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**TESTING NEOREALIST THEORIES IN CASE OF
GERMANY'S EEC ENLARGEMENT POLICY, 1961-1979**

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Abstract

Neorealism as a theory of international relations is criticized for its failure to predict a state foreign policy behavior. I argue, by contrast, that neorealism can be used as a theory of foreign policy at the structural level of analysis. Particularly, this study evaluates two neorealist theories – defensive realism and offensive realism, against historical records using a congruence analysis approach. To uncover the neorealist theories' explanatory power, *ex ante* predictions are generated regarding the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the European Economic Community's (EEC) Northern enlargement and the Mediterranean enlargements in the 1960's and the 1970's. The defensive realism's and offensive realism's predictions then are tested against the empirical evidence. The newly declassified archival documents have shown that neorealist theories capture much of the variation in Germany's EEC enlargement policy. It demonstrated that variation in the German foreign policy took place after a clearly defined shift in distribution of power, and consequently, in a realm of security had occurred. The research thus doubts negative criticism about neorealism as a tool for understanding state foreign behavior by initiating inquiry into the direct interaction between the distribution of power in the international system and state's security needs. It also advances the literature on neorealist theories by shifting their application away from war to cooperation. Furthermore, after this study it is now possible to conclude on which of the neorealist theories has the most potential regarding application to foreign policy analysis. From the test' results I recommend defensive realism as a theory which has grater potential of explanatory power.

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Abbreviations

In the text

EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In the notes

A/NATO	Documentary Library of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels
CM	Council of Ministers Archives, Brussels
NATO Archive OTAN	NATO Archives, Brussels
PA AA	Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
PA-DBT	Parliamentary Archives of the German Bundestag, Berlin

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This theory-oriented qualitative case study research is aimed at testing neorealist theories against historical evidence in case of a member state enlargement policy. The goal of the research is to contribute to the development of the neorealist theories. I adhere to Waltz's (1979: 6) definition of theory as explaining law. In order to evaluate to what extent the theories explanations are relevant, I review their main assumptions and then proceed with an exploration of theories and practice to find out whether or not theories' predictions regarding the research object are congruent with observations. Thus, the overall central question to be answered is:

- *Under which external to it conditions a member-state favors or opposes enlargement of the regional organizational formation to a particular applicant country?*

Two strands of contemporary neorealism – defensive realism and offensive realism – provide different answers to this question and imply two different approaches. One of them is security-maximization approach, which is based on Waltz's (1979) balance of power theory and highlights security as the ultimate concern of states. Another is power-maximization approach derived from Mearsheimer's (2001) offensive realism, which assumes that states seek to maximize power in order to maximize security.

Two questions will structure the discussion of the different approaches:

- 1) Under which conditions do the both strands of theory expect enlargement to be favored? Which hypothesis of a member state enlargement policy may be derived from the theories? What is the argument behind?

- 2) Which of two neorealist theories does bear the most potential for explaining a member state enlargement policy? What are the main strengths and critics of the theories implementation into the issue area?

The applicability of neorealists' hypotheses will be evaluated in regard to the concepts of power and security against the evidence from historical cases of (1) the European Economic Community (EEC) Northern enlargement towards Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; and (2) the EEC Mediterranean enlargements towards Greece, Portugal and Spain. To keep a case-study manageable I examine the foreign policy behavior of the most powerful state in the EEC – the Federal Republic of Germany, from 1961 to 1979. I choose a discrete historical period because it allows for feasible control of how well predictions derived from competing theories of a broader theoretical framework match the real world foreign political actions.

From the outlined by Waltz and Mearsheimer specific strategic options available to states, it is possible to deduce specific hypotheses about Germany's likely foreign policy behavior towards the EEC enlargement given the distribution of power at the both global level and regional level with regard to the Federal Republic's security needs. Thus, the theories will be evaluated on how applicable the neorealist hypotheses and the concepts of power and security are in regard to German foreign policy towards the EEC enlargement.

It is important to notice, first, that both neorealist theories claim to explain the results of states' behavior, under given conditions, but neither Waltz nor Mearsheimer makes any attempt to clarify under which conditions states choose between various strategies. Second, although defensive realism and offensive realism are built up from the assumed motivations of states and corresponding actions, the causes of these actions are not found in the motivations of states. Instead states' decisions to act are shaped by very presence of other states as well as interactions with them (Waltz 1979: 65). Nevertheless, a strong

emphasis on the strategic calculus of security maximization versus power maximization makes clear that under same external conditions differently motivated states are expected to act differently in accordance with the prediction made by the competing neorealist theories.

The thesis is of uttermost importance mainly for two reasons. First, there is no consensus in the field of International Relations on whether the neorealist theories can be applied to foreign policy analysis. Further, there is a lack of profound studies in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis, which clearly demonstrate that neorealist theories are (un-)able to produce testable predictions of states foreign behavior. Therefore, it is quite difficult to get a general evaluation checklist for neorealist foreign policy analysis. Second, neorealism is understood as a body of theories using the same set of core assumptions, but making different predictions on state behavior. Due to the serious lack of the discussions on the neorealist concepts as such, i.e. how to define power and related concept of security, it is extremely complicated to establish a consistent relation between structural factors and state foreign policy to be able to test defensive realism vs. offensive realism¹. In sum, this thesis in addition to studying the question of the applicability of the neorealist theory to the field Foreign Policy Analysis is conducting in order to give the floor for cumulative intra-realist debates and provide a better conceptualization of the theory.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. I proceed as follows. After the introduction presented in Chapter One, the second Chapter provides a discussion of the concepts which are essential in order to derive competing neorealist predictions. Chapter Three assesses the strength and limitations of congruence analysis application for the cases under investigation. In Chapter Four and Chapter Five neorealist predictions are tested against the evidence from the historical case of the EEC Northern enlargement and Mediterranean

¹ None of which provides substantial or structured discussions. For main contributors see Guzzini 1993, Snyder 1996, Baldwin 1997, Brooks 1997, Walt 1991, Wohlforth 2003, Wolfers 1962.

enlargements in the period from 1961 to 1979. Finally, in Chapter Six a relevance of theories is evaluated and a conclusion is drawn up.

Of necessity, the thesis exploits a large number of archival holdings. At the Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin I focused on an analysis of the records of the Federal Foreign Office and missions abroad covering the issue of the European Economic Community enlargement in a period from 1961 to 1979. The records of the German Bundestag have filled many gaps in the Federal Foreign Office archival materials regarding the issue of national security in the period under investigation. Extensive research was carried out at the NATO Archives and Documentary Library of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. Summary records of meetings of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Assembly's Political Committee Reports, Meeting Summaries and Policy Recommendations shed light on how security needs affected states foreign behavior in Europe in the 1960's and the 1970's. At the Council of Ministers historical archives in Brussels were consulted minutes of the Council throughout the period. For its part, the European Council records offer only few insights into what is discussed in the thesis.

Before starting, a couple of caveats should be made. First, the study is limited to two neorealist theories – defensive realism and offensive realism. Second, the selected theories are chosen based on methodological convenience for a congruence analysis task. Though, while providing a general evaluation of neorealist theory of international relation to foreign policy analysis, I focus the discussion on the competing defensive realism's and offensive realism's hypotheses and their explanatory power. Third, it is also important to emphasize the limits of the narrow focus of the thesis on applicability of the neorealist predictions in relation to Germany's foreign policy towards the EEC enlargement during the Cold War. Thus, even though I evaluate neorealism not as a theory of international relations, but rather as a theory of foreign policy analysis in general, the explanatory power of defensive

realism and offensive realism will be reviewed in relation to the very specific given focus of this thesis.

1.1 State of the art

The case of German enlargement policy is of particular academic interest from the perspective of the theoretical debates mainly based on explicit denial of the neorealist assumptions. The main counterarguments that cast doubt on the relevance of neorealist theory to the case at hand posit mainly eight issues at different levels of analysis. First, according to John Duffield (1998, 1999), political culture must be considered as a variable which is able to explain the failure of neorealism to predict German foreign and security policy after unification. To determine the impact of political culture on German foreign and security policy, Duffield illustrated that such important aspects of German foreign and security policy as antimilitarism and multilateralism have been inconsistent with the neorealist expectations and can be fully understood only if one considers German political culture. On the one hand, the culture of reticence has inclined German political elites to solve controversial and potentially explosive security issues through peaceful means. On the other hand, by the standards of German political culture, the pursuit of autonomy-seeking policy would conflict with the imperative to be a reliable partner (Duffield 1999).

Duffield is right that Germany's foreign policy could potentially represent a "hard case" for the neorealist theories, but many realists do not exclude possibilities of mutual security and have never denied that states can take themselves out of anarchy and cede much of their sovereignty to a central authority. According to Robert Jervis (1999), appreciation of crisis instability as a cause of war could lead even to greater cooperation. But what is crucial is that this kind of arrangements is instituted because national leaders

want them to have binding effect. The question is not whether states integrate or maximize their autonomy, but rather under which conditions states choose one strategy or the other. Charles Glaser (1996) pointed out, that whether states should cooperate depends on the states' interests and the constraints imposed by the system. According to Jervis (1999), offensive realists believe that the compelling nature of the international environment and the clash of states' preferences over outcomes put sharp limits on the extent to which conflict can be solved by available peaceful means. Defensive realists believe that foreign policy choice depends on the severity of the security dilemma and the intentions of the actors. Thus, defensive realists would not be surprised by German elites' commitment to European institutions, because they give each actor some confidence and "convince those who might feel threatened that the accumulation of power is not intended and will never be used for attack" (Wolfers 1952: 494-495). German leaders may want to strengthen European ties to avoid the pursuit of security policies that could endanger other European countries (Jervis 1999).

Second, James Sperling (2001) had tried to demonstrate in his analysis of German power in Post-Cold War Europe, that Germany is often perceived as a potential or even aspiring regional hegemon because its intentions, capabilities and ambitions are interpreted by its neighbors through the historical context. He stated that there is no support for the widely accepted neorealist axiom about Germany's material capabilities consistent with a hegemonic or dominant power. In order to analyze German foreign policy, he suggested treating the Federal Republic as a power of the middle rank. According to Sperling, Germany's national interests are subject to external constraints such as the disparate national interests and countervailing power of Germany's partner states, membership in multilateral institutions, and the historical memory of the Second World War.

Although, Marcin Zaborowski (2004) explained Germany's enlargement strategy towards Poland with reference to "power maximization", he suggested considering the problem in a "historical legacy" perspective. Arguing that enlargement served to increase the relative power of the both states – Poland and Germany, Zaborowski specified German vital economic and security interests. First, East Central European integration further improved Germany's weight in the global economy. Germany became a major foreign investor in the region, controlling a considerable share of the banking sector. This situation led to the growing dependence of East Central Europe on economic trends in the Federal Republic. Second, by completing the integration of Eastern countries into the West, Germany's sensitive status as a western frontier state disappeared, thereby considerably enhancing its security. He also made a point, that while the power-maximization argument seems to be more pronounced in the candidate countries' approach towards EU enlargement, Germany remained more focused on tackling instability in the region. According to Zaborowski, a complete explanation of German enlargement policy is necessarily to be enhanced by the historical background – Germany was an invader on more than one occasion. In this view, Western integration kept German allies assured that, being enmeshed with international institutions, the Federal Republic would be prevented from acting belligerently. Zaborowski underlined that reconcilability of interests beyond strategic concerns to areas of economic interests had exposed EU Eastern enlargement from "high politics" to the level of nation-states domestic system, and thus, should be analyzed on the base of nation-specific domestic factors.

Third, Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson (2000) considered an application of realist analysis of international relations to the study of German European diplomacy as inadequate. They explained Germany's strong commitment to a policy of "exaggerated multilateralism" by combination of two factors – domestic institutions and

Europeanized identity. The former refers to the fact, that German domestic institutions have de-concentrated and de-centralized power, the latter points to a discourse of “national interests”, which was nearly absent within Germany’s European policy. Thus, Germany can not be manifested as a realist state that acts accordingly realist paradigm. Peter Katzenstein (1997) and Thomas Banchoff (1999) have also pointed to a Europeanized German identity as a main explanation of Germany’s adherence to the integration process. Though Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson argue that German European policy is influenced by strong moral commitment to the integration process, they have not abandoned the notion that Germany has had a vital interest in Eastern enlargement as an instrument for stabilizing the zone of transition to Germany’s east, and therefore as a guarantor of German security. This security imperative was described by them as the prime factor which has led Germany, from the early 1990s onwards, to pursue active EU enlargement policy (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000).

Fourth, Adrian Price-Hyde (2000) also based his analysis of German foreign policy on three main concepts – interests, institutions and identities. He portrayed neorealist theory as failing to explain why Germany, being considered as the strongest state in Europe, supports institutional arrangements, which provide weaker states in Central Europe with decision making power over key policy issues. From his point of view, this can be best understood with reference to civilian power concept that refers to multilateralism, European identity, and a special responsibility for peace and cooperation in the region. He gave two reasons why neorealism is unable to provide an explanation for German foreign policy. First, neorealism ignores the importance of domestic factors. Second, it underestimates the effects of interdependence. According to Price-Hyde, Germany’s relative power capability and geographical location in the international system has changed little over the last century, but German policy towards Europe did exhibit enormous variation. These policy changes cannot be understood without

reference to domestic factors and the impact of international organizations on state's behavior. However, for realists, diagnoses of the international situation the state is in and the other's intentions is critical and difficult step, which explain why a particular policy behavior was perceived as an appropriate (Jervis 1999). If states know that the nature of other is mostly a function of its own domestic processes, then they must pay great attention to their present and future material capability, in order to guard against a situation in which the other becomes aggressive later on. The notion of interdependence of domestic processes undermines Price-Hyde's effort to show that material structures do not shape state behavior. Thus, domestic-level constructivism reinforces the value of neorealist view of world politics (Copeland 2000).

Henning Tewes (2002) also specified Germany enlargement policy with reference to civilian power concept. He noted West German foreign policy culture, its adherence to the Franco-German partnership, and its turn away from balance-of-power politics as main determinants of German policy towards EU enlargement. Tewes made distinction between "high politics", that is enlargement, and "low politics", that is, policy reform inside the EU. In accordance with the civilian power concept, only when sufficient progress had been made in realm of "high politics", the EU institutional reforms at "low politics" may take place. He argued that Germany favored EU enlargement in order to secure institutional deepening but provided little empirical evidence to support his argument.

To answer a question why did Germany strongly support EU eastern expansion, Sebastian Harnisch and Siegfried Schieder (2006) have combined civilian power approach with narrowly defined concept of policy domestication, i.e. a closer involvement of domestic political and commercial actors and a key role of the German government in determining the direction of the process of enlargement. According

Harnisch and Schieder, German elites, first, had particular keen interest in a durable stabilization of the European periphery and saw enlargement as a powerful means of pacifying neighboring post-communist countries. Second, Germany's proactive enlargement policy was driven by economic interests of domestic actors such as German industry associations, which have benefited substantially from external trade with the central and eastern European countries. Finally, eastward enlargement was advocated by the German governments out of historical responsibility. Overall, they underlined the central importance of policy performance in analyzing foreign policy, and recommended to start with actors having clear policy strategy. However, in their study of German policy towards enlargement Harnisch and Schieder failed to illustrate evidences compatible with German foreign policy and the main expectations derived from a civilian power approach.

In general, promoters of the civilian power concept suggest revising of the whole paradigm of foreign and security policy, which they considered to be over-affected by neorealism. They claim that traditional realist notions such as national state, sovereignty, power, system anarchy, national interest etc., no longer conform to the changed circumstances in the international politics. According to Hanns W. Maull (1992, 2006), the dynamic of globalization has become a key factor of power diffusion in the international system that puts states under strong pressure to adjust. In this context state's foreign policy depends on such external and internal conditions as non-violent, heavily institutionalized environment; effective international institutions; reliable and cooperative partner; and policy makers' skill (Maull 2006). With reference to civilian power concept, German foreign policy is oriented on deepening European and transatlantic integration, enhancing cooperative and multilateral conflict resolution, and using military force only as a last resort – and strictly within the framework of the United Nations. The discourse analysis applied by civilian power approach heavily relies

on official declarations, the inauguration speeches as well as the special addresses made by the chancellor to the Bundestag, speeches by foreign ministers. This method is often criticized for difficulty it has by separating rhetoric from reality (Desch 1999; Fischer 1992). On the public stage, actors present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage (Copeland 2000). The realist explanations, by contrast, are less likely to be based on rhetorical justifications as valuable evidence, and thus, may provide a surer guide for foreign policy analysis (Desch 1999). Specifically, an application of the methodology of neorealist research programme requires specification of core assumptions, hypotheses and heuristic, upon which neorealist predictions of state's behavior heavily depend (Elman and Elman 1997).

Fifth, when examining German policy towards Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Steve Wood (2004) focused on the enquiries of what were the German motivations for EU enlargement to these countries and of what developments assisted or countered this process. In particular, contrary to Tewes (2002), he postulated that Germany did not pursue enlargement primarily because it was driven by the motivations and inhibitions of civilian power. Wood described German political elites' behavior as a two-level pragmatic game that, however, allows a considerable degree of the "civilian power" interpretation. First, the disinclinations and countertrends from the German electorate in general, and certain interest groups in particular, caused conditions and delays to be imposed on entry candidates. He pointed to an inverse domestic-driven realism, projected from inside out. Second, Germany had to respond to intense pressure from Central and Eastern European Countries demanding to be admitted sooner rather than later. Wood underlined an essential geopolitical concern of German European strategy: without maintaining a dynamic of integration, Germany would find itself confronted by an alliance of states, some of which had experienced historically traumatic relationship with Germany. Having analyzed linkage between culture, commerce and

foreign policy, Wood concluded that the chief motivations behind German support for Eastern enlargement were the political elite's interpretation of Germany's geopolitical situation; their view of it as an essential condition for bilateral reconciliation; and initial perception by German business and politics that the Eastern enlargement offered commercial-economic potential including a transit to Russia. According to Wood, such negative factors as clashes of national preferences among old members, Germany's economic conditions, and apathy or opposition among the public countered enlargement process. My critic here is that Wood tried to explain state's foreign policy behavior on the limited basis of domestic interests and socio-cultural interactions without taking into consideration state's vital interests derived from the internal condition of anarchy and the distribution of power among states.

Sixth, Gunter Hellmann (2001) criticized the Waltzian concept of a material structure for neglecting the institutions, norms, and rules that may be reproduced as well as transformed by states. In his analysis of German policy towards Eastern and Western Europe he proposed an interactionist approach to examine the dynamic interplay between German foreign policy and European governance. From the interactionist perspective, Germany has not only reacted and adapted to changes in European and domestic structures but also shaped these structures to a significant extent. According to Hellmann, integrating Germany's eastern neighbors has become a new field of activity that, on the one hand, was oriented on stabilizing of Germany's regional environment, and on the other hand, presupposed institutional reforms in the West. He concluded that under new prevailing conditions (such as Germany's unification and the absence of direct threat) German foreign policy has become more capable of shaping the events (Hellmann 2001).

Dale C. Copeland (2000) explained the distinction between Hellmann's focus on structure as interaction of units, and Waltz's focus on structure as the potential for co-action among units in terms of time. For constructivists, it is the past that matter – how interactions in the historical process have shaped conceptions of self and other. For realism the past socialization is not the core issue; uncertainty about present and future interests of other is. According to Copeland, defensive realists tend to put more emphasis on uncertainty about present intentions, whereas offensive realists stress the problem of future intentions and consequent need to increase power as a hedge against future threats. States are rational maximizers of their security over the foreseeable future, and constantly worry about any changes in their external environment that might damage their chances for survival. From this point of view, integrating Germany's eastern neighbors has become a superior stabilization policy tool compared to other available options. Hellmann's conclusion about increased freedom for maneuver of Germany in Europe may be enhanced by neorealist explanations. In bipolarity security of states remains contingent on protection from one great power by the other. When a bipolar system falls, states can employ their capability independently to the greater degree. The power position increases even if state's share of available capabilities in the international system remains unchanged (Rittberger 2001).

Seventh, Christoph Bluth (2000) has accused neorealism of underestimating the importance of the regime and institutions for interpretation the West German foreign and security policy with reference to the theoretical models. First, he assumed that whereas realism in its various forms does not consider the structure of the international system dependent on the nature of the regimes governing individual states, the threat to European security posed by the Soviet Union was very much of the nature of the Communist regime. Bluth stressed that the ideological basis of Soviet expansionism was the establishment of world socialism, and thus, posed the threat that went beyond the

traditional security dilemma. From this follows, that constructivism provides more appropriate categories for describing German security policy, than neorealism does. Second, according to Bluth, Germany's concept of western integration went beyond the neorealist concept of alliance formation and can not be explained in terms of purely national interest considerations. He viewed the European integration as being designed to overcome the Franco-German competition for hegemony in Europe. For the West Germany it was also a framework in which the semi-sovereign country could, first, develop its identity as a member of international society, and second, reduce the disadvantages of the constraints imposed by the limitations of its sovereignty after 1945. This holds that German European policy is better understood in terms of explicitly institutionalist approach. At the same time, Bluth put forward argument about the critical importance of the EU Eastern enlargement for the political stability in Central Europe and German national security after the end of the Cold War, underlining the security concerns in Germany that drove the process of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

The evidences Bluth presented in his book are largely consistent with the neorealist assumption about security considerations as a key motive for integration (Andreatta 2005). Bluth himself explained it by the fact that neorealism exists in so many different manifestations that it can accommodate all conceivable facts, for example, the neorealist predictions for German foreign policy behavior are almost indistinguishable from those of institutionalists. Contrary to Bluth's assertions, Elman and Elman (1997) argue that neorealism by definition cannot predict behavior that is incompatible with any elements of the theory's hard core. Hence, it cannot predict that institutions will override or shape the preferences of autonomous actors who established them. Institutions can generate many different kinds of powerful feedback. But they are established when and only when cooperating and integrating are regarded by decision makers as a better

strategy to cope with the external threat. As Walt (1991: 225) writes, “institutional arrangements could contribute to peace, particularly if they directly address the primary controllable causes of war.” In this sense, institutions are tools of statecraft and mainly reflect states’ interests. However, it is also admitted that European integration is puzzling and neorealists do need to explain the conditions that lead to cooperation (Jervis 1999).

Eighth, Scott Erb (2003) stated that trying to understand German policy toward the EU adopting a domestic policy analysis framework is just as problematic as through a lens of neorealist international relations theory, since the EU is neither a superstate, nor a typical intergovernmental organization. According to Erb, German European policy fits better within the utilitarian liberal theory of foreign policy. The EU was described as a kind of “pacific union”, wherein Germany uses its power and influence to build cooperation rather than expend its national power. He claimed that for German political leaders, deepening of the EU was necessary in order to widen the EU. In closer union any policy conflict is seen more as internal domestic competition than as development of a national strategy. However, Erb argued that the German government resorted to the enlargement policy as a tool for stabilization of the Eastern countries.

Helga Haftendorn (2006) in her analysis of German foreign policy since 1945 stressed that Konrad Adenauer’s policy on Europe was not exactly an integrated one. From her point of view, Adenauer tended to adjust foreign policy to changing international developments rather than follow consistent conception. On the one hand, after the Second World War the idea of integration provided a model for avoiding military conflicts. On the other hand, developing a common cultural and political identity was necessary to resist the mass culture of the United States and the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union. Haftendorn argued that Germany’s fundamental European orientation

had coincided with its economic interest in creating better conditions for German exports industry. But the motivation for Eastern enlargement she classified as political. Germany's vital interest was to give up its front-row position on the borderline of inner-European stability by extending the European institutions beyond the EU eastern borders. The EU institutions are viewed as instruments for peaceful conflict resolution, economic development, and international policy formation in a way, what a neoliberal institutionalist approach would expect.

In the face of the theoretical debate Volker Rittberger (2001) has treated German foreign policy after unification as a "test case" for three different theoretical approaches – neorealist, constructivist and liberal analyses. His sample of cases includes security issue area – Germany's security policy within NATO; the issue area of welfare – Germany's foreign trade policy within the EU and GATT; and realm of Germany's EU constitutional policy and German policy on human rights within the EU. As Rittberger's explanatory records demonstrated, neorealist theories failed to account for Germany's foreign policy behavior in area of "low politics" in which relative economic gains and the delegation of sovereignty have been at stake. Conversely, neorealist theories have a strong record in explaining post-unification Germany's foreign policy in areas of "high politics" in which sovereignty is pooled and substantial influence gains such as military out-of-area operations, net contributions to the EU budget are achieved.

Further, in his historical study of German foreign policy Christian Hacke (2004) claimed that the lack of a clear understanding of the national interests and rejection of power politics has become a standard of German foreign policy. However, he argued from a realist point of view, that a state as powerful as the reunited Germany must define its interests for the reasons of international stability.

In the debates on the neorealism's irrelevance to understanding Germany's foreign policy towards the European Union enlargement the scholars do not distinguish between the different levels of analysis as it is an empirically based debate. Although, this debate is an interesting discussion, it remains, however, outside of the main focus of this thesis. In sum, most scholars in the debate adhere to several explanatory variables simultaneously. There is a general consensus on a role of historical context, institutions and domestic interests; however, the scholars differ on how strong were the subsequent effects of these factors on Germany's foreign behavior. Furthermore, in this debate on inapplicability of neorealism there are three main strands. At one end of the spectrum, some scholars argue that the neorealist concepts useless and must be replaced by other categories (e.g. Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000). At the other end, there are those arguing that neorealist concepts are not useless, but should be applied to areas of "high politics" (Rittberger 2001). In the middle, other scholars argue that application of the neorealist concepts makes sense in conjunction with other nation-specific factors (e.g. Zaborowsky 2004). In other words, the differences in the debate are not significant and demonstrate a general tendency towards the advocacy of a constructivist approach.

I do not argue that neorealism allows for the accurate predictions for German enlargement policy. In this thesis I try to clarify whether Germany indeed conducts its foreign policy also for strategic reasons in response to the structural pressure. Thus, John J. Mearsheimer (2001) insisted that realism offers the powerful explanations of international politics. He takes apart the main opposing arguments that predict a peaceful world – institutions and economic interdependence. For example he argues that international institutions are essentially irrelevant because they reflect states interests and policies and do not exert any independent effect on the struggle for power (ibid.: 363-364). However, Mearsheimer admitted, that political phenomena are highly complex and precise

predictions are impossible without very powerful theoretical tools, superior to those neorealists now possess.

To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from the preceding literature review: first, despite the appearance of multiple rival theoretical approaches to German foreign policy, neorealism, nevertheless, contains a number of promising instruments to the Federal Republic's policy towards the European Community enlargement. German EU enlargement policy is best understood when clearly placed into the context of security affairs. Therefore, neorealism has been taken as a point of departure in designing this research project. Second, notwithstanding the newest wave of analytical contributions, the debates about German EU enlargement policy are mainly concerned with the Eastern enlargement. Scholars have tried to explain why Germany supported the EU expansion eastwards and what were the costs and benefits for Germany from this policy (Tewes 2002; Wood 2004; Harnish and Schieder 2006). In these debates the question of under which conditions Germany favors or opposes enlargement to a particular applicant country has been systematically ignored. By contrast, this research project presents a theory-guided empirical analysis of Germany's policy towards enlargement, contributing both to the knowledge about Germany's foreign policy behavior and to the evaluation of the explanatory power of neorealist theories.

CHAPTER TWO:

FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATION THEORY TO THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

This chapter draws on and contributes to neorealist theories of international relations because I believe that neorealism² provides some critical intellectual tools for understanding states foreign behavior. The study of international relations is largely concerned with states and the effects of anarchy on the states foreign policies and the pattern of inter-states interactions. Although over last several decades theoretical innovations have slowly shifted scholars' attention from international structure onto normative elements of global society (Barnett and Sikkink 2009: 749), it does not mean that the rise of constructivist normative discourse analyses replaced the neorealist positivistic structural approach to international relations and states foreign behavior. I support neorealist emphasis on international structure and I agree that the main characteristics of international politics remain unaltered. The world is anarchic in the sense that there is no international sovereign that can make and enforce laws and agreements. States retain considerable power. The security dilemma persists as well, with the problems it creates for states who would like to cooperate but whose security requirements do not mesh (Jervis 1991-1992: 46). Moreover, questions about war and cooperation, and concepts such as power and security – the home turf of neorealism, remain central to the field of

² Throughout this thesis the terms 'neorealism' and 'structural realism' are used synonymously.

international relations. Focusing on major problems can help to figure out which insights from the broader theoretical approach to the field are valuable and which analytical tools yield undoubted insight or evidence (Keohane 2009: 775).

The present chapter focuses particularly on the neorealist formulation of a state foreign behavior. To sketch the neorealist approach, I elaborate ideas presented in *Theory of International Politics* (Waltz 1979) and *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Mearsheimer 2001). The intent is to suggest some theoretical ideas that might shed light on particular aspects of the role of external to states conditions in their foreign policy behavior. The aspiration is not to present a full-fledged neorealist theory of foreign policy; rather I am interested in testing of defensive realism and offensive realism without making an effort to provide a comprehensive review of the whole range of realist theories, their comparative advantages and the controversies in the field. Instead, I focus on systematic features of neorealism that make its applicability to foreign policy analysis possible. I ask how the international system's incentives account for a state behavior. First, I sketch the basic ideas of self-help pattern of inter-states actions in the neorealist research programme. Second, I attend the relationship between the abstract concepts employed by the neorealism and review some of the major debates between the defensive and offensive realist theories. Third, I represent neorealist models of state foreign behavior and state decision making by shifting the application of neorealist theories from international relations to foreign policy analysis and draw the frontier of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy. Fourth, drawing from the two neorealist approaches to state foreign behavior, I formulate defensive and offensive realist predictions about state foreign behavior in case of the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the European Economic Community enlargement in a period from 1961 to 1979. The aim is to dismiss the dominated idea about neorealism's poor performance. If neorealist theories can be used as theories of foreign policy, it makes the research programme more relevant and increases its predictive or explanatory power (Elman 1996).

2.1 Neorealist theory of international relation and state behavior

Neorealist theories of international relations explain how distribution of national capabilities and the pressure of international structure reflect on behavior of states and international politics (Waltz 2011: 391). As a general theory of international relations neorealism is written with reference to great power states, because from a neorealist perspective, “these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics” (Mearsheimer 2001: 5). The states “of greatest capabilities set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves” (Waltz 1979: 72). “The fortunes of all states – great powers and smaller powers alike – are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capabilities” (Mearsheimer 2001: 5). Due to the fact that neorealism comprises a body of theories – defensive and offensive realism – that use the same core assumptions and derive predictions from the same set of variables (Elman 1996), it is often conceptualized as a paradigm or research programme, rather than as a single theory (Elman 1996; Taliaferro 2000; Vasquez 1997).

In opposition to Mearsheimer that defines offensive realism as mainly a descriptive theory, which assumptions are accurate representations of an important aspects of life (Mearsheimer 2001: 30), and in line with Waltz (1979: 91) I argue that the motivation of the actors in the neorealist framework is assumed rather than realistically described. It is assumed, *first*, that states are “principle,” in accordance with Mearsheimer, and “unitary,” according to Waltz, actors in world politics. *Second*, at a minimum, they “seek only to be secure” (Mearsheimer 2001: 3), and their single motive is “the wish to survive” (Waltz 1996: 54). At a maximum, states strive to be the only great power in the system (Mearsheimer 2001: 2) and drive for universal domination (Waltz 1979: 118). *Third*, states’ worry about their survival (Waltz 1979: 105), and the fear of each other (Mearsheimer

2001: 2) conditions states foreign behavior. *Fourth*, states are self-regarding units that have to do whatever they think necessary for their own preservation, since no one can be relied on to do it for them (Waltz 1979: 109) in the absence of a central authority that can protect them from each other (Mearsheimer 2001: 3). *Fifth*, states can never be certain about other states' future intentions and actions (Mearsheimer 2001: 3; Waltz 1979: 105). *Sixth*, because states always have some offensive military capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001: 3) and may use force at any time, all states must be prepared to do so (Waltz 1979: 102). *Seventh*, states foreign behavior is affected by their relative power position in the international system, and the structure of the international system largely shapes their foreign policy (Mearsheimer 2001: 17; Waltz 1979: 106). *Eighth*, since international politics is a realm of power, considerations about its distribution and balance of power dominate state thinking (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). *Ninth*, the behavior of states is influenced mainly by the structure of the international system and not by variations in the quality of states – their type of government, the character of their decision making or particular features of their leaders (Mearsheimer 2001: 17; Waltz 1979: 67; Waltz 1996). From neorealist perspective, it is difficult to distinguish one state from another, unless there are differences in relative power (Mearsheimer 2001: 18). Only capabilities may tell something about units (Waltz 1979: 97). *Tenth*, interest in preserving themselves provokes a competition among states, which is characterized by a zero-sum quality (Mearsheimer 2001: 18, 34; Waltz 1979: 171). Neorealism neither acts on nor requires assumptions of rationality. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, within neorealist approach behavior is influenced not only by what states want, but also by their capacities to satisfy their desire (Mearsheimer 2001: 37). On the other hand, given structural constraints, even rational behavior does not lead to desirable results. Both defensive and offensive realism say just that one participant's gains result only from another's equivalent losses (Waltz 1979: 108, 118; Mearsheimer 2001: 34). Even though Mearsheimer uses term 'rational,' it refers simply to a state that considers how its own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of other states, and how other states' strategies

for survival are likely to affect its own security course (Mearsheimer 2001: 31; Waltz 1979: 134). The configuration of the system is the unintended consequence of security competition among states (Mearsheimer 2001: 49). *Finally*, self-help situation is defined as one of high risk but of low organizational costs (Waltz 1979: 111). Under the condition of insecurity war is a state of nature (Waltz 1979: 102) and an acceptable instrument of statecraft, while cooperation has an occasional character (Mearsheimer 2001: 18). The structure limits the cooperation in two ways. First, a state does not willingly place itself in the situation of dependence on others through cooperative endeavors and worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself (Waltz 1979: 106-107). Second obstacle in the way to cooperation is states' conflicting interests and a danger of being cheated (Mearsheimer 2001: 18).

