

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47 Author’s interview, Hargeisa (October 2012).
since the Federal Charter of the TFG, approved in 2006, introduced and encouraged the formation of ‘State governments, Regional and District Administrations’ \(^{48}\),

In the regions of Galgudug and Mudug, 7 state governments (Galmudug, Waax and Waadi, Himan and Heeb, Gal-Hiran and Haradh, Mareeg, Somali central state, Galguduug) and 2 district administrations (Bila Quban and El-Bur) have been created. In the region of Hiran, one state government (Hiran) and one diaspora administration (Hiraan and Midland) have been announced. Since 2009 in the Shabelle regions, almost three regional administrations (Shabeelaha Dhexe, Benadir, Wagaadhi) and three state governments (Benaadirland, Hir iyo Maanyo, Abweyn State) have been formed, while across the Juba regions there have emerged approximately 11 state governments (Azania, Dooxada Cagaaran, Greenland, Koofur-Galbeed, Jubaland, Jubba and Shabelle, Juba-Jasiira, Jubba-Ras, Shabelle-Jubba, South west, Udubland). A similar process has also occurred in the provinces controlled by Puntland and Somaliland: in the Bari region (Puntland) two regional administrations (Ras Aseyr, Karkaar) were established, while in in the southern area of Sool and Sanaag, (Somaliland) the state of Khatumo was recently proclaimed.

These mini-states survive in a statehood limbo, for several reasons. Firstly, authorities leading these states do not exercise an effective control over the territory, often because diaspora groups have been engaged in the process of formation of their own state but from outside the Somali territory \(^{49}\). In the southern regions of Juba Hoose and Juba Dheze there has been a proliferation of states supported by diaspora in foreign countries: in Scandinavia, in January 2011, the Somali diaspora created the state of Jubba-Ras which claims to govern the Lower and Middle Jubba regions. In 2010, Greenland and Juba-Jasiira were created in Nairobi, claiming to administer both the Jubba regions. In the same year, the Somali diaspora in Ohio promoted the formation of the Shabelle-Jubba, while in Minesota the Somali diaspora sponsored the formation of Jubaland (Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Mohamed Askar 2012).

Secondly, these authorities are not the most durable and realistic solutions for the Federal Republic of Somalia \(^{50}\): many of these states have emerged and then suddenly disappeared from the scene. For example, between Puntland and Somaliland there exists a

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\(^{48}\) State governments comprehend of two or more regions federate, based on their free will. District Administrations comprehend of governments that control less than two regions.

\(^{49}\) Author’s interviews, Hargeisa October 2011, London 2012.

\(^{50}\) Author’s interview, with Faisal Ali Waraabe, 31 October 2012.
buffer zone, formed by the disputed territories of Sool Sanaag and Cayn, where a large set of states have alternatively emerged and disappeared. In 2008, the leaders of the clan Dulbahante announced the formation of an autonomous state, the Northland State of Somalia. But during the dispute with Puntland, Somaliland extended its control on the presumed capital, Las Anod, and the Northland state ceased to exist. In January 2012, the Khatumo state of Somalia has been announced within the same contested territories of Loos Anod. On the other side, in 2008, the formation of the Maakhir state of Somalia was proclaimed in the northern part of this contested territory (Sanaag)51, but in 2009 it was again incorporated inside Puntland.

And lastly state governments face a third constraint: they often establish instrumental relationships with neighboring countries, producing controversial results in terms of stability52. For instance, on 3 April 2011 in Kenya, the formation of the Azania Regional State of Somalia53 was announced, as a new buffer state located on the southwest border with Kenya and Ethiopia: leaders from the three regions of the Juba River met in Nairobi to firm up plans of nominating a parliament and a house of elders to govern the new state. Similarly to other state governments, Azania aspires to become part of the Federal Republic of Somalia54. In the meanwhile, Azania has declared that the main goal of his administration will be to defeat al-Shabaab: on the basis of this common security denominator Kenya has actively supported its formation ‘pouring money (and) supplies into the Jubaland area for some time to fight [al] Shabaab’ (Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Mohamed Askar 2012), while Azania has allowed Kenyan troops to invade the Somali territory, in October 2011, for pursuing Al-Shabaab fighters.

In sum, proclaiming state-government has become a way to gain a credible role on the national scene, participating in the enforcement of the regional security and the construction of the federal system. The territorial fragmentation of Somalia is approximately represented in the Figure 6.

51 The Maakhir state comprised 1/3 of Puntland’s territory and was inhabited by more than 650,000.
52 Author’s interviews, Hargeisa October 2011, London 2012.
53 This new autonomous region comprises the regions of Gedo and Lower Juba, covering a territory of 87,000 km², inhabited by 1.9 million of people.
54 ‘State of Somalia and all other Federal Somali Regional States shall advocate that Somali Nation and its people are one and indivisible and under no circumstance or excuse, Somali people will accept the division of their beloved Nation of Somalia and its people’ (Ali et all:2008).
Figure 6. Territorial fragmentation in Somalia

Source: http://mapsof.net/search?term=somalia
5. Evidence for an alternative path to reconciliation: the case of Somaliland

Before evaluating whether the cases of foreign intervention presented in the following chapters effectively support my arguments, it is necessary to take into consideration to what extent other factors might actually explain the persistence of state disintegration in Somalia. Since advocates of the traditional approach have long since sustained that disintegration is protracted by the existence of clan divisions that have splintered the Somali landscape (Ssereo 2003, Wam and SarDesai 2005, Rotberg 2011), this section should try to demonstrate the opposite argument. But any IR scholar should be skeptical about this chirurgic operation: the pretence of isolating the role of international variables cannot be seriously taken into consideration, especially when applied to the state theories. Thus, this section will not attempt to convince the reader that inter-clan factional tensions have been irrelevant in Somalia: this would be foolish and misleading. However, recognizing the role played by internal factors within the statehood crisis raises one fundamental doubt: if ‘the segmentary lineage system or clan structure remains the bedrock foundation of the pastoral Somali society, and the primacy of clan interests is its natural divisive reflection at the political level’ (Lewis 1999), it is therefore ‘scientifically unacceptable’ (Laitin 1997: 2) to emphasize this factor ‘as an explanation for a changed value on the dependent variable’.

The Somaliland experience illustrates that clan organization cannot be considered a hostage of bloody-minded forces, as mainstream literature has tried to suggest. This paragraph will illustrate the manner in which the segmentary lineage system in Somaliland has paved the way to an alternative path of reconciliation and state-making. I will discuss the Somaliland case in the light of two historical periods identified by Ali, Mohamed and Walls (2008) as the stages of peace-building (1991-1993) and institution-building (1993-1997).

5.1 Peace building (1991-1993)

After the collapse of Siad Barre’s government, Somalia was embroiled in a permanent civil war: while separatism impinged the opposition in southern regions, in the North the liberation war culminated with self-proclamation of the independent Republic of Somaliland. The revolt against Barre escalated in 1988, when the Somali National Movement launched an offensive against governative troops in Hargeisa and Burao. The Somali army responded with air bombing which destroyed the two northern cities, but without hampering the advance of rebel militia: the SNM seized control of a major
northern area, and Barre was definitively defeated. Since early 1991, elders belonging to the northern clans have inaugurated a set of meetings to reconcile their combatants, and the SNM has accepted to ‘rely on traditional approach at peace-building’ (Drysdale 1994). The history of the Somaliland peace-building can be explained though a set of crucial factors.

The first important element has been the resort to traditional methods of conflict management (I). ‘When the state collapsed, the traditional system of governance was reactivated bringing the elders back as key players in local politics’ (Ali et all 2008). Local mediation committees were created for solving land conflicts, though the use of customary law (xeer)\footnote{Customary law has been crucial for the promotion of dialogue and mediation because facilitators have used instruments familiar to the population, usually employed for regulating the justice (systems of punishment and payment for crimes, compensatory system for property rights) and civil administration (marriage, access to resources, property rights).} and other traditional mechanisms. The centerpiece of this process has been the principle of reciprocity: conflict resolution was not oriented towards obtaining justice, rather to re-establishing an equilibrium that is acceptable to all parties\footnote{Diya (blood compensation), Diyo bixin (blood compensation, payment for a person’s life) and inter-clan marriage represent three of the most important rules guiding the solution of conflicts. Author’s interview with Abdillahi Ibrahim Habane, General Secretary of the Guurti, House of elders, 18/10/2011}.

Elders have been the most important protagonists of this traditional system of peace-building. Both communities and administration directly approached them for conflict management because they were perceived as ‘more familiar, fair and knowledgeable than state institutions and therefore better qualified to arbitrate in land-based conflicts’ (ibidem: 42). Elders have been crucial both in stopping conflict and in demobilizing armed groups. Demilitarization was essential: according to Ali Waran Ade, ‘Every clan, form different side, has pacified its own specific area of the city’\footnote{Author’s interview with Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Civil Aviation Minister 17/10/2011}. In an attempt to convince militia to stop fighting, the clan system has sponsored the civil reconversion of former-combatants into members of the army\footnote{‘We have tried to collect weapons because it was too dangerous having still armed people. The formation of a national army was indispensable to limit the risks associated with arms proliferation. We have tried to give them a salary, food, to put them in a separate place, and we have convinced them that this was the best way they could live and survive. It was a way to offer them an incentive for stopping conflict’. Author’s interview with Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Civil Aviation Minister 17/10/2011.}. Women also played a significant, but often shadow\footnote{Author’s interview with Farah Mohamoud Jama, Nagaad, 23/10/2011.} role in
conflict mitigation (Nagaad 2002, 2008), though their median position between two separate clan structures: the paternal clan and the marital clan.

The second element peculiar to the Somaliland way of pacification, as noted by Ali, Mohamed and Walls (2008), has been the preparatory nature of this process (II): conferences of national reconciliation in Berbera, Borame and Hargeisa have been preceded by a series of local meetings and inter-clan negotiations, oriented to promote the participation of social, traditional and religious leaderships. The first important meeting was held in February 1991 in the city of Oog, between the SNM and the Dhalbahante delegation, which established the necessity of addressing a conference in Berbera with other clans. In the meanwhile, a ceasefire was negotiated between the SNM and the Gadabursi group, in the western territories of Tulli and Borama. On the 15th of February 1991 the first national conference was held in Berbera between delegations from all the clans, which confirmed the ceasefire established during the preliminary meetings. In April, a second conference was held in Burao to continue the process of ‘confidence building’: the chair of the SNM announced the independence of the Republic of Somaliland and that the SNM would run the government until May 1993. The entire process was not immune from inter-clan fighting (Walls 2011): in May 1992, tensions escalated between Habar Je’lo and Habar Yoonis for the succession inside the SNM Central Committee. But local meetings were been able to settle the disputes: the Sheekh Conference, in October 1992, concluded the conflict in Burao and Berbera, but it also introduced the idea of forming a National Assembly of Elders (Guurti), representative of all the northern clans (Walls 2011). In 1993, the Borama conference was inaugurated to assure the transition from a military government towards a civilian one: representatives convened on the necessity of establishing a new constitutional structure. In 1993, another important conference was held in Erigavo as result of fifteen inter-clan meetings, oriented to pacify armed groups in the region of Sanaag (SDRA 1994). As summarized in Table 3, the three national conferences held in Berbera, Burao and Hargeisa have been preceded and followed by a total of 34 sub-national conferences, between 1990 and 1997.

60 According to Faisal Ali Waraabe: ‘We went around for 20 month making dialogue between militias and governments. It was easy to make peace because there were not external influences. In Somaliland there are main 4-5 clan. We strength the cohabitation with Intermarriage. So we know each other. It was more easy to make peace because we were more homogeneous. It was a political struggle, not an ethnic one’ (Ali et all 2008).
<table>
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<th>Place</th>
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The third important element in this process has been the *codification* of traditional *peace-building into a process of institution-building* (III). During the elders’ meeting prior to the Burao Conference (June 1991), the level and nature of political participation was assured though the introduction of methods and criteria of reconciliation shared amongst all the clans, attributing to each territorial authority a pacification function. The conference established the ‘responsibility of each clan for the security of their territories and the control of their militias’ (Mahamoud Abdi Sh. Ahmed 2011: 93). During the Sheekh conference, the principle of clan responsibility (‘*ama dalkaa qab, ama dadka qab’*) assumed a universalistic relevance, and was formalized in the ‘Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter’ presented in Borame.

The fourth peculiar factor to this pacification was the restoration of the Somaliland independence (Somaliland’s claim to sovereign status 2003). The idea of establishing a separate administration following in the footsteps of the independency gained by the former British Protectorate, in 1961, enjoyed strong and populist support. Somaliland had scarified its own sovereignty to pursue the dream of a unified Republic of Somalia, but this enthusiasm was lost amid Somaliland’s marginalisation and subordinate status inside the union (Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland 2001). The subsequent feeling of betrayal motivated the entire civil war against Barre, however the SNM had never included a claim for independence in its agenda. The major catalyst of the northern independence was the perception that southern allies (mainly the USC) would never be willing to share power with northern parties. According to Ali et all (2008) ‘the most critical immediate catalyst was Ali Mahdi’s declaration of the formation of a government in Mogadishu’ (1998:38).

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61 Author’s interview with Abdillahi Ibrahim Habane, General Secretary of the Guurti, House of elders, 18/10/2011.
63 Other principles, belonging to the traditional system, mixed with the adoption of Sharia, were codified inside the Chart, as for example the return of confiscated lands, the exchange of war prisoners, the demobilization of armed militia and their return in each designated clan area (Bradbury 1994).
64 Author’s interview with students, academics, civil servants and elders, October 2011, Hargeisa.
65 Author’s interview with Abdillahi Ibrahim Habane, General Secretary of the Guurti, House of elders, 18/10/2011.
66 Author’s interview with Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Civil Aviation Minister 17/10/2011 and Rashid Hassan, State minister for International affair, 31/10/2011.
In summary, successful reconciliation has been pursued in Somaliland, where affordable mechanisms for managing inter-clan conflicts have been established. This process was entirely reliant on the capacity of traditional practices to stop the conflict and consolidate peace. The clan lineage system has played, in this process, an undeniable peacemaker function.

5.2 Institution-Building (1993-1997)

The phase of institution-building in Somaliland can be analytically defined by two national conferences oriented to establish a new constitutional structure: the Borame (1993) and Hargeisa (1997) conferences.

The Borame conference is considered the centerpiece of the Somaliland formation: on one side, it formalized the principles of grassroots peacebuilding inside the ‘Somaliland Communities Security and Peace Charter’. On the other side, it proposed a hybrid system of government, a mixture between a presidential system, based on the tradition of western political institutions, and elements of the Beel system which recognizes kinship as the organizing principle of the Somali society (Bradbury et all 2003). The Parliament, in fact, consists of the House of Representatives and the House of the Elders. This last one, known as Guurti, is a National Council of Elders, reuniting all the elders of northern clans who are entrusted with safeguarding peace and stability (Somaliland Upper House of Parliament 2007). The phase of institution-building culminated in June 1993 with the election of the president, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

A short period of peace endured until October 1994, when new fighting arose around the sovereignty’s formation. During the phase of institution-building, the Somaliland political scene was unravelled by rampant factionalism and clan politicking, provoked by the clash of interests between opposed political forces. This phase was shaped by an intense political conflict between the Egal administration and its local opponents. Two main conflicts must be mentioned: a first discontent had arisen from one clan, Habar Yonis, refused to cooperate with the Egal administration (Ali, et all 2008:21) and declared its support for the SNA in Mogadishu (led by Aidid). Major fighting erupted when the

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67 Author’s interview with Abdi Yusuf Bobe, Academy for Peace, 25/10/2011.
68 Based on clan system.
69 ‘Enacting laws concerning security and stability, religion and culture; and reviewing laws passed by the House of Representatives with the exception of budgetary laws’ (Somaliland House of Peace: 2012).
70 Author’s interview with Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Civil Aviation Minister 17/10/2011 and Rashid Hassan, State minister for International affairs, 31/10/2011.
Egal administration attempted to keep control of the Hargeisa airport, where two ex-SNM militia units (composed of ‘Iidagalle and Habar Yoonis) were refusing to accept integration into a national army.

A second tension broke out in 1995 when Egal decided to extend control on the area of Burao where Habar Yonis militia were situated, and clashes between government troops and Garhajis militiam again (Bradbury 2009: 117). These conflicts were part of a struggle for political advantage, not clan revenge, because the contention concerned the process of negotiating administrative rules inside the emerging process of institution-building, and the control of resources located in areas where specific clans were situated.

Despite the traditional mediation that was successful in solving the first phase of conflict, the political nature of this new contention was immune to the cure of traditional approaches. These conflicts were only partially mitigated by the efforts of the ‘Somaliland Peace Committee’ to create conditions for a ceasefire. The Hargeisa Peace and Reconciliation Conference, held in October 1996, settled these conflicts, inaugurating the era of discrete stability in Somaliland. This conference differentiated from traditional methods previously envisaged because it was entirely organized by the government and it was respondent to a clear attempt of the Egal’s administration to centralize the process of institution-building (WSP International 2005, Ali et al. 2008). Even if this initiative met many discontents, the political strength of the Egal administration was able to impose a cease-fire and to manage the fighting surrounding the institutional process. In the aftermath, the conference inaugurated the period of ‘democratization’ (Ali et al. 2008), introducing a multi-party system, and establishing a period of peace that has been consolidated during the last 15 years.

Since 1997, Somaliland has accomplished renewed and constant efforts to build a ‘complete democracy’ oriented towards convincing the International community of its ability in conquering the requirements for statehood (Somaliland’s claim to sovereign status 2003). This phase of Somaliland’s recent history illustrates that institution-building has not been subject to the externalization of political authority that has

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71 Sub-clan of Habar Yonis.
72 For many ‘Iidagalle, their struggle was not with the Sa’ad Muuse, but with the Government, and a similar situation pertained for the Habar Yoonis: they were also fighting the Government rather than Habar Je’lo’ (Walls 2011: 142).
73 On 31 May 2001, a national constitution was approved by public referendum. In December 2002, the first local council elections occurred, while in April 2003 half a million Somalilanders voted for presidential elections.
traumatized the process of reconciliation in Somalia\textsuperscript{74}. In contrast, Somaliland has inaugurated a process of indigenization of the political authority (Somaliland Upper House of Parliament 2007), where respect for western criteria of statehood has been accompanied by attempts to bridge forms of democratic governance with traditional consensus and clan representation.

This analysis was undertaken with the aim of disconfirming the hypothesis attributing to clan system an innate conflictual connotation: the most important element of continuity between northern and southern Somalia has been the structure of societal organization. Clanship represents in fact, an element of geographic and temporal continuity between Southern and Northern Somalia. From a spatial perspective, society in Somalia and Somaliland are equally organized around the kinship element. From a temporal perspective, at the beginning of the XX century, the political communities organized around the Somali society have established indigenous states (the Ifat/Adal and the Ajuuraan Sultanates) that endured for long periods of time, without becoming entangled in the dysfunctions that have occurred in recent decades\textsuperscript{75}.

Whilst major challenges remain for Somaliland to realize the wellbeing of all Somalilanders, its recent experience suggests that the nature of the clan systems supporting the Somali society cannot be reasonably\textsuperscript{76}, and logically (Laitin 1997), considered the variable explaining the persistence of state disintegration.

6. Conclusions

In this paper I have tried to contribute to the debate on Somalia through an empirical analysis of the persistent disintegration. The analysis of the political authority has shown that Somalia has been embroiled in a period of interregnum for almost 21 years and that in this period the trend of state legitimacy has reached very low standard. Even if this trend has followed a slightly rising parable, the median percentage variation is not significant to disconfirm the hypothesis claiming for the implosion of the central authority. As a second step, the analysis of conflict has shown that conflict trend has deteriorated for 21 years.

\textsuperscript{74} Author’s interviews, Hargeisa October 2011.
\textsuperscript{75} According to the diachronic analysis conducted by Walls (2011: 155) ‘a series of indigenous states did establish themselves over a period of history beginning in about the twelfth century, and continuing through until the start of the colonial era. Two early examples, the Ifat/Adal and the Ajuuraan Sultanates endured for long periods of time, demonstrating the existence of meta-institutional arrangements that were sufficiently robust to allow the transfer of power from one sovereign to another’.
\textsuperscript{76} Author’s interviews, Hargeisa October 2011.
Two decades of protracted demobilization have resulted in some significant changes: the number of parties’ participant is increased (I), the intensity has recently reached the highest value (II), and the conflict has been internationalized (III). The analysis of fragmentation has demonstrated that almost 1/3 of the territory is ruled by local authority and is out of the control of central government, these quasi-states (*Republic of Somaliland, Federal Republic of Somalia*), autonomous regions or state governments (*Puntland, Galmudug*), limbo-state governents (*Galmudug, Waax and Waadi, Himan and Heeb, Gal-Hiran and Haradh, Mareeg, Somali central state, Galguduug, Hiraan, Midland, Benaadirland, Hir iyo Maanyo, Abweyn State, Azania, Dooxada Cagaaran, Greenland, Koofur-Galbeed, Jubaland, Jubba and Shabelle, Jub-Jasiira, Jubba-Ras, Shabelle-Jubba, South west, Udubland, Khatumo) and district administrations (*Bila Quban and El-Bur, Shabeelaha Dhexe, Benadir, Wagaadhi, Ras Aseyr, Karkaar*) all coexists under the same skyline.

The empirical analysis proposed in this paper has provided strong evidence of the persistence of state disintegration in Somalia. Yet, much empirical research on Somalia’s disintegration remains to be done. Further efforts would try to evaluate the consolidation of sovereignty’s fragments, which cannot be included at this stage, for obvious reasons of data availability and comparability. This chapter has also attempted to pierce the veil of conventional wisdoms generally informing much of the public and academic debate, by testing the validity of the clanship-traditionalist hypothesis. Considered the best rival theory available for disproving the interventionist assertion, clanship has offered indeed an unpersuasive interpretation of the outcome of conflict resolution: clanship cannot, alone, predict the persistence or resolution of state disintegration.
Chapter 4

Long-term international intervention

An ancient Chinese maxim defines insanity as ‘doing the same thing in the same way and expecting a different outcome’... Given this state of historical statelessness, it is an act of insanity to force a centralised state on a people who neither understand it nor seek to have one. The sooner we concede to reality, the more we are likely to avoid the fate of the mad man encountered above (Samatar 2010: 65).

When incorporating historical narratives with highly abstract theories we must negotiate the difficulty of managing archival materials without falling into the trap of the dreaded ‘paper trail’ (George and Bennet 2005). The guiding principle of this entire chapter has been the maintenance of a balance between a congruent historical description and a theoretically focused explanation. The necessity of operating with this double standard in weighing evidence has made the employment of a method of controlled comparison (Bennet 2005), able of building a theoretically explicit narrative tracing mechanisms and comparing blocks of events within a single case, indispensable. This process tracing has been employed as an essential method to reconstruct an explicit chronology of events.

