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"Am I Radical, Right?"

The Radical Right Family Ideological Outlook and Radical Right Attitude Among the Public

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The emergence of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) has been one of the most studied European political phenomena in the last thirty years, producing a prolific flow of research on both the ideological outlook of the radical right party family and the characteristics of its voters. Nonetheless, the academic debate on these issues is far from being appeased. The following work contributes to the debate by looking at the rise of RRPs in Europe through the perspective of their ideological outlook and by investigating both the supply side and the demand side by means of a data-driven machine learning approach. The literature on RRPs ideological outlook has been prolific and discordant, yet most scholars tend to agree on two main core ideological features that appropriately characterize the radical right family and set it apart from others: nativism and authoritarianism. These core features are complemented by other ancillary elements, on which the debate is more open. The most discussed example is represented by the evolution of RRPs' positions on economic issues. On this concern, some scholars claim that we are facing a real differentiation within the radical right that needs to be included in the ideological definition of the family, while others argue we are witnessing a series of blurrying processes that intervene on secondary issues holding limited definitory power. As far as radical right voters are concerned, their behavior has been analyzed under many different lenses, still the only condition on which all scholars agree is the centrality of individual attitudes towards immigration in shaping radical right voting. In a few words, we describe the awkward situation where ideologically complex parties, which are not considered single-issue parties, seem to mobilize voters on the basis of a single issue. The aim of the study is to put theoretical studies on the radical right ideology to an empirical test, starting from party-level data and by checking whether those who have been defined as the core features of the radical right family have a crucial role in defining the ideological borders of the radical right or not. Then, we define the potential voting base by following the ideological characterization that emerged empirically. Results confirm the centrality of both nativism and authoritarianism (and Euroscepticism, in addition) in shaping the radical right ideological outlook, while economic positions are the main division line that shapes heterogeneity within the family. The empirical clusters based on the criteria defined previously produce a classification which is coherent with the ones provided by the literature. Results also give empirical evidence of a process of radicalization that characterizes a group of center-right parties, which progressively get close to nativist and authoritarian positions, in continuity with the findings of studies on center-right radicalization. We also confirm that the emergence of a nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic set of attitudes among the public, which significantly shapes the probability to vote for a RRP.

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Introduction

This introduction puts the present PhD thesis within the academic debate, and it aims at giving the reader a clear map on what they would find in the following chapters. The emergence and the electoral success of radical right parties (RRPs) has been a widely studied political phenomenon in Western Europe for the last thirty years. Many prominent scholars have driven their research to shed light on the rise of the radical right from many angles, the most crucial of which are the definition of the party family's ideological outlook, the identification of the most important characteristics of their voters and the numerous attempts to establish a solid and reliable voting function in order to explain RRPs' success throughout Europe (a comprehensive selection of the most valuable publications on these topics would be impossible to fit in this introduction, nevertheless even the briefest list must include: Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt & McGann 1997, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007). However, despite the abundance of research within the past thirty years, the academic debate is far from being over and a widely agreed consensus on the phenomenon has not been reached yet. This thesis is structured on two main research topics that rise upon understudied or missing pieces of an otherwise vast and meticulous literature. First, we focus on the main theoretical definitions of the radical right party family and put them to test through a novel data-driven approach in order to confirm or reject the ideological conditions on which party classifications are based. Our first question aims at assessing whether theory-driven classifications, and the ideological outlook upon which they are based, would stand when put to empirical test or not. We can therefore expect a confirmation of previous established classifications and their preconditions, or their confutation. Whatever the result, we would be left with a set of ideological stances (whether confirmed or updated) that describe and define the radical right family. It is from this basepoint that we shift our focus from parties to individuals. Our main goal is to assess the existence of groups of voters whose attitudes and preferences correspond to the ideological outlook of radical right parties, and whether holding this set of attitudes influences their voting behavior. The novelties of this research and its contributions to the vast literature on the field are both methodological and substantial. First, we employ a data-driven approach to a topic (party families) that has been extensively tackled, examined, and confuted from a theoretical perspective. Second, we carry out the empirical work using machine learning classification algorithms both with party data and individual data, which is quite a novel approach within the field. Third, we highlight the importance of the combination of stances and attitudes in the study of parties and voters.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 presents a literature review showcasing and commenting the main approaches on the analysis of party families, the main theoretical studies on the radical right family ideological characteristics and classifications, the structure of political opportunities that could have fueled the rise of the radical right, the main studies on radical right voters' sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics and on the voting functions to frame and explain radical right voting. The review then allows us to shape the research questions and formulate the hypotheses on which the following two chapters are assembled. Chapter 2 presents a data-driven classification of parties. Chapter 3 performs a study on radical right potential voters. Both last chapters will be sketched in the next lines.

Chapter 2: A data-driven party classification

The first goal of the present study is to identify the ideological features on which the most relevant theoretical classifications of the radical right party family were built. The literature review highlights two main ideological features on which most scholars agree: nativism and authoritarianism. These core features are complemented by other ancillary elements, on which the debate is more open. The most debated example is represented by the positions of the RRPs on economic issues. On this concern, some scholars claim that the ideological transformation undertaken by RRPs on their political positions on the economy deserves a more prominent role within the ideological definitions of the radical right, because it brought a real differentiation within the family; while others argue that we are facing a series of confused and blurrying processes that intervene on secondary issues holding limited definitory power.

The aim of the study is to put these theoretical studies to an empirical test, starting from party-level data and by checking whether those who have been defined as the core features of the radical right family have a crucial role in defining the ideological borders of the radical right or not. Furthermore, we give evidence of within-family heterogeneity based on the discriminating effect of parties' economic positions. The data-driven research strategy aims at reversing the process of ideological denotation that characterizes the most relevant theoretical studies on the radical right. The data-based strategy we employ also happens to be stimulating (if not necessary) given that all major theoretical studies tend to indicate and classify the same parties, even though most studies differ both on the ideological outlook they outline and on the label they apply on those same parties. Therefore, we find large-scale agreement on who are the family members, yet not a total assent on what defines that party family ideologically.

The empirical analysis is based on a data-driven approach based on machine learning algorithms, then applied on expert-survey data. We start from party data and create a clustering of all parties on the basis of their ideological characteristics (measured through expert surveys) by means of an agglomerative cluster analysis; then, we test the obtained classification using a random forest model, which can produce an importance score for all the used indicators. This allows us to control which variables (and consequently which ideological features) have proved to be crucial to obtain that clustering.

Results confirm the centrality of both nativism and authoritarianism (and Euroscepticism, in addition) in shaping the radical right ideological outlook, while economic positions are the main division line that shapes heterogeneity within the family. The empirical clusters based on the criteria defined previously produce a classification which is coherent with the ones provided by the literature. Results also give empirical evidence of a process of radicalization that characterizes a group of center-right parties, which progressively get close to nativist and authoritarian positions.

Chapter 3: A radical right attitude

The second empirical part of the present thesis investigates the demand side, looking at individuals. Specifically, the main goal is to verify the existence of a potential electorate whose attitudes and preferences reflect RRPs' complex ideological set-up. We define the potential voting base by following the ideological characterization that empirically emerged through the cluster analysis we perform in Chapter 2. Given that our results confirm the main conceptual classifications in the literature, a common ideological outlook would become what makes both ends meet.

The literature on radical right voters is broad and multifaceted, however it provides no agreement on many issues. The literature review highlights the large number of indicators that have been used to outline both the main characteristics of radical right voters, and the main variables that convey radical right voting. Within the review, we consider socio-demographic characteristics, individual values and attitudinal attributes. However, the only condition on which all scholars agree is the centrality of individual attitudes towards immigration in shaping radical right voting. In a few words, we describe the awkward situation where ideologically complex parties, which are not considered single-issue parties, seem to mobilize voters on the basis of a single issue. Therefore, our empirical analysis aims at demonstrating the existence of a group of potential voters that are defined by a complex set of attitudes that reflects RRPs' ideological outlook on a whole.

In order to do so, we rely on an agglomerative cluster analysis based on individual data. Specifically, we examine self-placement indicators on a list of issues. This procedure ensures the division of all respondents (nested in 25 European countries) in well-divided and ideologically connotated clusters, making it possible to confirm the existence of specific radical right oriented clusters. Results confirm that the ideological set-up gathering nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism can shape specific groups of voters reflecting the RRPs' ideological outlook in the large majority of the examined countries. In line with Rooduijn's (2014) findings within the Dutch case, results confirm the existence of a radical right attitude throughout Europe: a complex set of attitudes that stands far from a mere and simple negative stigma of immigration. Results also show that economic positions are disconnected from this set-up: we find a precise within-context correspondence between the ideological orientation of the RRP and the attitudinal set-up of the potential voting base, but the position on economic issues embraced by RRPs in different contexts rarely finds a correspondence within the potential base. Finally, once we assess the existence of a radical right attitude, we show its crucial role in shaping voting behavior. Holding a radical right attitude deeply influences the probability to vote for a RRP and outweighs all the other control variables, with limited contextual differences.

Chapter 1

The radical right party family and its voters

The emergence and success of the radical right has been a widely studied electoral phenomenon in Western Europe. The outbreak of new political actors always represents a matter of academic debate, and even more when it proves to be peculiar and controversial. Thus, many valuable comprehensive studies started to blossom since the beginning of the 1990s (Ignazi, 1994; Betz, 1994; Kitchelt & McGann, 1997, Mudde, 2007 just to name a few). Nonetheless, academic controversies are far from being appeased and a general scholarly consensus has not been reached yet. The aim of this introduction is to survey this prolific and rather debated field and to build a coherent framework to develop the further steps of my research.

Chapter 1.1 deals with the concept of radical right party family. It first describes the main approaches to party family definitions, then it frames radical right ideological outlook, its evolution and the academic debate around it.

Chapter 1.2 narrows the debate down to the factors that helped radical right parties to gain visibility and, sometimes, power and votes within the institutional scenario.

At last, chapter 1.3 focuses on radical right voters and their mobilization. The first pages frame the individual voters' characteristics as detailed by the existing literature, then attention is devoted to voting patterns.

On the basis of this analysis, the chapter closes with the formulation of the hypotheses that will drive the following analyses.

1.1 – Exploring the radical right party family and its members: ideological profile and cohesiveness

What is a party family?

In order to provide a solid definition of the so called radical right parties (RRPs), attention must be first drawn to the notion of party family. Ironically enough, while academic research on party families has been wide and accurate, it faces a lack of systematic literature defining what a party family really is. Thus, researchers are left with a concept which is vastly used in political science, but just intuitively conceived as an umbrella term for gathering parties equipped with a similar ideological outlook (Decker & Lewandowsky, 2010). After the seminal work on this field of research brought forward by von Beyme (1985), who constructs several typologies based on a wide variety of approaches, the notion of party family has become quite implicit within the literature on specific party groupings, to the point that party classification almost became a matter of conventional wisdom and party groupings got treated as self-evident categories (Mair & Mudde, 1998). Nonetheless, we can still find literature that analyses party families thoroughly and explicitly, especially when it comes to party classification criteria.

Mair & Mudde (1998) identify the ideological approach as the most suitable for academic research. An ideological distinction, built on a variety of sources, offers an agile approach that allows to take party-level evolution into account: "A classification based on ideology necessarily allows parties to move from one category to another over time and also allows the researcher to group together parties that may have developed out of very different sets of circumstances" (Mair & Mudde, 1998, p.225). The ideological approach also allows researchers to develop precise and time-bound party family analysis.

Still, even though a classification built on ideological features gives many advantages when it comes to party gatherings, party family analyses has also been founded on different approaches based on the assumption that the formation of party families does not stop to ideology on its own. Indeed, parties have been gathered in different times on the basis of their role in the political system, their electoral structure, their organizational model and their origin (Decker & Lewandowsky, 2010). Each of these different criteria does not take parties' core ideologies as the main feature to identify or build a family, therefore, for seek of completeness, we must acknowledge different criteria, their strengths, and their disadvantages.

For example, a sociological approach to explain the origin of party families is to be found in Stein Rokkan's cleavage theory.[1] In the 1970s, the postmaterialist-materialist divide (Inglehart, 1977) has been portrayed as the line of conflict that gave birth to ecologist green parties, assuming that changes in the demand side of the political process induce the birth of new parties on either side of the political spectrum (Ennser, 2012). Yet, these approaches based on party origins cause two main problems: first, the increasing instability and de-freezing[2] of the European party systems brought a large amount of new political actors on stage, whose origins are not always clear when it comes to splits, merges and convergences. Second and foremost, building a categorization on how the parties began, rather than how they developed, leaves no space for their political evolution: once in one category, always in that category (Mair & Mudde, 1998). Therefore, an origin-based approach alone cannot be exhaustive because it could bring researchers to consider two birth-sharing parties as being part of the same families, even if they later went separate ways.

Mair and Mudde themselves propose two more approaches to build party families not assuming ideology as the main driver. The first approach is based on grouping parties on the basis of the transnational party federations they belong to. This criterion looks slippery for at least two reasons: first, some parties are members of different federations at different levels; second and foremost, other parties are not members of transnational federations at all, so they would be left outside the family. While the other approach proposed by Mair and Mudde is built on party names and, despite the great symbolical power of political labels and the evolution of their meaning through time, they cannot be considered as a crucial and reliable instrument to base party gatherings on; at most they could be used as an ancillary tool.

So, even though we could find different ways to build party family within the literature, ideology stands as the most reliable tool on which to build meaningful gatherings. Now, one fundamental problem is to establish which features define the ideology of a party. If we apply a cleavage politics model, which defines parties as political organizations representing specific social groups, we should take both party and individual level attitudes into consideration. If this was a fruitful approach in the post-war era of mass politics, given that freezed party systems were characterized by massive rates

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[1] Rokkan founds his theory on four critical cleavages that originated from the national and industrial revolution. These complex divides gave birth to different parties representing specific interests (for a well-grounded definition of cleavage, I refer you to Bartolini, 2011). In this perspective, the centre-periphery cleavage gave birth to the ethno-regionalist party family, while capital-workers cleavage forged the socialist workers parties (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1970).
[2] The term de-freezing comes from Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's "freezing of alternatives" theory, which stated the immutability of party systems due to the persistence of traditional cleavages in shaping the political scenario and narrowing political opportunities for new alternatives to grow and get more institutionalized. Theorists employ the term de-freezing to indicate the flourishing of alternatives made possible by the emergence of new cleavages or by the mere weakening of the older ones (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1989a, 1989b; Dalton, 2013)

of loyal voters and very limited volatility (Rokkan, 1970; Bartolini & Mair, 1990), it becomes a questionable choice in contemporary politics. In the last decades, a vast stream of literature highlighted the emergence and the increasing levels of electoral volatility, declining party affiliation and the subsequent party system instability (Franklin et al., 1992; Drummond, 2006; Tavits, 2008; Emanuele et al., 2020), in contrast with scholars who claimed that European electorates were not less balanced than voters in the past, on the contrary they showed a pattern of stabilization throughout Europe (cf. the seminal work of Rose & Urwin, 1970 on party system stability; Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Mair, 1993). Therefore, in times of party-system instability, increasing electoral volatility, increasing party-voter dealignment and weaker bonds between parties and voters (Dalton, 1984; Dalton & Wattemberg, 2002; André et al., 2015), a party classification that needs to be based on parties that explicitly politicize issues and demands coming from a defined social group seems problematic. Furthermore, we can acknowledge three further problems.

First, in a dealigned and fluid electoral scenario, a change in parties' electorate does not necessarily imply a change in the ideological outlook of the party itself. Hooghe & Marks (2018) stress out this implication by arguing that parties may seek to adapt their positions to voters' preferences on the one hand, but on the other these efforts are limited by long-term constraints, from policy commitments to issues dealing with branding and expectations. This "party stickiness" can therefore inhibit parties' ideological evolution even though their electorate seems to change. Furthermore, when we deal with RRPs, it turns out that electorates are not always homogeneous, and it is therefore unlikely to find strong common ideological features among different voters in different nations. Finally, a political party "is more than the mere collection of the individuals involved; it is an actor in its own right" (Mudde, 2007, p.38), so the most worthwhile approach to understand parties' ideological profile is to focus on the party alone.

As far as quantitative methods are concerned, expert surveys on party positioning and comparative manifesto datasets are the most used approaches to party classification and have been proved to be reliable tools to grasp where a party stands on different issues. Despite their strict coding scheme could lead to a conceptual rigidity and, mostly, lead to troubles in grasping complex ideological features (Mudde, 2007), they nevertheless show internal and external validity, each of them producing information in line with alternative sources (Hooghe et al., 2010; Bakker et al., 2015).

Within this essay, we leave out the more problematic approaches based on how parties are organized, on who they represent, and on the party federations they joined. On the contrary, we will refer to party families as groups of parties gathered on the basis of a common ideological outlook derived from expert surveys, which stand as one of the most adequate measures among different criteria, and,

despite some criticism on misestimation and misclassification risks (Mikhaylov et al., 2012; McDonald & Budge, 2014), it is also a methodologically sound approach to the party family analysis.

Radical right: a definition and its main ideological characteristics

After having defined what are the possible features that characterize a party family and having explained why the ideological criterium seems adequate to do so, it is now time to consider the radical right party family.

The term "radical right" (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mudde, 1996; Norris, 2005) emerged several years ago in the academic debate, but the debate on its meaning is not yet settled. Furthermore, "radical right" is not the only label used to define parties located in this political area. Some put more emphasis on parties' extremist features, opting for the term "extreme right" (Ignazi, 2003; Carter 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Caiani et al., 2012). Others employed a vaguer "far right" (Golder, 2016). Finally, more recently, the label "neo-nationalist" emerged (Eger & Valdez, 2018).[3] Many scholars then pair their core label with the adjective "populist", following Cas Mudde's (2007) highly acclaimed work on "populist" RRPs, thus adding an anti-elitist appendix on the radical outlook of the terminology in use. However, these different epithets that emerged across time have been used to label the same objects and they are meant to indicate the same group of parties. In a few words, the labels radical, extreme, and far right have been often used as synonyms. Still, if we stick to Cas Mudde's work, he clearly separates the radical right (which is authoritarian but not necessarily antidemocratic) from the extreme right (which is antidemocratic), thus restricting the use of "extreme right" to identify a rather specific group of parties. Therefore, as far as this work is concerned, we will not rely on the label "far right", which is too vague, neither on "extreme right", which is too specific. On the contrary, we will rely on the term "radical right" because it is an accepted label within the academic community, and it is the most used in current literature. As it will emerge from the discussion on radical right's ideological features later in the chapter, we do not assume openly anti-

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[3] We should make a point on this vast use of different labels. A well-funded debate and a scrupulous critique over the use of the most correct label could sound tedious and trivial, still it may be valuable for future research. On the one hand, one could say that scholars always indicate the same parties, whether they put them under the radical, extreme or far right umbrella; on the other hand, every term carries with it its peculiar meaning, connotation and symbolism. Every adjective holds a vast definitory power, therefore, if political extremism implies a compliance with specific characteristics, so do radical and far-rightist. Nevertheless, their meaning can change in time and space: what is considered to be "radical" also depends on the political culture of the country, and what was once supposed to be extremist may have turned more mainstream as time went by. Therefore, the use of different labels to address the same parties is somehow understandable, given the lack of generally accepted definitions of what is extreme and what is far or radical, and the fact that their meaning is often relative to the context. As the next pages will show, Mudde tries to avoid this problem by sewing a comprehensive ideological profile to the family in study.

democratic and explicitly neofascist parties to be part of this family. On the contrary, we stand with the discrimination made by Cas Mudde.[4]

One of the first attempts to build an ideological conceptualization of contemporary radical right is by Hans-Georg Betz, whose definition blends nationalism with xenophobia and a liberal approach to economy. According to him, RRPs stand against social equality and the integration of marginalized groups: they appeal to xenophobia, if not racism, and they hold a classical liberal position on the economy and individuals (Betz, 1994). Kitschelt maintains the structural elements of Betz's theoretical approach when he develops the famous "winning formula", which explains RRPs' success through a combination of socio-economic neoliberal and socio-cultural authoritarian appeals (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). The same socio-cultural authoritarian appeals are cited by Ignazi's (1994) attempt to bring RRPs together in the same family, together with the glorification of the natural community, hostility towards foreigners, and faith in a hierarchic society.

RRPs have been changing widely, but even though the abovementioned definitions would fail to keep up to the transformation of RRPs' outlook, they are useful to grasp one of the few things on which the entire scientific community agrees: the core ideology of the radical right family. Even though both Eatwell (1992) and Ignazi (1994) claim it is rather hard to identify a common core within the right wing, still the ideological foundation of all definitions cited above always finds its roots on the national/non-national divide, that is nationalism.

Still, without a strict and precise definition, nationalism does not stand as a defining feature that necessarily distinguishes the radical right from other actors on the center-right (Ennser, 2012). Therefore, Cas Mudde refines his minimal definition of radical right on the very concept of nativism. He defines nativism as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements represent a threat to the homogeneous nation-state (Mudde, 2007). This interpretation of nativism holds as a rigorous definition because it creates a solid ideological border that separates the radical right family from the others.

At the same time, Mudde's definition of nativism pushes the boundaries of the minimal definition to gather more parties together: it acknowledges the importance of opposition to immigration, without reducing RRPs to mere single-issues parties, and it can accommodate xenophobic reactions also to

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[4] As far as extreme right parties are concerned, given their negligible electoral results (assuming they compete in the elections), they do not appear within the dataset we will use for our analyses. Still, we had to deal with borderline cases, whose antidemocratic discourse has been a matter of debate. Greek party Golden Dawn has been often labelled as a threat to democracy (Kouroutakis, 2018), similarly as the People's Party – Our Slovakia (Nociar, 2012). Still, both parties have been taken into consideration for our analyses, given that we chose to put no barrier whatsoever restricting the party database we had selected. For more information, we refer you to Chapter 2.

ethnic indigenous minorities (Mudde, 2007). Furthermore, this interpretation of nativism gets rid of racism as a definitory item: as an ideological feature, nativism is founded on ethnopluralism, and it rejects biological racism. When compared to biological racism, ethnopluralism stands on a different theoretical ground: on the one hand, it is a non-hierarchical doctrine, therefore it does not claim different ethnicities to be superior or inferior; on the other hand, while racism aims at subordination, ethnopluralism aims at fighting threats to the nation-state through expulsion (Rydgren, 2013). So, with the implementation of nativism as a defining feature, the radical right family gets a solid and coherent boundary, which sets it sharply apart from other families. The centrality of nativism is also confirmed by Rydgren (2005), who cites it as a foundation for the "new master frame" of RRPs: the shift from biological racism to cultural racism, which has permitted RRPs to mobilize xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists.

So, if nativism acts as the core of the radical right family ideological outlook, when it comes to the elaboration of an extended definition, Mudde (2007) brings two more elements in discussion. The first addition is authoritarianism, which is defined as the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. As far as it may sound like a lame reference to law and order, this definition is deliberately left loose to neither exclude nor encompass an antidemocratic attitude, which is not a core feature of radical right but at the same time it is not precluded (Mudde, 2007). Furthermore, authoritarianism is conceived as one of the ideological features of the conceptualization of the "strong state" (Mudde, 2000) along with militarism, which is no longer current within radical right's ideological outlook. Therefore, this definition of authoritarianism is not elaborated to stand alone, yet it is sound enough to delineate a valid addition to the radical right ideological profile.

The second addition to establish an extended definition of the radical right is populism, which is intended by Mudde as an ideological feature, and not as a political style or a rhetoric strategy. Specifically, populism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that splits society into two homogeneous groups (the pure people and the corrupt elite) and that puts the general will of the people as the most important driving force of political action (Mudde, 2004; Mudde, 2007). The feature of populism is maybe the most problematic in Mudde's framework, for several reasons.

First, the conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology on which Mudde bases his threefold ideological outlook of the radical right has been rather debated and refuted (cf. Aslanidis, 2016). Therefore, if we intended populism as a communication strategy or as a rhetoric skill which is crosscutting over the political spectrum (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018), then it could not be considered as an ideological feature that could shape a party

family. Second, even if we do consider populism as an ideological feature, it still cannot be considered a radical right party family defining feature per se, given that anti-elitism and populist appeals are found in several other parties clearly not belonging to the radical right (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2014; Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019), contrary to nativism and authoritarianism.

Third and last, Mudde displays populism as a crucial definitory item to identify "populist radical right parties", which are indicated as a (rather substantial) subfamily of the radical right party family. Still, when it comes to show radical right party family members that are not populist, the examples are lacking. [5] In a few words, populism would stand as a feature of all parties of the radical right family (thus it is not useful to distinguish within), but at the same time it is not typical of them alone (thus it is not useful to distinguish between). Therefore, on the one hand, populism does not add any heuristic element to improve party classification. On the other hand, it cannot be indicated as a strict definitory item of the radical right party family on two different levels: first, if we do not define it as a thin ideology but as a communicative style, it would simply be a communication strategy implemented by parties; second, the adjective "populist" has been sticked to other parties throughout all the political spectrum, therefore it is not a property that specifically defines the radical right. Based on this reasoning, we will not count on populism to define the radical right party family, because, at the current state of the art, it is still a far too slippery concept to be used in a definition.

However, Cas Mudde's ideological profile of the radical right party family still works rather well even when based on two ideological features: nativism (the core) and authoritarianism (the extension). Even when separated from the third element (populism), the importance of Mudde's ideological outline is twofold: first, it still gives the radical right a stable place along the political spectrum by affixing peculiar characteristics to the party family; furthermore, it also sets it apart from other families that could overlap due to their proximity. This solid theoretical reinforcement of the radical right family borders is particularly useful: Mudde's definition applies clear-cut and strongly defined ideological features, which help to frame the party family reducing the risks of misclassification.

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[5] With respect to subfamilies, the situation is a bit blurred. Despite Mudde clearly states that not all radical right is populist and therefore we must look at populist radical right as a subfamily, then, when it comes to list non-populist radical right actors, there seems to be no valid example. Standing with his own definition of populism, Mudde rightly clears away all parties with elitist and state centered mindsets belonging to the extreme right party family. Afterwards, he cites Vlaams Belang and the Front National, which originated as nonpopulist RRPs and later adopted populism, after years of opposition on the wave of the "populist Zeitgeist" (Mudde, 2004). Still, both parties do not exist anymore, albeit in their "nonpopulist" form. Mudde only provides one example of non-populist contemporary actor: the Turkish Nationalist Action Party, which is both nativist and authoritarian, but it also reflects a "strong elitist and statist beliefs" as confirmed by Yavuz (2002). Its elitist nature is not at stake here, but its inclusion within the radical right has been questioned, especially after its electoral success at the beginning of 2000s (cf. Onis, 2003; Avci, 2011).

Relations with other party families

On the basis of the previous strategy, we already discussed a first slippery concept: nationalism. RRPs differ from classic conservative parties in terms of their conception of nationalism: while the conservatives assume nationalism as a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the nation, the radical right conceives it as nativism. With his definition, Mudde clears away the vagueness of the term "nationalism" and he lowers the risk of a tricky ideological overlapping between two separate party families. Conservatives and the radical right are also at odds with the liberal socioeconomic agenda or traditional ethics and religious values. This features for sure help to define conservatism, but Mudde indicates none of them as a core defining feature of the radical right.

Mudde also draws a line between the radical right and the extreme right, which are strictly disconnected by their stances on democracy. While the extreme right shows an anti-democratic outlook as one of its core features, the radical right can, at most, show an aversion to the rules of liberal democracy and its intermediate bodies. Although this distance between radical and extreme right has been questioned and the two terms are often used as synonyms, as we said before, it has nonetheless been recognized since the term radical right has been established. Betz (1994) acknowledges this difference by stating that "although in most cases they *(the RRPs)* do aim at a fundamental transformation of the existing socioeconomic and sociopolitical system, they see and promote themselves as democratic alternatives to the prevailing system" (p.108). Also, Rydgren, when stressing the anti-democratic feature as a foundation of its new master frame of the radical right, underlines the importance of the incorporation of an anti-establishment strategy has permitted to RRPs to pose serious critiques on contemporary democratic systems without being stigmatized as anti-democratic (Rydgren, 2005). So, despite the term "extreme right" has often been used as an equivalent of "radical right" and despite some ideological stances of both radical and extreme right parties might overlap, the absence of a clear anti-democratic position sets the former apart from the latter.

Ultimately, RRPs must not be considered as single-issue parties. Single-issue parties refer to an electorate with no particular social structure, they are supported because of a single issue and lack an ideological program (Mudde, 1999). Early research has often confused RRPs with mere anti-immigration actors. This is a misinterpretation of the role of immigration issues in RRPs' propaganda: it certainly is a major issue, and it is crucial in their mobilization strategies, yet it does not stand alone in their programs and, most importantly, immigration stances do not shape the radical right ideological outlook on their own (cf. Fennema, 1997). While some radical right parties may mobilize through one predominant issue and then blur their positions on other topics (Rovny, 2013), they

maintain a more articulated ideological profile, that often reflects a quite structured electorate, as the last part of the chapter will show.

In conclusion, academic research drew the radical right party family borders very precisely, it sketched the main differences that set it apart from other party families and put its core ideological features on the table. The coexistence of a nativist frame based on ethnopluralism with an authoritarian attitude to law and order that does not lead to anti-democratic stances are two fundamental features of RRPs and they are necessary to include a party into the radical right family.

Ideological homogeneity: within party and within families

Once the ideological profile of radical right parties has been detailed, it is time to check whether this party family shows an internal ideological cohesiveness, or it leaves space to heterogeneity. As previous paragraph showed, the nativist approach is widespread among RRPs and it works as the main ideological core on which party classification is based, but nothing was said about how the radical right family looks ideologically homogeneous or whether we might expect some ideologic variance among family members.

Contemporary literature points out that the level of ideological homogeneity varies across parties for sure, but it can also change within a single party (among members and factions) overtime (Rehm & Rielly, 2010), therefore ideological heterogeneity can characterize both party families and single parties. In a few words, parties are not unitary actors by definition and they do not always hold homogeneous policy preferences (Steiner & Mader, 2019). Therefore, also within-party cohesiveness must not be given for granted, because it may either increase or decrease in different times. Academic research has underlined many indicators and variables that can explain both growing and descending patterns, and one of them is the level of party institutionalization.

Value infusion can foster intra-party homogeneity because committed party actors are more likely to care for the general performance of the party, therefore they may be more inclined to form preferences in harmony with the party line (Mader & Steiner, 2019). Preference homogeneity is also more likely in parties that allows a fair and regular discussion on issues that can help new members to familiarize with rules and procedures that govern the internal life of parties, providing a formative environment with solid group ties (Bolleyer & Ruth, 2018). Further research also revealed that, while newborn-parties' members are strongly united just on key constitutive issues, it is just when institutionalization progresses that candidates finally converge also on secondary issues (Mader & Steiner, 2019). The control of the process of candidate selection by party leaders also seems to have a strong effect on

homogeneity. This fact suggests that a more spread and diffuse influence in the nomination process may indeed increase the tendency for more diverse preferences within a single party (Carroll & Kubo, 2019).

All these variables have been proved significant in growing diverse preferences within parties and therefore increasing heterogeneity, which has been in turn proved to have a direct effect of party issue-salience. In fact, parties tend to attach a lower salience to issues over which they are internally divided (Steiner & Mader, 2019). So, ideological homogeneity and issue salience are highly related on the intra-party side. The level of homogeneity influences issue salience, because the higher the internal homogeneity, the higher the salience on that issue.[6] These lines want to remark that the risk of within-party heterogeneity is not to be underestimated while dealing with the study of party families. The radical right family is no exception, and the next part of the paragraph will shed some light on how ideologically homogeneous it really is.

When we shift from single parties to the comparative analysis, previous paragraphs showed that party families' ideological profile has been massively studied. But when we narrow it down to intra-party family analysis, few comparative works rise, especially works dealing with the radical right. Academic research has indeed studied the relationship among different parties and party families, with a special attention on issues like polarization and ideological convergence, yet within-party and within-party family ideological cohesiveness has not been enlightened by many comparative studies. Those who did showed that European families display both a high degree of cohesiveness, which means that parties belonging to the same family have very similar ideological positions and share the same political space, but they also show high convergence, a reduction of ideological differences among parties of a same family[7] (Camia & Caramani, 2012). Specifically, right-wing families seem to be very homogeneous on cultural issues yet far more heterogeneous on economic issues than left-wing families (Camia & Caramani, 2012). Further research confirmed a marked diversity and flexibility of RRPs' positions on issues of state intervention, but it also showed that economic

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[6] Issue salience has been also studied within another lens, as it may alter party perceptions at the voter level. The main argument states that if one party puts more or less salience on particular issues, it does not necessarily change its ideological profile, still it influences how individuals perceive its political positions. One of the latest publications on this topic clearly showed how the AfD's perception changed dramatically immediately after the refugee crisis had hit Germany: when the economic crisis, accompanied by strong salience on economic issues, gave place to immigration crisis, and therefore to sociocultural issue salience, the German public opinion started to place the party far more on the right of the political spectrum than before (Giebler et al., 2021). On the one hand, this proves how, at least in the German scenario, radical right parties are perceived as radical right when they place more emphasis on cultural issues; on the other hand, it also proves how parties can be differently perceived when they change their emphasis on certain issues, as Wagner & Meyer (2017) argued. Therefore, the link between issue salience and party perception cannot be forgotten while dealing with party analysis.
[7] The study under analysis measures cohesiveness and convergence from 1945 to 2009, so it completely cuts off the period after the 2008 economic crisis.

nativism appears to be an important unifying factor of these parties in the post-crisis period (Otjes et al., 2018). So, even if some academic findings underline a degree of differentiation among parties within economic position, they also do not invalidate those studies that claim an ordinary level of homogeneity for the radical right party family.

Ennser (2012) confirms that RRPs are rather diverse when it comes to economic and decentralization attitudes, still they show more general homogeneity than traditional conservatives, Christian democrats and liberals, which stand out as the most heterogeneous party family by all metrics. Ennser also finds how radical right parties clearly distinguish themselves from other party families, a pattern that holds even when alien parties show a significant proximity to them: "While it can therefore be held that the boundaries between the radical right and some conservative parties appear difficult to delineate, it is the heterogeneity of the latter rather than that of the former group that leads to this outcome" (Ennser, 2012, p.165). Finally, the third finding is the presence of delineated subgroups into the radical right family.

After this review, two main observations emerge from the literature. First, if contemporary theoretical works on the radical right family have pointed out its minimal ideological characterization that sets it apart from other party groups, empirical studies on party family homogeneity have tended to confirm that the radical right shows a valuable ideological uniformity that separates its members from other parties, therefore its party family "status" has generally been confirmed. Second, other studies also investigated the degree of ideological differentiation among the radical right family members and found space for political divergence. Some also highlighted the existence of internal subgroups, thus suggesting that different political decisions and ideological transformations may have produced separate branches within the radical right family. The two main areas of analysis are now more explicit: we have showed what theory driven studies describe as the main ideological drivers of RRPs cementing the homogeneity within the family, still we have not yet surveyed the debate on what may differ RRPs from each other. The abovementioned studies suggest one specific area as the main driver of heterogeneity among RRPs: their positions on socio-economic issues.

The position of RRPs on socio-economic issues

Despite a general agreement on the foundational features of the radical right party family, a massive debate arose on RRPs' economic stances, their salience, their evolution, and their potential importance in framing a radical right ideological profile. Until here, our review showed how the radical right is a robust label, whose borders have been sketched precisely over the years, despite the

variety of its members. To put in the words of Kai Arzheimer (2013), RRPs hold similarities and differences that set them strongly apart from other right-wing actors, but still look quite heterogeneous. And the more discussed item explaining this heterogeneity is the economical profile.