In sum, the both neorealist theories defensive realism and offensive realism share the basic tenets of the realist school of thought. They derive predictions from the same core assumptions and expect the units of self-help system to act with respect to conditions of the international structure (Waltz 1979), which within neorealism largely shapes states' foreign behavior (Mearsheimer 2001: 17). The two neorealist perspectives accept a generative notion of structure, i.e. it is generated by the interactions of its principle parts – great powers. It is believed that the fates of all states in the system are affected by the actions of the major units (Waltz 1979: 72), while behavior of minor states is mostly “insulted from the intervention of the greatest powers” (Waltz 1979: 73). Furthermore, both defensive realism and offensive realism agree that the possibility of effective actions depends on the ability of states to provide necessary means (Mearsheimer 2001: 37), and most of all it hinges on the existence of conditions that permit nations to follow appropriate policies and strategies (Waltz 1979: 109). There are important differences, however, among the two theories in that one of them highlights more strongly than other the factors that motivate states actions. Defensive realism stresses that states seek self-

preservation and are motivated by the desire to secure their survival. Offensive realism, conversely, claims that survival might be attained through self-expansion and relates a motive for state behavior to power maximization. As a result, differently motivated states are expected to behave differently. While defensive realism forecasts a stronger tendency towards efficient balancing, offensive realism predicts that states will be more inclined towards competitive foreign policies (Glaser 2003: 270). It is the ability of neorealism to substantiate the opposite claims that is most valued within the congruence analysis approach to theory testing against the historical evidence. This is the case if one observation is at the same time evidence for the correctness of one theory's predictions and evidence for the incorrectness of another theory's expectations (Blatter and Blume 2008: 333).

In the following sections I look more closely at the differences among the neorealist theories. Since the aim of this study is to provide a test of the neorealist propositions on states behavior by looking at Germany's EEC enlargement policy during the Cold War, I outline competing neorealist assertions regarding power and security for a case of cooperation among states at the level of the European region in the context of bipolarity at the level of international system.

2.2 Neorealist concepts

2.2.1 Power

Both defensive and offensive realism examine the ways in which changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations affect general objectives of a state in its interaction with other states. For the reason of conceptual clarity of the neorealist expectations about states foreign behavior this section concentrates on the discussion of 'power' as explanatory

variable. However, to meet the requirements of congruence analysis approach, within which abstract concepts are determined through their embeddedness in the theoretical context, the meaning of the concept of power will be defined with reference to the neorealist theories and not to observable attributes of the concept. I provide a two-step-way of characterizing power. I will turn to a power definition as a tool to determine what the components of power are. After that, I proceed with a practical context of power as a tool to identify power's capacity to effect a change in a state foreign behavior whether intended or not (Morriss 1987: 19).

Power definition

There is no unifying definition of the concept of power applicable to the neorealist theories. According to Waltz, power is a relative concept, which can be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities, and thus, can be measured on a state score on capabilities in relation to the score of other states. Waltz (1979: 131) assumes that "states are ranked on how they score on *all* of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence." He notices that the economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectorized and separately weighed. In line with Waltz Mearsheimer (2001: 57) defines power as nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state. Yet, he goes further and distinguishes two closely related but not synonymous forms of power – potential latent power and actual military power. Latent power is based on the states' wealth and the overall size of their population as the raw potential for the building up of military forces (ibid.: 36, 55-57). For measuring latent power in the years up to 1960 Mearsheimer suggests using a straightforward composite indicator that accords equal weight to state's iron and steel production and its energy consumption; from 1960 to the present he recommends to use GNP as a measure of states' wealth. Military power refers

largely to the size and strength of the states' land armies and supporting them air and novel forces (ibid.: 56). The ability of a state to build a powerful army is a function of its latent power (Schmidt 2005: 541). A state effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states. The most powerful states are those that possess the most formidable land forces (Mearsheimer 2001: 56). Thus, Mearsheimer tends to define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the *ultima ratio* of international politics. Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. Mearsheimer qualifies a state as a great power, if it has "sufficient military asserts to put up a serious fight an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world" (ibid.: 5). In the nuclear era great powers are expected to have a nuclear deterrent as well as formidable conventional forces. While privileging military power, Mearsheimer underlines, however, that states care greatly about latent power, since the size of population and its wealth are the two most important components for generating military might (ibid: 56, 61). For instance, Mearsheimer excludes the possibility for states with small populations to become great powers, because only big populations can produce great wealth (ibid.: 61). Within offensive realism great powers also tend to fear states with large populations and rapidly expanding economics, even if these states have not yet translated their wealth into military might (ibid.: 46).

As in the case of Waltz's theory Mearsheimer's concept of power is relative and states pay close attention to how power is distributed among them. As Mearsheimer (2001: 34) puts it, great powers follow the balance-of-power logic and care about relative power, not absolute power. According to neorealism, states motivated by relative power concerns are likely to forgo large gains in their power, if such gains give rival states even greater power for smaller national gains that nevertheless provide them with a power advantages over rivals. In contrary, states that seek absolute gains would seize the opportunity for larger

gains, even if a rival gained more in the deal. According to this logic, power is not a means to the end, but an end in itself (ibid.: 36). Both Waltz and Mearsheimer distance themselves from relational concept of power suggested by Robert Dahl (1957). According to Waltz, Dahl equals power with control, i.e. power as ability to get someone to do something they otherwise would not do (Dahl 1957: 202-203). Waltz argues that Dahl's relational concept of power omits consideration of the influence of structure. In the neorealist terms structures cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have (Waltz 1979: 107). Power does need to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities, yet their possession still provides little guarantee of success (Waltz 1979: 192; Mearsheimer 2001: 58). The very problem is that rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results (Waltz 1979: 109). For Waltz, the possibility of effective action depends on ability to provide necessary means. It depends even more on the existence of conditions that permit nations to follow appropriate policy and strategies (ibid.: 109). When defining power, therefore, Mearsheimer (2001: 60) seriously advocates differentiation between material capabilities and the "military success", as opposed to Dahl's relational definition in terms of outcome as the amount of power in relation to others. Mearsheimer gives three reasons why power should not be equaled with outcomes. First, focusing on outcomes makes it impossible to assess the balance of power before a conflict. Second, an attempt to determine balance of power after a conflict leads to implausible conclusions. Third, Mearsheimer reminds that one of the most interesting aspects of international relations is how power, which is a means, affects political outcomes, which are ends. If power and outcomes were indistinguishable, there would be no difference between means and ends and neorealism would be left then with a circular argument.

Power is a core concept of neorealism, which provides important insights into how states behave (Mearsheimer 2001: 137). Calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them (ibid.: 12). Except for differences in how much power

each state controls, the neorealist theories treat all states alike (ibid.: 54). How powers are placed in the system affects their abilities, their opportunities, and their inclinations to act (Waltz 1979: 145). Although states are similar in their efforts to protect themselves, they have different capability to do so (ibid.: 105). Power estimates the extent to which a state can affect or be affected by others (ibid.: 192). Power index identifies the power levels of individual states and helps specify the architecture of the system. Since the relative strength of the major powers is known, it is possible to determine whether power is distributed more or less equally among them, or “there are large power asymmetries” (Mearsheimer 2001: 13). Neorealist argument is that great powers act in that and not the other way due to the structure of the international system. So long as structure remains unaffected it is not possible for changes in the intentions and the actions of particular actors to produce desirable outcomes or to avoid undesirable ones (Waltz 1979: 108). Waltz argues that the way units stand in relation to one another, the way they are arranged or positioned, is a property of the system. The structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts and varies because states material capabilities are different (ibid.: 133). Variation of structure is introduced only by distinctions among states according to their capabilities, and thus, their number becomes a factor of high explanatory power (ibid.: 133).

The aim of this research is testing neorealist theories. The concept of power will be only the basis for explanation and not explanation as such (Guzzini 1993: 445-446). The two theories involving power will be checked empirically, but neither of concepts will be measured. To make test manageable, I adjust the conceptual contributions of both defensive and offensive realism and use the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC)³ as a measure of power. The reason here is threefold. First, six indicators - military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban

³ For a discussion on the Composite Index of National Capability see Singer, David J. (1987) Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985. *International Interactions*, 14, 115-132.

population, and total population - are included in this data set, and each of them serves as the basis for the indicators of national capability used in the both neorealist theories. Second, geography of location and natural resources has been not addressed in CINC because the former “pertains to the *relationship between* nations rather than to the *characteristic* of a given nation” (Singer 1987). As to letter, natural resources available are already reflected to a considerable extent in the indicators employed. For example, it is widely believed among foreign policy officials that no country could wage a war without a strong, independent coal and steel industry (Sangiovanni and Verdier 2005: 104). This material non-relational approach to states capabilities is in line with Waltz’s and Mearsheimer’s conceptualization of power. Third, there are high correlations between CINC score and GDP/GNP or other power indexes (German 1960; Fucks 1965; Organski and Kugler 1980).

Purpose of power: why states need power?

In this section I will attend to the second step in the characterization on power. In his study on purposes of power Peter Morriss (1987) rejects a claim that a concept of power may be define as property concept or as a causal concept, and specifies power as a dispositional concept implying capacity to effect. Morriss suggests in the practical context actors are interested in power because they want to know what they and other actors in the system might bring about. As Snyder (1996: 181) writes, it is reasonable to define concept of power in terms of what a state’s material capabilities can accomplish. Waltz (1979: 105) makes a point in favor of this argumentation, when he writes that “although states are similar in their efforts to protect themselves, they have different capability to do so”. In this regard, Waltz offers to estimate the power of an agent by the extent it can affect others more than they affect him (ibid.: 192). Specifically, Waltz writes that how powers are ranked in the system affects their abilities, their opportunities, and their inclinations to act

(*ibid.*: 145). He underlines the importance of relative not absolute gains in power because one's gain measured against that of others affects the ability to shift balance of power in oneself favor (*ibid.*: 134). Mearsheimer (2001: 37) also underlines that great powers cannot always act following their own intentions. Instead, their behavior is influenced not only by what they want, but also by their capability to realize the desired. In Mearsheimer's words much depends on how military might is distributed among the great powers. Within neorealism, if states are interested in outcome which is never only in their but also in some other states reach, the knowledge about power distribution among nations "could be the beginning of getting a deal done" (Guzzini 2002). Actors want to know their power in order to seize an opportunity that possession of power provides. Yet, the most important interest is to know the capabilities of others in order to identify the threat and avoid being harmed by the effect of other agents' power.

Morriss (1987) stresses that in practice actors are particularly interested in non-intentional effect of power, especially, when they want to survive or to guard themselves against any adverse effects, whether intended or not. This important aspect of non-intentional power is a part of structural realist thinking. Neorealists define power as means to some desired end and the outcome of its use is necessary uncertain. For Waltz (1979: 110), states may seek reasonable and worthy ends of their policies, but they cannot figure out how to reach them. This is due to the fact that "the principle pains of a great power, if they are not self-inflicted, arise from the effects of policies pursued by other great powers, whether or not the effects are intended" (*ibid.*: 202). Mearsheimer as Waltz does not equate distribution of power with outcome. He admits that increase in power leads to increase in capacity, however, "the likelihood of success does not mean that success is virtually certain" (Mearsheimer 2001: 58). According to Waltz (1979: 194), there are four primary tasks that power performs. First, power provides the means of maintaining state's autonomy in the face of force that others may use. Second, greater power permits wider range of actions,

while leaving the outcome of action uncertain. Third, the more powerful states are safer in dealing with the less powerful nations, and they are also relatively free in their choice of actions. Those who are weak and hard pressed have to be careful. Inopportune acts, flawed policies, and misjudged timing may have fatal results. In contrast, strong states can be indifferent to most threats because only a few threats, if carried through, can damage them gravely. They can hold back until the ambiguity of events is resolved without fearing that the moment for effective actions will be lost (ibid.: 195). Fourth, great power gives its possessor a big stake in the international system and the ability to act for its sake.

Mearsheimer argues that power affects the intensity of fear among states in four main ways. First, rival states that possess nuclear forces that can survive a nuclear attack and retaliate it are likely to fear each other less than if these same states had no nuclear weapons. The logic here is simple: because nuclear weapons can impose devastating destructions on a rival state in a short period of time, nuclear-armed rivals are reluctant to fight with each other. However, it does not mean, that war is no longer thinkable among rivals that still have reason to fight each other (Mearsheimer 2001: 44). Second, when great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have many offensive capabilities against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problem for attacking armies. Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack or conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border (ibid.: 44). Third, the distribution of power among states in the system also markedly affects the level of fear. The key issue is whether power is distributed more or less equally among the great powers or whether there are sharp power asymmetries. A potential hegemon is more than just the most powerful state in the system. It is a great power with so much actual military capability and so much potential power that it stands a good chance of dominating all of the other great powers in the region. A potential hegemon must have excellent prospects of

defeating each opponent alone, and good prospects of defeating some of them in tandem. The key relationship, however, is the power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the region: there must be a marked gap between them (ibid.: 45). Fourth, Mearsheimer argues that states with larger share of material capabilities are able to act in their own interests (ibid.: 33, 49).

Points of disagreement between defensive realism and offensive realism

After I have presented the common for the both neorealist theories way to define concept of power, I proceed now with the different approaches the neorealists apply in dealing with it. In the general sense, Waltz and Mearsheimer refer to the same dispositional non-intentional relative concept of power, with the exception of four distinguishable aspects. First, the both theoreticians admit that states with the greatest capabilities have the larger impact on international politics (Waltz 1979: 72; Mearsheimer 2001: 5). Yet, in opposition to Waltz Mearsheimer (2001: 33, 49) argues that states with larger share of material capabilities are guided by military logic. Enjoying a favorable asymmetry of power, bigger states are neither inclined to show sensitivity to other states interests nor act to promote world order for its own sake. Second, the both school of realism agreed on the argument on zero-sum competition among states. Thus, according to Waltz (1979: 171), “in a two-power competition a loss for one appears as a gain for the other”. This is true also from Mearsheimer’s (2001: 34) point of view, which is “one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss”. However, while defensive realism assumes that “where a number of states are in balance, the skillful foreign policy of a forward power is designed to gain an advantage over one state without antagonizing others and frightening them into united actions” (Waltz 1979: 171); offensive realism regards as true that exactly because “great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other, the trick is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. To maximize power means

to act offensively towards other states, even though ultimate motive is survival (Mearsheimer 2001: 34). Third, within both defensive realism and offensive realism international system may be multipolar, that is an international distribution of power containing more than two great powers, and bipolar where an international distribution of power containing only two great powers. Both defensive realism and offensive realism agree that multipolar system is more vulnerable than bipolar one. Yet, unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer distinguishes balanced and unbalanced multipolar systems. Balanced multipolarity is represented by roughly equal great powers. Each of them is able to balance the other states' capabilities, but neither of them has a potential to become a regional hegemon. In unbalanced multipolar system power is distributed asymmetrically favoring regional dominance of the most powerful state. Fourth, realist theoreticians reveal contradictions when they distinguish between status quo and revisionist powers. This is an important within the offensive realist assumption that all states desire to maximize their power and that the states' motivational force lies in their preoccupation with power enhancing – “as more power as possible”, that is opposite to maintaining power position in the system – “appropriate amount of power”, as defensive realism postulates. Within offensive realism, the pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. For Mearsheimer (2001: 35), the idea that great power might feel secure, provided it has an “appropriate amount” of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to assess how much relative power one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Second, it is difficult to determine how much power is enough for today and for tomorrow. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony, it is still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system (ibid.: 35). To be clear, the claim that states would pass up cost-free

opportunities for power maximization is considered to be alien to any form of neorealism (Rendall 2006: 525). The logic of defensive realism does recognize limited expansion (Taliaferro 2000: 152). But admitting that foreign policy aims both at the acquisition of appropriate and sometimes of maximum amount of power, Waltz (1979: 126) stresses that states “cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue”. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goal as power, because the goal the system encourage them to seek is security. Increase in power may or may not serve that end. Therefore, the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.

It is customary for realist theoreticians to distinguish between goals and means, where power, normally, “is a means to other ends and not an end in itself” (Wolfers 1962: 89). For neorealists, the goal is security (Waltz 1979: 126; Mearsheimer 2001: 31), and states measure their ability to achieve this goal in terms of power (Glaser 1996: 125). Yet, it is hardly possible to divide sharply these two ideas – means and ends. Nevertheless, drawing on his theory of ends, Wolfers (1962) suggests elucidating the nature of ends for which power is used by clarifying the purposes to which power is employed and extent to which such ends influences the pursuit of power. According to Wolfers, “policy makers tend to keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses or is ready and willing to muster” (ibid.: 90). In this sense, the choice of ends is materially affected by the availability of power and varies according to the situation in which states find themselves. Under exclusive category of security Wolfers enumerates three different types of ends: self-preservation, self-extension and self-abnegation. Correspondingly, security might be attained through power expansion, power preservation, or power reduction. All three types are not sharply divided from one another and neither of actors is likely to pursue a single type of objective all the time. Still Wolfers specifies that policy of power expansion requires large sacrifices, while the policy of power reduction involves

small risks of the transcended national interests. To support his claim that under conditions in achieving security goal the reduction of power may be preferred over the unilateral power maximization, Wolfers refers to cooperative effort in West Europe after the Second World War.

Wolfers' classification of policy goals does help understand the different purposes for which concept of power is employed within defensive and offensive realism. On the base of this classification it is possible to delineate two ideal types of great powers policy to the end of security. These two types are: self-preservation policy course advocated by defensive realism, and policy of self-extension assumed within offensive realism. However, the Wolfers' ideas might be advanced by identifying the factors that account for the shift from one policy goal to another, especially when it appears that a state is pursuing two different goals simultaneously (Yalem 1960: 424). In this regard, I suggest that greater clarity might be obtained if the criterion for differentiation between the two strands of neorealism is the motives according to which states behave. In regard to the concept of power suggested by Waltz (1979: 118), there is no need to assume that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. For defensive realists, the pursuit of hegemony almost always fails, because it triggers a counterbalancing coalition (*ibid.*: 126). In contrast, Mearsheimer's concept of power very strongly emphasizes power optimization as a motive for state behavior (Kajsa Ji Noe Oest 2007: 35). Specifically, he argues that the system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states (Mearsheimer 2001: 29). It means, states are expected to act offensively towards other states, even though the principle motive behind great powers' behavior is survival (*ibid.*: 34-35). Following Hempel's and Oppenheim's (1948) thoughts about logic of explanation, I assume that when the action of a state is motivated by a desire to reach a certain objective, the action itself as a future event does not determine the state's present behavior, because the goal may not be actually reached by the action the state opted for. Rather it is

the actors' desire that have been presented before the action to attain the particular objective and their belief that such a course of action is most likely to have a desired effect account most. The strength of this approach to explanation lies in its focus on the impact of motives when theorizing about great power behavior.

In sum, I find it most relevant to define power according to an adjusted to the both defensive and offensive realist conceptualization. The characterizing power as dispositional concept complements the neorealist definition of relative power. Moreover, considering not just for what purposes a state can use its power, but also a motive for doing so constitutes essential difference between the two kinds of competing predictions about states behavior that defensive realism and offensive realism make using concept of power.

2.2.2 Security

This section attempts to explicate the neorealist concept of security broadly enough for the use within a congruence analysis approach with the theory's special reference to the nation-states. Some of the main problems in applying neorealist theories to the foreign policy analysis lies in it that they treat only peripherally the process by which anarchy and distribution of power in international system are transmitted onto behavior and outcomes (Snyder 1996). This section sets about elaborating on security as an intervening concept. I am suggesting that security considerations amount to specifying the missing links in the causal chain from structure and unit attributes on the one hand, to their interaction on the other hand. The point to be made is that security can be achieved on the inside level of nation states, while anarchy reigns on the outside zone of the international system. In this sense, security is a property of individual states, but the interest in security is strongly affected by the international structure (ibid.: 179). In essence, a need for security in the anarchy drives individual units to act, while the structure is the catalyst for these actions

(Seul 2006: 97). According to both neorealist theoreticians Waltz and Mearsheimer, for the most part, events are framed by and within a security mechanism of power-political considerations. In this regard, a test of whether the logic of neoralism might be applied to the case study at hand would be, given the security threat, whether fear of a state dominating a region, emerged (Jervis 1991-1992).

There is no neorealist definition of security. 'Security' is broadly understood as the matter of states' major concern and as a policy objective. Neorealism assumes that states can and do pursue different policy goals, but security remains the most important objective. For Waltz (1979: 126), security is the highest end in anarchy. According to Mearsheimer (2001: 46), survival is the number one goal of great powers. Thus, the equation of security with survival makes it difficult to define what precisely distinguishes security. In the following section I therefore specify the neorealist concept of security with reference to its key components identified by Baldwin (1997): Security from whom and to what values? How much security? Security at what cost and by which means?

Security from whom and to what values?

Within neorealist paradigm states traditionally concern themselves with security from external military threat (Baldwin 1997: 5). External threat is pre-eminent among the components of the security concept. Firstly, it determines the general type of relationship – adversarial, allied or indifferent – among states. Secondly, it determines the significance of two other security components – military capabilities and geo-strategy. Thirdly, external threat might be treated as the proximate sources of behavioral causation, operating to some extent independently, and channeling to some degree influence from units and system structure. Based on the assumption that the threat is dependent on capabilities, Waltz implies that the strongest power constitutes the main threat to others (Kajsa Ji Noe Oest

2007: 30). Mearsheimer defines threat as an aggressive behavior from another state and expression of power-maximizing behavior. He argues, that “capability that states have to threaten each other varies from case to case, and it is a key factor that drives fear levels up and down. The more power a state possesses, the more fear it generates among its rivals” (Mearsheimer 2004: 187).

Neorealist concept of security, which is often referred in the literature as a ‘conventional’ or ‘hard’ security, is reduced to its essentials comprehending nothing beyond armed territorial security. Defense spending conceived by neorealists as unproductive, remains nevertheless unavoidable for the states concentrating their major efforts on the maintenance of their autonomy and territorial integrity (Waltz 1979: 107). The indispensable features of ‘hard’ security are its external inter-state character and the forces build up as an inherent strategic element (Fatić 2002). As Waltz puts it, “to interdict the use of force by the threat of force, to oppose force with force, to influence the policies of states by the threat or use of force – these have been and continue to be the most important means of control in security matters” (Waltz 1979: 209). Neorealist specification of the concept of security, entirely defined in terms “of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991), limits the choice of means by which security may be attained exclusively to military solutions. Defensive realism assumes that whether or not by force, each state prearranges the political course that it thinks best serves its interests. However, conditioned by the possibility of use of force each state is prepared to do so singly or in combination with allies. Similarly, within offensive realism competition for security leaves states with no choice but to use force for the both purpose of offence and of defense in the world where a state of peace, “tranquility or mutual concord” is not likely to emerge (Mearsheimer 2001: 35).

Since the aim of this research is to test relevance and applicability of neorealist theories to the field of foreign policy analysis, rather than to amend or revise them, I support the stand in the debate that the broadening the neorealist concept of security – exclusively defined in military terms, to include non-military factors would require the dismantling main neorealist assumptions, which provide neorealism with its internal logic (Brooks 1997: 453). First, neorealists assume that there is always the perceived relative likelihood that military force will be used (Powell 1991). Second, in the system with high level of security competition, a rational state will give more weight to short-term priorities of its own survival. Third, neorealists mainly downplay the non-security element when theorizing about international behavior (Waltz 1979: 79-80). I argue that moving away from a focus on the relations between states may venture the research forth onto domains best covered by other academic disciplines. For the same reason human security is excluded. Therefore, the concept of security in this section is discussed in relation to its conventional definition excluding such mega threats to security as poverty, disease, global warming and energy dependence.

Although conventional security excessively overlaps with the neorealist concept of power – the both operate with military capabilities, balance of power and security dilemma, it is plainly distinguishable in terms of ‘values’ it measures. Specifying the security problematic, Wolfers (1952: 484-485) clearly defines *power* as a measure of the amount of a nation’s material possessions. *Security* he describes as a measure of the absence of threats to acquired values, or more precisely, a measure of fear that such values will be attacked. Arguing that the chance of future attack can never be measured “objectively”, Wolfers claims that subjective evaluations always matter (ibid.: 485). National attempts to achieve greater security would prove to be a function of power and the opportunity which nations possess of reducing danger by their own efforts (ibid.: 486). In other words, the concept of security allows for addressing phenomena that can be controlled by national leaders. It is quite difficult to

control polarity. By contrast, strategy can be altered by deliberate acts of policy (Walt 1991: 212). Neorealist theory shows that causes run not in one direction, from interacting units to outcomes produced, but rather in two directions (Waltz 1990: 34). It means that the connection between security consideration and state behavior as well runs both ways. Not only security needs shape policy choices; interaction among states can also change the severity of the security threat.

Determining whether states are responding to systematic incentives as specified by Waltz and further developed by Mearsheimer presupposes an investigation on “how states estimate the distribution of capabilities and what they do in response to those estimates” (Wohlforth 2002: 256). Waltz (1979: 176). believes that leaders who direct activities of great powers are “by no means free agents”. Within neorealism states’ leaders are expected to “respond sensibly” and in accordance with the estimating “pressures that encourage them to do so”. The idea that identity as well as the behavior of leaders is affected by the presence of pressures and the clarity of challenges has been prominent in both defensive and offensive realism thinking. Waltz intends to say that not a complicated set of personal virtues, but rather the pressures of a system strongly encourage leading politicians “to act internationally in ways better than their characteristics may lead one to expect” (ibid.: 176). In line with a neorealist point of view, in the literature on foreign policy analysis decisions are usually characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk (Renshon and Renshon 2008: 509). However, neorealists assume the standard problem of miscalculation by decision making as mainly caused by international factors and ignore physiological or domestic determinants of decision. Thus, as Mearsheimer (2001: 38) suggests, great powers might miscalculate because they invariably make important decisions on the basis of other states observable behavior. This problem has two dimensions. Potential adversaries have incentives, first, to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and second, to conceal their true aims. For example, an aggressive state might emphasize

its peaceful goals and exaggerate its military weakness, in order to prevent potential victims from building up their own power, and thus, leaving them vulnerable to attack. It all amounts to the same in regard to weak states, which without becoming strong are able to behave as though they were (Waltz 1979: 184). As Mearsheimer (2001: 211) puts it, even when state's leaders have a good reason to think that their initial judgments are correct, their guesses might still be wrong.

Neorealist logic implies that great powers are always unsure how their own and advisory's power will perform. Mearsheimer (2001: 211) describes the realm of international affairs as complicated business in which it is often difficult to predict outcome. Great powers have always to allow for the reactions of other states, but can never be sure about the other states possible responses to their own actions. Waltz (1979: 134) explains it by the fact that states, especially the big ones, are limited by their situations and have to react to the actions of others whose actions may be changed by their reaction. Thus, the outcome remains indeterminate. According to Mearsheimer, states are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of other states, and how behavior of other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long terms as well as the immediate consequences of their actions (Mearsheimer 2001: 31). As Waltz (1979: 134) resumes, each state chooses its own policies, regarding its security needs and situation. Neorealists believe that multipolarity gives raise to the problem of miscalculation, instead, bipolarity eliminates it, leading both parties to recognize limits beyond which they cannot provoke the others. Mearsheimer (2001: 343) points to fact that multipolarity leads states to underestimate the resolve of rival states and the strength of opposing coalition. War in turn is more likely when a state underestimates the willingness of an opposing state to stand firm. Waltz asserts miscalculation as the source of danger in a multipolar world, and overreaction as the

source of threat in a bipolar world. He notices that miscalculation is more likely to cause a change in the balance and bring powers to war. Overreaction is of the lesser danger “because it costs only money and the fighting of limited wars” (Waltz 1979: 172). An argument in support of this asserts is that “in the great-power politics of multipolar worlds, who is a danger to whom, and who can be expected to deal with threats, are matters of uncertainty. In the great power politics of bipolar worlds, who is a danger to whom is never in doubts” (ibid.: 170). Diffusion of danger, confusion of responses is the characteristics of great-power politics in multipolar world (ibid.: 171). And “the cautious optimism” is justified within neorealism “so long as the dangers to which each must respond are so clearly present” (ibid.: 176).

A significant neorealist proposition is that states are conditioned by the mere possibility of conflict and always adopt worst-case scenario. Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 10) views international system as a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other.” Similarly, Waltz (1989: 43) argues that “the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile,” and war may break out at any time (Waltz 1979: 111, 102). Nevertheless, Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 9) highlights that international relations are not perceived as a constant state of war, but the possibility of war is always in the background. Security competition is indigenous “to daily life in the international system, but war is not” and “only occasionally does security competition give way to war.” Since anarchy is constant, alone it cannot account “for why security competition some times leads to war but sometimes does not” (ibid.: 9). To account for the variation in state behavior Mearsheimer (2001: 334) considers such a structural variable as distribution of power among the states in the system. For neorealists, ultimately important is not that conflict is always possible in anarchy, but rather the relative chances that it will occur (Brooks 1997: 447). That is why within neorealism, a rational state always aims to balance the military capabilities of potential aggressor (ibid.: 448). There are three reasons for states to adopt a

worst-case perspective. First, given extreme potential costs of war the actors focus on the mere possibility of conflict. Neorealism emphasizes that political competition among states is much more dangerous than economic intercourse, because it can lead to war (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 12). Second, states are uncertain about others intentions, which “can be benign one day and malign the next” (ibid.: 11). States’ intentions are difficult to recognize, because they change quickly (Mearsheimer 2001: 345). In contrary, capability can be measured and allow for determining whether or not a rival state is a serious threat (Mearsheimer 2004: 190). Thus, rational actors are sensitive to other states’ potential for aggression measured by material capabilities. Third, states adopt worst-case scenario, because “they do not enjoy even imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves” (Waltz 1959: 201). It should be noticed that three mentioned above factors merely provide a justification for neorealist worst-case possibility assumption and by now means compel a rational state to adopt worst-case perspectives. Neorealists simply assume that states will react in this manner, but this assumption plays a pivotal role in the theory (Brooks 1997: 449). Balancing behavior and cooperation are conditioned not by a lack of hierarchical authority in the international system per se but by the perceived relative likelihood that force will be used (Powell 1991). Anarchy by itself does not shape decisions regarding balancing or cooperation, the possibility of worst-case scenario does.

Defensive precautions are considered to be the only true assurance against aggression. Neorealists presume that war can be prevented only by direct choice to pursue appropriate defensive preparations (Sangiovanni and Verdier 2005: 11). A central theme of neorealist theory is that states opt for the involvement in international conflicts at a minimum when they consider their survival to be at stake or in Wolfers’ (1962: 73) words when “their own territory comes under the threat of attack or actually is attacked.” In this view, the nuclear threat only strengthens the intensity of security competition and reinforces a condition that

would exist in its absence (Waltz 1979: 176, 181). Waltz insists that the recurrent forces of politics determine the behavior of nations to a greater extent, than the new military technology do (ibid.: 173). However, he admits that by comparison with the states armed conventionally, nuclear powers may have stronger incentives to avoid war, because nuclear weapons serve to limit escalation (ibid.: 175, 188). Any country's attempt to use force is lessened, "if its opponent has the ability to raise the ante" (ibid.: 188). In sum, Waltz classifies nuclear weapons as a unit attribute that has no dramatic effects to be qualified as structural (Snyder 1996: 170). Mearsheimer as Waltz remains skeptical about the idea that nuclear weapons can dampen security competition in any significant way, even if they do make great power wars less likely. From a neorealist perspective, nuclear weapons might be considered revolutionary in a purely military sense, simply because they can cause unprecedented levels of destruction in short periods of time (Mearsheimer 2001: 128, 133).