This research supports the Tillian notion according to which theoretically oriented explanations must be based on ‘verifiable causal stories’ more then large-N statistical analyses. Small-N comparisons allow scholars to assess more complex causal processes in a much richer way, but they also present the difficulties that arise from attempting ‘to arrange the material into a story’ (ibidem). The enduring state disintegration in Somalia has been ‘arranged’ as a longitudinal case study divided into three sub-cases, since three stages of intervention have afflicted Somalia from 1991 to 2010: the international intervention under the UN’s mandate (1992-1995); the regional mutual interference conducted by Ethiopia and Eritrea as proxy war for the continuation of their own conflict (1998-2000); the glocal counterterrorism promoted by Ethiopia and the US (2001-2010).
Twenty years of military interventions have created the conditions for a before-after investigation: the end of each stage of intervention constitutes the caesura around which structured comparisons have been organized.

To support the adherence of this case study to the theoretical framework employed, this chapter attempts to determine whether the explanatory variables consistently behave in conjunction with my hypotheses, using the method of structured focused comparison (ibidem) that allows for the presentation of the evidence collected from the case study in a comparable manner. This method has implied the formulation of a set of standardized questions (structured), appropriate with the case under investigation (focused). This set of questions has been formulated in order to establish which kind of implication each stage of intervention has had for the rehabilitation of the Somali conundrum. Firstly, what kind of motivation moved foreign actors to intervene in Somalia (I)? To what extent did foreign actors use international intervention for enhancing both opportunistic and constructive ends (II)? How did foreign actors manage to compel with the unilateral or multilateral structure of the intervention (III)? Thirdly, how did foreign actors manage to compel with the legitimacy, credibility and economic sustainability of each intervention (IV)?

The aim of this chapter is to identify and to evaluate the causal processes that have enabled the foreign interventions to prolong the duration of state disintegration in Somalia. For each stage of intervention, this chapter describes the structure, historical trajectory, and mechanisms connecting intervention with state disintegration.


1.1 Structure of intervention

The UN-US led intervention in Somalia has been one of the most significant instances of peace making pursued by the International Community during the post-cold war period, and one of the most disastrous cases of its failure. The resolution 775 (United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1992a), in March 1992 established the UNOSOM I with the dual aim of monitoring the cease-fire in Mogadishu and providing protection for the UN personnel delivering humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM was a multilateral mission initially composed by 50 military observers and a 500-strong infantry unit. The structure of the mission has been constantly modified: in August 1992, UNOSOM’s mandate and size were expanded to guarantee the protection of humanitarian convoys throughout Somalia. The total number of troops was presumed to rise to 3500, but only an additional military unit of 750 troops was effectively deployed. Although the formal mandate was limited to
military and humanitarian operations, UNOSOM also included in its responsibilities the promotion of political reconciliation (UN 1993).

In December 1992, UNOSOM was expanded and its mandate turned from peacekeeping to peacemaking: the Security Council adopted the resolution 794 (UNSC 1992c), authorizing the US to assume the command of a mission (UNITAF) aimed at establishing a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The resolution defined the conflict in Somalia as a threat to the international security, necessitating the use of ‘all the necessaries means’: for the first time the UN authorized the use of military forces for pursuing a humanitarian operation led under the operational command of a member state. The contingent was formed by 37,000 troops, 28000 provided by the US, while the remaining 9000 came from 20 other countries.UNITAF has been financed by the countries supplying the troops, or by voluntary contributes, and almost the 75% of UNITAF’s cost was picked up by the US.

Given the temporary nature of the UNITAF mission, on 26 March 1993, the Security Council adopted the resolution 814 (UNSC 1993a) approving the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOMII. A peace enforcement operation was authorized under the UN command: the mandate of UNOSOMII was oriented to improve security (‘consolidating, expanding and maintaining a secure environment’), and enhance national reconciliation (promoting the political rehabilitation of Somalia). After the violent defeat of the American troops in February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods, and in early March 1995 UNOSOM troops were definitively withdrawn.

1.1.1 Reasons and interests

United Nations and Unites States have been the major protagonists of this first phase of intervention. Both the actors arrived in Somalia with the goal of resolving conflict and containing its deleterious effects on the humanitarian and political landscape. But since third parties generally enter into foreign conflict for both opportunistic and constructive reasons, different motivations and interests pushed them to get involved. The constructive

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77 On 7 January 1993 the total amount of non-US troops was 9995 (UNOSOMII 2013): forces were send by France (2783), Italy (2150), Canada (1260), Belgium (572), Saudi Arabia (643), Turkey (309), Botswana (303), Egypt (270), Marocco (1356), UK (90), Germany (60), New Zeland (42), Kuwait (43).
reason pushing the UN and US to intervene has been the desire to halt the humanitarian catastrophe.

The UN’s opportunistic reason to intervene in Somalia concerns the possibility of allowing the organization a new role in the management of new warfare. After the cold war, the UN adopted a regulatory function in many inter and intra state wars, increasing the number of peacekeeping operations. Somalia was a ‘golden opportunity for the UN to expand, develop and consolidate its repertoire of peace practice’ (Al-Qaq 2009: 71). UNOSOM has been pursued with the idea of sustaining a political process oriented to redefine sovereignty. The aim of the UN was to redeem state failure revitalizing a modern variation of trusteeship: according to several scholars (Krasner 2004, Ford 2008, Simons 1993) the UN’s involvement has been based on the ‘ideal in international trusteeship in which the UN would assume temporary executive authority in a collapsed state in order to reconstruct acceptable forms of state-society relations’ (ibidem). Somalia was a ‘laboratory for all types of peacekeeping’ (Weiss 1997) and a potential pioneristic operation for solving the emerging crises of stateness.

In parallel, the US decision to intervene cannot be explained exclusively by the recrudescence of violence. At the beginning of the Somali crisis the US was one of the most obstinate supporters of non-intervention. Several factors influenced this hesitation: firstly, there was no government able of issuing a formal invitation to foreign countries for intervening in Somalia; consequently the interventionist posture was not supported by international consensus. Secondly, Bush Senior’s administration repeatedly argued that inter-clan conflict permeating Somalia ‘would make any military intervention too risky’ (Western 1999). And thirdly, when Barre was defeated in Mogadishu, the US-led UN coalition was conducting an attack on Iraq: the international crises in Yugoslavia an Iraq had captured most of the US’s attention.

Many analysts concluded that, because of the absence of vital national interests in Somalia the US was hesitant to get involved, and the further decision to intervene was entirely determined by ‘pure’ humanitarian feeling. In contrast, others have sustained that two opportunistic reasons moved the US towards intervention: the possibility to test the

78 In 1992 the US Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, used these words advocating for non-intervention: ‘The Somali is treacherous. The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as unforgiving (...) Inshallah, think once, twice and three times before you embrace the Somali tarbaby’ (Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby: 1992).

At the end of the Iraqi war, in March 1991, Bush argued that a new world order was struggling to be borne. Somalia became part of the redefined US interventionist doctrine, founded on the idea of building a new world order where the US finally fulfils its historic mission of ‘protecting the weak against the strong’ (Bush 1992). The policy statement of the Bush administration remained too vague about what exactly that order entailed, and the crisis in Somalia offered an ‘entire weak country in which to practice state-building doctrines, drawing the lines of a still embryonic new world order’ (Simons 1993). Somalia was a chance for testing the new US strategy, and the relative success achieved with the airlift operation ‘Provide Relief’, encouraged and convinced the US that a short and low cost solution could be achieved.

Beyond the universal principle guiding the formation of a new world order, geo-strategic considerations have never disappeared. Powell’s doctrine, elaborated at end of the Iraqi war, was based on the idea of deploying overwhelming forces only when vital national interests are at stake, and the public, and its elected representatives, support this initiative (Western 1999). Many analysts failed to see where any vital US interest was involved in Somalia: despite the argument that intervention in Somalia was at odds with the principle of the Powell doctrine, State Department documents offer strong evidence of the significant pressures applied by the oil industry urging US intervention. Somalia was still a site of geostrategic relevance for the US: in the mid-1980s, when geologists disclosed a great underground rift of oil extending into northern Somalia, Bush recognized ‘the growing strategic importance to the West of developing crude oil sources in the region’ (Fineman 1993). In 1991, a World Bank study confirmed that Somalia and Sudan would be two of the eight prospective commercial oil producers in Africa. Since 1986, two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to US oil companies (Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips) making explorations. The US decision to intervene has been directly urged and sponsored by the third largest energy company in the US, Conoco, investing in oil exploration in Somalia (Gibbs 2000). As reported in the Cable from the US Embassy in Mogadishu to State Department Headquarters (Petroleum Exploration: Conoco Searches for Oil in Somalia 1990), Conoco provided logistic and transport support to State Department missions, and arranged security for government personnel. The relationship with the State Department has been justified in terms of mutual assistance: ‘The first prerequisite for oil exploration was the internal peace’, and since 1992 ‘Conoco actively
cooperated in the military operation by permitting its Mogadishu offices to be transformed into a U.S. embassy and military headquarters’ (Parenti 1995:123).

1.1.2 Objectives and strategies

The UN and the US pursued two different objectives in Somalia through two antithetic strategies\textsuperscript{79}. The UN’s involvement was based on the idea that only a modern trusteeship, anchored to the principle of universal sovereignty, could solve and contain the failure of the national sovereignty. For Boutros Ghali UNOSOM was ‘an ambitious political exercise augmented by the military’ (Stevenson 1995): ‘There was no government. There was no order. There was death… We, the UN are rebuilding Somalia’ (ibidem). Therefore, the military component of the operation was oriented to support a political process of nation re-building.

For the US, UNOSOM was the exact opposite, a military mission eased by a little political spadework. Robert Oakley, who served as Special Envoy to Somalia, affirmed that if intervention led to the formation of a new government, ‘that is fine, but it is a Somali phenomenon we are not trying to determinate’. The US was not intending to restore the state in Somalia. On 4 December 1992 President George Bush announced the deployment of American forces in Somalia, making a promise to the people:

We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed (Bush 1992: 4 December).

The ideological differences between UN and the US have turned into a dissonant orchestration. Since the very beginning, intervention in Somalia developed with a decentralized command within a confused structure. As a result, foreign presence has been broader and impudent, and not supported by a coordinate plan. The following sections trace the historical trajectory of the international intervention in Somalia illustrating the phases leading to the formation of UNOSOM, and its operative period.

\textsuperscript{79} Given the US’s de facto primacy in UN internal politics, other analysts have supposed that the two actors were supporting two integrating (but opposite) politics (Stevenson 1995).
1.2 Historical overview: Intervention under UN mandate (1992-1995)

1.2.1 UNOSOM

The decision to intervene in Somalia was reached by the UN after one year of reluctance. The UN reconsidered this decision after Barre’s withdrawal, when conflict re-escalated into a civil war and Somalia precipitated into famine.

On 29 January 1991, two days after Barre withdrew from Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohammad was elected interim-president of Somalia. Since only four central committee members of the USC (out a total of 105) attended the meeting, the general Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid (chairman of the USC) did not recognize the government. In May and June 1991 the first national conferences were held in Djibouti: the second conference sponsored by the Government of Djibouti (Djibouti 2), supported by Italy, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, established the formation of the first government after the Barre’s defeat: Ali Mahdi was elected president, and made responsible for the formation of a new government. Yet the conference was attended by a restricted portion of political actors: the Manifesto group took part in the meeting, but neither Aidid, nor the leaders of the other armed fronts joined it. The absence of military groups undermined the sustainability of the initiative: Ali Mahdi formed the new government without respecting the USC decision to proclaim Aidid chairman of the party, and Aidid rejected Ali Mahdi’s appointment. On the 17th of November serious fighting between the two sides broke out, and the second stage of the civil war erupted in Mogadishu.

In December 1991 the UN general secretary Javier Pérez de Cuélla issued, for the first time, the intention of the UN to take an initiative to solve the crisis. In January 1992 the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, James O.C. Jonah, was sent to Mogadishu with the double aim of bringing a cease-fire and investigating the parties’ propensity to accept an international intervention (United Nations 1996). In the early stage of the UN activity, the cease-fire took priority. Without a formal request of intervention issued to a host government, intervention necessitated the agreement of the belligerents. On the 15th of January 1992, Omer Arteh Ghalib, proclaimed interim prime minister during the Djibouti conference, issued a letter to the UN Permanent Mission of Somalia, requesting an ‘effective action to end the fighting’ (UNISOMI 2013). On 23 January, the

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80 The Djibouti agreement aggravated the split within the USC between the Hawiye and Abgaal. The two wings of the USC formed two alliances: the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Aidid, and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) headed by Ali Mahdi Mohamed.
SC adopted the resolution 733 (1992), urging all the parties to cease hostilities and facilitate the humanitarian assistance. The resolution also imposed a complete arms embargo. On 14th of February in New York, the two factions signed a joint communiqué on the cessation of hostilities.

A delegation (led by Jonah and composed by members of the UN, the Arab League, OAU and OIC) was sent in Mogadishu: consultations agreed on implementing the cease-fire and accepting a UN monitoring mechanism. The agreement was signed in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992 by the interim president (Ali Mahdi), and the United Somali Congress (Aidid). While Ali Mahdi accepted all the elements of the cease-fire, Aidid raised two criticisms: firstly the UN observers should be in civilian uniforms. Secondly, he did not recognize the proceedings of the Djibouti accords as the basis for the new reconciliation conference. On 17th of March 1992 the SC adopted the resolution 746 supporting the deployment of a technical team for delivering humanitarian aid. In the meanwhile, the UN diplomacy began to follow its own course without respecting what was going on in the field: when Jonah’s delegation returned to Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi claimed that only the presence of a large peacekeeping contingent would be able to secure aid delivery. In April 1992, the cease-fire was subordinated to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation: the military capacity of the mission was amended, but Aidid expressed a clear criticism. On 24 April the SC adopted another resolution (751) that authorized UNOSOM, establishing the deployment of observers and ‘adequate security personnel’ (500 infantry) to safeguard the activity of the observers (UNISOMI 2013).

In parallel, Barre reorganized his forces under the Somali National Front (SNF) and advanced towards Mogadishu. Given the renewed common threat, the USC, SPM, SSNM (Southern Somali National Movement) and SDM (Somali Democratic Movement) coalesced into the Somali Liberation Army (SLA) under the leadership of Aidid. Fighting extended from Baidoa to the Lower Juba, where, on the 16th of June, the SLA forced Barre to withdraw. In June 1992, the balance of power between Aidid and Mahdi was clearly favourable to Aidid. When Mahdi urged the UN to deploy a peacekeeping operation, Aidid felt that intervention would prevent him from maintaining his position. Mahdi was hopeful that the presence of foreign troops would be a deterrent against Aidid, while Aidid and its faction harboured the suspicion that the UN was prone to supporting Ali Mahdi.

The UN planned a small-scale peacekeeping operation that was gradually transformed into a large-scale operation (United Nations 1996). Yet, peacekeepers have been deployed without an effective cease-fire: observers arrived in Mogadishu on 23rd of
July 1992, and in August the parties signed an agreement on the establishment of a further 500 Pakistani peacekeepers (UNOSOMI 2013). The continuous redefinition of the aims of the mission on the basis of Mahdi requests, made Aidid extremely suspicious. The SC authorized the deployments of adjunctive peacekeepers that were never positioned because of Aidid’s disagreement: on the 28th of October, Aidid declared that UN troop deployments in Kismayo and Berbera ‘was not acceptable’, and in November he officially demanded that UNOSOM leave the airport where it was positioned.

Three events in the course of 1992 compromised the credibility of the UN in Somalia. Firstly, limited resources undermined the effectiveness of the mission (Ali Jimale Ahmed 1995). Four and a half million people required urgent assistance, and in May 1992 a relief program, ‘90-Day Plan of Action’, was launched: food and vital assistance were delivered, but against the $117 million needed and appealed for, only $ 41 million was donated by July 1992. On the 26th of July, the UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali proposed an emergency airlift in the southern regions. In August, the US announced it would support the UN through the deployment of 10 military aircraft for transporting food and aid from Mombasa towards the southern territories. The operation ‘Provide relief’ has been considered one of the most successful operations, able to stop the famine and save an estimated 200,000 lives. The operation was an important attempt to contain the crisis but it was subject to many operational constraints, related to the absence of operative infrastructures to ensuring the food distribution. It also generated controversial outcomes: in September 1992, only the 40% of food delivered, effectively reached people. In some areas, the aid was transformed into a source of political competition and depredation between contending militia.

Secondly, in June 1992 a Russian airplane arrived in Mogadishu from Nairobi transporting arms and Somali currency for Ali Mahdi (Stevenson 1995). The UN opened an investigation on the incident, and it in its own defense appealed to an error into the aircraft’s label, since the vehicle was previously under contract to the World Food Program. However, the results of the investigation have never been published, and the UN has never reacquired its credibility (Ford 2008).

Thirdly, all the attempts made by the special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun to forge a semblance of accountability into the UN have been nullified by the diplomacy of the headquarters, in particular by the Secretary General Boutrous Ghali (Sahnoun 1994). While Sahnoun was trying to ‘close the communication gaps among the UN relief agencies, the Somalis and the NGOs’ the ‘UN was struggling to put a peacekeeping force
on the ground’ (Hirsch and Oakley 1995). The deployment of 500 peacekeepers was the object of an extenuate negotiation between Sahnoun and Aidid. In the middle of this negotiation, the SC approved another amendment to UNISOM capacity through the resolution 767 (USCN 1992b): the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops around Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo (ibidem, Drysdale 1994). The decision taken by Boutrous Ghali to enlarge the mission to 3500, without consulting Sahnoun, caught both Aidid and Sahnoun unaware (United Nations 1996, Sahnoun 1994).

Aidid obtained the confirmation of all its suspicion when Sahnous was forced to hand in his resignation and in November 1992 Ismat Kittani replaced him. Shanoun had openly criticised (Sahnoun 1994) the UN inefficiency and ineffectiveness in promoting a serious agenda for peace: at the core of his criticism was the early reluctance to get involved, the overlap between aims and strategies, the over bureaucratization and the complete lack of coordination between agencies.

UNOSOM did not reach significant results until 1992. In November 1992, Botrous Ghali informed the Security Council of the existence of an anti-UN feeling: an ‘invasion syndrome’ and ‘disturbing developments’ that were undermining the capacity of the mission to be effective (United Nations 1996). The Pakistani soldiers who arrived in September were unable to become operative, and the expected 3000 troops have never been deployed. The deterioration of the general situation, and UNOSOM’s ineffectiveness led the UN to rethink the principles of intervention in Somalia.

1.2.2 UNITAF

In November 1992, after one year of extensive opposition to employing American military force, the Bush administration launched a massive military intervention in Somalia: the failure of the UN initiative, in conjunction with increasing pressure on the US to become more involved in Somalia and Bosnia, led the US to reconsider its initial hesitation. On the 9th of December 1992, UNITAF was deployed in Mogadishu with a huge proof of strength. The 100-day action program was quickly and successfully implemented: UNITAF secured ports, aircrafts and roads, food arrived in many of the central and southern areas, UNICEF expanded its operations and famine was temporary.

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81 Sahnoun criticized the inertia and lack of coordination between UN agencies. The impossibility to provide a common direction to UN activities pushed Sahnoun to claim for a supervision of UN agencies, proposing to Boutros Gali a division of role between political and humanitarian affairs. The Secretary General admonished Sahnoun for it public criticism and did not supported his claims, leaving Sahnoun forced to resign (United Nations 1996, Sahnoun 1994).
defeated. But early in 1993, the ambiguity of UNITAF’s mission began to affect its relationship with the Somali population (Ford 2008).

UNITAF was oriented to disarm ‘the lawless gangs’ and to create a secure environment, enabling the UN to provide humanitarian relief (United Nations 1996). But since there was no clear definition of how the ‘security environment’ might be improved, the UN and the US conceived two different strategies. The UN believed that two conditions were essential for a successful transition: demilitarizing the organized factions and extending international control over the whole of Somalia, whilst the US restricted the security’s mandate to the provision of immediate humanitarian assistance. The ambiguity was introduced by the resolution 794 (UNSC 1992c), which made reference only to the establishment of a vague ‘security environment’. Appealing to this ambiguity the US refused to be engaged in peace-enforcement and argued for the substitution of UNITAF with a UN command:

It will also be necessary for us to keep in the closest touch in planning for the eventual transfer of responsibilities from the unified command to a United Nation peace-keeping operation in the form of an enlarged UNOSOM, perhaps with a modified mandate (United Nations 1996:216).

Assuming a short-term perspective, the US endorsed a fast and furious approach to securing Somalia, paradoxically this was more intrusive than the long-term approach encouraged by the UN. In the early days of January 1993, marines raided Aidid’s arsenal and swarmed the Bakhara gun market, in Mogadishu. As reported by Corporal William Hutchings, soldiers were acting like an occupying force (Stevenson 1995).

Meanwhile, the UN representatives in Somalia tried to sponsor a political reconciliation: the first proper UN initiative was inaugurated in January 1993, when the Secretary General opened a preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa: all the Somali political movements took part in the summit, along with representatives of regional organizations. On 15th of March a national conference was held in Addis Ababa, and on the 27th of March of 1993 the cessation of hostilities was negotiated; disarmament, restoration of property, and the formation of a Transitional National Council. The TNC was planned to be operative for two years, and a system of Central Administrative Departments (regional and district councils) was created in order to re-establish the government functions.

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82 The only missing party was the SNM, which declared the formation of an independent Republic of Somaliland.
The Addis Ababa conference was based on a peculiar admixture of international diplomacy and Somali traditional tools for conflict resolution. Before the conference was held, the UN encouraged the formation of district councils with the aim of complying with Somali traditional authorities. But western formats of peacebuilding neutralized the impact of traditional tools: firstly, the negotiation introduced a system of elective representation to the district councils, which exasperated the antagonism between militia and traditional leaders\(^{83}\). The nature of the political representation has been subject to huge disagreements between supporters of community or factions: the first advocated that militia leaders were the sole legitimate representatives of the Somali people. While the community-based delegations claimed for their own legitimate representation. The UN officially declared it would stay neutral, but the entire diplomacy was based on the critical relationship with militia leaders, already legitimated in the Djibouti agreement, and already legitimated by the UN’s preventive diplomacy\(^{84}\). The weakness of the Addis Ababa agreement became manifest when the SPM, under the leadership of General Mohammed Said Hersi (Morgan), violated the cease-fire in Kismayo on the 16\(^{th}\) of March 1993 and forces loyal to General Morgan defeated the faction of Omar Jess, allied with Aidid. The Belgian UNITAF troops had indirectly encouraged the defeat of Omar Jess, by provoking the protests of Aidid. The UN active involvement in the battle of Kismayo brought an end to the conference in Addis Ababa.

The failure of negotiations increased the discrepancy between UN and US strategies. The ‘Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia Resolution’ issued by the House of Representatives on the 13\(^{th}\) of March 1993, clearly demonstrates these constraints. Whereas, Congress recognized that restoration of government to Somalia was a fundamental objective of the international community:

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\text{the mission of UNOSOM II (…) is considerably broader than the original United States objective of creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For these reasons, and consistent with the objectives of promptly restoring Somali self-government and withdrawing foreign military forces from Somalia, the Congress declares that United States would begin withdrawing forces from Somalia not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this joint resolution and their functions assumed by UNOSOM II forces (H.J.RES.152.1993).}
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\(^{83}\) Author’s interview, Hargeica, November 2008.