If Cas Mudde avoided an economic approach while grasping a definition of the radical right party family, and left a major role to sociocultural items, seminal research emphasized even socioeconomical party positions (cf. Hainsworth, 1992; Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1994). Kitschelt brought them together in his famous "winning formula", which explained the success of radical right parties through a combination of socio-economic neoliberal attitudes and socio-cultural authoritarian appeals: a cross-class mobilization that used anti-immigration stance to capture the working-class and a convinced support to free market to appeal small business owners (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Betz (1994) also gave a primary importance to a neoliberal economic outlook in shaping RRPs' ideological profile, to such an extent that he proposed two main subfamilies: national and neoliberal populists, based on the relative weight of cultural and economic appeals each party gave to its program.

These elements can be easily traced when looking at the development of the radical right since the 1970s. In fact, the tradition of neoliberal right parties started with the electoral breakthrough of the so-called "Progress Parties" in Denmark (DPP) and Norway (NPP). Both parties hit the headlines in the early 70s, at the outbreak of the oil crises, when bourgeois coalition governments were in office during the most expansive period of the welfare state in both countries (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). Therefore, both parties were heavily ideologically characterized on the economic side: they were increasingly neoliberal, they claimed welfare reduction and a massive tax reduction, to a point that they were treated as single-issue parties by contemporary researchers (Jupskas 2015; Bjerkem, 2016). Their economically liberal approach to mass politics was also proved successful by the capacity to grasp the demand for individualism over the will for equality, which had always dominated both Danish and Norwegian public opinion (Betz, 1994). A similar story applies to the Front National (FN), which played a massive part of electoral mobilization on the field of liberal economy and anti-welfarism throughout the 80s, winning support from the right-wing Catholic well-off bourgeoisie (Mayer, 2013).[8] The FN promoted an exclusivist popular capitalism that brought two different

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[8] If all three parties held very similar positions, the political backgrounds were almost the opposite. If the NPP and DPP took advantage of high spending centre-right governments that did not cope with the expected and promised tax deduction, the FN got its first electoral breakthrough after the "socialism a la française" attempt then smashed by oil crises and double Franc's devaluation (Gentile, 2008).

political backgrounds together: the various strands of the traditional French radical right, and the neoliberal ideas of Thatcherism (Betz, 1994).[9]

Until now, this chapter clearly showed two recurring facts from the early literature on the radical right. First, parties' positions on socioeconomic issues were framed as an integral part of the radical right ideological outlook. Second, the literature agreed on the crucial role of neoliberal economic stances in order for RRPs to gain electoral success. Since then, however, several authors have doubted both the centrality of the economic platform and the applicability of Kitschelt's winning formula (cf. De Lange, 2007). In fact, they argued an evolution of radical right's ideological profile, in order to cope with new political developments that altered both European political landscape and the appeal of the neoliberal radical right. A "new winning formula" (De Lange, 2007) began to spread. Many established RRPs modified their ideological appeal: they started to abandon neoliberal economic positions, leaving their nativist and authoritarian outlook untouched (De Lange, 2007). The convergence to more centrist, if not leftist, economic positions gave birth to new interpretations to account for the genesis of new political actors (or the evolution of older ones) aiming at widening their electoral potential (cf. Kriesi et al., 2012). This does not necessarily mean that older frameworks like Betz's, Kitschelt's or Hainsworth's are now inapplicable, because neoliberal radical right parties still exist and may exist in the future (cf. Pauwels, 2010), still, they are not as useful as before at grasping radical right's ideological and electoral evolution.

Starting from the second half of the 1990s, several RRPs began to gradually moderate their economic stances, turning progressively away from their orthodox economic platforms (cf. Elff, 2013). It happened in France (De Lange, 2007; Betz, 2016), Belgium (De Lange, 2007), Denmark (Jupskas, 2015b; Careja et al., 2016), Sweden (Jungar, 2015; Norocel, 2016) and other European countries. But, if the programmatic transition to welfare maintenance and the inclination toward progressive social policy proposals[10] is documented (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), so is the requirement that RRPs demand in order to access public services, which are restricted to national citizens only; thus immigrants would have a limited access to social benefits (Lefkofridi & Michel, 2014). So, RRPs switched from an anti-welfare economic position to a different standpoint that not only acknowledges welfare politics, but it also restricts the access to those who nourish the welfare state in the first place. This phenomenon, labelled as "welfare chauvinism" (Andersen & Bjorklund, 1990), can be identified

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[9] The Austrian and Swiss counterparts are held up by the same ideological backbone: the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO), which Betz (1994) described as "generally neoliberal" (p.114) yet a bit vague on international trade, and the radically liberal and enthusiastically individualistic Automobile Party, whose name was then changed with a more appropriate Freedom Party of Switzerland.

[10] While many cited authors argued that radical right parties abandoned market liberal positions, others argued for a "blurring" strategy in order to mask the actual party position on economic issues (cf. Rovny, 2013).

as an economic declination of nativism, as it promotes a social model where native individuals are privileged over non-natives in the distribution of welfare benefits.[11]

However, the change in socioeconomical profile was not univocal. If the FN abandoned its references to a free market economy, it claims to be a forceful proponent of social justice, it advocates social services protection and it strives to defend and improve social security in a chauvinistic way (Lefkofridi & Michel, 2014; Pavolini et al., 2019), other parties do not. Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) strengthened their old radical right ideology, and they show only apparently a new approach to welfare issues, which are mainly used to make the point on how dangerous the outsiders (both immigrants and the EU institutions) are for their countries (Pavolini et al., 2019). While other actors, like the Dutch Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid,* PVV) did not change their liberal economic outlook. [12]

In a few words, welfare chauvinism does not represent a common feature for all European RPPs: many parties embraced it, others did not and still others hesitate. If early 1990s research was characterized by a shared agreement both on the crucial role of economic platforms and their ideological direction when implemented into the radical right definition, contemporary research is still debating. The evolution within the radical right party family brought a growing level of heterogeneity among RRPs on socioeconomic issues, which is mirrored by a wide range of controversial positions within the literature. There is an open disagreement between academics placing more importance on cultural issues in shaping both radical right's ideology and electoral success, and authors that also consider economic issues to be equally important. Some assert that the economic evolution of the radical right is a solid attempt to balance support for capitalism with support for welfare state, which has been defined as right-wing egalitarianism (Derks, 2006) or even populist political economy (Rydgren, 2004). They confirm the will of a branch of European RRPs to

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[11] The switch to social protection became apparent when Andersen & Bjorklund (1990) took stock of the opposing political evolution of the DPP and the NPP: they showed how the latter was fueled by "a significant faction of young ideologues committed to neoliberalism", and how the DPP was no longer a reference for neoliberal ideologues, who used to look more at liberal party Venstre, and it also appeared to be in a "turbulent situation" (p.213). In fact, while the NPP has maintained a coherent neoliberal rightist ideological outlook till now, the DPP basically ceased to exist in 1995, when a major split gave birth to the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) that is still today an example of a contemporary RRP: a nativist and welfare-oriented actor that did also influence Danish social policies in a chauvinistic direction when in government (Careja et al., 2016).

[12] Other parties have experienced a continuous internal debate among different political currents and their exponents. The Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) provides a good example. Built on libertarian and anti-dirigiste roots, the FPO used to be torn between two party-groups while in government: a "social-populist" anti-internationalist branch that opposed to the anti-interventionist deregulatory agenda, and those who supported it (Heinisch, 2008, p.52). Therefore, they experienced a split in 2005, when Jörg Haider founded the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZO). As far as research testifies, pro-redistributive policy preferences do not appear among the top five issues of the FPO and, at the same time, support for free market economy, once very salient, has disappeared from the more recent manifestos. This is what makes the FPO a hybrid case within the European radical right (Lefkofridi & Michel, 2014).

change their approach to the economy and social provision by embracing a chauvinistic protection of national welfare, and they also confirm how this issue stands out as one of the most salient in RRPs' manifestos. In their view, party positions on socioeconomic issues are solid, salient and coherent, and should therefore be considered as part of the ideological backbone of the radical right party family (Zaslove, 2008a). On the contrary, other scholars tend to present economic stances as secondary features that cannot find their place in a radical right party family definition. For instance, Mudde states that RRPs' economic outlook is a mere subproduct of their nativist traits, while Rovny (2013; Rovny & Polk, 2020) claims that RRPs compete on the non-economic dimension, therefore they blur their economic positions to misrepresent their spatial distance from voters.

In the literature, there is thus only one issue on which all scholars agree: a *radical* change happened within radical right on economic positions. Whether this represents an opportunistic political strategy or a real ideological shift it is still debated, but it stands as one of the most important changes in contemporary party politics. Once considered crucial and homogeneous, the socioeconomic orientation of the radical right has now changed.

Some expectations on the boundaries and internal composition of the radical right party family

To summarize this part of literature review, we first laid out different ways to build party families, then we selected the ideological criteria as being the most suitable for many reasons: it ensures that parties can easily switch from one category to another on the basis of the time selected and it concentrates on what parties really are and on which interests they represent. In second place, we framed the debate on the ideological attributes of the radical right party family. Contemporary research suggests a core ideology which brings all definitions together: nativism. Then, Cas Mudde extends its minimal definition by adding authoritarianism to the nativist core. Finally, we focused on the debate on RRPs' positions on socioeconomic issues, which recent literature framed as an ancillary definitory item. Hereby, we highlighted how several RRPs operated a convergence on economic attitudes: they abandon references to economic liberalism, which were once taken into account to define the boundaries of the radical right party family, and they embrace a more moderate, if not interventionist, approach framed on welfare-chauvinist attitudes. Debate aroused among those who consider welfare chauvinism a mere electoral stunt and those who raise it as a crucial ideological evolution. It is nonetheless true that research divided RRPs in different groups on the basis of their electoral programmes: those who implemented an interventionist turn both in their programmes and,

when possible, in their government experience; those who kept a more liberal political orientation; and, finally, those who abandoned any reference against social protection and state intervention, but still they have not made a change in the opposite direction. So, if RRPs show a high degree of ideological homogeneity within the cultural axis, especially on the immigration phenomenon that is usually framed as a cultural issue, when we narrow it down to the economic side, their different programmatic stances on economic issues open the field for heterogeneity. This is also suggested by academic literature on party homogeneity, which understands the radical right family as both homogeneous and discordant at the same time. If on the one hand, the radical right party family occupies a specific place in the political spectrum, it seems sharply divided from other families and it shows a good level of ideological homogeneity; on the other hand, the emergence of specific subgroups within the family is entirely possible, and the space for divergence seems to open up precisely on the economic side.

However, the goal of this chapter is not to propose a classification and derive a definition from theory driven studies. Quite the opposite, we aimed at showing the main characteristics of the radical right family as they appear in the literature, thus making explicit the criteria that have been used within the literature to frame the radical right. This is where the empirical work starts.

In fact, based on previous theoretical developments and building on prior empirical evidence, we formulate two main areas of expectation, which are tested in Chapter 2. These expectations are based on the ideological analysis of the radical right party family, framed into the three definitory levels listed above: the core, the extended definition, and the ancillary item. First, we highlighted a core definitory item which brings all definitions together: nationalism, later refined by Cas Mudde with the definition of nativism. The second level is represented by Mudde's extended definition, that encompasses authoritarianism. Finally, ancillary items, like radical right positions on socioeconomic issues, compose a third level which is contextually defined. The main goal of the empirical analysis is to put contemporary definitions to test by means of a data-driven procedure that reverses the theoretical process of a party family ideological definition.

First, we will examine whether the core definitory element of the radical right family can define the radical right borders with precision when assessed empirically or it lacks a clear-cut definitory power. We expect the radical right to stand as a party family by itself, and to be clearly and substantially divided from other party families in ideological terms, because of their core ideological trait. Therefore, we expect nativist stances to be crucial in shaping parties' radical right belonging.

The second goal is to use ancillary items to check for the emergence of subfamilies and see whether they coexist in time and space. We base our expectation on the assumption that ideological divergence

on economic issues would create the opportunity for within-family divergence. Specifically, we expect to appreciate the formation of two main subfamilies divided in terms of their interventionist or neoliberal economic positions. The hypotheses will be listed in Chapter 2.

1.2 – The radical right within the political scenario: political opportunities and the relationship with other parties

While the previous chapter focused on a comprehensive definition of the radical right party family, on RRPs' main ideological characteristics and within-family ideological cohesiveness, this part of the essay will deal with RRPs in context. The next pages will look at RRPs in the political scenario they share with other political actors, dealing with a complex set of conditions in order to survive, establish themselves and gain political power. The goal of the chapter is to highlight the main contextualities that can help or hinder radical right electoral breakthrough and persistence. The first paragraph will investigate the set of political opportunities emerging from the political and cultural contexts. The second paragraph will define the relationship between RRPs and other political actors. It will consider how mainstream parties can react to the radical right after its breakthrough, and their attempt to limit RRPs' influence and strength. We will also show that sometimes these attempts bring exactly to the opposite results. The final picture is a complex strategical interplay among different actors in different environments, whose outcome can be directly influenced by contextual factors. This whole scenario leaves no space to readymade political strategies, making RRPs' struggle to emerge and settle also dependent on the context in which they operate.

Political opportunities for radical right success: external contextual factors

Academic research has explained radical right success focusing on its ideological profile and political agenda, but it also concentrated on political opportunities that may have facilitated the success of RRPs. These constraints and opportunities are referred to as the external supply-side explanations for radical right success, and they range from the institutional framework to the structure of the political space and the evolution of party strategies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Contemporary research has shown the crucial role of these external factors for the proliferation of RRPs in Europe (Carter, 2005; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006) and it also proved that these contextual opportunities are as indispensable as the internal factors, namely the programmatic and political evolution of the party itself. As Rydgren argues, referring to his own studies, the innovation and diffusion of the new master frame was a necessary condition for the emergence of radical right actors, but it was not sufficient alone: Political opportunities must be considered as well to explain the rise of a new party family (Rydgren, 2005). So, on the other hand, political opportunities alone cannot do the trick: in order to be fruitful, political opportunities must be caught and exploited; and they will pay out only when political embryos have

the capacity to take advantage of them, in a necessary interrelation between party strategies and contextual factors. This part of the chapter will therefore deal with these necessary resources that are external to the party.

The first structural factor for a new party to emerge is the creation of a sufficiently large niche. Given that no niche can evolve under stable political conditions and stable voter preferences, it needs a degree of electoral volatility. When voters' distribution changes, significant gaps open between political demand and the supply side and new parties can therefore occupy this niche and attract votes (Rydgren, 2005). This scenario is particularly plausible when new issues connected to new divides increase in salience at the expense of older issues, especially if mainstream parties fail to deal with the new matters of contention. Three main considerations arise from these few lines: electoral volatility is crucial for new parties in order to take advantage of a political niche; the positioning on the main established parties on key old issues have a significant effect on the electoral opportunities of other parties; and, finally, partisan dealignment and subsequent realignment on the basis of new divides replacing older ones represent a rather favorable political opportunity for new parties to gain consensus (Rydgren 2004; 2005; Mudde, 2007).

The second aspect we focus on is the degree of convergence in the political space, which has been also proven to provide political opportunities. Theoretical works suggest that mainstream parties, once they converge on issues based on one specific divide, allow other parties (especially newer actors) to mobilize voters on another divide, and with a more extreme position on the political space (Carter, 2005). The theory also holds with grand-coalition governments, which themselves cause political convergence (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). In this perspective, academic research showed that RRPs have been particularly successful when the mainstream center-right competitor occupied a more centrist position (van der Brug et al, 2005). The mainstream's convergence on one issue can also contribute to its politicization and thus raise its salience in the political debate, and, most importantly, convergence can also give an issue-monopoly to non-converging actors, as Rydgren and van der Melden (2019) argue about the Swedish case. In sum, contemporary research convincingly framed the process of convergence among mainstream actors as a major factor for political opportunities. Still, RRPs can also profit from the opposite process, that is polarization, when they are part of one of the two main blocks of competition (Mudde, 2007). To sum up, it turns out that the capacity from RRPs to exploit political opportunities depends on the contextual situation either deriving from mainstream convergence or party system polarization.

Thirdly, political opportunities for non-mainstream parties can also flourish in parallel with crisis. Many studies have tried to explain radical right success with the erupting of economic and political

crisis, yet conclusions have been contradictory (cf. Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). The correlation between political crisis and radical right support have been studied empirically using political discontent, dissatisfaction with democracy and salience of clientelism and corruption (Betz, 1993; 2002; Ziller & Schübel, 2015; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). All studies gave positive and significant relationships, but they also showed relevant geographical differences (Mudde, 2007). Hutter et al. (2018) focused on Southern Europe, where countries faced both an economic crisis and a political crisis that produced a conflict structure shaped by struggles over austerity and political renewal at the same time. Results showed many differences across countries: while Greece saw both its party system and its main line of political conflict completely transformed by a double crisis mechanism, other countries faced a less traumatic experience (Hutter et al., 2018). Therefore, research proved that political and economic crisis actually trigger the rise of new challenger parties, but they do it in cooperation with other mechanisms, whose intensity is crucial for the magnitude of change.

Fourth, concerning other external opportunities for RRPs to gain success, academic research hypothesized the existence of more and less fruitful cultural context. Scholars investigated, among others, the centrality of new right intellectuals within the national political debate, the stigmatization of extremist movements at a national level and the pervasiveness of subcultural organizations acting both as salience highlighters and activists' recruiters (Mudde, 2007). However, one of the most interesting fields concerns how nation-states dealt with their connection to fascism from the end of WWII.[13] The effects of the re-elaboration of fascism and the legacy of the Nazi regime on the emergence of the radical right have been studied and mentioned by important scholars (cf, Tarchi, 2003; Art, 2005; 2007), but one of the most recent and convincing works is Caramani and Manucci (2019). They investigate the re-elaboration of fascism through two criteria, the placement of responsibility and the existence of a dictatorial regime ruling the country; thereby, they elaborate that a massive victimization and the cancellation of the fascist past open up the gaps for contextual cultural opportunities. The consequent persistence of a strong nativist subculture builds a favorable cultural scenario that can increase salience of nativist issues in domestic policies and facilitate contacts with the mainstream (Mudde, 2007).

To sum up, all these political opportunities provide a breeding ground for RRPs: mainstream's convergence and electoral volatility open a niche for more extreme actors; political and economic crisis give them another opportunity to gain consensus, along with the emergence of new issues based

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[13] Scholars did not expect direct relationship between the fascist experience and radical right emergence, in the sense that nations who did not experience a fascist regime may experience radical right success anyway, and, conversely, those who struggled with fascist administrations might not face a strong RRP. Furthermore, RRPs are not the successors of historical fascist parties, therefore any relationship can at best be indirect (Mudde, 2007).

on additional divides; last, specific cultural traits can improve the effectiveness of RRPs' strategy. All these factors strictly link the possibility for the success of the radical right to the context where RRPs operate.

However, the possibility for RRPs to find political opportunities does not stop at the external factors we have hereby investigated. In fact, the complex interrelation between internal and external circumstances that stands at the base of the political success of the radical right must be integrated with two other aspects: the strategic interaction between RRPs and the other political actors, given that different political strategies can give way to different outcomes; and the effect that the upsurge of RRPs has on the political landscape, whose transformation can alter the structure of political opportunities for the party itself. The next part of the chapter will add these new components to the context.

The radical right and other parties

RRPs have changed along with the European political systems: they changed their political orientation, especially in economic terms, and they did it into an everchanging landscape. In recent times, a branch of research tried to put RRPs' evolution and political transformations in relation with each other. In a few words, some scholars do not see the radical right as a mere part of the change, but they indicate it as a cause. In this perspective, the emergence of a new actor causes a massive change throughout the political spectrum: mainstream parties react to the rise of the radical right by adapting to their new competitor in terms of public discourse and government policies and by adjusting their positions with respect to radical right's core issues; this is particularly true for center-right parties (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016). This relationship though is not mutual, because, if it is true that mainstream right parties changed in terms of issue salience and they have shifted towards the right overtime, there is little evidence that the radical right has become more moderate (Wagner & Meyer, 2017).

Although, the claim that radical right parties directly affect mainstream parties is not unequivocal. While some scholars state that center-right parties do not go with the flow, but instead they co-opt challenger's positions, or they "parrot the pariah", in order to isolate them and win back their electoral support (van Spanje & de Graaf, 2018), other researchers entirely question the impact of the radical right onto the mainstream. According to this branch of research, it is very unlikely that RRPs played an important role in shaping public opinion and political actions of mainstream parties, on the contrary it was the mainstream right-wing that pushed west European politics to the right in

immigration issues, European integration, and authoritarian attitudes before RRPs would be strong enough to challenge them (Mudde, 2013). Furthermore, scholars also claim the lack of evidence to confirm a relationship between the two families when it comes to issue salience. In brief, when RRPs put more importance on one issue, the mainstream does not necessarily attribute a higher salience to that particular issue (Heinisch et al., 2019). As far as this topic is concerned, there is still no agreement on the role of the radical right in shaping the mainstream parties.

When it comes to political alliances, though, things get more straightforward. Nonetheless some clarifications are needed. Academic research acknowledges that the success of RRPs influences government stability. The impact is twofold: since challenger parties tend to stay in opposition and RRPs are generally sidelined in government agreements, on the one hand, the formation and maintenance of stable coalitions becomes more and more difficult, given that one actor is excluded from negotiations in the first place; on the other hand, a strong RRP can pave the way to grand coalition governments that keep both mainstream left and right together in order to form a *cordon sanitaire* (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016). So, when a challenger party rises, mainstream parties may face a problem of government stability; and, when they promote a grand coalition, they may even strengthen RRPs' claims and further facilitate their success.

Yet, political ostracism is not the only available strategy mainstream parties can engage to cope with a strong RRP. Recent history showed some cases where mainstream right-wing parties cooperated with radical right actors. For example, Berlusconi I, II and III governments were formed by the major party Forward Italy (*Forza Italia*, FI) in coalition with National Alliance (*Alleanza Nazionale*, AN) and the Northern League (*Lega Nord*, LN). The FPO established two distinct governments in Austria and the DF supported various executives in Denmark. These examples show that the mainstream right starts to consider the radical counterpart as coalition partners whenever the electoral pendulum swings to the right, therefore, when right-wing coalitions start to be strategically advantageous, mathematically possible, and politically viable (de Lange, 2012). Yet, such coalitions are often part of a broader strategy employed by the mainstream actors to neutralize the electoral success of RRPs (de Lange, 2012). By building an alliance with the radical right, the centre-right can maximize control over office, policies, and voters: under these circumstances, a right-right coalition is more rewarding than a politically moderate coalition, a-la *cordon sanitaire*. In sum, we can state that the effects of the radical right on coalitions depend on the political momentum. If the mainstream embraces ostracism, this may boost challengers' success, thus it may let them gain electoral power and therefore weaken

government stability. Whereas, if the mainstream right detects a strategic opportunity to let an RRP join the alliance, then a further party system polarization may occur.[14]

When it comes to the mainstream left, if Mudde (2013) stated that it has proven either incompetent to stop the public opinion shift to the right or even collaborative in supporting it, further research suggested a more complex scenario. Usually, when a new political party takes the stage, an old party has three options: he can stick to its guns in a Schumpeterian way, to reinforce its policy position; he can talk about other issues that he believes to own, therefore shifting the debate from a weaker to a stronger issue; or he can change position (Bale et al., 2010). Bale et al. applied these strategies to Western European social democrats facing radical right's electoral success. They found that the first strategy is an easy initial response, while the position change is not the default option, as it must take care of the behavior of both mainstream right (if they choose to emulate their radical counterparts or not) and parties on their left, which may criticize the sudden shift and then capitalize on letdown voters.

In conclusion, the rise of new actors is also said to bring major consequences to the stability of the entire party system (cf. Mair, 1989a; 1989b). New parties[15], regardless of their position on the political spectrum, increase the level of volatility, which indicates a decay in established patterns, therefore a weakening of party systems' stability (Przeworski, 1975). Still, the rise of the radical right after the 2008 subprime crises, yet very discussed, did not provide a major shake in party systems' innovation. Even if "during the last few years, there has been a sharp increase of the vote share received by non-founder parties, and in certain countries the change occurred since 2010 is larger than that cumulated between the end of WWII and 2009" (Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2018, p.482), the only case where a variation of cumulative party system innovation has been caused by a radical right party is the UK, while the greatest scores are recorded in countries where mainly radical left

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[14] Elite-level polarization is a rather complex topic both in conceptualization and measurement issues, therefore it cannot be reduced to a single event, but it must be considered as the result of a complex interplay of different factors (cf. Curini & Hino, 2012). It is nonetheless interesting to see how increasing polarization has been linked to the rise of the radical right and it showed an effect on democratic backsliding, even if the event has been just measured in Eastern Europe (Vachudova, 2019).

[15] When we say "new party", we do not necessarily mean a newly-founded organization. First, for a party to be considered new, there are more conventional approaches. We can rely on stricter criteria thus considering only newly born actors, but we can also adopt a more inclusive selection considering also mergers, splitters or parties that redefined their ideology (cf. Lucardie, 2000). Second, one party can be new at different stages. If a party runs at the elections for the first time, it is more logical and straightforward to understand it as "new". But, in a systemic-level perspective, party systems need to be studies in all the three arenas of inter-party competition: the electoral arena, which is the most clear-cut indicator of parties' success, but also the parliamentary and governmental arenas, which represent the main thresholds (representation and executive power) for political success (Rokkan, 1970; Bardi & Mair, 2008; Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2019). So, a party can still be considered new to the parliamentary arena even if it is not new from an electoral point of view (Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2018; 2019).

parties have given a shove to national party systems' stability, namely Spain and Greece (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2017; 2018).

Still, even though it did not provide a massive effect on party system change and stability, the rise of the radical right was proved to affect inter-party relationships heavily. And a substantial change in inter-party relations can have serious consequences on voters. Contemporary research finds evidence of a process of legitimation of radical right positions whenever a RRP sits in Parliament. In turn, the increase in legitimation leads to a change on how voters place themselves on debated crucial issues (Bischof & Wagner, 2019). Furthermore, the emergence of RRPs leads to higher mass polarization through increased elite polarization (Castanho Silva, 2018). So, if the change within inter-party relationships, once provided by the upsurge of a new actor, is proved to have effects on the demand side, the demand-side also have a deep effect on the electoral success of the new party. Demand-side explanations concerning the rise of the radical right have also received attention in research. The processes have been analyzed constantly, both at a macro level, for instance we can cite the studies on winners and losers of modernization and globalization (cf. Kriesi et al., 2012), and at a micro level. The next chapter will analyze the evolution of the demand-level that fueled the radical right outbreak in depth.

1.3 – Radical right people: individual variables, voters' profile, and mobilization

The supply side of electoral competitions and the relationship standing between the former and parties has been widely studied across time. The existing literature specific to the radical right is rather broad. Many analyses have been put down to understand the main items that guarantee electoral support: some studies focus on individual level variables, ranging from socio-economical characteristics to perceptions and personal opinions; others highlight the relevance of contextual elements, like globalization, deindustrialization, immigration issues and cultural harms; while still others put them all together attempting to build a solid voting pattern. This part of the chapter will deal with radical right success, its voters, their individual characteristics, and the main voting models that have been theorized to grasp the peculiarities of radical right mobilization and support.

Individual characteristics of radical right voters

If we asked random people to identify a radical right voter, we would probably collect rather similar descriptions: a white, low-educated male holding anti-immigrant attitudes, if not racist beliefs. Does this stereotype reflect the reality on the ground? Or better, is it possible to characterize radical right voters by means of individual features? Well, academic research has been quite prolific in trying to portrait a sociological profile of a radical right voter. Efforts have been made to grasp their specific profile through the analysis of gender, education, social class, but also attitudes and beliefs. For Instance, studies confirmed the centrality of individual beliefs on immigration in making voters lean towards RRPs (see next paragraph), but also some individual characteristics have been underlined to be coherent with a radical right voter profile. The general picture we can observe in these studies is although more complex than the stereotypical idea we sketched above. Therefore, this paragraph will briefly analyze each one of the main abovementioned characteristics, in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the individual variables that characterize the radical right electorate.

The gender connotation of RRPs' electorate has been a thorny topic. When the first studies on RRPs came out, they addressed the radical right as face men-only organizations or "mannerparteit" (Betz, 1994): women do not vote and do not campaign for them. Mudde (2007) among others argues that this is not entirely correct when it comes to the internal composition of parties. If it is true that there are fewer women than men in radical right parties at all levels, it is also true that this kind of

underrepresentation exists for almost all political parties. If compared to other political actors, the radical right falls short of the levels of female representation in left-wing parties, but there is little difference between them and the mainstream actors. So, on the one hand, when we stick to the elite-level women representation on the right of the political spectrum, the radical right is not an outlier.[16] On the other hand, women underrepresentation is undeniably true when we focus on who votes for this party family (Mudde, 2007; Immerzeel et al., 2015). The predominance of male support for the radical right has been explained in different ways: the so called "central tendency" of women to vote for centrist parties (Hofmann-Gottig, 1989); then, the "low-efficacy" interpretation, which states that radical right parties cannot successfully mobilize women because of their extremist image (Mayer, 2002); women's greater involvement to the church activities has been also highlighted as a possible cause for reluctance in voting for the radical right (Mayer, 2002); but also theories based on the "antifeminist" features of some RRPs, which argue that women do not vote for radical right parties because of their sexist approach (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Simmons, 2001). Yet, while these arguments may seem grounded, they were set aside on theoretical and empirical grounds: theoretically, they appear as generalization, and, empirically, most apparent gender differences usually disappear in multivariate analyses. Therefore, the gender gap with respect to RRPs is often overemphasized, given that the most important reasons why voters support them seem to be the same for men and for women (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). More interesting empirical results come from studies pairing gender underrepresentation to other disproportions. Gender, for example, has been found very divisive within perception of economic risks and the economic negative perception of immigration, therefore opening a new way to explain women underrepresentation (Coffé, 2013). To sum up, women underrepresentation has been confirmed at an electoral level, while it is not so profound within parties' organization. Most importantly, this misrepresentation does not hold a great explanatory power per se, but it is a useful ancillary variable to explain voting behaviour.

The same evaluation may fit with education. It is well documented that education has a negative effect on radical right voting. It means that, in general, the more voters reached an achievement in education, the less they vote for a radical right party. This pattern is generally taken for granted in political research, yet the situation is more complex. First, the negative relationship between high education and radical right voting was indeed confirmed, but there still is some room for debate. If there is no empirical evidence for the highly educated to massively vote for the radical right, academic studies highlighted how some RRPs get a high percentage of low educated voters, while others successfully mobilize in the middle of the spectrum, therefore radical right voters are not necessarily those with a

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[16] Mudde blames this misperception on what he calls a "feminist bias" in which gender equality is thought as the normal situation in party politics.

lower level of education (Givens, 2005). Therefore, education indeed plays a role in shaping radical right support, but few studies use education as the main independent variable to explain political support. On the contrary, education has been proven to hold a significant effect on political participation on a whole (Gallego, 2010) shaping what is called the "unequal turnout" (Lijphart, 1997). Still, this is the only empirically tested area where education has a direct effect. So, possibly the effect of education is more articulated and indirect, and it may hold greater explanatory power when used as an ancillary indicator. A good example is the relation between education and citizens' positions on the social scale.

Contemporary sociological accounts emphasize that globalization and modernization processes have largely benefited those social groups with the educational accomplishments, cognitive skills, geographic mobility, and professional career flexibility to take advantage of the new economic and social opportunities in contemporary societies (Ignazi, 2003; Norris, 2005). Therefore, education seems to act like a key to gain access to different social positions, which may in turn hold a high explanatory power for radical right voting. At the same time, other studies questioned educational connection to the economic dimension of politics and proved a higher effect of education on the cultural dimension, which affects radical right voting more than economic concerns (Ivasflaten & Stubager, 2013). In this perspective, education shows a direct effect on values and attitudes, and it generally prevents a person to have an exclusive national identity that could predispose him to radical right voting (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). In a nutshell, although most radical right voters stand among the middle and lower educated, education has a more direct impact on political participation rather than on specific party-voting behavior.

Consistently with gender and education, social class has been widely studied as a cause of radical right leaning. Academic research acknowledges that, usually, radical right voters come from lower classes than the mainstream and it also proved a negative relationship between a higher social class and the eventuality of voting for the radical right (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). Still, while there is no doubt that managerial classes and sociocultural professionals are the most ineffectually mobilized social actors, research has focused on the coexistence of working and middle class in the same RRP electorate. What Daniel Oesch (2008) calls "the process of proletarianization of the radical right" has raised RRPs to one of the main voting targets of the working class, along with lower-middle-class and shopkeepers. Recent studies have shown a wide disproportion in party support with respect to class distinction. While the left and center-left receive a disproportionate support among sociocultural professionals, the center-right leads the share of managers and self-employed. At the same time, the radical right receives more votes from production and service workers, therefore it provides a serious

challenge to the left over its traditional working-class stronghold (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018), in a scenario where even being a union member does not immunize the working class against the radical right vote choice (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013). But, even though a consistently wider slice of the working class is leaning towards a radical right vote, academic research has not provided sufficient evidence confirming a deep and direct effect of social class in shaping radical right voting. Not anymore, at least. For sure, in the early decades of the second post-war period, the class voting model[17], based on the social-class cleavage that gave birth to the classical left and right division, was the most predictive and influential: working class citizens tended to vote for the left in its various shapes, while middle class and self-employed were more inclined to vote conservative (Bartolini, 2000). But when we face the contemporary scenario, and read the latest works on class-voting, we can draw two main conclusions: First, social class symbolism has progressively disappeared from the supply side and it left room to socially neutral symbols, which are less socially constrained and therefore more valuable for parties, who can refer to a wider group of potential voters (Evans & Tilley, 2012b; 2017); then, even though scholars tried to pull class voting off its "premature obituary" (Evans, 1999), they could convincingly argue how social class positions still matter as far as experiences, inequalities and risks are concerned, still political support has been reshaped and the dynamics of voting behavior have broken away from a systematic link between voters, their social class and their choice.

Therefore, just like gender and education, social class does not turn out to be a useful feature if we are looking for a direct influence on radical right voting. Still, it can help to shape a more complex scenario where social class influences the dynamics of radical right leaning. For instance, social class belonging still serves a major purpose in studies on globalization, inequalities and voting behavior. One of the most quoted works is Hanspeter Kriesi and colleagues, who developed their own theory on the assumption that globalization brought a complex setup of opportunities and disparities, creating two different categories: winners and losers. The first group includes people who experienced an impoverishment both in lifestyle and working conditions, mostly unemployed and low-skilled workers who must cope with relocation and bottom down competition (Kriesi et al., 2012).[18] Kriesi et al. argue that globalization losers demand a control of borders both at cultural and economic level, therefore they can be mobilized more easily by parties operating a double demarcation, namely radical right parties that committed to state intervention (Kriesi et al., 2012).

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[17] A deep association between one's social class belonging and his electoral behaviour, that is to say a systematic link between voters' class location, their position in the labour market and the parties they support is a minimum definition for class voting (Lipset, 1960; Evans & Tilley 2017; Evans, 2017; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018).
[18] See also Beck (1999) and Gallino (2000) for the economic and social effects of globalization.

Still, even though being part of a disadvantaged social class may seem to intervene directly on the voting function, being a "loser" is the outcome of a more complex setup of variables than the mere social class. In a nutshell, the globalization losers' social group is not an easy notion to frame and conceptualize with rigor and precision, and social class only plays a limited (yet probably important) role in shaping who is a loser and who is not. So, a direct effect of being part of the working class on radical right voting is still missing.

