On the Margins of Neo-Kantianism. Schillerian Traces in the Baden School

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1. *On the margins of neo-Kantianism: Schiller and the Baden school*

The influence of Friedrich Schiller's work on the neo-Kantian school of Baden has been the subject of sporadic studies, focusing mainly on Windelband's reception of the poet[1]. The secondary literature on this philosophical school offers scant acknowledgment of Schiller's contribution to its development. While this gap is justified on the one hand by the fact that – with the exception of Windelband – the other mayor representatives of this school, namely Emil Lask and Heinrich Rickert, devoted limited attention to Schiller, on the other hand, Schiller's presence in their work is by no means negligible and deserves attention.

In this chapter, we examine Windelband, Rickert and Lask's reception of Schiller from a specific viewpoint. Our study aims to explore lesser-known works by these authors in which Schiller is appreciated not for his interpretation of Kantian philosophy, but for his concept of the 'whole man'. Adopting a Derridean formulation[2], we propose operating at the margins of the Baden School to critically examine the reception of Schiller within that intellectual tradition, without reducing it to Windelband's neo-Kantian interpretation of Schiller. To this aim, we will begin this investigation with Emil Lask, whose reception of Schiller will serve as an entry point into a theme that becomes significantly richer and more complex in the works of Rickert and, especially, Windelband. In the concluding section, we will offer only a few final remarks on Windelband, given the body of scholarship already devoted to his reception of Schiller.

[1] See, e.g., G. Morrone, "Una 'filosofia della rassegnazione'. Motivi schilleriani nel primo programma filosofico di Wilhelm Windelband", in G. Giannini, P. Marangolo, M. Papa (eds.), *Segni. Studi in ricordo di Riccardo De Biase*, Tab, Roma, 2023, pp. 281-294; F. C. Beiser, "The Neo-Kantians and Schiller's Transcendental Idealism", in A. Falduto and T. Mehigan (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Friedrich Schiller*, Springer Verlag, Cham, 2023, pp. 559-571; on Windelband see pp. 568-571. For the neo-Kantian interpretation of Schiller, see F. C. Beiser, *Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 4, pp. 268-270.

[2] J. Derrida, *Margins of philosophy*, En. tr. by A. Bass, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

2. *Emil Lask. Schiller and the idea of the whole man*

It should be noted from the outset that Schiller's influence on Lask's thought is marginal. His reflections on Schiller are limited to a few scattered notes, posthumously published, and to occasional references found in his correspondence[3]. In these instances, however, the emphasis lies not so much on Schiller's Kantianism as on a different philosophical notion – namely, the idea of the whole man (*der ganze Mensch*). To clarify the emergence of Lask's interest in Schiller's thought and in this notion, we shall begin by examining the period of Lask's philosophical apprenticeship, focusing on his philosophical readings. This period is thoroughly documented in Lask's correspondence.

Lask's written exchanges reveals that, during his time as a student in Freiburg, he first encountered Schiller's work through the lectures of Richard Weissenfels, a philologist and *Privatdozent* at the University of Freiburg. In fact, in a letter to his parents dating from 1894, Lask lists a series of university courses he was attending at the time, including one by Weissenfels devoted to Schiller[4]. Although Lask does not mention Schiller in this purely informative letter, it is worth noting that he quotes the *Reiterlied* in a subsequent letter dated December 29, 1895. This letter is addressed to Heinrich Rickert. In this epistle, Lask mentions Schiller to express his enthusiasm for philosophical study and the pleasure he derives from spending his time "drinking from the cup of philosophy. 'And, if tomorrow 'twill come, then, I say, Drain we the cup of life's joy to-day'"[5] . This quotation from Schiller is particularly significant, as Lask initially enrolled in law school at his father's insistence and only later turned to philosophy following his encounter with Rickert[6]. Nonetheless, despite this quotation from Schiller's *Reiterlied*, it is important to emphasize that Lask, even in this letter, makes no substantive remarks about the poet. Instead, his attention is directed toward Goethe, Plato, and Schopenhauer. We may therefore infer that, although the young Lask read Schiller, he was not as influenced by him as Rickert was.