How much security?

Specifying the concept of security, Baldwin (1997: 15) reasons out absolute security. This is true according to Wolfers (1952: 158) who expects absolute security to be out of the question, "unless a country is capable of world domination". In this case, however, he predicts that the insecurities and fears would be 'internalized' and probably magnified. Neorealists also recognize it. For offensive realism, hegemony is the ultimate form of security because there are no meaningful security threats to the dominant power in a unipolar system (Mearsheimer 2001: 345). However, Mearsheimer admits that the goal of global hegemony is hardly realizable, and thus, the achievement of the highest degree of security, is virtually impossible given stopping power of water (ibid.: 40-41). From a defensive realism prospective, states always act exclusively to insure their survival, because the security is not guaranteed (Waltz 1979: 92). This is precisely why the non-attainability of absolute security might be conceived within the neorealist framework. The neorealist

understanding of anarchy as the absence of government is associated with the occurrence of violence. Waltz identifies the threat of violence and the recurrent use of force as the distinguishable characteristics of international affairs (ibid.: 102). A nation is secure to the extent to which it is able to provide the means of deterring an attack or defeating it. In line with Waltz Mearsheimer (2001: 42) argues that great powers' fear of each other is a central aspect of life in the international system. In the offensive realism view, fear is based in the premises that great powers invariably have offensive military capabilities to threaten each other; that great powers can never be certain that other states do not intend to use their power against them; and that there is no international authority they can turn for help to protect them. How much states fear each other matters greatly in the neorealist thinking, because the amount of fear between actors largely determines the severity of their security competition (ibid.: 42). It is consistent with the neorealists' notion of threat to accept Wolfers' idea of security as a matter of degree (Baldwin 1997: 14). "Security," Wolfers (1952: 484) writes, "is a value, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure." The understanding of security as a value that might be attained or reduced to some extent is implied in the neorealist thinking. For instance, it makes understandable, why within neorealism great powers fall into two categories – status quo powers and revisionist states. Power in the neorealist theory is sought by states as a means to desired end. Quest for security calls forth a variety of attitudes toward power. Status quo countries, which are satisfied with things as they are, have no immediate incentive to enhance their power. Whether they become revisionist states, which are interested in getting more power, depends on the level of threat, real or imagined that others pose to them. In Wolfers' (1962: 97) terms, if policy is rationally decided the quest for power increases and decreases in proportion to the external threats.

Security at what cost and by which means?

Within neorealism states may use economic means for military and political ends, and military and political means for the achievement of economic interests (Waltz 1979: 94). However, the pursuit of security always involves costs which account for subordination of non-security gains to political interest (ibid.: 107). Neorealists' emphasis on the possibility of conflict reflects the view that actors heavily discount the future, favoring short-term military preparedness over long-term non-security goals. As Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 11) puts it, if a state losses in the short run, it may not be around for the long haul. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Mearsheimer (2001: 31) makes it clear that survival dominates other intentions because if conquered, state is not in position anymore to pursue other aims. Although neorealists do not treat non-security long-term goals as unimportant, the merely possibility of conflict makes states to be prepared for the short-term use of force by potential rivalry. For instance, Mearsheimer (2004: 192) emphasizes that security trumps wealth when those two goals conflict. He supports his argument by Adam Smith (1904) reasoning that "defense is of much more importance than opulence." However, both defensive and offensive realism recognize that states might pursue economic goals as long as this behavior does not conflict with balance-of-power logic. Mearsheimer (1994-1995: 20) admits that it is impossible to maintain the neat dividing line between economic and military issues, mainly because military might is significantly depends on economic might. Wealth in the neorealist theory is the foundation of military capabilities. The more wealthy states are the more powerful military forces they can afford. It has been argued that "in order to fight wars, states may need to be concerned with their industrial capacity, steel production, access to energy, especially oil, and technological capacity to support a modern defense establishment. This is particularly true in the long run; in the short run various decisions may be made for the sake of security which do not maximize wealth" (Kirshner 1998: 66). Waltz (1986: 331) allows to a significant degree for policy choices in favor of

profit maximization, but he emphasizes the competitiveness of international arena, and warns against pursue of economic gains oriented policy at the expenses of military preparedness vis-à-vis potential rivals. By assumption, states strive to secure their survival. Insofar as they are in a self-help situation, 'survival' outranks 'profit' as goal, since survival is a prerequisite to the achievement of other ends (Waltz 1979: 134). From a neorealist perspective, how rational states weigh short-term military objectives against long-term non-security goals depends on the degree of security competition in the international system (Brooks 1997: 450). In a system with a high level of security competition, a state's first concern will be to maximize the likelihood of its survival, even if focusing on short-term security gains has negative long-term repercussions. If security competition is not as fierce, a state will give more weight to long-term priorities. Thus, the more competitive the system is, the more states discount the future (Brooks 1997: 450).

Points of disagreement between defensive realism and offensive realism

In general, the two neorealist approaches share the basic tenets regarding the concept of security. The both defensive realism and offensive realism recognize that security is the highest end, yet, they suggest quite different ways in which the ultimate aim of security can be pursued. First, within offensive realism, great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price (Mearsheimer 2001: 2). According to offensive realism, to increase the prospects for survival "states employ a variety of means – economic, diplomatic, and military – to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile" (ibid.: 34). Hence, there could be no status quo powers within offensive realism, unless there is the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals

(*ibid.*: 2). Waltz claims the opposite. He argues that fear and quest for security stimulate states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balance of power (Waltz 1979: 118). Attempts to dominate an entire region or the world are dangerous and meet defeat, because balancing coalitions invariably form against expansionist states. Therefore, the constraints of international system are powerful too much for offense to succeed. This argument is not the point at issue for offensive realism and indicates the second point of disagreement between two strands of neorealism. With the reference to the historical records Mearsheimer (2001: 39-40) argues that defensive realism exaggerates the restraining forces of international system mistakenly equating irrational expansion with military defeat. He resumes in this regard, that it is a matter of considerable importance for a sophisticated power-maximizer to figure out when to raise and when to fold. Third, offensive realism predicts that great powers seek nuclear superiority, that is opposite to defensive realism belief that states operating in a world in which each side has the capability to destroy the other side after a first strike, should willingly accept the status quo and not pursue nuclear advantage (*ibid.*: 224). In this regard, Waltz (1979: 188-189) points to the error of identifying power with control. "Military force, used internationally," he writes, "Is a means of establishing control over a territory, not of exercising control within it. The threat of a nation to use military force, whether nuclear or conventional, is preeminently a means of affecting another state's external behavior, or dissuading a state from launching a career of aggression and of meeting the aggression if dissuasion should fail." However, he makes it clear that inability to exercise political control over others does not indicate military weakness. Even if strong states cannot do everything with their military forces, they still are able to do, what military weak states are not, because differences in strength do matter, but not for every conceivable purpose (*ibid.*: 189). In this sense, Waltz argues that military force has limits (*ibid.*: 190).

Fourth, the difference between the defensive and the offensive approaches lies in the manner they resolve a problem of threat. For Waltz, states that operate in the self-help system are interested in providing the means of protecting themselves against others. According to Waltz, if major force is used to defend, a vital interest would run the grave risk of retaliation (ibid.: 184). In this view, balance of power maintains an order; “the use of force signals a possible breakdown” (ibid.: 185). Mearsheimer (2001: 139-140) also defines balancing as the main principle for preserving the balance of power, while war is identified as a main strategy for gaining additional capabilities. However, he postulates that states act offensively to shift the balance of power in their favor and prevent other states from shifting it against them. In this sense, offense represents the best defense. This is due to the fact that states’ ultimate goal is to become a hegemon, i.e. the only great power in the system with “enormous” security benefits. Only when a state achieves that position, it becomes interested in preserving a status quo (ibid.: 40, 213).

Offensive realism introduces security policies which Wolfers (1952: 158) describes as self-defeating policies, because they are based on the accumulation of power, where “target level is set too high”, and thus, ‘power of resistance’ cannot be distinguished from ‘power of aggression’. According to the neorealist theories, it is a characteristic of anarchic system that actors will opt for violent means to solve conflicts and little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy (Mearsheimer 2001: 36). The essence of the dilemma states caught in is reflected in the common for the neorealists zero-sum formula. That is, the policies a state pursues to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. It becomes difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states. From a neorealist perspective, a state employs the force – not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one, for the sake of its own protection and advantage in the realm characterized by power and struggle (Waltz 1979: 112-113). This is a view held by John H.

Herz (1951: 4) who writes that “basically it is the mere instinct of self-preservation which leads to competition for ever more power.” However, as Wolfers (1962: 84) correctly underlines, within the neorealist paradigm the lust for power could not be explained by desire of power as such, but by states’ general quest for security. That is why he expects a prudent state “to keep the target level within moderate bounds and to avoid placing oneself in a position where the level has to be raised suddenly and drastically”. According to Wolfers (ibid.: 159), the reasonable desire to escape from security dilemma “presupposes a security policy of much self-restraint and moderation, especially in the choice of the target level.” He believes that “it can never be expedient to pursue a security policy which by the fact of provocation or incentive to others fails to increase the nation’s relative power position and capability of resistance” (ibid.: 159). From this point of view, prudent security policies should be directed not at resistance but at the prevention of the desire of others to attack (ibid.: 160).

It is important to notice that Mearsheimer does not limit a state’s options to the power-maximization as the only way to survival and suggests an alternative strategy of keeping aggressor at bay and preventing his aggressive actions by balancing through alliance formation. Discussing the possibilities of managing world affairs, Waltz (1979: 209) addresses the question of how great the need for prevention and control may be. He believes that in alliance among equals mutuality of dependence causes states “to watch each others with wariness and suspicion” and to treat other states’ acts as though they were events within their own borders. In line with neorealist argumentation Herz (1951: 3) asserts that “mutual suspicion” inevitably results in a security dilemma which leads “competition for the means of security”. Instead, in alliances among unequals a decrease in interdependence lessens the need for control. On the one hand, the possession of greater capabilities in the less interdependent world increases security of a state, because an amount of power it possesses reduces significantly the negative effects that hostilities

originated outside the state's territory may cause to it. On the other hand, lessened interdependence gives to great powers a better capacity for control and a greater ability to do so. Great powers may use threat manipulation in order to moderate the use of force by others, or they may be able to absorb possibly destabilizing for the international system consequences of uncontrolled violence. Following this line of reasoning Waltz concludes that the loose interdependence creates a condition of equilibrium among unequal states and enables the biggest of them to exercise a certain amount of control, and thus, to promote peace and stability. From the neorealist point of view, the low interdependence requires less coordination and concerted efforts to achieve collective goals. In the defensive realist view, control and prevention have been and continue to be the most important operations and the threat or use of force remains the main instrument of control in security matters.

In this section I have describe the neorealist concept of security and shown that defensive realism diverges from offensive realist approach at four points. First, they expect quite different types of great powers' behavior when security is the real issue at stake – balancing is the behavior expected by defensive realism and revisionist foreign policy course is predicted by offensive realism. Second, within defensive realism structural constrains are so powerful that offense would not succeed while for offensive realism states defense themselves at best when they take an offense. Third, although both Waltz and Mearsheimer remain skeptical about the argument that nuclear weapons suppress security competition in any significant way, the two theoreticians disagree when discussing whether or not great powers should pursuing nuclear advantage. Mearsheimer's claim that states seek nuclear superiority is opposite of Waltz' belief that states should willingly accept the status quo. Fourth, these different expectations reflect the two opposite approaches to the manner states resolve a problem of threat within defensive realism and offensive realism, namely defense through power-preservation within the former versus defense through power-gaining within the latter.

It should be reminded that this research addresses the ability of neorealist theories to be employed for foreign policy analysis. That is defensive realism's and offensive realism's predictions about a state foreign behavior will be tested against historical evidence, which are expected to confirm one theory and at the same time undermine explanatory power of other theory. In this regard, introducing concept of security explicitly into this research not only permits more detailed analysis of state's foreign behavior than it could be possible from only structural perspective, but also allows for more profound test of theories' competing predictions on states foreign behavior within the similar conditions of the international structure.

2.2.3 Cooperation

After I have presented a way to define neorealist concepts of power and security, I will in the following section attend to the neorealist study of alliances seen as cooperation between states. As a central form of international cooperation alliance represents the primary expression of a state's foreign policy preferences (Beres 1972: 702) and might be used as visible indicator of the state's commitments to cooperative efforts (Bennett 1997: 846). Attempting to assess the soundness of the defensive and offensive realism view on a member state enlargement policy I look to states' cooperative behavior as the dependent variable. Thus, to fully comprehend a member state enlargement policy, it is necessary to understand alliance formation within neorealist theories. To do so I, first, examine factors that limit cooperation under anarchy, and then I proceed to the conditions under which security-seeking states regard cooperative policies worthy of consideration.

Structural restraints of cooperation

Neorealism holds that anarchy and the need for survival often force states to forgo mutual beneficial cooperation. Cooperation is risky, first, because states are sensitive to how it affects their current and future relative capabilities (Waltz 1979: 105); second, anarchy leaves little room for trust because “a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed” (Mearsheimer 1994-95: 12). From a defensive realism view, cooperation is always constrained by the dominating logic of security competition (Waltz 1990: 36). According to offensive realism, a world where states do not compete for power is not likely (Mearsheimer 1994-1995: 9). Since neorealism requires that states evaluate the risks of cooperation and competition, it is therefore fair to expect that the neorealist theory does explain variation in states behavior.

Waltz (1979: 105-106) distinguishes two ways in which the structure of international system limits cooperation among states. Firstly, when states, which feel insecure, consider the possibility of cooperation for mutual gain, they express concern not about whether they will gain, but rather how gains will be divided and who will gain more. In a self-help system where states look for the means to protect themselves against others, actors worry that one state may use its disproportional gain from the cooperation in order to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy other states. In this way the very condition of insecurity and uncertainty about the others' future intentions and actions works against international cooperation among states. Secondly, states fear that they become dependent on others through cooperation and seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency. Within neorealism, mutuality of dependence leads each state to watch others with wariness and suspicion, because flexibility of alliances presupposes that their members may both prefer another partner or to defect. In this sense, nations pull apart as each of them tries to take care of itself and to avoid becoming dependent on others, because close cooperation raises the prospect of occasional conflict, especially when interdependence growth exceeds the development of central control (ibid.: 138). According

to Waltz, how independent states remain, or how dependent they become, varies with their capabilities. Increase in the disparity of national capabilities reduces interdependence (ibid.: 144).

Also Mearsheimer (2001: 52) specifies the same two key factors that inhibit international cooperation under anarchy: first, considerations about relative gains, and second, concern about cheating. He argues that any states contemplating cooperation must conceive how profits or gains will be distributed between them. For sure each state tries to maximize its share and does not get worse and perhaps does better, than the other states in agreement. Furthermore, great powers are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage. This concern is especially acute in the military realm, because the nature of military weaponry allows for rapid shifts in the balance of power. Relative power concerns create a zero-sum situation that makes cooperation difficult. Striving for hegemony, states prevent rivals from gaining dominance. Instead, an uncertain diplomacy of cooperative policies preempts states' possibility to achieve wealth, and the mightiest land forces, and nuclear superiority (Mearsheimer 2001: 138). Alliances are considered to be slow and inefficient. It takes time to formulate a strategy and then to coordinate the joint actions, especially if a number of member states is large. Moreover, states are self-interested and cost-sensitive players, and thus, they usually attempt to get others to bear the burden of *détente* (Mearsheimer 2001: 157). In this regard Waltz (1979: 197) argues as well that it is hard for states to achieve collective actions for several reasons. First, common projects may not be undertaken because the cooperation of recalcitrant states is difficult to secure. Second, it is difficult to organize for the coercion of the uncooperative participants and for collecting payments from free riders-states.

When cooperation is worth of a try?

Despite a strong emphasis on self-help, neorealist theoreticians do not preclude states from cooperative efforts (Mearsheimer 2001: 33; Waltz 1979: 166). Given the standard structural-realist argument that war is always a possibility, Walt (1991: 225), for example, expects neorealist theories to be also interested in devising ways to ensure that it does not occur, and suggests that cooperation may also be a realistic response to anarchy. Snyder (1996: 184) believes that “in general, the grater the threat from the adversary and the fewer and less desirable the alternatives”, the more the allies will rely on each other’s support. The alternative ways of meeting the threat might be other allies, increased military preparedness, or appeasement of opponent or military actions against him. In his work Glaser (1996: 125) considers cooperation as an important type of self-help. According to his asserts, the strong general propensity for adversaries to compete is not an inevitable logical consequence of neorealist assumption, and that “under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals trough cooperative policies” (ibid. 1996: 123). I support the argument that neorealism might predict states cooperative behavior, should the conditions for it prevail. Therefore, I review briefly the neorealist understanding of alliance formation in order to specify a set of conditions under which defensive and offensive realism expects states to cooperate.

Both Waltz (1979: 98, 131) and Mearsheimer (2001: 155, 212) approach the problem of alliance formation from focal point of dynamic of change in distribution of power among states in the international system. First, Waltz arguers that states form alliances to counter rising great powers which by virtue of their increasing capabilities alone threaten the existing balance of power. Waltz makes it explicitly clear that in anarchy where units are differentiated neither in their function nor in their intentions, an excessive accumulation of capabilities equals threat, because it is expected that if a state possesses capability to change the balance of power in its favor, it will try to do it. Thus, alliance-forming reaction is one

of the defensive responses to security threat posed by the imbalanced capabilities. With the reference to historical records Mearsheimer (2001: 345) also writes that balancing coalitions formed to defeat aspiring hegemons. With balancing, a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power. Mearsheimer underlines, that the initial goal of alliance formation is to deter the aggressor, but if that attempt fails, the balancing states will fight the war. Second, states cooperate with others, if their relative power position is falling behind and threatens to put their security in jeopardy (Waltz 1979: 126). Within neorealism especially powerful and highly aggressive states are always difficult to contain. The possession of nuclear weapons makes “the worries of lesser nuclear power incredibly greater” (ibid.: 181). Therefore, to deal with these aggressors less powerful states sometimes have no choice but to balance against the threat in order to deter wars in which they would be likely victims (Mearsheimer 2001: 49, 155). Both Waltz (1979: 196) and Mearsheimer (2001: 156) allow for assumption that war and the risk of war might turn to be more painful to bear than the costs of alliance formation, even if it takes time and managerial functions are badly performed.

Evaluating alliance formation and intra-alliance behavior, Waltz in line with Mearsheimer argues that a state may opt to ally itself against the threat or in support of it. The state may as well neither opt for any alliance nor look for compromise solution. Generally, if pressures are strong enough, structural realism predicts that states will deal with almost anyone who might help them (Waltz 1979: 126, 166). Mearsheimer (2001: 156) points to considerable importance for the threatened states to find alliance partners. On the one hand, the costs of checking an aggressor are shared in an alliance, especially when war breaks out. On the other hand, recruiting allies increases the amount of firepower and improves chance for deterrence. Specifically, within neorealism secondary states, if they are free to choose, are expected, first, to prefer cooperation with “the weaker side” (Waltz 1979: 127) and to “ally with minor power” (Mearsheimer 2001: 156), because it is the

strongest side that threatens them. According to Waltz (1979: 127), on the weaker side states are safer, given, that the coalition they join achieves enough deterrent strength to dissuade adversary from attacking. He also stressed that balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of winning coalition at the mercy of the strongest ones. Therefore, great powers opt for the weaker allies, because none of them wants one of the alliance numbers to emerge as the leader (ibid.: 126). Second, allies should have not all but one of their interests in common: fear of other states (Waltz 1979: 166; Mearsheimer 2001: 53) and direct responsibility to prevent aggression (Waltz 1979: 126; Mearsheimer 2001: 155). Within neorealism the interest of allies and ways to secure them are never identical, and do not provide sufficient grounds for predicting behavior. Instead, in self-help systems external forces propel the weaker parties towards one another in order “to combine to offset the strength of the stronger” (Waltz 1979: 202). In this sense, alliance strategies always represent compromise between great powers which cooperate to contain common powerful enemies.

In general terms, Waltz identifies alliances as external balancing against a common dangerous opponent. States use the alliance formation as defensive means to survival in the situation, when internal balancing, defined as unilateral arms build up, is the worst choice for them. Waltz does not expect that the strong states combine their capabilities in order to increase the extent of their power over others, but rather to assume a fighting stance and assure survival (Waltz 1979: 126). In line with Waltz Mearsheimer describes alliances as a defensive means and argues that only minor states apply external balancing in regional context. Contrary to Waltz, Mearsheimer assumes that alliance formation might be used for power-maximization goals, but war alliances or aggression alliances are omitted in his theory. Rather he defines balancing as the principle one for preserving the status quo (Mearsheimer 2001: 49, 156).

However, there is a general consensus on that international cooperation takes place between states of concern when the following four conditions occur:

- 1) There is a rising power that may dominate an international system.
- 2) The states of concern fail to keep up with their powerful adversary in terms of relative power.
- 3) The potential ally is weaker and more vulnerable than states of concern.
- 4) The states of concern and their potential ally have one shared interest: they fear common adversary and are responsible to deter its aggression.

An important issue that neorealist theories address is whether the destabilizing conditions are manageable better in multipolar or bipolar systems (Waltz 1988: 620). In the system of several great powers the power-politics turns on the diplomacy in order to build, maintain, and disrupt alliances, where diplomacy represents an uncertain process (Mearsheimer 2001: 342). The most basic criteria of 'alliances' is a joining together in common negative interest. Since alliance members are free to choose partners or to defect, states' option is limited to the strategy that pleases potential allies and satisfies present partners. Divergence from the previous alignment agreements comes when positive interests are at stake. Instead, in a two-power competition a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for other. Therefore, in a bipolar world leaders are free to set policy without acceding to the wishes of lesser alliance members. By the same logic, the latter are free not to follow the policy that has been set and may enjoy the freedom of the irresponsible since their security is mainly provided by the efforts that others make (Waltz 1979: 185). In a bipolar system one of the leading powers may drive for hegemony or may seek to enlarge the circle of great powers by

promoting the amalgamation of some of the middle states (ibid.: 199). In general, neorealists expect that the states of far-reaching economic importance and the states, which threaten to explode in military violence, will provide some regulation of military, political and economic affairs at times when management is badly needed. In addition, Mearsheimer (2001: 272) introduces geography as a factor that shows which state in coalition will take a responsibility for prevention of aggression. In this regard, the question of whether the threatened state shares a border with the aggressor is crucial. According to Mearsheimer, common borders promote balancing because on the one hand common frontiers provide threatened state with direct access to the territory of the rival. On the other hand, great powers that share a border with an aggressor are likely to feel particularly vulnerable to attack, and thus, they are more likely to take responsibility and balance against their dangerous foe. To sum up, within neorealism whether cooperation succeeds or fails depends on external situation and the balance-of power logic.

Points of disagreement between defensive realism and offensive realism

In general, neorealists agree that a relative gains problem and a danger of cheating prevent states from close cooperation but do not preclude them from being engaged in cooperative efforts, if conditions for it prevail. However, Waltz admits that the problems of securing payments for and participation in collective tasks can be solved, when the number of great powers tends to be smaller and the disparities between the few most powerful states and the many others tends to be wider. For instance, if in alliances among equal states the defection of one member threatens the security of others; in the alliances among the unequals alliance leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their followers (Waltz 1988: 621). In alliances among unequal states the contributions of the lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively small importance. The narrow concentration of power implies lessened interdependence and gives to the small number of states at the top of the

pyramid of power both a large interest in exercising control and a greater ability to do so (Waltz 1979: 209). In the absence of authoritative regulations, loose ties and certain amount of control exercised by large states help to promote peace and stability. This is due to the fact that the most powerful states are more likely to act for the sake of the system and to interfere in the affair of lesser states. Admitting, however, that international structure emphasizes adjustment rather than control, he believes, nevertheless, that in giving some help great powers do gain some control and influence the political-military strategies that others follow (ibid.: 197, 207). Waltz argues that to preserve the system, at least one powerful state must do what the moment requires, namely: overcome the conflict of present interests in order to add its weight to the side of the peaceful (ibid.: 164). It is important to mention here, that Mearsheimer does not agree with Waltz on this point. First, Mearsheimer (2001: 33) claims that states almost always act according to their own self-interests and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or of international community. Second, from an offensive realist view, great powers do not work together to manage the system and promote peaceful world order for its own sake. Instead, each seeks to maximize its own share of world power, which is in conflict with the goal of creating and sustaining stable international order. Mearsheimer reminds that within offensive realism states behavior is driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power, not by a commitment to build a world order independent of states' own interests (ibid.: 49). Although he admits that great-power rivalry does sometimes produce a stable international order, nevertheless, within offensive realism the great powers are expected to continue looking for opportunities to increase their share of world power, and if a favorable situation arises, to move to undermine that stable order (ibid.: 50). Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another states, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor (ibid. 2001: 3). In this sense, alliances as nothing more than "temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy,

might become tomorrow's partner" (ibid.: 33). Waltz (1979: 98) makes the same point when he describes alliances as "relations that form and dissolve". Yet, although he argues that alliance formation is not a structural property, he claims that it may reduce significantly the negative consequences of the systematic factors. This helps elucidate the competing nature of defensive realism and offensive realism. I will now present in detail the logic of each approach's expectations with regard to great powers' foreign behavior. Defensive realism expects that great powers, wishing to survive and in their quest for security, will behave as "responsible" in ways that tend towards creation balance of power through explicit cooperation at the regional level or by the internal build up. According to the offensive realism perspective, great power, wishing to maximize their power and seeking hegemony, will embark on expansionist foreign policy.

In sum, there are two structural-realist arguments against international cooperation among states. First, a relative-gains problem, which is considered to be especially severe in the realm of security, makes alliance formation difficult. Second, a danger of being cheated prevents states from close cooperation. Generally, neorealists believe that no amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition. Defensive realism, like offensive realism, considers international cooperation as possible under the same set of the external to states conditions. In contrast to the defensive perspective, however, offensive approach highlights a state self-interest in maximizing its own share of power as a motive for states cooperative behavior. The defensive realist predictions differ from offensive realism by focusing on the states' quest for security, rather than their drive for power maximization; in other words, defensive rather than offensive states motivations.

2.3 Neorealism as theory of foreign policy analysis

2.3.1 Neorealist model of a state's foreign policy behavior

Generally, the main difference between an International Relations theory and a theory of foreign policy analysis lies in it that the former emphasizes the role and influence of structural constraints on a state behavior, while the latter focuses on the possibilities of human agency to affect the international system. In regard to neorealism it is important to notice that the theory does allow for the agency of states' leaders and thinks of causes running in two directions, not only from the structure to the units, but also from interacting state to the outcomes their interactions produce. However, within neorealism the behavior of leaders is affected by the presence of structural pressures and the clarity of challenges (Waltz 1979: 176; Mearsheimer 2001: 168-169). Despite the fact that Waltz excludes the possibility for neorealist theories to be used for the purpose of foreign policy analysis, the theory is still based on the assumptions about states (Waltz 1979: 118) and the main argument of Waltz' *Theory of International Politics* as well as of Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* still refers to a state's foreign behavior. Thus, Waltz (1979: 134) writes that states, especially the big ones, on the one hand, are limited by their situations, and on the other hand, other states are able to act to affect them. Moreover, states have to react to the actions of others whose actions may be changed by their reaction. Significantly, the outcome remains necessary uncertain, because although both the situation and the actors exercise influence, neither controls. By assumption, within defensive realism states strive to secure their survival as a prerequisite to the achievement of other ends. In this sense, the balancing behavior is induced by the system and states' main concern is about maintaining their power position. Similarly, Mearsheimer (2001: 31) assumes that states are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of other states, and how behavior of other states is likely to

affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long terms as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. Contrary to defensive realism, Mearsheimer strongly emphasizes the quest of states for maximization of power, because only hegemony may give survival guarantees. In this regards, the motivation premises of the hegemonic approach of offensive realism directly contradict those of the balance-of-power perspectives of defensive realism. This controversies highlight the richness of the neorealist approaches to the behavior of states, by showing that international structure constrains do not determine states' foreign behavior and outcomes, rather systems may be either maintained or transformed by the actions of states (Waltz 1979: 199). In a sense, neorealism gives an insight into interaction between unit-level causes and structural causes (Waltz 1986: 343). As a theory of international relations it focuses its attention not only on structure of system, but also on the possibilities of states agency to affect and even change it, exactly as theories of foreign policy do. Furthermore, the focus on motivations, which is considered to be an unavoidable component of foreign policy analysis (Martin 2003: 71), is an integral part of the both defensive realism and defensive realism. Thus, the most important contribution of neorealist foreign policy analysis to neorealist international relations theory would be to define the point of theoretical interaction between structure and behavior of states.

Starting point for both neorealism as a theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis as a field is a state and its interaction with other states. In keeping with the neorealist logic in particular, all states' foreign policies conform to a set of the four parameters that scholars need to investigate in order to understand the outcome of foreign policy. Specifically, from a neorealist point of view:

1) Conditions of the international system encourage certain foreign policy behavior. Within neorealism differences in states behavior are not derived from differences in their internal composition.

2) Power is the key determinate of the state's ability to sustain a successful foreign policy. Neorealism excludes from its analyses the personality and role of the individual decision makers as well as the process of decision making itself.

3) Security is what states want. Their single goal is to survive. When theorizing about international behavior neorealists downplay the economic element, because in a quest for security various decisions may be made that do not maximize wealth (Kirshner 1998: 66).

4) Structures cause actions to have consequences states were not intended to have. Neorealism does not impose requirements on a foreign policy decision making to be rational, but rather to be loss averse.

The above criteria might be summarized in quite a simple model of a state's foreign behavior, which the neorealist assertion provides. The logic behind these parameters goes as follows. Having examined its security requirements, a state tries to meet them. Yet, the effective foreign policy course heavily depends on the ability of state to provide necessary means in terms of power, and most significantly, on the existence of conditions in terms of distribution of power in the international system that permit a country to follow the chosen policy (Waltz 1986: 106). Conceptually formulated, a state relative power position affects its security needs, and then the security needs clearly defined affect state foreign policy. Separate propositions can be formulated and tested about the relation between relative power position and security needs, security needs and foreign policy, and between relative

power position and foreign policy. Hence, if it is possible that concept of power has an effect on a state foreign policy, then an ‘intervening’ or ‘mediating’ concept of security links the independent and the dependent concept in a proposition and is necessary for the causal relation between the independent and the dependent concept to exist.

While the task of this thesis is to show that neorealism has some predictive power about foreign policy of nations, the ultimate test is to prove which of its strands – defensive realism or offensive realism, provides better account for the actual behavior of states. According to Waltz (1979: 118), theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain. Defensive realism claims to explain the results of states’ behavior, under given conditions and the conditions themselves. Specifically, a problem of this research seen in consideration of the theory is to say how the great powers’ possibility of constructive management of international affairs varies with some changes in the balance of power (Waltz 1979: 210). Defensive realism is built up from the assumed motivations of states and corresponding actions. It posits that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security. The term ‘security’ implies the minimum power necessary to survive. Although Waltz admits that states may be motivated by power-maximization, he assumes that this goal must be pursued safely and only if survival is assured (Schweller 1996: 103). In its stress on maximizing security defensive realism views the world through the lens of status-quo states. According to Waltz (1979: 123) security-maximization approach gains plausibility if similarities of behavior are observed across the realms that are different in substance but similar in structure, and if differences in behavior are observed where realms are similar in substance but different in structure. Given the difficulty of testing theory in such non-experimental field as international politics, Waltz recommends to compare features of the real world to those of theoretical framework. He points also that the theory becomes plausible if many hypotheses inferred from it are successfully subjected to test (ibid.: 124). Moreover, one should seek confirmation through observation of difficult cases,

for instance, of alliance formation, even though states have strong reasons not to cooperate with each other (ibid.: 125).