Related to social class, also income inequality has been investigated as a cause for radical right success, especially in light of its effect among high-income and low-income earners: it has been said to increase radical right support among manual workers because of their low income and to decrease it among managers and professionals because of their high income (Han, 2016). Other studies acknowledge the fear of slipping into economic difficulty as a major variable for radical right voting (Im et al., 2019). Nonetheless, it stills appear as a non-sufficient condition per se. The same can be said for unemployment, which has been investigated both as an individual characteristic and a contextual factor. If on the one hand, we can find studies arguing that RRPs could enjoy a higher support in regions with high or increasing rates of unemployment because people are in competition over scares resources, which may cause intergroup conflicts (Lubbers et al., 2002), results are conflicting. On one side, we find studies stating a negative impact of unemployment on radical right voting (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006) and others stating that almost half of researchers using unemployment variables in their models find no substantial relationship (Amengay & Stockemer, 2019). On the other side, a recent meta-analysis of studies using unemployment rate at a contextual level in their models found a generally positive, yet mostly small, effect on radical right voting that showed up evidently after the 2008 economic crises (Sipma & Lubbers, 2018). So, an agreement on the role of being unemployed in shaping radical right support is still to be reached.[19]

To sum up, this review on the role of individual characteristics in shaping the radical right electorate underlined two main conclusions. First, the individual characteristics of radical right voters do not have enough power to frame a clearly defined social basis on which RRPs build their electoral fortunes; indeed, even though RRPs supporters tend to be stereotypically portrayed by public opinion, they do not necessarily adhere to a social cliché as far as gender, education and job position are concerned, therefore they cannot be strictly characterized by means of individual features. Given that

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[19] A branch of research tried to build a relationship between unemployment and economic struggles: being unemployed is therefore framed as a key driver of economic insecurity, which isin turn expected to be key driver of RRPs support (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). Within tis branch, citizens are predisposed by poor economic conditions to accept the rhetoric of RRPs and they are predisposed by good economic conditions to reject it; and this relationship is not as effective in periods of low unemployment as it is in periods of high unemployment (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014). Still, the role of unemployment still is not understood to be direct.

there is no clear evidence of specific social groups that specifically identify with a specific political organization and given that these social groups are not represented by parties that consolidate this relationship, we cannot frame a clear cleavage politics as far as RRPs are concerned. Furthermore, individual characteristics do not show a significant direct impact on party support, while they may have a mediating effect, thus creating the foundation for the process of mobilization to be successful. In a few words, being male, low-educated, and working-class cannot guarantee radical right support on their own, still they can play an ancillary role in determining the final voting choice, whose main determinants should be found somewhere else.

Values and attitudes

When it comes to attitudes and values, the relationship with radical right voting becomes more evident. Generally speaking, among the general electorate, radical right voters are considered to be the most traditionalists, authoritarians, and nationalists, if not the most racist. Most studies on cultural indicators for radical right voting and party politics confirm such a picture, but even in this case things are more articulated. We will now briefly investigate each one of the main attitudes that are said to compose the radical right voter, and we will start from one of the more discussed: racist stances. As suggested in the first part of the chapter, where we focused on the ideological evolution of the radical right family, biological racism has been gradually abandoned from radical right parties, and it got harder to see a radical right leader apostrophize something in an explicitly racist way. Despite it holds court in media and public opinion, racism has not been proven to be that significant in shaping radical right voters' attitudes, which are on the contrary framed by immigration skepticism, that is to say the association between immigrants and social tension, criminality and loss of cultural distinction, more than xenophobic manifestations (Rydgren, 2007; 2008).

In the same way, cultural traditionalism has been extensively investigated as a major mobilization item for RRPs, yet its overall contribution to radical right voting might have been overemphasized. Despite radical right voters show a higher degree of traditionalism than the mean, still its effect tends to fade when it faces anti-immigration stances and nationalist issues; moreover, contemporary studies show that RRPs voters are bending towards a more libertarian approach to cultural issues, especially they proved to be more tolerant towards homosexuality and civil rights in Northern European countries (Spiering & Zaslove, 2015). So, despite it is a major topic of confrontation in public opinion, the predictive power of civil-rights conservatism changes in different areas. In most Western

European countries, radical right and non-radical right voters do not hold significantly different attitudes toward the freedom of expression of homosexuals, yet on the other hand, a significant difference exists in Eastern Europe, where attitudes towards homosexuality are an important predictor of radical right support, probably due to a lower level of social tolerance (Kehrberg, 2015). We can see this trend also by looking at the issue position Western European RRPs': while they are all highly opposed to some issues (like immigration) and these positions have either been consistent over time or increasingly radicalized, there is a larger variation among parties on gay rights, which sometimes corresponds to non-trivial changes in a more liberal direction (Backlund & Jungar, 2019). Furthermore, RRPs are frequently outnumbered on civil-rights conservatism by Christian-democratic parties and centrist political actors that evolved from older Christian democrats. In a few words, the issue of social conservatism is owned by another party family. Therefore, RRPs "provide unique party positions on immigration and the European Union, but not on gay rights and civil liberties. Consequently, the radical right parties improve the representativeness of their respective party systems on the two former issues by offering voters representation on a policy configuration that would otherwise be largely absent" (Backlund & Jungar, 2019, p.9). In this perspective, if we get back to voters, people in Western Europe may vote for the radical right in order to get representation on immigration issues, despite disagreeing with a potential traditionalism on civil liberties.[20] Or even vote for other parties if they rank traditionalist issues as their first concern. In any case, the explanatory power of cultural traditionalism for radical right voting has been declining and it no longer appears to be a major motivation for today's radical right electorate, who is, on a whole, less related to cultural conservatism than before (Lancaster, 2019; 2020).

Another issue that has been tested in radical right studies is authoritarian attitudes: several RRPs appear to successfully mobilize the proportion of electorate who views democracy as a bad system (Donovan, 2019). This trend can be traced back to what Foa and Mounk (2017) call "democratic deconsolidation". They find an increasing disaffection with the democratic form of government in both longstanding and newborn democracies, which, together with a large skepticism over liberal institutions and established political parties, produce a group of citizens who would approve a switch towards a stronger political leadership and a more authoritarian form of democracy[21] (Foa & Mounk,

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[20] On this possible discrepancy between radical right voting and attitudes on civil liberties, Akkerman (2015) argues a possible matching of the two: the fading of harsh traditionalism within the radical right may be canalized into a nativist frame, by linking gender equality or civil rights to a more Western cultural heritage opposed to (Muslim) immigrants' cultural background.

[21] This authoritarian form of democracy seems to stand very close to what Hungarian leader Viktor Orban once labelled "illiberal democracy", which erodes the separation of powers and subordinates civil rights to a general will of the people (Rensmann et al., 2017). Yet, despite this democratic deconsolidation manifested mainly in Eastern Europe, negative attitudes toward democracy affect even Western European longstanding democratic regimes.

2017). Further research shows that this assumption does not hold with the vast majority of center-left and center-right supporters, who were proved to be supportive of democracy as a political system, and it does not entirely represent RRPs voters either (Donovan, 2019). In other words, authoritarian attitudes do not show a stable and homogeneous positive effect in shaping radical right voters. This is confirmed by the fact that, with the only (temporary) exception of Greek party Golden Dawn, no openly antidemocratic party gained electoral success in Western Europe in recent years[22]. On the other side, one could argue that Eastern European RRPs, who operate in unconsolidated democracies and poorly institutionalized political contexts, may find a critical approach to democracy more electorally rewarding. Still, while researchers found some examples of radical right voters who are genuinely opposed to democracy in Slovakia and Bulgaria, there is no sign of deep authoritarianism in Latvian and Lithuanian radical right voters, who fit the Western European pattern (Stefanovic & Evans, 2019). So, even if illiberal politics and the return of fascism find space in European public debate when it deals with the radical right, academic research could not prove a real centrality of both illiberal and authoritarian issues in shaping radical right voters neither in Western or Eastern (on a whole) Europe.

The same interpretation counts for Euroscepticism.[23] On the one hand, it is undoubtedly proven that anti-EU attitudes positively affect the probability to vote for the radical right, as its effect has been growing since the economic crisis broke out (Arzheimer, 2009; Werts et al., 2013). On the other hand, Euroscepticism is not solely confined to the right of the political spectrum: the influence of a negative attitude on European integration spreads voters all around the political space and does not trigger radical right support on its own, therefore it does not hold an extensive explanatory power by itself.

If we focus on the supply side, European RRPs have steadily embraced Eurosceptic positions, primarily from a sovereignty perspective justified on an ethno-cultural ground. First, they found the space to do it, because mainstream parties, which tend to regularly participate in governments, had few incentives to politicize the EU, leaving a hole for niche parties to embrace a strong opposition to European integration; second, Euroscepticism perfectly fits into a nativist ideological frame, therefore it comes with no ideological costs and it promises a fair electoral reward (Vasiliopoulou, 2018). The fact that RRPs provide a different position from the mainstream on this topic, anyway, does not

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[22] Golden Dawn is therefore not to be considered a radical right party, precisely because of its open anti-democratic stances coming from its far rightist metaxist heritage, which is deeply linked with Greek colonels' dictatorship.

[23] Taggart (1998) defined Euroscepticism as "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (p.366). Academic research then provided more sophisticated categorizations based on both different degrees and multidimensionality of Euroscepticism (cf. Kopecky & Mudde, 2002; Rovny, 2004).

automatically imply that they own the issue. If it is true that RRPs were particularly successful in using anti-EU stances in Western Europe, the situation is different in Southern Europe, where Eurosceptic radical left parties had the upper hand (Brack & Startin, 2015). Current research showed that both radical right and radical left parties presented a similar picture on economic and territorial nationalism, while differentiating on ethnic and cultural concerns; and it also showed they adopted similar positions on all aspects of European integration (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). These similarities can be traced back to the early 90s, from the Maastricht treaty onwards, when a right-wing Euroscepticism started to develop alongside an older counterpart on the left: the two Eurosceptic poles gave therefore birth to a U-shaped relationship in most political arenas (van Elsas & van der Brug, 2015; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Therefore, while radical right parties can be issue-owners in some countries, in a European perspective they are not[24].

When we turn to the demand side, the salience of Euroscepticism in shaping radical right voting has been highlighted in many studies (cf. Brack & & Startin, 2015), yet debate arouse on its extent. Some studies pictured Euroscepticism as the third most mobilizing issue and expected anti-EU attitudes to become an even stronger source of radical right support (cf. Werts et al, 2013), yet further research found radical right voters to be less close to their parties on European integration than on other issues. A moderate positional congruence accompanied by a rather feeble salience congruence relegated Euroscepticism to be a secondary driver in radical right support (McDonnell & Werner, 2019), even though its predictive power increases with the level of skills of a voter, meaning that the more we climb the social scale, the more Euroscepticism gains significance (Cavallaro & Zanetti, 2020). In this perspective, Euroscepticism can be considered as a quite important contributing factor, yet also a secondary item for radical right mobilization, therefore we can apply the same conclusion we employed for cultural traditionalism and authoritarianism. But this would be impossible with the only issue that has been proven to be irremovable and irreplaceable: immigration.

Immigration issues have been described as the most lucrative for electoral purposes, as far as the radical right is concerned. Many studies confirmed that RRPs are considerably more successful than others at mobilizing immigration grievances, as individuals with liberal immigration policy preferences tend to stay away from such parties, while, as immigration preferences grow more restrictive, the probability to vote for a RRP increases dramatically (Norris, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008;

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[24] Contemporary research also focused on far-left Euroscepticism and the role of such parties in shaping centre-left mainstream parties' behaviour during election times and their position-taking (cf. Williams & Ishiyama, 2018). They all confirmed that the radical right cannot be defined as an issue owner when we deal with anti-EU attitudes.

Backlund & Jungar, 2019).[25] So, individual attitudes towards immigration issues tend to be a major driver towards radical right support, and this is confirmed by the high levels of correspondence between voters' and RRPs' position on the issue. What has mostly kept researchers busy is the causal mechanism that brings people to have such attitudes and then vote for RRPs. This is due to the etherogeneous nature of immigration itself, which can be tackled by many different standpoints, starting from a cultural perspective, to economic competition and a more pragmatic sense of being threatened. This double mechanism gave birth to many different studies and perspectives. When explaining the link between immigration and radical right, the basis of the cultural theory stands upon the differences between immigrant identity and the majority identity, and it results in a conflict that threatens cultural identity, social unity and the maintenance of social norms of behaviour (Kehrberg, 2015). Other studies suggested that immigration fuels cultural threat perception not by producing xenophobic attitudes, rather through a combination of immigration skepticism, fueled by radical right propaganda on immigrants; a frame that represents immigrants as a major cause of criminality and social unrest, producing unemployment and taking advantage of the welfare state (Rydgren, 2003; 2008). In this perspective, people may turn to the radical right because they are willing to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources in the labour market, housing and welfare benefits in areas with many immigrants, where this kind of competition is more manifest (Kriesi, 1999; Fennema, 2005; Rydgren, 2008). This pattern, known as the ethnic competition theory, is crucial for two reasons: on the one hand, it reconceptualizes the figure of the immigrant, who is not a threat per se, because of his role of *xenos*, rather because of the social unrest he causes (or he is said to cause); therefore, it is not xenophobia but suspicion and mistrust that fuels radical right success. On the other hand, this theory brings cultural threats into a social framework. People who experience ethnic competition and cope more with immigrants are mostly part of the unprivileged class of unskilled workers and lower educated living in poorer and more ethnically heterogeneous areas. In this new perspective, the centrality immigration issues in shaping radical right support would stand closer to the economic side rather than to the merely cultural one.[26] No agreement has been reached on what triggers negative attitudes towards immigration and how these translate to radical right voting and new studies on the subject blossom every year (cf. Shehaj et al., 2021; Ferrari, 2021). However, the

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[25] Some studies questioned the level of analysis, asking whether structural data or individual level perceptions are more predictive. In a meta-analysis of aggregate structural level studies, Amengay and Stockemer (2019) find inconclusive results on immigration as a structural-level variable, therefore they conclude that the relationship between immigration and radical right vote seems highly dependent on how immigration is operationalized. On the other side, Stockemer himself (2016) clearly stated that voters do not base their choice on objective data, rather it is voters' perception that counts. Therefore, an operationalization of immigration at a structural level seems less useful than individual level studies on immigration perceptions.

[26] This relationship is opposed by other studies that show how cultural ethnic threats have a larger impact than economic threats (cf. Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012).

importance of individual attitudes towards immigration, whatever threats it might cause, is tremendous: not only radical right parties massively use immigration-related issues as a mobilization tool and provide unique positions on them, but scholars also find a much closer correspondence between parties and voters on these specific issues than on others, like civil-rights conservatism (Backlund & Jungar, 2019).

To sum up, when it comes to attitudes, radical right voters are children of the nativist mindset of the parties they tend to vote: they generally share a negative reaction towards external groups that are opposed to their native group, and they perceive them as threatening and potentially dangerous. While they do not always share cultural traditionalist values and authoritarian attitudes, they are generally Eurosceptic, even if this is a much less relevant issue in shaping support in many national cases (Werts et al., 2013). However, the main issue that connects radical right electorates in Western Europe is by far an anti-immigrant attitude, which acts both as the lowest common denominator and as the main mobilizing issue across Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2008).

At this point we should trace a line and ask a question: once we have settled that attitudes on immigration are the key feature that frames radical right supporting, while every other indicator we discussed suits an ancillary role with different grades of importance, are we witnessing a process of single-issue voting for single-issue parties? When placing one issue above the others as far as the party-voters linkage is concerned we may incur the risk of inadvertently describe the whole relationship between voters and the party they chose as a connection which is just based on that single issue. Therefore, we will end this chapter by condensing the most meaningful debates on the voting models to explain radical right success, in order to clarify whether everything is based on a single issue, or the picture is more complex than it seems.

Explaining RRPs success: voting models and mobilization

Whenever we deal with the reasons why citizens choose a party, we need to cope with the evolution of a political and social scenario that changed (and is still changing) dramatically. This will not only make the picture clearer, but it will also provide a deeper understanding of the reasons why some explanations tend to overcome others within the debate on the voting function that brings voters and RRPs together.

RRPs (and their competitors) operate within a political landscape shaped by a complex series of conditions that are not so easy to condense into a few lines. A growing electoral volatility, the decrease in numbers of the working class and of the centrality of social class within the political debate (Evans & Tilley, 2017), the increasing wealth and education, profound economic changes, and middle-class enlargement are the main determinants that shaped the landscape for new ways to vote. At the same time and on this new surface, the rise of new postindustrial divides like gender, race, public vs private sector replaced socio-structural conflicts and the rise of postmaterialist values (Inglehart, 1977) produced 'issue oriented' voters, who tend to individually chose who to vote for, rather than being driven by collective identities (Franklin, 1992). With electoral volatility increasing throughout Europe, voters are now increasingly inclined to change their vote and decide whom to vote for closer to the elections (Mair, 2013).

Scholars developed issue voting theories within this sociological and political scenario, where a declining socio-structural voting gave place to mobilization through issue competition. It means that political parties emphasize those issues they want to be predominant in the political agenda, without ignoring others. In more proper and detailed words, "the central aim of a political party in issue competition is to get other parties to pay attention to the issue that it would like to see dominate electoral competition. It is about forcing political opponents to pay attention to issues they would rather see disappear, which also means that it is about being forced to pay attention to issues that are not necessarily attractive in electoral terms" (Green-Pedersen, 2007, p.609). We therefore need to frame radical right voting as developing in this sociopolitical framework, which enables political actors to search for new and broader electoral bases.

Some scholars argued that radical right support may articulate in a protest voting pattern, where a general political discontent and a deep sense of distrust of political institutions and mainstream parties play a key role in directing pockets of votes to outsiders, thus creating a pattern of "vote against" (Mayer & Perrineau, 1992). If the frame of radical right voting as a simple reaction to the status quo had a considerable echo in the early years of radical right research, subsequent studies did not confirm its validity; yet they improved this conclusion in two main ways: a first group claim that radical right parties have both protesters and supporters inside their electorates, still radical right voting cannot be framed as a simple protest (Mudde, 2007); others do not separate RRPs and protesters, but on the contrary they find the key to radical right electoral persistence in their ability to transform protest voters into support voters (Betz, 2002).

Nevertheless, even though protest voters are not erased from the equation, contemporary research tends to follow a more classic policy voting model, where radical right voters are framed as rational policy-oriented actors: they oppose to immigrants, they dispute multiculturalism and they are not more disillusioned than other voters (van der Brug et al., 2000; 2005). Furthermore, shared political preferences and the high ideological congruence between RRPs and their voters show a high level of agreement and concordance between the two, therefore theories based on mere mainstream rejection and protest voting have been relegated to the past (Lefkofridi & Casado-Asensio, 2013).

However, even though researchers established that radical right voting is not a matter of protest, different paths of radical right vote explanation have been put forward, and each of those follows a specific tradition. So, the voting function issue between RRPs and their voters is far from being disentangled. We can highlight three main explanations based on mobilization on three different grievances: modernization, economic and cultural grievances.

Scholars who follow modernization grievances argue that support may come from citizens who feel threatened by the rapid changes taking place in post-industrial societies. On the one side, these changes can produce a reactionary backlash among those who still hold traditionalist moral values that can favor RRPs (Ignazi, 1994); those same attitudes may also frame a new voting pattern on the basis of a cultural materialism vs postmaterialism cleavage (Inglehart & Norris, 2019). On the other side, modernization and globalization can create two distinct groups of winners and losers, who feel both culturally and economically underprivileged (Kriesi et al., 2012). However, even though some evidence exists that far right support does come from the more marginalized sections of society, we can find two main flaws to this modernization branch. First, globalization losers are not the easiest social group to define and represent; second and foremost, even if we could frame them correctly, it has not been proved yet that they would support RRPs just because they are modernization losers (Golder, 2016).

Scholars who follow economic grievances theories generally follow two different routes: one based on competition over scarce resources, and the other based on a more classic economic-voting tradition. As far as the latter category is concerned, voters are said to be influenced by economic conditions in their country at the time of elections and they perceive the incumbent political class as those to blame for poor economic performances. Still, on the one hand, we still miss the linkage between economic discontent and the radical right choice; and, on the other hand, this voting model has been found more useful to frame support for other party families, for instance, it holds more explanatory power for radical left voting (Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). Conflict theories frame radical right voting as the answer to the competition over scarce resources against immigrants: in this

perspective, citizens who feel economically threatened by newcomers would find a coherent response within RRPs' nativist outlook and their claims against immigration. The main flaw of this argument stands within the restricted area to which it is confined: ethnic competition theories only find their place in situations of economic scarcity or at the occurrence of economic or labour crises. Furthermore, a pervasive study by Rafaela Dancygier (2010) on immigration conflicts in Europe finds that the relationship between economic scarcity and radical right voting depends on a long series of contextual factors, from the type of immigration to one country, to the degree of immigrants' political representation and the macroeconomic characteristics of each nation. Therefore, theories based on economic grievances can be extremely useful to frame vote for RRPs, but they too strictly depend on context.

Finally, scholars who follow theories based on cultural grievances argue that RRPs mobilize their voters on those cultural issues they believe to own. Social conservatism and appeals to law and order have been examined in academic research, along with anti-immigration stances, which were identified as both the most crucial issue in radical right propaganda and the main factor for predicting its success (Norris, 2005). Studies belonging to this research area base their assumptions on a structural change in contemporary society, where a new cultural dimension gained more salience on the backs of the more traditional and long-established economic conflict line, making socio-cultural issues always more electorally relevant (Inglehart, 1990; Rydgren, 2007; Bornschier, 2010). This cultural divide is framed as a product of globalization, and it is centered on both emphasizing cultural diversity and the protection of national culture against the threats that open borders and reduced distances brought in. The focus here is on anti-immigration and anti-EU stances, which both grew in salience throughout Europe (Green-Pedersen, 2007) and have also been widely adopted by the radical right. Many studies also suggest that they grew in salience precisely because of the raise of the radical right, which acted both as an agenda setter and an issue exploiter (Minkenberg, 2001; Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014), while others argue that the politicizing role of the radical right is overrated (Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015). In any case, the centrality of anti-immigration attitudes still emerges as the only fil-rouge that tangles together the myriads of theories and academic works on the radical right. However, we find two main problems with the cultural grievance theories: first, anti-immigrant attitudes do not instantly transform into anti-immigrant behavior and radical right voting, in fact if all Europeans holding negative attitudes towards migrants voted for a RRP, we would face a much more prominent party family (Golder, 2016); second and foremost, being immigration a complex process, it both involves cultural and economic concerns, therefore it is barely impossible to split the cause of RRPs success into two explanations, one based on cultural grievances and another on economic grievances, when possibly both of them interact.

To sum things up, on the one hand, there is no doubt that RRPs find a considerable slice of their electoral success in mobilizing voters exploiting immigration issues: we can find evidence both in supply side studies, which highlighted the centrality of nativism as their ruling ideological outlook, and in demand side studies, which show how close parties and voters are on their evaluation of immigration and how attitudes towards migrants are the main indicator to define a radical right voter. But, on the other hand, the voting function that brings people to choose RRPs is still debated, and the solution of the puzzle should be looked for in an interaction among all of the three categories we mentioned, by framing radical right voting as a complex product of mobilization of cultural grievances, economic resentment and concerns about modernization processes.

Some further expectations

This last part of the chapter dealt with radical right voters and the main explanations academic research provided for radical right voting. We first focused on individual characteristics of radical right voters, by trying to check for the emergence of a match between the stereotypical mediatic description of a RRP voter and what had been established by empirical research. Indicators like gender, education, social class and job position can only partially identify a radical right voter and they do not hold a particular significance in shaping radical right voting throughout the studies we examined. Things changed when we focused on individual values and attitudes: while many of them have explanatory power when combined, immigration attitudes stood out as the most continuously meaningful characteristic of a radical right voter. When we narrowed it down to voting patterns, radical right voting could not be framed anymore as a mere protest vote which is performed by citizens to show their dissatisfaction with mainstream parties and their disillusion towards politics. At least, not completely. If research confirmed that radical right voters' rate of disillusion does not deviate from the mean of all voters, the mere dissatisfaction with the mainstream cannot shape a protest vote on its own. As Betz suggests, RRPs do draw a part of their electorate on people let down by historical parties, but they can retain them at the same time, which is not an easy goal for a simple protest party to reach. So, contemporary research cleaves, at least in part, radical right voters (and parties) from protest voting models. Voters are framed as rational actors, who know the ideological orientation of the chosen party and agree with them, as the high rates of party-voters ideological homogeneity confirm. Anyway, debate arouse on the voting function that leads citizens to target their vote to a RRP. We focused on explanations based on modernization, economic and cultural grievances reaching these conclusions: first, all explanations deeply rely on context in order to hold a significant and satisfactory explanatory power on their own, while they should be organized into a

complex set of threats and concerns that RRPs are keen to grasp and turn into votes. Second and foremost, all of these grievances revolve around one main indicator, which is individual attitudes towards immigration. Immigration is what links voters' attitudes to a party family that owns the issue and the main exploited issue that has the power to relegate other factors to ancillary roles, which are still important in determining the final choice, yet unable to target it with precision on their own.

So, if on the one academic debate is far to be appeased on what makes voters choose RRPs when they go to the polls, on the other hand the crucial role of individual attitudes towards immigration are the only issue on which all researchers agree. This leaves us with an apparent contradiction: on one side, party literature suggests that RRPs are not single-issue parties because they rely on a coherent and well-grounded ideological outlook that takes root on least two separate and complex system of ideas (nativism and authoritarianism); but on the other side, the only mechanism linking RRPs to their voters on which all literature agrees is linked to the only issue of immigration. So, if we cannot claim that RRPs are single issue parties, how come the radical right electorate seems to be mobilized on one issue? Here lies the contradiction between "multiple-issue" parties and single-issue voters. This is the area we will investigate in Chapter 3 by inspecting whether the ideological setup of the radical right party family is mirrored on the demand side.

In the first part of the chapter, we set the main items of radical right family ideological outlook into three categories, ordered by the academic consensus they shared. We set nativism as the core, which is always present in any theoretical definition and acts as the common denominator among different works. As far as what we showed in this part of the chapter, we can basically argue that, if nativism is RRPs' ideological core, then attitudes towards immigration are the core of what triggers radical right support. Authoritarian attitudes, a critic standpoint towards European integration and cultural traditionalism then stand as the subcore, which is still debated in academic literature and shows variation on its centrality depending on context.

Building on this framework, we plan to check for the emergence of a pattern within the demand side, similar or dissonant from the one on the supply side. In the same way we addressed the issues that will be carried out in chapter 2, chapter 3 will check for the emergence of a potential group of voters that shows a coherent set of attitudes with the national RRP. Keeping immigration attitudes as the main indicator, as the literature suggests, we will check if attitudes on authoritarianism, social conservatism and other ancillary traits show a coherence with the ideological outlook of the radical right family. By detecting a solid group of potential voters showing the same complex ideological setup we would check for the emergence of a coherent demand counterpart for RRPs. We therefore expect the emergence of a group of individuals who, on the one hand, show negative attitudes towards

immigration, and, on the other hand, we expect them to reflect the other core characteristics that shape the ideological outlook of the radical right family. In a few words, the correlation among different ideological connotations would shape the existence of a "radical right ideology" not only among parties, but at the individual level.

As far as the ancillary ideological items are concerned, we will also check for the emergence of a connection between the eventual radical right ideology and individual attitudes towards the economy. The expectation is to detect a meaningful variation across contexts. More precisely, within each context, we expect the economic orientation of the RRP to be matched on the public opinion level. We expect that RRPs' economic orientation conform to the economic attitudes of individuals who show the abovementioned complex setup of attitudes that we called radical right ideology. Therefore, if country x hosts a RRP that has distanced itself from free-market defence and holds a pro-welfare and more state-oriented positions, we expect individuals with harsh attitudes towards immigration to also share preferences for welfare preservation, social spending and a more state in the economy. On the contrary, we expect immigration-adverse citizens to stand for market economy and to claim less taxes when a RRP holds on to an economically liberal orientation. In a few words, we expect to find an ideological correspondence between the radical right supply and the potential radical right demand also within the socio-economic attitudes. This expectation, whether confirmed by the empirical analysis, would put parties' economic orientation into a different light, because it would suggest that parties may use economic stances in a strategic way to stabilize or maximize their potential share. More on this in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2

Mapping and understanding the European radical right party family: A validation of previous classifications through machine learning

The emergence of RRPs is one of the most debated topics in contemporary political party research and across the field of comparative politics in general. The radical right party family has grown in the absolute number of actors operating in both Western and Eastern Europe. It has been through a massive electoral rise that resulted in an increase of seats within both national and European assemblies. Furthermore, the entire party family went through a solid programmatic evolution which made it one of the most dynamic families in the contemporary political scene. Consequently, the academic interest on this new party family raised accordingly: it has been the subject of numerous theoretical studies that highlighted its most important ideological connotations, but scholars have also been rather productive in demand-side analyses. If the individual characteristics of the demand have been indicated clearly in past years, we find a lack of academical agreement on the voting function, but also on the ideological backbone of the supply, which is the topic of this chapter.

The previous introductory chapter showed the main studies on the radical right ideological profile, and, specifically, it put order within the debate by framing the main ideological elements into three levels depending on the degree of disagreement among scholars: a core (nativism), a sub-core (authoritarianism) and an ancillary level (economic position). The core and the sub-core found place in a diachronic perspective in all classifications, while the ancillary elements are a matter of discussion still to these days. We will now reintroduce a definition for each of the three levels and check to what extent scholars tend to agree on them. Nativism and authoritarianism come from Cas Mudde's acclaimed classification, and we will stick to the definition we find in his work.[27]

The core is nativism, which stands as an evolution of a nationalist profile. If nationalism also represents a distinctive feature of a broader classic conservatism, nativism indicates the requirement for the nation-state to be inhabited exclusively by the members of the native groups, while the non-natives represent a threat to its homogeneity. We refer to nativism as the ideological core of the radical right party family for two main reasons. First, it is the bottom line of the minimal definition theorized

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[27] These two defining features find place in Mudde's acclaimed book from 2007 and they represent his own effort to put forward a minimum definition of radical right parties' ideology, based on nativism, and a maximal definition, resulting from the adding of authoritarianism. Earlier, Mudde (1996) himself proposed an inventory of the most mentioned features to define RRPs in an equally acclaimed review that selected 26 definitions and highlighted 58 features. We chose to start from the newer work for a simple reason: definitions up to 1995 miss all the major changes that invested the radical right in the following years, therefore they may not be able to be suitable for newcomers, which are, by contrast, better covered and interpreted by newer definitions.

by Cas Mudde. Then, every study that aimed at an ideological definition of the radical right family is built on a native vs non-native conflict or on political doctrines that revolve around the nationalist concept. Some of the most prestigious examples include Jens Rydgren, who defines the radical right as built on "ethnonationalism based on cultural racism" (2005, p.416; see also Fennema 2004; Rooduijn, 2014). Terri Givens (2005) states that one of the main defining features of radical right parties is their strong nationalism, on which most positions that the parties take on other issues are derived from. Roger Eatwell (2000) stands very near to the concept of nativism when he focuses on what he calls "holistic nationalism" as a defining feature of the radical right, which stresses conversion or the expulsion of the "other" in defence of a traditional conception of community. The same counts for Paul Hainsworth (2008) when he expresses the fundamental nationalist feature of RRPs by saying that the nationalism of the radical right tends to be a narrow, exclusive, and ethnocentric alchemy. So, albeit every scholar frames the nativist issue in their own way, their definitions all gather around the conflict between natives and on non-natives built on a cultural frame.

The same partially holds for authoritarianism, which we framed as the sub-core within the radical right outlook. Authoritarianism underlines the centrality of social order maintenance, but at the same time it cuts ties with a pure anti-democratic discourse.[28] As for nativism, all definitions frame the radical right family as having a clear and coherent ideological position on law and order. However, we lack a clear-cut definition which is widely accepted.[29] Furthermore, scholars are still debating about anti-democratic stances within the family: many works suggest we are dealing with parties that do not question the democratic form of state anymore, while others do not. For instance, Michael Minkenberg (2000) argues that core element of right-wing radicalism "is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism" (p.174). Roger Eatwell (2000) states that RRPs cannot be liberal-democratic, but they can still be democratic because, in their view, democratic freedom is held to be possible when societies are homogeneous. While Susann Backer (2000) acknowledges that the radical right shares a degree of authoritarianism without being totally hostile to liberal democracy. These three examples highlight the distance among scholars when they deal with the impact of the radical right on democracies. This

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[28] An appeal to anti-democratic instances was previously listed as a radical right defining feature in early theories. Nowadays, the anti-democratic feature sticks more to anti-systemic extreme right movements and lost any centrality in radical right definitions. However, many scholars still debate on whether RRPs complied completely with the rules of the democratic regimes.

[29] Some examples of authoritarianism definitions range from "The belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (Mudde, 2007, p.23), to "Some mix of conventionalism, submission, and aggression that is found in the ideologies of all right-wing extremist/radical parties" (Carter, 2018, p.14), to the older definitions provided by social psychology.

distance, the lack of a clear definition and the unsolved debate on its consequences relegate authoritarianism to a role of sub-core of the radical right ideological outlook.

Lastly, we framed the RRPs' economic position as an ancillary ideological item. If disagreement among scholars on the concept of nativism as a foundational element of the radical right family ideological outlook is marginal, and the debate on authoritarianism is limited to definitional issues, when we take the approach to the economy under analysis, things change dramatically. Political researchers show opposing thesis on RRPs' economic outlook on different levels: the actual party attitudes towards the economy, the role of the state and public spending, the effective salience of economic issues for RRPs, and, more generally, scholars are discordant about the need of taking the economic outlook into account when dealing with the building of the radical right ideology.

Contemporary research underlined a massive evolution throughout RRPs' economic inclination. We don't need to repeat the theoretical steps on which we built the previous chapter, still we can sum it up as follows: the main theoretical works on RRPs from the 1990s underlined their economic conservatism, which encompassed a tendentially liberal approach to the economy, an anti-statist attitude and the inclination for tax reduction (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Then, newer stream of research showed a clear turnaround: an always larger part of the radical right party family tended to abandon economic conservatism to embrace, at first, a more centrist approach, and then to accept an economic orientation which was more oriented to public spending, with the economic platform finding more space in RRPs' programs (de Lange, 2007; Eger & Valdez, 2015).[30]

Then, why has the economy lost its place within theorizations on the ideology of the radical right? Mudde claims that economics are a secondary feature because RRPs "define their socioeconomic policy on the basis of their core ideology, particularly nativism, and instrumentalize it accordingly" (2007, p.133). However, this approach involves a risk, that is to reduce the success of the radical right to cultural grievances (Zaslove, 2009). This sounds particularly problematic when we take into account what Eger and Valdez state: "it makes little sense to ignore the economic axis only for anti-immigrant parties, especially when we can see that economic positions within the radical right family have varied overtime" and, equally importantly, "anti-immigrant parties with rightist economic preferences and anti-immigrant parties with leftist economic preferences occupy distinct political spaces, making them more or less able to compete for different types of voters" (2019, p.395).

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[30] Also Jan Rovny (2017; & Polk, 2018; 2020) confirms that the economy found enhanced space and salience within RRPs' programs, even though his blurring theory suggests that radical parties tend to blend their economic position in order to win votes rather than strengthen it in a coherent and ideologically solid way.

To sum up, we identified three definitory levels for the radical right party family which are derived from the literature. Nativism (the core) is solidly defined, widely accepted and therefore it is expected to cut the borders of the family sharply and precisely. Authoritarianism (the sub-core) is equally present in the most important definitions, still it lacks the degree of agreement on its definition and implication; nonetheless, it is equally expected to own a high definitory power for the radical right. Lastly, the economic position (the ancillary level) is the most problematic, given the lack of agreement on its role, salience and even utility in shaping the radical right ideological borders. In any case, given the flow of literature regarding RRPs' economic orientation, we expect it to be determinant in shaping radical right subfamilies characterized by diverse and well-rooted economic orientations.