[3] E. Lask. *Die wissenschaftliche Korrispondenz*, ed. by A. Funke, R. Redaelli, and J. Zhao, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2022, p. 53.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 55. Here Lask quotes Friedrich Schiller, *Reiterlied*, in Id., *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1798*, Tübingen, 1798, pp. 137-140, p. 138. We quote the English translation of the verse collected in *Schiller's Dramatic Work. Wallenstein and Wilhelm Tell*, En. tr. by S. T. Coleridge, J. Churchill and M. Theodore, George Bell and Sons, London, 1891, p. 39.

[6] Regarding Rickert's influence on his decision to study philosophy, Lask writes to his cousin Jenny on December 3, 1896: "Through his encouraging words and confidence-inspiring voice, he gave me the courage to pursue my current studies and the trust to face the future with serenity. Recognising my existing inclinations, he guided me in taking the first step on my academic journey – a step that, in a sense, is the most important – and gave me impulses that will continue to affect me forever" (E. Lask, *Die wissenschaftliche Korrispondenz*, op. cit., p. 66).

In fact, Schiller's name, linked to that of Weissenfels, recurs in a letter written by Rickert to Lask in 1899. In this letter, Rickert first informs Lask of Weissenfels's departure from his academic position in Freiburg, and then significantly notes that courses on Goethe, Schiller, and the Romantics would serve as valuable preparatory exercises for a book Rickert intended to write on Fichte[7]. More precisely, Rickert affirms that these courses would be beneficial both formally and substantively for his work on Fichte, and that they might help him refine his writing style, which he himself considers overly dull. Therefore, for Rickert, as emerges from the letter addressed to Lask, Schiller could play a supporting role in the writing process of his book on Fichte, a book that was never written, while Lask's interest in Schiller does not appear to have developed, as evidenced by the fact that Lask does not mention Schiller in his reply letter to Rickert.

With regard to this initial exchange of letters, which we have attempted to reconstruct in broad terms, it is noteworthy that in 1899 Lask had already planned to write his doctoral dissertation on Fichte and had begun discussing it with Rickert[8]. Yet Lask does not seem to follow his mentor in looking to Schiller as a possible interpretive lens for rethinking Fichte. Given this premise, it should come as no surprise that Schiller plays no role in *Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte* (Fichte's idealism and history), Lask's doctoral dissertation on the logic of history developed by Fichte. Indeed, in the doctoral thesis, dating back to 1902, Schiller is mentioned only in passing, in relation to a work by Ottokar Lorenz on history[9]. But, beyond the isolated reference in the Fichte-Buch, Schiller's work had no discernible influence on Lask's first publication, as shown by the complete absence of citations or substantive references to Schiller's writings.

Schiller's name reappears elsewhere in the correspondence, where Lask lists his philosphical reading[10]. While Schiller's works are largely absent – except for the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*[11] – Lask does include texts about Schiller, most notably Eugen Kühnemann's *Kants und Schillers Begründung der Ästhetik* (Kant's and Schiller's foundation of aesthetics)[12]. These readings took place in 1913, when Lask had already published his two main works, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre* (The logic of philosophy and the doctrine of categories) in 1911 and *Die Lehre vom Urteil* (The doctrine of judgment) in 1912. In these works, as in his doctoral dissertation, Schiller leaves no significant trace. But it is precisely in 1913 that the few

[7] "Lectures on Romanticism, Goethe and Schiller would be good preliminary exercises for the Fichte book, both in terms of content and form. This might make my style a little less grey" (ibid., p. 99).

[8] See Lask's letter to Rickert dated 10 October 1897 (ibid., p. 81).

[9] O. Lorenz, *Die Geschichtswissenschaft in Hauptrichtungen und Aufgaben*, Wilhelm Herz, Berlin, 2. vol., 1886-1891.

[10] E. Lask. *Die wissenschaftliche Korrispondenz*, op. cit., p. 690.