For Mearsheimer (2001), offensive realism is ultimately persuasive, if there is substantial evidence that great powers think and act as the theory predicts. One must demonstrate, first, that the history of great powers politics involves primarily the clashing of revisionist states, and second, that the only status quo powers that appear in the story are regional hegemons, i.e. states that have achieved the pinnacle of power (ibid.: 168). Yet, Mearsheimer (ibid.: 169) admits that demonstrating that the international system is populated by revisionist powers is not a simple matter. Third, the evidence must show that states look for opportunities to gain power and take advantages of it then arise. Fourth, it must be also shown that great powers do not practice self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift the balance of power in their favor, and fifth, that states still go on a quest for power even if they have a lot of it. Powerful states should seek regional hegemony whenever the possibility arises. Finally, there should be little evidence of policy makers saying that they are satisfied with their share of world power when they have the capability to gain more. Indeed, one should almost always find leaders motivated by the desire to gain more power to enhance their states' prospects to survival (ibid.: 168-169). However, Mearsheimer defines power-maximization in such a way that it becomes indistinguishable from security-maximization, for instance, when he equates hegemony with ultimate form of security (ibid.: 345).

In sum, a list of important steps to be taken towards neorealist foreign policy analysis might be represented as follows: first, look how power is distributed in the international system; second, examine a state's security requirements with reference to the power constellation in the international system; and third, calculate an appropriate state action in

accordance with the theory-specific motives for state foreign behavior with reference to defensive realism and offensive realism respectively.

However, the above model indicates that neorealism simplifies highly complex political phenomena. The main criticism that can be raised against neorealist theory of foreign policy lies in the theory's strong emphasis on the international structure. First, neorealism investigates how structure influences the behavior of states, but ignores a variety of non-structural factors such as domestic politics or normative commitments. In this regard, Waltz (1979: 65) makes a point that it is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. He refers to the history of international relations that provides examples of results being achieved, but seldom achieved in correspondence with the intentions of actors. This is due to the fact that causes of results are not found in the individual characteristics of states. Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal possession, but its decisions are shaped by very presence of other states as well as interactions with them. To keep this issue clear, neorealism explains the external constraints that confine all states. What matters for the theory most is how much relative power the states of the international system possess at the time (Mearsheimer 2001: 10-11), because in consideration of the theory, there can be no other way, if states do care about their survival (*ibid.*: 335). Second, neorealist approach to foreign policy is oriented toward the most powerful states. It does not say much about relationship of small states to other great powers, or to other small states in either a bipolar or multipolar world. The system-level theory considers system-level threats and therefore exigencies connected with lesser unit-level threats and responses are not of concern to neorealism (Waltz 1979: 72-73). Third, although both defensive and offensive realism recognizes that great powers might pursue non-security goals as long as this behavior does not conflict with balance-of-power logic, both authors Waltz and Mearsheimer avoid unfeasible assumptions about and answers to the questions that are not relevant to power political considerations. Waltz

(1979: 121) specifies the boundaries of the domain, for which the propositions of the neorealism are believed to be true as follows: “balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order is anarchic and that it is populated by units wishing to survive”. Thus, according to Waltz, even if neorealism is able indeed to explain some matters of foreign policy, it leaves much of the policy making aside (Waltz 1996: 54). Moreover, a theory of foreign policy is expected to make determinate predictions for dependent variable by answering the question: what a state will do under the particular circumstances (Elman 1996: 12). Neorealism does offer answer to this question by reference to the placement of units in the international system. However, its predictions remain indeterminate, because foreign policy outcome within realist theories is necessary uncertain (Waltz 1979: 124). As Mearsheimer (2001: 11) puts it, neorealism is a prescriptive theory that gives directions, and not deterministic theory with an inevitable consequence of antecedent sufficient causes. It expects that states should behave in the predicted way. Given these limitations, both defensive and offensive realist theoreticians abandon any thought of being a universally applicable research programme. Yet, the strength of the neorealist approach lies in its sense of the impact of external conditions on great powers behavior. The theory helps to understand differences in states foreign policy behavior at the international level, by answering a question of how variation in conditions external to states constrains them from taking certain actions and disposes them towards taking others.

2.3.2 Neorealist model of decision making and prospect theory

Neorealism is a third-image theory⁴. It explains a state’s behavior with reference to constraints imposed by the international system. Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that

⁴ Third-image realism emphasizes the impact of the structure of the international system on a state behavior, while second-image realism points to the importance of domestic institutions, politics, and culture. The first-image realism sees the source of international anarchy and instability in the sinful nature of man.

within realist theories predictions are simply derived in one direction, from structure to states, because states' actions are not determined by structure. Rather, neorealism emphasizes that causation runs from structure to states and from states to structure (Waltz 1997: 913; 915). In doing so, neorealist theory sees states both forming structure by their interactions and being affected by the structure resulted from their interactions. The difficulty with the theory application to analysis of foreign policy lies in it that the neorealism views states as "black boxes" – it focuses on state's observable behavior, not their type of government, the quality of their decision making or particular features of their leaders, as for example, the second- and first-image realist theories do (Glaser 1996: 127). Furthermore, as a result of the neorealist strong belief that a prudent state's behavior responds to external constraints tracing process of the decision making becomes impossible (Elman 1996: 16-17). Moreover, neorealism falls outside the standard rationalist view of decision making with reference to expected utility approach. First, in the expected utility framework, the utilities of outcomes are weight according to their subjective probability, while in the neorealist theory, states behavior is determined by the mere possibility of conflict that contradicts the expected utility logic (Brooks 1997: 454). Second, following expected utility reasoning, actors weight their preferences according to the probability of getting a certain outcome. In contrary, neorealist theory emphasizes that the outcome of the application of one's capabilities in the process is necessary uncertain (Waltz 1979: 191; Merasheimer 2001: 58). Third, the expected utility principle asserts, that in their choice between risky options decision makers choose the option with the highest weighted sum, whereas in the neorealist perspective actors value a gain less than they fear a loss of equal size (Brooks 1997: 454). It means they will be willing to pay far more to reduce the risk of a catastrophic loss from .10 to 0 than from .20 to .10, even though the change in expected utility is the same (Levy 1992). Fourth, in the neorealist world actors overvalue small probabilities of conflict and undervalue large probabilities of other gains. Finally, unlike rational choice, neorealist theory allows for "the transience of preferences" actors

may have depending on the situation in which they find themselves (Fuhrmann and Early 2008: 31). As Waltz (1979: 134) puts it, “each state chooses its relations to its situation”.

In this study I rely on suggestion that neorealist logic of decision making better fits prospect theory than expected utility framework (Brooks 1997, Levy 2003). Prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979) uses insights from behavioral economics to explain decision making under risk. It attempts to incorporate the observed violations of expected utility into an alternative theory of risky choice. The theory best known predictions are, first, that most actors are risk-averse to secure gains, but risk-acceptant to avoid losses; second, that actors treat highly possible, but uncertain outcomes as if they were in fact certain (Kahneman and Tversky 1986: 268). The third prediction is that, frame held by actors at the time they make their decisions is composed by observable external conditions and plays an operative role in the choices actors will ultimately make (Fuhrmann and Early 2008: 31-32). The propositions of prospect theory that actors are dominated by loss aversion and that they will exaggerate rare and dramatic events run parallel to the neorealist view on state behavior. In accordance with Waltz (1979: 205) and Wolfers (1952: 497), states that enjoy a margin of power over their closest rivals are led to pay undue attention to minor danger, because an attack must be feared as a possibility, even though the intention to launch it cannot be considered to have crystallized to the point where nothing could change it. Diplomatic and military moves must at times be carefully planned lest the survival of the state be in jeopardy. Furthermore, the appropriate state action must be calculated according to situation in which the state finds itself. It means that great powers have always to allow for the reaction of others and choose their own relations to the situation (Waltz 1979: 134). Although within offensive realism “great powers are primed for offense” (Mearsheimer 2001: 3), they are not characterized as mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing war. On the contrary, before great powers take offensive claim, they think carefully about the balance of

power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weight the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait a more propitious moment (ibid.: 37). A scared state will look especially hard for ways to enhance its security, and it will be concentrated on pursuit of risky policies to achieve that end (ibid.: 42).

Since neither process tracing method, nor expected utility framework is suited for neorealist analysis of a state foreign behavior, I support an argument that the mentioned above key components of prospect theory may be used as central organizing elements to structure neorealist analysis of states decision making on foreign policy issues. In this research I will not debate the empirical validity of prospect theory. Over the last decades international relations scholars (see, for example, Jervis 1991; Levy 1992) have applied the concepts of loss aversion and varying risk attitude to a state foreign behavior and analyzed their contribution for the field of international relations. Rather, I proceed with introductory summary to decision making model of prospect theory for the field of international relations and discuss its application to the case at hand later in this section. Before starting, however, a couple of caveats should be made. Most importantly, prospect theory is a descriptive theory of decision making under conditions of risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and uncertainty (Quattrone and Tversky 1988), which is largely responsible for the field of behavioral economics. In this regard, I argue that it is not possible within neorealism to estimate foreign policy goals in terms of money or some measurably commodities with which prospect theory operates. For instance, within neorealism, security as a policy goal includes elements that could not be calculated with respect to quantity. No metric exists that can be applied directly to fear and threat. Rather, I refer to the economic conception of actors' attitude to risk. By the economic definition, for a given decision actor's risk attitude can change depending on arbitrary aspects of the situation in which the decision is made (O'Neill 2001). This way of conceptualization corresponds to a

neorealist approach to a state foreign policy in a sense that risk attitude is determined by existing conditions, and not by personality of decision maker or the discrete components of a decision making process. Furthermore, it should be stipulated, that prospect theory is a theory of individual choice, not a general theory of politics. Nevertheless, given that structural realism draws its inspiration partly from economic theory (Waltz 1996: 55) and that it regards states as unitary actors, I argue that introducing prospect theory elements into neorealist foreign policy analysis is not entirely unreasonable.

In general terms, prospect theory describes decision making as a two-stage process. At the initial 'editing' phase actors identify the reference point, the available options, the possible outcomes and the value and possibility of each of them (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 174, 284-285). Then, at the second 'evaluation' stage actors assess the value of each of the options and choose one in terms of deviation from a reference point or aspiration level (Levy 1992: 174). In particular, it is important to underline that prospect theory represents a formal model of the evaluation of prospects, not a theory of their editing (Levy 1996: 186). It is important to stress, that within prospect theory actors tend to think of gains and losses in terms of deviations from a reference point. The reference point is usually the status quo, but one can also speak of deviations from an aspiration level or some other reference point which is not equivalent to the status quo (Levy 1992: 174). How actors frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices (Levy 1996: 179). For instance, after a gain is made, actors evaluate future gains and losses based on their newly acquired reference point; after a loss occurs, however, they continue to evaluate future gains and losses based on the former reference point. At the same time, actors treat gains and losses differently: they are risk-averse in respect to gains and risk-acceptant in respect to losses. Specifically, prospect theory suggests that decision makers are risk-averse when presented with gains and are more likely to be risk-acceptant after experiencing losses (Fuhrmann and Early 2008: 23). In other words, "if leaders act from a

secure position, the decision is likely to be more cautious; if the decision results from a more desperate place, the choice is more likely to be risky in nature” (McDermott and Kugler 2001: 51).

In the realm of international relations, if a state has recently suffered a loss of territory, it will presumably continue to define its reference point as the status quo ex ante, see the current status quo as a certain loss, and adopt risk-seeking strategies to recover those losses. Instead, state gaining the territory will usually renormalize its reference point, adjusted to the new status quo, and engage in risk-seeking strategies to defend it against loss. Particularly, prospect theory would expect states to behave offensively through engagement in wars and other conflicts, if they are more strongly and more commonly motivated by the desire to avoid perceived losses than by hope of making gains. It is assumed that states are more often pushed into offense, first, if the status quo is unsatisfactory; and second, if they fear that the alternative to preventive military actions is a serious deterioration in their power position. In this regard, loss aversion logic implies that a statesman will decide to run a significant risk of war, if he or she thinks the alternative options is certain deterioration in a state’s security. In contrary, in the situation when the status quo is at least tolerable, states would prefer to act defensively. They would tend to preserve existing balance of power rather than running a significant risk of greater loss that offense would bring. In terms of loss aversion, a statesman would not be willing opt for the war, if he or she believed that status quo could be maintained or even improved by other alternative to war policy (Jervis 1992: 193-194).

2.3.3 Neorealist competing theoretical predictions

Generally I have by this review of defensive realism and offensive realism shown that these two approaches within neorealist school of thought generate different predictions concerning state behavior. Although, the competing expectations with regard to state

foreign behavior are based on the same core assumptions, defensive realism sets apart from offensive realism, when appealing to different motives for state foreign behavior. Defensive realism holds that states have a single motive – the wish to survive, and the goal they are encouraged to seek by the system is security. In this sense, they are interested in self-preservation and maintaining the status quo is their minimum aim. Using this logic defensive realism predicts that states behave towards the creation of balance of power. Despite the common affiliation with the neorealist school, the premises of offensive realism directly contradict those of defensive realism. Within offensive realism, motivational force for states behavior lies in their preoccupation with getting as much power as possible, and thus, states almost always have revisionist intentions. This is an important within offensive realism assumptions that great powers are rarely content with current status quo and hegemony is their ultimate goal. Only if a state achieves the dominant position, it becomes a status quo power. In sum, focusing on the different motives for state behavior, the power-based theories yield different predictions. First, the defensive realist logic suggest that under the conditions a state motivated by desire to survive would tend to preserve a current status quo in the international system and avoid offense. In a quest for security, statesmen would tend to self-preservation through balancing. Second, from the offensive realist logic follows that under the conditions, a state motivated by power maximization would tend to abrupt the current status quo by a means of offense. In a quest for hegemony, statesmen would tend to opt for self-extension through more risky policy.

With regard to this clear differentiation I can therefore conclude that defensive realism and offensive realism are eligible to meet the challenge of being tested empirically in order to evaluate each approach's explanatory power. Generally speaking, testing theories always means inferring expectations or hypotheses from them and testing those expectations against evidence (Waltz 1979: 123). Given the difficulty of theory testing in such non-

experimental fields as international relations, the comparisons will be made between the real world evidence and theoretical predictions about state behavior within the similar and different conditions of international structure (ibid.: 125). I seek to examine the validity of neorealist competing theories with reference to correctness of their expectations about the foreign behavior of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the European Economic Community enlargement. I choose a discrete historical period from 1961 to 1979, because it allows for feasible control of how well particular foreign policy acts were predicted by competing theories of a broader theoretical framework. From the outlined by Waltz and Mearsheimer specific strategic options available to states, it is possible to deduce specific hypotheses about Germany's likely foreign policy behavior towards the EEC enlargement given the distribution of power at the both global level and regional level with regard to the perceived threat .

Thus, this research is design to examine the following neorealist hypotheses about German enlargement policy:

Hypothesis 1: Defensive realism predicts that states will tend to respond to structural incentives as security maximisers:

German foreign behavior is motivated by the desire to maximize its security in order to survive. Under the conditions this logic predicts that it will tend to preserve the international system and avoid military disaster. German leaders will seek to do both to guarantee security and to maintain Germany's position in the international system by means of balancing through enlargement of EEC cooperative effort to a candidate country.

From a defensive realism perspective, states cooperate with others, if their relative power position is falling behind and threatens to put their security in jeopardy (Waltz 1979: 126). To preserve the system, at least one powerful state must do what the moment requires, namely: overcome the conflict of present interests in order to add its weight to the side of the peaceful (ibid.: 164).

Hypothesis 2: Offensive realism predicts that states will tend to respond to structural incentives as power maximisers:

German foreign behavior is motivated by the desire to maximize its power in order to survive. Under the conditions this logic predicts that it will tend to change balance of power in the international system and adopt aggressive or force-prone behavior. German leaders will seek to do both to embark on expansionist foreign policy and to gain the position of regional hegemon by means of reunification if the balance of power favors Germany. Wishing to maximize its power and seeking superiority in the region, Germany will forgo enlargement of EEC cooperative effort to a candidate country in favor of German reunification.

From an offensive realism perspective, states almost always act according to their own self-interests and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or of international community (Mearsheimer 2001: 33). Great powers do not work together to manage the system and promote peaceful world order for its own sake. Within offensive realism states behavior is driven largely by narrow calculations about relative power, not by a commitment to build a world order (ibid.: 49).

It is important to notice that neither Waltz nor Mearsheimer makes any attempt to clarify under which conditions states choose between various strategies. Nevertheless, a strong

emphasis on the strategic calculus of security maximization versus power maximization makes clear that under same conditions differently motivated states are expected to act differently in accordance with the prediction made by the competing neorealist theories. In this regard, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the European Economic Community enlargement is a good empirical example of how the logic of prospect theory contributes to neorealist foreign policy analysis. Prospect theory predicts that in a period under consideration (1961-1979) German leaders framed their reference point around an aspiration level defined by Germany's peaceful reunification they hope to implement, saw themselves in the domain of losses that would only deteriorate with the rising Soviet power and decided for risk-seeking policy to eliminate that losses either by the means of the European Economic Community enlargement, as defensive realism expects, or by the means of reunification as offensive realism predicts.

Hypothesis 3: Prospect theory hypothesis for defensive realism may be formulated as follows:

At the risk of enlarging the European Community, when German dues to provide security guarantees will be paid, but it won't reintegrate its Eastern territory, and despite the fear that the other states will cheat on the agreement and gain relative advantage, the decision makers were willing to support applicant countries membership, if there were international conditions that shift decision makers' frame from tolerable to deteriorating the state's security. The risk of enlargement was accepted, because the Soviet threat to Germany was perceived more intensely than the other side of the equation.

Hypothesis 4: Prospect theory hypothesis for offensive realism is:

Given the choice between a dead loss due to the decreased power capabilities of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis a rising power of the Soviet Union (for sure), or a loss in security due to the reunification (with a chance of success in returning to its reference point and reintegrating German eastern territory), German leaders gambled on the reunification policy losses. Prospect theory contents that when faced with accepting otherwise certain losses, decision makers will be more willing to choose risky options that could worsen their situation if even just a small chance exists to prevent such losses (Berejikian 1997: 793).

In sum, only if a continuation of the status quo was intolerable, it was worth gambling on a risky policy either to an end of self-preservation in order to reduce a level of the external threats, as defensive realism predicts, or to the end of self-expansion in order to regain German share of world power, as offensive realism expects.

For these predictions to hold true, the evidence of a shift in observable external conditions, in which German leaders make their decision, needs to be provided.

Unlike Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), which classify motives for actors' behavior among antecedent conditions, and for which there is no formal difference between motivational and causal explanation, neorealist theoreticians (see, for example, Waltz 1997: 914) consider motives from which states act as having little causal effect. Waltz (1979: 91) omits leaders' motivations as causal variable for international outcomes, except for the minimal assumption that states seek to survive (Elman 2008: 18). Mearsheimer disagrees with Waltz on the last point, but not on his notion that there is only minimal causal accounting for motives. From a neorealist point of view, motives have little to do with the consequences

of states actions (Waltz 1997: 914), and there is a gap between what states want and what states get (Elman 2008: 19). Rather, states' motivations are considered to be embedded into the theories' exclusive categories of power and security. Thus, Mearsheimer (2001: 36) sets out to show that states are motivated by relative power concerns, because security requires acquiring as much power compared to other states as possible. Drawing from the neorealist different ideas about states' prime motives, I am able to make different predictions about Germany's foreign policy using the same explanatory variables. For purpose of this research, I refrain from elaborating on neorealist assumptions about motives as additional variable, because it would change the theories subjected to a test in this thesis, turning them into new theories that have to be evaluated on their own right (Waltz 1997: 916).

2.4 Conclusion

Summing up, the review was conducted in seven parts. First, as the point of departure of this chapter the neorealist core assumptions were presented. Second, the chapter set out to discuss the neorealist key concept of power by presenting a two-step-means to characterize power, firstly, by defining the components of power, and secondly, by identifying power's capacity to effect a change in the foreign behavior of a state. The question of differences in approaches to power within defensive realism and offensive realism was addressed. Third, the concept of security as a 'mediating' factor between power and states foreign behavior within neorealist analytical framework was introduced. This section focused precisely on the different ways in which states pursue a goal of security within defensive realism and offensive realism. Fourth, a review of similar and distinguishably different neorealist perspectives concerning great powers cooperative behavior was conducted. Thus, I have presented the means to enable empirical test of each of the neorealist theories. Fifth, from the overview of neorealist exclusive concepts of power, security and cooperation a simple model of a state's foreign policy behavior has been drawn. Sixth, prospect theory

was suggested as a potentially useful means to a structural explanation of logic of the neorealist decision making. Seventhly, from the logic of competing neorealist approaches of the same theoretical paradigm predictions regarding Germany's foreign policy towards the European Community enlargement in the period under investigation were generated.

After this theory's review it is now possible to test the neorealist competing predictions and to conclude which of the neorealist approaches has most potential in relation to applicability in studies of foreign policy analysis. Both defensive realism's and offensive realism's predictions about a state foreign behavior will be tested against historical evidence, which are expected to confirm one theory and at the same time undermine explanatory power of other theory.

CHAPTER THREE:

CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS APPROACH AND SINGLE- CASE STUDY

This chapter assesses the strength and limitations of congruence analysis application for the case under investigation. The chapter begins by defining and describing the way that congruence analysis draws inference. The second section charts the development of a theory-centered approach in the field of the political methodology. Third, I describe in formal terms why the congruence analysis is valuable for addressing a broader theoretical discourse. Fourth, I discuss three methodological challenges that the congruence analysis frequently confronts: research method, problem of case selection and measurement validity, showing the design application of each. Finally, I review two methodological issues that arise commonly with the congruence analysis: concepts and generalization. The chapter concludes by describing the way in which the congruence analysis is used to draw inferences about the relevance of the neorealist theories to the case of Germany's EEC enlargement policy.

3.1 Definition of congruence analysis

Congruence analysis is a strongly theory-centered approach that states congruence between predictions deduced from theories and empirical observations within one or few cases.

Congruence is understood as correspondence between predicted and observed value of dependent variable. The term 'prediction' is directly related to deductive conclusion about a broader range of expectations derived from the theories for the case studies (Blatter and Blume 2008: 325). This wide-range prospect differentiates the congruence analysis from the mainstream of quantitative research, where predictions are made exclusively for the value of dependent variable (given the value of independent variable). Deduction in the congruence analysis is not limited to the expected co-variation between dependent and independent variable. Theories are supposed to be conceptually rich and open to complex conceptualizations of the dependent and independent variables. Researches have to go beyond the simple predictions of causal relationships between a factor and an outcome (Blatter and Blume 2008). Deductive analysis should include assumptions about the fundamental elements of the theory's research programme, which in accordance with Lakatos (1970), is traditionally characterized by four elements: (1) a hard core of unchanging, privileged knowledge; (2) a negative heuristic, which not allow for direct challenging to these knowledge; (3) a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, which get adjusted or replaced in order to protect the core; (4) a positive heuristic, which "guides the prediction" being derived from a specific theories within the programme.

Congruence inference does not apply an exhaustive search for a precise correspondence between the hypothesized value of dependent variable and empirical evidence. Instead, it uses a broad set of predictions and observations. As a consequence, complete theory falsification is not achievable, and the null hypothesis (H0) does not play any meaningful role (Blatter and Blume 2008). The preconditions for this kind of inference are the plurality of full-fledged and coherent theories, and the diversity of available observations. The main mechanism of control in the congruence analysis approach is the competition between different theories within the internally coherent theoretical framework. It is anticipated that theories are based on the same inviolable core, but make contradictory predictions. The

problems of spuriousness arise and causality fades into irrelevance, if congruence analysis is based on several competing theories with alternative logic and different causal mechanisms. As a consequence the theory test runs a risk of being inconclusive. Instead, the theories of the same paradigm focus on the common independent variables might predict different outcomes without contradicting one another logically.

Congruence analysis approach draws inference about the capacity of abstract concept to understand a specific empirical case. The concrete and observable evidence is used to evaluate an abstract and unobservable theoretical construct. Congruence analysis acknowledges the theory-dependency of the scientific inquiry and uses empirical observations as proof for the theories relevance. Matches or mismatches between empirical findings and concrete expectations deduced from core elements of theories, such as actors, structures or motivational foundations of interactions, are established by generating ex-ante predictions about what kind of the real world observations would appear according to the particular theories (Blatter and Blume 2008). Congruence analysis implies a method of causal interpretation which does not operate according to the causal logic of experiments and does not attempt, as a controlled comparison does, to achieve the functional equivalent of an experiment. However, if theories are designed to show the causes of phenomena, theory testing requires causal inference (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 99-100). The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that there is no need to trace the causal process from the independent to the dependent variable. The congruence test does not use process-tracing, because the theory-centered analysis invokes causal mechanisms that are imbedded in a theoretical context and considered to be ultimately unobservable (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). Scientific inquiry begins with a theory and then proceeds with evaluation of its ability to predict the outcome under investigation. In doing so, the researcher assesses the value of the independent variable and then deduces the value of the dependent variable from the theory at hand (George and Bennett 2004: 181). The most

important concrete real world observations for the congruence analysis are those discriminating between the two rival theories. This is the case if one observation is at the same time the evidence for the correctness of one theory's predictions and the evidence for the incorrectness of another theory's expectations (Hall 2006). Abstract conclusions lead to relevance or relative strength of theories to explain the cases under investigation (Blatter and Blume 2008). If the observed outcome of the case is consistent with the theory's prediction, it can be entertained that a causal relationship may exist (George and Bennett 2004: 181).

Because the term 'congruence analysis' is often used loosely to encompass theory evaluation research, it is worth mentioning a more refined classification system, suggested by Popper. By varying question of scientific inquiry, four different ways of theory-testing may be distinguished. First, the logical comparison of the different abstract inferences drawn from the same theory investigates its internal consistency. Second, an inquiry into the logical form of the theory is made to find out the character of the theory – empirical, scientific or tautological. Third, the theory might be compared with other theories in order to determine its scientific relevance. And fourth, the theory might be tested through empirical applications of its abstract conclusions. The purpose of the last approach is to find out whether the theory stands up the demands of practice. The theory passes the test, if its singular conclusions turn out to be verified, and is discarded if these conclusions have been falsified by the empirical evidence (Popper 1992: 32-33).

3.2 Development of a theory-centered approach

Despite the recent progress in the development of the consistent methodological advice for theory testing, there remains important domain of political science that lies beyond the reach of congruence analysis. Although method of confronting hypotheses with

observations dates back to Karl Popper (1959), Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1948), and Harry Eckstein (1975) the first analyses in congruence-like manner appeared at the end of 1990s. Wilson and Woodside (1999) have developed an analytical technique to compare the strength of four theories of group decision making (rational, bounded rational, political and garbage can) in relation to each other. They used the notion of “pattern matching” and tested a “prediction matrix” derived from the theories against observations from the data set. Another type of congruence analysis was applied in Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) study into governmental decision making. To explain the Cuban Missile Crisis authors used three theoretical paradigms: one dominant – ‘Rational Actor’ model, and two complementary – ‘Organizational Behavior’ and ‘Governmental Politics’ models. Although, the main goal of the research was not the theory testing, authors tried to reveal additional insights that haven’t been considered by the dominant approach. A kind of congruence test was employed by Bennett’s (1999) research on Soviet military intervention. In this study a relatively new theory, learning theory, was compared to more established theories through assessing their individual and collective congruence with the dynamic of Soviet interventionism. The next example of theory-guided empirical analysis appeared in 2001. A researchers group organized by Rittberger (2001) tested predictions made by three theories of international relations (neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and constructivism) about German foreign policy after reunification. The degree of congruency between predicted and observable values of the dependent variable indicated the theories’ explanatory power. Although the number and variety of strongly theory-centered analyses grew markedly, there is still a long way to go before the comprehensive and definite methodological recommendations and their application can be offered.

The most influential research methods book, *Designing Social Inquiry* (King, Keohane and Verba 1994), ignores the topic of congruence analysis, despite the fact that theory evaluation provides considerable power in many kinds of research problems. Stephen Van

Evera in his work on methods in political science (1997) equals congruence procedure in theory testing with experimentation, noting in passing that “congruence of prediction and result corroborates the theory, incongruence infirm it” (Evera 1997: 28). The congruence analysis’s low profile in political science may be traced to two prevailing methodological difficulties. The first is that method of evaluating hypotheses against observations doesn’t allow for clear distinction between ‘explanation’, ‘prediction’ and ‘testing’. Popper suggests a differentiation according to a task at hand. Looking for an ‘explanation’ means to find the initial condition or/and a universal law from which the explanation might be derived. Popper defines initial conditions as the cause of the specific event in question. Universal law is understood to refer to the hypotheses, which have the character of natural laws (Popper 1992: 60). If the laws and initial conditions are not held for questioning and are merely used for deducing the prognosis, researches are trying to make a ‘prediction’. However, when either a universal law or an initial condition is considered to be problematic and the theoretical predictions are to be compared with the historical observations then a ‘test’ of the theoretical premise may be done (Popper 1991: 133).

The second methodological difficulty that contributes to the neglect of the congruence analysis lies in confusion between theory as a tool of explanation and theory as the full explanation of concrete events (Eckstein 1975: 131). The essence of the method in question has been stated in the academic discussion of the law-reliant type of inference labeled as a “deductive-nomological” model (D-N model). This type of explanation was developed by Karl Popper and formulized by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. The ‘nomic’ logic posits that existence of phenomena could have been inferred – either deductively or with a high probability – by applying certain laws to specified antecedent conditions (Hempel 1965: 299-303). In line with Popper, D-N model defines ‘antecedent conditions’ as certain circumstances which are realized prior, or at the same time as, the phenomena to be explained. They may be said jointly “cause” the event (Hempel and

Oppenheim 1948: 136, 139). ‘Laws’ identify specified empirical regularities, which imply that whenever antecedent conditions for the phenomena to be explained occur, the event of the kind will take place (ibid.: 139). In the nomological inquiry, the question: why the phenomena happen, is substituted for the question: according to what general law and under which antecedent conditions the phenomena occurred. For Hempel and Oppenheim, a stage in research where phenomena are subsumed under a general law directly connecting observable characteristics represents the first level of explanation (ibid.: 147). A source of inference here is a positive correlation between the appearance of the hypothesized cause and the observed effect. A phenomenon may be explained by means of certain assumptions concerning the case study at hand.

‘Theory’ is a more comprehensive regularity that provide an explanation whenever the questions *whether* and *how* are raised in regard to general laws. In the broadest sense, theory is not the occurrences of events seen and the causal associations recorded. Theory shows how those associations obtain and explain the laws (Waltz 1979). Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) call it a higher-level explanation. The concept of higher-level explanation deals with procedures of a certainly different kind. It requires a use of more or less abstract theoretical constructs which function in the context of some well-established theory. This kind of inference relies upon congruity of magnitude between purported causes and observed effects. A class of phenomena may be explained or predicted by means of the theory concerning their micro-structure. It is important to notice here, that although the D-N model is a causal explanation, it does not offer the explanation of laws, but rather invokes causal mechanisms that are ultimately unobservable (George and Bennett 2004: 132).

Long-standing suppositions about necessity of congruence analysis approach have recently begun to change in political science. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett in their book *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (2004) propose the “congruence

method” of causal interpretation as an alternative to the experiment-like method of controlled comparison. Joachim Blatter and Till Blume (2008) go beyond George and Bennett’s understanding of the congruence method and conceptualize it as “a strongly theory-centered alternative to the variable centered co-variational approach.” If the latter draws causal inferences on the basis of observed co-variation between independent and dependent variable, the former focuses inferences on the congruity between observed and predicted value of the dependent variable. For the purposes of this research, the attention will be turned to the relative strength of two competing neorealist theories for the cases under investigation. I will henceforth use the term ‘congruence analysis approach’ to refer to the study in cumulative intra-realist debates.

3.3 Congruence analysis and inference

The test of properly formulated theory, even if its propositions appear wrong, brings knowledge about how much of the real world the theory can help explain. The logic underlying congruence analysis approach is often explained in terms of theory evaluation developed by Karl Popper (1959) and theory examination elaborated by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Theory testing is best understood by setting aside, for the time being, the topic of congruence and focusing solely on the definition of causal inference. The term ‘causal inference’ is often referred to conclusions drawn from empirical observations to abstract causal explanations of events (Blatter and Blume 2008: 318). In theory testing inferences are dependent on the causal assumptions of the theories at hand. Theories indicate what variables are connected causally and how the causal connection is made. Theories are tested through empirical applications of its abstract conclusions. To make the inference about theories means to evaluate their explanatory power or their relevance for the case studies under investigation. The important notion here is that theories cannot be tested directly (Waltz 1979: 13). The theories are not verifiable. They are neither true, nor false. Only

hypotheses derived from the theories might “corroborate”⁵ according to a degree they have withstood tests (Popper 1992: 251).