These expectations alone highlight the lack of agreement within this field of research. Specifically, we find multiple ideological criteria used to shape the outlook of the radical right family. Even though research tend to agree on the national/non-national divide as the main ideological frame, debate is still arousing on every other aspect. Still, this never-ending quarrel on which features really determine what really is radical right does not harm classifications. On the contrary, whenever researchers deal with the radical right, they all tend to agree on which parties are legitimately part of the party family. The discussion on the definition of the concept of radical right party is not mirrored by a disagreement on the empirical referents of that concept. Basically, everybody knows which parties are RRPs but with no agreement on which characteristics makes them radical right. Therefore, this study fills a void within this stream of research by proposing an empirical test on these classification principles. In a few words, we will reverse the approach of most contributions in the field. We will not start by considering a conceptual definition of the radical right family, which is restricted to those features that define RRPs, instead we will consider a broad range of features as presented by Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. We will then produce an empirical classification which will be later compared to the conceptual classifications as found in the literature and the ideological connotations on which they have been built.

We will apply a data-driven procedure by relying on machine learning procedures, and we will perform the algorithms on expert survey data covering all European parties throughout different time spans. First, we will build party families using a hierarchical clustering procedure performed on all parties contained within the selected datasets and on a wide range of ideological indicators. Then, we will explore the ideological span of each family and we will build a score of importance using Random Forest models, in order to see which indicators really matter for the ideological structure of the party family. Results are going to confirm whether the core and the sub-core really act as the

determinants for a party to be a member of the radical right family, and whether the ancillary level proves to be a secondary and purposeless issue, or it has an explanatory power in ideologically shaping subgroups or even the family on a whole. The next sections will present the selected methodologies, data, and the empirical procedures.

2.1 Data and Methods

The process of party classification can be very demanding and very straightforward at the same time. When it is based on a comprehensive reading of party literature and previous theoretical studies on party gatherings, the operation needs to be long and meticulous. On the contrary, when we deal with pre-built conflict-lines and categories, then the process gets more direct and undemanding: most observers can allocate parties in the political spectrum and trace the distinction between centrists and extremists, leftists and rightists, and so on.

The goal of this research is not set to give a new pervasive theoretical definition of a party family, neither to split political actors using established taxonomies. The aim of the study is to check whether previous classifications and the theoretical bases on which they were built turn out to be relevant and consistent, when confronted with a detailed analysis of the position of parties on several issues, which are relevant to cover the three foundational dimensions highlighted above. So, the methodological procedure stands midway between the two approaches sketched above. We plan to build our own party families empirically, therefore we will not use previous classifications. We will also not attempt at a party family reclassification, but instead we will aim at a validation (or invalidation) of the established codifications and the ideological requirements they stand on using existing expert survey data. Therefore, the study will not stop at a party family-building process, but it will also underline which variables have more importance in determining parties' aggregation within one group or another. Like so, we will acknowledge the role played by the core, the subcore and the ancillary level in building the ideological foundations on which the radical right family stands.

The main goal of the empirical analysis is to put contemporary definitions to test. First, I examine whether the core definitory element of the radical right family can define the radical right borders with precision when tested empirically or it lacks a clear-cut definitory power. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis:

H1) The radical right exists as a party family by itself, and it is clearly and substantially divided from other families in ideological terms.

Its members show a considerable level of ideological homogeneity on cultural issues.

Nativist stances are crucial to shape parties' radical right belonging.

The second goal is to use ancillary items to check for the emergence of subfamilies and see whether they coexist in time and space.

H2) The ideological divergence on economic issues creates the opportunity to find two main subfamilies within the radical right party family: one made of parties that are ideologically orientated towards welfare and social provision, and another that consists of those parties which still stand closer to a liberal attitude to the economy.

Authoritarian stances are joined by parties' economic orientation in shaping parties' radical right belonging.

Datasets and indicators

The data used here are taken from Chapel Hill Expert Survey. To have a more widespread knowledge and to run comparisons, we selected four different waves: 2019, 2014, 2010 and 2006.[31] CHES datasets give accurate scale measurements on parties' ideological outlooks and their position on policy dimensions, still expert surveys are not the only available source to deal with party positions. In fact, we can list at least two more vastly used approaches: opinion polls and, most importantly, manifesto data. When we deal with the latter, the focus is on the Comparative Manifesto Project, which could build almost a monopoly on the location of political parties given the capillarity of their range and scope, both in terms of covered parties and elections.

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[31] Chapel Hill database also offers a complete wave for 2002 and another survey from 1999. They were not included in the research because of the lack of cases (all selected datasets capillary cover the whole European scenario, while 2002 and 1999 waves only cover a few main countries) and a big gap in the coverage of policy dimensions, thus in variables' availability: while the four selected waves put forward a long list of variables measuring many and diverse political and ideological positions, the dropped waves only covered a few essential dimensions.

Table 1 - List of indicators

Measurement	Scale	CHES19	CHES14	CHES10	CHES06
General left-right: overall ideological position	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Economic left-right position	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
GAL-TAN: sociocultural position	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on immigration policy	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on multiculturalism	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on redistribution of wealth	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on environmental sustainability	1 to 10	X	X	X	
Public spending vs taxation reduction	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on market deregulation	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on state intervention in the economy	1 to 10	X	X		
Civil liberties vs law and order	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on social lifestyle issues	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on the role of religion in politics	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on ethnic minorities rights	1 to 10	X	X	X	
Cosmopolitanism vs nationalism	1 to 10	X	X		X
Urban interests vs rural interests	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Liberalization vs protectionism	1 to 10	X			
Position on political decentralization	1 to 10	X	X	X	X
Position on European integration	1 to 7	X	X	X	X
EU cohesion vs regional policies	1 to 7	X	X	X	X
Position on EU foreign and security policies	1 to 7	X	X	X	X
Position on the internal free market	1 to 7	X	X	X	X
Position on EU authority on budget policies	1 to 7	X	X		
Position on EU authority on asylum policies	1 to 7	X			
Position on European Parliament authority	1 to 7		X	X	X
Position on International security missions	1 to 10		X	X	

Despite the many advantages provided by the CMP (first and foremost it provides massive information, and it still is the most systematic attempt to measure parties' positions) criticism was raised in the last decade. Some widely criticized point include a not empirically validated coding scheme, a questionable document collection and selection procedure, issues on documents comparability in time and space, doubts on coders' reliability, the use of issue salience to establish party positions, lack of crucial issues and harsh dichotomization of others (Frantzman & Kaiser, 2006; Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Gemenis, 2013; Zulianello, 2014; Bruinsma & Gemenis, 2020).

On the other hand, expert surveys have been recognized in the academic community as an important tool for political research: they provide valuable information on a wide range of policy dimensions, they do it in a standardized format, and they are flexible and versatile. Furthermore, experts base their judgements on multiple sources of information, and they are not limited to manifesto data and documental sources: in expert surveys there is no specific document source, but experts are asked to make judgements (later aggregated into a mean value) of party positions based on their personal knowledge (Gemenis, 2015). Still, expert surveys face with some weaknesses as well. Namely, expert evaluations are essentially based on a subjective judgement and therefore scores may be biased by informational asymmetry among respondents and even personal preferences (cf. Mair, 2003; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007; Curini, 2010). The main response to this drawback regards the aggregation of single judgements. Specifically, expert disagreement can be resolved through statistical aggregation because eventual individual errors will be neutralized (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007). Still, criticism has not been quenched, as critics suggest that simple statistical aggregation is not sufficient to guarantee valid measurement of party positions (Gemenis, 2015). In any case, albeit conscious of these structural limitations (and we must not forget the limited expert data availability before 1999), we chose to rely on CHES data for their valuable strengths that include flexibility, reliability, the range of covered issues, their availability in every wave, the lack of dichotomized variables, and the relevant number of analyzed parties.

Table 1 shows the selected variables for the present study, their scaling, and their availability within each dataset. These indicators have been selected not only to measure the ideological areas we are interested in, but also to cover a wider scope of political issues. By keeping these indicators, we chose not to limit the scope of the analysis and to avoid a selection bias that could have limited the veracity of our results. Even though we expect some ideological features to be more crucial than others in shaping the radical right family, building our expectations on established theories, we do not want to risk underestimating any other feature. Furthermore, the whole data-driven process of building party gatherings, when based on a more comprehensive set of indicators, can reach a more complete outcome which is more consistent with the political reality. These indicators cover many policy areas and, apart from a handful, each measurement is available within every dataset, therefore every dimension is equally covered in each wave. All scale variables listed in the table obviously differ from each other based on what they measure, but they can be gathered into three main groups according to their characteristics.

- Ideological classification questions. All three variables (left/right scale, economic left/right scale and GAL-TAN scale) are measured on a 1-10 scale, and they can be found in all four datasets.

- Policy dimensions. They are measured on a 1-10 scale. All questions ask for the position of each party on several dimensions, which can be identified as mainly based on cultural and economic issues. As far as the latter category is concerned, newer waves added positions on state intervention and protectionism. The same counts for environmental sustainability issues, while judgements on international security missions just found place in the two middle waves.

- European integration and EU policies related questions. Each time measured on a 1 to 7 scale, a core of four variables (integration, cohesion, free-market, and security) is available for all waves, while position measurements on asylum and budgetary policies found place later on. On the contrary, the 2019 dataset did not cover positions over the European Parliament.

When we take our theoretical backbone into account, then each one of the definitory levels of the radical right family we earlier developed finds its suitable indicators.

- The core (Nativism). We can analyze parties' nativist profile through three main proxies: Party positions on immigration, positions on ethnic minorities' rights and cosmopolitanism vs nationalism. If the latter directly measures parties' nationalist orientations, the first two indicators still fall within the native/non-native conflict that lays the foundation for nativism. Therefore, standing with the literature, all three variables are expected to show a significant contribution in shaping the radical right family ideological profile.

- The sub-core (Authoritarianism). As far as authoritarianism is concerned, we can measure it though the "Civil liberties vs law and order" indicator.

- The ancillary level (Economic positions). Parties' economic orientations are well assessed by four specific indicators estimating party positions on redistribution of wealth, public spending, market deregulation and state intervention. CHES 2006 dataset also offers an indicator for economic protectionism. Lastly, the economic left/right scale also represent a useful classification to assess parties' economic positions.

All other indicators represent different ideological and political dimensions that we decided to maintain within the analysis. Attitudes towards traditionalism, social conservatism, environmentalism, regionalism, and party positions on European integration may not be definitory items that are specific to the radical right family per se, still they can enrich the analysis and help to

shape results more comprehensively. Table 2 shows the countries we investigate. Apart from Croatia, Malta, Luxemburg, and Cyprus, all EU-member countries find their place in all four datasets. EU non-members like Turkey, Norway and Switzerland are not covered by CHES 2006, still they appear in all the others.

Table 2 - Countries covered by each CHES wave

List of covered countries	CHES19	CHES14	CHES10	CHES06
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	X	X	X	X
Croatia, Turkey, Norway, Switzerland	X	X	X	
Malta, Luxemburg, Cyprus	X	X		

In a nutshell, the first part of the study aims at creating party families through a data-driven methodology. For this purpose, we will use all parties available in every country covered by the four selected waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The formation of party groups will be based on the interaction among all the indicators we explained above. Then, after having built party families, we aim at revealing which of the indicators have the more important role in forming and defining the party gatherings we earlier obtained. The next lines will describe the two methods we chose to perform these tasks and how they will interact.

Building party families: Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis is a vastly used methodology to group different objects together through an index of homogeneity/heterogeneity and divergence/convergence based on different variables and dimensions. In a few words, it is one of the most common ways to divide a population into groups, using members' similarity as a discriminant in the group-building process. Since there is plenty of rules to assess similarity[32], and each of these gives birth to a wide range of methods and clustering

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[32] Some of the most important ways to deal with similarity include models based on connectivity among items, others that measure distance between an item and the centroid of each cluster, and even others building groups upon density.

algorithms, some words must be said about the choice of hierarchical clustering (HC). As the name itself suggests, HC algorithms create a hierarchy of clusters, and they can be both aggregative (when the process starts with single units and fuses them into clusters when possible) or divisive (when the algorithm is set to divide an omnicomprehensive macro cluster). The results of the analysis are then shown by a dendrogram, a tree graph that illustrates the progression of the whole clustering. HC shows many advantages. First, there is no issue of replicability: results in HC are always exactly reproducible. Since we do not need to specify the number of clusters in advance to run the operation, as it would be for K-means clustering for example, HC will continue to agglomerate (or divide) items until they will all be part of a macro cluster containing all objects (or until they will all be separate). This property ensures the replicability of the operation with no harm to the final result, and it also implies that the number of clusters can be decided afterwards, testing for the internal validity, separation and items' overlapping. Therefore, HC allows to select the most suitable number of groups deciding on the actual performance of the model, and not a priori. For this project, this peculiarity represents a major advantage both practically and conceptually. Given that the merging of parties into families is set to be carried out ex novo, driven by data, HC represents the best method to reach this goal because previous knowledge on the number of party gatherings is not required to get the algorithm started. A second peculiarity, and a consequence of hierarchy, is the feature of irrevocability: once an item is paired with another one or placed in a cluster (agglomerative) or separated from another (divisive), it cannot be reallocated. This major feature of HC also fosters the property of replicability.[33] HC also shows some limitations, especially when it comes to big datasets. Even though this study is not based on an amount of data so massive to drop it, still some issues turned up with clusters' representation. It is well known that dendrograms become unworkable when they have to portray the merging of hundreds of objects, still this issue can be overcome with zooming and, in a more effective way, with cartesian representation, where the two axes represent two fictional dimensions formed by the aggregation of variables. The result is a reliable representation of clusters in a two-dimensional space, where cluster separation, overlapping and items' position within the cluster are more visible and the purity of groupings can be better appreciated.[34]

As far as the distance metrics is concerned, the final choice fell on Ward's algorithm as a linkage method based on automatically computed Euclidian distance. Unlike other linkages, Ward's is based on the loss of information occurring when units are grouped together as a single agglomeration.

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[33] Despite the feature of irrevocability makes the replicability of the study easier, we are also aware that the impossibility to reallocate an object could also represent a weakness. As the agglomeration goes forward and new items are added to the cluster, then the cluster could change and maybe an item that was originally included within one cluster is not any longer fit into that specific group.
[34] All these operations are carried out using algorithms in R software.

Therefore, it creates groupings that minimize the error sums of squares, that is to say the squared deviation of objects' values from their cluster means. This method is therefore keener on finding global patterns and reducing the sensitivity to noise and nuances, and it also ensures a minimization of within-cluster variance and a maximization of inter-cluster variance, thus creating the strongest possible groupings at each step of aggregation. Furthermore, while testing for the most reliable linkage method, Ward's algorithm reached the greatest agglomerative coefficient among every other linkage.

To sum up, HC stands as a reliable clustering method: it ensures results' replicability, it provides hard clustering with no possibility of item reallocation, it gives researchers the freedom to explore dendrograms in search for a number of clusters that is suitable and meaningful, and, finally, it does not show problems with the amount of data on which this study is based. An example of application of HC based on the Ward's algorithm for studying RRPs is provided by Laurenz Ensser (2012). So, as we said, HC accomplishes the first part of the research.

Integrating Hierarchical Clustering with the Random Forest procedure

As far as methodological procedure is concerned, the empirical work has been carried out as follows. Groups of similar parties were identified by means of a cluster analysis using four different datasets from 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2019. From a comparison of the resulting sets of clusters with each other and the party family categorization built up in the previous literature, any new difference in the composition of party families and their level of homogeneity could be assessed. As explained before, the cluster analysis is carried out setting an aggregative hierarchical clustering method with Ward's algorithm for linkage and Euclidian distance as a distance metric. Afterwards, a few tests are set to obtain the ideal number of clusters. Some of the most used tests to measure the quality of clustering are the silhouette test, which determines how well each object lies within its cluster using an average value of cohesion and separation for each cluster (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2009), and the gap statistic, which looks mainly for cluster separation and possible item overlapping (Tibshirani et al., 2001).

After having performed the agglomerative HC, we can run across the dendrogram backwards to identify all the gatherings. The procedure is set for a dataset containing all available parties, to avoid a selection bias. For the identification of the radical right family, we consider both the presence of parties which have been classified in the literature as being radical right (a cluster hosting every RRP

known in the literature can hardly be something else than the representation of the radical right family), and the ideological orientation of the cluster given by the mean values for all indicators.

Once the cluster analysis has structured different groups of parties, the Random Forest model is performed.[35] Like all machine learning methods, the RF first works on a train-set to develop a trustworthy classification algorithm that is subsequently put to work on a test-set in order to appreciate its predictive performances. Both data subsets are created from the dataset involved with HC: first, given that CHES datasets list parties by country, the observations are shuffled in order to have bigger chances to get all country representatives in both subsets; then, samples are split using a standard ratio of 70% of data forming the train-set, and 30% creating the test-set. Then, the total number of trees and the number of variables available at each split are to be set. The ordinary RF usually runs 500 trees with a number of variables at each split equal to the square root of the total number of variables. Still, k-fold cross-validation can be useful to get the most suitable figures to avoid overfitting and obtain the highest accuracy. When all models were run, they produced the quantification of variable importance that was depicted on a histogram on which each variable is paired with a value (the increasing error mean when that very variable was substituted and the decreasing Gini index), therefore the distinction from important and noise variables is visible, and a scale of importance is set.

After all these procedures have been carried out, we will have: a cluster representing the radical right family (and eventual relevant subfamilies clustered within), its ideological connotation given by the main values of the indicators, and a scale of importance for each one of them. Therefore, it will be possible to validate (or invalidate) our expectations on the features who define the radical right ideologically, and the role played by the core, the sub-core and the ancillary connotations.

Further methodological clarifications, limitations, and results discussion planning

As far as the clustering procedure is concerned, once we identified the radical right cluster, we paid particular attention to the detection of the ideal number of subfamilies to then proceed with the analysis of their ideological connotations. As said in the previous lines, we relied both on silhouette

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[35] Random Forests are an ensemble-based method for supervised machine learning made by an ensemble of binary decision trees, and it can be used both for classification and regression tasks. We decided to discuss the main technicalities of this method later in the chapter, before the RF result comments, in order to facilitate the reading and understanding of the procedure.

values and gap statistics. Still, it seems necessary to shed light on the procedure we used, specifically because of the interaction between the two indexes, which often gave different results.

Silouhette always gave an optimal number of two clusters as response, while gap statistic showed a continuous pattern, where the more the clusters, the better the separation and cluster validity. Despite this conclusion seems quite logical (more clusters are more likely to avoid overlapping than fewer clusters), it was hard to come up with a precise number of clusters: on the one hand, the distribution did not come to a maximum until items were perfectly separated; on the other hand, most of the times, it was hard to clearly find the curve elbow or the exact point of curve flattening. Therefore, considering these recurring outputs, both approaches were tested to determine which cluster selection process would have given better responses:

- Considering separation metrics results, clusters' number has been increased continuously until the reach of a point of mediation between the effective number of clusters and their actual meaning. Since it would be conceptually useless to create a massive number of clusters each filled with a couple of items, even though they would be perfectly separated, the process continued until the point when the addition of one cluster would not add any new explicative power to the cluster division and at the same time would not massively improve the degree of cluster separation. This approach was performed both on the whole agglomeration and on single families.

- Considering cohesion metrics results, which constantly suggested two clusters as the ones showing the highest average cohesion value, the split was carried out as a dichotomizing process. First, the macro-cluster resulting from HC process has been split in two, thus giving birth to two groups that tendentially represented a leftist and a rightist side. Then, the rightist side has been divided into two other groups (basically, a center-right and a radical right family), and finally the latter has been separated into two subgroups, until any other further split would have given birth to small and analytically meaningless groups.

It is essential to state that both procedures resulted in identical divisions: the progressive dichotomization of the space gradually produced the same clusters as the former procedure. Then, we could reach a classification for all parties. In all four CHES waves we started the agglomerative process by using the whole number of available parties. With no preselection whatsoever, we avoided any selection bias, and we did not put any limit to the data-driven clustering process. Therefore, all the parties named in the following tables must be understood as members of a radical right cluster that came to light after a HC which took all available parties into the process. The radical right clusters

were defined whenever we encountered groups gathering parties that had all been previously categorized as RRPs in previous classifications, and the ideological outlook of the cluster looked coherent. These two requirements have always matched throughout all procedures; therefore, the identification of the radical right clusters have always been an easy task.

Some words must be spent also on case selection. As a rule of thumb, the main goal was not to incur in any selection bias, therefore, given no valuable reason to exclude any case a priori, we used every single party contained in each dataset. Still, we had to face the insurgence of missing cases from one wave to the other. It not only afflicted the number of parties (it is quite obvious that some actors may decrease in popularity or even disappear from wave to wave, especially when we deal with minor radical organizations in times of high volatility), but also countries. For instance, the CHES 2006 dataset did not include many Eastern European cases, while extra-EU countries like Norway and Switzerland found their place just in waves 2010 and 2014.[36] On the other hand, when it comes to parties, their inclusion in the datasets depended on their electoral results and their overall centrality in the national party systems.[37] This problem affects mostly Eastern European countries, where high electoral volatility and low party institutionalization influences the unexpected rise of new parties, then followed by their sudden electoral breakdown. For example, many Polish and Bulgarian nationalist movements find their place in one wave only, side by side with more established European political actors which are by contrast represented throughout every wave. This disparity among the representation of countries and parties leads to more and less populated datasets, still, as results will show, it will not affect the strength and separation grade of the radical right family.

This leads to the third point to comment before heading towards the empirical results, namely the similarities we encountered within the agglomerative process across all four waves. Despite an everchanging condition with respect to the number of countries and parties covered by each survey, we noticed no sharp differences, if we exclude the number of parties clustering together. As far as 2006 and 2010 waves are concerned, the number of parties that compose the RR cluster is smaller than the one we find within waves 2014 and 2019, and this is due to a lower N with respect to the following waves. However, in all four cases, the radical right family is well separated from other groups and deeply defined ideologically. We can deduce it just by looking at what height the radical right cluster is aggregated to the main cluster: it is the last group to be merged with the others, before the complete aggregation (the creation of the omni-comprehensive cluster) is finalized. Given that

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[36] In wave 2006 they were not taken into consideration, while in wave 2019 Swiss and Norwegian parties did not show coefficients for variables regarding EU stances, and they were therefore dropped from the analysis.
[37] It goes without saying that parties that were not born yet could not be measured, and the same counts for those that were dismissed.

hierarchical clustering tends to minimize inter-cluster variation, the later the aggregation of cluster X takes place, the more cluster X is ideologically specific and unconventional. This suggests a wide degree of peculiarities to characterize the radical right family and it also hints at solid dissimilarities between the radical right and other clusters. This pattern is always recurring. Therefore, all differences in terms of covered countries and parties seem not to bother or compromise the specificity of the radical right family.

Once we explained the aim of the study and the implemented methodology to carry it out, we must dedicate a few words on eventual problems and limitation provided by our methodological choice. Specifically, we will discuss the eventual issue of circularity that could be triggered by the encounter of expert survey data and previous theoretical knowledge on party families. As we explained above, the aim of this study is to validate, by means of a data-driven procedure, that specific salient characteristics of parties are relevant in producing clusters of parties, with specific interest on RRPs gatherings. Even though the cluster of parties and their characteristics could be consistent with previous theoretical studies or not, the very nature of the data used for validation might be problematic, since it is not completely exogenous to the theoretical argument originally advanced to defend the taxonomy. In a few words, expert judgements are rather likely to be based (also) on the theory-driven classifications listed above, therefore the data resulting from experts' opinions cannot be clearly separated from this previous knowledge. So, given that it is indeed highly possible that the experts interviewed during the CHES data collection to evaluate the parties are aware of the taxonomies employed to evaluate RPP parties, our results, albeit data-driven, could be less exogenous than expected. Our data-driven procedure surely represents a new way of validating the theory-driven taxonomy, but we cannot exclude the possibility that if our data-driven results validate theory-driven classifications might be because experts are simply (implicitly) reporting the taxonomy they have already collectively accepted from the literature. We would find ourselves in the awkward situation where both the theory-driven and the data-driven procedures are the result of the same-data generator process. This implication stands as a major potential issue for the entire empirical work, and it is hard to tackle it a priori, before dealing with expert data empirically. Still, we think that our very results are reassuring, therefore we must unfortunately give a major anticipation to clarify this issue. On the one hand we find a relative stability within the radical right clusters throughout the first three data waves (2006; 2009; 2014) both in terms of parties classified as radical right and the ideological backbone of the clusters, which is coherent with what has been stated in the most influential theoretical studies on the family. We are aware that this point could be the outcome of experts replicating what they have introjected and accepted as true from theory driven studies, this therefore would confirm what we fear: endogeneity and circularity. Still, results from 2019 mark the split of

the radical right cluster, given that neoliberal RRPs that usually clustered within the other radical right members take another way and form a completely new cluster along with those we called "radicalized center-right parties". This is a major finding of the thesis, and it is also useful to try to disentangle the circularity issue. When we take this cluster into account, we notice that the left-right scale variable is a source of diversity within the group: therefore, experts did follow their previous knowledge on parties' allocation on the political space: they discriminated between those they recalled as radical right parties and those they recalled as center right parties by giving them different scores. This might be circularity. But crucially, on the other hand, they also reckoned how those same parties they classified as center-right by giving them different scores on the L/R variable had changed their position on many issues, radicalizing their stances, to the point that these parties split from other conservative actors joining radical right parties. So, if experts were prisoners of circularity, they would not mark this evolution within this group of conservative parties. They would have simply confirmed what they already knew about the center right from previous theoretical studies that they gave for granted. Therefore, at this point, we cannot state the absolute absence of a potential issue of circularity within our data, still we are quite sure that experts can perceive political and programmatical evolution and indicate it accordingly in their scores, thereby mediating the potential circular effect of their previous knowledge on the topic.

After these necessary methodological clarifications, we will start to deal with empirical results. The discussion is organized as it follows. The first part of the chapter shows the composition of clusters for each wave, along with aggregation coefficients and the evolution of their profile, which is shown by variables' means. So, within this section we first identify which and how many clusters show the characteristics to be a coherent representation of the radical right family. We first check whether clusters' ideological features are coherent with a radical right profile and then we also check on the items that are contained within the cluster and whether they have been classified as RRPs in previous theoretical studies. Then, we show and comment the ideological features of each cluster. Then, the second part of the chapter is set to bring the results together and to comment them diachronically. Finally, the third part shows random forest models' results and the variable importance scores for each cluster.

2.2 Results discussion

The organization of the discussion of cluster analysis' results is organized on the basis of the analyzed CHES waves. First, we will comment on 2006 and 2010 data, then we will focus on the latest two waves from 2014 and 2019. The result discussion of each wave is supported by three tables: the first one provides the list of items included in each of the selected clusters that showcase a nativist authoritarian outlook; the second table represents a horizontal dumbbell plot which is useful to appreciate the inter-cluster distance between the means of all indicators (and therefore to differentiate between features that foster the aggregation of the cluster and those that shape the division); finally, a dendrogram represents the process of formation of the clusters. Other tables are available in the appendix at the end of the chapter, namely: the complete dendrogram representing the whole aggregation process (and not only the formation of the nativist-authoritarian clusters) and the cartesian representation of all clusters (cluster-plot).

All under control: 2006 and 2010 cluster analysis results

After the aggregation process within the 2006 cluster, two main nativist subgroups. The bigger one comes out as a process of creation of a core that is then joined by two small gatherings, while the smaller one comes together in the early stages of the analysis. Both clusters are formed by parties that had been already put into the RR family in contemporary classifications. Both clusters' composition is showcased in Table 1.

The fact that the agglomeration process shapes two different groups which do not merge instantly suggests that the level of similarity between the two is limited to certain variables. Therefore, on the other hand, there must be a degree of divergence that holds them separated. By looking at both clusters' profiles, we can extract the means for each variable on which the analysis was previously based on. Figure 1 shows the mean value of two items: for each variable, the table represents mean values for subgroup one and subgroup two. Figure 1 shows a high level of similarity between both subgroups, but it also underlines which variables have more variance. On the one hand, both subgroups show almost identical values in what we could call a cultural factor: they hold complementary positions on immigration, civil liberties, and the role of religion in society, and they stand on the same side of the national/cosmopolitan axis. The same counts for EU stances, despite a slightly higher distance between values. On the other hand, what keeps the two subgroups separated seems to be based on economic stances. In fact, all three variables measuring parties' orientation

towards wealth redistribution, enhancement of public services and economic deregulation show wider deviation from the RR cluster mean. The same counts for the ideological variable "L/R economy", which measures party positions in terms of their ideological stances on economic issues. Therefore, on the basis of their ideological characteristics, we can identify one cluster as nativist, authoritarian and interventionist, while the other cluster can be described as nativist and authoritarian itself, but with a neoliberal economic connotation.

Table 3 - Main Radical Right subgroups after performing cluster analysis on CHES 2006

Danish People's Party (Den); Popular Orthodox Rally (Gre); Freedom Party of Austria (Aut); Alliance for the Future of Austria (Aut); True Finns (Fin); National Union Attack (Bul); Law and Justice (Pol); League of Polish Families (Pol); Party of the Great Romania (Rom); Slovak National Party (Svk); Slovenian National Party (Slo)	**Nativist authoritarian interventionist**
National Front (Fra); Movement for France (Fra); Northern League (Ita); Party for Freedom (Ned); UKIP (UK)	**Nativist authoritarian neoliberal**

Figure 1 - Mean values for each variable and subgroup, CHES 2006

Figure 2 - Radical right family agglomeration dendrogram (CHES 2006)

When we take wave 2010 into consideration, we can detect a similar situation: economic indicators show the highest differentials among the means of each subgroup. While immigration and cultural indicators represent the same ideological positions within every subgroup, we can clearly see a subgroup holding a more liberal view on the economy (in line with the original winning formula), a more economically moderate counterpart, and, lastly, the third block showing a more state-centered outlook, closer to redistribution and public spending. Given that all parties populating the latter group also tend to hold harshly conservative positions on lifestyle and religious principles. Despite the widest differences appear on the economic line, variables on EU policies also tell a story: despite they all show values closer to Euroscepticism, the economically moderate group holds more anti-EU position than the others. But, despite clusters' profile show a visible variation even within EU-related variables, they do not seem to hold as much power as the economic classifiers. For instance, the interventionist group joins the cluster in a later stage of the aggregation process, despite it stands closer to the Neoliberal cluster as far as EU variables are concerned. This reasonably happens because of its position on the economic stances, and not for its stances on European integration.

Vlaams Belang (Bel); National Front (Bel); Popular Orthodox Rally (Gre); Northern League (Ita); Reformed Political Party (Ned); Conservative Party (UK); Alliance for the Future of Austria (Aut); Freedom Party (Nor); Swiss People's Party (Swi); Conservative Democratic Party (Swi)	**Nativist authoritarian neoliberal**
Danish People's Party (Den); National Front (Fra); Movement for France (Fra); Party for Freedom (Ned); UKIP (UK); British National Party (UK); Freedom Party of Austria (Aut); Swedish Democrats (Swe); Slovak National Party (Svk);	**Nativist authoritarian moderate**
True Finns (Fin); Nationals Union Attack (Bul); Jobbik (Hun); Self Defense of the Polish Republic (Pol); League of Polish Families (Pol); Party of Great Romania (Rom); Slovak National Party (Svk)	**Nativist authoritarian interventionist**

Mean values for CHES 2010 Radical Right family subgroups

Figure 3 - Mean values for each variable and subgroup, CHES 2010

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
Figure 4 - Radical right family agglomeration dendrogram (CHES 2010)

Something new under the sun: 2014 and 2019 results discussion

Things get more complicated with waves concerning the EU elections in 2014 and 2019. Results for wave 2014 place fifty parties within the nativist cluster and show many subgroups quickly merging, giving birth to three rather populated main subgroups, which are reported in table 5. The overcrowding of the three could make their profiles harder to grasp, given the occurrence of new parties that has distinguished the 2014 EU elections, especially in Eastern Europe. Still, by looking at cluster means we could reshape convincingly the same groups we encountered before, sharing nativist and authoritarian attitudes, and differing on economic views: the Neoliberals, the interventionists, and the moderates. One recurring similarity we can observe is an overall small variance in mean values for cultural variables, while economic variables diverge to a greater extent; still, they are not as clear-cut as in the two previous cases. Furthermore, the overall distribution of cluster means does not clearly reveal a discernible pattern to explain party aggregation. The only subgroup that manifests a continuous and coherent value difference with the others is the neoliberals, which stands clearly as the most right-wing in general economic issues, economic interventionism, wealth redistribution, public spending, and deregulation. We can therefore argue that its aggregation

to the main cluster happens much later due to those marked differences in the economic outlook. As far as the other two subgroups are concerned, the moderates are less harsh on the EU policies axis and it shows the lowest score on general left/right orientation; on the contrary, the interventionist group scores the lowest values on European integration stances, an extremely high mean in variables measuring nationalism and opposition to multiculturalism.

Table 5 - Main Radical Right subgroups after performing cluster analysis on CHES 2014

People's Party (Bel); Alternative for Germany (Ger); Northern League (Ita); Conservative Party (UK); UKIP (UK); Team Stronach for Austria (Aut); Alliance for the Future of Austria (Aut); Civic Democratic Party (Cze); Party of Free Citizens (Cze); Congress of the New Right (Pol); Freedom Party (Nor); Swiss People's Party (Swi).	**Nativist authoritarian neoliberal**
Vlaams Belang (Bel); Ticino League (Swi); Reformed Political Party (Ned); Christian Democrats (Fin); Ordinary People and Indipendent Personalities (Svk); Christian Democrat Movement (Svk); Croatian Party of Rights (Cro); Croatian Party of Rights, dr. Seferovic (Cro); Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Lux); National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (Bul); Bulgarian National Movement (Bul); Bulgaria Without Censorship (Bul); Order and Justice (Lit); The Way of Courage (Lit); People's Party (Rom); Federal Democratic Union (Swi).	**Nativist authoritarian moderate**
Danish People's Party (Den); True Finns (Fin); National Democratic Party of Germany (Ger); National Front (Fra); Movement for France (Fra); Freedom Party of Austria (Aut); Swedish Democrats (Swe); Slovak National Party (Svk); Dawn of Direct Democracy (Cze); Party for Freedom (Ned); Golden Dawn (Gre); Popular Orthodox Rally (Gre); Independent Greeks (Gre); Jobbik (Hun); Fidesz (Hun); Ataka (Bul); Brothers of Italy (Ita); Law and Justice (Pol); United Poland (Pol); Croatian Paesant Party (Cro); Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja (Cro); Nationalist Movement Party (Tur).	**Nativist authoritarian interventionist**

*Figure 5 - Mean values for each variable and subgroup, CHES 2014*

Figure 6 - Radical right family agglomeration dendrogram (CHES 2014)

If wave 2014 is the less clear-cut of the package, wave 2019 is the most surprising. Results indicate thirty-three members for the RR cluster, which is formed by three main subclusters. The first cluster is mostly formed by Western European well-established actors, showing a centrist and moderate

economic position, in continuity with the previous examples. The second group is the smallest one, it shows very high aggregation coefficients, and it marks the first minor difference with the subfamilies we mentioned before. Its members register extreme scores on wealth redistribution, they lean towards a state centered economy, and they are harshly traditionalist and nationalist. If this description may resemble the interventionist subfamily, we encountered in waves 2010 and 2014, the scores of the abovementioned indicators fall at the end of the scales. Furthermore, the cluster is made of six parties: two government parties (Fidesz, Hungary; Law and Justice, Poland), and four actors characterized by a solid extremist heritage. The third group stands midway between the other two and it is difficult to grasp a sharp ideological connotation that can be encapsulated into a convincing label. The subcluster convincingly shows a nativist and authoritarian outlook and moderate views on the economy, and the only feature that may have some discriminating power, according to the means reported into the dumbbell, is a less harsh position on European integration. The only other peculiarity that stands out is the geographical origin of the members of the subcluster, which gathers only Eastern European actors, with the exception of Brothers of Italy. So, wave 2019 shuffles the cards on the table: if we could find reoccurring subfamilies though every wave, each one of them shaped according to quite sharp ideological connotations, now we are left with two clusters never seen before.