[11] A. Michelsen (ed.), *Briefe von Schiller an Herzog Friedrich Christian von Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg über ästhetische Erziehung*, Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, Berlin, 1876.

[12] E. Kühnemann, *Kants und Schillers Begründung der Ästhetik*, C. H. Beck, Marburg, 1895.

notes Lask left us on Schiller date back to. These notes by Lask were compiled in the posthumously published writings edited by Eugen Herrigel in 1923 and 1924. They appear in the third and final volume of the philosopher's collected works. Notably, references to Schiller are found in the section titled *Zum System der Philosophie* (On the system of philosophy) and in the paragraph *Notizen zum System der Werte* (Notes on the system of values). According to Herrigel, in these passages Lask seeks to reconceptualize the notion of subjectivity by grounding it in the concept of substratum[13].

Before examining these notes, it seems appropriate to outline, albeit briefly, the more detailed context in which they are placed. In the section of notes and annotations in which Schiller's name appears, Lask reflects on the system of values, which is based on the distinction between the contemplative and the practical life. More precisely, in this part of the notes, Lask seems to criticize the traditional placement of the religious sphere in the contemplative life. In fact, in Lask's view, religion is as much a part of the practical life[14] as it is of the contemplative life. For Lask, only aesthetic and theoretical attitude are exclusively part of the contemplative life, while religion is characterized by both contemplation and activity, as Rickert himself states, perhaps influenced by Lask[15]. It is in Lask's reflections, gathered in his notes on the system of values, which encompass aesthetics as an aspect of the contemplative life, that we encounter his remarks dedicated to Schiller.

These notes[16] reveal that, for Lask, Schiller deserves credit for emphasizing the unity of man, of the whole man (*der Ganze Mensch*), and for opposing the destruction of man caused by the differentiation of his activities and faculties[17]. In other words, Lask argues that Schiller "wants to save cosmically living personal abundance from

[13] E. Herrigel, "Vorwort des Herausgebers", in E. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, ed. by E. Herrigel, Mohr, Tübingen 1923, pp. xvii-xxii, p. xx. On the issue of subjectivity in Lask's later work, see also E. Herrigel, "Emil Lask Wertsystem. Versuch einer Darstellung aus seinem Nachlass", in *Logos*, 12, 1923, pp. 100-122; S. Nachtsheim, *Emil Lasks Grundlehre*, Mohr, Tübingen, 1992; U. B. Glatz, *Emil Lask. Philosophie im Verhältnis zu Weltanschauung, Leben und Erkenntnis*, Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg, 2001, pp. 189-217; F. Masi, *Emil Lask. Il pathos della forma*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2010; R. Redaelli, *Emil Lask. Il soggetto e la forma*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2016; S. Besoli, *Forma categoriale e struttura del giudizio. Sull'incompiutezza del sistema di pensiero di Emil Lask*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2019; G. Gambaro, *Emil Lask e le matrici neokantiane dell'empirismo trascendentale*, Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2022, pp. 190-205.

[14] E. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, ed. by E. Herrigel, Mohr, Tübingen, 1924, p. 175.

[15] On this point, see A. Spinelli, *L'irrazionalità del pensabile. Vita e riflessione nella filosofia di Emil Lask*, CLEUP, Padova, 2019.

[16] The fragmentary nature of the notes does not allow for an unambiguous interpretation of them. Lask addresses different themes in these notes, including the problem of monism in relation to Goethe and Schiller. Here, we propose reading these notes in light of Lask's redefinition of the subject in terms of substratum, as suggested by Herrigel.