\(^{84}\) The political platform throughout that the UN based its plans for reconciliation on was the Djibouti agreement. The UN employed the political representations figured out in the Djibouti agreement for establishing a criterion of political representation with Somali leaders, without considering the lack of credibility and legitimacy infused in that process.
On the eve of these divisions, in March 1993 the international mission returned to being under UN command.

1.2.3 UNOSOM II

On the 26th of March 1993 the SC approved the transition from UNITAF to a UNOSOMII: the mission came back under the command of the UN, and its mandate was extended to cover nation-building responsibilities (H.J.RES.152. 1993). The transition from UNITAF was completed on the 4th of May 1993. The US remained, however, a key actor and an important source of divergence between the US and the UN disappeared with the change of the American administration: whereas the Bush administration was skeptical about assuming a nation-building commitment, the incoming Clinton administration welcomed the UN idea of promoting political solutions. As stated by Madeline Albright, US Permanent Representative to the UN, the new goal of UNOSOM was ‘nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations’ (United Nations Documents 1993), while the State Department official David Shinn spoke of ‘basically re-creating a country’ (Sheely 1993). Finally, the US vision converged with the initial aim of Boutrous Ghali to redeem Somalia’s sovereignty.

Beyond the UN optimism, the US departure left UNOSOMII highly unprepared: the new mission became an extension of the original mandate but weakened by a reduction of its financial and military capacity. Several factors increased the gap between the presumed and the effective capacity of UNOSOMII: on the military side, the resolution 814 approved a force of 20000 troops (UNSC 1993a), but in May 1993 a large number of forces had still not arrived. UNITAF was withdrawn before troops from other countries had arrived: in May, UNOSOM II had only 17.000 troops, compared to a peak of 37.000 deployed by UNITAF. The size of UNISOMII was reduced by 1/3: the military personnel decreased by 37.000 in March to 28.000 in August 1993 (UNOSOMII 2013). On the financial side, UNOSOM II was the most expansive humanitarian operation ever undertaken, with the annual cost estimated at $ 1.55 billion, but countries were reticent in providing their financial contributions and delays affected the real capacity of the mission (United Nations 1996).

Furthermore, the organizational side of the mission was flawed: essential planning was absent. As pointed out by the Admiral Howe (2012):
There really had been very little preparation done by the United Nations in anticipation of this resolution. So what we had to do is sit down as a staff -- to the extent that we had a staff -- and really build a strategic plan which looked at all the elements; disarmament, determining political representative government and how you got there through district and regional and finally a national assembly. [We had] to look at the whole economic system and how we could help and perhaps direct the re-construction as well as the emergency relief efforts that were going on. It became a much more complex kind of charter, and it also was for the whole of Somalia, not just the areas of starvation, [a mandate to] help this country which was struggling throughout its borders to make its recovery.

The lack of strategic planning compromised the entire operation: UNISOMII pursued disarmament without an effective cease-fire. The use of force for disarming factions led UN troops to fight against the USC/SNA. On 5 June, a UNISOM contingent inspected Radio Mogadishu, the SNA radio station close to the faction arms base. The SNA opened fire killing 23 Pakistani peacekeepers. The following day, the SC passed the resolution 837, authorizing ‘all the necessary measures against those responsible for the 5 June 1993 attack on Pakistani troops serving in UNOSOM II’ (UNSC 1993b).

The resolution 837 was intended to serve as ‘a warning to all those who threaten or harass the peacekeeping forces of the UN in any part of the world’ (UNSC 1993b). On the contrary, it has become the UN’s war declaration to Aidid. A US investigation determined that since the USC controlled many of those territories, ‘General Aidid had the trinity uniquely’ for that attack (Jasper 1994). The defeat of Aidid took precedence over the imposition of a cease-fire or demilitarization: on 12 June 1993 UNOSOMII, in collaboration with the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF), began an active campaign aimed at neutralizing the SNA, who indeed answered with intensified guerrilla warfare. Attacks on UN personnel and facilities increased, while US air missiles made a high number of causalities. On the 12th of June 1993, the QRF attacked a compound, the Abdi House in South Mogadishu killing many civilians.

When the conflict worsened, the military profile of the US rapidly increased: Admiral Howe announced a $25.000 reward for information helping to capture general Aidid, while Boutros Ghali asked the new Clinton administration to assist him in arresting Aidid (UNISOMII 2013). On the 22nd of August 1993, the US authorized the deployment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) in response to the attacks made by the SNA. The so-called ‘ranger task force’ did not fall under the UNOSOM II command: it remained under American control. In September the conflict worsened, culminating in the Battle of the Black Sea (Ma-alinti Rangers in Somali): on 3 October, two U.S. Black

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85 The task-force was formed by ground special operations, helicopters, U.S. Air Force special personnel and U.S. Navy Seals.
Hawk helicopters were shot down and 18 US soldiers belonging to the Ranger Task force were killed. This event signalled a turning point in the involvement of the international community (Boutros-Ghali 1996): on 6 October, Clinton announced all troops will be out by the 31st of March 1994 and that the UNOSOM mission will no longer include nation building responsibilities.

The military capacity of UNOSOM was seriously weakened: more than 9000 troops were withdrawn, the European troops were evacuated, and many member states were reticent in sending other troops, or financing the mission. The European allies turned to the conclusion that the crisis in Somalia would be resolved only by a political, not military, solution. As a result, in April 1994 the number of troops allocated in Somalia decreased to 3000. The refusal to allocate the adequate resources for implementing nation building curbed any further UNOSOM development: nobody would keep their own flag on the ruins of Mogadishu and the UN was forced to completely rethink its Somalia strategy. The SC revised the UNISOM’s mandate until the end of May 1994, and authorized only peacekeeping operations, reducing the size of the mission. Peace enforcement functions, such as coercive disarmament and the use of force, were no more part of the mandate. On the 9th of October the SNA declared a cease-fire, and the UN revitalized the political reconciliation introducing for the first time the idea of a ‘building-block’ approach, which gave ‘priority to directing international reconstruction resources to those regions where security is being re-established’ (United Nations 1996:66).

Before the UNISOMII backlash, the UN had convened a set of regional conferences in the northeast and central regions. Also in Mogadishu, UNOSOM II sponsored several inter clan meetings, one of the largest was held in early October, just few days before the Battle of Rangers was fought. These efforts culminated with the second national reconciliation conference convened by the UN in Nairobi: on 24 March 1994, Ali Mahdi and Aidid signed for the umpteenth time a Declaration on National Reconciliation. The two leaders repudiated, for the umpteenth time, any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts, but no substantial progresses has been made to make these promises reliable. The SC decided to terminate the mission on the 31st of March of 1995. Troops and staff were gradually reduced and almost 50 UN staff remained for monitoring the situation. The UN’s material inability to sustain the plan of reconciliation, determined a

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86 The evanescence of this declaration was manifest when two Italian journalists, Ilaria Alpi and Miran Kroyatin, were killed on 24 March, the same day in which cease-fire was formally established.
progressive withdrawal of international hope for Somalia. Since that time it has been generally recognised that international actors have left Somalia in a worse condition than when they had first intervened (Moller 2009).

1.3 Intervening variables: factionalism and war economy

During this first stage, the UN intervened in Somalia with the aim of sustaining the weaker party (the SSA led by Ali Mahdi) who were considered the legitimate ruling party, and to isolate the stronger, insurgent, faction (the USC/SNA led by Aidid). But contrary to the cases in which intervention has served to curb the rebellion by culminating in the defeat of the insurgents, in Somalia the opposite has been the case, since the battle of the Black sea marked the defeat of the American troops and the withdrawal of the international forces. This first phase of intervention oriented to isolate the insurgents, has generated two dangerous outcomes doomed to protract the status of disintegration: the legitimation of clan factionalism (I) and the reinforcement of war economy (II).

Firstly (I), the UN’s lack of material basis for peace transformed warlords into peacelords (Menkhaus 1997). The necessity of pursuing nation building and conflict resolution made the UN prone to legitimating the existing factions, while traditional leaders played no role in these proceedings: ‘in attempting to bring the warlord together for national-level negotiations, the UN and US also effectively legitimated their authority and gave them added leverage in their local wars for land’ (Cassanelli 1997:75). As a result, the UN increased the legitimacy of militia factions that perceived their participation in national conference as an instrument for gaining domestic legitimacy: UNOSOM enhanced the legitimacy of the insurgents, ceding authority to one of the parties or another. The UN undersecretary James Jonah had recognized Ali Mahdi as the interim president, without considering that the base of his authority (Djibouti 2 Accord) was largely unrecognized by all the other factions (United Nations 1996), while the UN special representative Sahnoun increased the foreign reliance on Aidid’s control of Mogadishu.

The UN extensively focused on the USC struggle for Mogadishu and Kismayo, instead of addressing the basis of Somalia’s conflict, the land resources. The factional conflict within the Hawiyee for the control of the capital city obscured the fact that ‘one of the driving forces behind the civil war in southern Somalia was the competition for access to natural resources’ (Cassanelli 1997: 67). Land allocation and compensations have been completely excluded by the UN reconciliation agenda, since operations monitoring land grabbing would require a deep knowledge of the Somali society, knowledge that UN
advisers would not be able to provide (ibidem). UNOSOM has failed to address the real cause of conflict, and it has largely focused on the factional conflict, contributing to expanding, rather than containing, the civil war. When in 1993 conflict erupted between SNA and UN/US troops, the fragile equilibrium between the neutrality of the UN’s role and the Somali willingness to accept the foreign intervention definitely deteriorated. The UN informally declared war to Aidid, taking a precise side in the conflict, and failing to establish a secure environment. Four months of fierce confrontations culminated with the UN-US disaster, the unprecedented Somali triumph of the 3rd of October, and the unprecedented International failure. As a consequence, Somali civil society has been completely excluded from the process of political restoration and Intervention focused on the oppressor, rather than the victim of the conflict.

Secondly (II), the humanitarian relief has achieved the short-term goal of alleviating the suffering of the Somali population traumatized by three years of civil war, but it has also fomented conflict by making a business out of the war. Agencies delivering food or installing passive mechanisms of food consume, have generated a dependency syndrome: one of the most controversial initiatives was the delivery of soup kitchens, that even whilst saving lives from malnutrition, attracted people away from the rural areas, altering the normalcy of Somali nomad society (Jaspars 2000). The aid dependency has increased the level of violence because food had become an attractive objective of plunder for organized and non-organized groups. When the collateral damage of the humanitarian assistance emerged, the USAID Officer of Foreign Disaster (OFDA) decided to reduce the alimentary dependency through monetization, a marked-based intervention, according to which food is bought in the donor country and sold in the local market of the recipient country with the final aim of generating funds to be invested in further programs (Natsios 1997). Somalia has been flooded with maize, bulgur, wheat, sorgum, additional to those products already being sold in the local market.

Advocators of monetization have argued that, unfortunately ‘a law of unanticipated consequences’ has been operative in Somalia (Natsios 1997). In October 1993, the augmented distribution of food, instead of reducing the violence, inflamed tensions between factions and leaders. According to Natsios, ‘the drop of food prices increased it (violence): warlord and thieves alike stole a greater volume of food to make up for its diminished value’ (ibidem 91). On the other side, critics of monetization (Simmons 2009)

87 Author’s interview, Hargeisa, October 2011.
have sustained that a set of predictable consequences have been operative in Somalia. Inside a conflict-ridden context, without a sufficient control on the distribution of humanitarian aids, parties use relief agencies for their own economic and political objectives. Humanitarian aid and monetization have exposed Somalis to the vulnerability of food insecurity, as a consequence the humanitarian intervention has inflamed tensions between communities, disrupted the local markets and provided strong disincentives for production (Simmons 2009). The attempt to solve the sovereignty crisis in terms of a humanitarian catastrophe, in turn, has transformed the sovereignty crisis into a humanitarian catastrophe.

2. Regional Intervention (1996-1999)

The second stage of international intervention in Somalia has been characterized by a pattern of mutual regional interference. After the UN troop’s withdrawal by 1995, the politics of international intervention in Somalia has been deeply regionalized. When conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalated in 1998, the two countries pursued a proxy war not only in the respective enemy’s country but also in the neighbouring states. The need to open a second front has sponsored the ramification of the regional conflict in Somalia, which has experienced a complex stage of mutual intervention (Abbink 2003), composed of competitive unilateral actions directed to mutually foment oppositions.

On the 6th of May 1998 Eritrean forces claimed authority on Badme, a small village in Ethiopian territory: a territorial skirmish broke out into a large-scale war when Eritrean troops entered the Ethiopian territory and the conflict spread along the entire length of the border. The Ethiopian response to the Eritrean imprudence was massive: in February 1999 Ethiopia launched Operation Sunset and re-captured Badme. In May 2000 the Ethiopian army launched its last offensive assaulting Torona and Zambalesa where the Eritrean army was unable to repel the assault. In June 2000, belligerents established a cease-fire and in December they signed a peace treaty. The Algiers Agreement established the formation of a Boundary Commission for demarcating the border and the deployment of a UN Mission (UNMEE) to oversee the ceasefire.

The border was not the real issue at stake, since neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea has tried to limit the war to a territorial question: the war resulted from the deteriorated relationship between the two countries after Eritrea gained independence. Two factors have been particularly important: the non-implementation of the economic integration which was exasperated when Eritrea decided to coin its own currency, and the tension between
national ideologies and state building projects. The question of nationality lies at the heart of the conflict, as in the Horn survival of antithetic patterns of statehood depend on the possibility of establishing and maintaining the norms and rules of a hegemonic political order (Ruth Iyob 1993). Since the Ethiopian hegemonic posture was threatened by the Eritrean revisionist forces, the war in Badme inevitably showed a substantial crisis of hegemony within the state-building project promoted by these two countries (Araya 1997). DeGuttry, in fact, has defined this war as the ‘the latest variant of the centre-periphery dialectics’ between conservative and revisionist forces (De Guttry, Post and Venturini 2009); while Calchi Novati (2010) has noted that the problem of supremacy is the key reason explaining why the territorial skirmish has rippled throughout the Horn.

2.1 Structure of intervention

The war in Badme has assumed an unfinished character and it has had a long-term impact on the region (Cliffe 2004). The structural conditions of this new phase of interference diverge significantly from those of the classic intervention. Firstly, mutual intervention consists of competitive unilateral actions directed by foreign actors inside a third country. The basic scheme of mutual interference is based on the idea that ‘the enemy of my opponent is my friend’. Here, the ‘opponents of enemy regimes all receive some kind of support from governmental or other forces in neighbouring countries’ (Cliffe 1999: 89). The ‘complex’ scheme of mutual interference deployed in a third country, is instead based on a multiplication of the friend-enemy relationship, according to which ‘a friend of the enemy’s enemy’ is, definitively, my friend. The complex mutual interference inside a third country consists of a strategy where the allies of each enemy receive foreign assistance, not because of who they are, but because of who they are against.

Foreign countries have been engaged with mutual interference for reasons (I), interests (II) and with strategies (III) internal to each national agenda. Firstly, the balance between opportunistic and constructive reasons (I) leading states to get involved in a third country’s conflict, here is completely altered: there are no constructive purposes motivating countries to act in mutual interference. This strategy holds an ontological destabilizing aim because it is devoted to mutually fomenting the opposition, especially when (and because) regimes face mounting internal crises. According to Cliffe, the mutual interference in Somalia belongs to ‘a pattern of intervention clearly oriented to hinder resolution of conflicts’ (Cliffe 1999).
Secondly, Ethiopia and Eritrea have pursued in Somalia the common aim of opening a second front, but with two asymmetric interests (II). For Ethiopia, the interference was directed to preserve its hegemonic rule inside the region. Given the deteriorated relationships with Eritrea, the Ethiopian priority was that of containing the alliance between its domestic diasporic insurgency (ONLF and OLF), the diasporic state (Eritrea) and the Somali factions. The stability of the Ethiopian federalism was dependent on the possibility of ‘persuading the Somali living in Ethiopia to shed their irredentist aspirations’ (Markakis 1996: 567). As a consequence, the possibility of influencing the process of reconciliation in Somalia without the Somali ambition of rebuilding a Greater Somalia acquired a special value for the Ethiopian national security. The main Ethiopian concern was to preserve or restore the territorial status quo, while for Eritrea the main interest was that of radically subverting the regional status quo creating a cordon sanitaire around Ethiopia and supporting insurgent forces that would assist Asmara in case of new attacks to its borders (Reid 2009).

Thirdly, according to their different geopolitical positions, two distinct strategies have been adopted (III). Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of its landlocked position: sharing a border of 1600 km with Somalia, Addis Abeba has privileged direct military incursion via ground operations, employing the mutual ‘tit for tat’ support of rival parties, only to reinforce the plan of direct incursions. On the other side, Eritrea has taken advantage of its access to the sea, privileging indirect military interference, using navy trans-shipment of arms equipment and combatants, with the final aim of strengthening a network of insurgents aimed to oppose the authorities in Addis Ababa (Reid 2009): the Eritrean modus operandi has been based on building alliances through nested organizations, with the aim of manipulating ‘larger, more loosely organized bodies in order to achieve political ends’ (ibidem).

In order to trace the process leading regional intervention to endure the state disintegration in Somalia, the following sections will investigate the major phases of the regional intervention.

2.2 Historical overview: proxy war in Somalia during the Ethiopia-Eritrean war

As theorized by Ruth Iyob, the mutual intervention has been operative into specific, intertwined and intermittent fronts, the military (I) and diplomatic ones (II).

Between 1995 and 1997, the factional conflict was latent but of low intensity (I). Following the withdrawal of UN troops by the early 1995, major divisions within the Habr
Gedir and the Somali National Alliance surfaced in the area of Bakol. On June 15th, 1995, during a Conference of Reconciliation attended exclusively by the SNA, Aidid was appointed president of Somalia. Opposite factions, led by Ali Mahdi and Ali Ato, denounced this appointment and militias loyal to them continued to clash with the SNA. In September 1995, Aidid’s forces occupied Baidoa in the southwest, where in March the Reewin people had established a Supreme Governing Council. After Aidid occupied Baidoa, the Reewin people formed a new party, the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), oriented to liberate all the territories inhabited by Digil and Mirife clans. After the death of Aidid, on the 2nd of August 1996, his son, Hussein Mohamed Farah, took over the leadership of the SNA. Since regional countries became more involved into Somalia’s affairs, between 1998 and 2000, the security situation has further deteriorated. On the military side (I), mutual intervention was in force across two existing conflicts between Al-Itihaaad and the Somali National Front on one hand, and RRA (Rahanwein Resistance Army) and SNA (Somali National Alliance) on the other one, respectively across the Gedo region, and inside the Bay and Bakool regions. Between 1996 and 1997, Ethiopia mounted major operations in Somalia against Al-Itihaaad (Loewenstein 2010), an Islamist organization, based in the Gedo region and responsible for several attacks in Ethiopia. In March 1996, the Ethiopian army raided the Somali territory near the border, with the aim of pursuing the Islamists. Three months later, the Ethiopian raids had been transformed into ground occupations: on the 9th of August, 50 Ethiopian troops crossed the Somali border to assault the bases of al-Itihaaad. Several reports indicate that Ethiopian troops had been backing the Somali National Front (SNF), which supported the Ethiopian initiative because it was competing with al-Itihaaad for control of the region (Amnesty International 1996). The Ethiopian intervention, in fact, occurred while the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) was attacking the more important installations of the SNA, in Huddur and Baidoa, with the aim of reconquering the operative bases lost in 1995.

During this second phase of intervention, military incursions were constantly accompanied by regional efforts to conquer the role of peace promoter (II). After global actors had openly failed to pacify Somalia, Ethiopia had gained the legitimacy of the

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88 Al-Ittihad took over control of the Gedo region in 1991. The town of Luuq became the seat of its administration where it established a police force, Islamic courts, Islamic education centers, and health centers, all intricately linked to the principles of Islamic Sharia laws.

89 Two events precipitated the Ethiopian incursion: the attempted assassination of an Ethiopian government minister (July 8) and the bombing of the Wabe-Shebelle hotel in Addis Ababa (August 4).
international community to manage the crisis: under the mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in November 1996 Ethiopia sponsored a national conference in Sodere (New Approaches to the Somalia National Reconciliation 1998). Twenty-six faction leaders participated, but neither SNA nor SNM (ruling Somaliland) recognized the legitimacy of this initiative. The conference culminated in January 1997 with the formation of a National Salvation Council (NSC), introducing for the first time the idea of a decentralized form of government. The meeting in Sodere encouraged the formation of regional authorities oriented to establishing a federal state. The conference also established a fixed proportional criterion for regulating clan representation, the ‘4.5 formula’, allocating an equal number of seats to each major clan and half of the total number of seats to women and minorities. The conference proceedings, however, have been strongly boycotted.

An attempt to counterbalance the growing Ethiopian role inside the Somali conflict was pursued by Egypt, in March 1997, when a reconciliation conference was held in Cairo. The Egyptian involvement was motivated by the necessity of containing the Ethiopians, because of the competition for water resources on the Nile River. As a consequence, in opposition to the building block approach inaugurated in Sodere, the Cairo conference followed a centralist focus oriented to revitalize a national unified state in Somalia. In December 1997, representatives of several Somali factions met under the Egyptian and Arab League auspices: 26 factions signed a peace agreement, and fixed a conference to be held in Baidoa in 1998. The aim of the Cairo Conference was that of reaching an agreement between Hussein Mohammad Farah and the National Somali Council (NSC), formed during the negotiations held in Sodere. But NSC leaders did not participate in the conference, and Hussein Mohamed Farah renewed his disagreement with the Sodere proceedings. Finally, in May 1998, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Mohamed Farah signed an agreement, but the fragile regional equilibrium existing behind each diplomatic effort, began to alter the prospect of reconciliation. As a result of talks in Cairo, in August 1998 the Benadir Administration was formed for governing the Mogadishu area. Four states recognized the new administration and installed a diplomatic presence in

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90 Since 1995, a study group commissioned by the EU concluded that Somalia had to be decentralized, and that a bottom-up approach was essential for ensuring the participation of society to reconstruction (The London School of Economics and Political Science 1995). Also the UN strongly supported this idea, and Ethiopia practically sponsored this approach.
Mogadishu: Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. Ethiopia, on the other side, rejected the Cairo meeting because it did not include members of the NSC.

Meanwhile, the National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) held in Sodere in May 1997, established another meeting in the city of Bosaso, in the northeast. For four months Bosaso was consumed by major preparations, but when several faction leaders announced that they would boycott the Bosaso National Reconciliation, the meeting was cancelled. The main political party controlling the North East, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), called for an urgent Community Consultative Conference to discuss how to address their own regional agenda, given the ineffectiveness of the national process.