The basic problem in estimating the causal assumptions of a theory and its relevance lies in it that particular empirical tests neither confirm nor disconfirm it once and for all. For Popper a fundamental asymmetry exists between positive and negative corroboration of a theory. The former is almost irrelevant, whereas the latter is the key to science. For theory testing the asymmetry between verification and falsification of hypotheses is not as significant. Instead, both negative and positive corroboration add to scientific knowledge and provide evaluation of the theory’s explanatory power (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 100-101, 102). Theory test gives useful information, but researchers must be aware of their limitation. To resolve this problem of “incontrovertible proof”, the test should be done against the evidence able of falsification. As Waltz puts it, instead of being arbitrary fixed on the expectations that available data can cope with, one should derive the expectations from the theory and then check these expectations against historical observations (Waltz 1979). The question to be asked about any hypothesis derived from the theory is: what evidence would falsify it? Moreover, inquiry based on disconfirming counterevidence is consistent with the principle of accurate representation (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Evera 1997).

To return to the topic of congruence analysis, it should be underlined that this approach makes inferences focusing on a set of rivalry theories and the wide range of observations. Ex-ante predictions about real world events that are expected to occur according to the competing theories generate controversies. Broader observations may be helpful as a means to improve the precision with which the explanatory power of each of the theories

⁵ Popper prefers the term ‘degree of corroboration’ to the term ‘degree of confirmation’ as a neutral one that describes the degree to which a hypothesis has stood up to sever test. See Popper, Karl R. (1992) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London, New York, Routledge, p. 251.

is estimated. Two further assumptions play a subtle, but important role in congruence analysis. The first is the idea of “differential quality” of specific observations. Embedded in a positivist approach to congruence analysis the idea is that a concrete observation values more when it both provides evidence against one theory and in favor of another theory (Blatter and Blume 2008). Of course, it is assumed that other observations that do not have such a discriminatory power, might be necessary to underpin the accuracy of inferences about theories’ explanatory power. The second assumption implies the notion of “intra-theoretical fairness”. The debates within a particular research programme, and not debates between different paradigms, have the greater potential to generate theoretical progress. Firstly, theories derived from the same core assumptions more easily clarify auxiliary hypotheses (Taliaferro 2000). Secondly, theories of the same paradigm either reinforce or counteract one another’s predicted effects. Thirdly, the competing predictions of the internally coherent theoretical framework allow for a more careful congruence analysis (George and Bennett 2004: 185-186).

In line with Waltz and Popper and in opposition to Blatter and Blume I argue that the logic of congruence analysis as any research design that attempts to test abstract theoretical propositions is deductive. To evaluate theories inductively as Blatter and Blume (2008) recommend would mean to claim the understanding of phenomena before the theoretical framework for their explanation is provided (Waltz 1979). As Popper (1992: 268) puts it, in the history of science it is always the theory not the observation, which opens up the way to new knowledge. Experiment saves researches from choosing the way that leads nowhere. Theories explain some part of reality and can be tested by experience to prove that they are useful. Usefulness is estimated by explanatory and predictive power that theories demonstrate.

In sum, problems of theory testing present a set of design challenges for researchers that apply congruence analysis. Awareness of these problems leads researcher to gather the data that are relevant to a theory's domain (e.g. fundamental background assumptions, central structures, actors etc.). It is a theoretical framework that helps us to make sense of the data. Yet, the data limit theories' application. It encourages researchers to think about which of the theories is acceptable or is likely to be problematic for the case under investigation. The next section considers the consequences of these two problems for the design of research.

3.4 Research method, case selection and measurement validity

3.4.1 Research method

A standard approach to theory testing is to accompany with the argument about why we should believe that the variation in independent variable could cause variation in the dependent variable. This argument refers to plausibility of theory. Congruence analysis approach gives more weight to the empirical relevance of the main conceptual elements within a specific theoretical framework. It goes beyond the predicted co-variation between independent and dependent variables as the central observation. The purpose is to see whether theory meets the challenges of practice. The argument refers to theories explanatory power. In Popper's terms, the falsifiability of any empirical theory is characterized by logical relations between this theory and basic statements deduced from its whole theoretical system including initial conditions. Basic statements are to be tested by observations (Popper 1992: 102). At this point case studies considered to be extremely useful as a method for assessing whether and to what extent arguments proposed by the theory for explanation of phenomena are plausible and congruent with empirical observations. Case-studies analysis explores few or one cases in detail to demonstrate whether events develop in the way predicted by the theory. According to Blatter and

Blume, case studies are an efficient method for theory evaluation because a broad set of quite abstract concepts can be connected to empirical information. Reference to a range of theoretical approaches does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the case under investigation. Instead, the strength of case studies is that the low number of cases enables researchers to draw inference towards adequacy and relevance of theories at hand (Blatter and Blume 2008).

Fearon and Laitin (2009) doubt whether case studies are designed to discover inductively empirical regularities, but admit that they can be “quite useful – indeed, essential” – for assessing deductively the causal mechanism that give rise to broader theoretical discourse in political science. For the ‘cases’ that are sequences of events in different countries and/or in different years, the case study will entail a narrative account of what led to what outcome, including an assessment of what role the proposed by the theory causal associations played. Phenomena are examined in greater depth than coding of values on the outcome and explanatory variables would require (ibid.: 1167). The main point that Eckstein makes in his chapter *Case Study and Theory in Political Science* (1975) is an argument that case studies are most valuable when candidate theories are tested especially in regard to macropolitical phenomena of considerable magnitude or complexity (ibid.: 80). Under ‘macropolitics’ he understands the over-all politics (for instance, nation-states) as units of analysis (ibid.: 121, 134). Samples of macropolitical units are always likely to be highly uncertain in result and badly biased concerning theoretical frameworks. Case studies are better able to scrutinize some of them compensating for losses of range by gains in depth (ibid.: 122).

3.4.2 Case selection

An important question for the congruence analysis approach is: how to choose the cases for deeper investigation. Being centered on theories, congruence analysis seeks cohesion and consistency on the level of the abstract concepts and not on the level of empirical cases. The selection of cases within this approach is theory-driven. Not all theories permit the congruence test to be done. Theories selected for examination through case study method are expected to be “fairly well-developed” and able to predict outcomes on the basis of specific initial conditions (George and Bennett 2004: 115). The empirical findings are used to estimate the predictive power of the specific theoretical framework. Not all cases are equal in their import. The question is: whether their inequality extends to the point where certain types of cases can serve the goals of theory testing (Eckstein 1975: 112). In order to test empirical validity of a theory, or at least to compare the relative strength of a theory to make correct predictions, Blatter and Blumer recommend to select cases on the basis of prior expectations about their relationship to theories (Blatter and Blume 2008: 346). As Dul and Hak (2008: 93) put it, for case selection suggested here, it is necessary to measure the value of the independent or dependent concept before the actual test is conducted. If not, then the case cannot be used for testing the hypothesis. It is important to mention here, that theories are mentally formed framework for understanding events and outcomes of a bounded realm or domain of real-world activity (Blatter and Blume 2008; Waltz 1979). According to Waltz, an infinite number of events in any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. A theory indicates which factors are most important than others, specifies relations among them so that isolate one domain from all others to deal with it intellectually (Waltz 1979: 8). In other words, the domain of a theory provides a specification of objects of study for which the theory is believed to be true. Thus, cases for theory-testing must be selected from the domain to which the theory is

assumed to apply. The basis for selection must be the presence or absence of the dependent or independent concept (Dul and Hak 2008: 92).

In congruence analysis approach the main criterion for the case selection is their usefulness to frame theoretical debates within the same paradigm. Eckstein (1975: 133) distinguishes a paradigmatic case study as one that involves the application of a well-established “framework or checklist” to analyze phenomena under investigation. Such an application may produce valid explanations only if the theories permit strict deduction and if the case interpretations are “logically compelled by the theories” (ibid.: 103). For case selection it is not enough to know that some regularity exists, and thus, a case somehow “fits” a theory being tested. It should be demonstrated by correct reasoning that given the regularities and the characteristics of the case, an event predicted by the theory would occur (ibid.: 103). From the wider perspective of congruence analysis follows that for examination of the theories’ explanatory power it is reasonable to choose cases about which competing theories make different predictions. In this sense, proving one theory false requires proving other theory true (Waltz 1997: 914). Finally, more than other approaches to cases study congruence analysis rely on the application of the plurality of coherent theories to the diversity of available observations (Blatter and Blume 2008). Cases that provide many observations are preferable because they allow for a higher number of congruity measures. Tests that rest on more measures are considered to be stronger (Evera 1997: 62).

The practical question becomes: what number of cases is appropriate for congruence analysis. There is no unfailing way to solve this problem. In an effort to examine theory, one must derive hypotheses that predict a fact about the case, not about how it compares to other cases (Dul and Hak 2008). Moreover, most theories of international relations use historical records as data. The historical records deteriorate sharply as researchers move from case-study methods to large-*N* analysis. Under this scenario, one or few in-depth case

studies allow stronger tests and yield results that are otherwise inaccessible (Evera 1997: 30). Eckstein (1975) argues that if a theory can compel particular case interpretations, then the particular case could invalidate or confirm the theory. One case might be sufficient if it is well-chosen, so called crucial case. It means that case “*must closely fit* a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, *must not fit* equally well any rule contrary to that proposed” (ibid.: 118). If a case is crucial it provides a better test of theories, because it permits their deductive and predictive application and involves far more compelling practical demands for the proper statement of theories (ibid.: 123). Eckstein states forcefully that conclusive theory testing does not need plausibility probes into several cases because the very notion of the crucial case study was devised largely from that of the plausibility probe. However, he allows for further examination of other cases when confirmation occurs, but concedes them of little importance if one is interested in matching theories. He also stresses that crucial cases do not commonly occur, and they are hard to find even if they exist (ibid.: 118).

In line with Evera (1997), Gerring (2009) argues that a single case study allows a strongest test for a theory. This is due to the fact that insofar as a case-study analysis provides an insight into causal mechanisms, and causal mechanisms are integral to a given theory, a single case may be enlisted to confirm or disconfirm theory’s prepositions. The strength of this test is the extraordinary fit between the theory and a set of facts found in a single case (Gerring 2009: 661). However, this method of analysis requires cases that are more or less crucial for confirming theories. The theories most amenable to crucial case analysis are those which are law-like in their precision, degree of elaboration, consistency, and scope. The more a theory attains the status of a causal law, the easier it will be to confirm, or disconfirm, with a single case (ibid.: 660-661). Gerring notes that the crucial case method of case-selection, whether employed in a confirmatory or disconfirmatory mode, cannot be employed in a large-*N* context. This is because an explicit cross-case model would render

the crucial case study redundant. Dul and Hak (2008) also argue that against common belief, single case studies can be used for theory testing due to two logically related facts. First, a single case study provides information only about relations or processes that are observable. Second, if a relation or phenomenon can be observed in a single case then the single case can be used for a test. The idea is that a probabilistic phenomenon is simply not observable in a single case and can only be discovered in large-*N* research.

Blatter and Blume distance themselves from Eckstein and Gerring's understanding of a crucial case, who according to Blatter and Blume, refer to "must-fit" cases and "law-like" theories, while Blatter and Blume are concerned with the status of specific theories within a specific theoretical discourse. Blatter and Blume define as crucial those cases which provide strong evidence to undermine a hegemonic theory and bolster at the same time peripheral theories within the scientific discourse in a specific field of inquiry. Authors resume that although congruence analysis does exhibit a strong affinity to selecting theoretically crucial cases, it is not restricted to adjusting the explanatory model for a specific case. Rather this approach is designed to show the capacity of new paradigms to create new important comprehension beyond the comprehension created by established paradigms (Blatter and Blume 2008). However, this understanding of crucial cases within congruence analysis approach violates main principles of theory-oriented inquire. The first principle for theory examination specified by Eckstein (1975) and Waltz (1979) lies in finding theories adequately precise and plausible to make testing worthwhile. Few theories of international relations define terms and specify connections between variables with clarity and logic that would make the test possible. Researches may be involved in accomplishing something that cannot be neither confirming nor disconfirming of any predictions, unless the confused definitions of variables and vague relations between them are remedied. The second rule was formulated by Popper (1992) and postulate that "laws of causality" are invariant with respect to space and time. Popper admits that new experiments may decide against an old

theory. Yet, even when the old theory is superseded, it may still retain its validity as a kind of limiting case of the new theory. And it may still to be applied, at least with a high degree of approximation, to those cases in which it was successful before (Popper 1992: 252). The third principle was formulated by Eckstein (1975) and further developed by George and Bennett (2004). As it is already known, even if a test is passed, no theory can ever be proved true. This means that a null hypothesis does not play meaningful role for theory testing. However, a powerful substitute for the null hypothesis can be the process of simultaneous testing of alternative hypotheses derived from “counter-theories”. Congruence rests on “strong inference” from one paradigm and some of its specific theories, i.e. intra-theoretical debates, as opposite to Blatter and Blume’ focus on inter-theoretical debates. According to George and Bennett, simultaneous testing of theories which operate with different concept and contradict each other in logic may result in spuriousness and inconclusiveness of scientific task.

Yet, there is no intellectual consensus on whether a single-case study is the most efficient method for theory testing. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) cast doubt on the argumentation that a pure single observation is an effective technique to examine theories. Even if a single-observation study can be used for evaluating causal explanations within a research programme, it still runs a risk to provide an indeterminable explanations and incorrect inferences from only one observation. George and Bennett (2004: 32) suggest that these two problems will be greatly reduced, if a single case study relies almost exclusively on within-case method and congruence analysis. This practice means that even in instances of single-case testing, the researcher must examine at least a small number of observations within the “case” that are relevant to the competing theories. More specifically, a case under investigation must provide multiple observations to which a wide range of alternative hypotheses will be applied to ensure validity of the research design (ibid.: 80). One of the precise ways to increase the number of observations was proposed

by King, Keohane and Verba (1994). They suggest a partial replication of hypotheses that use a new dependent variable, but keep the same explanatory variable (ibid.: 218). According to King, Keohane and Verba, the technique of retaining the same unit of observation, while changing the dependent variable is powerful for testing theories and identifying different effects of the same cause (ibid.: 223). The entire range of variation in the dependent variable is needed to be a possible outcome of the experiment in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of the explanatory variables. For instance, if one is interested in the conditions under which outcome occurs, it would be a mistake to choose as observations only those instances where the outcome of concern is always present. A better design to understand the sources of event would be one that selected observations according to the explanatory variables and allowed the dependent variable the possibility of covering the full range from the event anticipation to its actual occurrence or non-existence (ibid.: 109).

In contrast to King, Keohane and Verba, Dul and Hak (2008) argue that many causal relations in real world situations can be formulated as deterministic necessary conditions. And many academic theories in fact express deterministic relations. According to Dul and Hak, a proposition that expresses a deterministic necessary condition implies that for *each* single instance in the domain the proposition is true according to the theory. From this consideration, they conclude that the proposition can be tested in a single instance and propose to use the single case study as the best strategy for testing a necessary condition. In opposition to King, Keohane and Verba, Dul and Hak recommend case selection on dependent variable. This means, that one case in which effect *B* is present must be carefully chosen, and then it must be observed whether condition *A* is present or not. If not, then the hypothesis is rejected. A proposition with a necessary condition is confirmed if in a case the both *A* and *B* are present or if by taking away the condition *A*, the observable effect *B* disappears. However, Dul and Hak's strategy for theory testing requires a

replication procedure, whenever a hypothesis is confirmed or rejected. Testing of propositions by replication follows the same logic as initial testing of propositions and takes into consideration inferences from the previous case study. Authors argue that replications with other cases are needed to enhance the generalizability of the proposition, which they define as the degree of confidence that a proposition is correct and applies to the entire theoretical domain. (Dul and Hak 2008: 47). Dul and Hak redefine Eckstein's approach to theory testing within a single case study method wherein they include replication procedure for both confirming and disconfirming results while still trying to use only one observation. However, they take an indeterminate state when in an attempt to test a theory they look for recurrence of events, and not their antecedent conditions. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) emphasize that the term 'event' refers in the social science to the occurrence of some more or less complex characteristic in a specific spatio-temporal location. Event does not repeat itself with all its peculiar characteristics, but nevertheless it may be explained by general laws of the causal type. And all that is needed for the testability and applicability of such laws is the recurrence of events with the antecedent characteristic, i.e. the repetition of those characteristic, but not of their individual instances (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948: 142). Keohane (2009) warns against case selection on dependent variable, if one seeks to put forward explanatory propositions, because there is a danger of biased inferences. This is due to the facts that data in the field of international relations are not generated by experiment, and often the class of relevant events is small and not independent of one another. It means that researcher needs continuously to be aware of uncertainty of the inferences and try to account for sources of bias (Keohane 2009: 771).

3.4.3 Measurement validity

That said, theory-centered approach is by no means free from methodological concerns. In particular it is susceptible to criticism about measurement validity. When discussing the problem of measurement for the congruence analysis, it is necessary to stress that this approach operates with methods for analysis of observational data, and relies on substantive assumptions about the matches or mismatches between empirical findings and theoretical predictions. However, the simple description, with which the congruence analysis operates, raises a question of how correspondence between theoretical concepts and empirical observations actually may be measured to allow for valid theory evaluation. For example, Popper (1992) finds it impossible to define a numerically calculable degree of theory's corroboration. One can speak "only roughly in terms of positive degree of corroboration, negative degree of corroboration, and so forth" (ibid.: 268). Even if a statement is falsifiable to a high degree, it may still remain slightly corroborated. Furthermore, the degree of corroboration of two statements may not be comparable in all cases, because validity of laws in social science is limited to a specific spatio-temporal dimension. Not a number of instances must be assessed for measurement validity; rather the severity of procedures determines the precision of a test. Once a theory is well corroborated, further instances raise its degree of corroboration only very little, unless these new instances are very different from the earlier ones. According to Popper, positive corroboration of the theory in a new field of application may increase its predictive power "very considerably" (ibid.: 269-271). To meet the minimum requirement for the measurement precision Eckstein recommends to exclude the measurement techniques where any measure considered to validate or invalidate a theory could imply the opposite (Eckstein 1975: 129). In principle, I agree with Dul and Hak (2008) that within congruence approach validity of measurement is achieved when empirical statements can be considered to capture meaningfully the ideas contained in the corresponding concepts. Yet, the degree

to which this has been achieved cannot be assessed “objectively” and is mostly an outcome of argumentation and discussion (ibid.: 260). The validity of the substantive assumptions on which observational inferences rests is seldom verifiable in any direct sense. Nevertheless, current methodological debate on measurement technique is premised on the assumption that the value of causal parameters may be better assessed by means of observational estimates than by means of cutting-edge statistical techniques (Gerber and Green 2009: 1118).

3.5 Concepts and generalization within the congruence analysis

In contrast to earlier approaches to qualitative concept formation, where meaning of concept was determined by the set of internal attributes that can be observed empirically (Sartori 1970; Collier 1993, 1997), within the congruence analysis method abstract concepts can only be defined in a meaningful way with reference to theory. This notion of concept formation is derived from recent insights into social science methods (Davis 2005; Bevir and Kedar 2008; Blatter and Blume 2008), which claim that there are no point-to-point relationships between the objective world and abstract concepts. As Waltz (1979) writes, “reality” will neither be congruent with a theory nor with its theoretical propositions. From this perspective, it is hardly possible and certainly unnecessary to specify exclusionary categories where each observation is exclusively connected to one abstract concept, as logic of operationalization would require. Davis (2005), for instance, refers to Hempel, who wrote, that it would be unreasonable to demand an operational specification of meaning for all the terms in social science. There should be some terms in any definitional context that “must be antecedently understood”. Davis goes further claiming that behind operationalization and measurement lie theories. And theory-dependence implies the absence of generally valid or absolute concept operationalizability. The precision and generalizability of operational definitions are limited to their theoretical origin. Indeed, in

opposition to Sartori (1970) and Collier (1993) and in line with Bevir and Kedar (2008) Blatter and Blume (2008: 343) argue that concepts and their properties can have variety of meanings depending on their theoretical embedding.

Theory-dependence of concept and observation is central to congruence analysis approach. As Davis puts it, observation is a mental experience of the integration of inputs into the meaningful term or basic concept. Such basic concepts, in turn, provide building blocks for higher-order theories that help researches to make sense of experience by guiding observations toward putative relationships among concepts (Davis 2005: 48). The inferential leap between concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical terms is made by delineating the meaning of concept as being embedded into the coherent theoretical framework. However, in contrast to Bevir and Kedar's anti-naturalist interpretive approach to concept formation, the congruence analysis holds a positivist epistemology according to which causal explanations are validated by their fit with observations. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 110) stress, the only phenomenon for which data are available or the only type of historical event for which records have been kept is a perfectly respectable aspect of empirical investigation. Abstract, unobservable concepts "can play a useful role in theory formulation; but they can be a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypotheses unless they can be observed and measured" (ibid.: 109).

Congruence analysis as any case study method raises question about generalizability. To what extent the findings hold for other settings? Scholars have approached this issue in two complementary ways. On the one hand, generalizability is understood as a characteristic of a theory. It is the degree of confidence that theory's notions are correct and may be applied to the entire theoretical domain. Generalizability is enhanced if the propositions are supported in a series of observations, and decreases if the propositions do not stand the

test of practice. There is, however, a general “lack of generalizability” of propositions in the sense that most propositions are tested only once in a single-case study (Dul and Hak 2008: 47). On the other hand, generalization goes beyond the capacity of a concept to explain a specific empirical case through congruence tests. Rather, it refers to relative strength or relevance of a theory within the theoretical paradigm (Blatter and Blume 2008: 342). However, generalizations directly inferred from data only hold (probabilistically) for phenomena observed under the conditions prevailing during observation (Eckstein 1975: 114). This is due to the fact that general laws explained by theories are not timeless. As Jervis (1991-1992: 45) puts it, even if the historical generalization is correct, the projection of it into the future may not be. In some cases generalizations will no longer hold even though the basic laws that generate them are valid, because these laws work themselves out differently if there are changes in the conditions that call these regularities into being.

In sum, generalization of a given theory-oriented case study is not a simple function of the number of instances observed; rather it refers to relative strength and relevance of the neorealist international relation theory to a new field – foreign policy analysis. Generalizability is understood as a characteristic of the theory. By broadening the scope of the theory through the inclusion of an additional variable ‘security’, an attempt is made to refine contingent generalization from the case of German policy towards the EEC enlargement. If neorealist theories can be used as theories of foreign policy, it makes the research programme more relevant and increase its predictive or explanatory power. However, due to the fact that the theory has a specific spatio-temporal location, generalizations directly inferred from data only hold for phenomena observed under the conditions prevailing during observation and in a particular historical context.

3.6 Conclusion

This research is focused on the theory and not on the cases under investigation. I will argue that the neorealist theory not only provides a solid foundation to identify external conditions that manifested themselves in a state foreign behavior, but also meets Joachim Blatter and Tell Blume (2008) exacting criteria for assessing theories within congruence analysis approach⁶. In accordance with their standards, I have: (1) defined neorealist key concepts of power and security through their embeddedness in a theoretical context and not with reference to their observing attributes; (2) shown that within internally coherent neorealist framework a distinct variation exists between defensive realism and offensive realism in their approaches to the Federal Republic's foreign behavior; and (3) demonstrated that defensive realism and offensive realism use the same fundamental elements of the neorealist theoretical framework, but provide competing predictions about Germany's behavior towards the European Economic Community enlargement during the 1960's and the 1970's. To uncover the best predictive power of neorealist theories for a state foreign behavior in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, this thesis uses defensive realism and offensive realism to generate ex-ante predictions regarding German policy towards the enlargement of European Economic Community in a period from 1961 to 1979. It then tests the theories' predictions against the empirical records of the European Community's Northern enlargement towards Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the European Community's Mediterranean enlargements towards Greece, Portugal and Spain. The empirical findings of case studies will be used in theoretical discourse to indicate the neorealist theory relevance to foreign policy analysis.

⁶ Blatter and Blume (2008) contend that congruence analysis approach relies on (1) use of "more abstract concepts"; (2) "variations of a theoretical discourse within a paradigm"; and (3) "the rivalry between theories".

3.6.1 Case selection

The primary criterion for case selection has been relevance to the objective of theory testing. It is recommended to select the case for theory testing that “closely fits a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory” (Eckstein 1975: 118). The goal of this task is not to falsify the defensive or/and offensive realism, but to determine predictions of which of two theories fit with the empirical observation of German foreign policy. Why is this “crucial case” to test the neorealist propositions on state foreign behavior? First, this study is dealing with a state behavior in a bipolar system at the international level and an imbalanced multipolar system at the European regional level, which should be an ideal environment for balance of power theories: defensive realism (Waltz 1979) and offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001). As Waltz (1979: 118) remarks, theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain. Balance of power theory claims to explain the results of states’ behavior, under given conditions.

Second, in the period under investigation, a would-be hegemon, the Federal Republic of Germany, had pursued both a goal of power enhancement through reunification of its eastern territories and a goal of security preservation by means of the European Community enlargement. By the reference to the discriminatory power of historical observations this case provides the main mechanism of control within the congruence analysis approach – the rivalry between two theories. In this sense, selection of the case is guided by the ability it provides to carry out the test that the neorealist research programme most needs at its current stage of development. Specifically, neorealism is built up from the assumed motivations of states and corresponding actions (Waltz 1979: 118). However, within defensive realism and offensive realism states are motivated differently, and therefore, they are expected to behave differently, given the conditions.

Additionally, this research examines the period between 1961 and 1979, because archival documents remain classified for 30 years, and thus, it is not possible to obtain historical records dated from 1980. Given that neorealists look to distribution of power to predict tendencies in states foreign behavior, and they expect that changes in this variable will be associated with important developments at the international arena, the period under investigation provides necessary evidence that make congruence analysis doable.

3.6.2 Methodological approach

Predictions about Germany's enlargement policy are derived from the both defensive and offensive variants of neorealist theory for each case. For each variant of theory the predicted value will be compared to the observed value of the dependent variable – 'Germany's EEC enlargement policy'. According to the congruence procedure, the explanatory power of a theory can be assessed by the degree of consistency between predicted and observed value of the dependent variable. If the observed value of the dependent variable turns out to be different from its value predicted by the theory, the prediction derived from the theory in that case is falsified and the theory is weakened. By contrast, the consistency between predicted and observed values of the dependent variable strengthens further confidence in theory's explanatory power. Generally, neorealist predictions will be correct if there is the historical evidence that German policy towards the enlargement of the European Economic Community changes following changes in the international conditions. The explanatory power of two rival theories – defensive realism and offensive realism, will be evaluated on the base of the evidence that at the same time will confirm the correctness of one theory's predictions and the incorrectness of predictions made by other theory. Specifically, if under the conditions, the German leaders were motivated by security-seeking, and thus, did not opt for self-extension policy through reunification, rather they preferred self-preservation through the European Economic

Community enlargement, these statements both provide evidence against offensive realism explanatory power and for defensive realism explanatory power. Yet, Germany is a straightforward case that provides strong support for offensive realism. Search for power and aspiration to reunify the country stimulated German leaders during this period (Mearsheimer 2001: 169). Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that German policy makers talked and thought like offensive realists. It has been certainly hard to find evidence of key leaders expressing satisfaction with the existing balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001: 170).

3.6.3 Description of variables

The study's dependent variable is 'Germany's EEC enlargement policy'⁷. A 'state relative power position' is included in this study as independent variable. Drawing from the two neorealist approaches highlighted above, the effects that power distribution had on Germany's foreign policy towards the European Community enlargement in the 1960's and the 1970's are to be explored. To use power as a relative concept, any index of Germany's power (see Appendices) will always be considered in comparison with those of an applicant state and the EEC members against the United States and the Soviet Union as a leading land power in the European system (Levy and Thomson 2005: 18). 'Security' will be included as an intervening variable to show how the differentiation of present security needs influences Germany's enlargement policy.

⁷ Although the purpose of this research is also to test defensive realism versus offensive realism – what a state will do under the conditions – the dependent variable must be broader since the neorealist theories predict entirely different outcomes.

3.6.4 Data

In this study an analysis of empirical evidence is based on archival documents. Summarizing historical details, it is important to understand which events were crucial, and therefore construct accounts that emphasize essential. To analyze European history during the Cold War, we need to analyze the principles of military strategies as the Great Powers and Germany understood them (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 53). Yet, it is often difficult to study security related state actions because many of the relevant internal documents and historical records still remain close to public access. Despite this challenge, sufficient data on Germany's policy towards the European Community enlargement had been collected, using primary sources only. Four categories of documents informed this research: analysis, studies and reports of Federal Foreign Office in Berlin; summary records of meetings of the Foreign Committee in Bundestag; summary records of a meeting of the NATO Council; recommendations and resolutions adopted by NATO Assembly.

With the above methodological concerns in mind, two following chapters will now proceed to an examination of the German foreign behavior in two cases correspondingly: Northern enlargement of the European Economic Community towards Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in a period from 1961 to 1973 and Mediterranean enlargements of the European Economic Community towards Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1970's. In each of the cases I turn to the internal documents to provide the historical evidence that demonstrate whether and how such systematic factors as relative power position and security needs have influenced the decisions of leaders on the state foreign policy. To understand the prevailing motivations behind these policies I will rely primarily on the logical analysis of Germany's foreign behavior using declassified archival documents.

CHAPTER FOUR:

**GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ON NORTHERN
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY TOWARDS DENMARK, IRELAND AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1961-1973**

Of necessity, Chapter Four and Chapter Five of the study exploit a large number of archival holdings, which represents data for analysis in this research design.

4.1 Background

The focus of this section is transformation in power constellation at two levels – global and Western European, which affected German behavior towards the EEC enlargement. The process of systematic change is discussed in terms of two models: a strictly bipolar world model and a Western European model of imbalanced multipolarity. At the global level, during the 1960's and the 1970's I think of the international system as bipolar one with the two world powers being the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War between these two powers had not been over yet. At the regional level, during this period I think of Western Europe as a geographically separated sphere, which represents imbalanced multipolarity and is affected from the outside superpowers. I find the Federal Republic of Germany as the dominant European power according to the national ranking indices. The

impact of systematic alteration and trends in power constellation which may shape very different circumstances are drawn into question.

4.1.1 Conditions of the international system

In a period from 1961 to 1973 two states – the United States and the Soviet Union, dominated the international system. None of the Western European countries constituted a decisive power at the international arena.⁸ In order to maintain a proper position in the world, European states were forced to merge its resources economically and politically.⁹ As it was stated in the report on General Policy of the Council of Europe in 1957 “since the Second World War Europe is no longer the nerve-center of the world. Two enormous Powers dominate the scene by reason of their geographical area, their population, their economic and military strength: the United States and Soviet Russia. Situated between them, Europe will be unable to uphold her freedom of action and independence unless she unites.”¹⁰

The evidence from newly declassified NATO documents indicates that Germany remained a key problem both at the international level of counterbalancing between the United States and the Soviet Union and at the regional level of Western Europe. In the report of Political Committee presented at the NATO parliamentarians’ conference in 1966¹¹ was recognized that, a divided Germany, with undefined territorial boundaries was perceived as a source of continued European instability. From one standpoint, Berlin, German reunification, and German boundaries represented vital differences between the Soviet Union and the United

⁸ PA AA, B 20-200, Band 1460, Address by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark Mr. Jens Otto Krag, to the National Press Club, Washington D. C. September 27, 1967.

⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Vortrag vor dem amerikanischen National War College über deutsche Europapolitik, vom 11. April 1967.

¹⁰ PA AA, B 21, Band 23, General Policy of the Council of Europe, 1957.

¹¹ A/NATO, J. 134, PC (66) 45, Report of Political Committee, presented by the Reporter, Senator Jacob K. Javits, NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, Twelfth Annual Session, NATO Headquarters, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris 16e, 14th to 19th November, 1966.

States. A reunified Germany could have the strength to tip the balance of power between East and West, and thus German future was of cardinal importance to both sides. From another standpoint, the German government felt that without Germany's strong political role in the region, German security interests could not receive the due dealing with the Soviet threat and was seeking to strengthen its political voice through greater influence on military-strategic affairs. Specifically, West Germany wanted to play stronger role in the control and use of nuclear weapons. However, German desire to strengthen its position in Western Europe was a cause of worry and created more problems that it solved both for the Germans and for its allies. On the one hand, it could be resented and feared by all European nations which might in turn lead to a wave of anti-German feelings. On the other hand, it would harden the whole diplomatic picture of an East-West counterbalancing. Hence it was considered to be unnecessary to anticipate and thereby to create a German demand for a nuclear role. Instead, "a just and peaceful settlement of major problems in Europe"¹² through political consultations was favored as the only solution for the both the German question and the lasting peace and security in the region.