[17] In this regard, Lask writes the following note, referring to letter twenty-one on the aesthetic education of man: "The whole person versus individual functions and features [*Ganze Mensch kontra einzelne Funktionen und Leistungen*]" (E. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, op. cit., p. 197). However, Lask does not seem to appreciate Schiller's tracing of the notion of the whole man back to the aesthetic dimension: "But this is all mistakenly pushed into the realm of aesthetics" (ibid.).

violation"[18] caused by modernity, that is, by the differentiation of human faculties and the division of professional activities. Thanks to Schiller, Lask thus discerns the possibility of conceiving the subject as a living, unified whole – one in which no irreparable separation exists between work and man, and consequently between spirit and nature – as he writes shortly before his notes on Schiller[19]. However, in Lask's view, this does not mean falling into monism, but holding fast to the dualism of the non-sensible and the sensible[20], showing their coexistence, which, as Schiller affirms, was harmonious in Greek culture but is no longer so in our age. In fact, Lask writes, referring to the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, and in particular to sixth letter, that "individuals suffer from the universal aim"[21], that is, from the dispersion caused by modern culture, or, in Schiller's terms, "the fragmentary cultivation of human powers"[22]. Lask also states, with reference to Simmel's Goethe, that "the wholeness of life [is a] greater involvement and consecration of the entire substrate […] which was what Schiller wanted to achieve through aestheticization!"[23].

At the core of Lask's final philosophical reflections lies the concept of life as a substrate – the origin of forms, or more precisely, as a primordial form itself – wherein the diverse (pratical and contemplative) dimensions of the human experience converge. Therefore, through the lens offered by these brief notes dedicated to Schiller, we can observe Lask's transition to a concrete subjectivity, to a sensible, receptive subjectivity that plays the role of a substrate that embraces values. In conclusion, according to our hypothesis, these notes serve a functional role within Lask's final project: that of bringing to the fore a notion of concrete subjectivity capable of accounting for the multifaceted nature of the human being. In this regard, Schiller appears to offer Lask valuable insights for rethinking the subject as a living entity, as well as for developing a system of values that considers human nature in its entirety – and, in particular, its substratum[24].

[18] Ibid., p. 200.

[19] Ibid., p. 196.

[20] Significantly, in these notes, Lask emphasizes the importance of the sensible substrate for subjectivity, so much so that the philosopher notes that "even the Kantian-dualist moralist *needs* the sensible as substrate!" (ibid., p. 200).

[21] With regard to the issue of *Arbeitsteilung*, Lask refers to the sixth letter: "the individuals suffer under the curse of the universal aim [*Individuen leiden unter dem Fluch des Weltzwecks*]" (ibid., p. 197).

[22] "Thus, however much may be gained for the world as a whole by this fragmentary cultivation of human powers, it is undeniable that the individuals whom it affects suffer under the curse of this universal aim" (F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, En. tr. by R. Snell, Dover, New York, 2004, p. 44).

[23] "*Simmel*'s wholeness of life = greater involvement and consecration of the entire substrate; according to my principles, it cannot be anything else! This is now the same thing that Schiller wanted to achieve through aestheticization!" (E. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, op cit., p. 197).

[24] Crucially, Schiller's theme of the whole man is also addressed, outside the triad of authors we are discussing, by Martin Heidegger. In a 1936 seminar, reflecting on Schiller's renowned *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, Heidegger poses a crucial question: what kind of human

3. *Rickert. Rethinking humanity with Schiller*

With regard to Rickert's reception of Schiller, it is worth noting that the philosopher devotes more attention to the poet's reflections than Lask does. In this respect, it is sufficient to say that in the winter semester of 1896-1897 Rickert taught a course on Schiller's philosophical poems and in subsequent years offered his audience various seminars entitled *Probleme der Ästhetik* (Problems of aesthetics), in which Schiller was called into question. In fact, Rickert mostly links Schiller's name to aesthetics and to the part of his value system that is, precisely, dedicated to aesthetic values. For instance, in his 1922 lecture notes on the contemplative life, Rickert distinguishes the contemplative attitude of those who devote themselves to knowledge, that is the theoretical attitude, from the aesthetic attitude, referring precisely to Schiller's notion of play[25].