The first conference of the people inhabiting the land of Punt was convened between the 28th of February and the 8th of March 1998, in Garowe: the constitutional conference held in May declared the formation of the autonomous Puntland State of Somalia. Participants agreed on the fact that ‘Seven years of statelessness without a light at the end of the tunnel was long enough to wait for a national solution’ (Mohamed Abdashir Waldo 2010). Decentralization was conceived as the best solution for stopping conflict, and a suitable ‘middle solution’ between a centralized system and a secessionist trend. The first Ethiopian attempt at national reconciliation culminated, indirectly, in a process of regional formation, since Puntland was the first regional autonomy calling for a decentralized Somalia.

According to Bradbury, the Ethiopian diplomatic initiative was sustained by the necessity to legitimize its further military incursions into Somalia (Bradbury 2009). On the diplomatic front, Eritrea has been visibly unable to play an active role: it anchored its position to the Egyptian initiative, coalescing with Arab axis belonging to the broader regional competition existing between African and Arab states. Eritrea has instead played a more active role on the military front.

In 1997, the quiet balance between regional interference and the factional conflict began to deteriorate (I). Early in 1997, the Ethiopian incursions into the area of Bakool and Bay increased and Hussein Mohamed Farah issued a statement requesting the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to intervene and stop Ethiopia from occupying part of Somalia. The statement accused Ethiopia of occupying 30

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91 Eritrea shared with Arab League states an anti-Ethiopian feeling, but the relationship between Eritrea and Arab states has not been as linear as is often implied by Ethiopian or US analysts. Eritrea has established a controversial relation with the Arab League, it refused to join the organization in 1996 and following conflict with Yemen and Djibouti further deteriorated this relationship.
square kilometers of Somali territory and the leaders of both Al-Itihaad and the SNA agreed to cooperate for ending the Ethiopian occupation of Dolow. The Ethiopian tactic of incursion had become more systematic, and strictly anchored to the military proceedings of its key allies, the SNF and the RRA. Addis Ababa pursued a twofold aim: on one hand that of supporting the revenge of the Rahanwein Resistance Army against the SNA in gaining the control of Bay and Bakol; on the other one that of crushing al-Itihaad from Gedo, enabling the the SNF to establish its own control of the area.

The size of the mutual intervention cannot be provided because states usually classify military assistance to foreign insurgents under non-military budget. But the UN Monitoring group has collected partial data on the arms violation: this data can be employed here, as an indicator of the country propensity to assist allies in Somalia. According to the report released by a UN Group of Experts, in 2002 Ethiopia has been a major source of weapons for a number of Somali groups: Ethiopian officials trained and armed more than 1200 members of the SNF (UNSC 2002b: 20). In 1997 the SNF received the assortment of arms and ammunition resumed in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Amount of ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 assault rifle</td>
<td>1 008</td>
<td>252 000 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.5 mm Browning .50 calibre heavy machine gun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14 850 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 mm mortar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>450 bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82 mm B-10 anti-tank gun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>450 shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM/PKT machine gun</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6 000 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 mm anti-aircraft artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 500 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 mm anti-aircraft artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 500 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (UNSC 2002b: 21)

In parallel, Eritrea reinforced relationships and connections between anti-Ethiopian insurgents, using a temporary alliance between the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) and the SNA (Schlee 2010). According to Reid (Reid 2009: 36), Eritrea used a ‘nesting organization within regional opposition formations’, to cover its impact but multiplying its presence in the region. The Eritrean aim was that of supporting the alliance between frontier groups assisting the SNA in maintaining the control of Bakool, and troubling Ethiopia with its southern border. In April 1998, the OLF convened a meeting in Mogadishu, under the protection of the SNA.
(‘My enemy’s enemy’ 1999). The Eritrean intention was to include the Somali allies, in
the ‘Coalition of Ethiopian Oppressed People’, launched in 1997 between Oromo (OLF,
OPLF) and Ogadeni (ONLF). In 1998, Hussein Mohamed Farah visited Asmara, and after
meeting with the Eritrean president Issayas Afeworki, five Antonov plane-loads of arms
were sent to his faction (ibidem). According to Africa Confidential, the weapon equipment
was intended both for the Somali militia and for the OLF and Ogaden National Liberation
Front (‘My enemy’s enemy’ 1999).

The presence of Oromo fighters in Somalia significantly increased in this period: in
July 1998 ‘at least 400 heavily armed members of the Oromo Liberation Front arrived in
the south-west Shabelle region’ (‘Africa Oromo forces on the move in Somalia’ 1999).
According to Plaut and Gilkes (1999), during the same month, ‘three shiploads of arms,
and some 1,500 Oromo fighters subsequently arrived from Eritrea to join hundreds of
other Oromos trained earlier at Qorioli in southern Somalia’. According to the UN report
on the violation of Somalia’s embargo (UNSC 2003), in February 1999 an Eritrean cargo
M. S. Yohana transported the amount of arms reported in the following Table 2:

Table 2 Arm’s and military equipment supplied to the SNA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Type of equipment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Number of ammunitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 July 1998</td>
<td>Military uniform</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boot and Belts</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 February</td>
<td>Ferret Armoured cars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>BRDM Armoured scout cars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ak-47 (7.62 x 39 mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s illustration based on data retrieved from UNSC 2003.

Comparing the limited data reported inside Tables 1 and 2, it seems clear that Eritrea
has delivered conventional arms to the SNA in order to counter the Ethiopian offensive,
while Ethiopia has supplied the SNF and RRA with small arms, because using its direct
incursions to support the Somali allies did not necessitate providing them with heavy
equipment.

In 1999, after Ethiopia had reinforced its direct military intervention across the
Somali border, the regional interference reached its peak of intensity. In October 1998,
Ethiopia assisted the RRA to capture Huddur in Bakool (UNHCR 2004), and the fighting
spread to Baidoa. In March 1999, Ethiopia raided the Somali border town of Balanballe
(‘Ethiopian troops in Somalia’ 1999), and in April Ethiopian troops entered the towns of Beledhawo and Dolo: therefore, Ali Mahdi and Hussein Mohamed Farah issued a joint statement of complaint on both the SC and AU to end the Ethiopian aggression (‘Somali Protests Ethiopian’ 1999). In May 1999, Ethiopian soldiers with the support of the Somali National Front (SNF) occupied the town of Luuq in southwest.

The Ethiopian intervention has actively changed the equilibrium inside the conflict between the SNA and the RRA with the capture of Baidoa and Garba Harre. On the 7th of June 1999, the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) claimed the capture of Baidoa, while the SNA’s radio station declared the loss of Baidoa already the day before, as a result of the Ethiopian attack. As reported by various sources ‘a combined force of 3,000 Ethiopian and RRA fighters attacked Baidoa and took control of the city’ (IRIN 1999a). In late June 1999, Ethiopian soldiers launched an attack from Luuq, which captured the town of Garba Harre, previously controlled by the SNA (Bamfo 2009).

On the other side, the SNA was determined to win back the towns conquered by the RRA (‘Oromo forces on the move in Somalia’ 1999): several sources have confirmed that in May 1999 ‘several hundred more Oromos arrived from Eritrea where they had been training, together with Eritrean officers’ (Gilkes and Plaut 1999) and in July, at least 400 heavily armed members of the OLF had arrived in the Shabelle region. Although Asmara has consistently denied any allegations of its relationship with the Somali factions, Mohamed Hussein Farah has admitted the existence of a connection with the Oromo fighters, even reversing the ‘terms’ of the alliance: according to the SNA’s leader ‘the SNA has provided a safe haven for Oromos and allows them to express their political views. Only about 700 are organized politically. This is very small - and we do not allow a weapons supply’ (IRIN 1999b).

In sum, even if the Eritrean strategy was effectively oriented to counter Ethiopia in the region, the initiative was too weak to successfully contain the Ethiopian offensive. The fragility of the alliance between anti-Ethiopian forces became evident in December 1999, when the SNA disarmed members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) living in Mogadishu. According to IRIN, this shift ‘came as a result of meetings in Addis Ababa in October between Mohammad Hussein Farah and Ethiopian authorities’ (IRIN 1999a). In contrast, the Ethiopian strategy has been able to establish its own ‘security buffer zone’, ultimately oriented to weaken the EPLF government in Asmara (Negash and Tronvoll 2000). Mutual intervention in Somalia has been a double success for Ethiopia, blocking the Eritrean efforts to open a second front and sending ‘a clear message to Islamic
fundamentalists in southern Somalia to be very careful about incursions into Ethiopia’ (IRIN 2001).

2.3 Intervening variables: factional conflict and competing state-building

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has had military and political ramifications in Somalia. Since tensions between ethnic composition and the access to resources and political representation have constantly challenged the Ethiopian stability, the survival of the Ethiopian multi-ethnic state has been shaped by centripetal forces operating on the margins of the federation. Therefore, for Ethiopia the maintenance of the regional order was dependent on the repression of diasporic groups within and outside the Ethiopian border. The ideological and pragmatic mutual relationship established between Eritrea, Somali insurgents, Oromo and Ogadeni national movements, has been a source of anxiety for Addis Ababa (Banadir 2012). For this reason Ethiopia has consistently tried to destroy ‘the solidarity structure’ (Modelski 1964) of its opponents. For Eritrea, the Somali insurgency has been a precious ally: given Ethiopia’s superior military capability the only way to sustain an anti-hegemonic posture was anchored to the existence of a peripheral rebellion against the common enemy. The Eritrean attempt to change (or simply destabilize) the regional status quo, thus, has been subordinated to the ability to enlarge the alliance of diasporic states.

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have continuously denied providing any military assistance to Somali groups, however, there is little doubt that both have opportunistically taken sides among the divided factions still battling for control of southern territories, sending guns and soldiers into Somalia as an extension of their own border war (‘Africa Oromo forces on the move in Somalia’ 1999, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1996, UNSC 2003). However, this involvement has been totally asymmetric. Ethiopia has assumed a leading role in the process of reconciliation, addressing a decentralized solution for the future of Somalia, while Eritrea has been a simple follower of the centralized solution promulgated by the Arab states. On the military side, Ethiopia has supported allied factions, but it has also advanced a direct military intervention. Eritrea, instead, has played the indirect role of regional spoiler, building a network of frontier groups with the aim of forcing Ethiopia to maintain robust forces in its southeast as well as to its north.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, is composed at least by 70 ethnicities, where Oromo accounts for the 34.5% of the people, Tigre 6.1%, Somali 6.2%, Sidama 4%, Gurage 2.5%, Wolaita 2.3%, Afar 1.7%, other nationalities 3% (US Department of State 2013).
The Eritrean effort to ‘open in Somalia an additional southern front in the war against Ethiopia’, has failed rather dramatically because Ethiopia has contained the threat (Abbink 2003) and Somalia has been deeply penetrated by constant Ethiopian incursions.

Beyond this asymmetry, the regional interference has generated two important outcomes. Firstly, the increased military assistance (in terms of fighters, arms and equipment) afforded by regional patrons has significantly improved the capacity of the Somali factions to sustain the longevity of the conflict: between 1998 and 1999, the Somali civil war reached a major level of intensity. Until 1997, the level of factional fighting was ‘lower than in any year since civil war started in 1991’ (Amnesty International 1998), but in 1998 militia warfare and banditry increased considerably. The Ethiopian long-standing intervention has enabled the RRA to recapture Baidoa, and the SNF to defeat al-Itihaad inside the Gedo region. While the Eritrean support has empowered the SNA and Al-Itihaad to resist the Ethiopian offensive, but not to rollback its advance on Baidoa. The U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 1999, Somalia, estimates that in 1998:

Armed clashes forced an estimated 25,000 people to flee from southern coastal areas … violence among Somalia’s clan leaders increased in southern and coastal areas of the country, forcing tens of thousands to flee their homes (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 1999).

Secondly, regional actors have more or less actively sponsored the bifurcation of the reconciliation process into two competitive approaches (building block vs. centralist) that have encouraged the territorial fragmentation. As a result, this second season of intervention has inaugurated a process of decentralization without establishing a controlled and unified system of political authority. Both conferences in Sodere and Cairo culminated with the formation of regional administrations, the Puntland state of Somalia in the northeast, and the Benadir administration in Mogadishu. The first has become the epitome of the building block approach, actively sustained by the Ethiopian government and international organizations such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the European Union. While the Benadir administration has been the outpost of the centralized approach, supported by Arab states and strongly disapproved of by Ethiopia.
3. Regional and Global counter-terrorism intervention (2001-2010)

3.1 Structure of intervention

Since 2001, Somalia has been shocked by a new phase of foreign intervention in which global and regional strategies have become deeply intertwined. This third stage can be renamed the age of glocal counter-terrorism, where the global war on terrorism (GWOT) has been turned into a regional phenomenon and the regional interference has been deeply globalized. This intervention was not oriented to resolve the chronic instability of Somalia, but rather to ‘manage’ or ‘contain’ it, neutralizing the forces considered a threat because of their connection with al-Qaeda (United States Department of State 2007). Contrary to the unilateral intervention performed until 2001, the glocal counter-terrorism has been articulated as a bilateral response to the problem of failed states invoking terrorist threats. But it has been equally anchored to the launch of unilateral actions, carried out without the authorization of the countries concerned and without authorization from the UN Security Council. The bilateral regime has involved a small ‘coalition of willingness’ formed by Ethiopia and United States, but actively supported by regional states and organizations. In some respects, this intervention has assumed a semi-multilateral architecture, since a set of cooperative agreements was established to enforce and coordinate relations between states and institutions. However, intervention has been operative through a bilateral alliance, where the regional partner has been used as proxy in the GWoT: multilateral responses to international terrorism have been promoted more in the area of diplomatic, economic and judiciary cooperation than in the military one. The hybridity of this semi-multilateral counter-terrorism architecture has compromised the effectiveness of the intervention, but before evaluating impacts, significant differences must be traced among the global and regional aspects of this intervention.

3.1.1 Interests and reasons

Disparate interests and goals have persuaded global and regional players to get involved in Somalia. The US returned to Somalia with the duel aim of pursuing its own national security imperative (fighting terrorists) by enforcing state capacity (building states)\(^9\). In 2002, the Bush administration moved towards a pre-emption doctrine, oriented

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\(^9\) Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs House International Relations Committee Joint Hearing (June 29, 2006): ‘When considering the Africa policy of this Administration it is worth noting that this credo has two implications; the United States is contributing generously toward improved democratic governance, health and economic growth in
to take military actions against any state considered a sponsor of international terrorism (United States Department of State 2007). According to the National Security Strategy addressed in 2002, state failure has become a US national threat because of its presumed dangerous connection with terrorism proliferation. The U.S. interest in Somalia was thus to ‘prevent terrorism’ (ibidem), ensuring the eradication of any platform for al-Qaida.

However, the preference for a second line posture made the US counter-terrorist initiative very cautious and regionally anchored; the pre-emption doctrine did not change the reluctance to undertake direct intervention. Following the 1993 Black hawk crashes, the entire US foreign policy in Africa was redirected towards the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’. In 2007, the acting secretary of state for African affairs, Snyder addressed the US Foreign Policy Priorities in Africa for 2007, with these words: ‘we don’t want to be the bus driver. We’d like to sit in the third row on the bus. We don’t want to sit all the way in the back of the bus, but we don’t want to be the bus driver’ (Smith 2010: 185).

The most important regional actor involved in the glocal counter-terrorism in Somalia was Ethiopia, considered by the US as its most important strategic partner in the Horn. The Ethiopian participation occurred in continuity with the proxy war in which it was engaged during these years. This proxy war was a spill over from the border war with Eritrea and was oriented towards destroying possible alliances between anti-hegemonic forces around and inside the Ethiopian border. Behind the aforementioned necessity of fighting Somali insurgents lies the threat of disintegration to the Ethiopian ethnic federalism, which was vulnerable to the possibility that Islamist insurgents in Somalia might coalesce with and stimulate radicalisation of the Ethiopian diasporic population. The rationale behind Ethiopian intervention in Somalia prioritised Ethiopia’s existence as a modern state: whatever attempts have been made by ethnic federalism to mitigate the imperial connotations of the Ethiopian state, the discontents of federalism still view the EPTF as an instrument to be used against forced assimilation. The formation of federal autonomies in 1993, in many instances remained a sort of de jure equality, insufficient to placate the rebellion of the Ogadeni and Oromo people, and insufficient to ensure de facto equality ‘where marginalised ethno-cultural communities have had a limited capacity to

Africa, and the United States is also actively engaged in denying safe haven to terrorists with the help of African partners. Africa finds itself involved in the Global War on Terror, and Somalia is a critical element of our broader efforts to fight global terrorism’.
make use of these constitutional rights’ (Maru 2010). In this precarious context, the turmoil surrounding the border with Somalia represented a question of national security for Addis Ababa. For this reason, Ethiopia stretched the meaning of counter terrorism, so as to deal with domestic security concerns, casting political oppositions on the basis of the new legitimacy given by the global priorities. Despite this many scholars have doubted the extent to which African partners have found the global war on terror relevant (Ford 2011), yet in this instance we have seen how Ethiopia has made all the necessary efforts to stretch the concept of global terrorism to include liberation and self-determination struggles.

3.1.2 Strategies and resources

Glocal counterterrorism in Somalia has been pursued within a specific division of work between global and regional partners, but with a non-pertinent distribution of costs and resources.

The first phase of counterterrorism, from 2001 until 2006, was characterized by a high political profile oriented to promote a stable government, and by low-scale military activity directed to establish international partnerships and infrastructures critical for preparing the logistical base for further counterterrorist operations. During this stage, regional partners addressed the process of reconciliation, while the global one enhanced the intelligence capability of its regional allies.

The second phase of glocal intervention indeed, comprised between 2006 until 2010, has witnessed a major military profile: both regional and global actors were engaged in disrupting and dismantling the bases of presumed adherents to Al-Qaida in Somalia, and regional partners have renewed efforts at state-building. Furthermore, during this phase the military intervention has been based on a precise division of work: the global ally was employed on the second line, working on air surveillance and operations, while the regional partners played a vital role as frontline states conducting ground operations. The War on Terror has made the US’s Horn of Africa policy more regional and explicit, but the policy remains anchored to an indirect intervention. The Ethiopian involvement on the ground was thus strategic and fundamental for implementing further counterterrorism operations. Whilst the involvement of the global and regional partner has been critically

95 Ethiopia has strongly encouraged foreign governments to add the OLF and ONLF to their lists of terrorist organizations; request denied by the United States, for the lack of credible insights.
unbalanced, it was based on a tacit acceptance of the terms of alliance, since Washington might have little credibility among Somalis as an honest broker, or facilitator.

Glocal counterterrorism has been pursued within a specific division of work between global and regional partners, but with a non-pertinent distribution of costs and resources. Data on the US foreign operations and Ethiopian military expenditure illustrate two important evidences: in 2007, Ethiopia became a frontline in the war on terror, but no substantial variations have occurred in the military spending. According to estimates by SIPRI illustrated in Figure 1, in 2007 Ethiopia spent $429 million in its military budget: between 2007 and 2008 total military expenditure decreased by 20 per cent, and it has continued to decrease slightly by 0.8 per cent between 2008 and 2009 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2001-2011). Between 2004 and 2009, the military spending decreased by an annual average of 7.6 per cent in real terms.

![Figure 1. Military expenditure by country, Ethiopia, in constant US dollars for 2001-10 and current US dollars for 2010](image)

*Source: Author’s illustration based on SIPRI Yearbook, 2001-2011*

The mismatch between spending figures and actual outlays is nowhere clearly apparent: the regional direct involvement has been financed, directly or indirectly, from external sources. According to data retrieved from the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, since 2006 Ethiopia has become the largest recipient of US foreign
assistance in Africa: between 2002 and 2009 Ethiopia has received $27 million from the US in form of International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Since 2002 the US has significantly resumed the International Military Education and Training (IMET) which had been suspended after the arms embargo that was imposed during the Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict. Furthermore, the US has substantially increased the Ethiopian capacity and willingness to participate in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism by using the Foreign Military Financing, which in 2007 has reached its peak value of $7 million, as illustrated inside the Figure 2.

*Figure 2 All fund sources ‘spigot’ report by country (Ethiopia) in $ thousand*

Source: Author’s illustration based on data retrieved from the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2002-2009

If we take into consideration the entire financial assistance (composed by economic, social and military programs) provided by the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, illustrated in the Figure 3, in 2007 Ethiopia received a total amount of $474 million US foreign assistance, with an increasing rate of 168 per cent in comparison with the total ($176) received the previous year (Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 2008). In 2008, the US increased its military assistance to Ethiopia by 97 per cent, spending a total amount of $933 million. The increase in American aid was strictly anchored to the necessity of getting involved in Somalia, as demonstrated by the

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*According to the Congressional Budget Justification Foreign Operations for the fiscal year 2009: ‘The increase of funding between FY 2008 and FY 2009 to support programs in the Peace and Security Objective reflect increased national security threats posed by domestic insurgents, Eritrea, and extremists from Somalia, requiring a significant increase in foreign assistance for this strategic partner of the United States.’ (Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 2009)."
fact that in 2009, with the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, the aid has gradually decreased.

*Figure 3. US Foreign Assistance for country, Ethiopia (F.Y. 2000-2010), in $ thousands*

A third factor must be taken into consideration: the cost of glocal counterterrorism has been externally ‘output-based’, since the US financial cover was primarily aimed at establishing a ‘strategic partnership with Ethiopia’ (Congressional Budget Office 2009), and secondly to stabilizing Somalia. As confirmed by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2011), the US priorities have not been harmonized with those of the reconciliation process. This strategic divergence has undermined the possibility to sustain the costs associated with maintaining the Ethiopian presence in Somalia. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, has often declared that Addis Ababa never requested or received financial support from the US for the Ethiopian presence in Somalia. However, Ethiopian military officials, without mincing words, have often lamented that Washington was scarcely contributing to the military enterprise. In 2008, the General Samora lamented that the ‘U.S. did not support a single bullet for our operations in Somalia’. On the other side, the US lamented that Addis Ababa was refusing to implement the terms of their agreement. The US Ambassador in Ethiopia, Donald Yamamoto, in 2008 lamented the Ethiopian attempt to escape the US conditionality to the formation of their ‘strategic partnership’:

> Ethiopia consistently rebuffed US efforts to pursue other priorities, notably political and economic reform, and also turned down a significant number of programs designed specifically to enhance trust, communication and security cooperation between our militaries (...) The Embassy Addis Ababa will make it clear to the Ethiopian government at the highest levels that the U.S.-Ethiopia strategic partnership requires reciprocity and that, for
the United States, counterterrorism and security cooperation do not occur in a vacuum (Berhane 2011).

The economic provision of this stage of intervention in Somalia has brought into doubt the extent to which hybrid counter-terrorism architectures are capable of suiting the separate interests existing between global and regional partners. In order to understand the outcomes produced by this convulsed third stage of foreign intervention, the following sections will illustrate the historical trajectory of the glocal counterterrorism in Somalia.

3.2 Historical overview: Intervention under Glocal counterterrorism

Somalia entered into the new millennia with a new attempt at national reconciliation: in May 2000, the government of Djibouti convened a conference at Arta supported by several international actors. Approximately 2.500 participants, between political, business and religious leaders attended the talk but Puntland, Somaliland, the SNA, the RRA, the SPM and six Mogadishu faction leaders did not recognize the legitimacy of this initiative. The Arta conference revived the notion of a unitary state and culminated with the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) charged with governance for a transition phase of three years.