In November 1966 General of the Deutscher Bundestag a.D. Fritz Berendsen¹³ commented on the mentioned above report of the Political Committee. Particularly, he said that if the military equilibrium between East and West would change unfavorably for the West, the political repercussions in Germany that find itself along the Iron Curtain should not be underestimated. Yet, given the worries in Western Europe about German interest in strengthening its influence on military-strategic affairs, General Berendsen resumed that "we then think of the creation of a united Europe", where the national decisions and measures for crises must be coordinated in the sense of cooperation of the Europeans. In

¹² A/NATO, JJ/PVI/VE/I, NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Reports and Recommendations. Tenth Annual Conference, NATO Headquarters, Paris, 16-21 November, 1964.

¹³ A/NATO, J. 212, MC (66) 11, Twelfth Annual Session, NATO Headquarter, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris. Speech by a. D. Fritz Berendsen (Deutscher Bundestag) before the Military Committee on 15th November, 1966.

1967 at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Brandt recognized, that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany could only be guaranteed by a politically consolidated and military effective North Atlantic Alliance, without whose support a policy of détente was impossible to achieve, and this, in turn, was necessary for European peace and for an equitable and durable solution to the German problem of reunification. He recalled that a solution to the German problem – was only possible during a phase of political détente. He concluded that his government's efforts to reduce the German problem could only meet with success within the larger framework of a European peace settlement, which again was dependent on the unity of the Alliance.¹⁴

Moreover, as it was recognized at the meeting of Three Western Powers¹⁵ - the United States, the United Kingdom and France, German reunification would provide adequate and durable stability to the whole European continent. However, the goal of the reunification could be achieved only by a peaceful means so that security of all the European states could be ensured. It was admitted that this objective could hardly be attained at the time of tension and hostile confrontation of blocks, but rather in a period of détente.¹⁶ Relaxation of tension was not a final goal, but a step on the way towards a European settlement, which in itself no longer gave rise to renewed tension. On the other hand, it was clear that no substantial progress could be made towards a European settlement without the Soviet agreement, and it was also clear that in the circumstances of that time the Soviet government did not consider that it was in its interests to make a major change. The existence of the two pact systems and the incorporation of each of the two parts of Germany in one or other of the systems was the most significant manifestation of the division of Europe. It would be impossible to separate the German problem from the division of Europe. They were indissolubly connected. In this regard, any solution of

¹⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/67/50, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 13^h December, 1967.

¹⁵ PA AA, B 38, Band 1, Seite 000223, Stand der Deutschlandfrage, Bonn, den 1. Juni 1965.

¹⁶ PA AA, B 38, Band 189, Seite 382, Deutschlandfrage und Entspannung.

German problem contributing to a lasting European settlement required actions of Four Powers with special responsibility for Germany, and required co-operation of all European states interested in establishing a lasting peaceful order in Europe. It was necessary that the Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of German state should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

What the Alliance meant by policy of détente is clear from the North Atlantic Council Report¹⁷ of 28th November, 1966, on East-West relations, namely: “to create a political environment in which the existing partition of Europe and of Germany can be peacefully resolved and a genuine and stable European settlement achieved.”¹⁸ However, as follows from the North Atlantic Council Amalgamation of East-West Document¹⁹ of 15th March, 1969, “the Western concept of détente and what the USSR means by “peaceful co-existence” has different meaning. Essentially, the Soviet concept of peaceful co-existence permit the pursuit of Soviet objectives by any expedient means short of direct Soviet involvement in war, while retaining control, by force if necessary, over their own empire. Soviet leaders must have hoped that East-West contacts, particularly if developed selectively, would erode Western solidarity”. It was also believed that the Soviet governments “seemed prepared to accept moderate change in Easter Europe, but not to the point at which their grip on the Warsaw Pact area would be loosened.”²⁰

In the report it was mentioned, that to the extent that the Soviet Union pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, it is because of their leaders’ belief that “objective conditions” demanded such a course. Should these “objective conditions” change, Moscow would take

¹⁷ NATO Archive OTAN, Document C-M/66/84 (Final), paragraph 1.

¹⁸ NATO Archive OTAN, PO/69/132, Amalgamation of East-West Document, 15th March, 1969.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

more risks.²¹ It was reported, that the Soviet Union did appear to accept certain facts of the nuclear age. It was recognized the need for preventing nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or communication failure. Outside of these recognitions of danger of nuclear war, the Soviet Union had given no other hard evidence that it had given up the goal of a Soviet-dominated Europe. Moscow still desired to fragment Western Europe Unity and still invested a high proportion of its resources in the production of armaments and its capabilities remained strong and continued to grow. Aside that it was admitted that military security considerations could not dominate all thinking about the Soviet Union, no doubt had been left that there was recognition of the distinction between the Soviet capabilities and Soviet intentions, and the realization that the latter may change at any time. This report put forward a neorealist argument when it underlined that foreign “policy cannot be based on unknown intentions and motives alone but has to be based on capabilities as well.”²² In this regard, it was stated that the hoped-for European settlement could be only a product of Western strength, firmness, and patience, because appropriate security guarantees were considered to be impossible as long as the Soviet Union premised all negotiations on a Soviet-dominated Europe and, in particular, Eastern Germany.²³ The another great fear in Western-Soviet Relations was that one or several of the Western powers will seek to negotiate with Moscow on a separate basis. This fear had applied in that period to the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and the West Germany as well. It was considered to be counter-productive to any of the countries to set a bilateral example. The behavior of one would only tempt to the others into unilateral exploration of the possibilities of transforming their own relations with the Soviet Union, because it could only create new gambits for the Soviet diplomacy to achieve by Western disunity.²⁴

²¹ A/NATO, J. 134, PC (66) 45, Report of Political Committee, presented by the Reporter, Senator Jacob K. Javits, NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, Twelfth Annual Session, NATO Headquarters, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris 16e, 14th to 19th November, 1966.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ A/NATO, J. 134, PC (66) 45, Report of Political Committee, presented by the Reporter, Senator Jacob K. Javits, NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference, Twelfth Annual Session, NATO Headquarters, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris 16e, 14th to 19th November, 1966.

Significantly, the Soviet position had changed very little with respect to Europe. The view of the Soviet leaders was that the key to security in that area lay in concerted actions by the Soviet Union and the United States, but the United States had made it clear that it would engage in no discussion on this basis and would undertake no commitment on matters affecting Europe or allies of the United States without consulting those allies. Concerning the FRG and DDR issues the American viewpoint had been stated as follows: it was that the United States government would be largely guided by the attitude of the Federal Republic²⁵. In this context, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel said that the Federal Republic had to take into account the fact that Germans continued to regard themselves as members of a single nation, and could do nothing to prejudice the search for the restoration of national unity. No settlement of the intra-German relationship would affect this principle, and the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole would also have to be preserved.²⁶

German leaders were well aware that although the United States continued to emphasize the importance of Europe to American security and interests, at the same time a possibility of the US troop withdrawals from Western Europe was not entirely excluded. One of the main themes of both President Nixon's State of the Union Message of January 1970 and the report submitted by the President to Congress on the United States foreign policy for the 1970's, "A new Strategy for Peace", in February 1970, was revitalization at home coupled with a reduction in American "involvement in other nations' affairs." In this Foreign Policy document President Nixon underlined the need to maintain the United States overseas commitments in the foreign policy and defense fields where American interests continue to justify this. Although there had been no outright declaration by the

²⁵ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/25, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Bonn, 30th May, 1972.

²⁶ Ibid.


United States Administration that cuts would be made to United States forces stationed in Europe, “A New Strategy for Peace” did, however, hint at this possibility. Commenting on this issue in the meeting of Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1970 General Reporter Erik Blumenfeld²⁷ (Federal Republic) underlined the main political reason for which he considered it essential that that the United States maintained its level of military commitment in Western Europe. “Basically”, he said, “The political stability that has been achieved in Europe in the post-war years has been due to matching by the West - acting as a collective entity, of the military might available to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Many strategists and commentators have pointed out that this balance would no longer be credible if it merely applied to nuclear forces. Any sudden run-down of Western conventional forces could only serve to weaken the political and diplomatic negotiating position of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and might well undermine Bonn’s chance of achieving a more normal relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” on acceptable terms. Blumenfeld feared that “unless rapid and positive steps are taken by the countries of Western Europe to achieve closer cooperation over defense matters, American cuts might be regarded by Western Europeans as an example to them to reduce their own separate defense efforts”. He added that “there is already a feeling in Europe that the great issues of security have now become the monopoly of the two superpowers and that the role of the Europeans in defense is merely to provide a secondary conventional contribution.”²⁸

4.1.2 Power constellation

The *Figure 4.1* shows that a world system during the 1960’s and the 1970’s had been characterized by bipolarity, i.e. it was ruled by two great powers of roughly equal strength –

²⁷ A/NATO, N 47, PC (70) 3, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), June 1970.

²⁸ Ibid.



SOURCE: The numbers for each country and for each year are from Singer, David J. (1987) *Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985*. *International Interactions*, 14, 115-132.

Figure 4. 1 Graphic illustration of national material capabilities in the years: 1961-1973.

the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, a system of European region was represented by imbalanced multipolarity, dominated by four regional powers – France, West Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, where Germany had been feared as an aspiring hegemon. A brief look at the distribution of power during 1961-1973 (see *Figure 4.1*) shows clearly that no great power or combination of great powers existing in European region could prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Western Europe. Neither Germany, nor France was in position to build an army in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that the United Kingdom had substantial military forces, it did not have sufficient material resources to lead a balancing coalition against the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer 2001: 327-328). The European states being left on their own would not be capable to maintain the balance of power. The security in the region was guaranteed only through the close cooperation with the US in the framework of the NATO.”²⁹

Thus, in 1964 in his statement³⁰ at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Schroeder said that the balance of power between East and West had been altered in that: first, the Soviets had built up a nuclear potential with which they could threaten not only Europe but also the American continent; second, the nuclear potential of the West had been increased, although to a limited degree, by new developments in the United Kingdom and France; finally, Germany had contributed conventional forces to the Alliance, which had been strengthened in that field. In general, the relative peace in the European region at that time Schroeder explained by the fact that balance of power and a sufficient position of strength was being maintained in the European-Atlantic region. However, he reminded that surprises were always possible. The conclusion he drawn was that “as long as an opponent had to be faced, whose military power extended from Vladivostok to the Elbe, who possessed a human potential by 1970

²⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 726, Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Studien über die langfristige Entwicklung und die Sicherheit Europas in den 70er Jahren.

³⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/64/54, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 15th December, 1964.

of 360 millions, and a gross national product equals to 21% of the gross national product of the whole world”, the Atlantic Alliance would be “an indispensable safeguard to the peace and security of all its member nations”. He presented a valid argument that “the presence of 400,000 American soldiers on European soil was a decisive factor in the balance of power between East and West”.

However, in the 1970’s two other trends in the region gave reason to worry (see *Figure 4.1*). First, the distribution of power at the regional level had been changing. France was strong, but Germany and Britain were relatively stronger. The US predominance in the Western Europe was declining. Moreover, according to the German-French study on European security,³¹ the gap in military economical and technological development between superpowers and the Western states, as well as between single European states was expected to grow. In regard to Western Europe, two economic blocks – the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were established. Although, both the states of common market and EFTA had been successful, a growing economic gap between the two groups endangered their political and security cooperation and threatened with a division of the continent into two rival economic blocs.³² According to the study, the Soviet Union seemed to be reluctant to relinquish its influence in the region. However, taking into consideration its military, economical and technological advantages against the United States declining power it seemed reasonable to assume that the pursuit of an expansionist policy was not only possible but also desirable for the Soviet government. The USSR might try to suppress American presence in the region, weaken solidarity and cohesion among the European states, and increase its own influence in Europe. Probable decline in the Soviet power could only either partially

³¹ PA AA, B 21, Band 726, Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Studien über die langfristige Entwicklung und die Sicherheit Europas in den 70er Jahren.

³² Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM5, ADH1, 1963, TEMP 252, Informativische Aufzeichnung. Erklärung der britischen Regierung zu ihren Europa-Politik vor dem Unterhaus (25. Juli 1960), Brüssel, den 16. August 1960.

neutralize or even strengthen the effect of this policy. Withal, Vietnam conflict became a strong argument against the hopes in Europe that relations between superpowers might be improved. Thus, in 1968 West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger was convinced that the allied position in Europe would be enhanced if the United States were able to arrange “a tenable piece” in Vietnam and “devote more attention to European affairs.”³³ From the Chancellor’s point of view, “if Western Europe fell under Soviet hegemony that would be dangerous and direct soviet control would be even worse.” Chancellor was insistent that the worst-case scenario must be preserved by “adequate defense arrangements” as long as “an enormous concentration of military power”³⁴ remained in the East.

The second trend referred to European concern about peaceful settlement of German problem.³⁵ European states were looking for the European security system which would be accepted and guaranteed by both the US and the USSR in order to be stable and be in conformity with the overall balance of power in the world.³⁶ European states had a mistrust of increasingly powerful Germany. The Federal Republic was suspected of weakening the Community by means of its foreign trade oriented outside the EEC. Germany was charged with the alleged intention to reintegrate its territory out of the European Unity.³⁷ The Netherlands feared that in the Union of the Six the bigger states like France and Germany would predominate over smaller members and insisted on immediate Britain’s entry to the EEC.³⁸ Germany saw itself as particularly constrained by the risk that other European powerful states or even a coalition of states might directly oppose its policy of reunification which might be only possible in the European framework. If the Federal Republic

³³ PA AA, B 21, Band 733, Interview Mr. Sulzberger mit dem Bundeskanzler vom 15. Mai 1968.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ PA AA, B 20, Band 1460, Introduction by Hansen, Peder, Member of Folketing (Denmark), at the Conference of European Parliamentarians in Bohn on 3rd and 4th May 1968, Bundeshaus.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ PA AA, B 20-200, Band 1163, Die Europäische Einigung im Urteil der Luxemburgischen Öffentlichkeit, Luxemburg, den 10. Mai 1966.

³⁸ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Aufziehung über Europäische politische Zusammenarbeit, vom 3. November 1967.

reintegrated its territories as a single national state, it would disrupt a balance of power in the region. Instead, Germany's reunification as a member of EEC provides security guaranties both for Germany and its neighbors, first, because in the Community none of the contracting states can dominate, and, second, the rise of German power would be counterbalanced by France and Britain³⁹ to preserve power-political equilibrium.⁴⁰ Britain's membership in the EEC had become a political necessity. The only precondition for the British accession was its readiness to cooperate politically.⁴¹

In sum, in the sixties and the mid-seventies it became evident that not only Europe's security depended upon the balance of power between the US and the USSR, the influence of Western states on superpowers' politics in- and outside Europe was heavily dependent on their coherence.

4.2 Strategic behavior of the Federal Republic of Germany

In what follows I will show that the variation in German enlargement policy towards Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom was caused by the same factors, namely, changes in the balance of power at the international and regional level, and the security fears engendered by these changes.

4.2.1 Security needs

In 1963 there had been a pause in the customary West-East conflicts and threats, and agreements had been reached on certain limited issues. There appeared to exist a common

³⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 730, Möglichkeiten der deutschen Politik zur Förderung der europäischen Einigung, Bohn, den 6. Februar 1968.

⁴⁰ PA AA, B 21, Band 648, Denkschrift der Europa-Union Deutschland zur gesamteuropäischen und gesamtdeutschen Politik, 1966.

⁴¹ PA AA, B 2, Band 73, Seite 309, Beitritt Großbritannien zur EWG, Bohn, den 21. April 1961.

East-West policy with respect to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to other national forces, and both the United States and the Soviet Union had announced the leveling-off and possible slight reduction of their national defense budgets. Yet, there was no sign of a major change in the direction of the two great powers policies.⁴² Thus, commenting on the new Brezhnev and Kosygin leadership in the Soviet Union during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 21st June, 1965, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Schroeder said that although “the policy of the Kremlin had become more realistic, consistent and cautious, its basic features had not changed in objectives and initiatives since the time of Khrushchev”. As regard Europe, the Soviet Union “endeavored to concentrate its effort on maintaining tension vis-à-vis the Federal Republic, on petrifying the partition of Germany and Europe and on consolidating and extending Soviet influence over Germany.”⁴³

Specifically, in his statement made during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council German Minister for Foreign Affairs Schroeder said that the propaganda attacks and efforts made by the Soviet Union to separate the Federal Republic of Germany from its allies and to defame it as a stronghold of revanchism and militarism, confirmed that the Soviet Union excluded Germany from its policy of relaxation. Therefore, he stressed that the West should not delude itself from the danger of what happened daily along the Iron Curtain in Germany, because the division of Germany remained a continuing obstacle to permanent peace in Central Europe and problem of German reunification continued to be essential to Western security.⁴⁴ Germany’s anxiety at the propaganda campaign lunched against it by the Soviet Union had been considerably heighten by the invasion of

⁴² NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/64/22, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in the Princess Julian Building, The Hague, 12th May, 1964.

⁴³ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/65/21, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Lancaster House, London, 11th May, 1965.

⁴⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/64/23, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in the Princess Julian Building, The Hague, 12th May, 1964.

Czechoslovakia that aroused fear in Germany that the Federal Republic might not receive NATO support and assistance in time.⁴⁵

As regards the essential condition of German reunification, Mr. Schroeder noticed that “the Soviet position had hardened since the fall of Khrushchev, but despite Soviet propaganda against the Federal Republic, there was no likelihood at present of any daring action in the style of Khrushchev, but only the preference of the new leaders for the policy of a “carefully calculated risk.”⁴⁶ Later in a report on Atlantic Political problems submitted to the Political Committee in September 1969,⁴⁷ it was also admitted that in practice, however, the determination of the Soviet Union to maintain the status quo in the divided European region had not altered. Rather, its policy on the division of Europe hardened accompanied by increase of the influence of the military establishment in the USSR.

In the presence of the Soviet policy on division of the Europe region, the substantial reduction that the United States seemed to make to their forces in Europe would leave Western Europe in a trip-wire situation as far as its defense is concerned. Politically also reduction of the American presence, and thus, its symbolic commitment to Western Europe would enormously strengthen the political bargaining position of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the separate countries of Western Europe, especially on the sensitive issues such as Berlin and reunification of Germany. In this regard, German leaders were convinced that “the most logical and effective way of trying to replace this element is by measures of defense integration that will create a politically and military coherent whole of the fragmented individual countries of Western Europe. It should be added that such a development would also enable Western Europe to deal with the United States as a more

⁴⁵ NATO Archive OTAN, PO/69/137 (Revised), Resolutions and recommendations adopted by the 14th annual session of the Northern Atlantic Assembly, 27th March, 1969.

⁴⁶ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/65/21, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Lancaster House, London, 11th May, 1965.

⁴⁷ A/NATO, M 153, PC (69) 12, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), September 1969.

equal partner on political and security questions.”⁴⁸ Although Germans were sometimes blamed, that the proximity of Germany to the enemy had led to overestimation of his potential danger and power, however, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 15th September, 1965, German Federal Minister for Defense von Hassel pointed to the fact that differences of perspective could not change the situation so far as the Soviet military capabilities remained unchanged. The Soviet Union might today be acting with caution for tactical, political and economic reasons, but its intentions might change very rapidly.⁴⁹ He believed that the Soviet Union pursued its ultimate goal of world domination and Europe remained its principle objective.⁵⁰ Therefore, all available means of defense should be assembled for its protection. In this context he welcomed a statement that the United States did not intend to redeploy United States combat units from Europe.

By 1968 it became clear that neither Soviet efforts to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany and thus to weaken her, no German military aspiration that would create mistrust between the Federal Republic and her allies had provided a solution for the German question. The problem of German reunification could be only solved within the framework of lasting European peace order.⁵¹ There could be no progress on the vital questions of German reunification unless there was a basis of discussion, mutually agreed by sides concerned. Approaching the European political settlements from a security angle, there was, of course a very faint possibility that the Soviet Union might be prepared to permit German reunification on conditions that a reunified Germany was, first, to leave NATO; second, to be disarmed; and, third, to become a neutral state. Reunification on these terms

⁴⁸ A/NATO, M 153, PC (69) 12, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), September 1969.

⁴⁹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/65/52, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 15th December, 1965.

⁵⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/64/56, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 16th December, 1964.

⁵¹ North Atlantic Assembly. Addresses, Reports, Recommendations. Adopted at the Fourteenth Annual Session, Brussels, 11-15 November, 1968.

was unacceptable for the Federal government for political and military reasons.⁵² As General Reporter Blumenfeld noticed in his report on Atlantic Political Problems in September 1969, the conditions of war in the nuclear age were such that no European country had the strength and resources to confront an enemy such as the Soviet Union on its own. Autonomous defense made no sense for any European country.⁵³ In this regard, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council Foreign Ministers made it quite clear that in the interest of European security they would appose any solution to the German question based on the use of force.⁵⁴

In his address to the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1970 Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt⁵⁵ said that “the policy of the Soviet Union intent on maintaining and consolidating a sphere of interest in Europe”, but not striving under present conditions for any territorial gain in Europe. He made a point that “by this are also resulting the objectives of German policy which seems to be contradictory in itself.” On the one hand, the status quo in Europe, the continuing division of this continent and Germany was a consequence of the peace-preserving strategy of balance between the two Super-powers. On the other hand, this unnatural status quo with all its inherent dangers constituted the crucial source of tension which had aroused fears of violent change and war in Europe. The problem could be solved, however, neither by a unilateral voluntary act, nor by trying to declare the existing state of affairs irreversible or just normal. In such a situation, inaction was as inappropriate as was excessive zeal. He emphasized that “the Federal government measures its policy of peace by the principle of security by military balance and security by détente”. According to Mr. Schmidt, “the

⁵² A/NATO, M 153, PC (69) 12, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), September 1969.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, PO/69/137 (Revised), Resolutions and recommendations adopted by the 14th annual session of the Northern Atlantic Assembly, 27th March, 1969.

⁵⁵ A/NATO, N 308, (16) CR 1, (Second part), North Atlantic Assembly, Sixteenth Annual Session, Official Report, 9th November 1970.

impelling motive” of the German policy vis-à-vis the powers of the Warsaw Pact “is the recognition that security through deterrence is a primary essential element stabilizing the framework of international relations and that security through lessening tension is a supplementary one”. He added, that “there is no chance for success unless our own security and that of our Western Allies remains ensured. Any other approach might turn out to be an indefensible illusion.”⁵⁶

Specifically, in his speech in 1970 Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt⁵⁷ identified five different fields in which the security-driven concept of the German foreign policy was intended to operate synchronously: the first was a field of the common defense of the North Atlantic Alliance and especially the field of Germany’s cooperation with the United States; the second was the field of Western European integration, particularly with respect to the EEC and to Germany’s relations with its West European neighbors; the third was the East European field towards the Soviet Union and its allies; the fourth, was the intra-German field as regard Germany’s specific relationship with the German Democratic Republic; and fifth, the geographically overlapping field of arms limitation and arms control. In this regard he added that “the Federal government of Germany will, first, try to contribute to a stable military balance of force. Secondly, on this basis we will try to consolidate peace in Europe by resolving the state antagonism between East and West. Thirdly, we will try to support the constant efforts at limiting and controlling the armaments of all nations.” However, he concluded, that “it remains necessary to bear in mind that we are face to face with a world power that has traditionally conducted power politics. It is necessary therefore always to include the basic elements of Soviet behavior in one’s own calculation. He who fails to do so, he who does not put himself in their shoes, may find that his own efforts are not only in vain but actually

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ A/NATO, N 308, (16) CR 1, (Second part), North Atlantic Assembly, Sixteenth Annual Session, Official Report, 9th November 1970.

dangerous. For this reason it is imperative for us not only to conduct a thorough analysis of Soviet behavior and an appraisal of the Soviet political and military capabilities: it is equally essential to the West never to lose sight of its own capabilities and goals”.⁵⁸

From a point of view of German leaders, the enlargement of the European Economic Community was “necessary transitional phase towards cooperation among East and West.”⁵⁹ Commenting on Germany’s ‘Westpolitik’ (Western Policy) German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel made it clear that there was no question of the European Community considering itself a bloc vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance; instead, a united Europe could only exist if the NATO Alliance guaranteed its security by safeguarding the balance of power in Europe.⁶⁰ At the same time the Atlantic Alliance welcomed the progress towards the expansion of the European Community, which, although not directly linked to NATO security policies, would prove a key factor in affecting the future form of the Atlantic partnership. The economic weight and the political influence of the enlarged to Nine European Community would make it all the more important and the process of full, open, timely consultation among all members of the Alliance be continued in the NATO framework.⁶¹ Furthermore, in 1968 North Atlantic Assembly noted in regard to the division of Germany that removal of barriers in Europe remained the aim of the Alliance that could only be achieved by a lasting peace settlement in the region. Noting that the policy of the Soviet Union on the German question had become ever more uncompromising, the Assembly believed that peaceful cooperation in Europe would be improved by the extension of the European Economic Community through the admission of the Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. It was the assembly

⁵⁸ A/NATO, N 308, (16) CR 1, (Second part), North Atlantic Assembly, Sixteenth Annual Session, Official Report, 9th November 1970.

⁵⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Deutsche Europapolitik, Bonn, den 6. Oktober 1967.

⁶⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/60, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 7th December, 1972.

⁶¹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/25, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Bonn, 30th May, 1972.

opinion that only the Western Europe acting in close cooperation could play a decisive role in achieving détente, and that a strong Atlantic Alliance imperatively demanded a unified Europe. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1968 the Foreign Ministers also reaffirmed their intention to continue to further détente. They concluded that the searching examination, within the framework of the Alliance, of the political measures which could lead to the establishment of a stable order in Europe, to the ending the division of Germany and to the strengthening of European security, would be very useful and should be continued. However, they made a point that the enlargement of the European Economic Community to include the United Kingdom and other countries was not a matter for the Council.⁶²

In regard to Germany's 'Ostpolitik' (Eastern Policy), German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Schroeder had already stated in 1964 that "the monolithic and centralized Eastern bloc constructed by Stalin no longer existed and had been replaced by a complex and frequently divided enemy which had to be dealt with by flexible and varied political methods."⁶³ From his point of view, non-military cooperation might be more useful for the purpose of détente than the creation of new machinery. Germany considered that greater possibilities for an improvement of East-West relations existed in a bilateral approach by Western states towards the states of the Eastern bloc. It was argued that in most cases it would be sufficient to exchange information and experience, but in other cases, namely in those where a problem came close to the core questions of security, disarmament, German reunification allies must continue to try, as in the past, to achieve a common political line.⁶⁴ Moreover, the German government hoped that establishment of multiple bilateral and regional contacts between the states in Western and in Eastern Europe would limit a

⁶² NATO Archive OTAN, PO/68/375 (Revised), Recommendations and resolutions adopted by the thirteenth annual session of the „Northern Atlantic Assembly”, 26th July, 1968.

⁶³ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/63/54, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 15th December, 1963.

⁶⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/66/58, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 3rd November, 1966.

degree of latitude for both the US and the USSR in the region, would help to reduce their power-political intervention in European affairs and could reconcile the superpowers' national interests with those of the European states. In this regard the issue of Germany's reunification was of certain importance, since the crucial decision on the German question was depended on the superpowers involved.⁶⁵ In the given state of affairs there could only be a choice of either Soviet hegemony or an ever lasted United States military presence in Europe. In each of two cases the region would remain in a situation of dependence. There was no better European security policy than the consistent efforts to unite Europe.⁶⁶ The reason for this German wish was a fear of war.⁶⁷

It should be noticed that Germany attached considerable significance to the questions of military security. With regard to the initiative of freer movement of people, ideas and information among Eastern European states and Western European countries, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel said that normalization of relations in Europe was one of particular interest to Germany. However, Mr. Scheel warned against the danger of giving the impression that opening of multilateral talks in itself implied changes in political structures, such an impression could lead to increased pressure for reducing defense expenditure and could remove the very foundations of the approach which had been prepared. A credible and effective Alliance defense would continue to be essential. It had been made entirely clear that political and military security were indivisible.⁶⁸

From the archival documents it is become evident that the leaders of the Federal Republic regarded existing status quo in Europe as artificial, resulted from the two superpowers

⁶⁵ PA AA, B 21, Band 726, Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Studien über die langfristige Entwicklung und die Sicherheit Europas in den 70er Jahren.

⁶⁶ PA AA, B 21, Band 728, Die Vorschläge der Bundesregierung zur Europapolitik, vom 4. November 1964.

⁶⁷ PA AA, B 21, Band 733, Interview Mr. Sulzberger mit dem Bundeskanzler vom 15. Mai 1968.

⁶⁸ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/25, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Bonn, 30th May, 1972.

confrontation, and thus, one that would always be hard to change. Nevertheless, they took a firm stand on the reunification of the German state and sought to challenge the status quo.⁶⁹ The promotion of the unity of the German nation was the guideline of the Federal government. However, German leaders recognized the importance of the problem of reunification for European security and in the interests of European peace they considered important to find interim arrangements which would promote the coherence of the German nation until such time as circumstances permitted its realization.⁷⁰ As the Federal Minister Scheel stated, the fact that the Federal government was pursuing its aim of reunification energetically did not mean that it had either set itself a deadline or would accept it from others. On contrary, it realized that détente was a long-term process and was prepared to maintain its efforts of détente in all directions. However, it was repeatedly emphasized, that détente must not be sought at the expense of security, and the pursuit of a détente policy was possible only because the allies' security was guaranteed by the Alliance.⁷¹ The intention to pursue a policy of détente the German government explained by Germany's "in-between situation" in the East-West conflict.⁷² It was stressed that security concerns remained in the centre of German foreign policy towards unification of European continent.⁷³

4.2.2 Foreign policy towards the EEC Northern enlargement

The German security aspirations in the EEC had practical policy implications and the archival materials shed light on Germany's attitude to the enlargement question. For the

⁶⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 730, Beratende Versammlung / Text der Rede von Staatssekretär Jahn, Strassburg, den 27. Januar 1969.

⁷⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/69/49, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 5th-6th November, 1969.

⁷¹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/71/30, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Ajuda Palace, Lisbon, 3rd June, 1971.

⁷² PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Ansprache des Herrn Minister über das Thema „Deutschland und Europa“, Bonn, den 7. Juni 1967.

⁷³ Ibid.

German governments the European economic integration has never been the thing-in-itself. The cooperation in the field of foreign policy among the states of common market, opened for other nations had to become a precondition to the firm security guaranties for the continent.⁷⁴ From the very beginning Western Europe was warned against making the vital issue of a “common foreign policy” dependant on the success of economic integration.⁷⁵ The economic integration of Europe would undoubtedly help to establish solidarity in foreign policy, but it was not a pre-requisite for such solidarity. Paul Henry Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, also warned the European countries that the Atlantic Alliance would collapse, unless the NATO states coordinate their foreign policy.⁷⁶ The European unity was inconceivable without the development of a common foreign course.⁷⁷ German leaders had repeatedly expressed their concern about little if any progress in the practice of the political consultations among the Six on the matters likely to affect the partnership of European nations.⁷⁸ However, German approach to political cooperation has been wholly pragmatic.⁷⁹ The superior goal of any German government was state’s territorial and national reunification.⁸⁰ The solution of the German question was only possible in conjunction with a large-scaled peaceful settlement between West and East.⁸¹ Hence the development of a common Western concept of foreign policy was specially important and urgent for this particular problem.⁸² Mainly for the reasons of

⁷⁴ PA AA, B 21, Band 728, Die Vorschläge der Bundesregierung zur Europapolitik, vom 4. November 1964.

⁷⁵ PA AA, B 21, Band 23, General Policy of the Council of Europe, 1957.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ PA AA, B 20-200, Band 1163, Beitrag zu erstellenden prognostischen und analytischen Aufzeichnung über die Europa-Politik, Bonn, den 28. Dezember 1966.

⁷⁹ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Vortrag vor dem amerikanischen National War College über deutsche Europapolitik, vom 11. April 1967.

⁸⁰ PA AA, B 2, Band 197, Seite 163, Der Auswärtige Ausschuss der Bundestages, Bonn, den 21. April 1972.

⁸¹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/67/27, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Kirchberg, Luxemburg, 13th June, 1967.