Remaining faithful to our intention to explore the margins of neo-Kantianism, we will not examine Rickert's aesthetic reflection here, where Schiller is somehow implicated, but will instead turn our attention to another moment in Rickert's thought in which Schiller is invoked. These considerations on Schiller are collected in the part of Rickert's philosophical system known as philosophical anthropology[26], which began to take shape in the early 1930s through his courses on social philosophy and the fundamental problems of philosophy[27]. Concerning the notes used for these courses, references to Schiller can be found in them. Among these few references, one is particularly significant because it is linked to Schiller's notion of the whole man, to which Lask himself refers. This reference appears in the notes of the 1932 *Sozialphilosophie*[28] course.

subject is Schiller referring to? For Heidegger, as for Lask, we could say that Schiller deals with the actual man, the man who actually exists, says Heidegger, which in Lask's terms would be the living subjectivity, the concrete subject. See M. Heidegger, *Übungen für Anfänger. Schillers Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Wintersemester 1936/37 (Seminar-Mitschrift von Wilhelm Hallwachs), mit einem Essay von Odo Marquard, hrsg. v. U. von Bülow*, Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, Marbach a. N., 2005, pp. 9-33.

[25] H. Rickert, *Philosophie des kontemplativen Lebens. III. Kunst*, Sommer Semester 1922, in Heidelberger Handschriften, 2740 II C – 197, pp. 1-78, p. 74.

[26] On philosophical anthropology in Rickert's philosophy, see R. Redaelli, "Heinrich Rickert. Zu einer axiologischen Anthropologie", in *Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie*, 16, 2022, pp. 119-134. On Rickert's philosophical system, see C. Krijnen, *Nachmetaphysischer Sinn. Eine problemgeschichtliche und systematische Studie zu den Prinzipien der Wertphilosophie Heinrich Rickerts*, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzbug, 2001.

[27] The course notes were then used to compose the book H. Rickert, *Grundprobleme der Philosophie. Methodologie. Ontologie. Anthropologie*, Mohr, Tübingen, 1934.

[28] H. Rickert, *Sozialphilosophie (Grundlage der Ethik und Erotik)*, Sommer Semester 1932, in Heidelberger Handschriften, 2740 II C – 140. We believe that an analysis of Rickert's rich *Nachlass* can be helpful not so much in redefining the boundaries of the philosophical system outlined in the philosopher's published works, which remain largely unchanged, but rather in understanding Rickert's position on specific philosophical issues.

In this course, Rickert undertakes to define the subject matter of social philosophy, which in Rickert's mature system is part of philosophical anthropology. It is in defining the subject matter of social philosophy that Rickert refers to Schiller and his 1795 poem *Die Weltweisen* (The worldly wise). In particular, Rickert shares Schiller's criticism of Pufendorf and Feder and their rationalistic view of man. In fact, in this poem, Schiller contrasts the rational and mechanistic view of human nature with his conception of the whole man, guided by both reason and sensibility. This same idea is shared by Rickert, for whom social philosophy, and especially social ethics, should consider the human being in his wholeness, starting from two elements highlighted by Schiller, namely hunger and love. Without these two elementary factors, there can be no social relationship, Rickert asserts in the wake of Schiller, and therefore there can be no social philosophy:

> Rather than following the example of the social philosophers Pufendorf and Feder, who were ridiculed by Schiller, let us begin with 'nature'. Hunger and love are two fundamental factors without which human life, including social life, would not exist; indeed, they are the origins of social relationships and social-ethical problems. In our context, we must place 'love' before hunger[29].

In our view, this reference to Schiller serves a specific function within Rickert's project: that of liberating his social philosophy from rationalistic perspectives on man and defining, as the object of his reflection, the human being in flesh and blood, the whole human being connected to other human beings. In this case too, as in Lask's brief and enigmatic annotations, the unity of man, his multifaceted nature as opposed to any unilateral or reductionist view of the human, comes to the fore. And it is precisely this human being understood in his entirety[30] that is at the centre of Rickert's later anthropological project. Indeed, it is no accident that Rickert, in his lectures in the 1930s and in his book *Grundprobleme der Philosophie* (Fundamental problems of philosophy), includes in his philosophical system an anthropology that has as its object the whole human being – conceived as both a psychic and physical entity – who takes a stance toward the world of which he is a part[31]. In fact, for Rickert, human being should be investigated in his various forms, in various value spheres, taking into account all aspects of his life, from politics to erotics[32], from aesthetics to scientific *theorein* to religion. In this sense, according to our hypothesis, Rickert accepts Schiller's call to re-evaluate the human being in his wholeness.