The TNG was the first government after Barre’s collapse, reoccupying its seat at the UN and regional bodies, but reconciliation was still embroiled inside a top-down and externally driven mechanism. Regardless of whether or not local communities are supposed, generally, to help larger political organizations to reconcile, in Somalia regional alignments have continuously fomented the endemic division of communities along clan rivalries and regional affiliations. A set of events must be considered: firstly, the Arta process was supported by a large Mogadishu-based coalition at the expense of a pro-Ethiopian alliance (Bradbury 2009). Most of the League of Arab states sustained the formation of the TNG: in 2000, the League established a financial support of $56 million that was never released, but a number of Arab states bilaterally contributed to the financial architecture of the new government, as reported in Table 3.

97 IGAD member states, United Nations, Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference and European Union supported the Arta process.
Secondly, given the Arab ‘influence in the TNG, Ethiopia and Western Powers did not extend their support to the government’ (Bradbury and Healy 2010: 117). As prospected, Ethiopia maintained an active role in fomenting the opposition to the TNG: in March 2001, Ethiopian officials informed the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) that a group of Mogadishu factional leaders boycotting the TNG would be hosted near Addis Ababa. ‘Ethiopia denied that there was a plan for the establishment of a parallel government’ (UNSC 2001:2) but the intention of the group was clear from the very beginning: in April 2001, the group announced the formation of the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), oriented to hold an ‘all-inclusive national reconciliation conference within six months to form a representative Transitional Government of National Unity’ (UNSC 2001:3). Several parties coalesced inside the SRRC have confirmed the Ethiopian role in training troops, and providing military equipment (UNSC 2005). Also the SNA joined the alliance of blocks against the TNG.98

In parallel, Ethiopia consistently tried to foment the opposition of existing blocks towards the National Government. In that phase, the major Ethiopian ally was the regional government of Puntland, lead by the colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. For instance, the UNSC (2005) reported that in 2001 the Ethiopian Army delivered the assortment of arms to Abdullahi Yusuf reported in Table 4.

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98 Until 1999 the SNA was considered to be allied with al-Itihaad and Oromo fighters. In 2001 the SNA drastically switched its position. Inside an interview (IRIN 1999b), Hussein Mohamed Farah affirmed this by warning ‘Our main enemy is Islamism, fundamentalism. The TNG has some clans who are mixed but they are not political parties who control the country. Basically they are just a new faction, but their platform is al-Ittihad, their platform is Islamism because they are not from the tribes, they are imported from outside and funded from outside. There is fighting in Puntland, there is fighting in Mogadishu, so this group is creating civil war. We have been in power for 11 years and this group came in by airplane. We are completely against the TNG. It is a platform for fundamentalism. They are backed financially by the Arabs and fundamentalist states’. [156]
Table 4  Arms equipped by Ethiopia to Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-10 anti-tank</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSHK heavy machine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM machine</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-48 assault rifles</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 assault rifles</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9 pistol</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (UNSC 2005).

An escalation of tensions occurred at the end of 2001, when Somalia was besieged by a new phase of foreign intervention. On the 24th of September of 2001, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya was included in the United States list of 27 organizations suspected of having connections to Al-Qaeda: on the 7th of November, the United States Treasury blocked the accounts of the Al-Barakaat Group, alleged to be the principal source of funding for Osama bin Laden. Many scholars have sustained that the inclusion of Al-Itihaad in the list of terrorists was an overstatement promulgated by the Ethiopian government: from 1997 Al-Itihaad had already abandoned the armed struggle due to difficulties in articulating its own local agenda (Smith 2010). A certain degree of incongruences was apparent between the United State Departments: the Department of Defense (DoD) affirmed that ‘the US had strong evidence’ of the Al-Qaeda connection or presence in Somalia, while the Department of State (DoS) was more cautious, stating that a preventive intervention should be addressed as if left unchecked, ‘terrorist activity might find some fertile ground’ (‘Terrorist moving from Somalia’ 2002). Based on fragile evidence, since October 2001, the US has increasingly encouraged its allies to take measures against groups alleged to support terrorism.

On the military front, the US sustained the politics of mutual intervention inaugurated by Ethiopia during its proxy war with Eritrea. When in October 2001 Puntland and the SRRC alleged that the leadership of the TNG was pro-Al-Itihaad, the US supported the coalition of warlords and the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Conference (SRRC) was established in Addis Ababa in early 2002. Tensions between the TNG, the SRRC and Ethiopia soon escalated: in mid February 2002, a battle between the Conference and the Juba Valley Alliance (allied with the TNG) broke out at Bardere, inside the Gedo Region. On May the 15th, the SRRC together with the Ethiopian army attacked the border town of Beledhawo: the TNG’s Minister for Foreign Affairs accused
Ethiopia of supporting one of the Marehan sub-clans actively participating in the fighting (UNCHR 2004), while Ethiopia denied any involvement and, in turn, accused the TNG of using Ethiopia as a scapegoat (UNSC 2002b). In June, the TNG’s Prime Minister asked the Security Council to send troops to assist its government with disarmament.

On the diplomatic scale, Washington’s policy was that of pressing allies for the exclusion of hostile political forces from negotiation (Young, 2007). In Sudan the US persuaded the Government of Karthoum to cooperate on intelligence material related to Islamist groups, but it also encouraged Kenya to reinvigorate the IGAD process, both in Somalia and Sudan (Malito and Ylonen 2013). In November 2002 the Kenyan government made a new effort to reconcile the TNG and the SRRC: the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the outcome of the Nairobi meeting, but it also made clear that Ethiopia would prefer an IGAD initiative (UNSC 2002c). As a result, on the 15th of October 2002, IGAD sponsored its first concrete involvement in Somalia’s affairs, once the Kenyota President, Moi, inaugurated the National Reconciliation Conference between the TNG and the SRRC99. On the 27th of October, the conference terminated with an agreement on the cessation of hostilities and the formation of Transitional Federal Institutions. Despite Somali leaders officially stating that they would work for the formation of a broad government ‘inclusive, representative and acceptable to all the parties’ (Somalia National Reconciliation Process (SNRP): art.1), the conference was plagued by deep disagreements. An agreement was signed to expedite the formation of an all-inclusive government, but one month later the TNG claimed that Ethiopia was training nearly 5000 young men inside Somalia ‘with the aim of inflaming a new civil war’ and that ‘trucks carrying nearly 200 Ethiopian soldiers had arrived in Baidoa on 30 December’ (UNSC 2002a). IGAD was unable to make the process reliable for all the contending parties and inter- and intra-clan fighting continued to break out: some factional leaders indicated that they would not be participating in the talks, and IGAD member states ignored that negotiation was transforming into a ‘Farewell Symphony’ (Malito and Ylonen 2013), where the delegates abandoned the talks one after another. Somaliland, for instance, refused to participate because of its tensions with Puntland100, however other factors also negatively affected the Nairobi process: the ‘frontline states’ (Ethiopia Djibouti and Kenya) formed a Technical

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99 The first meeting was held in Eldoret, the following ones from February 2003, in Mbagathi.
100 On the 27th of December 2003, Puntland forces took control of Las Anod, the capital city of the Sool region, which Somaliland claimed under its authority. Tensions between the two countries broke out, and Somaliland considered the IGAD’s talks in Nairobi as a dangerous threat to its sovereignty.
Committee in order to manage the talks. But the committee was practically immobilized by Ethiopia’s dominance and its chronic disagreements with Djibouti (ICG 2004). During the negotiations, IGAD openly supported the SRRC, excluding the TNG from the formation of new transitional institutions (ICG 2006). In the early 2003, IGAD talks remained deadlocked, and many leaders abandoned the conference\textsuperscript{101}: as a result, IGAD’s credibility was completely eroded by the shared suspicion that under Ethiopian pressure, the Committee was orienting the talks in favour of the SRRC\textsuperscript{102}.\textsuperscript{103}.

3.2.1 Building infrastructure and supporting stable governments (2001-2005)

During the Ethiopian ‘covert’ attempt to change a regime potentially close to Al-Qaeda, the US began building the logistical and infrastructural base for a direct counter-terrorism strategy. During the summer of 2002, US Special Forces operating from Djibouti took part in anti-terror operations in Yemen and the Horn. In May 2002, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa\textsuperscript{104} was established at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The same year the US also launched the East-Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) for deploying regional military operations (police activity, and border and coastal control) necessary to counter terrorism\textsuperscript{105}. In 2002 the US assumed a preventive posture, enforcing the air surveillance and establishing a military architecture able to deploy further operations. But the US hypothesis to be engaged on direct military operations was dropped by March 2002, when the absence of a serious threat pushed the Bush administration to refocus its field of active intervention. Since 2002, Somalia has remained the subject of an intense intervention by its regional patron.

In parallel, on the diplomatic side, when the TNG collapsed in 2003, IGAD

\textsuperscript{101} For example, in March 2002, the TNG decided to hold its own reconciliation process, considering the lack of progress at the Mbagathi Conference, but since the Arab states did not provide support, the TNG was forced to come back into the IGAD talks (ICG 2006).

\textsuperscript{102} The credibility of the process was further eroded when Djibouti suspended its participation to the Technical Committee, accusing Kenya of lining up with Ethiopia and blaming the conference chairman personally for mismanaging the talks.

\textsuperscript{103} Abdikassim Salad Hassan and members of the National Salvation Council held talks with officials in Djibouti, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen from 13 to 19 November, reportedly to seek political and financial support for the holding of a reconciliation conference in Somalia. But the TNG did not receive the support it hoped for.

\textsuperscript{104} The CJTF-HOA, formed by more than 1500 members of the US military assumed a mission with the aim of building ‘partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect US and coalition interests’ (CJTF-HOA 2011).

\textsuperscript{105} In 2002 the US enforced air surveillance with 3 amphibious assault ships, US Navy P-3 aircraft and Predator vehicles were deployed near the Somali cost; while a 160-strong German contingent and 140-strong British unit joined the brigade.
undertook a second attempt to stabilize Somalia, through the Mbagathi Peace Conference (Somalia National Reconciliation Conference 2003b). As a natural consequence of tensions developed in the previous talks, by mid-September, discordances on the legitimacy of political representation led the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference to an impasse over the adoption of the Transitional Charter. The third phase of the Mbagathi process concerned the formation of transitional institutions, but the absence of shared criteria according to which parties would agree on the core issue of political representation, led several actors to abandon the talks (ibidem): on the 29th of January 2004, only eight representatives from the expected 38 signed the Safari Park Declaration at the Kenyan State House, while only a few months earlier half the participants had withdrawn their approval of the declaration (ICG 2004).

Divergences on the political representation have been a watershed in the Mbaghati process: the SRRC contended that only the President of the new Government and the 24 leaders who signed the Eldoret Declaration (SNRP 2002) were entitled to be involved in the selection of the members of parliament. Only this formula would guarantee significant SRRC control over the new parliament. On the opposite front, members of the former TNG argued that all 38 leaders invited to Nairobi would be included, this being the only criterion suitable for excluding the SRRC. The process for the composition of the transitional parliament remained obscure106. IGAD’s tortuous peace process culminated in October 2004 with the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), temporary based in Baidoa. On the 10th of October, the Transitional Federal Parliament elected Abdullahi Ahmed Yusuf (the former president of Puntland) as interim president, and the IGAD talks culminated with the institutionalization of the exclusionary politics which had been inaugurated during the reconciliation: according to the International Crisis Group (2006: 3), ‘the first cabinet formation concentrated power within a narrow circle, mainly pro-Ethiopian allies from the SRRC, at the expense of clans and movements from the failed TNG’.

106 As a regional official told ICG (2004: 8): ‘[The faction leaders] only signed because each of them received the recognition he wanted: Abdullahi Yusuf was recognized as president of Puntland; Mohamed Abdi Yusuf was recognized as prime minister of the newly-revived TNG; the G8 was formally recognized as a political grouping for the first time with Mohamed Qanyare as its head; Aden Madoobe got what he wanted as the only signatory from the RRA; and Abdiqasim got to sign the agreement as Head of State. Apart from this they agreed on virtually nothing.’
3.2.2 Global Containment by regional incursion (2005-2007)

Once the TFG was established, its primary concern was that of establishing political authority on the ground. Soon after his election, Yusuf appealed both to the AU and the UN Security Council to authorize a 20,000-strong multinational force expected to protect the government and disarm the opposition. The UN did not respond to the request, but AU and IGAD began examining the options for a peace support force. Meanwhile a Mogadishu group opposed the proposal advanced by Abdullahi Yusuf to deploy Puntland forces around the capital: at the end of 2005 an internal crisis surfaced within the new government, and the control of southern Somalia was contended between three groups: the TFG based in Baidoa, the Mogadishu Group and the Islamic Courts (ICG 2006).

The formation of a responsible government, however, was undermined by the legacies of a precarious negotiation: the Yusuf-Ethiopian alliance had alienated large sections of the Hawiye clan, leaving the TFG with a support base too narrow to operate. Yusuf’s election fomented the Islamists, who interpreted the Mbagathi process as an Ethiopian move to secure its own boundaries with a friendly regime. This suspicion was incited by the fact that the first cabinet formation concentrated power within a pro-Ethiopian alliance. On the eve of this fragile political authority, the TFG’s legitimacy was undermined by the increasing popularity of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)\(^\text{107}\), led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The ICU was a heterogeneous body, composed by almost four factions (Harakat Al-Shabaab, Al Itihaad Al Islam, Majuma Ulema, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a) and various sharia courts. Beyond the existence of various political wings, the Courts consisted of a unitary militia force of about 400 men.

While the Courts were growing in terms of power and legitimacy, Ethiopia and the US enforced their counterterrorism rhetoric. Until 2005, the anti-terrorism campaign was mounted without any substantial evidence of the Somali complicity with the global jihad: in 2004 an investigation of the National commission on Terrorist Attack affirmed that no evidence was linking Al-Barakaat to Al-Qaeda (Roth et al. 2004). But in 2005, US officials emphasized the emergence of new proofs confirming heightened Al-Qaida activity in Mogadishu. As a consequence, on the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) of February 2006, several Mogadishu warlords and members of the TFG announced the formation of a coalition, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). The US State department openly admitted the US was funding the coalition as part of its counter-terrorism

\(^{107}\) The Supreme Council of Islamic Courts was an umbrella organization of shari’a courts in Mogadishu, founded in 2004, and renamed Islamic Court Union in 2006.
initiatives: John Prendergast confirmed that Washington paid the warlords about US$100,000–150,000 a month, since 2005 until the first half of 2006 (Burkeman et all. 2006).

Clashes between Islamic Courts and ARPCT erupted in February 2006 near the port area of Mogadishu: fighting culminated on 24 March with almost 70 dead. In May, the battle intensified and in early June the ICU took control of Baidoa and Mogadishu forcing the ARCPT to flee in Jowhar, where the ICU launched its last offensive. The battles of Mogadishu and Jowhar marked the ICU’s seizure of power inside the Benadir triangle, but regional and global actors were not disposed to recognize the Courts as de facto authorities. For this reason, the US and Ethiopia were forced to reconsider their local counter-terrorism strategy: the defeat of the ARCPT signed the official end of the politics oriented to curb the Islamic enthusiasm, and has inaugurated the era of global containment by regional incursion.

Since August 2006, massive Ethiopian troops have moved in and around Baydhabo, where the TFG was confined. The relationship with Ethiopia deteriorated when the Courts revealed the purpose of reuniting all Somali speaking regions around Somalia. In September, the League of Arab States attempted to mediate between the TFG and the ICU, but the negotiations failed. Meanwhile, inside the Courts there emerged Al-Shabaab, the best-organized faction and the most critical group against the foreign presence. The failure of the Arab negotiations in conjunction with the unwillingness of the other regional institutions to get involved in mediation enabled Al-Shabaab to fortify its military posture 108.

On the 6th of December 2006, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 1725 (UNSC 2006), authorizing the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force, IGASOM, made up of IGAD and AU ‘to facilitate peace talks between the TFG and ICU, maintain security in TFG-controlled Baidoa, protect TFG government officials and train TFG security personnel’ 109. On the 14th of December, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi E. Frazer, asserted that Al-Qaeda controlled the Islamic Courts (Cawthorn 2006). Further investigations had shown that members of Al-Shabaab were linked to Al-Qaeda and Somalia was used as short-term transit (Menkhaus 2004). But Frazer’s statement was an evident exaggeration (Elmi 2010, Hoehne 2009), fomented by

108 Author’s Interviews, Hargeisa, November 2012.
109 Already on the 13th of September 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council had decided to deploy an IGAD peacekeeping operation for Somalia, IGASOM.
the decision of the Courts to oppose international observers and measures proposed by the Security Council. In July 2006, Osama Bin Laden complicated the situation, by issuing verbal support to the Somali jihad, and encouraging the formation of an Islamic state. Already in September, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had called on Somalis to oppose the TFG and expel the ‘Zionist Crusader presence’ from the Horn of Africa. However, these messages were more an effort to ‘incorporate a new and more distant geographical area’ into the Al-Qaeda global struggle (Hoehne 2009) rather than a proof of the Somali active connection with Al-Qaeda. The non-verbal evidence of the Somali Islamists connection with the global jihad was scarce: prior to 2001 there were no transnational militant groups fighting in Sub-Saharan Africa (Piombo 2007) and the Horn of Africa. Even if neither Ethiopia nor the United States declared the ICU in toto as a terrorist organization, both refused to recognize the Courts as a de facto authority. Weak allegations of the connection between Al-Qaida and the ICU were sufficient to detonate a massive intervention: after that fighting between the Ethiopian forces and the ICU broke out around Baidoa, on the 23rd of December the Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia. After one week of artillery and mortar duels the situation spiraled into an open war, and by the end of December, forces loyal to the TFG had gained control of towns held by the ICU.

In order to comprehend the causal mechanism that began after the Ethiopian incursion, two aspects must be evaluated: the precarious legality of the Ethiopian incursion and the relationship with the global ally. Firstly, the Ethiopian incursion into Somalia has been justified on the basis of two norms, self-defense and legal invitation (Allo 2009, 2010). On one hand, Ethiopia claimed that its intervention was allowed by the invitation of the ‘internationally recognized government of Somalia’ (Zenawi 2006). This justification, however, was rendered uncertain by the fragility of the state authority in Somalia, since factors making intervention inside a foreign country legal (state authority, legitimacy and effectiveness) are very weak in a failed state scenario.

In parallel, Ethiopia defined the incursion as an exercise of its right of self-defense against the Islamic threat (BBC 2006). The Prime Minister Meles Zenawi sustained that Ethiopia was ‘technically’ at war with the Islamists because they had declared jihad on his country (ibidem): but an attack inside the Somali territory against Somalia’s TFG might not be considered an attack on the Ethiopian government given absence of a prior bilateral or multilateral treaty arrangements establishing a collective security defence between Ethiopia and Somalia (Allo 2011). The right to self-defence was also enforced by the claim that an attack against the Ethiopian troops had been conducted by ‘Ethiopian
rebel forces operating from the areas under the control of the ICU’ (Zenawi: 2006). However, also this claim did not justify the Ethiopian right to self-defence under the requirements of the UN Charter Article 51: firstly, because the armed attack was conducted by Ethiopian rebels; and secondly because a proper allocation of responsibility between insurgents and forces hosting or supporting insurgents cannot be assured. In order to enforce the legality of its incursion the Ethiopian government played the card of the global war on terrorism (GWoT), claiming that the chairman of the Islamic Courts was the head of Al-Itihaad, the Islamist organization blacklisted by the US (Zenawi 2006, Allo 2011). Despite the attempt of using the GWoT to invoke a right to self-defence, the real core of the Ethiopian intervention concerned its national security. The Ethiopian Prime Minister on 24 December 2006 affirmed that two of the factors triggering the armed intervention were ‘the presence in Somalia of Ethiopian insurgents which seek to overthrow the government of Ethiopia by force’ and the ‘destabilizing presence of the Eritrean government in Somalia’ (Zenawi 2006). Ethiopia perceived the Islamic Courts as a threat because the group ‘was controlled by forces that are still actively pursuing the vision of a Greater Somalia- a vision that aspires to integrate Ethiopia’s Somali-speaking Region of Ogaden into mainland Somalia and hence threatens Ethiopia’s political independence and territorial integrity’ (Allo 2011). The Ethiopian Parliament Resolution authorized the government to take all the necessary measures against the ICU because of its ‘expansionist intent’ to annex the Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (UNSC 2011). On the 5th of December 2006 Bereket Simon, advisor to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, confirmed that the eternal tension with diasporic forces was still a source of anxiety for the Ethiopian government: ‘past wars with Somalia were caused by the expansionist attitude of the Somali government who wanted to take part of Ethiopia to be incorporated with the greater Somalia they had in their mind. Nevertheless, this is a new government which doesn’t have any qualm with the Somali people’ (Banadir 2012). For the Ethiopian government, thus, stabilizing Somalia without its irredentist project was still a matter of survival.

The second important aspect of the Ethiopian armed incursion was the relationship with the global ally. The United States assisted the Ethiopian initiative with aerial reconnaissance and satellite surveillance support: since November 2006, Meles Zenawi (2006) has told US officials that Ethiopia ‘would be grateful if the US would help locate bases of al-Shabaab’. As clearly argued by Menkhaus, the Ethiopian offensive was not simply an ‘instance of the U.S. subcontracting the war of terror to a regional
ally…Ethiopia pursued its own interests and would have acted with or without U.S. approval’ (Menkhaus 2009: 3), as demonstrated by the fact that Ethiopia have launched incursions in Somalia since 1996, prior to the escalation of the global war on terror. As early as November 2006, Meles Zenawi affirmed that Ethiopia would intervene ‘with or without the US’, but that it preferred to do it with them: in fact, the GWoT has been a golden opportunity for the Ethiopian regime to legitimate years of military incursions into Somalia, and increase repression against its internal opposition. The US position was clarified on the 23rd of December 2006 by the statement released by John Prendergast, the former U.S. Department Official, according to which ‘We (the United States) are now giving a yellow-slash-green light to Ethiopia’s policy of containment by intervention’ (Landay and Bengali 2011).

In parallel, the Ethiopian incursion was a green light to US unilateral operations. After the Ethiopian initiative the US launched several direct military operations on the ground: on the 9th of January 2007, the US Air force carried out two strikes in southern Somalia, targeting an Islamist fighter (Abu Talha al-Sudani) but killing 27 civilians. The bombing took place near the Kenyan border and was the first recognized military action since the US withdrawal from Somalia in 1995. The attacked targets included two members of Al-Qaeda, one of whom was wanted for his involvement in the 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi. This military action was the first in a long series that in critical conjuncture with the Ethiopian invasion forced the ICU to retreat into a defensive jihad in Djibouti and Eritrea.