⁸² PA AA, B 21, Band 23, General Policy of the Council of Europe, 1957.

closer cooperation in the field of foreign and defense policies Germany attached a great importance to Britain's entry into the EEC.⁸³

France that strongly emphasized national component in the field of European and defense policy vetoed Britain's first application for accession to the common market because the UK has never come out for a supranational solution too.⁸⁴ Although the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr. Selwyn Lloyd assured that the House of Commons "recognizes the need for political and economic unity of Europe," he stressed, that for the United Kingdom the plan to make British Parliament to subordinate to some higher Parliament, is "no light matter."⁸⁵ In this regard, the desire to work not only for economical but also for political cooperation was stronger in France and Germany, than in the United Kingdom.⁸⁶ In 1963 Germany supported French veto because enlargement towards a state, which was very little inspired by the perspective to cooperate in the realm of foreign and defense policy, would weaken European dynamic of unification.⁸⁷ Earlier, in 1961, the German delegation made it clear that the EEC membership presupposed the participation in political consultations, and underlined the importance of this issue for Germany.⁸⁸ At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1963, turning to European matters, German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Carstens reaffirmed the policy of the Federal Republic supporting the entry of the Great Britain and other

⁸³ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Vortrag vor dem amerikanischen National War College über deutsche Europapolitik, vom 11. April 1967.

⁸⁴ PA AA, B 21, Band 730, Deutsch-französisches Verhältnis, Oktober 1969.

⁸⁵ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM5, ADH1, 1963, TEMP 252, Informativische Aufzeichnung. Erklärung der britischen Regierung zu ihren Europa-Politik vor dem Unterhaus (25. Juli 1960), Brüssel, den 16. August 1960.

⁸⁶ PA AA, B 21, Band 733, Interview Mr. Sulzberger mit dem Bundeskanzler vom 15. Mai 1968.

⁸⁷ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM5, ADH1, 1963, TEMP 312, Informativische Aufzeichnung. Parlamentarische Versammlung der Westeuropäischen Union – Beitritt des Vereinigten Königreichs zu den Gemeinschaften, Brüssel, den 7. Februar 1963.

⁸⁸ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM5, ADH1, 1963, TEMP 151, Entwurf einer allgemeinen Erklärung des Sprechers der Six auf der Regierungskonferenz der EWG-Mitgliedstaaten und Großbritanniens am 8. und 9. November 1961 in Brüssel.

prospective applicants into the European Community, but stressed that “for the immediate future this was impossibility.”⁸⁹

In contrast to the UK, two other applicant states - Denmark and Ireland, in general, supported the idea of political cooperation. Even though Irish government in regard to the political aims of the European Economic Community noticed, that “these have been defined in the Rome Treaty only in rather vogue terms,”⁹⁰ there were no doubt, that the members had “political objectives very much in mind” and expected that “all applicants for membership should be willing to work with them, without reservation or qualification, for the attainment of those objectives.” However, neither Ireland nor Denmark entered the EEC in 1963. There were two reasons for it. First, after the breakdown of negotiations on Britain’s membership neither of the states was willing to leave EFTA and enter the EEC separately. Second, the both Scandinavian states pursued foreign policy of neutrality that became an obstacle for their membership in the EEC. Ireland has not been a NATO-member. Denmark had good diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Against this background neutral foreign policy course had little interest in common with the European countries’ vital security concern. Although NATO membership was not identical to political cooperation⁹¹ and friendly relations with the USSR were supposed to ease the international tension, Ireland and Denmark had not been accepted because they lacked European identity. Identity was understood not as who they are (both belong to Europe geographically, historically and culturally),

⁸⁹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/63/14, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 20th March, 1963.

⁹⁰ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM5, ADH1, 1963, TEMP 318, Speech by Mr. Seán F. Lemass, Taoiseach, at Annual Dinner of Cork Chamber of Commerce, Imerial Hotel, Cork, Saturday, 11th November, 1961.

⁹¹ PA AA, B 2, Band 73, Seite 461, Behandlung des irisch Antrags auf Beitritt zur EWG, Bonn, den 16. Oktober 1961.

but rather whether and how they would contribute to cooperation in the field of foreign and defense policy in a smaller circle.⁹²

When the negotiation on the EEC membership of the Northern states had been broken down in 1963, neither the applicants were agreed on proposed association status, nor the member states considered the international situation to be more secure. A year after the rejection of Britain's, Denmark's and Ireland's membership in the Community of Six, the movement toward political unity in Western Europe had slowed down.⁹³ France strived to become a predominate power in the region.⁹⁴ According to NATO annual review,⁹⁵ by 1964 Germany had reached the highest standard of living in Europe and was expected to strike the right balance between further increase in material well-being and the requirements of an adequate security. Given that German defense expenditure had increased each year during period 1954-1964, it was to be hoped that Germany if this proved necessary to meet urgent military requirements would be able to raise the share of the GNP devoted to defense gradually. Italy was concerned with "privileged relations" between political might France and economical might Germany, and was plaguing enlargement towards Britain in order to build counterbalancing group Italy-UK.⁹⁶ The Netherlands resisted the European institutionalization of any kind until the UK would take part in it.⁹⁷ A permanent British presence in the Common Market could assure the Benelux countries and Italy that they would not become pawns in a France-German

⁹² PA AA, B 20, Band 640, Beitritt Dänemark zur geplanten politische Union. Bonn, den 7. November 1962.

⁹³ A/NATO, C. 32, SC (64), NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. The Future of the Atlantic Community. Speech given by Ambassador Livingston Merchant to members of the British Atlantic Committee on February 10th, 1964.

⁹⁴ PA AA, B 20, Band 1479, Die „besondere Beziehungen“ Großbritanniens zu den USA und deren Einfluss auf die europäische Rolle Großbritanniens, Bonn, den 10. Juli 1967.

⁹⁵ NATO Archive OTAN, C-M/64/119, 1964 Annual Review, Chapter on the Federal Republic of Germany, 30th November 1964.

⁹⁶ PA AA, B21, Band 734, Besuch Saragat in Großbritannien, Fernschreiben aus Rom, vom 2. Mai 1969.

⁹⁷ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Aufziehung über Europäische politische Zusammenarbeit, vom 3. November 1967.

struggle for ascendancy.⁹⁸ Britain had been losing its influence in the international arena and was forced to look for allies. The USSR might become one of them.⁹⁹ Moreover, the Soviet Union had strategic interest in the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the territory of Scandinavian states and was intended to use their political neutrality in order to weaken Western Europe defense on the Baltic coast.¹⁰⁰ Faced with threats both from within and threats from without, Europe had to decide either to “unite or perish.”¹⁰¹

After a dialog on Britain accession had been resumed Germany strongly supported the membership application of Denmark, Ireland and the UK in the hope to avoid division of Europe and prevent increase of the soviet influence in the region. At the beginning of the seventies Denmark and Ireland continued keeping their foreign-political course of neutrality. Ireland has not become a NATO-member. Denmark had rejected the Soviet proposal of creating nuclear-free zone, but the bilateral Soviet-Danish relations had been improving and the USSR's influence in the country was strong.¹⁰² Britain had agreed to consult with the EEC members on some politically relevant issues, but repeatedly emphasized that the Rome treaty is not a barrier to the state's independent foreign policy course.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, Britain's second application was accepted and the parallel accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK had become a success in 1973.

From the German perspective,¹⁰⁴ the question of an “altered character” of the enlarged Community after the entry of the Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland should be answered

⁹⁸ A/NATO, J. 134, PC (66) 45, Report of Political Committee, presented by the Reporter, Senator Jacob K. Javits, NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Twelfth Annual Session, NATO Headquarters, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, Paris 16e, 14th to 19th November, 1966.

⁹⁹ PA AA, B 20, Band 1479, Die „besondere Beziehungen“ Großbritanniens zu den USA und deren Einfluss auf die europäische Rolle Großbritanniens, Bonn, den 10. Juli 1967.

¹⁰⁰ PA AA, B 20, Band 1222, Sowjetisch-Dänische Beziehungen, 1965.

¹⁰¹ PA AA, B 20, Band 526, Statements by the Rt. Honorable Edward Heath, M.P., at the meeting in Paris on 10th October, 1961.

¹⁰² PA AA, B 20, Band 1222, Sowjetisch-dänische Beziehungen, 1965.

¹⁰³ PA AA, B 20, Band 1479, Erklärungen des britischen Staatsministers für europäischen Fragen im Foreign Office Lord Chalfont am 4. August 1967.

¹⁰⁴ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Deutsche Europapolitik, Bonn, den 6. Oktober 1967.

positively because, there were not only evident economic interests of the Federal Republic, but also the long-term prospective of German policy towards Europe. The problem of German reunification had to be solved in the framework of economic and political cooperation between West and East (so called “European Friedensordnung”). To enable this cooperation, first of all Western European states should began to cooperate among them. Furthermore given even stronger polarization of power relations among the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe should strengthen its position through involvement into economic and political cooperation with other inspired candidate countries. The rejection of membership applications would only hinder the efforts to provide security in the region and to reunify Germany later on. It was stressed that crucial for an integration success is not ideal functioning of the European institutions after the enlargement, but rather the real economic growth of the Community members. Moreover, enlargement would reinforce political cooperation among members-states. Hence, the German government saw enlargement as a means to strengthening of the European Community and to lessening of its dependence on the United States’ security guarantees. However, a strong and united Western Europe had not been seen as a counterpart of the Eastern Block, but rather it was expected to establish a dialog that would take into consideration states’ nation interests and thus could lead to cooperation among all European states regardless of their political regimes. The German question had been at the core of the German policy towards East and of the European policy of détente.

4.3 Conclusion

4.3.1 Performance of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy analysis

In sum, the newly declassified archival documents covering the Northern enlargement of the European Economic Community have shown that neorealist theories capture much of

the variation in Germany's EEC enlargement policy towards Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

First, it demonstrates the important role that external to the Federal Republic conditions played in the foreign policy decision making. Specifically, the evidence presented in this chapter supports a neorealist argument that transformation in distribution of power in the international system modifies Germany's security needs, and thus, alters its foreign behavior. In the period under investigation, West Germany was subject to the threat at two levels: at the international level from the Soviet Union and at the regional level from the feared smaller European neighbors prone to build a counter-coalition against the German growing might. Yet, Germany's security needs in the beginning of the 1960's had differed from those of the early 1970's. First, unlike in the early 1960's, in the 1970's the Soviet Union represented a military might that threatened to dominate Western Europe, while the United States put forward the idea of American troops' withdrawal from the European continent. Second, at the regional level increase in power indexes of Germany and France threatened to provoke grouping and coalition formation inside the European Community.

Second, a neorealist account expected that the Federal Republic would favor the European Community enlargement to an applicant state under the specific conditions discussed in the Chapter Two. The case study illustrates that neorealism does make empirically valid predictions. There was a rising power – the Soviet Union, which threatened to dominate the European region. Even though the Federal Republic was perceived as a regional would-be hegemon, it was not able to match the Soviet Union in terms of power. However, despite the fact that all three applicants – Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom were weaker than Germany states, the policy towards the European Community enlargement merited the approval of the Federal Republic only in the early 1970's after the candidates clearly demonstrated shared interest, i.e. responsibility to deter the common

aggressor – the Soviet Union - by means of cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. Reluctance of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to do so in the 1960's had become a destabilizing condition during their first application.

4.3.2 Performance of the defensive realism vs. offensive realism

The empirical findings presented in this chapter provide broader support for defensive realism and its security-maximization approach to the German policy towards the European Community Northern enlargement.

First, in situation when states are collectively faced with an external threat and cannot unilaterally ensure their security, defensive realism predicts that they may cooperate for survival. Specifically, defensive realists argue that at the international level the threat to Western European security posed by the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War provided the impetus for extensive cooperation in the European region. At the level of region, in the period under investigation the unification of Germany and the waning credibility of American security guarantees to the continent had the potential to provoke a severe security competition among the European states. The Federal Republic understood that the re-emergence of security dilemma in the region would undermine its own perspective for survival, and being motivated by very defensive realist concern about survival, Germany should be willing to mitigate the security threat at the both international and regional level through cooperative strategy of the European Economic Community enlargement. As Waltz puts it, "living in the superpowers' shadow" Germany saw that offense was fruitless and began to believe it impossible, and decided to run the risk of suffering relative losses of cooperation (Waltz 1979:70). Offensive realism expects states to pursue more competitive policies to maximize their power as the best way to ensure their survival. In regard to the case at hand, during the Cold War Germany was motivated by very offensive realist

concerns about power and pursued power enhancing strategy of reunification. Given that internationally security was provided by balancing of two world superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union, at the level of the European region the Federal Republic as a potential hegemon should forgo cooperative policies of the European Economic Community enlargement in favor of reunification as a special effort to maximize its share of world power. Offensive realism’s most robust account of a resurgence of German power revolves around the US essential interest in a prosperous and powerful West Germany (Mearsheimer 2001: 325). This is not what happened. Documentary evidence of Germany’s policy towards the EEC Northern enlargement defeated offensive realist logic. The Federal Republic actions were not designed to enhance its power by means of reunification. German enlargement policy was driven instead by its desire to pay cost of cooperative efforts to secure what it had. To change the status quo for Germany, its leaders were not willing to take greater risk of reunification, unless survival is assured. This is what defensive realism would expect. As Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Moersch said, the German decision for enlargement of the European Community had become the decision that postponed the goal of the German reunification, but at the same time it met Germany’s urgent need for security and guaranteed freedom for the Federal Republic.¹⁰⁵

Second conclusion to be drawn is that offensive realism has some inconsistencies between predicted value and Germany’s enlargement policy observed in this chapter. Following power-maximization course in its foreign policy towards European enlargement Germany, as a revisionist state seeking power-maximization, was mainly concerned about security and détente. Defensive realism demonstrated here the higher degree of consistency. To recover its power position vis-à-vis military might of Soviet Russia, the Federal Republic had provided guarantee to smaller European states not to use its power against them. Being

¹⁰⁵ PA AA, B 21, Band 730, Wortprotokoll der Bandaufnahme mit Herrn Staatssekretär Moersch vom 26.11.1971.

self-bound in the European Community with an enlarging number of participants Germany, first, signaled its benign non-aggressive intents,¹⁰⁶ and second, tried to ease the tension in Europe to enable peaceful reunification of its Eastern territories. This is another important observation in this case study, discriminating between two rival approaches. Germany had sought to maximize its security in order to maximize its power. This evidence proves at the same time the correctness of defensive realist predictions and the incorrectness of competing offensive realist approach.

Third, the evidence does substantiate a prospect theory-based model of decision making embedded into defensive realism's approach to foreign policy analysis. Indeed, in the beginning of the 1960's German leaders perceived a strategy of enlargement as one that leads to losses. Given the achieved level of European cooperation, policy of non-enlargement was intended to defend the European Community against damage which could be caused by membership of neutral states reluctant to cooperate in the field of foreign policy and security. But after the alteration in the balance of power took place, threat to the German security did not have their previous level. Specifically, given the neutrality of the applicants and increased political interest of the Soviet Union in the Scandinavian countries, at the end of the 1960's expectations that, first, non-enlargement would lead to a certain loss in external security for the Federal Republic, and that, second, power asymmetries among the Six would worsen the Federal Republic's (a would-be hegemon) position inside the EEC, reinforced the German government support of the European Community enlargement towards the candidate states. It was German leaders¹⁰⁷ and their European partners belief that "no European state will be able to dominate that cooperation"¹⁰⁸ of economic nature and presumably of political character as well. This contradicts the prediction derived from offensive realism. Even though the Federal

¹⁰⁶ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 79, Bericht des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen zur außenpolitischen Lage, vom 27. Juni 1980.

¹⁰⁷ PA AA, B 21, Band 730, Wortprotokoll der Bandaufnahme mit Herrn Staatssekretär Moersch vom 26.11.1971.

¹⁰⁸ PA AA, B 20-200, Band 1460, Address by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark Mr. Jens Otto Krag, to the National Press Club, Washington D. C. September 27, 1967.

Republic had salient power interests at stake – the goal of reunification – it neither pursued expansionist foreign policy, nor tried to gain a position of regional hegemon.

In sum, what the neorealist research programme assumes about state behavior remains a theoretical question, not an empirical one. The task here was to prove whether these assumptions give rise to possibly correct expectations about a state foreign behavior in context of a broader theory. The main neorealist prediction that Germany's policy towards Northern enlargement would vary due to the structure of the international system, has been confirmed. Under condition of the threat from increasing military strength of the USSR and relative decline of the US power position, the need for reducing the danger of war in Europe became much stronger at the end of the sixties than it was in their eve. A quest for security imperatively demanded an extension of united Europe.¹⁰⁹ Since the Federal Republic of Germany had been particularly interested in securing its reunification in conditions of freedom, it also supported the European Community enlargement in the attempt to convince those European partners, which might feel threatened by the very possibility of German reunification, that the consequential power increase would never be used to attack them.

¹⁰⁹ NATO Archive OTAN, PO/68/375, Recommendations and resolutions adopted by the thirteenth annual session of the „Northern Atlantic Assembly”, 5th July, 1968.

CHAPTER FIVE:

**GERMAN POLICY ON MEDITERRANEAN
ENLARGEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY TOWARDS GREECE, PORTUGAL AND
SPAIN IN THE 1970'S**

5.1 Background

Since the bipolarity had been a constant property at the global level during the 1970's, there was nothing to vary in the probabilities of dramatic structural changes. However, changes in structural dynamics occurred in the unbalanced multipolarity at the level of Europe. The statement about unbalanced multipolarity should be caveated with a reminder that in neorealist terms (Mearsheimer 2001: 337), a system is unbalanced if it contains an aspiring hegemon. The basic requirement for balance is that there no a marked difference in power between the two leading states. As it is shown in the *Figure 5.1*, the United Kingdom's membership would contribute more to the establishment of balance of power among countries of the European Economic Community in the 1960's, than in the 1970's. In this regard, the fact that in the ten years since the first application, the power index of the United Kingdom had been significantly reduced in comparison to that of the Federal Republic provides the evidence of Germany remaining a European would-be hegemon

within the European Community of Nine. After this remark I specify the dominating trends in power constellation at the regional level. First, despite the fact that the United States' relative power had waned, the country still played a key role in the defense of Western Europe. Second, although, the dominant Soviet position in Eastern Europe remained a political and military fact, the Eastern Bloc had lost much of its monolithic character. Third, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean represented a serious threat to the European region from the South. Fourth, political integration in Western Europe in the field of foreign and security policy had still been away from a genuinely common European foreign policy. In the following chapter I will show that differences in the German foreign policy towards the Mediterranean enlargements of the European Economic Community were caused by changes in the power balance in the European region and the security fears that these changes generated. Specifically, in the 1970's the increasing capacities and military presence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean region presented a major challenge to the European balance of power. From a neorealist point of view, Germany's peers in the region should have sought to rectify the imbalance.

5.1.1 Conditions of the international system

In the period under investigation, Soviet strategic and political interests were deeply involved in the Mediterranean.¹¹⁰ In the 1970's the continued build-up of Soviet Naval forces in the Mediterranean area was a matter of grave concern to both the United States and its Western European allies. It should be noticed that the more than one-half of Europe's total energy resources came from the Middle-East. For this reason alone the Soviet Union, if unchecked in that area, might hold Europe to ransom, being both

¹¹⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/71/30, Part II, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Ajuda Palace, Lisbon, 4th June, 1971.

economically and strategically in a position of control such as it had not held in the whole history of Russia.¹¹¹

The main cause of tension in the Middle East was the dispute between Israel and the Arab states. In this regard North Atlantic Assembly's draft report on Political Problems underlined the Soviet Union's main responsibility for the achievement of peace and security in the Middle East. A settlement could not be reached until the Soviet Union persuaded its Arab client states to modify their attitude towards Israel, to recognize its existence and to guarantee its frontiers. On its side, Israel had made it clear that it is not prepared to accept the Soviet Union as a guarantor of a Middle East settlement – a situation which would give the USSR a juridical basis for future intervention in the affairs of Israel, the Middle East and the Mediterranean and which would constitute a diplomatic and political triumph for Moscow.

According to the North Atlantic Assembly report of 1969,¹¹² the Mediterranean region had always been, a “Western Lake”, but the hostility of Western political leaders to the emerging force of “progressive” Pan-Arab nationalism led in the 1950's to a deterioration of Western relations with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Whereas the Arab governments of the “ancient regime” had suppressed Communism, and supported NATO, the “progressive” Arab republics turned to China, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for weaponry and military aid. The Soviet Union had exploited this situation to the utmost. As a result, before the June War of 1967, the United Arab Republic was already heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for arms and economic aid. Apart from the strong position it had established in the United Arab Republic and Algeria, the Soviet Union had achieved its traditional aim of access to the Mediterranean. Until 1967,

¹¹¹ A/NATO, N 308, (16) CR 1, North Atlantic Assembly, Sixteen Annual Session. Official Report, Monday, 9th November, 1970.

¹¹² A/NATO, M 153, PC (69) 12, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), September 1969.

individual Soviet warships or submarines passed through the Turkish Straits or through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean for short visits. Since May 1967, the situation had completely changed. Between May 1967 and August 1967, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean more than doubled and during 1968 the number of the Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean varied between 30 and 60, remaining, in general, at the level slightly below that of the 1967 pick.

It was believed¹¹³ that the main reason for the establishment of a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean was to “show the flag” so as to encourage and back up Soviet client states in the area and to discourage and frighten Western client states. Further, by means of its Mediterranean fleet, the Soviet Union could threaten Yugoslavia and Albania and was also in position to cut off the vital supply routes of Greece, Turkey and Italy. The Soviet fleet also posed a threat of direct military intervention in countries such as Israel or Morocco which might come into conflict with the United Arab Republic or Algeria. Although the Soviet Mediterranean fleets could not compete with the Mediterranean fleets of the NATO countries and the US Sixth Fleet, it could “mark” and possibly attempt to neutralize the nuclear capabilities of the Sixth Fleet and of American Polaris submarines in Mediterranean.

The Middle East conflict had occurred on the doorstep of Europe and events in that area had a direct effect on the European region. It had been observed for a long time that the Middle East situation was drifting towards a crisis and the necessary initiatives had never been forthcoming. It should be noted that Western Europe depended heavily on regular oil supplies and every aggravation of the Middle East conflict threatened the economies of many European allies as well as their security – which included that Alliance as a whole – and affected relations with the Soviet Union. Commenting on the events, German Federal

¹¹³ Ibid.

Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel pointed to the dangers to peace and to the détente policy which arose from the Middle East conflict. Clearly, therefore, members the Alliance and the European Community of Nine had a vital interest in a solution and should all contribute to political stability in the Middle East. The problem of raw materials supplies, especially oil, was particularly acute but it was one which had existed even before the Middle East War, an event which had only emphasized the problem. There was a specific interdependence in the sense that solution to the problem of raw materials could be reached only in the presence of successful cooperation between producers and consumers.¹¹⁴

In the period under investigation the European Economic Community was considered to be the largest promoter of economic integration on the European side of Mediterranean. The intention behind the EEC trade agreement and associations with countries around Mediterranean was the hope that an economic community might eventually lead to a political community. In this regard the United States Ambassador to the Community Schaetzel, expressed his concerns and pointed to American Administration's fear that these agreements might lead to new economic and political blocs, which could impair American economic interests.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the very EEC "philosophy of association" with Mediterranean states was not simply based on the economic interests in the region, but rather on the political and strategic necessity to secure the European Southern flank.¹¹⁶ This new policy connected the European and the Mediterranean states might, however, jeopardize the maintenance of American interest in the region. Thus, Spain had been left with no alternative, but to choose between Europe and the United States.¹¹⁷ The United States had friendly relations with Spain, which resulted also in the special military

¹¹⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/73/74, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10th December, 1973.

¹¹⁵ A/NATO, Document N 67, PC EC/MED (70) 7.

¹¹⁶ PA AA, B 21, Band 729, Deutsche Europapolitik, Bonn, den 6. Oktober 1967.

¹¹⁷ PA AA, B 20, Band 1854, Besuch des US-Handelsministers in Spanien, Bonn, den 27. April 1971.

arrangement under the Defense Agreement of 1953. Moreover, in 1963 the United States government decided to make the extension of this Agreement for the next five-year term. Hence, the United States reminded that the facilities made available for the American military use in Spain served as an addition to the over-all defense of Western Europe.¹¹⁸


Moreover, some Mediterranean countries such as Greece, which was linked to the Community by association treaty, considered the Western European movement towards unification as a problem that the region had to face. Greek government felt that this development could strengthen and could also weaken the Western position. It was recalled that the members of the European Economic Community were in process of creating consultative machinery. This raised the question of the relationship between political consultation in the Community and consultation within NATO. It was then in the general interest that the quest for negotiated solution on consultation between the European and the North American members of the Alliance and on consultation between members of the European Economic Community and the associated countries whose integration within the Community was only a matter of time, should be conducted with only one precondition, namely, security.¹¹⁹

5.1.2 Power constellation

In the period under investigation there were four major changes in structural dynamics in Europe (see *Figure 5.1*). First, the United States had lost much of its former economic, technological, and industrial edge to Western Europe. Second, the dominant Soviet position in Eastern Europe remained a political and military fact. Third, the European Economic Community, which had been slowly degenerating into a free trade area, could

¹¹⁸ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/63/56, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, 27th September, 1963.

¹¹⁹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/25, Part II, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Bonn, 30th May, 1972.



SOURCE: The numbers for each country and for each year are from Singer, David J. (1987) *Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985*. *International Interactions*, 14, 115-132.

Figure 5. 1 Graphic illustration of national material capabilities in the years: 1961-1986.

hardly contribute to the stability in the region. According to a report of the North Atlantic Assembly of 1977,¹²⁰ the United States had a certain conventional power advantage on Western Europe's borders, but it (the United States) was no longer regarded as the "unchallenged Titan" and it was having more bilateral arguments with its allies today that it had 15 years ago. The Soviet Union had impressive strategic weapons that could strike directly at the United States and in its (the Soviet Union) relations with Western Europe no dramatic changes had taken place except increased economic and technological exchanges. Fourth, and most significantly, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, representing as it did a serious threat from the South, had radically altered the strategic situation on the Southern flank of Europe, which until recent years had been threatened only from the North. Thus, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Bitsios said in 1974 that his country was directly affected by any disturbance in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean and was keeping a careful watch on developments in the Middle East crisis, which were causing it serious concern.¹²¹ It was mentioned that the Middle East conflict had provided the Soviet Union with a means of furthering its aims with respect to the oil-producing countries, and to the extent that the Arab states lost their confidence and the faith in the efforts of the West and thus their hope for a satisfactory solution, they were expected to lean more and more towards Moscow.¹²² The Middle East War had once more proved to what extent the developments in that region had important repercussions on Europe and the Northern Alliance as a whole even though it was outside the area covered by the Atlantic Treaty. The dispute had enabled the Soviet Union to increase its influence and penetration in the area

¹²⁰ A/NATO, U 124, PC (77) 5, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft General Report on Atlantic Political Problems, presented by Mr. Pieter Dankert, (Netherlands), General Reporter, September 1977.

¹²¹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/74/60, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 12th - 13th December, 1974.

¹²² Ibid.

thereby creating a potential threat against the Alliance in general and Europe's Southern Flank in particular.¹²³

A report¹²⁴ submitted to the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in 1970 contains an analysis of the increasingly evident Soviet presence in the Middle East and Mediterranean, which, according to the study, had been established on a permanent basis. The unsettled political relations between Israel and the Arab countries provided the Soviet Union with a profitable area of intervention. The presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean coupled with increasing Soviet political and military influence in some of the major Arab states, and the consequent threat of eventual Soviet control over the Middle East's oil supplies to Western Europe added up to a situation in which the Soviet Union was able to exploit local tension to apply psychological, military, political and economic pressure on the whole Mediterranean region including the NATO.¹²⁵ Hence, it was only logical that the Western concern for the security of the Mediterranean as an oil-supplying and transporting region should, since the closure of the Suez Canal, be extended to the security of the oil route from the Persian Gulf round the South African Cape up to Western Europe. Purely military measures were, however, considered to be only a partial response to Soviet penetration of this area, which is largely political and economic in its nature.¹²⁶ Besides the steps taken by NATO to counter the Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean, it was suggested that individual member country of NATO should also take steps to protect the oil supply route from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe around the South African Cape. The long-term aim was of replacing the present political instability of the Mediterranean region by a more stable supply. Thus, in the Declaration of the North

¹²³ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/73/74, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10th December, 1973.

¹²⁴ A/NATO, N 47, PC (70) 3, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), June 1970.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ A/NATO, M 153, PC (69) 12, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft Report on Atlantic Political Problems, prepared by Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, General Reporter (Germany), September 1969.

Atlantic Assembly on the future of the Alliance in 1970 an emphasis was made, among other issues, on “mounting Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean, Baltic and North Seas and the corresponding increase in pressure on the Northern and South-East flanks of the Alliance.”¹²⁷ Specifically, the Assembly urged the North Atlantic Alliance to strengthen the military measures in order to counter the Soviet naval build-up by setting up a standing NATO naval force in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the governments of the European members of the Alliance were urged “to concert and implement parallel action towards the creation of greater political unity with a view to strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic partnership.”¹²⁸

For the foreseeable future there was no alternative to the Alliance and all members would have to prevent the development of any internal crisis and meet external crisis jointly.¹²⁹ The Alliance remained essential in order to maintain balance, security and the prospects of a successful détente policy in the region. The security of Western Europe continued to be based on the United States forces and nuclear shield. Although, concern was felt about the continued arms build-up of the Warsaw Pact, there were some signs of gradual changes in relations with Eastern Europe, giving rise to the long-term hope.¹³⁰ However, the German government believed that the political evolution of the European Community would favorably affect the contributions made by its members to the defense problem. There were expectations that Europe was approaching political union. Through the creation of the “European Council” the European Community hoped provide its member-states with “an appropriate forum” in which the Heads of Government and their Foreign Ministers “can examine in a single context, the economic and political problems arising at any given

¹²⁷ A/NATO, N 311, Declaration on the Future of the Alliance, 1970.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/73/74, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10th December, 1973.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

moment.”¹³¹ It was reaffirmed that “political cooperation between the Nine remains one of the elements necessary for giving relations in Europe a positive direction, one which increasingly corresponds to those principles of real détente which must reach far enough.” “Concerted political planning” by the Nine was expected to “yield results not only in the major arenas for international cooperation but also in other context,” involving regions close to Europe geographically. Specifically, “a serious investigation was begun of the opportunities for cooperation between the countries on either side of Mediterranean.” According to a report of 1975 submitted to the European Parliament, “it is, in fact, the concern generated by the tensions in the Middle East that laid the continuous consultations by the Nine on this topic during the past year.”¹³²

However, a report of 1977 on Alliance Political Problems¹³³ stated opposite. The European Community was recognized to be still an important experiment in international relations, but it failed to create a forum for consultation on foreign policy and security. Thus, in a reply to Oral Question of 1975 put on behalf of the European Parliament concerning the Community’s future policy towards the Soviet Union, the Council of the European Communities stated that this kind of issues “presuppose detailed analyses and studies which the Council has not in fact carried out and which it is moreover not in a position to carry out. It has, furthermore, never discussed these matters.”¹³⁴ Therefore the report of 1977 on Alliance Political Problems¹³⁵ pointed to considerable danger that European Economic Community would no longer be able to keep the momentum of its earlier years and slowly degenerate into a free trade area. In such a situation its contribution to Western

¹³¹ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM2, 1975, TEMP 180, Rapport de M. Rumor, president de la conference des ministres des affaires étrangères, au PE sur la cooperation politique, 15.10.1975.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ A/NATO, U 124, PC (77) 5, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft General Report on Atlantic Political Problems, presented by Mr. Pieter Dankert, (Netherlands), General Reporter, September 1977.

¹³⁴ Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM2, Liste Rouge, 1976, TEMP 20667, Reply by the President in Office of the Council of the European Communities to Oral Question with debate: No 0-80/75, put by Mr. Dykes on behalf of the European Conservative Group of the European Parliament concerning “Relations between the EEC and the Soviet Union”, Luxembourg, 8 April, 1976.

¹³⁵ A/NATO, U 124, PC (77) 5, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft General Report on Atlantic Political Problems, presented by Mr. Pieter Dankert, (Netherlands), General Reporter, September 1977.

European development and therefore to Western stability could hardly be expected. The danger could be precipitated by the conditions of Greece, Portugal and Spain entry. Politically, all democratic European nations had right to apply for EEC membership. It is however exactly this condition under which a rapid entry of the three applicants could not be foreseen, as rapid entry could easily bring about an inexorable drift towards a “two-tier” Community, where a core of richer countries would be allowed to forge ahead of their partners to close economic cooperation. This would certainly undermine the basic argument of enlargement: the stabilization of democracy in three countries.