Yet the most striking finding comes from the analysis of the indicators' coefficients. Until now, we established two stable points: low variations among nativist and authoritarian indicators, which stand as the glue that holds the radical right family together, and much higher variance among economic indicators. If the former finding is still confirmed, we cannot say the same about the latter. More precisely, we can still observe differences between subgroup means as far as economic stances are concerned, but there is no subcluster to show a value high enough to place it on the neoliberal end of the economic axis. Consequently, the radical right cluster shows a relative stability on economic stances for the first time in our analysis, which showcases an interventionist and two centrist subclusters. The lowering of economic variables' means within all the radical right cluster attests the disappearance of the neoliberal subcluster for the first time within the selected data, and it also assesses the progressive estrangement of RRPs from a liberal approach to economic issues that has been highlighted by recent literature on party manifestos.

Table 6 - Main Radical Right subgroups after performing cluster analysis on CHES 2019

Vlaams Belang (Bel); Danish People's Party (Den); Alternative for Germany (Ger); National Rally (Fra); France Arise (Fra); Party for Freedom (Ned); Freedom Party of Austria (Aut); The Finns Party (Fin); Swedish Democrats (Swe); Freedom and Direct Democracy (Cze); Conservative People's Party (Est); Slovenian National Party (Slo);	**Nativist authoritarian moderate**
Golden Dawn (Gre); Greek Solution (Gre); Ataka! (Bul); Fidesz (Hun); Law and Justice (Pol); People's Party - Our Slovakia (Svk)	**Nativist authoritarian interventionist**
Brothers of Italy (Ita); Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (Cro); Bridge of Independent Lists (Cro); Croatian Conservative Party (Cro); National Popular Front (Cyp); Bulgarian National Movement (Bul); National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (Bul); Volya (Bul); National Alliance (Lat); Kukiz '15 (Pol); Jobbik (Hun); Order and Justice (Lit); Lithuanian Center Party (Lit); Slovak National Party (Svk); We Are Family (Svk);	**Nativist authoritarian**

Figure 7 - Mean values for each variable and subgroup, CHES 2019

Figure 8 - Radical right family agglomeration dendrogram (CHES 2019)

In search of the Neoliberal Radical Right

Despite the analysis on 2019 data show that RRPs seem more compact than ever on economic indicators, we could not get the disappearance of neoliberal RRPs for granted. We refer to those parties that had been consistently put together within the RR family, both in previous literature and by empirical results, and still maintained a liberal economic outlook. The Northern League, Reformed Political Party and UKIP have been clustered within the RR party family in every wave until 2019, and they all showed the characteristics to be a part of it coherently: a traditionalist score on cultural variables, a Eurosceptic approach, and neoliberal economic stances always made them part of the neoliberal radical right subcluster. Empirical results from wave 2019 show how they maintained their ideological outlook intact, and still they set apart from the radical right family. Specifically, they found place into the center-right cluster.

All three abovementioned parties stand in a little subcluster along with the Danish New Right, the Dutch Forum for Democracy, Polish Confederation of Liberty and Independence, Brexit Party and Vox, the newborn right-wing actor that, according to recent research, put an end to the Spanish exceptionalism (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019; et al., 2020). This subcluster shows all the characteristics that put it in line with a coherent Kitschelt-*ian* winning formula RR: nationalist, against multiculturalism, against EU integration and, most importantly, on the right-wing of the economical axis. In spite of this solid radical right heritage, the subgroup merges with well-established center-right actors: a process that marks a unique event for our study.

How can radical right parties be tied with center-right parties? How can they be so ideologically and politically close to find themselves in the same cluster? At this stage we can come up with two possible scenarios. First, the difference on economic positions between the Neoliberal Radical Right and the conventional Radical Right was so pronounced to invalidate the aggregative effect of every other indicator. Second, the change happened within the center-right group: a conspicuous positional evolution among center-right parties made them meet with the neoliberal RRPs (cf. Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2018; Bergmann et al., 2021; Bale, 2022; Hadj Abdou et al., 2022). In a few words, if once they only shared their approach to the economy, now they have more points in common.

Under the light of new analysis, the second scenario seems to be the most accurate. We started by analyzing the formation of the rightist cluster as a whole, in all four waves. Within previous datasets, the right-wing block has always been the result of the aggregation of three groups, each of which showed separate and distinctive ideological connotations: 1) the Radical Right cluster; 2) a Liberal-Conservative cluster (established and institutionalized parties of the European center-right, from New Democracy to the French Republicans); 3) a Centrist-Moderate cluster (mainly formed by Christian-democrats and moderate parties). The analysis on 2019 data shows a significant difference: the Radical Right cluster and the Liberal-Conservative cluster still come together, while the Centrist-Moderate cluster merges with the center-left.

The resulting scenario is rather unique. On one side, centrist moderate parties find a more coherent match with the center-left. On the other side, neoliberal RRPs find more to share with liberal conservatives. When we put these two findings together, we must bring cultural indicators into the analysis. A cultural convergence between an increasingly radicalized branch of center-right parties and RRPs would help to explain both situations. On the one hand it would illustrate why centrist and moderate parties, with moderate positions on cultural issues, set apart from the right-wing cluster. On the other hand, it would tell why Neoliberal RRPs matched with the liberal conservatives: once the difference between the two groups on cultural issues decreases to the point where there is no real difference anymore, there are no more ideological barriers between the two, given they both share the same economic ideological platform.

Figures 9 and 10 show the changes in variable means for the center right cluster in each one of the four considered CHES waves. The pattern is quite clear: economic indicators tend to be stable, then 2019 represents a small increase towards more neoliberal positions; on the contrary, cultural indicators' coefficients rise quite sharply in 2019, underlining a more radical approach to cultural issues. The sudden revolution within the center-right may therefore be found in the increasing distance on cultural issues between the Moderates and a radicalizing Liberal-Conservative branch. A

radicalization that may be caused by the necessity to stop the electoral success of the radical right by competing on the same issues that had rewarded RRPs with high vote shares. Random forest results will be shown in the next pages, and they will help to shed further light on the main variables that shape party divisions, therefore it will be possible to further evaluate the role of cultural indicators in creating this unique scenario. But before we deal with new results, we will sum up the main conclusions from this part of the analysis.

Figure 9   *Figure 10*

Cluster analysis conclusion

This paragraph puts together the main findings from cluster analysis on four waves of CHES data and comments the main conclusions we could reach. They are articulated into three main considerations: First, the radical right family turns out as an always detectable party family, shaped by clear ideological specificities that make it *radically* diverse from other groups. Subsequently, it shows coherence and continuity both on a party positions ground and on party reoccurrence. We will now comment each of them.

An always detectable and specific party family. Each wave gave birth to a detectable RR cluster that continuously showed good aggregation coefficients and a clear-cut separation from other clusters. All four clusters were the last ones to be merged to complete the aggregation process. Therefore, the

radical right cluster has always maintained its own specificity and diversity that set it apart from other political families.

Continuity and coherence with previous taxonomies and throughout data driven classification. By comparing empirical results given by aggregative cluster analysis with previous influential theoretical classifications, we could detect a pattern of continuity between the latter and the former. Most parties that were once put together in the RR family tended to maintain their place within the same cluster through time. Nevertheless, the family tended to grow bigger in number through time, especially in wave 2014, which was heavily affected by the electoral breakout of many radical actors in the European elections of the same year.

If we consider the classification made by Cas Mudde in 2007 as the starting point to evaluate clusters on the basis of their members, then we can see that the great majority of parties that Mudde classified as RRPs always cluster together in all four CHES waves considered, as we can see in table 7. We can therefore highlight a pattern of stability of the party family in terms of long-lived members.[38] Still, despite the existence of a more historical and solid core of parties, especially in Western Europe, the blossom of new actors and the fall of older ones make the RR family change over the years, without harming its solidness in terms of aggregation and separation from the other party groups.

Table 7

Party Name	Mudde	CHES06	CHES10	CHES14	CHES19
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Aut)	X	X	X	X	n.a.
Freedom Party of Austria (Aut)	X	X	X	X	X
Vlaams Belang (Bel)	X	DC	X	X	X
National Union Attack (Bul)	X	X	X	n.a.	n.a.
Ataka! (Bul)	X	n.a.	n.a.	X	X
Bulgarian National Movement (Bul)	X	n.a.	n.a.	X	X
Danish People's Party (Den)	X	X	X	X	X
National Front (Fra)	X	X	X	X	X
Popular Orthodox Rally (Gre)	X	X	X	X	n.a.
Northern League (Ita)	X	X	X	X	DC
League of Polish Families (Pol)	X	X	X	n.a.	n.a.
Party of the Great Romania (Rom)	X	X	X	n.a.	n.a.
Slovak National Party (Svk)	X	X	X	X	X
Slovenian National Party (Slo)	X	X	X	n.a.	X
Swedish Democrats (Swe)	X	n.a.	X	X	X
UK Independence Party (UK)	X	X	X	X	DC

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[38] Mudde's original classification was not just limited to the main RR actors, but it also listed small parties and small-scale political movements that were not covered by CHES data. Therefore, while the complete classification can be found in its entirety in the Appendix, table 2 shows only those parties that were actually analyzed by CHES experts.

X = Clustered in RR family
n.a. = Party not in dataset
DC = Clustered in a different family

When we widen the scope to every party that took part into the analysis, the outcome does not change. Table 8 shows all the parties that have been clustered within the RR family at least once. The chart considers the cluster results for all the four CHES waves, and it also shows the classification made by Cas Mudde as a reference. Despite the high number of missing cases from one wave and the other, on which we discussed commenting the cluster results, one can still spot a pattern of continuity: when parties are covered by data, they always tend to cluster together in the RR group.

Table 8

Party name	Mudde	CHES06	CHES10	CHES14	CHES19
Alliance for the Future of Austria (Aut)	X	X	X	X	
Freedom Party of Austria (Aut)	X	X	X	X	X
Danish People's Party (Den)	X	X	X	X	X
National Front (Fra)	X	X	X	X	X
Vlaams Belang (Bel)	X	DC	X	X	X
Popular Orthodox Rally (Gre)	X	X	X	X	
Northern League (Ita)	X	X	X	X	DC
League of Polish Families (Pol)	X	X	X		
Party of the Great Romania (Rom)	X	X	X		
Slovak National Party (Svk)	X	X	X	X	X
Slovenian National Party (Slo)	X	X	X		X
Swedish Democrats (Swe)	X		X	X	X
UK Independence Party (UK)	X	X	X	X	DC
National Union Attack (Bul)	X	X	X		
Ataka! (Bul)	X			X	X
Bulgarian National Movement (Bul)	X			X	X
True Finns (Fin)		X	X	X	X
Movement for France (Fra)		X	X	X	
Party for Freedom (Ned)		X	X	X	X
Law and Justice (Pol)		X	DC	X	X
Conservative Party (UK)		DC	X	X	DC
Fidesz (Hun)		DC	DC	X	X
National Front (Bel)			X		
Jobbik (Hun)			X	X	X
Reformed Political Party (Ned)			X	X	DC
Freedom Party (Nor)			X	X	

Party			
Self-defence of the Polish Republic (Pol)	X		
British National Party (UK)	X		
Swiss People's Party (Swi)	X	X	
Conservative Democratic Party (Swi)	X	DC	
National Alliance (Lat)	DC	DC	X
Order and Justice (Lit)	DC	X	X
Team Stronach for Austria (Aut)		X	
Bulgaria Without Censorship (Bul)		X	
National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (Bul)		X	X
Croatian Paesants Party (Cro)		X	DC
Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja (Cro)		X	X
Croatian Party of Rights (Cro)		X	
Dawn of Direct Democracy (Cze)		X	X
Alternative for Germany (Ger)		X	X
National Democratic Party (Ger)		X	
Golden Dawn (Gre)		X	X
Independent Greeks (Gre)		X	
Brothers of Italy (Ita)		X	X
Congress of the New Right (Pol)		X	
Ordinary People and Indipendent Personalities (Svk)		X	DC
Federal Democratic Party (Swi)		X	
Ticino League (Swi)		X	
Volya (Bul)			X
Croatian Conservative Party (Cro)			X
National Popular Front (Cyp)			X
Conservative People's Party (Est)			X
France Arise (Fra)			X
Greek Solution (Gre)			X
We Are Family (Svk)			X
People's Party – Our Slovakia (Svk)			X

X = Clustered in RR family
DC = Clustered in a different family
Empty box = Party not in dataset

The RR family therefore showed a remarkable stability as far as party membership is concerned, still we must mention a few cases where parties moved from a cluster to another throughout different waves. They can be divided into three categories: parties that started in one cluster, moving afterwards to the RR group, and then returned to another (the UK Conservative Party); then, parties that were once part of a different cluster but then stabilized as RR family members (Fidesz and Vlaams Belang); and lastly, parties that moved from the RR family to another (Northern League and UKIP). Still, the number of parties moving in and out of the family borders is so low that it does not harm the bigger picture, which we can put into a wider proposition: despite missing cases and a few parties with no

stable aggregation, once an actor is clustered as a RRP, it tends to remain in the same group. In a few words, the empirical groupings built by means of cluster analysis always tend to produce a classification that is coherent with the reference literature.

Ideological coherence. The radical right cluster showed continuities also on its ideological outlook. Indicators measuring nativist and authoritarian features always tend to be what brings the items together. This finding is in continuity with the main literature. Indicators measuring nationalism, multiculturalism, attitudes towards immigration, and ethnic minorities' rights play a unifying role though time, showing the lowest differences between subclusters means. Indicators for authoritarianism also fostered the radical right family ideologically throughout all waves. On the contrary, parties' positions on the economy acted as the main discriminating features and showed the widest differences among subclusters' means. By looking at these coefficients in all four waves, we could assess that the RR party family has always been split between a more moderate (if not interventionist) subfamily and a neoliberal group, until the latter became a branch of the center-right cluster, leaving the RR family orphan of a state-free, pro-market wing. In conclusion, as long as the cluster analysis is concerned, the ideological core and sub-core that define the ideological positions of the radical right family are confirmed as crucial. While the ancillary economic items stand as the main divisional indicators, until 2019 where their dividing power was halved.

In a nutshell, previous classifications tend to be confirmed: once a party has been classified as an RRP, it stands within the family. Our data-driven strategy built empirical clusters that were clearly and substantially divided from each other. The hierarchical clustering procedure always created a cluster that could be reasonably be considered as a sharp representation of the radical right family both by checking its ideological features (nativist and authoritarian indicators always acted as the main aggregative features) and by looking at the clustered items, which were always identified as RRPs by previous theoretical classifications. The family's ideological outlook is in continuity with the reference literature: nativist and authoritarian indicators always tended to keep the cluster together ideologically, while party positions on the economy acted as the main discriminating feature.

Still, our discussion on the ideological outlook of the radical right family is only based on the consideration of a single coefficient. With a view to say which feature holds an aggregative or discriminating power, we only relied on the difference between subclusters' means. So, to give more robustness to our argument on the radical right ideological outlook, we relied on a procedure based on Random Forest models, whose results will be commented in the next paragraph. RF models have been useful to test our data-driven party classification and then to create a variable importance score that can appropriately state which indicators have the higher weight in shaping that classification. So,

the RF procedure assumes the given classification, it trains the algorithm to replicate it, and then provides information on the parameters of the classification itself. In a few words, RFs can analyze how we got from the data to the classification. Therefore, the next paragraph will confirm whether nativism and authoritarianism really act as the ideological core of our radical right party family or not, and it will also provide information about the role of economic positions. But first, we will describe RFs more accurately, then we will comment the results.

Random forest: detecting variables' discriminant power

Random Forests (RF) are an ensemble-based method[39] for supervised machine learning which stand as ensembles of decision trees, and they can be used both for classification and regression tasks. The principle of RF is to combine many binary decision trees built using several bootstrap samples (random sampling with replacements) coming from the learning sample and choosing randomly at each node a subset of explanatory variables. The best split at each one is calculated only within this subset of variables (and not among all possible variables) and no pruning step is performed to any of the trees, which is otherwise quite common in decision tree models to avoid overfitting (Liaw & Wiener, 2002; Genuer et al., 2010). Even from these few lines, it is quite clear why this model is called Random Forest: the gathering of many decision trees gives birth to the forest, while randomness is the key feature of the whole method; given that bagging operations often result in the selection of the same variables for many trees, thus causing a dependency issue, RF solve this problem by performing random variable selection.[40]

One of the main tasks of random forest models is the quantification of variable importance. In a few words, this feature helps researchers who deal with a large list of variables (or contradictive studies on different sets of indicators, like in our case) to check which ones hold the strongest predictive power and to eliminate those that do not. The most used score of importance is the increasing mean of the error of a tree in the forest, when the observed values of one variable are randomly permuted in the out-of-bag samples (Genuer et al. 2010). In other words, the values of each variable (one at the time) will be permuted with random values, and the more the model loses its accuracy, the more that

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[39] An ensemble method fits multiple (yet finite) learning algorithms in the same model to *get a better performance in prediction than a single algorithm. The idea that lies underneath ensemble methods is that, whereas one algorithm may perform poorly (weak learner), by combining multiple weak learners, a stronger learner is created (Lantz, 2015). The most common procedures to build ensemble methods are boosting and bagging. The former sets the algorithms that correct their own mistakes through a re-weight process. The latter creates many subsamples of the training data, it trains one algorithm on each subsample and then it aggregates the predictions. RF are based on this very procedure.

[40] Despite its versatility and high predictive power, RF are not perfect, and they show some weaknesses as well, especially on the data side. For example, they tend to give more importance to continuous variables when they appear alongside factors, which is not the case for this study.

variable will be important. Methodological research confirms that this procedure gives more accurate results compared to others, such as the measure of relative decreasing Gini index, especially when dealing with variables with many categories (Strobl et al., 2007). Still, in the results section both importance metrics will be showed.

This operation can be performed both for standard and high dimensional problems, due to the versatility of the RF, and it is particularly fruitful for many reasons. In fact, despite the procedure is sensitive to bigger or smaller numbers of cases and variables (the quantification of importance gets a little more unstable with higher numbers of variables and the less the number of cases, the greater the instability), noisy variables always tend to have zero importance and the variables' ranking tends to remain the same at any N (Genuer et al., 2010). In any case, the best number of features available for splitting at each node, and the exact number of trees to increase model stability are easily measured by means of cross-validation and tests. The figures giving higher accuracy in the training part are of course the ones to be chosen.

The use of random forest models has been twofold: first it is used as a robustness check for cluster analysis results, then it is performed to get a scale of importance to check which variables were the most crucial in shaping cluster differentiation.

As a robustness check, the RF confirmed the clustering results showing high accuracy in the reallocation of the objects within the correct cluster. The idea behind using this algorithm even as a check for the HC comes from the basic characteristic of all machine learning procedures, which is the division of the dataset into a train-set, where the algorithm trains its classification skills, and a test-set where it finally scores its acquired predictive power. [41] In a nutshell, when we created separate groups of parties through HC, each one had its own specific features represented by the different values among indicators. So, if the party classification we carried out through HC had problems of noise values, randomness, or incoherent pairings so serious to compromise the entire reliability of the classification, then the RF algorithm would have not been able to train itself to replicate such classification and, consequently, it would have not been able to produce an acceptable prediction. Therefore, the lower the estimate error rate in the train-set and the highest the accuracy in prediction within the test-set, the stronger the HC classification. The diagnostics for RF models show excellent values at each step of the classification. The highest estimate error rate among all training sessions is 6% (2019 Radical right subgroups) and the prediction accuracy never fell under 100%. Therefore, we

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[41] As a rule of thumb, samples are usually split using a standard ratio of 70% of data forming the train-set, and 30% creating the test-set. However, in some cases where one of the classes had far fewer members than the other, the ratio was lowered to a more even 60/40 to have slightly higher figures for the smaller class. For the complete diagnostics table, I refer you to the appendix.

can state that the objects' classification carried out with HC was robust and coherent enough to avoid misplacements as much as possible. The excellent diagnostics that confirmed the reliability of our data-driven classifications also foster the accountability of the variable importance scale. Whenever estimate error rates show so low figures and the predictive power of the trained algorithm is so accurate, we can be quite confident on the score of importance for each indicator in shaping such divisions.

Before commenting the results, a few words on the plan of the paragraph. First, we will comment on the radical right cluster and on which features separate it from the others. This will show what are the ideological characteristics that set the radical right apart, thus what represents its ideological core. Then, we will comment on the subclusters that form the radical right cluster and consequently on the features that shape these subgroups. Lastly, we will focus specifically on wave 2019, which is characterized by unique results that add new pieces of information to the debate on RRPs. All diagnostics and variable importance tables are available within the appendix at the end of Chapter 2.

What sets the Radical Right apart: The core, the subcore, and the third wheel

When we start with what sets the division line between the center-right and the radical right, the variable importance score shows a picture where the ideological division line between the two main families of the right-wing is a matter of cultural values: the radical right is fiercely Eurosceptic, nationalist, and anti-immigration, while the center-right stands on more moderate positions. We also find a very limited role for economic variables in shaping a split between radical and center right. This is a recurrent result that is maintained throughout the first three waves, despite the outcome of the cluster analysis on wave 2014 showed some peculiarities[42]. The dichotomization of the right-wing is mostly up to the relationship between parties and European policies, opposition to immigration and nationalist attitudes.

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[42] 2014 data gave the center-right family cluster a peculiar conformation. The group holds in a great number of parties on a very wide ideological scope. This peculiarity seems to be caused by a distinctive feature of the aggregation procedure. In all other cases, every subfamily joined a macro-cluster, a left-wing and a right-wing cluster, which were then merged to complete the aggregative clustering procedure. On the contrary, in this case, the two separate macro-clusters have not been formed, or, more specifically, the aggregation procedure ends with the radical left cluster joining a wider cluster formed by all other political actors, as shown in the dendrograms in the appendix. So, if in an ordinary case, the first backwards split would have separated the completed aggregation into two clusters representing the left-wing and the right-wing, in this case, the same operation gives birth to the radical left family and a greater agglomeration. So, at the same time, when the subsequent split would have created a coherent center-right and the radical-right, now the same procedure gives birth to the radical right cluster and to a wide family embracing all the political spectrum from the conservatives to the liberal center-left.

When we put all these results together and connect them to the theoretical framework of the research, we can positively state that the ideological core that characterizes the radical right family throughout all major theoretical definitions is really what differentiates the radical right from the other party families. The three indicators that we used to define nativism within our data-driven research (positions towards immigration, ethnic minorities, and nationalism) have always gained the highest positions in the variable importance scores. The crucial role of the abovementioned variables in dividing the radical right from the center right confirms the tendency of the former to base its political supply on the demarcation between natives and non-natives. The grade of ideological separation between the radical right and the more moderate center-right cluster clearly depends on a conflictual dimension between a group of parties that stigmatizes diversity and another that tends to hold more balanced positions.

The same stands for what we called the subcore, that is to say attitudes towards authoritarianism, which we measured through the indicator of positions towards law and order. Despite it tended to show milder figures in the variable importance scores throughout waves, the indicator always stood in high positions, therefore we must consider the tendency to embrace an authoritarian perspective to the role of the state on the public life as another crucial part of the process of separation between the radical and the center right.

Still, what we did not consider was the role of the indicators measuring attitudes towards the European Union and the unification process, which on the contrary held up as crucial factors of differentiation between a fiercely Eurosceptic family and a group of parties which are far closer to the European institutions and bound to European integration. The anti-EU affair was not an option within our ideological classification; however, it may show some points in common with our ideological core. If we framed the relationship with the European Union as the interference of a supernational organization on the powers and the legitimate authority of the nation-state within its borders, then we could assert an adherence between radical right's Euroscepticism and the native vs non-native framework. When we frame it in such a way, the centrality of the attitudes towards the European Union in shaping the center-radical right division does not come as a surprise, in fact it seems coherent with the ideological platforms of the parties at stake. However, despite it finds some common ground with the nativist core, it cannot be defined as a part of the ideological core by itself. It is a result of a nativist approach to the European integration issue. Therefore, we can argue that attitudes towards the European Union are an unexpected third wheel. In a nutshell, they are crucial items of separation between the center right and the radical right, and, even though we can classify them as a consequence

of the ideological core of the radical right party family, they stand as a main division line, beside nativism and authoritarianism.

The ideological definition of Radical Right subfamilies: A matter of economic orientations

When we get to what divides the RR family, the random forest results tend to confirm the hypothesis on the ancillary variables: it is mostly a matter of divergence on the economic positions undertaken by family members, at least until 2014. Starting from 2006 and from inside the RR cluster, random forest results confirm the outline we could get from looking at differences in variables' mean values: all economic indicators show the highest values; therefore, they act as the main force that made the building of two subfamilies possible within the RR cluster. Also, variables measuring party positions towards European integration and European cohesion policies show sufficiently high values, so we can finally appreciate a meaningful division within RR family based on economic outlook and, at a second stage, on a slight difference regarding the appraisal on European integration. Results from wave 2010 build a pattern of continuity with the previous as far as internal division in RR cluster is concerned. When we look at the most important variables shaping the two main subclusters, it is still a matter of party views on the economy: all economic variables occupy the main spots in the importance scale, with solid coefficients in both rankings. The same counts for wave 2014. Values on both accuracy fall, and Gini scale set the economic policy indicators apart from all other variables: they show a clear predominance of the economic outlook, thus confirming even more the hypothesis of two separated RR subgroups based on different views on the economy. The centrality of economic indicators in dividing the radical right family can be acknowledged also by looking at what instead keeps it united. In fact, whenever we look at those indicators showing the lower figures in the importance scale, we will see every single variable representing what we called the core and the subcore of the radical right's ideological outlook. The same indicators that held a crucial role in separating the center right from the radical right, now are the ones that keeps the latter deeply unified and homogeneous. In a nutshell, party attitudes towards nationalism, immigration and law and order are confirmed to be the ideological glue that keeps the radical right family together; while economic issues represent the field on which parties hold their more divisive and heterogeneous political positions. This is a recurrent pattern for the 2006, 2010 and 2014 waves, still results from 2019 wave show a different picture, given the peculiar results it produced.

2019, a matter of radicality: A homogeneous radical right or a radicalized center-right?

As we stated in the previous paragraph, the neoliberal radical right subgroup found no place in the RR cluster anymore in 2019. Therefore, we could expect the economic indicators to hold a much lower significance in shaping within-cluster divisions, given the absence of parties that represent a solid state-adverse position. On the contrary, when we look at the variable importance metrics for the division within the RR cluster, we can still see the predominance of economic variables, as it was for the previous cases, but the coefficients on both decrease in accuracy and the Gini scale show much smaller figures. This result could hint at a RR family which is still divided mainly on the economic axis, despite the absence of neoliberal family members. As it is, the division should be acknowledged as a matter between moderate parties and actors with a more interventionist position on the economy. Still, given the actual weaker power of the division, we can argue that the RR cluster, in 2019, looks far more homogenous on every line. And, for the first time, we are dealing with a less divided family even when we look at the ancillary indicators.

A similar degree of homogeneity can be traced even within the center-right cluster, in 2019. While the economic outlook shows no impact whatsoever in shaping a within-family division, the main division lines are represented by cultural and EU-related variables. Still all coefficients prove to be lower than previous cases, with the only exception of nationalism. So, we find a high level of homogeneity even within the center-right, also among those indicators that used to divide the center from the radical right. Consequently, we can observe that a part of the center right in 2019 gets closer to a more radical outlook. This hints at a process of radicalization of a part of what used to be the more moderate party family on the right of the spectrum. Or, at least, given that we deal with expert judgements, it could be more appropriate to say that we can observe a process of perceived radicalization.

What is also very interesting is the importance score of the general L/R scale variable inside the center-right cluster: it is one of the most divisive. Therefore, inside the center-right cluster, we find parties with moderate scores on the L/R scale alongside parties with extreme scores. This is coherent with what emerged from our classification in 2019, where the neoliberal radical right merged with the center-right cluster. And here comes the interesting part: even though neoliberal RRPs and center-right parties show they have lots in common, still their scores on the L/R scale remain rather different, to such an extent that the indicator for the left-right scale is the second most important variable in shaping a within-family division. So, even though experts noticed a radicalization among some center-right parties, they still gave them a "center-right" score on the L/R scale, while giving an extreme score the parties they have acknowledged as radical right. In a few words, experts recognize

a process of radicalization of a branch of the center-right, but still, they believe their overall general position on the political space to be out of the edge of the scale.

The fact that we are presumably dealing with a radicalized center-right is reinforced by variable importance scores for the indicators that shape the division between the center right and radical right. Nativist-authoritarian-Eurosceptic variables in general show very poor coefficients, thus revealing their negligible role in shaping the gap between the radical right and the center right. This is another clue: a part of the center-right is now much closer to radical position than it was before. Quite the contrary, variables measuring parties' economic outlook show very strong figures: the division between center and radical right is now based more on the economic position than on cultural features. In a nutshell, what used to separate the two clusters is now what makes them meet. If in 2006, 2010 and 2014 nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism drew the border between the radical and the center right, now they mark a convergence. The opposite counts for economic stances, which gain a major role in dividing a moderate/interventionist radical right from a neoliberal radicalized center right.

At this point, we could draw two main conclusions. The first one would state that we now face a radicalized branch of the center-right that stands much closer to the ideological outlook that has always shaped RRPs. So, nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism break the wall of radicalism and get to the mainstream. We could therefore talk of an expansion of radicalism: a winning over moderation, at least in ideological terms. The second one would only focus on the radical right family, which would be now a more cohesive group: RRPs economic platforms are all moderate or interventionist, so there is no longer the need to sustain the divisive role of economic stances within the family and therefore they could leave the role of ancillary variables they were given by academic research.

However, there are good reasons to doubt and object to the second conclusion. Simply because it is based on a wrong assumption: the disappearance of neoliberal RRPs. On the contrary, neoliberal RRPs did not disappear: they did not change their economic outlook and they certainly did not change their nativist-authoritarian-Eurosceptic ideological core, they are still where we left them, ideologically unchanged. They are still fully-fledged radical right actors. The only crucial difference is that now they are sharing a matching platform with center-right parties that increased their level of radicality. RRPs are still divided by economic differences. In a nutshell, as far as RRPs are concerned, we are facing the same situation we saw in 2006, 2010 and 2014, but in disguise. In conclusion, what is here at stake is not the mere homogeneity of the radical right family, but its eventual enlargement, whether a branch of the center-right will keep on running the track of radicalization.

Final remarks

After we evaluated literature on the radical right party family, we identified three main definitory level for the radical right party family ideological outlook. First, a widely accepted core (nativism) which is reported within every radical right ideological definition, often argued to be the main point to bring RRPs together. Second, a sub-core based on authoritarianism, which is still cited within most important definition but at the same time it lacks agreement on its meaning and implications. Lastly, an ancillary level formed by party positions on the economy, which lacks agreement both on its role in shaping a coherent radical right ideology, and on its salience in shaping radical right family borders. We therefore argued a stable and crucial role for the core and the subcore in shaping these borders between the radical right and other party families. Furthermore, we expected the variety of economic positions provided by RRPs to be the cause of within-family divisions. The evaluation of all three definitory levels (specifically the potentially divisive role of party positions on the economy) would have then allowed the assessment of previous classifications, which do not include parties' economic platforms within the main ideological profile of RRPs and within extended definitions either.

The empirical work provided a data-driven classification of all parties by means of hierarchical cluster analysis, which has been later tested by mean of random forest models that also gave a variable importance score in order to assess which indicators had a crucial role in shaping that classification. The resulting empirical clusters provided groups of parties that were coherent with previous theory-driven classification established in the literature. Throughout all four waves, we could always identify a cluster showing all characteristics to be legitimately indicated as the radical right family: all the gathered items represented parties established within the literature as RRPs, and the clusters' ideological conformation always showed continuity with the outlook highlighted in the literature.

H1 is confirmed. The radical right party family turns out empirically as a group that is clearly and substantially divided from other families in ideological terms. Furthermore, once parties appear in the radical right cluster, they tend to fall into the radical right family ever since. We also confirm an ideological stability within the party family shaped by nativism and authoritarianism. All the indicators measuring the core and the sub-core always showcased an important role in shaping the family borders: they showed the weakest distances in mean values among subclusters, and they were the most crucial in separating the radical right cluster from the others. The same counts for what we ironically called "the third wheel", which is Euroscepticism. Therefore, our results suggest the confirmation of the core (nativism) and the subcore (authoritarianism) as the main ideological borders of the family, along with Euroscepticism, which, albeit not being an issue owned and dominated by

the radical right like the first two, still serves as a delimitation of the family. On the contrary, RRPs' economic orientations always show the wider distances among subclusters, and they stand as the major division line within the radical right family. Our results therefore confirm the outcomes of major theoretical studies on RRPs: nativism and authoritarianism stand as the core and subcore of the radical right family. Nonetheless, we find evidence on how the same role is played by Eurosceptic attitudes. We also confirm that RRPs hold a differentiated approach to the economy that can shape solid subgroups sharply divided on the basis of an interventionist, moderate or neoliberal standpoint.

This evidence holds up until 2019, when the distance among RRPs on the economic axis decreases to the point that we can appreciate within-family homogeneity on economic platforms for the first time. The transformation of party positions on economic issues from an agent of division to a unifying feature may raise a debate on the influence of the economic discourse on the building process of the radical right family and, more broadly, on the role of RRPs' economic platforms within their ideological outlook. In a few words, it could mark the time for parties' economic platforms to gain a more crucial and primary function within radical right definitions. Still, as we previously discussed, the disappearance of neoliberal RRPs from the radical right family is not due to the evolution of their economic profile, but to a process of radicalization of the center-right, which disrupted the ideological barrier that held them separate. As a matter of fact, RRPs' economic positioning still marks the same old difference: we still face neoliberal RRPs, albeit undercover, hosted by another cluster. What is at stake now is not the radical right family ideological connotation. The family is well bounded within its walls of nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic stances, and divided on its members' attitudes on economic policies. And this is a recurrent result in all four waves. What is really at stake is the eventual expansion of the family as a result of center-right radicalization.

A1 - Further tables and material for hierarchical cluster analysis

Allocated by survey wave, you will find the complete aggregation dendrograms and the clusters' cartesian transposition into a cluster-plot. Both its axes represent a dimension that captures different indicators together in order to give a meaningful and informative spatial representation of the clusters.

Afterwards, you will also find the spatial representation of the radical right family into the cluster-plot and the silouhette values for each one of the parties involved into the family. As you will see, we found hardly any case of misplacements (negative silouhette value) within the radical right family and subfamilies.

CHES wave 2006

Cluster plot

Silhouette plot of (x = sub_grp_rr, dist = d)

n = 16

2 clusters C_j

j : n_j | ave$_{i \in C_j}$ s

1 : 11 | 0.25

2 : 5 | 0.46

Average silhouette width : 0.31

Cluster plot

CHES 2010

Cluster plot

Silhouette plot of (x = sub_grp_rr, dist = d)

Average silhouette width : 0.15

Cluster plot

CHES 2014

Cluster plot

Silhouette plot of (x = sub_grp_rr, dist = d)

n = 50

3 clusters C_j
j : n_j | $ave_{i \in C_j}$ s_i

1 : 12 | 0.19

2 : 16 | 0.17

3 : 22 | 0.11

Average silhouette width : 0.15

Cluster plot

CHES 2019

Dendrogram of agnes

cheshcna
agnes (*, "ward")

Cluster plot

Cluster plot

Silhouette plot of (x = sub_grp_rr, dist = d)

n = 33

3 clusters C_j

$j : n_j \mid ave_{i \in C_j}$ s

12	
9	
11	
29	1 : 12 | 0.21
1	
18	
4	
24	2 : 6 | 0.32
19	
22	
31	
20	
30	3 : 15 | 0.10
32	
21	
13	
26	

0.0   0.2   0.4   0.6   0.8   1.0

Silhouette width s_i

Average silhouette width : 0.18

A2 - Random Forest Diagnostics

For each wave, we performed the random forest model for three steps of the aggregation. The first step is the division of the omnicomprehensive cluster into two groups, which fairly represent the right and the left. The second step is the dichotomization of the right-parties cluster into the center-right family and the radical-right family, The third step is the division of the radical right into its subgroups.