After the Ethiopian incursion, glocal intervention continued to be operative in Somalia in one of the most complex stages of the entire period of foreign intervention in Somalia. Due to this complexity, the period comprised between 2007 and 2010 must be analyzed as operating within three intertwined dimensions: the regional legitimacy for combating Global terrorism (3.2.3), the reconciliation process (3.2.4) and the never ending military solution (3.2.5).

3.2.3 Regional legitimacy for combating Global terrorism

One of the arguments provided by the Ethiopian government to justify intervention in Somalia was the threat posed by the Eritrean presence in Somalia. Since members of the ICU fled to Asmara, Eritrea has long been accused of fomenting Somali Islamists with providing arms, funds, and training. For this reason, IGAD called for the UN to impose sanctions against its former member state. In the meanwhile, the Eritrean foreign
relationships were already deteriorating since the country suspended its membership to IGAD, due to the organizations reluctance to condemn the Ethiopian armed intervention in Somalia. On the other side, the Eritrean involvement in supporting the Somali insurgents has been subject to a controversial debate. The UN Arms Embargo Monitors claimed that between February and May 2005, three flights from Eritrea arrived in Dhusamareeb, carrying ONLF militia. The monitor group had established that over 2000 Eritrean combat troops were in Somalia between 2006 and 2007: even if this estimation was largely overstated (ICG 2007) the Eritrean presence in Somalia has often been mentioned as the causus belli mounting the ‘lawful Ethiopian response’ (Allo 2009). Even if Eritrean officials have never admitted that Eritrea might be involved in the Somali affairs, the Eritrean interference cannot be reasonably denied. However, its consistency has often been exaggerated. On the 6th of September 2007, a meeting was held in Asmara between leaders of the ICU, representatives of civil society and diaspora. Eritrean government and officials from the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) attended the Somali Congress for Liberation and Reconstitution. The secretary of PFDJ addressed the conference on behalf of the Government of Eritrea (‘Somalia: Congress for Liberation and Reconstitution Opens in Asmara’ 2007). But, as argued by the head of the Organizational Affairs for PFDJ, Mr. Al-Amin Mohammed Seid, the Somali Committee organized the conference and the Eritrean government hosted the initiative. The conference was oriented to create a new political platform for establishing a ‘national unity and reconciliation among the Somali people, and stopping the violence caused by the foreign occupation’ (ibidem). At this conference the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) was created. Thus it is clearly evident that Eritrea offered assistance in terms of political and logistical supports, hosting Somali political factions and supporting the cause of the Somali liberation from the Ethiopian siege: congress spokesman and former Information Minister, Dr. Zekaria Mahmoud Abdu, affirmed this meeting was ‘decisive in driving out the invading forces of the TPLF regime and the establishment of a united Somalia’ (ibidem).

110 Initially, IGAD member states called for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops (IGAD 2007), but since IGAD’s policy has been deeply penetrated by the interests of its major regional power, the organization has never condemned the violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. Eritrea criticized the weakness of the regional body and its denial to take action.

111 Hundreds of Oromo fighters reportedly arrived in Somalia between June and December 2006 to reinforce the Courts’ forces, and Oromo combatants were killed and captured in Somalia during the fighting with the Ethiopian army.
However Eritrea was accused of militarily supporting al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the major protagonists of the fighting with the Ethiopian-TFG troops\textsuperscript{112}. In 2011, the UN Monitoring Group obtained ‘firm evidence’ of the Eritrean support to the armed opposition groups in Somalia. The investigation (UNSC 2011) relies on two sources of evidence. Firstly, there was a constant connection between key players (I): Somali militiamen and Eritrean diplomats, officers, or military personnel responsible for the direction of intelligence operations. And secondly, a consistent volume of receipts certifying money transfers and payments (II) issued by the Eritrean officials towards Al-Shabaab and Hizb Islam\textsuperscript{113}. But the Monitoring group has not been able to obtain all these documents, neither to estimate the total amount of this support. On the basis of these weak allegations, Eritrea has continued to deny any concrete involvement\textsuperscript{114}.

Whereas Eritrea has provided a logistical support, political sponsorship and an undefined amount of military assistance to the Somali insurgents, this interference has been overestimated. Despite Ethiopian action in Somalia having been significantly more intrusive and equally illegal as the Eritrean action, the flawed proofs of the Eritrean sponsorship of the Somali resistance\textsuperscript{115} were seen as sufficient to undertake a war campaign. The application of a double standard in matters of foreign interference culminated on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of December 2009, when the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea, while it formally legitimated the Ethiopian armed occupation of Somalia in 2006.

\textsuperscript{112} The Eritrean alliance with the Somali insurgents was not motivated by any ideological reorientation, but from a tactical need to support whichever group could oppose the Ethiopian hegemonic projects. An Islamic state in Somalia threatens the interests of Eritrea. Firstly, because the ruling party is a secular organization; and second because the country is also affected by tensions between Christians and Muslims. Thus, the Eritrean support for the ICU was more tactical than strategic (Reid 2009).

\textsuperscript{113} ‘Covered financial support, payment vouchers marked “State of Eritrea”, cash receipts marked with Tigrinya and Arabic lettering and the emblem of the State of Eritrea, and tabulated records of payments. Receipts documenting financial transfers to Somali individuals from the Eritrean embassy in Nairobi’ (UNSC 2011:88).

\textsuperscript{114} The weakness of these allegations is also demonstrated by the uncertainty showed by the US in including Eritrea inside the list of States Sponsors of Terrorism. Notwithstanding the continuous pressures made by the Ethiopian ally, the US has never formalized its insinuations, but it has continuously threatened to add Eritrea to the list of pariah states, establishing a war rhetoric against the Asmara government.

\textsuperscript{115} Arab newspapers, like Al-Sharq al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, uses the term al-Muqawamah to identify the Somali insurgency composed by ARS, Al-Shabaab and later Hizbul-Islam.
3.2.4 Reconciliation process: fighting new terrorists, reconciling with the old ones

Once the anti-terrorist rhetoric was enforced, glocal intervention continued to be operative during one of the most complex stages of foreign intervention in Somalia, a phase marked by an exclusionary process of political reconciliation. Taking into consideration the divisions existing between members of the former Islamic Courts, the TFG and regional partners have continuously tried to broaden these divisions by encouraging skirmishes with the hope of provoking an all-out military confrontation. But the contrary has been often the case: as is clearly stated by Calchi Novati:

In Somalia, jihadism seemed a way to get rid of fragmentation, anarchy, and instability… The re-unification assured by Muslim ideology was a good alternative to the split in struggling clans. The Muslim movement got the genius of the so-called ‘little solutions for big problems’ and that was enough for the Somali population after so many years of despair and bad governance’ (Calchi Calchi Novati 2010: 12).

In January 2007 the former chairman of the ICU, Sheikh Sharif, surrendered to the Kenyan authorities: Only a few months after declaring a jihad against Ethiopia, the courts changed their minds and decided to pursue a peace process. The parts of the ICU located in Somalia, and still fighting against the TFG-Ethiopia alliance, distanced themselves from the chairmen who they considered a ‘coward’. In September 2007, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys convened a conference between the former Islamic Courts, prior to this he had escaped into Eritrea and installed himself as executive chairman of the emergent group, thus formalizing the divisions between ARS-Asmara (Aweys) and ARS-Djibouti (Sheikh Sharif). Despite Sheikh Sharif having surrendered, Al-Shabaab and other Islamic or clan militia continued the military campaign aimed towards recapturing the south.

On the basis of this delicate equilibrium between political and military leaderships, in May 2008 the Djibouti government, under the auspices of IGAD and UNPOS, decided to start reconciling with members of the Islamic Courts who were desirous of stopping the conflict. An ARS delegation including Sheikh Sharif, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, met the UN Special Representative in Nairobi, where they agreed to issue a peace agenda. On the 9th of June, the parties reached an agreement establishing the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force. The agreement, however, constituted the basis of the watershed between Islamists, since the agreement established the dissociation ‘from any armed groups or individuals that do not adhere to the terms of the agreement’ (UNSC 2008: 3).

The other factions interpreted this agreement as a betrayal: Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys affirmed that the ARS would refuse any negotiations outright ‘the war will
continue until the country is liberated from enemy occupiers’ (Hassan 2012). Meanwhile, the opposition expanded its territorial control of southern Somalia: in August 2008, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Courts conquered the key port city of Kismaayo, where they established a district administration, however international actors were still reluctant to recognize de facto political authorities. On the 25th of November 2008, the TFG and the wing of the ARS based in Djibouti signed an agreement for the formation of a Government of National Unity: the parliament was enlarged to include members of the former Islamist Courts, and in January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad, was elected president by the expanded transitional parliament.

The parts signed an agreement purely for opportunistic reasons (Apuuli 2011): the TFG wanted to preserve some semblance of credibility by opening the negotiations with the insurgents, while for the ARS-D the process represented the only way to gain momentum in the Somali political scene: ‘The overall aim of the architects of the process was to create a powerful political alliance, capable of stabilizing the country, marginalizing the radicals and stemming the tide of Islamic militancy’ (ibidem). As planned, the Djibouti talks marked a breaking point between negotiating and belligerent forces: even if official conference proceedings demonstrated a willingness to work towards reconciling the combatants, parties never made practical efforts to promote an inclusive political process. After the designation of Al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, in February 2009, the imperative of the TFG’s national security was that of containing and rolling back the opposition. Here, the interests of the GWoT advanced by the US collided with the necessity of the TFG to acquire stability: as illustrated by map in Figure 1, during early 2009 the Somali resistance (Al-Shabaab and ARS-A) controlled the majority of the southern Somalia.
In summary, the exclusion of the *de facto* political authorities from the reconciliation processes has fomented the division between the political and military authority in Somalia: ‘The discrepancy between the balance of forces on the ground and the political talks between two protagonists who control very little, made implementation problematic’ (Apuuli 2011: 24). As a result, the proceedings of the Djibouti agreement were inoperative from the very beginning: the Government of National Unity was expected to mediate with former members of the Courts, but as reported by the ICG (2010: 14) a reconciliation strategy was not clearly articulated and the TFG seemed reluctant to enlarge the alliance of moderates for power-sharing: ‘Sharif has failed to take advantage of his
superior knowledge of Islam and excellent oratory skills to counter Al-Shabaab propaganda’ (ICG 2010: 15). In particular, Sheik Sharif, instead of pursuing reconciliation with his former allies has attempted to break up the front of the Resistance, conducting secret talks with both Al-Shabaab (Mukhtar Robow) and Hizbul Islam116 (Yusuf Indha Adde).

As reported by Garowe Online (‘Ideological Differences Splits Somalia’s al-Shabaab’ 2009) the deputy leader of al-Shabaab, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow known as Abu Mansur, was seeking to change the al-Shabaab’s doctrine to allow for negotiation with the TFG: in February 2009, Abu Mansur met with Sharif Ahmed, but disagreements on the implementation of Sharia and the Ethiopian presence denied any possibility of reconciliation (Horadam 2012b). Meanwhile, Sheikh Sharif stated that he had pursued successful meetings with local civic, religious, and political leaders in Mogadishu: on the 12th of February, Abu Mansur said that ‘none of his group’s officials ever met the Somali president during his visit to the capital Mogadishu …As far as we are concerned Sharif is not different from his predecessor Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and we will continue the Jihad against the invaders’ (‘Al-Shabaab reiterates opposition to new Somali leader’ 2009).

On 28 February 2008, Sheikh Sharif officially claimed that he had agreed ‘proposals for a truce with the leading rebel group and also accepted the implementation of sharia, or Islamic law, in the country’ (‘Somalia in truce with rebel group’ 2009). However, the day after the declaration of cease-fire, the spokesman of Hizbul Islam, Arale said his group had met with mediators but only discussed plans for a partial withdrawal of rebel fighters. Sheikh Sharif, thus, tried to present the application of sharia Law as an object of negotiation: ‘The mediators asked me to introduce sharia in the country and I agreed’ he said (ibidem). While at the real stakes in the competition there was the removal of the military troops from civilian areas: Iman, a member of the ARS-Asmara affirmed ‘The jihad is not over until we confirm that the country is liberated from enemy forces and their collaborators’ (‘Somalia: Islamic Party insurgents declare war on new govt’ 2009). The first rounds of reconciliation personally addressed by Sheik Sharif culminated with the declaration that jihad was not over.

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116 In February 2009, the Islamist groups merged to fight the new government: on 4 February four Islamist groups, including the Eritrean branch of the ARS merged and created Hizbul Islam, guided by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.
3.2.5 The never ending military solution (2007-2010)

The marginalization of the Somali resistance has produced an inevitable escalation of violence. While many analysts have speculated on the regional and global re-composition of the Somali rebellion, little attention has been dedicated to the structure (I) interests (II) and strategies (III) of the local insurgency, on which depend most of the reasons explaining why insurgents have opposed the foreign intervention, protracting the conflict. In fact, while the ICU’s top political leadership moved to Asmara and Djibouti, the military commanders of the Courts (Aden Hashi Ayro, Hassan Turki and Mukhtar Robow), together with the Hawiye clan militia waged a guerrilla campaign throughout Somalia. The Somali insurgency was composed both by clan militia and Islamists previously coalesced inside the ICU (I): the presence of the Ethiopian troops in fact coalesced a new insurgency oriented to expel the Ethiopians and gain control of the territory governed by a puppet Transitional Government which represented a betrayal of the past insurgency (II).

Between February and June 2007, the Habar Gidir clan militia and Islamists launched their guerrilla campaign in Mogadishu: By the end of March 2007 the war also intensified in Mogadishu where Ethiopian and TFG troops were under daily attacks. Insurgents pursued a low-level but effective guerrilla campaign (III), while Ethiopia used area bombardments, heavy artillery and mortars to counter the offensive (‘Eight killed in Mogadishu clashes’ 2008). In July, the insurgency spread to the entire Banaadir region, Middle and Lower Shabeelle and parts of the Juba Valley: the TFG lost the majority of territories conquered during the 2006 Ethiopian incursion. In October, the guerrillas reached the Hiiraan, and Galguduud regions, and in December, Sheik Qasim Ibrahim Nur, the national security director of the TFG, announced that 80% of the country was no longer under the TFG’s control (‘Official sees resurgence by Islamic courts’ 2007).

Since early 2008, Al-Shabaab moved its tactics towards longer occupations of towns (III): during this period, the US unilateral operations gradually increased. On one side, the rising necessity of ‘combating the scourge of piracy’ (Rice 2008) demanded the presence of the US Naval Force patrolling activity off the Somali coast117: when in April 2009 pirates assaulted a US merchant ship on the Somali coast, fighting piracy became an urgent concern for Obama’s administration. On the other one, the full realization of the US military presence in the Horn (and generally in Africa) was formalized with the

117 Since January 2007, US naval forces were deployed off the Somali coast to prevent leaders of defeated Islamist militias escaping’ (‘US navy patrols Somalia’s coast’ 2007).
instauration of the new US Africa command (AFRICOM), in October 2008, in Camp Lemonier. Therefore, Ethiopian constant incursions and the deployment of a military infrastructure were indispensable for developing the new US strategy in Africa: in fact, according to Strategic Survey, until 2007 the US had avoided becoming directly involved on the ground but ‘the establishment of the TFG rendered overt US military action on Somali soil politically easier, and American AC-130 strikes targeting al-Qaeda players made sense from a strictly counter-terrorism standpoint’ (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007: 260). During this period a growing number of secret operations\footnote{On the 15\textsuperscript{th} of June 2012 President Obama acknowledged for the first time that United States military forces had taken ‘direct action’ against groups affiliated with Al Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen (Baker 2012).} were conducted: in March 2009, one month after Al-Shabaab was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the United States launched a missile attack from a naval vessel into the village of Dobley, against Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab militants. On the 14\textsuperscript{th} of September near the town of Baraaawe the Operation Celestial Balance was conducted, in which a US assault helicopter killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of the most wanted Islamic militants said to be responsible of a 2002 hotel bombing in Mombasa. While in 2011, several air attacks conducted by unmanned drones or helicopters were resumed\footnote{In June 2009, missile attacks hit a militant training camp near Kismayo. At the end of June ‘another attack occurred in Taabta village in the Afmadow District of Lower Juba’ (Pelton 2011). On the 6\textsuperscript{th} of July, US drones or planes ‘reportedly hit three al Shabaab militant training camps in Afmadow’. On the 6\textsuperscript{th} of October, Somali farmers were reported to have been killed in a drone strike in Dolbiyow Village, 35km east of Dhoobley. On the 14\textsuperscript{th} of November Missiles were fired at a training camp in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle, according to al Shabaab (ibidem).}.

In the early 2009, the security situation deteriorated significantly. When Ethiopia became impatient with the TFG’s dysfunctions, and worried about the expansion of the Somali resistance, the security of the TFG was entrusted to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. On the 20\textsuperscript{th} of February 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the African Union (UNSC 2007) to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM, a multilateral force\footnote{Uganda, Nigeria and Burundi promised deployment of troops while Western donors (EU, US and UK) offered a financial support.} composed by 7700 troops and deployed around Mogadishu, for an original period of six months with a mandate oriented ‘to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization,
reconstruction and development in Somalia’ (AMISOM 2012). On the 6th of March, the first 400 Ugandan troops arrived in Somalia, but several factors undermined its effectiveness.

During the first phase, comprised of at least between 2007 and 2010, AMISOM was underequipped (Mays 2009). In March 2007, only 2710 troops arrived in Somalia (AMISOM review 2010) of the envisaged total of 8000. By late 2008, only 1700 Burundian soldiers were deployed to Mogadishu and by April 2009, when 3000-4000 Ethiopian troops left Somalia, AMISOM had around 4300 troops. AMISOM was underfinanced and underprepared: behind the initial generosity of western partners (US and European Union), several delays occurred in sending troops and funds. On one hand, AMISOM did not automatically have a secure source of financing since it received contributions from several multilateral and bilateral donor sources. On the other, this contribution has ‘been relatively modest in comparison with other funding sources’ (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2012: 15).

As a result, during the first stage of intervention, AMISOM was largely unprepared to conduct its mission (AMISOM review 2011). In early 2009, the security situation in Somalia significantly deteriorated: when Ethiopia became impatient with the TFG’s dysfunctions (ICG 2008), and worried about the expansion of the Somali resistance, the security of the TFG was entrusted to the African Union Mission. AMISOM was located in a few strategic places in Mogadishu: the airport, seaport, presidential palace and later the strategic roads (AMISOM review 2011). As a result, AU troops soon came under attack. The Somali insurgents took advantages of AMISOM’s weakness and the military tenure of the TFG collapsed once the Ethiopian troops withdrew: a ‘few hours’ after the Ethiopians went out, the cities were overrun by the insurgents (The International institute for Strategic Studies 2009). The TFG faced the opposition of its old comrades in arms, Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam: Baidoa was conquered on the 25th of January, while on the 8th of February heavy fighting broke out in southern Mogadishu where on the 22nd of February two car bomb attacks against an AU military base killed 11 AMISOM soldiers (UNSC 2008).

Conflict reached its peak in violence in May, when Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam entered...

121 In June 2009, the UN Security Council authorized a logistical support package for AMISOM, and a voluntary Trust fund was established, making AMISOM’s funding ‘intermittent, unpredictable and, on the whole, insufficient’ (AMISOM review 2012a: 16). Many actors had promised funds that have never been materialized and troops have not been paid in months.

122 AMISOM was launched with an expected cost of $335 million for the first year (LWJ), but according to the United Nations (2009), $ 798 million have been appropriated for AMISOM between July 2008 and June 2012 (Bruton and Norris 2011).
Mogadishu to take over the city (Mapping militant organizations 2012). AMISOM mounted a robust defense of the government, repelling the assault on the presidential palace and putting significant pressure on the Islamist insurgency (ICG 2010). The battle, however, ended with relative success for them, as they managed to take control over most of the capital, while AU forces withdrew into protected territories (ibidem). Security in Mogadishu deeply deteriorated: over the following months the capital remained the stage of continuous and intermittent offensives. Attacks in Mogadishu targeting TFG and AMISOM forces decreased only in October 2009, when the alliance between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam was broken by a power dispute in Kismayo (ICG 2008), concerning the distribution of port revenues, and fighting between the two factions continued until December 2009 (Mapping militant organizations 2012).

Without funds and clear operational strategies Ugandan and Burundian troops were unable to manage peace making or to contain the Somali insurgency. As argued in December 2009 by the AMISOM force commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha: ‘We were supposed to come in, extend down south and move north…Unfortunately, we are still here. Our numbers are limited and therefore our activities have to be limited’ (‘Somali’s peacekeepers: underfunded, under attack, but still there’ 2009).

In line with the rapid intensification of global unilateral operations, during the months following the Ethiopian formal withdrawal, Ethiopia has continued to pursue ground operations inside the regions of Hiran, Gedo, Galgudug and Bakol. During 2010, the entire Ethiopian role in Somalia came back to the paradigms of the mutual interference adopted before the 2006 armed intervention: on one hand, sponsoring the formation of friendly insurgents such as Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa to expel Al-Shabaab from the central regions of Galgudug and Hirna123, on the other continuing to support the TFG fighting against Al-Shabaab.

The third stage of foreign intervention in Somalia has not yet been concluded, since counterterrorism has been reinvigorated by the increasing Kenyan involvement. Since July

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123 In 2008 a clan alliance of the Hawiye sub-clan belonging to traditional Sufi groups, named Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) clashed against al-Shabaab for the territorial control of territories of Hiran and Galgudug. In December 2008, Ethiopia military supported the ASWJ attempt to expel Al-Shabaab from these regions. According to the (ICG 2011) ‘Ethiopia’s motive is to use ASWJ to create a buffer region hostile to Al-Shabaab, but it is also keen to prevent the rise of a formidable future adversary, which is perhaps why it is seeking an ASWJ-TFG merger.’ In march TFG and ASWJ signed an agreement for combatting their common enemy, but their power-sharing alliance did not last for long, since it opened a schism inside ASWJ, and one part has not recognized the agreement (Mapping militant organization 2012).
2010 in fact, border clashes between Kenya and Al-Shabaab have occurred in the area of Liboi, after which hundreds of Kenyan security personnel have been moved to the Kenyan-Somalia border. On the 15\(^{th}\) of October Kenyan troops moved to take the Somali border with the declared aim of militarily destroying Al-Shabaab in Kismayo (‘Kenya pushes to Kismayo in Somalia’ 2011). The Kenyan decision to enter Somali territory with a massive armed intervention has opened a second front of the glocal counterterrorism intervention in Somalia. According to the ICG, ‘Nairobi’s Somalia policy has dramatically shifted in 2010. Pragmatic, quiet engagement with Al-Shabaab has been abandoned. Containment of the group is now regarded as a national security imperative’ (ICG 2010: 12). The operation Linda Nchi was oriented to re-seize the key city of Kismayo, considered to be strategic for the survival of the insurgent’s economy, but the operation was part of a broad strategy oriented to promoting the formation of a buffer security-zone capable of protecting Kenyan national interests\(^{124}\) (ibidem).