In the context of this re-evaluation of the whole human being, we intend to highlight a salient point of convergence between Schiller and Rickert. First of all, if the problem of all of Schiller's mature research is the connection between the animal

[29] H. Rickert, *Social-Philosophie III. Methode, Gebiet und Gliederung der Social-Ethik*, in Heidelberger Handschriften, 2740 II C – 140, pp. 28-29. This comment by Rickert follows the quotation of Schiller's entire poem in the philosopher's lecture notes.

[30] H. Rickert, *Sozialphilosophie*, op. cit.

[31] Ibid., p. 8.

[32] H. Rickert, "Vom System der Werte", in *Logos*, 4, 1913, pp. 295-327, pp. 313-319.

and spiritual nature of man[33], it should be noted that Rickert himself dealt with this problem from his very earliest works and that he addressed it in the 1930s from an anthropological perspective that brought him drastically closer to Schiller. Thus, by adopting an anthropological perspective, Rickert reinterprets the traditional mind-body problem in new terms, and Schiller assists him in this task, by offering some suggestions, including that of the whole man.

This first point is linked to a second one, which we consider briefly as *possible suggestion* for further investigation. Although Rickert approaches the anthropological problem from an axiological perspective, from the 1930s onwards he also takes into account the bodily dimension of the human being[34], as Schiller does. As proof of this re-evaluation of the body, Rickert writes significantly in *Grundprobleme der Philosophie* that "in the family, at work, in the community, the body also participates as a means of expressing meaning, and in this respect it cannot be ontologically ignored"[35]. In other words, the body plays a specific role in the constitution of society, the role of mediator of social action as *Sinnträger* (bearer of meaning)[36]. As such, it cannot be disregarded from a philosophical standpoint, particularly within the framework of the social philosophy that Rickert seeks to establish. Here as well, one may discern an indirect influence of Schiller on Rickert's philosophical anthropology – or, at the very least, on the way Rickert conceptualizes the human being as the central object of his investigation.

4. *Some concluding remarks on Windelband's reception of Schiller*

From the standpoint of the concept of the whole man, we may now turn to Windelband's reception of Schiller. While significant scholarship has already addressed this reception – primarily focusing on Windelband's 1905 essay *Schillers transcendentaler Idealismus* (Schillers transcendental idealism)[37] and the speech *Schiller und die Gegenwart* (Schiller and the present)[38] – our aim is to explore two alternative sources. These sources shed light not so much on Schiller's reworking of Kantian

[33] See C. Sini, *Il problema antropologico nel pensiero di Schiller*, Università degli studi dell'Aquila, Dispensa, CTCA, A. A. 1973-1974.

[34] Signore clearly highlights how *Leiblichkeit* in Rickert plays the role of mediator of social action as *Sinnträger* (see M. Signore, "I modi d'essere del mondo. Problemi di ontologia", in M. Signore, ed., *Rickert tra storicismo e ontologia*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1989, pp. 81-93, pp. 89-90). In this vein, Signore rightly recognizes in Rickert's latest works a revaluation of the bodily dimension. In this regard, Rickert himself states that "a *rehabilitation of the corporeal world* as a carrier of meaning [is] necessary" (see, H. Rickert, *Grundprobleme der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 90).

[35] H. Rickert, *Grundprobleme der Philosophie*, op. cit., p. 90.

[36] M. Signore, "I modi d'essere del mondo", op. cit., p. 89.

[37] W. Windelband, "Schillers transcendentaler Idealismus", in *Kant-Studien*, 10, 1905, pp. 398-411.