For each of these steps, we will show the total number of items (parties) involved, and how it is split into the two subgroups; the ratio of the split between the train set and the test set (whether it is 70/30 or 60/40) and the number of items involved; the estimate error rate of the train-set; the number of trees (ntree) and the number of predictors randomly selected at each node (mtry); finally, the accuracy of the prediction measured in the test-set.

CHES 2019

First step (from whole agglomeration to left and right clusters)
N: 243 (180; 63)
Split samples: 0.7. Train-set data: 126;45. Test-set data: 54;18
OOB estimate error rate: 1,75% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 93%

Second step (from right cluster to center-right and radical right cluster)

N: 63 (30; 33)
Split samples 0.7. train-set data: 21;24. Test-set data: 9;9
OOB estimate error rate: 1,59% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Third step (from radical right to subgroups)
N: 33 (27; 6)
Split samples 0.6. Train-set data: 17;4. Test-set data: 10;2
OOB estimate error rate: 6% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

CHES 2014

First step
N: 268 (53;215)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 15;64. Test-set data: 38;151
OOB estimate error rate: 3,17% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4.
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Second step
N: 215 (165;50)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 49;15. Test-set data: 116;35
OOB estimate error rate: 2,33% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4.
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Third step
N: 50 (12;38)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 4;15. Test-set data: 8;23
OOB estimate error rate: 4% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4.
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

CHES 2010

First step
N: 217 (98;119)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 69;84. Test-set data: 29;35.
OOB estimate error rate: 1,9% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Second step
N: 119 (93;26)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 66;19. Test-set data: 27;7.
OOB estimate error rate: 5,8% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4.

Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Third step
N: 26 (19;7)
Split samples 0.6. Train-set data: 12;5. Test-set data: 7;2
OOB estimate error rate: 3,8% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

CHES 2006

First step
N: 168 (69;99)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 49;70. Test-set data: 20;29.
OOB estimate error rate: 8,4% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 96%

Second step
N: 99 (83;16)
Split samples 0.7. Train-set data: 59;12. Test-set data: 12;4.
OOB estimate error rate: 2% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

Third step
N: 16 (11;5)
Split samples 0.6. Train-set data: 7;3. Test-set data: 4;2.
OOB estimate error rate: 0% w/ ntree 500 & mtry 4
Accuracy in prediction_ 100%

A3 - Random Forest Scores of Variable Importance

model3

Figure 11 - Variable Importance in shaping distinction between Center-Right and Radical-Right clusters, data CHES 2006

model1

Figure 12 - Variable importance in shaping Radical right subgroups, fata CHES 2006

Figure 13 - Variable importance in shaping Center-right and Radical-right clusters, data CHES 2010

Figure 14 - Variable importance in shaping Radical-right subclusters, data CHES 2010

Figure 15 - Variable importance in shaping Center-right and Radical-right clusters, data Ches 2014

Figure 16 - rr subgroups 2014

model1

Figure 17 - cr rr 2019

model1

Figure 18 - rr subgroups 2019

Chapter 3

Through the looking glass, in search of a radical right attitude

The previous chapter dealt with political offer. It presented party family formation and the main theoretical frameworks that attempted to capture RRPs ideological and political essence. Afterwards, it highlighted the results of an empirical research based on machine learning methodologies: first, political party gatherings were assembled using cluster analysis; then, a random forest algorithm has been used as a robustness check for the clustering results and then it helped to ascertain the main political and ideological divisions among the resulting families, thus shedding more light on each family's distinctive outlook. Following this procedure, we finally came up with these main conclusions: once we kept Cas Mudde's classification as a reference, all parties that were thereby classified as RRPs were put together by the clustering algorithm through all the considered Chapel Hill waves, thus showing high consistency and ideological continuity for the radical right party family. Party positions on cultural issues and attitudes towards immigration stood as the main ideological bonding keeping RRPs together. On the other hand, as previous literature suggested through party manifestos analysis, attitudes towards the economy were proved to be the main divisive item. Whenever put into the analysis, political statements towards the role of the state in the economy, wealth redistribution in the society and economic deregulation showed wider distances between the two main subclusters within the radical right family. Their centrality in shaping both subgroups has been later confirmed after running the random forest model, which clearly highlighted a more center-left leaning and a properly right-wing subclusters on the economic axis. The solid division on the economic platforms provided by different RRPs remained salient to a point that those actors who still embraced a more liberal and state-free orientation towards the economy ended up merging with established conservative parties in 2019 dataset. If on the one hand this could be further evidence of a radicalization of a branch of the center-right on cultural issues, on the other hand the role of the economic outlook grew in importance and differences among radical right actors enhanced.

Building up on these results, this chapter will draw attention on the other side of political competition: the demand side. The main goal will be to check if ideological profiles and political stances at a party level are matched or misrepresented at the voters' level. To do so, we will take two waves of European Election Studies database (2014 and 2019, which match the two last waves of CHES data) and replicate part of the research design based on cluster analysis developed for chapter 2. Then, I am going to select a set of variables measuring the interviewees' self-placement on several issues also used for the party level analysis. After having set the clustering algorithm and gathered all units into

separate clusters, we will be able to check for correspondence between the ideological and political stances of the resultant groups of individuals (not necessarily voters) and RRPs' positions for each country. The chapter will be organized as follows: first, I will provide a synthetic review on the main studies analysing citizens' ideological positions, and most importantly how these are formed and eventually changed or influenced by political elites; then, a data and methods section will explain the choice of datasets and the replication of the methodological approach which shaped the previous chapter; eventually, results will be showed and commented.

3.1 - The relationship between supply and demand: Top-down, bottom-up or by-the-way?

Changing the research object from parties to individuals does not merely imply a change of perspective from party literature to public opinion studies, but it also asks for a clearer view on the intermediation process between both levels. The congruence between mass beliefs and elites has had a difficult research history (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). From the first pioneering study by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes (1963), which investigated the complex relationship between constituency's attitudes and its perception among representatives along with their own attitudes and behaviour, many others attempts were made to understand the dynamics of opinion change, the correspondence between citizens' policy preferences and the actual policy outcomes, but also, and more crucially for this topic, comparisons between party programs and the preferences of the electoral base.

Taking one step back, public opinion branch of studies must rely on the assumption of a basic understanding of political competition from the citizenry, but they must also build on the assumption of a rudimentary pattern of rationality that allows personal preferences to be formed, then influenced, changed and eventually led to an electoral choice. A pattern that might not be necessarily adherent to a Dahl*ian* enlightened understanding, but at the same time must be far from randomness. There is a wide and prolific academic debate on individuals' sophistication related to public opinion and, as Kuklinski and Peyton (2007) state, we face an arguably schizophrenic literature generated by changes in concepts, definitions, and measurements throughout decades of research. In fact, different authors in different times get to opposite conclusions. In his seminal work, Philip Converse (1964) finds a small minority of people who show a sufficient understanding of ideological politics and specific issue knowledge, and, crucially, he reports ideologically unconstrained preferences and unstable

attitudes for the majority of his sample.[43] Other studies call for a reformulation of non-attitudes theories and they state that (American) citizens hold more true attitudes on public policies than previously argued and that opinion elite is not the only reliable actor to provide substantial attitudes on issues of public policy (Pierce & Rose, 1974). At the same time, other scholars stand in contrast with this standpoint and adopt a top-down perspective when they argue that what individual say or perceive as their attitude or preference is highly dependent on the surrounding political environment, their exposure to political communication and to the message thereby conveyed (cf. Druckman, 2001a; 2001b). Zaller (1992) explicitly states that individuals are very unlikely to express true attitudes because they base their preferences on whatever seems more easily accessible and salient when they form that preference, therefore, if an individual happened to be recently exposed to communications regarding one specific issue, he would likely build its preference on that specific issue. In a few words, this branch of literature portraits individual attitudes as volatile, weak, unstable, and vague, if not random. It also hints at a mass of unsophisticated, uncertain, and politically naïve individuals, left to be helpless victims of political elites' communication, issue salience and short-lived considerations.

Still, further research reached opposite conclusions. For instance, some works highlighted how citizens are aware of ideological reasoning, they use it to evaluate facts and issues and, even though people might not be fully understanding its implications, the ideological labels they use have political significance and help them to establish a closer bound to the political process (Levitin & Miller, 1979). In a nutshell, a newer stream of research demonstrated that people hold meaningful political attitudes, which can be improved, changed, or updated when shed with new information, political messages, and exogenous events. It also suggested a variable and ever-growing level of awareness and political comprehension due to the changing characteristics of contemporary publics (see Kuklinski & Hurley, 1996). Russell Dalton (2007) puts the emphasis on the dramatic spread of education and information sources, through which more people can now deal with the complexities of politics. Therefore, we are left with individuals who have more tools to understand reality and politics, updating their preferences and factual beliefs.

Still to these days, we face the lack of an unequivocal and widely accepted theory on public opinion and there is still no univocal story about individual beliefs even in recent research. A substantial part of academic research assume that most individuals show real and funded attitudes, they behave rationally when they upgrade their preferences, and they use them to orientate their behaviour. On

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[43] Stability was later found in more politically knowledgeable people, who have the means to maintain and reinforce their attitudes, yet failing to hold factual beliefs (Kuklinski & Peyton, 2007).

the other side, we find studies calling for high dependency between individual stances and a complex and overwhelming socio-political environment that intensely orientates mass beliefs and reduces them to unmeaningful echoes. So, considering this endless debate, the implications on the relationship between parties and citizens may change dramatically whether one follows one stream of research or the other. Still, more specific research can help us to get a better idea of what is the role of party elites and, more crucially, whether they influence and drive public opinion or, on the contrary, they tend to follow changes in mass preferences for electoral purposes. In other words, the goal of this theoretical introduction is to point out where public opinion literature places more responsiveness to change: whether changes in opinion cause political responses at an elite level, which is the baseline assumption of dynamic representation theory (see Stimson et al., 1995), or on the contrary political elites can pave their way by changing public opinion according to their needs.

Crucially, this is not the easiest of tasks, especially when addressing the direction of causality. The estimation and measurement of the effect of elite messages on individual attitudes formation is arguably the main problem within public opinion literature, first and foremost at a theoretical level but also as a methodological issue. In fact, it has proved hard to get rid of issues of endogeneity and omitted variables, given that changes in elite communication may be responses to public opinion changes, and, alternatively, both elites and individuals may be reacting to similar stimuli (Gabel & Scheve, 2007). Still, after considering these problems, recent research has brought forward knowledge about the relationship and causality between the two poles.

In a longitudinal study examining eight European party systems from 1976 to 1998, James Adams finds that parties of the center and right adjust their ideologies in response to public opinion shifts more than leftist parties, which appear unresponsive to short-term public opinion shifts and less responsive to short-term changes in the global economy. A result that supports the perspective that different types of parties use different set of rules to change their positions (Adams et al., 2009). This result also echoes a similar conclusion reached earlier by Adams himself, who found evidence for a different relationship between parties and public opinion, namely that parties shift their ideological orientations only when public opinion moves in a direction that is clearly disadvantageous for the party itself (Adams et al., 2004).

Both studies claim a differentiation between parties tending to operate a shift and parties that hold their positions: whether the latter identifies shifting actors as those more disadvantaged by a change in public opinion, a pattern labelled as the "Dynamic of disadvantaged parties" (Adams et al., 2004, p. 590), the former points out shifting parties by placing them on the political spectrum, standing in the same path created by previous literature on the more historically ideological nature of leftist

parties and their deep ties with specific social groups and organizations restricting their ideological flexibility (see Przeworski & Sprague, 1986).

Another important finding is provided by Kluver and Spoon (2014; 2016), who showed that larger parties are more responsive to voters' political priorities, being more office-seeking actors following a broader ideological apparel, while governing actors show less responsiveness, given a higher level of political constraint than opposition parties, who have more flexibility to propose policies that voters favour. They also provide evidence for niche parties to be generally more or less receptive as any other type of party, except for green parties in environmental protection. Therefore, we might expect a higher level of responsiveness from one-issue parties on the topic they own. It might be the case that RRPs show a high interest in following public opinion changes on immigration issues, which is the main political glue that holds them together as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Still, it might also not be the case for economic issues and redistributive policy preferences, where they could simply follow other niche parties' patterns of behavior. At the same time, following Kluver and Spoon's findings, things might change whenever we deal with RRPs that reached the status of large and influential political actors.

A good part of political research studying the relationship between changes between party positions and public opinion focused on the issue of Euroscepticism. Some studies confirmed that public opinion shifts on EU integration consistently influenced party positions on the same issue (Arnold et al., 2012). Others added that party responsiveness to individual policy preferences on European integration enhanced dramatically after the signing of Maastricht treaty in 1993, thus underlining a crucial role for issue salience in growing or diminishing party reactions (Steenbergen & Scott, 2004). Williams & Spoon (2015) also focused on Euroscepticism and confirmed that larger parties tend to follow public opinion more than smaller parties, but they could not provide evidence of different levels of responsiveness between opposition and government parties. A result that hints at another potential problem: if research confirmed that different parties react differently to public opinion changes, conversely there might be issues causing different reactions, depending on their salience, the importance they hold for voters, or possibilities for political exploitation.

Leonard Ray (2003) also researched public-élite causal relations within EU integration issues, but he reached different conclusions, namely that party positions on determined issue can act as a cue for supporters, and not vice-versa (see also Wessels, 1995 and Gabel, 1998 for similar results). Specifically, when that issue is particularly salient for the party and when individuals show high party-attachment, the connection between party position and voter opinion is enhanced (Ray, 2003). These results stand in a top-down theoretical path which stresses out that individuals take cues from

political élites, rather than influence party strategies with opinion shifts, and then adjust their views to be more in line with party leaders. So, while bottom-up patterns, like the one at the base of dynamic representation models, portrait political parties as ever-probing actors willing to adjust their policies and stances to meet public opinion changes to gain votes and offices, the top-down approach underlies "a more pessimistic reading of the cognitive limitations of citizens than is typically found in bottom-up theories" (Steenbergen et al, 2007, p. 17). As Wendy Rahn (1993) argued, individuals tend to disdain policy information and policy attributes to reach evaluations, instead they use party labels to draw inferences, therefore political parties play a major role in decision-making processes. It is a stream of research that builds on Converse and Zaller's evaluation of public reasoning and political understanding, and it actively confirms their findings.

Still, studies on top-down patterns, albeit finding élite positions effects on individual attitudes, show very different effect magnitudes. In a rather meticulous experimental study, John Bullock (2011) comments on six previous research findings and finally states that "the variation in these findings defeats most attempts to generalize" (p. 509). Furthermore, only one of them consistently finds that party-cue effects outweigh policy effects, which is also consistent with his own results stating that the formers are rarely larger than the latter and, quite the contrary, they are sometimes much smaller than the effects of an exposure to substantial amounts of policy information.

More recent contributions by Rune Slothuus clarify issues of consistency between parties and public opinion formation, adding substantial findings dealing also with economic and cultural issues, which stand closer to the thesis topic. Building on explicit party conflict and recognizable value reputation, Petersen and Slothuus (2010) state that individuals do not simply follow the position taken by their favorite political leader without any connection between their general values and the issue at stake. Instead, they seem motivated to form an opinion that is consistent with their political values, and they use information and party reputation to orientate. Only parties who are highly profiled on a certain value dimension can facilitate consistency between that dimension and public opinion. The empirical analysis showed for example that only parties with high and explicit value reputation on economic dimension were able to increase the consistency between economic values and opinion on the economic issue (Petersen, Slothuus & Togeby 2010).

Crucially, only established parties from center-left and center-right actually held a consistent reputation on economic issues, while actors from the radical right and left were able to increase consistency on cultural issues. The role of RRPs in guiding public opinion on economic policy is therefore in doubt.

However, Petersen and Slothuus' results reinforce previous findings claiming that people were more inclined to follow a frame if endorsed by a party they identified with, still they always tended to judge those frames according to their own believes on the selected issue (Slothuus, 2010). So, party frames can produce a shift of public opinion, but "the considerations emphasized in the frame must resonate with the preexisting beliefs of receivers" (Slothuus, 2010, p.172).

This set-up changes dramatically in polarized environments, where partisans follow their party regardless of the type of strength of the argument the party makes and they eventually develop a strong motivated reasoning that fosters their own opinions, thus changing the way they would normally make decisions (Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Druckman et al., 2013). Ciuk and Yost (2016) find that issue salience is an important moderating factor: in fact, people tend to rely on heuristics such, crucially, party cues when they deal with low-salience issues, while they engage in systematic information processing whenever they stand in front of a high-salience topic. Still, the most recent piece of research put forward by Slothuus and Bisgaard goes in the opposite direction. After they analyze how people responded when their political party suddenly changes its position on a welfare issue, they find that individuals immediately and substantially followed their party's new line, regardless of the opinion they previously held, even though issue-salience was rather high (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021). Further evidence was also added by Nordø (2021).

This introduction highlighted how existing literature on the relationship between changes in public opinion and party level ideological and political shifts produced a wide spectrum of results, which may often seem in contradiction with each other. However, we can draw some conclusions that places everything together. First, individuals do not change their attitudes aimlessly. Even if a branch of public opinion literature calls for a pattern of unclear attitude construction and incoherent translations into preferences by the citizenry, most of the studies I cited find a connection between shifts in public opinion and changes in the surrounding environment. Whenever a change happens in the political background, individuals react to this transformation, therefore, variation in public opinion is not accidental or fortuitous. The second assumption is related to the variety of these changes. It has been proved that citizens can reply to a wide range of stimuli: from party-level ideological adjustments to exogenous changes in the country's economy and society, but also to new and improved policy information. Therefore, the interconnection between parties and individuals does not end in a one-way relationship where one simply influences the other. Parties can of course try to shape the informational environment and tighten their influence on their voters, and on the other hand individual beliefs orientate the citizenry's attitudes towards policies and their sentiment towards political élites.

However, both actors share the same stage and behave accordingly to an everchanging context on which they cannot have full control. The third comment deals exactly with the influence of the environment surrounding politics. The cited experimental and quasi-experimental studies have highlighted the important role of contextual factors shaping country-level environments. Factors like electoral context, party systems' attributes, media structure and supporters' attributes vary in each country, and they create a problem for the generalization of the obtained results. Furthermore, they also call for single case studies that can take all the contextual variables into consideration.

Another difficulty in drawing a clear-cut conclusion from the literature is the variety of definitions, changes in conceptualization and the amount of different operationalizations affecting research objects. A way to be as less unequivocal as possible is to follow a pattern of reciprocal influence between supply and demand, thus not following a univocal top-down or bottom-up process. We may therefore assume that both sides tend to be responsive to each other's changes, they both have means to communicate these changes and they both show responsiveness, although influenced by a wide variety of variables, which space from contextual attributes to party roles and dimensions. Evidence of a pattern of reciprocal causation, which assumes that top-down and bottom-up processes may be mutually reinforcing, can also be found in the literature (Hill & Hinton-Andersson, 1995; Steenbergen et al, 2007).

3.2 - Research questions, data, and methods

As stated in the introduction to the chapter, this part of the essay will deal with the demand side of political competition. The aim of the chapter is to find which kind of match exists between party and individual level in different countries. Chapter 2 gave an answer to the first research question, showing the existence of a solid radical right party family throughout European countries, its ideological structure, and how RRPs evolved ideologically in the last fifteen years. We found a structured, coherent, and firmly bordered party family which is ideologically consistent and continuous on nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism and whose members find the most shared ideological characteristic that keeps them together in the negative stigma of immigration. On the other hand, they show divergence on economic issues, and they lack agreement on the policy responses to face them. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to check empirically whether this ideological set-up is mirrored on the demand side. Furthermore, we aim at checking for a coincidence between supply and demand on both the unifying stances (nativism, authoritarianism, Euroscepticism) and those creating divergence (economic positions).

Therefore, when we step from the offer to the demand, we aim at showing whether party-level programmatic and political divergence on the economy are mirrored by differences in public opinion, or they are disconnected from individual attitudes. In a few words, the second research question focuses on checking for the emergence of a coherent potential constituency for RRPs. If we assume nativism (empirically interpreted as anti-immigration tendencies), authoritarianism and Euroscepticism as the ideological outlook of the radical right supply, like the empirical analysis in chapter 2 suggests, how is the potential radical right constituency set up? Whenever we find a RRP operating in one specific context, are we likely to find a coherent counterpart on the demand side? The existence of a group of citizens that exposes a complex political position which is coherent with the one put forward by the local RRP(s) would hint at an ideological reciprocity that would go beyond the mere salience of anti-immigration attitudes, which is interpreted by the political behavior literature as the only undisputable and continuative item for radical right mobilization. Whether, into a context characterized by a successful RRP, a coherent group of anti-immigrants, authoritarian and Eurosceptic citizens exist or not could mark the difference between an all-round adherence to the party ideological and political outlook, and a relationship merely based on a single issue. Based on this assumption, we would find four possible main outcomes.

Table 3.1 - Potential outcomes of the comparison between supply and demand characteristics

Concurrence of both RRP and coherent potential constituency	RRP with no coherent potential constituency
Potential constituency for a RRP not mirrored at the supply level	Neither RRP nor potential radical right demand

Table 3.1 outlines the potential scenarios we might come across, resulting from the interconnection of parties' ideological outlook and those of the citizens' clusters. The first scenario represents a pattern of correspondence, whenever an existing RRP holding a defined set of political stances finds a matching counterpart on the demand side. The second and third scenarios represent a pattern of incongruity. It may happen whenever a RRP does not match with a cluster because of ideological discordance on one or more indicators. We may come across a scenario of incongruity whenever a RRP finds no correspondence with a cluster showing preferences for strict immigration rules but showing no authoritarian sympathies or not being Eurosceptic. Consequently, the third scenario of incongruity appears when we appreciate an unmatched con/stituency, whenever a potential radical right cluster appears in a country with no coherent counterpart at the offer level. Lastly, scenario four

is the absence of both sides, specific contexts where we find no operating RRPs and no demand for it.

One further step of complexity is given by the addition of the area where parties diverge. If now we focused on the three main grounds on which the ideological congruity of RRPs stands (Nativism, Authoritarianism and Euroscepticism), things can change if we also add economic positions to the equation. By checking also for citizens' economic preferences, then the mapping of the potential radical right constituency in each context is for sure enriched. It also would give another piece of information on the strategies that RRPs embrace on those issues they do not own. The expectation would be to find an economic correspondence between the party and its potential constituency, which would hint at suggesting why RRPs hold multiple and different economic positions in different contexts while keeping their ideological core and subcore identical. In a few words, we expect that, if party A holds moderate attitudes on state intervention and wealth redistribution, then it is likely that its potential constituency also holds those attitudes. On the one hand, we do not assume any direction within this relationship: we do not state whether the match comes *ab alto,* or it is the supply following the evolution of demand's preferences. But, on the other hand, the expectation for a coherent relationship between both sides' preferences on economic policy would be the baseline for suggesting that economic positions matter even for those parties that have absolute control on one issue and mobilize their constituencies on it, like RRPs do on immigration issues. If this reciprocity on economic policies was not to happen, then we would suggest for a less sharp and less determinant link between RRPs and potential constituencies on economic preferences, which would be downgraded as less important items.

Given this backbone, if we drop back to our outcome table, which produced four possible combinations, two considerations rise. First, given the coexistence of unifying items (nativism, authoritarianism, Euroscepticism) and diversifying items (economic position), we cannot exclude the eventuality of two different outcomes at the same time. For instance, one country can possibly show one RRP and two solid clusters holding radical right positions yet separated by opposing economic attitudes. Therefore, we would end up with two distinct but equally coherent constituencies: one would represent a correspondent match, and the other would be a demand which is not represented by a coherent supply.

Second, the detection of an all-round ideological concurrence of both supply and demand is just one step of the ladder and it represents the best-case scenario. When we deal with complex setups and individual preferences, we might end up with the most complex outcomes, especially when we deal with many different topics. Chances are that citizens only partially share a common ideological

ground with a RRP. To monitor the demand side in a more pervasive way, we will be using the following scheme.

Country		Anti-Immigration											
		Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
		Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	Demand												
	Supply												

Using this table, each cluster resulting from the analysis will be placed accordingly to their characteristics based on the four main indicators we listed. For each country, we will be able to compare the eventual ideological correspondence between supply and demand by also placing parties according to their ideological outlook.

Once the analysis has been performed and patterns of correspondence or incongruity are established, we will appreciate the distribution of RRPs ideological outlook and individual attitudes for each country. We will be able to check for the emergence of broader consistency between RRPs and potential voters. More specifically, we will have a clearer view on how citizens show responsiveness to the economic attitudes embraced by RRPs in each country. Then, a comparison between the size of the clusters (the percentage on the total number of cases) and the share of votes that RRPs achieved in every single country will allow for new discussions. First, by checking the dimension of the potential voting base, we may appreciate whether a party is overperforming or underperforming. Finding potential RR shares of electorate would be even more interesting in those countries where no RRP exist, they cannot get enough votes to reach seats, and they struggle to reach a solid role in the political scenario that would justify their presence in surveys and datasets.

Lastly, once we find a correspondence between supply and demand on the basis of the same ideological features, we will go one step forward and test the substantive effect of this set of attitudes in shaping voting behavior. Namely, we will be interested in understanding if and to what extent holding a radical right attitude can enhance the probability to cast a vote for a RRP. So, if chapter 2 showed the ideological features that distinguish RRPs from others, Chapter 3 aims at showing that the same set of features, intended as a set of individual attitudes, can shape groups of people mirroring the same ideological setup, and that people who hold this set of attitudes are more likely to vote for a RRP.

Data & Methods

To carry on the empirical part, we will use wave 2014 and 2019 European Election Studies (EES) datasets to assess the attitudinal profile of citizens in each one of the EU member states covered by the surveys. The two waves have been chosen for three main reasons. First, for a matter of timing: both waves were built in the same time span as the last two CHES waves used for the empirical analysis on the supply side in chapter 2, therefore they suit the requirements for comparability. Second, each wave covers all major EU member states (with the exclusion of Malta and Luxemburg), unlike other equally acknowledged surveys affected by case drops from one wave to another. Third, waves 2014 and 2019 offer self-positioning variables for different issues, and all of them are scale variables ranging from 0 to 10, unlike waves 2004 and 2009, which still contain self-positioning variables, but they cover less issues with scale variables ranging from 1 to 5.

Table 3.3 - List of indicators EES 2014

Immigration	0 - You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration 10 - You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration
Civil Liberties	0 - You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime 10 - You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime
Same-Sex Marriage	0 - You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage 10 - You are fully opposed to same-sex marriage
EU Integration	0 - The EU should have more authority over Member States' budgetary policies 10 - Our country should retain full control over its budgetary policies
State Intervention	0 - You are fully in favour of state intervention in the economy 10 - You are fully opposed to state intervention in the economy
Redistribution	0 - You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor 10 - You are fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor

Table 3.4 - List of indicators EES 2019

Immigration	0 - You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration 10 - You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration
Civil Liberties	0 - You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime 10 - You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime
Same-Sex Marriage	0 - You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage 10 - You are fully opposed to same-sex marriage
EU Integration	0 - European unification has already gone too far 10 - European unification should be pushed further
State Intervention	0 - You are fully in favour of state intervention in the economy 10 - You are fully opposed to state intervention in the economy
Redistribution	0 - You are fully in favour of redistribution from the rich to the poor 10 - You are fully opposed of redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the six selected topics for the two selected waves. In self-placement variables interviewees are asked to place themselves or their opinion on a scale, given a topic, a judgement, or a policy statement. Once the interviewer sets the two extremes, not only each interviewee can say whether he agrees or disagrees with the given statement, but they also can express to what extent by placing their position on a step of the scale. Therefore, self-placement variables represent one the most accurate tools to grasp individual attitudes and political orientations. Each indicator investigates some of the most salient issues in political debate, and crucially the most indicated to frame a potential electorate which is coherent with RRPs' ideological outlook. In both questionnaires we always find indicators measuring individual positions on the same issues, which is crucial for the goal of the chapter, still we find differences in wording.[44]

Self-placement on economic issues is measured by two different indicators. In both questionnaires, interviewees are asked to place their opinions on the role of the state in the economy, and on how they feel legitimate to implement policies of redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in their country. While the variable measuring attitudes towards state intervention hints at a more general orientation towards the issue, the question on redistribution of wealth explicitly points out the context by saying "in our country". We cannot give for granted if all interviewees answer those questions by referring to a more ideological inclination or they always keep contextual constraints as a driving force of their reasoning, still, when they are asked to give their opinion on redistribution, they are explicitly reminded to keep the context into account. This peculiarity also appears in wave 2019 redistribution variable.

Attitudes on cultural issues are measured by two variables, which are part of both 2014 and 2019 wave. If attitudes towards same-sex marriage would give a measure of traditionalism, when individuals are asked to choose between whether restricting privacy rights to combat crime or to fully respect privacy rights even though it might hinder state efforts to combat crime, they implicitly show their support for a strong state or whether they give an unavoidable priority to individual rights. The law-and-order indicator can give the closest appreciation of individual tendency to an authoritarian or less authoritarian government, therefore it is the most indicated to mirror supply side authoritarianism.

Attitudes towards European institutions are measured by one indicator for each wave, still the indicators are affected by a potential wording issue. Although they both inquire individual positions towards the process of European integration, their approach to the topic is quite different. The 2014

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[44] Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the exact wording for the two extremes for each variable. Yet, for a comprehensive view, I refer you to the master questionnaires, which are available openly and in their entirety for both EES 2014 and 2019.

indicator explicitly addresses budgetary policies by asking which institutions would be the most legitimate to rule the budget for the respondent's country: whether it is European institutions, the respondent would likely be labelled as an integration enthusiast, while if they called for a stricter control of their own government on budgetary policies, they could probably be Eurosceptic. On the other hand, the 2019 indicator focuses directly on the unification process, by asking the interviewees whether it is gone too far, or it should be enhanced. As we said, both indicators tackle the same issue, but the questions look completely different, and this could create problems with comparisons between the two waves. Still, the difference seems time-bound, and each indicator seems framed in the best way possible to obtain meaningful placements. The emphasis on budgets in 2014 seems suitable, in the aftermath of the economic crisis and within a period of austerity policies mostly imposed by supranational institutions, while it maybe would have not framed meaningful results in 2019, when a more general question on European unification seemed more legitimate. However, despite this potential problem which was worth pointing out, both indicators serve their purpose.

The indicator measuring attitudes towards immigration is perhaps the most relevant for our purpose. At the party level, the orientation towards strict rules on immigration has been proved to be the most important glue for the radical right party family, and the only political stance they all always share. Therefore, we also expect it to be the main common denominator for a potential RR electorate. This is also confirmed by the literature review carried out in chapter 1.3. Consequently, comments on the clusters resulting from the empirical analysis will start with the location of groups showing attitudes towards strict regulation on immigration. Then, we will check for the emergence of authoritarian and Eurosceptic attitudes, which would encapsulate a coherent demand for RRPs. Lastly, we will check for left-leaning or right-leaning views on economic issues for each of the variables at my disposal.

In order to build cohesive groups of individuals, we will rely on hierarchical clustering methods. The choice of this methodology, albeit showing a path of continuity with the analysis carried out in chapter 2, is not immune to contradictions and criticism. First, it will be used for much larger datasets than it was in the previous chapter. While in chapter 2, the total N was represented by the number of political parties in all European countries for each CHES wave, and it did not hold more than 250 cases, each analysis will now be based on the number of respondents of the EES surveys. The number of cases for each country mostly stands between 800 and 950. It is well known that hierarchical clustering algorithms suffer some drawbacks from handling a large amount of data: they require more computational power and time as the quantity of cases grows, the graphic information they give (dendrograms and dispersion graphs) become barely informative and unsuitable with hundreds of issues to be placed, and each resulting cluster ceases to be as sharp and detached as it should be with

less cases and variables. Precisely because these problems are real threats to the goal of the research, they were very seriously taken into consideration.

As far as timing issues and the need of computational effort are concerned, they were easily contained. The same cannot be said for the lack of suitability of the basic graphic information provided by hierarchical clustering algorithms. If dendrograms have been very useful for explaining the formation of party family clusters graphically in chapter 2, given the small numbers of issues, they were unfitting for this part of the essay. The same can be said for dispersion graphs, which were rather fuzzy and sometimes indistinguishable. Still, if the analysis carried on in chapter 2 required the use of this graphical tools to check for the members of each party family, their location in an ideological space, the path that made their aggregation possible and the sequence of the aggregation process, now this information is not indispensable. Chapter 2 dealt with parties, each one of them was represented by an issue telling an important piece of information at every step of the research. For instance, checking for the process of aggregation of the Front National to the RR cluster (at which point it was aggregated, with whom, and what space it occupied) was extremely meaningful for the purpose of the research. This is not the case for each one of the 900 observations analyzed for country A. The main concerns are about the ideal number of clusters to use after the aggregation process, and the mean values for every self-placement variable to give a political meaning and an ideological characterization to every group.

Finally, the biggest problem of all relates to clusters' sharpness and the grade of separation among them. In a few biting words, clusters are mostly overcrowded, their extremities sometimes overlap with others and therefore they generally show poor diagnostics for strength and separation. The situation seemed alarming, when compared with chapter 2, where clusters were more robust, rarely overlapping and well divided. A higher number of cases seems to affect the results of the empirical analysis. Still, we think the cause of the problems does not merely stand in the quantity of data, but also within a qualitative difference between the two kinds of data on which the two analyses were based. Whenever we deal with party data, we deal with a measure of political orientation applied to a rational actor that builds a systematic political view on an ideologically coherent structure. This architecture changes with individual data, given that citizens, albeit being rational actors themselves, might not have the same necessity to build a meaningful and ideologically coherent structure of attitudes and orientations. The potential range of diversity among citizens can be much broader than among parties. Furthermore, individual orientation distribution may be close to a normal distribution, with many citizens sharing a moderate and centrist position on specific issues. For instance, low-salience topics or issues they do not know. Therefore, to group different individuals together on the

basis of their position on political issues might be more difficult than grouping parties in party families, which are by definition an ideologically coherent group of political organizations shaped by the same orientations. Clusters diagnostics for strength and separation showed more satisfying figures when we reduced the number of variables, and when we enhanced the total number of clusters. However, both operations would affect the explanatory power of the empirical research, leading to uninformative results. Lastly, the same poor diagnostics appeared in both hierarchical and k-means clustering algorithm, and with every type of linkage available. In fact, hierarchical clustering with Ward's algorithm was the most suitable method.

To sum up, timing and computational issues gave no problem whatsoever; empirical results do not need graphical transpositions that would be severely affected by a higher number of cases; I relate problems with cluster diagnostics to the quality of individual level self-placement data; among the most used clustering methodologies, no one gave better results than hierarchical Ward algorithm clustering.

As anticipated, we will perform a hierarchical cluster analysis to form separate groups of individuals showing an attitudinal correlation to each other. This analysis will be performed for 25 countries contained in 2014 and 2019 EES datasets, to obtain and compare two time-bound sets of clusters. Cluster analysis will be based on the set of indicators listed in tables 3.3 and 3.4, by using which we are going to obtain an attitudinal measure on four different fields: nativism (through self-placement on immigration policies), authoritarianism (self-placement on law-and-order attitudes), Euroscepticism and economic position. This last figure will be the mean between the two self-placement variables on economic policies which were available in both datasets: attitudes towards state intervention in the economy and towards wealth redistribution. This operation will give birth to three categories depending on the resultant figure: interventionist, moderate and neoliberal. The last step will be to set the number of clusters. We will use silhouette graphs and gap statistics to identify the ideal groups' amount: both methods give a cartesian output showing the number of clusters on the x axis and the corresponding robustness on the y axis. The ideal number of clusters is therefore a comparison between the two, by considering elbows and growth in the distribution. Therefore, each set will have its own best, and the number of ideal clusters can therefore be different from country to country. To check for the emergence of a coherent potential radical right constituency, we will first show the weight of the cluster whose items show anti-immigrants, authoritarian and Eurosceptic attitudes. The weight of the cluster will be the percentage of the clustered items on the total N. This figure (if available) will be then compared to the electoral turnout of the local RRP (if any) at the 2014 and 2019 European elections.