The operation, however, has opened a breach in the alliance between global and regional actors: after the incursion, the US ambassador Scott Gration denied any US involvement, claiming that the US was involved only in technically supporting Kenya’s military equipment. ‘We don’t have military operation outside the border of Kenya’ (‘US denies Al-Shabaab role’ 2011) the envoy said during a news conference at the Department of Defence. Thus, the regional attempts to include the regional ‘patrolling’ operations inside the multilateral architecture of counter-terrorism have been disconfirmed by the US willingness to preserve the unilateral asset of the military initiatives.

On the other side, the operation has also exacerbated the divisions within the transitional government. The TFG spokesman has denied the incursion, while Kenyan officials stated that the intervention occurred on the basis of a legal invitation issued by the Somali government. Three days after the incursion, on the 18\(^{th}\) of October, Kenya and TFG signed a cooperation agreement for fighting al-Shabaab, but on the 26\(^{th}\) of October Sheikh Sharif, criticized the Kenyan incursion into the Somali sovereignty, which he considered as inappropriate (Mohamed Ahmed 2011). One day after, the TFG prime minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, contradicted what Sheik Sharif said, affirming that Kenya enjoys the right to fight Al-Shabaab with the support of the Somali government (ibidem). The volatility of these declarations represents just one of the visible signs of the

\(^{124}\) Since January 2010, in fact, Kenyan official informed US counterparts about the initiative of supporting the formation of a buffer-state in Somalia, the Jubaland, oriented to cut-off Al-Shabaab form the south (Some 2011).
incongruences that have emerged between regional and global approaches to the glocal counter-terrorism.

3.3 Intervening variables: polarization and radicalization of the insurgency

The glocal counter-terrorism in Somalia has been one of the most violent phases of foreign intervention, resulting into a net expansion of the Somali conflict. According to Amnesty International (1998), in 2006 alone fighting between the Islamic Courts Union and TFG killed nearly 6,000 civilians in Mogadishu. Conflict further deteriorated in 2008: between January 2007 and December 2008, this war left more than 10,000 people dead, many more wounded, and more than a million residents temporarily fled Mogadishu (ibidem). In 2010, conflict in Somalia resulted in almost 2100 battle-related deaths (SIPRI 2011), and according to Melvin and De Konig (2010) it was one of the major armed conflicts fought in 2010, after Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During this stage, foreign actors continued to help the weaker party (the TFG) to take military control of southern Somalia, delegitimizing the opponents. Interveners have worked to isolate and suppress insurgents, who are considered an extreme challenge to the current formula of the international system. Contrary to the intervention that occurred under the UN mandate, during the glocal counter terrorism, internal conflict has been largely ‘used’ by external powers for their own purposes. Global and regional actors have followed desperate interests: Ethiopia has tried to re-establish the regional order shaken by the aggressive Eritrean foreign policy and its alliance with diasporic forces, while the US has pursued in Somalia its own, and often unilateral GWoT. As theorized by Modelski (1964), third parties have been interested more in bringing about the complete or ‘total’ victory of either party, than in securing the internal peace. For this reason, this stage of intervention has produced a net expansion of the conflict. Three mechanisms generated by the intervention have been relevant: the weakness of the negotiation (I), the polarization of the Somali insurgency (II) and its military radicalization (III).

Firstly, the US strategy of launching unilateral or bilateral operations whilst simultaneously stretching a multilateral façade of intervention, and using regional institutions as proxy, has weakened the negotiations, as regional facilitators have failed to prioritize national reconciliation. IGAD was one of the preeminent regional protagonists of the US attempt to build a multilateral counter-terrorism architecture in the Horn: from the analysis of its historical trajectory it emerges that the GWoT has inflicted on IGAD a reordering of priorities not necessarily coherent with the concerns of its regional agenda,
as demonstrated by the fact that until 2000, the question of terrorism was absent from IGAD official speeches (IGAD 2000). In 1998, the proceedings of the 7th Summit of the Assembly of IGAD Heads of States reiterated the factional roots of the Somali conflict, stressing that ultimate responsibility to find a solution rested with Somali people (IGAD 1999). In 2000, IGAD member states affirmed that recent trends in Somalia’s conflict were making progress towards resolution (IGAD 2000), but in 2002 the 9th Summit of IGAD Heads of States mentioned the danger that anarchy in Somalia would be a ‘good climate for terrorists’ (IGAD 2002). Conflict in Somalia was suddenly interpreted through the lens of the GWoT: during the 15th Extra-Ordinary Assembly of IGAD, member states defined the conflict in Somalia not as a ‘conflict among Somalis but between the people of Somalia and international terrorist groups’ (IGAD 2010).

As a result, IGAD’s role in Somalia’s peace process has been completely subordinated to the double security interests of its regional master and its global ally. During the negotiations between the SRRC and the TNG held in Eldoret, talks were immobilized by the Ethiopian dominance, actively oriented to marginalize the TNG supporters (ICG 2006). During the escalation of tensions between the TFG and the ICU, IGAD’s shift from mediation to contention (ICG 2006, Healy 2011) generated a deficit of neutrality and a marginalization of key political actors. As clearly mentioned by Healy (2011: 118), ‘Somalia urgently needed mediation … But IGAD proved too narrow and too internally conflicted to provide mediation between ICU and TFG’. Since regional institutions and actors have sponsored power-sharing and regime change instead of reconciliation, the insurgents have gradually lost the aspiration and motivation to stop the conflict in and partake in exclusionary negotiations.

The most dangerous effect of this, still ongoing, stage of foreign intervention has been the polarization of the insurgency (II). The first indicator of this polarization is provided by the ideological redefinition that occurred in 2009, when Al-Shabaab was formally renamed Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin to bolster its jihadist identity and the global nature of its changed aspirations. Since the beginning of the counter-terrorism campaign, the US and its allies have continuously accused various Islamist organizations

125 During the IGAD Second International Consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa in 1998, member states defined the guidelines for the International Advisory Group able of addressing a new approach to the Somalia national reconciliation. According to the list of priorities for the group, the problem of security in Somalia included ‘a) measures of decommunizing, b) Computing the Militia into security forces and c) the de-politicization of the Militia’ (New Approaches to the Somalia National Reconciliation 1998: 22).
(Al-Itihaad, ICU, Al Shabaab and ARS) of being connected to Al-Qaida. Until 2008, all the Islamist groups denied these allegations, stressing the local dimension of the Somali jihad. But for the first time, in February 2012, the chairman of Al Shabaab Godane, officially declared his organization’s allegiance to Al-Qaeda, stimulated by the necessity of uniting the ‘armies of the Ummah under one banner’ (Somali war Monitor 2012).

The US air bombing has directly fueled this polarization. The U.S. military operations have pushed the Somali resistance towards a global jihad and enforced the bridge between the local Islamists and al-Qaeda: the US missile or drone attacks have killed dozens of innocents adding legitimacy to the Islamist insurgency (Menkhaus 2009) and serving ‘as a jihadi recruitment aid’ (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009: 280). In fact, the US’s decision to designate al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization ‘proved counterproductive’ (ibidem: 280), immobilizing the proceedings of the Djibouti process. The TFG has refused to enlarge ‘the alliance of moderates’: beyond the official claims to reconciliation the TFG has showed no willingness to share power with insurgents or regional administrations. This is the reason why Sheikh Sharif opened a semblance of reconciliation with his former comrades, with the aim of using his new position to enlarge rather than reduce the distance between them (ICG 2010). This diplomatic hazard has resulted in the polarization of al-Shabaab though the marginalization of those actors favorable to cooperation. After Sheikh Sharif was engaged with secret negotiations with Al-Shabaab, and although Abu Mansur rebuffed the allegations of being in communication with Sheikh Sharif, the Emir Godane, pressed for the removal of Abu Mansur from the role of spokesman: this marginalization was an opportunity for Godane to complete the restructuring of the organization, causing al-Shabaab to drift towards a foreign jihadi ideological agenda. According to the ICG (2010:6) ‘The net result of all the changes was that Al-Shabaab moved closer to the al-Qaeda orbit, and the links have become more solid in the past year’.

The third dangerous mechanism generated by the glocal counterterrorism has been the military radicalization of the guerrilla campaign (III). After the Ethiopian armed intervention, the desire to destroy insurgents achieved the opposite result of enhancing their status. In late 2006, al-Shabaab used classic guerrilla tactics to oppose the TFG and Ethiopian troops. At the beginning of 2007 the organization extended its political power in southern Somalia through pragmatic means that led to a large growth in its popularity. In 2007 al-Shabaab tactics and strategies suddenly changed (Marchal 2011): the insurgents
began to use indiscriminate methods\(^{126}\), such as suicide bombs, land mines and roadside bombs, and a more centralised command structure was adopted, with foreign jihadists taking operational command (Hoehne 2009).

Several analysts have defined this radicalization as the natural outcome following the Ethiopian occupation (Hoehne 2009, Marchal 2007), since Al-Shabaab has galvanized a strong and consolidated dislike among Somalis of Ethiopia, into an active armed resistance. As noted by the International Crisis Group ‘Never before Ethiopian intervention was the radicalization so high and were people so numerous to be ready to lose their life to fight those they considered occupying forces’ (ICG 2011)\(^{127}\). The increase of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers is clearly illustrated in the Figure 5: between 1998 and 2003 Somalia had approximately 3 incidents a year classified as ‘terrorist incidents’, 11 incidents in 2006. In 2007, after the Ethiopian occupation, the number of incidents rapidly rose to 159.

**Figure 5. 'Terrorist incidents' overtime in Somalia (1978-2008) (Malito and Ylonen 2103)**

\[\text{Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2011.}\]

\(^{126}\) According to Marchal (2011), after the Ethiopian intervention four changes occurred within the al-Shabaab military tactics: the systemic use of IEDs and suicide bombers, a reshaping of the combat unit based on 9 elements, a major focus on infantry, the enforced mobility of troops.

\(^{127}\) The perception that Al-Shabaab and other Islamist insurgent groups are a rag-tag army of crude fanatics whose first instinct is to use force and terror to impose their radical vision is a caricature. They have largely succeeded in casting themselves as true Somali patriots opposed to the Ethiopian-allied TFG. As a result, they have been gaining popularity in central and southern Somalia, just as they did before the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006 (ICG 2008).
To sum up, this chapter has attempted to describe the manner in which foreign intervention has generated a set of mechanisms hostile to the redemption of the state disintegration in Somalia. Despite the fact that disparate phases of foreign intervention have stimulated different outcomes, one illusion has accompanied these two decades of intervention, that is, as Clarke once noted, ‘[The illusion] that where people are dying in large numbers because of civilian conflict can be a type of intervention that does not immediately interfere with the domestic politics of a country and include ‘nation-building’ component’ (Clarke and Herbst 1997: 245). This chapter attempted to explain why this illusion must necessarily be discarded.
Chapter 5
The impact of international intervention

One journalist wrote: ‘If there is such a thing as Dante’s Inferno, then surely it is to be found in Mogadishu’ ...
Well the making of this particular Inferno took a long time receiving as it did a generous helping hand from many countries along the way to conflagration (Abdullahi Mohamed Diriye 1995:1).

After the crisis of the African state sprung up in the mid 1990s, many African countries have become the recipients of military interventions oriented to promote state-building projects and develop the institutions of liberal-democracies. Important experiments have been pursued to support processes of democratization, assuming that rebuilding states according to global standards of democratic governance would be sufficient to reduce the propensity to conflict. Post-colonial studies and doctrines of international intervention have been deeply entangled with a philosophical exercise questioning whether a new ‘right to intervene’ was taking shape or not, given the emerging normative priorities appealing to the necessity of protecting human rights and promoting democracy. But this oneiric vision, accompanied by the Western enthusiasm to convert old enemies in new democratic partners (Prunier 2009) has been sharply interrupted by the failed attempts of the International Community to contain the Somali crisis and by the clamorous reluctance to stop atrocities in Rwanda. While the neo-liberal orthodoxy continued to consider humanitarian intervention as a shortcut to the Weberian state128 (Ottaway 2002), intervention in Somalia as elsewhere was turned into a practice where sovereignty has been deeply violated and traumatized.

After the clamorous withdrawal of the International Community from Mogadishu, scholars and practitioners began to rethink interventionist practice and principles. Many have questioned the conditions under which intervention succeeds or fails in containing conflicts (Gizelis and Kosek 2005); others have shown that interstate interventions have

128 ‘The model chosen by the international community is a short-cut to the Weberian state, an attempt to develop such an entity quickly and without the long, conflictual and often brutal evolution that historically underlies the formation of states’ (Ottaway 2002:1004).
rarely succeeded in establishing stable solutions to conflicts and humanitarian crises (Weiss 1997) (Weiss and Collins 2000, Regan 2000), while Many others have tended to explain recent failures focusing on the manner in which conflict is managed (Essuman-Johnson 2009), while others have approached the issue without isolating the rationale of intervention from its political dimension (Zack-Williams 2012).

But despite the Somali case inaugurating a useful rethinking of peace enforcement operations (Hirsch and Oakley 1995, Boulden 2001), very few considerations have been brought back into Somalia. After the UN enterprise two seasons of intervention have occurred, similar operative deadlocks have been pursued, but public and academic discourses have continued to present Somalia as embedded inside a perennial humanitarian crisis (Hobbs et all 2012), where the political discourse has been cannibalized by the clan inter-warfare. Whilst the failure of the International Community has been widely recognised, no structural analysis has been provided to evaluate the pervasive effect that foreign interferences have generated on the mechanisms of internal reconciliation and state-rebuilding.

To fill the gap, this concluding chapter will demonstrate that the most dramatic failure of the International Community in Somalia must be associated with the ambition of building states by military intervention. To be effective, this effort considers three analytical strategies developed inside this chapter as follows: the first assesses the impact of each stage of intervention on the three constitutive dimensions of the state disintegration (conflict, implosion and fragmentation). The second section provides a comparative analysis of intervention in order to cover how continuity and discontinuity are displayed. The third concludes this research by distilling the academic implications for further researches.

1. Evidence from the international route to reconciliation: the case of Somalia

For evaluating the impact of intervention on state disintegration a set of turning points inside the history of the Somali state disintegration must be identified with the aim of testing if our explanatory variables do really account for these decisive changes. This paragraph will not only illustrate the important changes that occurred in the three dimensions of state disintegration, but also explore the critical junctures existing between them.

129 Here is taken into consideration the method suggested by George and Bennet (2005) for addressing the problem of competing explanations.
The first critical juncture concerns the state of implosion (I) and the process of territorial fragmentation (II). The implosion of the central state in Somalia has never been reversed (I), since the corrosive rule of the foreign forces has weakened the legitimacy of the emerging political authorities. During the first intervention of the international community, the UN diplomatic activity was perceived as bargaining between the political candidature of Mahdi and the military leadership of Aidid (Hirsh and Oakley 1995). This attitude conferred legitimacy on clan factionalism, while other sections of the society, pivotal for the processes of reconciliation, have been marginalised. After the failure of the UN initiative, regional partners and foreign ‘facilitators’ either believed they could bypass the problem of rebuilding an organized political community by focusing exclusively on the choice between constitutional models (central vs. federal state). However, both the regional and global agenda rather than promoting the remaking of state or stimulating transformative politics actually encouraged the outsourcing of sovereignty functions. In the constant vacuum of a central political authority, foreign actors have attempted to establish a monopoly on the use of violence on behalf of the still fragile domestic authorities. Since the military intervention has been operative during unresolved phases of the civil war, foreign actors have actively, and more or less directly, changed the equilibrium internal to the factional conflict in favour of one part or the other (Stevenson 1997, Clark and Herbst 1997, Hirsh 1995). In 1995, the balance between the two wings of the USC was altered by the UN decision to fight and capture Aidid. In 1999, the Ethiopian support to the RRA in gaining the control of Baidoa (IRIN 1999) changed the balance between the RRA and the SNA. Since 2001, the counter-terrorism alliance has fomented the opposition (SRRC) against the incumbent (TNG), and once a friendly regime was created (TFG), the scheme of mutual interference has been inverted and interveners have attempted to discourage the insurgents (ICU) trying to take military control on behalf of the weak incumbent (TFG): first, sustaining a anti-terrorism coalition (ARPCT), and then appealing to the ground intervention of the Ethiopian troops.

Furthermore, the process of territorial fragmentation (II) has tended to externalize the sovereignty functions. When the state collapsed sub-national polities assumed real political functions and foreign actors actively attempted to direct, influence or mitigate this process. The International Community, in fact, has been reluctant to recognize Somaliland’s compliance with the basic requirements for statehood. However, since 1995, Western think tanks, partner and international organizations have begun to rethink ‘adequate structures for a future Somali government’ sponsoring the idea of a ‘controlled
process of decentralization’ capable of suiting the issue of conflict but warding off the risk of secessionism (The London School of Economics and Political Science 1995)\textsuperscript{130}.

Between 1998 and 2000 the bifurcation of the reconciliation process, sustained by the diplomatic quarrel between Ethiopia and Egypt and by the Ethiopian-Eritrean proxy war, increased the level of territorial fragmentation. Three regional administrations were formed in these years: the Benadir Administration, the Puntland State of Somalia, and the Reewin state. Competitive regional interests were able to put these administrations in power, fomenting the idea that the support of foreign allies would be sufficient to establish new political authorities. Except for the Puntland state, the only one able to consolidate, the temporal survival of these experiments was very short: the Benadir administration ‘soon collapsed due to the failure of its leaders to agree on reopening the capital’s seaport and main airport’ (Ali et all 2008: 15), and the Reewin state, established after the RRA-Ethiopian backed conquest of Baioda, suddenly disappeared under a siege of internal disagreements (ibidem).

In 2008, after the Djibouti conference, the TFG formally inaugurated the process of federal formation\textsuperscript{131} and efforts towards decentralization proliferated throughout Somalia. In December 2008, the TFG-Ethiopian area of operation was limited to Baidoa and few districts in Mogadishu (ICG 2008): when the Ethiopian troops pulled out in January 2009, opposition forces took over most of the positions vacated by the occupants. To contain the expansion of the insurgents, the TFG has attempted to capitalise on the proliferation of clan-based authorities, with the aim of counterbalancing the role played by the insurgents (ICG 2011). The process of decentralisation resulted in an uncontrolled fragmentation (Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Mohamed Askar 2012) accompanied by a sovereignty disenfranchisement that proved counterproductive for the stabilization of the Somali political space.\textsuperscript{132} The process in fact, was arbitrary, and its trajectory completely unclear: since 2009, the number of the regional formations has increased to almost 25 (Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Mohamed Askar 2012) but these fragments of sovereignty do not move in

\textsuperscript{130} According to the official and public discourse, the Somaliland’s claim for independence does not stand ‘neither for secession, nor for the revision of Africa’s border’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007): Somaliland gained independence from Great Britain in 1961, and five days after Somaliland and Somalia declared their union as the Somali Republic. ‘Somaliland was among the first African states to be free from colonial rule, and our demand for recognition implies all the respect of the border received at the moment of independence’ (ibidem).

\textsuperscript{131} In 2004, a process of decentralisation was only formally inaugurated, because the deterioration of security conditions hindered the process of federal institution-building.

\textsuperscript{132} Author’s interview with Abdullahi Odowa, chair of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa.
harmony with the central government\textsuperscript{133}, as proved by the fact that the TFG has recognised only three regional states on a total amount of 25 pretending federal entities.

The second critical juncture concerns all the dimensions of conflict (II) (clan factionalism, regional proxy war and radicalization of the insurgents) that have sponsored the internationalization of the internal conflict\textsuperscript{134}, and increased the level of general violence in Somalia. As illustrated in Figure 1, elaborated on data available on Prio Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et all 2002) the Somali conflict reached its peak of major intensity during and after the UN intervention (1992-1993) and the Ethiopian occupation (2006). Foreign interventions in 1991 and 2006 have sponsored a very substantial degree of escalation of conflict, while low-level conflict reigned between 1995 and 2006.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{somalia_intensity_of_conflict.png}
\caption{Somalia: Intensity of conflict}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: Author’s illustration based on data retrieved from Gleditsch et all 2002.}

As a dramatic consequence, at odds with the formal justifications provided for the employment of military means, no real improvement of the humanitarian conditions has occurred with the deployment of the international missions (African Rights 1993, Rutherford 2008): the internationalization of the internal conflict has rather further deteriorated the already catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Figure 2 illustrates to what extent Somalia’s chronic insecurity has forced very large numbers of citizens to flee, especially in years when the level of violence has risen, and intervening forces have not stopped the spiralling of violence (African Rights 1993).

\textsuperscript{133} Confusion in the adoption of federalism or decentralised unity still affect the TFG, as demonstrated by the fact that TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has often argued that ‘federalism is a temporary system’ in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{134} Modelsky (1961) has defined the internationalization of internal war by the presence of foreign actors inside the ‘structure’ of the internal war.
Several disparate factors might influence the decision to flee the origin country, but it is evident that major movements occurred between 1991 and 1993. When the Somali civil war escalated in 1991, over one million Somalis fled the war seeking to become refugees in neighbouring countries (UNHCR 2010). By the summer 1992, over one and a half million people were displaced. In 1992, the humanitarian conditions were unbearable, especially in the Bay and Lower Shebelle provinces, affected by a 90 per cent child malnutrition rate and a 16 per cent death rate among the displaced. The situation deteriorated in 2006 (ibidem) and data on the humanitarian emergency offers useful insights for understanding the catalyst effects of the Ethiopian intervention: according to a Joint Report from the Centre for American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation, in 2008 and 2009 Somalia faced a ‘growing humanitarian crisis as more than 1 million people were displaced from their homes because of renewed fighting’ (Bruton and Norris 2011). Arriving at accurate estimates as to displacements directly attributable to this phase of violence is nearly impossible, but in 2007 the number of Somali refugees increased from 395,000 to 1,000,000 (ibidem), and many organizations have confirmed that the deterioration of the humanitarian conditions was directly attributable to the escalation of conflict following the Ethiopian incursion.\(^{135}\)

Summing up, intervention has not established a linear causal relationship with the persistence of state disintegration, but rather a complex interaction, illustrated in Figure 3,\(^{135}\)

\(^{135}\) According to the US Agency for International Development 335,000 Somali refugees who sought asylum abroad were displaced in 2007 (USAID 2007). According to Civins (2009: 128) ‘subtracting the 400,000 protracted IDPs who were in Somalia prior to the outbreak of the conflict from the 2007 total IDP figure leaves 300,000 newly created IDPs. While an estimated 1,000,000 IDPs were living in Somalia by late 2007’.
where the outsourcing of sovereignty functions (I) in conjunctur with the internationalization of the internal conflict (II) have seriously hampered the possibility to revert the state of disintegration.

In order to best capture the mechanisms at work, the Figure 3 illustrates how and under which conditions the international intervention has set in motion the destructive turn of events that have prolonged the state of disintegration. The scheme presents four levels: the first (I) level is composed by our independent variable, the international intervention, differentiating the three periods, and subcategories, under consideration (UN intervention, regional hegemonic competition and glocal counter-terrorism). The second level (II) includes the six intervening variables generated by the international intervention (legitimation of clan factionalism, reinforcement of war economy, bifurcation of reconciliation, proxy factional conflict, Extraversion of negotiation, polarization and radicalization of insurgency), while the third (III) embraces the processes by which intervention might exert influence on state disintegration: the internationalization of conflict and the externalization of the political authority.