[38] W. Windelband, *Schiller und die Gegenwart: Rede zur Gedächtnisfeier bei der hundertjährigen Wiederkehr seines Todestages an der Universität Heidelberg*, Carl Winter, Heidelberg, 1905.

ideas, but rather on his ability to reconcile Goethe and Kant, thereby offering a philosophical vision of the whole human being.

Windelband addresses the issue of the whole man in a course he taught in 1895-1896 on Goethe and Schiller[39], and above all in his *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der allgemeinen Kultur und den besonderen Wissenschaften* (The history of modern philosophy in its connection with general culture and the special sciences). In the latter, Windelband devotes a chapter to Schiller entitled *Der ästhetische Idealismus. Schiller und die Romantiker* (Aesthetic idealism. Schiller and the Romantics), where the theme of the whole man takes on a cultural dimension. With regard to these sources, we would like to draw attention to a particular aspect of Windelband's reception of Schiller that, in our view, deserves attention. As already mentioned, Windelband not only shows the fecundity of Kantianism in Schillerian thought, but also emphasizes, especially in the volume dedicated to the history of philosophy and in the course on Goethe and Schiller, Schiller's ability to unite Kant and Goethe, rationality and sensibility, morality and aesthetic life, in a vision that engages the human being in their entirety.

On this point, Windelband writes significantly that "if one call the former the Goethean ideal and the latter the Kantian ideal, we can say that Schiller's spirit responded to both so sympathetically and was so equally imbued with both that throughout his entire career as a writer, from beginning to end, we can trace these two elements. […] This struggle between the two elements ends neither with the victory of one over the other, nor with a complete and all-round reconciliation between them […] he always made new attempts to reach an agreement"[40]. In other words, Windelband explains that, for Schiller, on the one hand, only submission to Kantian *Rigorismus* is moral, but, on the other hand, if we consider man in his development, we must take into account man as a sensible-supersensible being[41], who finds support for his moral realisation in his sensible nature. Because of this tension, Schiller's work takes on a paradigmatic value in Windelband's philosophy, because in it Windelband recognises the ideal of the highest culture, which is realised by Schiller through the reconciliation, albeit never definitive, between Kantian philosophy and Goethe's artistic spirit, which leads Schiller to consider the whole man from a philosophical point of view.

Based on these brief considerations, it may be observed that even in Windelband's thought, the question of the whole human being – though approached with certain reservations regarding anthropology – occupies a non-negligible role. In this sense, it can be noted, in conclusion, that Windelband, Rickert and, albeit to a lesser

[39] W. Windelband, *Goethe und Schiller in ihren Beziehungen zur Philosophie*, Winter Semester 1895-1896 (Vorlesungsmitschrift von Heinrich Rickert), in Heidelberger Handschriften, 2740 II A – 38.
[40] W. Windelband, *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der allgemeinen Kultur und den besonderen Wissenschaften – Die Blüthezeit der deutschen Philosophie*, Breitkopf und Härtel, Leipzig, 1880, pp. 249-250.
[41] Ibid., p. 257.

extent, Lask, are inspired by Schiller's idea of man understood in his multifaceted nature, in his life that is both multiplicity and unity. In their view, Schiller deserves the merit of attempting to reconcile sensibility and rationality, nature and culture, without however falling into forms of monism. His reconciliation preserves the productive tension of an irreducible dualism – or perhaps more accurately, a pluralism – which Schiller eloquently articulates in the following lines from *Über Bürgers Gedichte* (1789):

> In the isolation and fragmented activity of our mental powers, made necessary by the broadened scope of knowledge and the specialization of the professions, the art of poetry is almost alone in being able to unite once again the divided forces of the spirit. Poetry occupies head and heart, perspicacity and wit, reason and imagination in harmonious fellowship, and recreates, as it were, the whole man within us[42].

[42] F. Schiller, *Über Bürgers Gedichte* [1791], in *Schillers Werke*, Nationalausgabe, vol. 22, *Vermischte Schriften*, ed. by H. Meyer, Böhlau, Weimar, 1958, pp. 245-264, p. 256.