3.3 – Being radical: a radical right attitude across Europe

In this section of the essay, we will discuss the empirical results from the cluster analysis carried out on 25 different countries. To show the main outcomes, we will rely on aggregative tables that will show the picture for all countries, while more in-depth comments on single countries will be found later in an appendix, along with more informative tables.

Table 3.5 shows the map of all potential radical right constituencies for each country and for both EES waves. Countries are listed on each row, while columns represent the weight of anti-immigration, authoritarian and Eurosceptic clusters. On the left side, we find results for 2014, while results for 2019 are listed on the right side. For both waves, we can appreciate the weight of potential radical right clusters divided into three categories based on each clusters' economic position: interventionist (pro state intervention and wealth redistribution), neoliberal (anti state intervention and wealth redistribution) and moderate (values between 4.5 and 5.5 on the scale).

So, after having established that the radical right party family's ideological outlook gathers around nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism, the question was if this ideological set-up that characterized the supply level was matched on the demand side. Given the results contained in table 3.5, a simple answer could be a mere yes. A coherent cluster made up by items sharing anti-immigration sentiments, authoritarian preferences and harsh Euroscepticism appears in almost every country in both selected waves. Radical right correspondent clusters appear in 22 countries in 2014 and 19 in 2019, with total percentages going from the smallest amount of 3,93% to whopping figures well above 30%. Results show that in both years, in almost every country we can appreciate the formation of a specific group of items which is not merely characterized by a vague anti-immigration sentiment or a shallow preference for strict governments, but it is the outcome of a complex interaction among the same three indicators that characterize the radical right party family ideological outlook.

Therefore, we are not dealing with something trivial, but with the same reiterative interlock on the demand side among the three ideological properties that consistently shape the radical right party family outlook on the supply side. In a few words, there is a solid concurrence between the two sides in most cases. By confronting the results from 2014 and 2019 we can also appreciate the stability of the pattern. Whenever a radical right cluster forms in 2014, it tends to be replicated also in 2019. The presence of a coherent demand for RRPs is therefore continuative throughout most European countries.

Clusters whose items show anti-immigration, authoritarian and Eurosceptic attitudes

Countries	Interv.	Neolib.	Moder.	Total 2014	Interv.	Neolib.	Moder.	Total 2019
Austria	16,71%			**16,71%**		7,97%		**7,97%**
Belgium	6,46%			**6,46%**	8,56%	8,27%		**16,83%**
Bulgaria	13,45%			**13,45%**				
Cyprus	21,16%		17,79%	**38,95%**		13,48%		**13,48%**
Czech Rep.	10,57%			**10,57%**	11,36%			**11,36%**
Denmark	7,44%	21,75%		**29,19%**		10,33%	12,19%	**22,52%**
Estonia	22,03%	12,94%	22,34%	**57,31%**		8,51%	14,02%	**22,53%**
Finland	7,29%		13,03%	**20,32%**	31,25%			**31,25%**
France	4,81%		17,83%	**22,64%**			21,81%	**21,81%**
Germany								
Greece	17,86%	12,10%		**29,96%**			18,18%	**18,18%**
Hungary	40,84%			**40,84%**			41,32%	**41,32%**
Italy	4,92%	9,85%	11,10%	**25,87%**			20,91%	**20,91%**
Ireland					8,53%			**8,53%**
Latvia	12,57%			**12,57%**	11,44%			**11,44%**
Lithuania	25%			**25%**				
Netherlands			14,46%	**14,46%**	10,80%	16,85%		**27,65%**
Poland	4,81%			**4,81%**	9,72%	7,77%		**17,49%**
Portugal	16%			**16,00%**				
Romania	13,53%			**13,53%**				
Slovakia	3,93%			**3,93%**				
Slovenia							22,17%	**22,17%**
Spain	7,53%			**7,53%**		10,64%		**10,64%**
Sweden	12,62%	5,56%		**18,18%**	9,15%	27,58%		**36,73%**
UK	27,49%	11,28%		**38,77%**		15,76%	17,61%	**33,37%**

However, this stability does not hold when we look at the percentages, which tend to be rather different from one wave to another on both supply and demand side, as table 3.6 shows. Electoral turnouts, especially in second order elections like European Parliament elections, tend to be rather volatile, and we cannot also expect personal preferences to hold stable in a span of five years, when new and old issues gained and lost centrality and salience in the political debate. Still, when we focus on the relationship between the two sides, we can appreciate few changes.

Table 3.6 - A confrontation between radical right demand (weight of the correspondent cluster) and supply (RRPs' vote share at the European elections) for every country in 2014 and 2019

Country	D 2014	S 2014	D 2019	S 2019
Austria	16,71%	25,92%	7,97%	17,20%
Belgium	6,46%	6,44%	16,83%	12,50%
Bulgaria	13,45%	16,67%	0%	12%
Cyprus	38,95%	0%	13,48%	8%
Czech Rep.	10,57%	16,03%	11,36%	23,68%
Denmark	29,19%	26,60%	22,52%	13,70%
Estonia	57,31%	0%	22,53%	12,70%
Finland	20,32%	12,87%	31,25%	13,80%
France	22,64%	28,68%	21,81%	26,85%
Germany	0%	7,04%	0%	10,97%
Greece	29,96%	15,50%	18,18%	9,08%
Hungary	40,84%	66,12%	41,32%	58,90%
Italy	25,87%	9,81%	20,91%	40,74%
Ireland	0%	0%	8,53%	0%
Latvia	12,57%	14,36%	11,44%	16,49%
Lithuania	25%	14,25%	0%	7,86%
Netherlands	14,46%	20,99%	27,65%	21,32%
Poland	4,81%	42,91%	17,49%	53,62%
Portugal	16%	0%	0%	0%
Romania	13,53%	3,61%	0%	0%
Slovakia	3,93%	11,07%	0%	24,64%
Slovenia	0%	4,03%	22,17%	4,01%
Spain	7,53%	0%	10,64%	6,21%
Sweden	18,18%	9,70%	36,73%	15,30%
UK	38,77%	26,60%	33,37%	33,70%

Table 3.7 - Correspondance outcomes for all countries in both 2014 and 2019

2014	Coherent RR demand	No RR demand
Supply	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, UK	Germany, Slovenia
No Supply	Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal, Spain	Ireland

2019	Coherent RR demand	No RR demand
Supply	Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK	Bulgaria, Germany, Lithuania, Slovakia

No Supply	Ireland	Portugal, Romania

Table 3.8 - Concurrence of supply and demand discriminated by difference between demand size and electoral results

2014	Overperformance	Missed opportunity	Equal
Concurrence of supply and demand	Austria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia	Finland, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Sweden, UK	Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia

2019	Overperformance	Missed opportunity	Equal
Concurrence of supply and demand	Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland	Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden	Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, UK

In both 2014 and 2019, eighteen countries showed the presence of at least one RRP which was mirrored by a significantly coherent demand. Most of them maintained this pattern in both waves. Instead, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia lost their radical right demand still maintaining their operating RRPs, while Germany showed the emergence of a RRP which was not mirrored by a coherent demand side in both waves.

As far as this eventuality is concerned, we must clarify a crucial aspect. Whenever we say there is no coherent radical right demand, we are not stating the absolute inexistence of a group of people who share nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic believes. What emerges from the analysis is the absence of a significantly numerous, robust, and defined cluster with these characteristics, meaning that the interaction among the indicators representing these three attitudinal connotations was not strong enough to make it appear among the main significant clusters. Basically, it certainly hints at a weak and disjointed radical right potential constituency, but the mere absence of clusters cannot state on its own that a coherent radical right demand is completely inexistent or has progressively disappeared.

The most interesting part, anyway, regards the bottom cells of both tables. In 2014, four countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Portugal, and Spain) showed a potential demand for a RRP but no sign of a coherent supply, and this situation evolved for all of them. In three cases, the demand for the radical right turned out to be the trigger for the birth of new radical right actors: the National Popular Front (ELAM) in Cyprus, the Conservative People's Party (EKRE) in Estonia and Vox in Spain. The only country where no RRP appears in 2019 is Portugal, which by contrast shows a contraction of its radical right demand.

We have therefore highlighted two main outcomes: the continuity of the pattern of reciprocity and the evolution of a radical right demand into a correspondent supply. The first outcome shows that once the link between supply and demand is established, it tends to be maintained in almost every case, yet with everchanging numbers. So, if we first showed the existence of a solid radical right base which is the demand correspondent to an operating RRP, now we can see the persistence of this linkage also five years later. Therefore, we can claim the existence of a long-term relationship between RRPs and the radical right base that we built empirically. The three indicators that constantly built up the ideological outlook of the radical right party family, when used on the demand side, shape a coherent counterpart also at the individual level; a counterpart that keeps emerging in both waves. The fact that this concurrence cannot be a repeated casualty is also suggested by our second outcome, which underlines the birth of a coherent supply in 2019 in those countries where a radical right demand stood still also in 2014.

However, if we could state that the same indicators can be used to build and indicate a party family and groups of individuals, what happens when we put economic positions into the equation? Our study on the supply side showed that party positions on economic issues were the most divisive within the radical right party family. Therefore, in continuity with the individual level results we just showed, we should expect that they also have a divisive power within demand side clusters. We expect nativist, authoritarian, and Eurosceptic citizens to hold different views on economic issues. This would be illustrated by the emergence of more than one radical right demand cluster, each of them must be characterized by opposite economic positions.

However, we could also expect the opposite effect, which is the complete correspondence between the economic position of the local RRP and the attitudes on the economy made explicit on the demand side. To frame this expectation, we start from what we already know. Given that the economy is the issue on which RRPs most differentiate each other, we can argue that it is the policy area where RRPs can choose where to stand without harming their political collocation and without affecting their identifiability. In a few words, changing their position on economic issues should be less problematic than changing their claims on immigration. So, the variation among contexts of RRPs' positions on economic issues could be the outcome of an attempt to maximize their potential turnout by adhering to (or by actively framing) their potential constituency's economic position. To put it simply, they could choose where to stand based on the opinion of radical right people. Contrary to our first expectation, this scenario would imply that, in each context, radical right constituencies hold compact on economic policy preferences, while RRPs give a meaningful and coherent representation of these

preferences at the supply level. Therefore, that same issues that act as a divisional item on the supply side would turn into a unifying item on the demand side.

Table 3.9 - Radical right potential constituencies divided by economic preferences, compared with local RRPs also divided for their position on economic issues (2014)

Country	D/S	Inter	Neolib	Moder	Tot.
			Anti Imm, Auth, Anti EU		
Austria	Demand	16,71%			16,71%
	Stronach		5,73%		25,92%
	BZO		0,47%		
	FPO			19,72%	
Belgium	Demand	6,46%			6,46%
	PP		2,18%		6,44%
	VB			4,26%	
Bulgaria	Demand	13,45%			13,45%
	Ataka	2,96%			16,67%
	BNM	10,66%			
	NFSB	3,05%			
Cyprus	Demand	21,16%		17,79%	38,95%
	Supply				
Czechia	Demand	10,57%			10,57%
	USVIT	3,12%			16,03%
	Svobodny		5,24%		
	ODS		7,67%		
Denmark	Demand	7,44%	21,75%		29,19%
	DPP	26,60%			26,60%
Estonia	Demand	22,03%	12,94%	22,34%	57,31%
	Supply				
Finland	Demand	7,29%		13,03%	20,32%
	TF	12,87%			12,87%
France	Demand	4,81%		17,83%	22,64%
	FN			24,86%	28,68%
	Arise		3,82%		
Germany	Demand				7,04%
	AfD			7,04%	
Greece	Demand	17,86%	12,10%		29,96%
	GD	9,40%			15,50%
	ANEL			3,40%	
	LAOS	2,70%			

Country	D/S	Inter	Neolib	Moder	Tot.
			Anti Imm, Auth, Anti EU		
Hungary	Demand	40,84%			40,84%
	JOBBIK	14,64%			66,12%
	Fidesz			51,48%	
Italy	Demand	4,92%	9,85%	11,10%	25,87%
	NL		6,15%		9,81%
	FdI			3,66%	
Ireland	Demand				
	Supply				
Latvia	Demand	12,57%			12,57%
	NA		14,36%		14,36%
Lithuania	Demand	25%			25%
	TT	14,25%			14,25%
Netherlands	Demand			14,46%	14,46%
	RPP		7,67%		20,99%
	PFF			13,32%	
Poland	Demand	4,81%			4,81%
	PiS	31,78%			42,91%
	CNR		7,15%		
	UP	3,98%			
Portugal	Demand	16%			16,00%
	Supply				
Romania	Demand	13,53%			13,53%
	PP	3,69%			3,69%
Slovakia	Demand	3,93%			3,93%
	SNP	3,61%			11,07%
	OLANO		7,46%		
Slovenia	Demand				
	SNP		4,03%		4,03%
Spain	Demand	7,53%			7,53%
	Supply				
Sweden	Demand	12,62%	5,56%		18,18%
	SD			9,70%	9,70%
UK	Demand	27,49%	11,28%		38,77%
	UKIP		26,60%		26,60%

In order to check for these expectations, we will compare the economic orientation of anti-immigration, authoritarian and Eurosceptic clusters we already showed with the position on economic

issues undertaken by RRPs in each country, as measured by CHES data.[45] Table 3.9 shows results for 2014, while table 3.10 reveals results for 2019.

Table 3.10 - Radical right potential constituencies divided by economic preferences, compared with local RRPs also divided for their position on economic issues (2019)

Country	D/S	Anti-Imm, Auth, Anti-EU				Country	D/S	Anti-Imm, Auth, Anti-EU			
		Inter	Neolib	Moder				Inter	Neolib	Moder	
Austria	Demand		7,97%		7,97%	Ireland	Demand	8,53%			8,53%
	FPO		17,20%		17,20%		Supply				
Belgium	Demand	8,56%	8,27%		16,83%	Latvia	Demand	11,44%			11,44%
	VB			12,50%	12,50%		NA		16,49%		16,49%
Bulgaria	Demand					Lithuania	Demand				
	4 Ps	12%			12%		O&J	2,73%			7,86%
Cyprus	Demand		13,48%		13,48%		LCP	5,13%			
	ELAM		8%		8%	Netherlands	Demand	10,80%	16,85%		27,65%
Czechia	Demand	11,36%			11,36%		FFD		10,96%		21,32%
	SPD	9,14%			23,68%		RPP		6,83%		
	ODS		14,54%				PFF		3,53%		
Denmark	Demand		10,33%	12,19%	22,52%	Poland	Demand	9,72%	7,77%		17,49%
	DPP	10,80%			13,70%		PiS	45,38%			53,62%
	NR		2,90%				Kukiz15		3,69%		
Estonia	Demand		8,51%	14,02%	22,53%		K		4,55%		
	EKRE			12,70%	12,70%	Portugal	Demand				
Finland	Demand	31,25%			31,25%		Supply				
	TF		13,80%		13,80%	Romania	Demand				
France	Demand			21,81%	21,81%		Supply				
	Arise		3,51%		26,85%	Slovakia	Demand				
	RN			23,34%			SNP	4,09%			24,64%
Germany	Demand						OLANO			5,25%	
	Supply		10,97%		10,97%		LSNS	12,07%			
Greece	Demand			18,18%	18,18%		Sme Rodina	3,23%			
	GS	4,18%			9,08%	Slovenia	Demand			22,17%	22,17%
	GD	4,90%					SNP		4,01%		4,01%
Hungary	Demand			41,32%	41,32%	Spain	Demand		10,64%		10,64%
	Fidész			52,56%	58,90%		Vox		6,21%		6,21%
	JOBBIK	6,34%				Sweden	Demand	9,15%	27,58%		36,73%
Italy	Demand			20,91%	20,91%		SD			15,30%	15,30%
	League		34,26%		40,74%	UK	Demand		15,76%	17,61%	33,37%
	FdI			6,48%			UKIP		3,20%		33,70%
							Brexit		30,50%		

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[45] As all clusters' economic attitudes value resulted from the mean between two indicators (attitudes on state intervention and attitudes on wealth redistribution), also figures for RRPs' position on economic issues are based on the same operation. Both indicators (state intervention and redistribution) are in fact available in both CHES 2014 and 2019.

Both tables display all 25 countries, and, for each one, they show the weight of demand and supply on rows, while the discrimination upon economic positions (interventionist, neoliberal and moderate) stands in columns. Each country displays one row named "demand", showing potential radical right constituencies' weight, while every other row represents the turnout at the European elections gained by the country's active RRP(s). Each row intersects with three columns, discriminating in terms of economic positions. The final column (highlighted in green) represents the total for each country: it sums up supply's electoral results and potential demand for each country, allowing for a comparison.

As tables 3.9 and 3.10 show, there is no clear correlation between the radical right supply and the potential radical right constituency on economic positions. In 2014, just nine cases out of twenty-five display a correspondence. Still, even within this minority, the situation in multifaced. Bulgaria, for instance, shows a perfect correspondence: not only the three RRPs operating within its borders share an interventionist position on the economy with their potential constituency, but the sum of their turnout at the 2014 European elections is comparable with the weight of the radical right demand. On the other hand, we also find countries with more than one RRP getting substantial turnout, but whereas one RRP finds an all-round ideologically coherent base, the others do not. For instance, Slovakia, where the Slovakian National Party (SNP) finds its interventionist counterpart, while Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLANO) is orphan of a radical right base with a neoliberal economic attitude. Results also display the opposite: an unanswered demand, like in Greece, where there is no coherent supply for the neoliberal radical right cluster.

Results form 2019 show the same pattern: nine cases over twenty-five show a correspondence between supply and demand on economic positions. Among these, we find almost perfect reciprocities, like in Cyprus where the neoliberal ELAM finds its own all-round potential constituency, but also more complicated scenarios. Netherlands, for instance, displays three RRPs which are all solidly standing on neoliberal positions, mirroring a neoliberal cluster, still leaving an interventionist cluster with any coherent supply. Czech Republic, on the other hand, displays the opposite situation where the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is orphan of a neoliberal radical right base, while Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) is located within a coherent interventionist niche.

Summing up, not only results from both waves do not highlight a strong correspondence between parties and the radical right oriented demand on economic issues, but, also when this match happens, we face an overcomplication given by further unmatched supplies or demands. Therefore, our expectation to find a greater ideological match between RRPs and their coherently potential voting base, a match that could also break the barrier of economic divergence, is not confirmed. The confrontation between the economic positions of the supply and its coherent demand does not support

the hypothesis of a strategic move undertaken by RRPs in order to maximize their turnout by placing their claims over economic policies in combination with their demand. In conclusion, the suggestion of economic positions acting as an aggregating item within the demand side, while standing as the main discriminant among the supply, also decays.

However, even though economic positions do not represent a strong link between RRPs and their demand, are they as diversified for voters as they are for parties? Furthermore, is this a cross-country or also a within-country phenomenon? Also in this case, results are not harmonized, as they change across contexts, but first we will focus on cross-country variance and then we will get into the single cases.

Among all 25 countries, we face a solid variability, and, quite interestingly, a sharp evolution between the two waves. First, in both 2014 and 2019, all three economic attitudes are well represented: radical right clusters display interventionist, neoliberal, and moderate attitudes towards economic policies. Potential radical right voters' attitudes towards the economy are not as robustly and solidly oriented as their orientations towards immigration, authoritarianism, and European integration. Given that they display different positions from country to country, they cannot be linked to a particular connotation within the field of economic stances, and everything seems to change across contexts. In a few words, whenever we selected groups of citizens by means of an interaction among nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic stances, we could never find a specific attitude on economic policy that was characterizing and distinctive of radical right clusters on a whole. RRPs' potential constituencies express different stances on the economy whenever we jump from one country to another. Therefore, we cannot say that, for instance, people with radical right attitudes also display interventionist traits, because this would hold true for radical right clusters in country A, but not for the same cluster in country B.

However, this does not mean we could not find a prevailing set of stances. Quite the opposite, we found an interesting evolution of economic values for radical right clusters getting from wave 2014 to 2019. In 2014, among all 33 radical right clusters we found in twenty-five countries, a whopping 21 of them displayed interventionist attitudes: the items composing these 21 groups all tended towards giving more interventional power to the government within the economy and tended to achieve wealth redistribution from the richer parts of society to the more unfortunate. Only 6 clusters among 33 showed neoliberal attitudes towards state intervention and redistribution, and also only 6 on 33 showed a moderate centrist approach to the subject. The situation changes quite sharply in 2019, when, among 26 radial right clusters, the ratio of interventionist clusters drops to only 8, while neoliberal clusters grow to 10 out of 26, and moderate clusters also grow till 8 out of 26. So, if in

2014 we could state that radical right people were prevalently aiming at state intervention and wealth redistribution, the situation in 2019 is much more levelled.

The preponderance of interventionist stances in 2014 could hint at a reallocation of nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic people on "leftist" state-oriented attitudes, but this trend was put to an end as early as 2019, when economic stances are more spread among all three categories. This not only shows that radical right people have no clear-cut and widespread economic connotation, but it also shows how volatile and changeable their opinion on the economy is. A path that is probably dependent on contextual explanations but also on macro factors.

We cannot fail to notice that 2014 data were collected within a period of profound economic suffering after the subprime crisis and its long-term backlash on most European economies. Researchers have noticed and demonstrated the raise of interventionist stances and citizens showing the need of economic protection to avoid bankruptcies and unemployment among European countries. This trend has been highlighted both by general data (cf. Eurobarometer trends) and by more refined research, which has demonstrated how perceived crisis impact after 2009 had a robust association with greater welfare support and greater state intervention, also among traditional opponents (Sachweh, 2018). So, the fact that our results show that interventionist attitudes are far more popular in 2014 than 2019 is consistent and coherent with a scenario that is legitimated both by raw data collected after 2009 and empirical research. Therefore, the major preponderance of interventionist economic attitudes among radical right people in 2014 seems to be a consequence of times of crisis. Subsequently, results from 2019 display more variation among different attitudes, thus they show that the large adherence to interventionist stances in 2014 was not a robust, continuative, and long-term adhesion to a "leftist" view of the economy and its policies.

So, if cross-country comparison shows quite a large variation among radical right clusters as far as their economic position is concerned, now we will step back to within-country results description to check for the same diversity.[46] A partial conclusion could be driven from the total number of clusters we listed earlier in the paragraph, which could not suggest a wide variation. In fact, the coexistence of more than one set of attitudes towards the economy is displayed in only eight countries in 2014 and seven countries in 2019, while most nations only show one cluster that is properly characterized by radical right traits, therefore the only detectable economic position is the one that is pointed out by that only cluster. So, we face a minority of countries where radical right people hold are divided on the base of what they think about the most suitable economic policies, and a majority where people

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[46] For a more pervasive analysis on single countries, we refer you to the Appendix, where we will describe the evolution of supply and demand for each country with complete tables.

are more compact on one set of attitudes. We can therefore state that, in the latter cases, economic differences were not robust enough to call for a split of the cluster. Or maybe the number of the economic outliers within the cluster was not sufficiently high.

However, a coherent objection could be the following: in those countries where we only face one radical right cluster, we can still not prove that all items' economic attitudes are equal or comparable. Still, if cluster analysis always leaves space to outliers on every indicator, radical right clusters mostly stand on one precise side of the economic spectrum. We face very few countries whose only radical right cluster show a moderate approach to the economy, which could possibly be the result of two equal sides of interventionists and neoliberals balancing each other. All other cases show the only radical right cluster having interventionist o neoliberal positions, and this can only be possible with a skewed distribution of the items' preferences.

3.4 - The effect of a radical right attitude on radical right voting

If in chapter 2 we established the importance of three main ideological claims (nativism, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism) in shaping the ideological outlook of RRPs, chapter 3 shows that the same three features are also relevant to locate and identify groups of individuals sharing a "radical" ideological setup in most European countries. Therefore, we could state the existence of an ideological match between radical right supply and groups of people displaying a coherent set of claims that may lead to the establishment of a radical right demand. In a few words, we found a potential constituency, at least ideologically speaking, for RRPs throughout Europe. This final part of the chapter attempts at completing the journey, by establishing whether being ideologically compatible with a RRP has a major effect on voting for such parties or, on the contrary, it stops to a mere affinity. We will therefore bring further individual evidence to our case, strengthening the consistency between *being* radical and *support* the radicals.

To do so, we first need to create an indicator that keeps together all the three main features that we indicated as the main radical right ideological stances. To explore such radical right dimension, we will run a standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the three variables we used to identify radical right clusters (table 3.11). Finding a sufficiently strong latent dimension would give us a single variable displaying a complex radical right attitude. Furthermore, the use of PCAs will also serve as a robustness check for our previous results, given that we expect a stronger latent dimension in countries showing a radical right cluster, and, conversely, we expect a weak or inexistent dimension in countries where a radical right cluster did not emerge from the analysis. Consequently, once we

have a variable measuring the whole radical right attitude, we will check whether expressing this radical right attitude has any effect over voting for a RRP. In order to do so, we will perform a regression using vote choice as the dependent variable, discriminating between voting for a RRP at the last elections and any other kind of behavior. Given that our study purposes bring us to recode vote choice as a dichotomous variable, we will employ a simple probit model. The main independent variable will be the dimension resulting from our PCA, however we will test the effect of this latent dimension along with other variables that have been used in previous studies to explain radical right voting in the past, as we thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1.3. Table 3.11 lists the independent variables at our disposal. Continuously with our previous cluster analysis, we will rely on EES database 2019. As far as cases are concerned, we will perform the whole procedures on all countries where we found a concurrence of radical right supply and demand, but we will comment thoroughly on one single case and leave the others as confirmation. We selected Italy as the main case because, within this subgroup of countries with radical right supply and demand, it represents the case on which we share the best political knowledge, which is crucial to give meaningful comments. First, we will acknowledge the strength of the latent dimension; then, we will comment on the probit regression results. While doing so, we will also share comments on comparative cases. Italian PCA diagnostics will be put in comparison with countries showing no sign of an attitudinally coherent radical right demand: whether their PCA diagnostics showed weaker figures than Italy, it would stand as a robustness check for our cluster analysis, given that such a result would confirm the goodness of the clusters' outcome. Lastly, we will show probit results for other cases to test the significance of radical right attitude in shaping radical right voting across Europe.

We start from considering the results of a Principal Component Analysis on the Italian case. We expect the chosen variables to capture a radical right attitude among the public, as we intended it when assessing radical right clusters. The abovementioned radical right attitude must be based on the simultaneous occurrence of high aversion towards immigration, an authoritarian leaning and fierce Euroscepticism. When we look at the PCA results, we appreciate the existence of a latent dimension. As appointed in table 3.12, we extracted a variable with an eigenvalue higher than 1 (1.41) which, according to the Kaiser method, is required to obtain a component that explains more variance that the single variables used to create it. Loadings can be considered acceptable under the most common interpretations, still loadings for civil liberties (which is the selected variable to measure authoritarian leanings) are quite weak (0.276).

Table 3.11 - Independent Variables used for probit regression

**Original Variables for PCA
creating Radical Right Attitude**

Agreement: Immigration	0 = You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration
	10 = You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration
Agreement: Civil Liberties	0 - You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime
	10 - You are fully in favour of restricting privacy rights in order to combat crime
Agreement: EU	0 - European unification should be pushed further
	10 - European unification has already gone too far

Further Independent Variables

Gender	0 – Male 1 - Female
Education	0 – Low 1 – Medium 2 - High
Social Class	0 – Working Class 1 – Lower-Middle Class 2 – Middle Class 3 – Upper-Middle Class 4 – Upper Class
Agreement: State Intervention in the Economy	0 – Fully in favour 10 – Fully opposed
Agreement: Same-sex marriage	0 – Fully in favour 10 – Fully opposed

Still, given the good eigenvalue, the dimension we extracted should be considered a reliable indicator of a radical right attitude, despite its limitations. The extraction of a latent dimension with a good eigenvalue confirms a positive interaction among the three variables, and it also serves as a robustness check for previous cluster analysis results. This assumption holds even when we consider countries showing no radical right clusters in 2019. As we show in table 3.13, each country we encounter weaker eigenvalues, which are in some cases barely over 1. The fact that principal components in

countries with no radical right clusters always show weaker eigenvalues than Italy's first component hints at two major considerations. First, it shows the scarce interaction among the three variables thus confirming the validity of our cluster analysis. Then, it puts the Italian case eigenvalues into perspective, confirming its acceptability. Therefore, the extracted variable can be employed as a tool for our analysis.

Table 3.12 - Principal Component Analysis diagnostics

	Coef.	Std.Err.	z	P>z	[99%	Conf.	Interval]
Eigenvalues							
Component 1	1.410	0.066	21.260	0.000	1.239	1.581	
Agree Immigration (Nativism)	0.696	0.028	24.440	0.000	0.623	0.769	
Agree Civil Liberties (Authoritarianism)	0.276	0.086	3.200	0.001	0.054	0.498	
Agree EU (Euroscepticism)	0.663	0.039	16.920	0.000	0.562	0.764	

Table 3.13 - Compared eigenvalues for the first component after having performed a PCA for each country. Keeping Italy as a comparison, all other countries show a weaker eigenvalue. All other countries showed no radical right clusters.

Countries	Eigenvalue 1st component
Italy	1.410
Bulgaria	1.030
Germany	1.082
Ireland	1.217
Lithuania	1.057
Portugal	1.201
Romania	1.101
Slovakia	1.017

Once we extracted a dimension to measure a radical right attitude, we fit a probit model to test its effect on voting for a radical right party. We are also particularly interested in measuring its intensity over the main socio-demographic and other attitudinal indicators that have been consistently used to explain radical right vote over the years. And that is because academic literature on the topic, albeit vast and extensive, has seldom tackled complex sets of attitudes as radical right vote predictors, and, when it did, it only put that attitudinal dimension to test.[47] On the contrary, the majority of the

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[47] We specifically refer to Rooduijn (2014) who was able to recreate a radical right attitude in the Netherlands based on Cas Mudde's three main features (with a specific care for populism, which we do not tackle), but then failed to put this attitude in a multinomial model in order to compare the effect of radical right attitude with other indicators. On the

literature employing accurate control variables tended to only work on some specific indicators, without widening the scope towards a complex radical right set of attitudes. In a few words, most of the literature investigates attitudinal variables in isolation, not assessing their predictive power when their combination represents (or would represent) a coherent set of ideas. Therefore, we expect that the combination of nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism which is represented into the variable we extracted by means of a PCA would be extremely predictive of radical right voting.

To check this expectation, we run a probit model with a dichotomous vote-choice variable as dependent (0 = Vote for all parties; 1 = Vote for RRP(s), within the Italian case namely Lega and Fratelli d'Italia), radical right attitude as the main independent and several control variables based on the most used in the literature. As reported in table 3.14, our expectation is confirmed. The effect that holding a radical right attitude has on the possibility to vote for Lega and FdI is positive and significant: the more an individual manifests nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic stances, the more they tend to direct their vote to a RRP. The positivity of the coefficient and mostly its high significance confirms that searching for a set of attitudes which mirrors the ideological features of parties at the voters' level is not a mere exercise, but it is a valuable tool to understand a voting behavior that is much influenced by attitudes more than social characteristics. In fact, at least within the Italian case, we find scarce evidence of any meaningful effect played by control variables. Gender does not play a role in determining a radical right vote (even though it is quite significant in other cases, as we will show in the next pages), nor we could highlight any effect played by education. The same counts for both the attitudinal variables we put into the model: being pro or against state intervention in the economy has no significant effect, nor, quite surprisingly, does being against same sex marriage, which we used as a proxy for traditionalism. Still, belonging to a specific social class holds a modestly significant effect. Namely, individuals who position themselves into the upper-middle class have a much greater probability to vote for a RRP. This finding is particularly puzzling because it stands in contrast with the main literature of the last decade on the topic, starting from the globalization losers and double demarcation theory developed by Kriesi and colleagues (2008), who stated that low-skilled working-class and impoverished middle-class members would form the main RRPs' electoral base; to the main empirical (cf. Oesch & Rennwald, 2018) and theoretical (cf. Mondon, 2016) studies on the radical right challenge to the left for production workers votes and the association between workers and nationalism. The antithesis between what most of the literature argues and demonstrates, both in single cases and comparative studies, and our results might be the consequence of the structure of Italian radical right supply. At the time of data collection, the Lega

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contrary, Rooduijn builds a fascinating (yet maybe incomplete) analysis on propensity to vote, showing that a radical right attitude positively affected the propensity to vote for (and only) the radical right party PVV.

had just won the highest share of votes in its history at the 2018 Italian elections (17.4%) while Fratelli d'Italia, the other main Italian RRP according to both literature and our empirical classification results, won a mere 4.4%, and this imbalance is mirrored in our data too.[48] Consequently, when we deal with "radical right vote" within this context we mainly refer to a vote for Lega. Albeit its chameleonic nature (Passarelli, 2013), the Lega has always relied on a quite geographically clustered electorate, professing itself as the party representing the northern entrepreneurs. Furthermore, empirical research has confirmed that the Lega has been radicalizing its economic stances (until recent years, when they started to blur their economic position, see Jessoula et al. 2020) and its electorate tends to agree with a pro-liberal policy in economy, it is more prone to cut tax and to express dissatisfaction towards public management (Passarelli, 2013; Basile & Borri, 2018). So, the Lega, despite all efforts played by its newest leaders, is still a product of its own past, therefore the fact that being part of the upper-middle class influences radical right voting in Italy (at least in 2018) might be in contrast with what is generally argued in the literature, but it becomes more coherent and understandable by looking into the context.

Table 3.14 - Probit model results. Case: Italy. Data: EES19.

Voting for RRPs	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf	Interval]	Sig
RR Attitude	**.382**	.046	8.32	0	.292	.472	***
Gender							
Female	.019	.103	0.19	.85	-.183	.222	
Education							
Medium	-.237	.171	-1.39	.166	-.573	.098	
High	-.269	.178	-1.51	.131	-.619	.08	
Social Class							
Lower middle	.147	.191	0.77	.441	-.226	.52	
Middle	.208	.177	1.18	.239	-.138	.555	
Upper middle	.599	.227	2.64	.008	.154	1.044	**
State Intervention	-.005	.003	-1.44	.151	-.011	.002	
Same Sex Marriage	.004	.006	0.60	.546	-.008	.015	
Constant	-.849	.218	-3.89	0	-1.277	-.421	***

Mean dependent var	0.216	SD dependent var		0.412
Pseudo r-squared	0.104	Number of obs		839
Chi-square	90.593	Prob > chi2		0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	806.407	Bayesian crit. (BIC)		858.461

*** p<.001, ** p<.05, * p<.1

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[48] N: 847; RR_Vote: 181 (Lega: 156 (18.42%); FdI: 25 (2.95%)). Figures after data manipulation (na omit).

Still, the crucial finding is the high positivity and significance of holding a radical right attitude in shaping radical right voting. And this assumption holds for almost any other case. In fact, we ran the same PCA and probit model on all countries showing a concurrence of both a radical right demand and radical right supply and we can therefore show three main results. First, we could extract a meaningful radical right dimension, with good eigenvalues and acceptable loadings, in every case. The three variables interact quite well across Europe and, quite constantly, Nativism and Euroscepticism showed the higher loadings, while Authoritarianism showed lower figures. So, on the one hand we showed how a radical right attitude that mirrors RRPs' ideological backbone exists across Europe, and, on the other, we could also check the robustness of our cluster analysis results, given the good interaction of all three variables wherever we found a cluster. Second, radical right attitude always has (except for Latvia) the most significant effect on the probability to vote for a radical right party.