5.2 Strategic behavior of the Federal Republic of Germany

This section turns to the available empirical record that illustrates German foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis the question of the European Economic Community enlargement towards Greece, Portugal and Spain. Here, I offer a detailed account of the external to the Federal Republic conditions and their evaluation by the German leaders that caused the changes in German enlargement policy in the 1970's to provide important contextual information.

5.2.1 Security needs

The German government¹³⁶ was deeply concerned with the dangerous military disparity in conventional and nuclear forces among the Soviet Union and Europe. From Germany's point of view, the defense and détente were connected at the both global and regional level and included military forces, geo-strategic situation, strategic concepts and such factors as economy, population and political structures. However, if at the international level the NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been kept in balance, the Western states were trying to

¹³⁶ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 27, Entgegennahme einer Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, vom 10. April 1978.

preserve their power position against evidently unaltered policy of power-extension pursued by the states of the Eastern Block. Although, by the end of 1973 the strategic balance between the two super-powers had reduced the danger of escalation inherent in West-East conflict, a specific question had been raised with regard to the European defense. Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union were each vulnerable to strategic weapons only, Europe, for its part, was vulnerable to both tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. It would even be vulnerable to political pressure should it have the impression that it would not be defended in a conflict. Thus, the balance of force had a stabilizing effect in the two powers' relations, or in the confrontation between them, whereas this was not possible for Europe because there was a danger of other forms of conflict as a result of geographical conditions and asymmetrical resources. For these reasons, therefore it seemed that the problem of European defense was taking a character of its own responsibility.¹³⁷

In 1967 German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Brandt told at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council that with the appearance of the Middle East crisis the Federal government had reaffirmed its policy of non-intervention into the Mediterranean region, but added that no one could remain indifferent. He thought that a lasting solution to the problems in the Middle East was essential for the security of the Alliance and for a successful policy of détente in Europe, and might be easier to achieve within the regional framework. He regretted the fact that Europe had shown a certain political underdevelopment in the face of the conflict on its doorstep, but urged that, in any case, the West should proceed with caution and avoid giving the impression of trying to dictate a peace settlement.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/73/65, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 14th November, 1973.

¹³⁸ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/67/27, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Kirchberg, Luxembourg, 13th June, 1967.

In connection with its statement on the German problem Brandt reminded that the question of reunification of the country could be solved only in conjunction with the European peace settlement and the latter could only be possible in a state of détente. For the German government, security was not just a question of the borders. It was the German leaders' opinion that if the Federal Republic had strived for security in terms of integrity of its territories it would have become a beginning of new conflicts in Europe. Instead, when the German government raised the question of security with regard to Berlin and the German Eastern territories, it referred to the establishment of the balance of interests and power in the region.¹³⁹ The Federal government refrained from making its policy of détente dependent on any progress in the solution of German problems. Despite the fact that Moscow had wished to exclude these problems from European détente, and that the Soviet leaders made political pre-conditions designed to continue the division of Germany, accusing Bonn of revanchism and militarism,¹⁴⁰ the German government expressed its determination towards continued policy of détente in the East-West relations even after the Soviet Union's intervention into Afghanistan in 1979, when it became clear that the USSR took a tenable risk in the region where the stability lacked. German leaders worried that the Soviet Union might as well try this scenario in divided Europe too.¹⁴¹ In this regard, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1974 German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher underlined the continued importance that the Federal government granted to NATO and to presence of the Atlantic allies in Europe for maintenance of security as a pre-condition for an effective détente policy. To achieve this aim, Atlantic policy would have to be carried out in harmony with its complementary European policy because European unification could only be achieved under the shield of the Alliance, which in its turn, would be strengthened by this unification. Genscher added

¹³⁹ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 79, Bericht des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen zur außenpolitischen Lage, vom 27. Juni 1980.

¹⁴⁰ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/67/27, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Kirchberg, Luxembourg, 13th June, 1967.

¹⁴¹ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 79, Bericht des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen zur außenpolitischen Lage, vom 27. Juni 1980.

that East-West relations should not impede the unification of Europe and reiterated his government's support of a policy of détente with the East.¹⁴²

As it was admitted in the annual political appraisal presented at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 1974,¹⁴³ in matching the Soviet military build-up difficulties arose mainly from economic problems. The resources available to governments for all purposes were reduced mainly because of increase in prices of raw materials and energy. Given the impressive military efforts undertaken world-wide by the Soviet Union, which went well beyond legitimate Soviet security needs, the security of the West was not stable and a sudden crisis in East-West relations continued to be likely. In this situation, absolute security of one power led to the absolute insecurity of the others. Thus, Mediterranean countries had already expressed their concerns that the steady build-up in the Soviet presence had upset the existing balance in the region. Soviet influence was continually increasing in the area, and this worsened the threat for the Mediterranean states.¹⁴⁴ It had been made clear enough that détente was not irreversible, automatic or all-embracing. Détente without adequate power in political form was likely to be short-lived and unbalanced.¹⁴⁵ Taking into account the constellation of power, the German government hoped that security in Europe could be guaranteed only through unity to which actually, the European Community was originally aimed.¹⁴⁶ It was hoped that only united Europe could increase its capacity to act and reduce its inferiority to the Soviet Union.

¹⁴² NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/74/28, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Government Conference Centre, Ottawa, 18th June, 1974.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/72/25, Part II, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held in Bonn, 30th May, 1972.

¹⁴⁵ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/74/28, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Government Conference Centre, Ottawa, 18th June, 1974.

¹⁴⁶ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 105665, Zukünftige Entwicklungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Bonn, den 10. Juli 1975.

From the point of view of international relations,¹⁴⁷ the consequences of the European Community enlargement could be formidable. First, Europe's direct political responsibility in the Mediterranean regions would tremendously increase. Second, a more direct involvement in Middle East problems would almost certainly follow. Third, enlargement would strengthen already existing tendencies of confronting the United States with carefully prepared European positions concerning more active involvement into the Mediterranean region. Yet, it was expected that in consequence of the European Community enlargement towards the economically weak Mediterranean countries the integration process would inevitably slow down. However, the European and foreign political aspects of their joining of European Community were to weight up against this negative perspective. Specifically, of strategic importance were, first, the political demand to avoid the division of the European continent; second, the security need to strengthen its Southern Flank; and finally, the foreign political worry that, if not accepted into the EEC, these Mediterranean countries might opt for neutral foreign political orientation or would fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. From this point of view, the German government favored Greece's and Portugal's entry and expressed its concern about Spain's relatively distant perspective for membership.¹⁴⁸ Germany warned against further postponement of negotiation on Spain that could lead to even larger foreign political gap between Spain and the European Community.¹⁴⁹ The strategic importance of Spain for European defense was considerable.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ A/NATO, U 124, PC (77) 5, North Atlantic Assembly, Draft General Report on Atlantic Political Problems, presented by Mr. Pieter Dankert, (Netherlands), General Reporter, September 1977.

¹⁴⁸ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 105669, Problematik weiterer Beitritte zur Europäische Gemeinschaft. Zusammenfassung und Entscheidungsvorschlag, Bonn, den 16. September 1975.

¹⁴⁹ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 105669, Spanien – EG, Bonn, den 15. Februar 1974.

¹⁵⁰ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 105669, Ministerbesuch. Thema - Spanien und EG, Bonn, den 7. März 1975.

5.2.2 Foreign policy towards the EEC Mediterranean enlargements

Paying attention to critical developments in the Mediterranean, German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel commented in 1970 that the Middle East conflict helped the Soviet Union to advance even into the Western Mediterranean. He believed that under this condition, the contribution of the European nations in promoting economic and social development and in strengthening relations within the area was of indisputable significance.¹⁵¹ However, in the early 1970's Germany had been following the European Community approach to the Mediterranean countries which remained exclusively economic one. The Community had decided against political involvement through establishment of free trade areas or custom unions with states in that area. According to a report of 1975 addressing the European Parliament, the Community's attitude to Portugal was characterized "by the Nine's hope and fervent desire" for "economic progress" and "democratic stability" in the country.¹⁵² Acting on this basis the European Council accepted the Portuguese government's request for aid, but reaffirmed the Community's fundamental political approach of support for the countries of pluralist democracies, and stressed at the same time the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. As for Spain, the Nine expressed their "earnest desire" to see the country among the EEC members, yet, "in keeping with the democratic aspirations which are at the basis of Community's ties."¹⁵³ With Greece the Community had relations in form of "increasing of political information" to the country. Due to the fact that the Greek association suffered in the early 1970's from the political situation within the country, all the European Community's stipulations, which required consultation and new agreements, had been suspended until Greece returned to the democratic form of government. The report ended

¹⁵¹ NATO Archive OTAN, C-R/70/28, Part I, Summary records of a meeting of the Council held at the Palazzo dei Congressi, Rome, 26th May, 1970.

¹⁵² Archives Historiques du Conseil, CM2, 1975, TEMP 180, Rapport de M. Rumor, president de la conference des ministres des affaires étrangères, au PE sur la cooperation politique, 15.10.1975.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

by the Nine's strong belief in "European political identity" as "a factor tending to promote co-operation and security between states", "resisting each cause of conflict and tension."¹⁵⁴

Following the Middle-East crisis that enabled the Soviet Union to increase its influence in the Mediterranean region, creating thereby threat to Europe from the South, the German leaders¹⁵⁵ had given higher political priority to the Southern enlargement of the European Community towards Greece, Portugal and Spain in the late 1970's than during the previous years. It was expected that accession of these three countries would not only contribute to the stabilization in Southern Europe,¹⁵⁶ but provided also security for Western Europe. For the German government, the EEC membership of the Mediterranean states – even being long-term prospects – was indispensable first of all for security reasons.¹⁵⁷ Security, strengthening of democracy and European unification became paramount arguments in favor of the Mediterranean enlargement. The economic problems of Greece, Portugal and Spain entry to the EEC had been seen from this point of view.¹⁵⁸ In general, it was repeatedly stated that security and European unity became a cornerstone of German foreign policy towards the Southern enlargements. In particular, however, there were some worries expressed in regard to the possibly unbalanced strengthening of the "Southern bloc countries" within the European Community.¹⁵⁹

In 1976 the German government favored Greece entry into the European Community and made it clear that it should be followed by joining to the EEC of Portugal and Spain later on. It pointed to the increasing role of security considerations in its foreign political

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121841, Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Integration in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Berichtszeitraum Oktober 1977 bis März 1978.

¹⁵⁶ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121841, Lage der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Bonn, den 21. Mai 1979.

¹⁵⁷ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121695, Aktuelle Fragen der EG-Politik. Beziehungen EG – Iberische Halbinsel, Bonn, den 30. Dezember 1976.

¹⁵⁸ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121695, Probleme eines etwaigen EU-Beitritts Portugals, Bonn, den 24. Februar 1977.

¹⁵⁹ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121695, Aufziehung über die Probleme eines etwaigen EU-Beitritts Portugals, Bonn, den 27. August 1976.

decision to support Mediterranean enlargements¹⁶⁰ and underlined its strong support to membership of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Specifically, Portugal had not only been of considerable strategic importance for the Northern Atlantic Alliance, but its long-term bilateral military cooperation with Germany was also essential for the security in Europe.¹⁶¹ German leaders believed that Mediterranean enlargements would contribute to the security on the continent. It was also expected that through an extension of the EEC Southern dimension, enlargement would have retroactive effect on balance of power in Europe and in the Mediterranean region.¹⁶² Although, it was stipulated that political stabilization in the Mediterranean was connected to the both economic and security relevant factors¹⁶³, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher in his speech¹⁶⁴ in German Bundestag in 1979 underlined the great foreign political significance of European Community enlargement towards Greece, Portugal and Spain. Particularly, he stressed that the foreign political reasons compelled Germany and other European states to support the applications of these three candidate countries in the hope that the Southern enlargement would better preserve the specific European interests in the Mediterranean region.

Thus, Greece had applied for the EEC membership in June, 12th 1975, Portugal in March, 27th 1977 and Spain in July, 28th 1977. However, as became evident from the historical documents, shortly before, in May 21st 1977 the Foreign Ministers of the Nine had already agreed that even though the entry of the applicants would pose unquestionable economic problems, the political reasons in favor of the Mediterranean enlargements prevailed and were an issue of particular concern for all the member-states. Yet, it was still unclear, when these Mediterranean countries would become full members. If Greece and Portugal

¹⁶⁰ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 114352, Außenpolitischer Teil des Regierungsprogramms, Bonn, den 11. November 1976.

¹⁶¹ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 15, Beratung der Vorlage des Auswärtigen Amtes betreffend Abgabe von Überschussmaterial aus Beständen der Bundeswehr an die Türkei, Griechenland und Portugal, vom 19. Oktober 1977.

¹⁶² PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121687, EPZ and EG-Erweiterung, Bonn, den 16. September 1977.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ PA AA, Zwischenarchiv, 121691, Erklärung von Bundesminister Genscher im Auswärtigen Ausschuss des Bundestages am 14.11.79 (EG-Beitritt Griechenlands), Bonn, den 12. November 1979.

were expected to enter the EEC not before 1980, the negotiations on the Spanish membership were supposed to require a longer period of time.¹⁶⁵

5.3 Conclusion

5.3.1 Performance of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy analysis

The historical evidence from the Mediterranean enlargements of the European Economic Community indicates that the neorealist perspectives on states foreign policy correctly highlight the effects of structural imputes on Germany's foreign behavior towards entry of three applicant countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1970's.

Indeed, resolute structural constrains were the important pattern of Germany's foreign behavior towards the European Community enlargement during the 1970's, a period characterized by Middle East crisis and the Soviet military build-up in Mediterranean. At the beginning of the 1970's, the German leaders had been following common for the European Community policy of exclusively economic cooperation with Greece, Portugal and Spain. At that time the European Community membership of three economically weak Mediterranean countries was not feasible because it would inevitably slow down the integration process in Western Europe. In accordance with neorealist expectations, Germany gave more weight to negative long-term economic repercussions at the beginning of 1970's, because security competition in Europe was not that fierce as it turned to be later on. The Mediterranean region on the ground of its geo-strategic location had been of utmost importance for the Western defense. Therefore, after the increase of the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean and the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan in the late 1970's the issue of the Southern Flank took high priority for the Western European

¹⁶⁵ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 17, Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Erweiterung der EG, vom 9. November 1977.

countries and Germany in particular.¹⁶⁶ The German government perceived the Mediterranean enlargements of the Economic Community to be indispensable for security reasons and saw the economic problems of Greece, Portugal and Spain from the foreign political point of view. Security-related power political reasons compelled Germany to support the Mediterranean countries' membership applications. The empirical evidence does substantiate neorealist theories expectation that the Federal Republic will subordinate non-security gains to political interests, because in the European system of the late 1970's with a high level of security competition Germany's first concern was to maximize the likelihood of its survival. In this regard, changes in the Federal Republic foreign behavior were not affected by changes in balance of power between superpowers, but rather variation in the German enlargement policy reflected the bipolar structure of the international system and the need to restore the balance of power at the level of European region.

5.3.2 Performance of the defensive realism vs. offensive realism

The historical records demonstrate that offensive realism fails to produce the correct *ex ante* predictions about Germany's policy towards the Mediterranean enlargements of the European Economic Community in the 1970's. Instead, defensive realism emerges as the best neorealist perspective to prognosticate this behavior.

First, offensive realism predicted that, given structural transformation in Europe in the 1970's, Germany as a potential regional hegemon would be reluctant to support the European Community enlargement towards new members to manage the system and provide peaceful order for its own sake. Rather, it should seek to reunify its territories – the

¹⁶⁶ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 73, Bericht der Bundesregierung über außenpolitischen Lage, vom 13. Mai 1980.

behavior that conflicts with the goal of creating and sustaining stable order. The historical record does show that strong Germany inspired by reunification had been able to threaten the stability in the region. But German leaders believed that if the Federal Republic had strived for security in terms of integrity of its territories, it would lead to new conflicts in Europe. Therefore, the question of the German Eastern territories was raised in conjunction with a European peaceful order and in relation to the balance of interests and power. The Federal Republic supported political course towards the Mediterranean enlargements of the European Community for the reason of security in order to prevent the division of the continent and to reassure the balance of power in the region. Only if peace settlements in Europe were assured, could Germany make progress in the solution of its reunification problems. Thus, in his address to the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1970 Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt said, “Wrong as it would be to see security policy as an end in itself instead of regarding it simultaneously as the prerequisite for dispassionate policy of equitable compromise.”¹⁶⁷ As was mentioned above, the evidence demonstrates correctness of the defensive realism prediction and, at the same time, contradicts the proposition derived from offensive realism.

Second, offensive realism predicts that the German government faced with otherwise certain losses of the German division vis-à-vis increasing military presence of the Soviet Union on the European doorstep, would have chosen risky option of reunification policy even if it worsened its situation, when just a small chance existed to prevent such losses. The evidence demonstrates, however, that the Federal government had accepted the risk of the European Community enlargement towards new members, because the Soviet threat was perceived more intensively than other factors. As a result, defensive realism emerges as the best neorealist perspective to explain both why the German enlargement policy in the

¹⁶⁷ A/NATO, N 308 (16) CR 1, (Second part), North Atlantic Assembly, Sixteenth Annual Session, Official Report, 9th November 1970.

early 1970's had changed dramatically in the mid-1970's and why the membership of Greece, Portugal and Spain was supported by German leaders after the Soviet Union had undertaken the impressive military efforts in Mediterranean and why it did not happen before. Germany's reluctance to push forward the EEC enlargement policy before the increase of Soviet influence in Mediterranean can be explained by the risk-aversion in the frame of gains. In the early 1970's taking risk of enlargement could potentially jeopardize the security enjoyed under the status quo – balance of power at the international level, and cooperative efforts at the regional level, which made dominance of the Federal Republic as the most powerful state in the region impossible. The German government diverged from its cautious approach after the Soviet presence in Mediterranean had upset the existing balance, because the developments in the region in the late 1970's diminished the significant security gains that Germany had made in the previous years. The power asymmetry in Europe threatened with further deterioration, if the resulted status quo endured. Referencing the Federal Republic's security status at the beginning of the 1970's placed the German government in a realm of losses in the end of 1970's and inclined it to support a risky policy of Mediterranean enlargements that offered the possibility of re-securing Germany's previous position.

In particular, the German government believed that the Soviet military build-up in Mediterranean and the intervention of the Soviets into Afghanistan after ten years of détente was not simply related to East-West confrontation, but rather it pointed to East-South problem, and thus, demonstrated the dynamic expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁸ In consideration of those imminent military actions the German government had stated that the Soviet Union was unchangeably oriented towards expansion whenever risks were tenable. It was the German leaders' firm belief that the Soviet government had taken

¹⁶⁸ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 79, Bericht des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen zur außenpolitischen Lage, vom 27. Juni 1980.

advantage to shift the balance of power in its favor.¹⁶⁹ This situation altered the German leaders' perceptions of the status quo relationship between Europe and the Soviet Union and their view of what the endurance of the new status quo implied. Germany's new perception of the Soviet threat implied a substantial loss in security relative to the position Germany had enjoyed previously. In addition, a decline in the United States' relative power – the state military presence of which Germany perceived to be responsible for the security in Europe – also changed the German government's perception of the future, making it to consider the worse-case scenario. Viewing Germany's position through this lens, the Federal government reassessed its security needs vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. After the changes in structural dynamics discussed above, the German leaders began to believe that security might be rectified by means of the European Economic Community enlargement towards the Mediterranean states. In the mid-1970s, Germany favored membership applications of Greece, Portugal, and Spain in order to avoid the division of the European continent and to strengthen the European Southern Flank. Furthermore, it was expected that EEC membership would prevent these Mediterranean countries both from pursuing neutral foreign politics and from falling under the influence of the Soviet Union. As defensive realism predicts, after experiencing losses, the Federal Republic pursued a risk-acceptant policy of the European Community enlargement in the hope to restore the previously achieved level of Germany's security.

¹⁶⁹ PA-DBT 3104 A 8/3, 79, Bericht des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen zur außenpolitischen Lage, vom 27. Juni 1980.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

Generally, I have by this thesis shown that neorealist theory of international relations is eligible for application to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. This research demonstrates the utility of neorealist theory application to foreign policy analysis at a high level of abstraction. Furthermore, after this study it is now possible to conclude on which of the neorealist theories – defensive realism or offensive realism, has the most potential in relation to applicability to studies of state foreign policy. I will from the congruity test' results recommend defensive realism, which in spite of neglect to be directly related to the foreign policy analysis appears to have grater potential of explanatory power. I can therefore conclude that defensive realism as a Theory of International Policy is eligible to meet challenges of being applied to analyses of foreign policy.

Summing up, this study has evaluated two competing neorealist theories – defensive realism and offensive realism in light of German policy towards enlargement of the European Economic Community in a period from 1961 to 1979. This evaluation had four stages. First, the neorealist core assumptions and central concepts was expounded, taking due note to the points of divergence between the two approaches. I have contributed to efforts to explore how specific variations of a theoretical discourse within a neorealist paradigm generate competing concrete predictions. Findings indicate that the root of the disagreement between defensive and offensive realism is that there is no consensus about what constitute a prime motive for a state behavior – a need for security or a need for

power. Within neorealism, great powers have two types of needs. First, great powers are motivated to action by the need for security. Second, states need power to achieve security. In other words, 'security' is the end and 'power' is a means to this end. The task of separation of closely associated neorealist terms of goals and means has in practice proven to be very difficult. Defensive realism points to security as a prime motive for states foreign behavior, which is different from that of power enhancement within offensive realism. Specifically, defensive realism tends to see security as a consequence of power balancing, if it is established. From this perspective, preserving of balance of power would provide security for all. Within offensive realism power-enhancement is a prime motive for the behavior of actors. It is because offensive realism tends to see security as a derivative of power, i.e. an actor with enough power to dominate a region or the world would acquire security for him or her as a result. Although Mearsheimer rightly places security as the goal, the understanding that power is a means to it is inherently self-defeating (Buzan 2011: 19). This fundamental point of divergence structures a major debate among the two neorealist approaches. Offensive realism posits that it is systematic characteristics which compel states to maximize power, and thus, to adopt offensive strategies, which often result in conflict and war. Defensive realism claims the opposite: the defense has the advantages over offense; because aggression always meets resistance and hegemony always face balancing. The very nature of the international system provides incentives for moderate, cautious, and restrained behavior of states seeking to survive.

Second, arguments that neorealist theories of international relations can be applied to the field of foreign policy analysis were provided and a set of competing predictions about German EEC enlargement policy was derived from the both defensive realism's and offensive realism's propositions. The study demonstrates that the neorealist theory not only provides a solid foundation to identify external conditions that manifested themselves in Germany's foreign policy towards the European Community Northern enlargement and

Mediterranean enlargements in the 1960's and the 1970's, but also sets up a simple model¹⁷⁰ for analysis of a state foreign behavior. In accordance with neorealist criteria, I have: (1) considered the Federal Republic's relative power position and looked how power was distributed in the international system and among the member-states of the European Community, including applicants; (2) examined Germany's security needs resulted from the power constellation; and (3) calculated appropriate according to the defensive realism and offensive realism perspective foreign political behavior of Germany towards the European Economic Community enlargement in the period under investigation.

The findings also suggest that prospect-theory based accounts of foreign policy decision making contributed to explore how within neorealist approaches sensitive to costs state leaders opt for risk-accepting foreign policy course. To structure the neorealist analysis of Germany's decision making on the European Community enlargement, I have: (1) identified the reference point of the Federal Republic of Germany used by its government in adopting (non-)enlargement policy course in response to the external threat; (2) demonstrated that variation in Germany's EEC enlargement policy took place after a clearly defined shift from a realm of relative security gains to the domain of relative security losses had occurred; and (3) shown that German leaders adopted risky policy to prevent such losses.

Third, the two cases of German foreign policy towards the EEC Northern enlargement and the EEC Mediterranean enlargements were explored looking for congruence or inconsistency between the neorealist rival predictions and historical observations. A careful analysis of the case of Germany's EEC enlargement policy revealed that in each instance, the decision against or in favor of the European Economic Community enlargement was a

¹⁷⁰ Conceptually formulated, the content of the neorealist model of a state's foreign behavior is the relation (1) between a state relative power position and security needs; (2) security needs and foreign policy; and (3) between relative power position and foreign policy (see section 2.3.1 of Chapter Two).

reasonable response to the international circumstances Germany faced with. Empirical observations specified how German foreign policy towards the Northern enlargement of the European Community and the EEC Mediterranean enlargements varied with some changes in the balance of power although a realm of international affairs is the same in substance. The findings of this thesis suggest that the variation in degree of the Soviet threat to the German security produced a variation in the Federal Republic policy towards the EEC enlargement. Entry of applicant countries was favored at the times when the Soviet Union posed a major threat to security of Germany, because incorporating the new members into the European Community was perceived to serve German security interests. Furthermore, the study that illustrated that neorealism does make empirically valid predictions about external conditions under which the Federal Republic was expected to favor the European Community enlargement to an applicant state. In the case of the EEC Northern enlargement, all three applicants – Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, were weaker than Germany. Yet, the policy towards the European Community enlargement merited the approval of the Federal Republic only in the early 1970's after the candidates clearly demonstrated shared interest, i.e. responsibility to deter the common aggressor – the Soviet Union, by means of cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. Moreover, the empirical evidence from the case of the EEC Mediterranean enlargements does substantiate neorealist theories expectation that the Federal Republic will subordinate non-security gains to political interests, because in the European system of the late 1970's with a high level of security competition, Germany's first concern was to maximize the likelihood of its survival. The German government perceived the Mediterranean enlargements of the Economic Community to be indispensable for security reasons and saw the economic problems of Greece, Portugal and Spain from the foreign political point of view. Security-related power political reasons compelled Germany to support the Mediterranean countries' membership applications.

Fourth, competing neorealist expectations were assessed following the congruence method, that is, on the basis of the evidence, which at the same time proves the correctness of one theory and incorrectness of another, the predictive power of each of the theories was evaluated. The evidence from the case-studies falsifies neither defensive realism nor offensive realism per se, but rather it contradicts offensive realism's underlying motives for a state behavior: that states especially in the situation of unbalanced multipolarity, usually tends to act offensively to amass as much power as it can and to take big risks in the pursuit of the regional hegemony. Contrary to Mearsheimer's predictions, in the period under investigation from 1961 to 1979 German leaders repeatedly demonstrated their interest in maintaining the balance of power in the European region. Although, offensive realism is right that the Federal Republic of Germany was unsatisfied with the status quo in Europe, and the way Germany was positioned vis-à-vis its surroundings did provided an incentive to expand by a means of reunification of German Eastern territories, a position of Germany in the international system with regards to conditions and circumstances held back its government from acting offensively. In the period under investigation Germany's index of power was relatively high in comparison to those of other European states and made it seem threatening. Yet, in reality German leaders upheld the European status quo and promoted peaceful settlements in the region. Defensive realism already recognizes that states are motivated not by desire to maximize power, but to insure their security. Only if survival was assured could Western Germany safely seek such a goal as reunification. The international system encouraged the German leaders to accept the existing status quo for the sake of security, since increase in power through reunification would undermine it. Thus, defensive realism gives a better account of the German foreign policy towards the EEC enlargement, because it incorporates a clear choice in states motivation, while offensive realism suffers from lack of clarity when distinguishing between power and security as policy goals.

Without dismissing offensive realism and its power-based approach, the study's results provide further empirical support for the defensive realist notion that larger units tend to take on systematic tasks because of the extent of their interests. Although from a defensive realist standpoint (Waltz 2011: 394), a country which "choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly," its security-based approach allows for a situation when some countries "may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid doing so", especially if "external conditions press firmly enough". However, the choice is "a constrained one". Given the expectation of the necessity to take care of Germany's own interests, one may wonder how a state with the economic capability of a great power can refrain from territorial reunification. Yet, Germany was made uneasy by the steady growth of the Soviets' military build-up and by the gradual increase in its power projection capabilities. The presence of the Soviets' military forces, combined with the drawdown of American power, could hardly be ignored by Germany. Uncomfortable dependency on the United States protection and perceived vulnerabilities had led Germany to support the EEC enlargements and postpone reunification for the sake of security, even though German leaders might prefer to do otherwise.

Future research should continue to explore neorealist theories' usefulness in explaining cooperation during times of crisis. Additional research is also needed to clarify and delineate the specific conditions that determine the one foreign policy strategy over the other. Furthermore, more empirical studies should examine whether and exactly how power and security influence states foreign behavior in order to further increase the validity of the concepts. And lastly, a successful case of hegemonic behavior should be found in order to contribute to the debate between defensive realism and offensive realism. If it would be impossible, the conclusion that power-enhancement is not a successful foreign policy strategy is important. Given, that what states do is a function of causes at different levels of analysis, further efforts to apply neorealism to the studies of foreign policy is not

entirely unreasonable for the cases when external conditions dominate other non-structural dispositions of states. I concentrated on one European Community member-state's policy towards the EEC enlargement but did so in a way that brought the two issues of intra- and extra-European relations and the regional and global balance of power into focus. The thesis exposes the more relevant historical evidence in a way that allows for a grasp of fundamental for the neorealist theories indirect relationship between a state foreign policy and its power indices in comparison to those of other states' by analyzing the direct interaction between the distribution of power and security needs. The security at the level of state was considered to be interrelated at the level of the region and the international system. Neorealist theories have the negative criticism about their determination to include only systematic variables, and therefore, they are not considered to be designed to generate determinate predictions about states behavior per se, as foreign policy analysis would require. I do not doubt that in case of Germany's EEC enlargement policy the questions of personalities played their part; and so did questions of domestic and economic policy. But all the indications of this study are that the matters, treated by German leaders with the utmost seriousness, were the foreign policy issues, and more particularly, the way in which security had to be provided. In spite of the abundance of studies that criticize neorealism as international relation theory for its failure to predict foreign policy, I recommend neorealism as foreign policy theory mainly in the structural level of analysis with the potential of the further research depending on a focus of studies.

Appendices

Appendix A

Table 1

EEC Northern Enlargement: National Material Capabilities Index (per country, per year)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score</i>			
<i>Year</i>	1961	1963	1967	1973
<i>The Six</i>				
<i>Belgium</i>	.0070984	.006996	.006674	.0073682
<i>France</i>	.0304155	.0292545	.0261057	.0247604
<i>Germany</i>	.040526	.0398266	.0361095	.0356328
<i>Italy</i>	.0200094	.0205556	.0213543	.0212121
<i>Luxemburg</i>	.0020903	.0018628	.0016064	.0013206
<i>Netherlands</i>	.0067976	.0065981	.0065442	.0076032
<i>Superpowers</i>				
<i>USA</i>	.2108264	.2008139	.2087243	.1591247
<i>USSR</i>	.1739389	.1714768	.166979	.1665549
<i>Candidate countries</i>				
<i>Denmark</i>	.001588	.0016728	.0017434	.0015468
<i>Ireland</i>	.0006803	.0006516	.0006364	.0005511
<i>UK</i>	.0401537	.0371953	.0327802	.02717

SOURCE: The numbers for each country and for each year are from Singer, David J. (1987) *Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985*. *International Interactions*, 14, 115-132.

Appendix B

Table 1

EEC Mediterranean Enlargements: National Material Capabilities Index (per country, per year)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score</i>					
<i>Year</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1977</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1986</i>
<i>The Nine</i>						
Belgium	.0070984	.006674	.0064251	.0064203	.0061387	.0049066
Denmark	.001588	.0017434	.0015505	.0015148	.0013655	.0013319
France	.0304155	.0261057	.023461	.0232928	.0217994	.0181908
Germany	.040526	.0361095	.033097	.0317273	.0292195	.0255195
Ireland	.0006803	.0006364	.0005327	.0005084	.0005225	.0005623
Italy	.0200094	.0213543	.0198713	.0197656	.0188079	.0173332
Luxemburg	.0020903	.0016064	.0012545	.0011319	.0009411	.0009065
Netherlands	.0067976	.0065442	.0071539	.0071168	.0063063	.0060473
UK	.0401537	.0327802	.0277123	.0260087	.0248435	.0232125
<i>Superpowers</i>						
USA	.2108264	.2087243	.1441825	.141818	.1392099	.1369066
USSR	.1739389	.166979	.1739738	.1730555	.1687791	.1737522
<i>Candidate countries</i>						
Greece	.0026521	.0025452	.0031346	.0032421	.0031853	.0029091
Portugal	.0018909	.0026336	.0018746	.0015776	.0016057	.0016254
Spain	.0098412	.0100386	.0119743	.0117478	.0118844	.0102947

SOURCE: The numbers for each country and for each year are from Singer, David J. (1987) Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985. *International Interactions*, 14, 115-132.

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