The first level concerns the introduction of international components into the structure of internal war (Modelski 1964). This process has been inaugurated by the legitimation of the clan factionalism and by the war economy prompted by the UN intervention, while it has been enforced by the regional proxy war and definitively bolstered by the polarization and radicalization of the insurgency following the glocal counter-terrorism.

The externalization of political authority concerns the changes to the internal political authority which were sponsored by the international influences, these would include; the choice between constitutional models, the selection of authoritative decision-makers, the dependency on foreign resources for accomplishing elementary sovereignty functions (such as the provision of basic needs to the population and the establishment of a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence). The Somali political authority has been deeply externalised, as result of two mechanisms: the bifurcation of the constitutional choice into two approaches and the extraversion of the national reconciliation fomented by the glocal counter-terrorism. The outsourcing of sovereignty functions has hampered the rehabilitation of the central sovereignty and fomented the territorial fragmentation. The fourth level presents the ontological attributes of the persistent disintegration.
Figure 3. A composite model of persistent disintegration in its regional and global determinants
2. Intervention, continuity and discontinuity: lessons never learned

Although the literature on the Somali studies has been swamped by analysis drawing operational lessons from past operations (Allard 1994, Bryden and Brickhill 2010, Crocker 1995), scholars have rarely investigated intervention in Somalia in a way that would yield useful knowledge of the mechanisms drawing systematic third-party intervention to resolve or destabilize internal wars. This lack of foresight outlines one of the constraints of this debate, and for this reason this thesis has attempted to bridge the current gap, providing a comparative strength analysis of the three phases of intervention. The comparison of matched cases enabled us to identify both elements of continuity and discontinuity across the structural (global or regional), typological (risolutive or dissolutive, multilateral or unilateral) and contextual (economic sustainability, homogeneity, credibility, resoluteness, legitimacy) components of the international intervention.

2.1 Homogeneity of results in testing heterogeneous typologies

All the three phases of intervention in Somalia have displayed an important element of continuity that captures the essence of this case study: the failure to generate the desired results in stopping conflict and recomposing the state. Whether or not UNOSOM is classified as a partial (Crocker 1995) or complete failure (Abdullahi Ahmed Diriye 1995, Bratt 1996, Sahnoun 1994), it is clear that this first stage of intervention culminated with the legitimation of clan warfare and the reinforcement of war economy. Successively, the regional intervention has resulted in its ‘expected’ disrupting outcome: the bifurcation of the reconciliation process and the proxy factional conflict. Finally, the glocal counter-terrorism indeed has resulted in an ‘unexpected’ dissolutive impact: whilst this intervention was originally oriented towards a Leviathan function (building states), the pre-eminence of an external security agenda (fighting terrorists) has proved to be deeply counterproductive, pushing the Somali insurgency toward a polarization and radicalization of the military campaign.

Despite important discontinuities being accounted for on both the structure and typologies of intervention, similar outcomes have been equally reached. The first discontinuity arises from the geopolitical structure of the military intervention: in Somalia both global and regional operations have prompted destabilizing outcomes, falsifying the
hypothesis according to which regional solutions (to regional problems) should be more effective than the global ones (Leifer 2010).

Also the purposes of intervention have been discontinuous. The UN mission was motivated by a resolutive aim, the regional intervention was clearly oriented to destabilize the internal balance of power, while the glocal counter-terrorism held a hybrid purpose, concurrently pursuing resolutive (building state) and dissolutive goals (fighting terrorists). Despite differences in the strategic horizon, actions clearly oriented to stabilize the internal conflict (UN and glocal intervention) have produced a destabilizing outcome, similar to that expected from interventions oriented to subvert the internal political balance (regional interference).

The third discontinuity relates to the form of collective action: the UN mission was deployed through a multilateral operation; the regional intervention was based on unilateral security actions; while the glocal war on terror was operative through a hybrid multilateral structure made by a bilateral alliance (Ethiopia-United States) combined with unilateral military operations (US) and multilateral diplomatic initiatives (IGAD, Kenya and Djibouti).

The fourth discontinuity concerns the level of commitment involved in each stage of intervention. During the UN mission, the willingness of the major partners to be engaged was very low, as demonstrated by the US hesitation to get involved and by their reluctance to assume a nation-building orientation (Stevenson 1995). Since the UN operation was originally oriented to promote reconciliation, intervening forces were not motivated by the necessity of containing or resolving conflict particularly hostile to their own security or stability. For the US, the outcome of the war was less important than the very fact of the occurrence of violence (Modelski 1964): as a result, the intervener’s commitment was scarce. In contrast, during the regional interference, the resoluteness of interveners was higher, since intervention was clearly directed to ‘encourage or discourage forces perceived as hostile’ (Ruth Iyob 2000). For both Ethiopia and Eritrea the proxy war in Somalia was oriented to open a second front: therefore, the outcome of the mutual interference ‘was more important than the very fact’ (Modelski 1964) of the Somali civil war. During the glocal intervention different levels of resoluteness have been registered: the reasons behind the intervention were strictly anchored to the security agenda of the global and regional actors. But the Ethiopian willingness to get involved in Somalia was
higher than the American one, since the outcome of this new phase of conflict was of vital importance for Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{136}

Evidence from these elements of discontinuity illustrates that no one of the factors mentioned above has alone been sufficient to establish a linear relationship with the outcomes of intervention. The structure of intervention (regional or global), its typology (dissolutive or resolutive), the form of collective action (unilateral or multilateral), and its resoluteness, cannot alone predict the success or failure of intervention. These findings raise more questions than they answer: what explains, therefore, the homogeneity of negative results of intervening in Somalia?

\textit{2.2 Homogeneity of contextual factors related to the conditions for success}

Firstly, the dispersion of strategic aims is one of the most important elements of continuity achieved during the three interventionist stages. Foreign interveners in Somalia have pursued different purposes, often competitively or simply antithetically between them. UNOSOM’s mandate was the most ambiguous: three delicate aims (security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation) were mixed without moving in harmony with the operational capabilities of the major partners. The US intention to manage the Somali crisis with a fast and furious approach collided with the UN idea of nation rebuilding and the lack of a unity of command (Allard 1994) challenged the realization of the mission.

However, the divergence of interests came to the fore during the multilateral stage, which saw the establishment of elements of paradoxical continuity with the competitive character of the regional mutual interference, ‘naturally’ composed of unilateral actions motivated by opposing strategic aims (Cliffe 1999), and clearly oriented to destabilize the supporters of each respective enemy. In a similar way, in the course of the glocal counter-terrorism global and regional allies have pursued heterogeneous interests and strategies: the difficulty of reconciling the interests of the US foreign policy with those of many and different regional actors (Colombo 2010) limited the possibility of stretching the blanket of the GWoT. In the Horn of Africa, the disparity of interests has considerably added to the costs of the regional actors attempts to maintain the alliance: considering the bilateral axes of intervention, the disequilibrium existing between regional (Ethiopia) and its global ally

\textsuperscript{136} The Somali insurgency has never posed any threats to the US national security, while the connection between Somali insurgency and diasporic rebels in Ethiopia was a pillar of the Ethiopian discourse on national security (Banadir 2012)
(US) has led the weaker actors to increase the security claims of the major partner, multiplying the efforts at externally-driven securitizations. This is demonstrated by the US’s reluctance of funding the Ethiopian military operations (Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operation 2009), if Addis Abeba still refused to comply with the political conditionality imposed by Washington\textsuperscript{137}. The same heterogeneity of interests has led the regional institution (IGAD) to sacrifice, upon the altar of the GWoT, the priorities of the regional security agenda: as illustrated by the Djiboutian decision to host the US African command at Camp Lemonier, a decision which has definitively compromised the credibility of Djibouti as the IGAD headquarters and a neutral guarantor of the regional order.

Secondly, a problem of costs has unravelled the relationship between the United Nations and the United States during UNOSOM (United Nations 1996). The amount of resources employed was not adequate to sustain the long-term horizon of the nation building efforts (Stevenson 1995): the UN was deeply reliant on US financial and logistical support, but the US sponsored an idea of active participation restricted both in scope and duration, since it intervened smartly in a limited humanitarian mission (UNITAF)\textsuperscript{138}, withdrawing as quickly as possible when the mission entered its nation-building stage (UNISOM II). According to Herbst and Clark (1997), one of the major problems of the two-track policy in Somalia was the US’s decision to limit the mission that, at the beginning have contributed to expand.

During the glocal counter-terrorism, a similar deadlock occurred. The division of roles between global and regional actors forced the US to support the Ethiopian front line posture, but this provision was anchored to the formation of a strategic partnership (Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations 2009) that was only partially established. As a result, the failure to subscribe to and uphold the terms of the alliance decreased the willingness of the actors to comply with their own responsibilities (Berhane 2011).

\textsuperscript{137} In November 2006, the US Ambassador in Ethiopia, Das Yamamoto, claimed that: ‘Today we have a strong relationship with Meles and the inner circle, but it is a wary one. It is not yet a full partnership because Washington remains hesitant over Ethiopia’s human rights record (…)’. In parallel, the General Samora responded that ‘$2.5 million in C-130 spare parts is nothing in comparison to the sacrifices made by Ethiopian troops in Somalia without U.S. financial support’ (Berhane 2012).

\textsuperscript{138} On 28 April 1992, the New York Times wrote that ‘the Bush Administration balks at humanitarian intervention in Somalia because it might cost the United States $7.5 million’ (Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty 1992).
A third element of continuity concerns the credibility of the intervening forces. During the UN intervention, the erosion of the Somali reliance on foreign intervention\(^\text{139}\) was of paramount importance for the tragic conclusion of the mission. The Somali attitude towards the UN began to manifest an anti Western feeling, given the large intrusion played by the UN not only in actively changing the power equilibrium between Mahdi and Aidid, but also in building the new government infrastructures (Kertcher 2003, United Nations 1996)\(^\text{140}\).

Similar dysfunctions have occurred during the glocal counterterrorism when the Ethiopian incursion, in conjuncture with the US soft-presence, eroded the Somali susceptibility towards the foreign aid. The US sponsored the idea of ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ encouraging Ethiopia on the frontline, however the regional mediator did not established higher levels of credibility: the feeling of historical enmity shared by the Somali population against Ethiopians (Cliffe 1999), in conjunction with the conflict of interests corrupting the formal motivation (helping the TFG) issued for the occupation of Somalia, has eroded Somali trust in the genuineness of the Ethiopian intervention. In addition, Somalis considered with great suspicion the increased military role endorsed by the United States, not only for the tragic legacy left on the ground during the UN mission, but also because the US return was largely associated with the attempt to bolster the Ethiopian role as US gendarme in the Horn (Calchi Novati 2010).

The fourth and most important element of continuity envisaged across all the stages of intervention concerns the deficit of legitimacy. A military intervention is considered legitimate on the base of a dynamic relationship existing between (I) normative values (II) legal doctrine (Buchanan 2005), and (III) the society perception and acceptance of these formal justifications (Azimi and Chang 2005). The UN intervention in Somalia has reached a major level of legitimacy because two of the above mentioned sources were met: the normative imperative of protecting human rights (I) and the legal authorization provided by the Security Council (II)\(^\text{141}\). However, UNOSOM failed to establish legitimacy on the ground. The initial hesitation of the International Community, and the delay in reaching the decision to intervene, weakened the Somali perception about the

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\(^{139}\) Author’s interviews, Hargeisa October 2011.

\(^{140}\) One major interference has concerned the reform of the judiciary system, when the UN attempted to re-establish the Somali Judiciary Police, and penal code. UNISOMII nominated some of the judges, angering the USC/SNA which denounced the overstepping of the UN’s mandate, and the violation of rules established in the Addis Abeba Agreement (United Nations 1996).

\(^{141}\) The Resolution 794 of the 3rd of December 1992 was the first to establish a humanitarian operation under the 7th Chapter of the UN Charter.
utility of the humanitarian operation\textsuperscript{142}: since 1993, in fact, Boutros-Ghali lamented the diffusion of an anti-Western feeling between Somalis that culminated in the Battle of Red Sea (Stevenson 1995, Weiss 1997).

The regional intervention has reached the lowest level of legitimacy, since neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea envisaged any one of the three sources of legitimacy above mentioned in order to justify their presence in Somalia. From a legal perspective, the two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force established by the UN (the right to self-defence or the security threat) cannot justify the politics of mutual interference. Secondly, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea has ever admitted interference in Somali internal affairs (‘Ethiopian troops in Somalia’ 1999): as a result they have never provided any normative foundation for their intervention, and neither have they enjoyed any kind of social legitimacy.

A low level of legitimacy has been reached also by the counter-terrorism intervention, which satisfied only the normative criterion for legitimacy enunciated inside the formula ‘fighting terrorists while building states’ (Quarantino 2008). Both global and regional allies have tried to enforce the legal posture of this intervention by stretching the concepts of ‘legal invitation’ (Zenawi 2006) and ‘collective self-defence against terrorism’ (Allo 2009). On one side, the justification claiming that the TFG invited Ethiopia to intervene in disarming the Courts was inconsistent, since the ‘moral authority’ of extending an invitation to another state on matters of internal affairs is non-existent among those who purport to govern without domestic legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of the Ethiopian intervention was fragile because the empirical legitimacy of the TFG was very weak. In fact, Ethiopia concurrently appealed to the right of self-defence enunciated under the Article 51 of the UN Chart: this appeal was not congruent with the criteria established by the UN for appealing to self-defence (Allo 2010), and it was clearly at odds with the claim of the ‘legal invitation’\textsuperscript{143}. But neither the UN nor AU have questioned, sanctioned or condemned the Ethiopian violation of the Somali sovereignty. On the global scale, until 2012 the US administrations denied any ‘direct action’ on the

\textsuperscript{142} This criticism was fomented by the UN representative for Somalia, Sanhoun, that in October 1992, affirmed: ‘A whole year slipped by whilst the UN and the international community, save the international Red Cross and a few nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, watched Somalia descend into this hell’ (Bonner 1993: 58).

\textsuperscript{143} According to Allo (2010:166): ‘Ethiopia’s claim to self-defensive measures does not seem to be in line with the requirements of the UN Charter because it fails to meet the requirement of an occurrence of an attack of a significant scale and effect before recourse to the self-defensive measure. Under customary international law, although Ethiopia could be seen to be under an imminent threat of attack triggering the right of recourse to a proportionate response, it certainly went beyond what is necessary to remove the threat and used a disproportionate force’.
Somali ground. Only recently (‘US admits ops in Yemen and Somalia’ 2012) have the US unilateral operations been justified on the basis of the right to self-defence against those groups ‘who pose a direct threat to the United States and to our national interests’\textsuperscript{144}.

During this stage, the weakness of the legal criterion stems from a strong sense of normative legitimacy based on the need of securitising the state to ward off the risks associated with the proliferation of terrorism in failed states contexts (United States Department of State 2007). Whilst the anti-terrorism appeal has become the normative value of major reliance in contemporary interventionism, it has not been sufficient to grant the social acceptance of the military means; it has rather deteriorated the Somali perception of the foreign actors, who are considered to be competitors with the indigenous forces in matters of state-building\textsuperscript{145}. Whether or not, as has been suggested elsewhere, the legitimacy of state-building relies on a fragile balance between the establishment of a certain order and the formation of institutions (Lake 2006), during the global war on terror this hierarchy has been inverted to prompt the formation of legal representative institutions, constantly pursued to the detriment of factors qualifying the effective statehood. The most important indicator of the deficit of social legitimacy is represented not only by the jihad against foreign forces, but rather by the popular consensus held by the insurgents against the legitimate institutions\textsuperscript{146}.

The disaggregated data on the legitimacy of intervention can be illustrated in the following Table 1, where the concept of legitimacy has been operationalized along its three components (social, normative, legal) and a dichotomist value (high, low) has been attributed to each component in each phase.

\textsuperscript{144} In June 2012, for the first time the White House has formally acknowledged that is conducting ‘direct actions’ in Somalia against al-Qaeda (‘US admits ops in Yemen and Somalia’ 2012)

\textsuperscript{145} Author’s interview with Somaliland Minister of State for foreign affairs, Mohammed-Rashid Sheikh, 31/10/2011.

\textsuperscript{146} Author’s interview with Abdullahi Odowa, chair of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa.
Table 1 Level of legitimacy across interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Normative</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>High: SC authorization</td>
<td>High: Responsibility to protect HR</td>
<td>Low: Maalinka Ranger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional interference</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low: Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Glocal war on terror</strong></td>
<td>Low: congruences between collective self-defence (UN Charter art. 51) and security threats (UN charter Chapter VIII)</td>
<td>High: Securitizing the state by Terrorists</td>
<td>Low: Radicalization and polarization of insurgency; social consensus on the opponents (Islamic Courts and Al Shabaab)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the comparative analysis it appears clear that all the three stages of intervention have performed a low level of social legitimacy: the ability of the foreign actors to improve the societal acceptance of the interventionist practice has remained scarce. This constant deficit of legitimacy shows that Somali society has been susceptible to the changes being fostered, given the inability of the intervening forces to deal with the root cause of the conflict (Ali et al. 2008) and to present themselves as reliable facilitators (ibidem).

Summing up the findings of this comparative analysis, different structural factors (global or regional intervention), different forms of security action (unilateral and multilateral intervention), guided by different purposes (dissolutive or risolutive) and through different levels of commitment, have generated interventions with very similar dissolutive outcomes. However, despite this structural divergence, the three stages of intervention in Somalia have displayed a constant deficit across four crucial conditions: the homogeneity of strategic aims, the economic capacity, the credibility and legitimacy of intervention. These findings have been summarized in the following Table 2.

Table 2. Continuity and Discontinuity between interventions in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Typologies of intervention</th>
<th>Conditions for success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Dissolutive aim</td>
<td>- Economic deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Deficit of credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Deficit of legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of power</td>
<td>- Resoluteness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontinuity</td>
<td>Aims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Form of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

147 Author's interview with Ali Mohamed Waran Ade, Somaliland Civil Aviation Minister 17/10/2011 and Somaliland Minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohammed-Rashid Sheikh, 31/10/2011.
This analysis, appealing to lessons that have never been learned, has aimed to amend the tradition consolidated among Somali studies of dawning lessons from past experience without developing a clear method of analytical comparison. This section has demonstrated that the structure of intervention during these two last decades has been transformed, but no substantial changes have occurred in the manner in which interventions have been pursued.

3. Conclusion

Although many scholars of IR are inclined to be optimistic about the effectiveness of democratic military intervention, the ‘capacity’ aspirations of contemporary failed states do not seem to improve in response to international intervention. The descriptive data in Somalia supports our theoretical expectations, showing that both the regional and global intervention have prolonged the state disintegration.

The UNOSOM intervention mostly corresponds with the subversion outcome delineated by Modelski (1964) in cases of intervention oriented to isolate the insurgents. The regional intervention complies with the expected outcomes of the regional conflict that move hegemonic and diasporic states to regionalize their rivalries (Ruth Iyob 1993). And lastly, the glocal anti-terrorism has followed the isolationist trend identified by Modelski (1964), oriented to curb those revolts considered too dangerous for the survival of rules sustaining the international system. In focusing on causal mechanisms and causal effects this dissertation has illustrated that intervention has actively contributed to prolong disintegration, through the outsourcing of the sovereignty’s functions and the internationalization of the internal conflict (Modelski 1964). This analysis implies that the over militarization of the process of reconciliation and the deep penetration of foreign security interests into the structure of the internal conflict have promoted a slide towards a modern version of trusteeship. Perhaps most importantly, I found that comparing the case of Somalia with its Somalilander alter-ego clearly highlighted the failure of the internationally-led peace-building efforts mustered in response to the state collapse.

Given that the case of Somalia can be considered a ‘crucial case’ fitting our theoretical expectation, these findings cannot be reasonably generalized beyond the scope and the geopolitical boundaries of this dissertation. However, the conceptualization of state disintegration here provided, offers a probative value for the study of contemporary statehood crises in Africa, for at least two good reasons.
Firstly, disintegration and intervention hurt Sub-Saharan Africa in a decisive way: although Somalia represents the most dangerous challenge to the linear trajectories of political development (Rostow 1953), other tensions between central and peripheral forces are fracturing the lines of post-colonial sovereignty, in similar, symmetrical or less-likely ways. Exactly ten years after the African Union (AU) replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the idea of ‘an integrated prosperous and peaceful Africa’ (Nkrumah 2012) is still far away and the African continent is facing the risk of disintegrating along sub-national lines. Conflictual processes of decentralization inside the DRC (Englebert 2012), the cycle of rebellion in which the Central African Republic has been entangled, and the rising problem of fragmentation in Mali (Graham IV 2012) represents only few examples of the modern frontier established between African chronic instability and foreign penetration. As Nkrumah prophetically claimed in his address to the Organization of African Unity founding conference in 1963 ‘The unity of our continent, no less than our separate independence, will be delayed if, indeed, we do not lose, it, by hobnobbing with colonialism’ (Nkrumah 2012:27). The contemporary ‘multiplicity of unviable states’ indeed makes the call for African unity more urgent today than ever before (Nyerere 2012).

Secondly, while most of the attention in African studies has focused on the phenomenon of state-building, very few efforts have addressed the ‘tragic scenario’ associated with the modern enterprise defined by Bhuta as ‘very similar to colonial state-building’ (2008:535). Although academic and political supporters of democratization theory believe that states become sustainable democracies as a result of foreign intervention, empirical data shows that these enterprises have rarely resulted in the desired democratic outcomes (De Mesquita and Downs 2006): thus, the state failure in Africa has rekindled the debate about the lenitive and leviathan function of military intervention. Once again, if Somalia represents the most dramatic challenge to the credibility of the International Community to solve the sovereignty’s dysfunctions, the French intervention in Zaire (1996-1997), the UN response in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2004), or the UN and British intervention in Sierra Leone (1999-2002) offer useful insights for rethinking the effectiveness of intervention in re-establishing sovereignties. Scholars of international relations have invested considerable time in trying to understand international intervention, but few efforts have been made in mapping the theoretical and empirical connections across intervention and disintegration. Filling these gaps holds great promise not only in international relations, but also in comparative politics: trying to imagine the directions of...
future research, a comparative analysis between the NATO intervention in Libya and the French one in Cote d’Ivoire, represent the most recent and intriguing cases of intervention with Leviathan function around which further research might be oriented.

To conclude, this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that sovereignty in post-colonial countries might be subject to a process of subordination and resistance bolstered by integrated forms of foreign penetration. While ‘Internal wars have been the favourite pretext of the men who came to fight the war for staying on’ (Modelski 1964:39), international intervention, in its regional and global configuration, has been the Trojan horse used by the men who came to stop the war for sponsoring changes of sovereignty regime. The Somali experience has demonstrated that establishing a turning point in the descending parable of political development still depends on building the African state according to the African aspirations.
Visions of sovereignty in Hargeisa, 31 October 2011.

Optical illusions in the eyes of a scholar: even a tobacco publicity card is perceived as a declaration of sovereignty.
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