Figure 3.15 - Significant results of probit models ran on countries with radical right supply and demand concurrence

	RR Attitude	Gender	Education	Social class	State Interv.	Same sex marriage
Austria	.303		Med. -.409 High -.809	Up-Mid -.377		
Belgium	.211					
Cyprus	.397					
Czech Rep.	.164	Fem -.313				
Denmark	.153					
Estonia	.583	Fem -.589	Med .648			
Finland	.568	Fem -.523				
France	.465			Upper -1.013		
Greece	.349	Fem -.603				
Hungary	.359	Fem -.278	High .404		-.013	
Latvia						
Netherlands	.221	Fem -.428				
Poland	.282					
Slovenia	.232	Fem -.342				
Spain	.349	Fem -.459		Up-Mid .498		
Sweden	.492		High -.642			
UK	.238					

Reported RR Attitude coefficients are significant with p<.0001
All other coefficients' significance with p<.0005

Therefore, we can argue that a radical right attitude is not only detectable among most of Europe, but it has also been proven to be a significant determinant in supporting a RRP. Although this may sound trivial, most of the literature has investigated single attitudes and single policy support, in a sort of compartmentalized way, instead of weaving an attitudinal web by analyzing individual ideological and attitudinal trends in composition and not in isolation. With all its limitations and maybe excessive simplicity, our work shows that this could be a rewarding way to follow. Third and last, as we saw with the Italian case, context seems crucial to explain the rise of the radical right. As table 3.15 shows, a radical right attitude is always super significant, still each country shows other indicators which are significant in explaining the probability to vote for a RRP. As far as gender is concerned, in almost half of the countries being a female voter decreases the probability to support a RRP by quite a lot. Conflictual results interest education and social class, which should be assessed with single case studies to take care of the many contextual differences that may provide researchers with different results in different countries.

Final remarks

The intention of this chapter was to frame radical right demand considering the results on the ideological outlook of the radical right party family explained in chapter 2. Once we established that the ideological borders of the radical right family were built on the interaction among nativism, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism, the first research question asked whether this complex ideological set-up would be mirrored within the demand side. Afterwards, economic positions were added to the equation. The subsequent research strategy was to establish whether economic stances could have held the same discriminant power on the demand side as they did at party-level. Furthermore, if radical right potential constituencies had held robustly on one specific set of economic attitudes (interventionist, moderate or neoliberal) into one country, then we would have expected the supply side to show the same orientation, thus shaping an hypothesis based on a strategic reasoning by RRPs, willing to maximize their turnout by adhering (or framing actively) their potential constituency's attitudes on economic policies. As a general conclusion, we can state that not all expectations were confirmed.

First, the quest for a coherent radical right demand throughout Europe ended up positively, as nearly all European countries displayed a solid radical right demand shaped by the interaction of the same three ideological stances on which the radical right party family stands.

Second, when we added economic positions to the equation, we could no longer identify an all-round adherence between supply and demand across countries, given that in most cases the economic attitudes on the demand side did not overlap with the ones provided by the radical right supply.

Third, we could observe a cross-country diversity yet not a within-country diversity. If the three sets of economic attitudes (interventionist, moderate, neoliberal) were well distributed across all countries, when we stepped back to a within-contexts analysis, the radical right demand tended to hold one specific economic position in most cases.

We are left with a scenario where: first, the raise of a coherent radical right demand leaves space to RRPs' success; second, cross-country variation on economic positions shows that both radical right demand and radical right supply can embrace different economic stances; third, their overlap within contexts is often missing; fourth, although this variation happens cross-country, it is not replicated within-country, where radical right clusters display one economic position most of the times.

So, if we limit the analysis on the three main ideological components of the radical right family, we find the same aggregation on both sides: the same aggregative process based on nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic stances that shaped a party family gives the same results when is replicated at the individual level. Therefore, not only European parties and citizens are responsive to this peculiar set of attitudes, but we can obtain the same response on both levels. Provided that there is no undisputed recipe for radical right mobilization, given the lack of academic agreement on many variables and given its dependency on contextual issues, still the existence of such a share of attitudes between the supply and the demand side hints at a solid relationship between the two. At the end, this chapter not only showed that a potential ideologically coherent demand for RRPs exists throughout all Europe (whether it is exploited or not), but it also demonstrated that a radical right attitude is a significant predictor of radical right voting wherever we found a coincidence of supply and demand. So, not only we showed the existence of clusters of individuals who stand against immigration, hold authoritarian attitudes and are fiercely Eurosceptic which is there to be mobilized, but we could also prove the effect this attitude has on the probability to vote for a RRP. This finding stands in continuity with recent literature on radical right voting, which has been continuatively disjointed from mere protest, but rather as a voting behavior engaged by rational individuals which is better explained by ideological proximity and policy considerations.

Single cases

The first part of the appendix shows the cluster analysis results for each case and for both waves. For each one of the mentioned states, the first table refers to EES 2014 data, while the second table shows EES 2019 results. Each table shows the emergence of clusters whose members show anti-immigration attitudes, which is intended as the *sine qua non* condition for detecting a radical right cluster (on a 0-10 scale, it is a < 5 cluster mean for the immigration attitudes indicator). Within each table, each cluster is placed according to the positions it represents on economic preferences, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism. Mean scores are available for each one of the prementioned indicators. The appendix breaks down the general results and conclusions discussed in the chapter for each case.

Austria

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		16,71%					13,92%					
Immigration		2,72					2,93					
Authoritarianism		5,91					4					
EU		7,91					8,62					
Economy		3,64					6,68					

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				21,84%		7,97%		16,19%				
Immigration				2,89		1,69		1,48				
Authoritarianism				3,29		7,15		4,31				
EU				4,91		2,52		2,52				
Economy				4		6,43		6,52				

On the supply level, Austria was home to three RRPs in 2014. The Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO) and Team Stronach shared both a liberal, market-oriented economic position and poor electoral results that led them to a progressive disappearance from the Austrian political scenario soon after 2014. On the contrary, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) has long stood as one of the most prominent parties in Austria, promoting anti-immigrants and anti-EU stances as well as welfare protection under a chauvinist frame, which on the one hand enabled the FPO to promote the protection

of wealth *makers* against wealth *takers* through welfare mechanisms dedicated to active working citizens and taxpayers, but on the other hand did not stop it from calling for tax cuts at the same time (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Rathgeb, 2021). Such a case of economic blurring makes the economic identification of the FPO very hard, in fact CHES scores for economic positions made it fall under the economic moderate label in 2014 and under the neoliberal label in 2019. Without these scores given by CHES data, even the quest for correlated individual clusters would be a hard job. The same variation also stands within the demand side. We found one radical right cluster in both 2014 and 2019, interventionist the first, neoliberal the latter. If we widen the scope to the population who is strictly anti-immigration, they always share Eurosceptic positions, while they fluctuate on authoritarianism and economic positions. As far as these are concerned, the Austrian anti-immigration block, which grew in numbers from 2014 to 2019, shows both neoliberal and interventionist positions in large numbers and in both waves.

Belgium

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	23,62%	6,46%	10,38%	4,34%								
Immigration	2,3	1,34	2,67	1,12								
Authoritarianism	5,95	8,61	2,89	2,41								
EU	4,91	8,52	3,06	8,78								
Economy	4,28	2,42	3,52	2,28								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		8,56%	6,64%		8,56%	8,27%						6,20%
Immigration		2,06	1,66		1,6	0,73						1,14
Authoritarianism		6,17	3,31		6,56	6,48						4,38
EU		1,06	6,4		8,03	2,05						1,92
Economy		3,29	2,76		6,53	7,28						4,92

At least in 2014, Belgium was home to two RRPs both representing different economic positions. If the People's Party (PP) was a mainly francophone party framing its programs on economic liberalism before dissolving in 2019, Vlaams Belang (VB) still stands today as the Flemish radical right alternative and one of the oldest European members of the radical right family. Firmly standing on Flemish nationalism, VB opposes immigration and the European integration process, undermining multiculturalism and basing its rhetorical frames on the clash of civilizations, while on the economic side it both rejected an economy mostly based on public sector and laissez-fair liberalism, standing

as a self-proclaimed workers party (Pauwels, 2011; Moufahim et al., 2015), in fact CHES data classify VB as a centrist economic actor in both waves.

Two equally weighted interventionist radical right clusters appear in both 2014 and 2019 waves, and the latter also show the emergence of a neoliberal one. The match between moderate economic positions does not happen, still the total weight of the clusters is comparable with the total radical right turnout. All anti-immigration clusters in 2014 have explicit interventionist positions, which scattered throughout the spectrum in 2019.

Bulgaria

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		13,45%										
Immigration		3,65										
Authoritarianism		7										
EU		7,43										
Economy		2,71										

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			14,80%								24,33%	
Immigration			1,43								3,04	
Authoritarianism			2,76								4,97	
EU			6,26								5,42	
Economy			2,5								4,83	

The Bulgarian scenario has proved to be rather fertile for the growth of RRPs, if not necessarily in terms of electoral support, surely in numbers. Party data for 2014 claimed the existence of three different political actors which could be put together within the radical right family, some of which tightened into a strong subcluster showing characteristics that hinted to an extreme right subfamily, as reported in chapter two. All parties claimed a total share of votes of more than 15% are Ataka, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), the Bulgarian National Movement (BNM). 2019 elections saw the rise of a new radical right actor called Volya. In terms of policy and ideological measures, all parties display very similar ideological outlooks: they are nationalist, immigration adverse, fiercely Eurosceptic and culturally conservative organizations, showcasing a left-leaning approach to state intervention and public services. Such a scenario finds a quite perfect

correspondence into individual self-placement data in 2014, when the radical right cluster not only adheres to the political stances of the supply side, but it also shows a weight comparable to the electoral turnout. In 2019, the anti-immigration clusters gain a considerable weight, as it is the case for all Eastern European countries due to the immigration crisis, still no coherent radical right cluster emerges.

Cyprus

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		21,16%								17,79%		
Immigration		2,07								3,75		
Authoritarianism		6,81								8,58		
EU		9,32								9		
Economy		1,36								5		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	10,78%			13,11%		13,48%			4,95%			
Immigration	2,45			2,08		1,97			0,7			
Authoritarianism	9,32			4,24		6,47			7			
EU	8,29			4,46		3,52			9,76			
Economy	1,89			1,84		6,35			5,7			

Despite having been a prolific scenario for extreme nationalist organizations after the end of WWII, especially within the range of time going from the *Enosis* proposal (the unification with Greece) and the subsequent Turkish invasion, Cyprus ceased its radical right experience up until recent years, when a new political party called National People's Front (ELAM) broke through an electorate opposing any attempt at radicalizing the political conflict (Katsourides, 2013). The ELAM, often labelled as Greek nationalist party Golden Dawn's little sister, spouses a fierce anti-immigration orientation and severe attitudes towards law and order, with the addition of a manifested neo-fascist mythology (Charalambous & Christoforou, 2018). Despite being a rather new actor in the Cypriote political scenario, it could reach a whopping 8,25% at the 2019 European elections and two seats at the national Parliament. Still, as far as public opinion is concerned, the potential for a radical right breakthrough existed also in 2014, when two massive radical right clusters emerge: strictly interventionist the first and moderate the latter. This radical right potential showcases increasingly neoliberal positions in 2019, making ends meet with the radical right supply, which is depicted as neoliberal itself by CHES scores. This match is one part of a common pattern for 2019, when the

large majority of newly founded RRPs find a perfect adherence with their potential constituency, also on the economic side.

Czech Republic

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	5,87%	10,57%		15,98%								
Immigration	2,08	1,9		3,88								
Authoritarianism	7,04	7,74		4,63								
EU	2,04	9,27		9,27								
Economy	2,39	2,65		3,61								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		11,36%		20,72%				3,21%				
Immigration		1,88		1,1				1,66				
Authoritarianism		6,62		3,21				4,54				
EU		4,89		2,01				0,25				
Economy		3,86		4,31				9,08				

The Czech scenario is also home to three radical right actors in 2014, but just one of them could survive until the 2019 elections call, also improving its score. The Dawn of Direct Democracy (Usvit), a populist and Eurosceptic party with an interventionist approach to the economy, dissolved in 2018, and the Party of Free Citizens (Svobodny), an anti-immigration neoliberal force, returned to be an electorally insignificant niche party after 2014 elections. The lead over the Czech radical right was then caught by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), a once liberal-conservative governmental party that dropped its consensus after the 2013 corruption scandal, and by the newborn Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), a fiercely anti-immigration and anti-Islamic party showcasing an interventionist approach to the economy. Although the economic differences among Czech RRPs, radical right clusters always showcase a fierce interventionist position in both 2014 and 2019, clinching with the political offer of the SPD (another newcomer finding an all-round coherent potential constituency) but leaving the ODS without a coherent counterpart on the demand side.

		Anti-Immigration										
		Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
		Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			7,44%				21,75%		11,49%				
Immigration			0,75				2,57		1,65				
Authoritarianism			8,16				7,57		3,2				
EU			9,53				8,51		8,67				
Economy			4,09				6,41		5,7				

		Anti-Immigration										
		Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
		Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
						15,74%	10,33%				12,19%		
Immigration						2,13	0,98				0,92		
Authoritarianism						4,03	7,88				6,12		
EU						5,87	4,02				1,41		
Economy						6,07	6,59				5,01		

Empirical analysis carried out in Chapter 2 confirmed the Danish People's Party (DPP) as the only RRP showing considerable support in the country in 2014. Taking a strict immigration adverse and anti-EU orientation as granted, the DPP revealed an interventionist approach to the economy and the role of the state in both waves. Furthermore, it showed more moderate views than its peers on social lifestyle, which is not an uncommon pattern among Nordic RRPs yet not strong enough to shape a separate subfamily. The DPP proved to be an electorally successful party in both European elections, even though it more than halved its consensus in 2019 after an outstanding performance in 2014, so it is implicit to state the existence of a substantial electoral base. Still, the lack of a cluster showcasing a clear ideological correspondence between the DPP political backbone and individual attitudes makes it difficult to state whether the party is overperforming or underperforming.

Estonia

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		22,03%				12,94%				22,34%		
Immigration		2,05				0,92				3,27		
Authoritarianism		6,48				6,19				5,73		
EU		9,59				9,55				5,27		
Economy		3,41				6,83				4,76		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	17,16%				22,98%	8,51%				14,02%		
Immigration	1,56				3,09	1,38				1,38		
Authoritarianism	6,73				5,67	6,21				5,48		
EU	5,88				5,14	3,21				1,03		
Economy	3,99				5,53	7,86				4,8		

Academic literature on RRPs in Estonia is significantly underdeveloped when compared to other countries, not necessarily located in Western Europe, given that the growth and settlement of proper nationalist actors only happened in recent years. The Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) have consolidated its role in national politics and established successfully as a first row party, even supporting a government coalition. EKRE's political position is moulded on nativism and Euroskepticism, and fiercely battling against multiculturalism, liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and of course immigration by exploiting the collective memories of Soviet colonization (Petsinis, 2019; Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019). On the demand side, Estonia has shown a wide potential for radical right mobilization in both waves. In 2014, more than a half of the interviewees are brought together into three clusters showing a complete radical right outlook: nativist, authoritarian and Eurosceptic, divided by economic positions. In 2019, this enormous potential looks reduced in numbers, still it provides an adherent potential constituency for the economic moderate EKRE. As far as anti-immigration attitudes are concerned, the Estonian citizens still stand among the most immigration-adverse; a continuous set of attitudes which is maybe fueled by the historical aversion towards the Russian speaking ethnic minorities.

Finland

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		7,29%								13,03%		
Immigration		1,77								4,18		
Authoritarianism		8,19								7,5		
EU		9,42								8,16		
Economy		2,21								5,22		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		31,25%		13,55%								
Immigration		1,38		1,72								
Authoritarianism		7,03		2,5								
EU		3,35		3,79								
Economy		3,45		3,79								

The right side of the Finnish political supply spectrum has been dominated in recent years by the True Finns, which has gained an important position among European RRPs for its longevity and the continuously high turnout that increased its centrality within Finnish political scenario, leading the TF to be part of a government coalition. The TF follow the radical right ideological scheme based on nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism, while their positions on economic policies is more nuanced. In fact, CHES data from 2014 and 2019 reveal an evolution within the TF's ideological profile, which moves from an interventionist standpoint to a more liberal position. Actually, if the TF fortified their status within the political landscape in Finland by labelling themselves as "the right-wing party of the poor" and by adopting center-leftist economic policies, they later tuned down this heritage (Hatakka, 2021). This change though does not find a match between supply and demand as far as our data are concerned. In fact, if in 2014 data show the existence of a fully-fledged potential voting base for the TF, even on the economic side, then in 2019 this concurrence is no more. Furthermore, not only we could not find any cluster characterized by both radical right values and neoliberal economic position, but we could not either show the existence of a relation between anti-immigration positions and liberal economic attitudes. Given the explosion of anti-immigrants sentiment in Finland (44% of total weight in 2019 vs 20% in 2014, with much more radical values on the immigration self-placement scale), the fact that this increasing positions hardly find a match with neoliberal attitudes raises some questions over the actual importance of the policy change undertaken by the TF, which maybe gets its turnout by campaigning on other issues.

France

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	6,51%	4,81%		9,50%	14,06%					17,83%		
Immigration	1,3	2,86		3,52	1,58					2,12		
Authoritarianism	6,92	7,86		3,45	6,03					6,99		
EU	2,84	9,56		8,65	6,71					8,12		
Economy	4,08	2,12		2,71	5,83					4,59		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	26,16%			14,82%						21,81%		
Immigration	2,3			2,44						1,1		
Authoritarianism	5,51			2,94						5,89		
EU	6,06			1,41						3,59		
Economy	4,33			3,52						4,93		

France is home to two radical right organizations in 2014 and 2019. If France Arise stands as a minoritarian RRP bringing nationalist, Eurosceptic and anti-immigration stances together with economic liberalism, the main radical right formation operating within the French territory is the Front National (FN). Often described as the archetype of the contemporary RRP, the FN is at the same time one of the oldest right-wing movements in Europe and one of the first to pursue the path to a more moderate approach to the economy, by disengaging from economic liberalism and by accepting the role of state regulation, thus converging to the economic positions of the median voter (Ivaldi, 2015). As can be excepted, alongside the FN's economic platforms stands a stable radical right ideological core that, even though under a more mainstream or "de-caffeinated" (Betz, 2018) guise, still rejects immigration, criticizes the EU integration process, and supports more severe punishments and a strong state power; an ideological outlook that diversified and enhanced the party's voting base (Ivaldi, 2017; Stockemer & Barisione, 2018). Given the ideological confirmation of the RRPs operating in France and their electoral results in 2014 and 2019, we would expect the formation of radical right clusters showing a moderate approach to state intervention and redistribution of wealth. Data from 2014 and 2019 confirm this expectation: the FN always finds a coherent and fully fledged potential constituency, which is quite a rarity for a major radical right political force, as far as our results are concerned. The same cannot be said about France Arise, which never finds a neoliberal counterpart on the demand side.

Germany

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	14,98%		13,50%									
Immigration	3,84		2,13									
Authoritarianism	5,3		3,89									
EU	3,72		8,59									
Economy	3,55		2,47									

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			24,46%		27,62%		4,43%					
Immigration			3,48		3,34		0,57					
Authoritarianism			2,21		5,12		2,8					
EU			6,03		5,86		1,42					
Economy			4,35		5,56		6,6					

The 2014 German scenario is home to two operating RRPs, which are the outcome of different historical backgrounds and two politically distinct actors. The National Democratic Party (NPD) had a major role in Germany's political life: on the one hand, it was the first successful actor of mobilization of the extreme right in post-war Germany, but, on the other hand, it collected negligible electoral results, which is why it did not find space within this study, thus confirming the German political scenario as a home to a well-rooted extremist subculture, yet unable to sustain successful parties (Backes & Mudde, 2000). Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a much younger organization founded in 2013 as a Eurosceptic right-wing party that consistently radicalized on anti-immigration, anti-establishment rhetoric, and cultural conservatism, while maintaining a market-oriented, yet de-emphasized, economic platform and a moderate opposition to redistribution (Kim, 2018; Diermeier, 2020). In fact, CHES data placed the AfD within the neoliberal category in 2014, while in 2019 the party's scores on economic indicators were more moderate. As far as individual data are concerned, Germany represents a unicum throughout our study, because it is the only country that never saw the formation of a properly radical right cluster, neither in 2014 or 2019. If a conspicuous part of of the population with harsh opinions on immigration always shows up (it even swells up in 2019, after the immigration crisis), the requirements for authoritarianism and Euroscepticism are always missed.

Greece

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		17,86%	15,98%	10,40%		12,10%	7,99%					
Immigration		1,3	3,6	2,7		3,61	3,5					
Authoritarianism		6,82	3,85	1,69		5,23	4					
EU		8,6	4,13	9,32		7,7	4,75					
Economy		3,45	3,8	2,51		5,64	5,61					

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				20,36%	15,15%					18,18%		
Immigration				3,32	2,85					0,84		
Authoritarianism				4,14	4,14					5,36		
EU				4,91	8,17					3,22		
Economy				4	6,12					4,63		

The Greek political scenario is one of the more peculiar within the European Union. The military seizure of power of 1967 made Greece the only country in Western Europe to suffer a coup d'état after WWII and it also had consequences on national political development, especially when dealing with RRPs. Since 1974, the main center-right political organization, New Democracy (ND), had played a crucial role within the right side of the political spectrum, first by absorbing army officers and monarchy loyalists, and then by coopting members of challenging parties from the extreme right, both reducing their nationalist overtones and preventing RRPs from capitalizing votes, thus relegating them to the fringes of the Greek political scene (Ellinas 2010; 2013). Still, the intersection of the post-2008 economic crises and the spread of popular mistrust towards political elites made Greece home to three different RRPs in 2014. If the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) used to be a nationalist organization economically standing on what party leader Giorgos Karatzaferis himself labelled "popular liberalism", the Independent Greeks (ANEL) originated a split from ND and framed its ideological outlook through a nativist agenda and a firm rejection of austerity and neo-liberal economic policies, which also made ANEL a suitable government ally for the radical left party SYRIZA (Fielitz, 2018). Still, the emblem of Greek radical right rise is Golden Dawn (GD), even though it shares more similarities with anti-system extreme right movements than with European RRPs, being an extremely centralized party that holds a strong anti-systemic profile, still maintains links with a violent neo-Nazi subculture, rejects capitalism and publicly expresses biological nationalism (Ellinas, 2015). Furthermore, it still has no ties with European RRPs and their MPs do not belong to any political group at the European Parliament. The cluster analysis shows the

emergence of radical right clusters in both waves. Data from 2014 showcase two groups characterized by interventionist and neoliberal attitudes, with the former that clinches perfectly with the economic positions of the two most successful RRPs. In 2019 we still come across a radical right cluster with moderate economic positions.

Hungary

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			8,08%							41,32%		
Immigration			0,77							1,68		
Authoritarianism			2,66							5,21		
EU			7,53							4,23		
Economy			1,85							4,7		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		40,84%										
Immigration		3,05										
Authoritarianism		6,36										
EU		6,4										
Economy		3,83										

The Hungarian case shows one distinctive characteristic: it is the only country, alongside Poland, where a RRP has been a longstanding governmental force with a driving role in forming the executive. If some European countries have witnessed radical right actors supporting governments as minorities within a broader executive usually led by center-right parties, and even though some RRPs recently had the opportunity to lead a government coalition, Hungary and Poland are the only cases where radical right parties have continuatively received high votes shares, which allowed them to claim a leading role in the government. Originated as an anti-communist generational youth party, Fidesz has first played a pivotal role in concentrating, organizing, and leading a greatly electorally stable center-right bloc (Fowler, 2004), and then radicalized its stances on immigration, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism becoming a fully-fledged member of the radical right family. Unlike other radical right examples, Fidesz had the opportunity to put emphasis on its economic stances by leading structural reforms that rejected classic liberalism and led to a nationalization program that made Fidesz become the main agent in national capital management (Rogers, 2020). Furthermore, recent analysis shows that the subsequent economic growth and fall of unemployment cemented a strong and consistent satisfaction with the economy, which stepped up as the main driver of Fidesz popularity (Scoggins, 2022). Alongside Fidesz's nationalist embedded capitalism, Hungary saw the

rise of the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), which started as a marginal extremist youth movement until establishing as a consolidated parliamentary force that expresses a political identity forged by nationalism, anti-immigrants, and anti-minorities stances and an ethnonationalist and anti-capitalist perspective on the economy (Varga, 2014; Kim, 2016). Based on such a cohesive approach embraced by both Hungarian RRPs on economic policies, we expect most immigration-adverse respondents to also show a preference towards moderate or interventionist policies. The expectation is supported by cluster analysis results. Both waves highlight a massive cluster aggregating 40% of respondents showing a proper radical right orientation, which is paired with an interventionist attitude in 2014 and with a moderate position in 2019. Given its history as a center-right pivotal actor and its decennial role as the political leader of the Hungarian government, it is likely that Fidesz refers to a much wider constituency which extends its borders also to moderate voters, still it is quite remarkable to see such a wide group of radical right support within the Hungarian population.

Ireland

	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				27,94%								
Immigration				2,87								
Authoritarianism				4,8								
EU				7,58								
Economy				3,65								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		8,53%	6,47%									14,73%
Immigration		2,77	1,87									2,16
Authoritarianism		8,58	1,57									3,38
EU		4,24	6,65									3
Economy		4,16	3,19									4,9

The Republic of Ireland is quite a unique scenario within the European Union. In fact, it is the only country, alongside Portugal, where no RRP has been able to establish and grow electorally in the past twenty years. The reasons for this quite rare radical right under-development have been found in many peculiarities of the Irish political landscape. First, it is demonstrated that the center-left party Sinn Féin, which was historically correlated with the Irish independentist front, could reach potential radical right voters with their nationalist appeal; second and more broadly, the political mainstream in general was able to occupy areas of the political debate that are elsewhere considered uncontested radical right issues; finally, peculiar Irish historical traits, like the hegemony of Catholic nationalism

throughout all the political spectrum, could limit the appeal of the radical right (Garner, 2007; O'Malley, 2008). Individual data show the emergence of a proper radical right cluster only in 2019, thus showing the existence of a potential radical right constituency, still no proper radical right organization could stand as a credible contestant and mobilize what seems to be a solid, yet quite limited, electoral potential.

Italy

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		4,92%	16,20%			9,85%				11,10%		
Immigration		0,52	3			0,86				1,64		
Authoritarianism		6,67	4,59			6,52				6,75		
EU		8,2	3,88			9,11				7,37		
Economy		2,94	3,52			5,8				5,41		

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				16,62%	12,72%					20,91%		
Immigration				2,03	3,25					1,3		
Authoritarianism				4,66	6,33					6,21		
EU				4,53	5,55					3,95		
Economy				2,91	5,68					4,93		

The Italian scenario represents a quite fruitful arena for RRPs. Like France, Italy saw prominent radical right performances, with results settling at high percentages, still the differences between the two countries are conspicuous and especially settled on the supply side. Italy in 2014 was (and still is) home to two major RRPs: the Northern League (LN) and Brothers of Italy (FdI). Even though they both share an anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, traditionalist and socially conservative outlook, the two parties come from rather different backgrounds: while the LN underwent a series of political evolutions throughout its history, profoundly changing its political appeal, FdI properly collects the legacy of the Italian right-wing, by putting itself in continuity with the tradition of the Italian Social Movement, whose tricolour flame still rises on the party's symbol. Another difference affects the approach to economic policies. The LN both holds a deep bond with Northern Italian businesses and comes from a neoliberal tradition based on harsh government spending criticism, therefore it still claims for less taxes and strongly supports free-market economy. On the other side, FdI shows a mixed and blurred approach, binding together liberal stances with elements that stand closer to their social right-wing tradition.

Given the weight of the radical right supply and their wide economic policy proposals, we expect a solid radical right demand with multifaced economic interests and results for 2014 confirm this expectation: radical right clusters weigh beyond 25% of the sample and they showcase three different economic sets of attitudes. This potential is then aggregated into one single economic moderate cluster in 2019. However, we find quite a big mismatch between the weight of the radical right potential constituency and the electoral achievements obtained by both RRPs in Parliamentary and European elections. Instead, when we compare the total weight of the anti-immigration clusters on a whole with both RRPs turnout, the figures stand much closer.

Latvia

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		12,57%										28,41%
Immigration		1,34										2,93
Authoritarianism		8,22										4,95
EU		9,13										8,35
Economy		2,46										5,59

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		11,44%							25%			14,30%
Immigration		1,92							2,02			1,64
Authoritarianism		8,19							6,84			3,49
EU		1,67							5,87			2,98
Economy		2,63							5,09			4,57

As far as the supply side is concerned, Latvia shares some similarities with its northern neighbour Estonia. Despite Latvia has a greater number of grass-roots radical movements and the Latvian RRP National Alliance (NA) has a much longer and established political history than its Estonian counterpart EKRE, the way in which they convey nativism is rather similar: the main target is represented by Russian speakers, and even more recent resentments over the refugee crisis interlinks with the colonization memories and post-Soviet legacies (Auers & Kasenkamp, 2013; Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019). Nonetheless, the demand for radical right in Latvia remained constant through both waves: scarsely over 10% of the sample, fully-fledged demand orientated on the interventionist side of the economic spectrum.

Lithuania

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		25%						14,20%				
Immigration		3,13						1,63				
Authoritarianism		6,01						6,29				
EU		5,99						8,02				
Economy		2,36						5,86				

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	16,56%						14,22%					
Immigration	1,47						3,17					
Authoritarianism	5,61						4,88					
EU	5,15						8,57					
Economy	3,09						6,02					

If the Estonian and Latvian radical right supply scenarios have been colonized by one main actor, the Lithuanian experience is more puzzling. Lithuania used to host one, long-lived, pivotal radical right actor, Order and Justice (TT), but 2019 saw the rise of a new radical right challenger, the Lithuanian Center Party (LCP). Despite their ambiguous political history, characterized by many name changes and programmatical shifts, both TT and the LCP put forward a political proposal in line with other interventionist RRPs. Still, if the newcomer could build up a considerable share of turnout, the former protest party TT is now in an electoral downforce that encompasses all the newer parties within the Lithuanian system, all unable to enter the Parliament in 2016 (Jurkynas, 2019). At the individual level, if 2014 provided a large potential support for an interventionist RRP, so much so that TT could reach almost 15% of turnout, 2019 sees the disappearance of any coherent radical right base.

Netherlands

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
										14,46%		11,51%
Immigration										2,36		2,88
Authoritarianism										8,29		3,07
EU										8,96		8,51
Economy										5,31		5,06

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		10,80%				16,85%	11,52%					
Immigration		3,34				2,25	2,38					
Authoritarianism		7,48				6,89	2,38					
EU		2,91				1,83	5,57					
Economy		3,29				6,53	5,62					

The Dutch scenario provides two RRPs in 2014: The Party for Freedom (PVV) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP), with the addition of the Forum for Democracy (FvD) in 2019. Founded by Geert Wilders in 2006, the PVV embraces a blurry and somehow centrist socioeconomic program, moving away from economic liberalism; it also embodies radical stances on immigration and EU integration, combining them with an anti-establishment approach and a chauvinist defense of the welfare state (Akkerman, 2018). On the other hand, both SGP and FvD share a more right-winged position on economic issues, both calling for tax cuts and less regulations for small companies (Otijes, 2021). Still, while both share a nativist and immigration-adverse position, the FvD has been often labelled as a confessional party, opposing its parochial outlook to cosmopolitanism (De Vries, 2018). Given all three parties electoral results in 2014 and 2019, the expectation is to find a more pronounced centrist approach to the economy among people opposing immigration in 2014 and more conservative attitudes in 2019. Empirical results confirm these expectations. First, data from both waves do not shape a particularly harsh public opinion against immigration: in both cases, we can appreciate moderate weights for clusters showing a fierce demand for strict regulations, if compared to other scenarios. However, in both waves we appreciate the formation of coherent radical right demand bags and in both cases, they are as economically orientated as the supply.

Poland

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		4,81%						4,37%				
Immigration		2,21						1,6				
Authoritarianism		7,96						2,5				
EU		9,18						9,73				
Economy		2,77						6,86				

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		9,72%				7,77%					24,05%	
Immigration		2,12				1,75					2,46	
Authoritarianism		5,07				5,34					2,84	
EU		4,37				3,15					5,89	
Economy		1,91				7,69					4,78	

As mentioned already, the rise of radical right actors in Poland shows many similarities with the Hungarian scenario. As in Hungary, Polish governments have continuously led in recent years by a very electorally successful RRP, Law and Justice (PiS), which has many affinities with Fidesz both in terms of its ideological outlook and in terms of the implemented policies while occupying governmental seats. Born as an outgrowth of the Center Alliance, PiS spouses a nationalist outlook, xenophobic stances and a profound cultural conservatism, which, alongside the rejection of globalism and neoliberal economic policies, form the ideological base for the so called "conservative modernization": a state-centered model of economic development where the central state administration becomes the major agent in coordinating economic activities and at the same times it creates a clientelistic network that reinvigorates its power and increases the party's political longevity (Jasiecki, 2018). Despite being the most successful party in Poland, PiS is not the only RRP operating in the country. 2014 European elections saw the momentaneous rise of the right-libertarian movement Congress of the New Right (KNR) and the nationalist organization United Poland (SP), which then conflated with PiS; while in 2019 the Polish radical right family also welcomed the personal party Kukiz15 and the Confederation of Freedom and Independence, a nationalist and xenophobic party list embracing economic liberalism. With the overall electoral power of Polish RRPs ranging around 50% of turnout, the expectation would be to find an equally wide radical right potential at the demand level, but data from both waves do not confirm such hypothesis. The 2014 Poland shows one of the lowest shares of anti-immigration attitude in Europe, which reinvigorates in 2019 after the refugee crisis, a constant pattern among all eastern European countries. Coherent radical right demand is almost inexistent in 2014, while it grows in numbers in 2019, still not coping with Polish RRPs' huge success. However, both newcomers (Kukiz and Konfederacia) find their niche within a neoliberal radical right cluster. While all-round ideological shares between newer RRPs and their coherent demand is also a recurrent pattern, on the other hand we lack the numbers to justify the high electoral success of the more established Polish radical right, whose drivers must therefore be found somewhere else.

Portugal

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			16%	4,80%								
Immigration			2,96	2,4								
Authoritarianism			7	4,43								
EU			7,34	3,33								
Economy			4	1,85								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			18,47%									
Immigration			2									
Authoritarianism			3,05									
EU			5,54									
Economy			3,02									

The Portuguese case has been labeled by researchers as part of the Iberic exceptionalism, which represents the lack of a substantial radical right challenger reaching considerable popular share in both Portugal and Spain. Individual self-placement data instead tell a different story. The analysis of 2014 data confirm the existence of a small, yet ideologically coherent, niche waiting to be mobilized by an eventual radical right newcomer, thus showing the potential for the rise of a RRP even within a country that is historically averse to such electoral success. This coherent demand turns into a more generic anti-immigration cluster in 2019, still the cluster's total weight remains very similar to the 2014 radical right group. So, the total amount of anti-immigration sentiment is not subject to the increase we measured throughout all of Europe. This hints at a real Portuguese exceptionalism regarding the perception of immigration and the eventual political strategies in order to keep it a minor issue within the political scenario. However, the radical right exceptionalism could be on its way to an end, because a new political alternative called Chega recently made national and international headlines after running for the 2021 Portuguese presidential elections, claiming an unpredictable third place in both Presidential and legislative elections, gathering more votes than many historical and institutionalized parties, breaking the negative stigma oppressing RRPs at least in the Iberic area (Mendes & Dennison, 2020; Afonso, 2021).

Romania

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		13,53%	6,18%									
Immigration		1,41	1,59									
Authoritarianism		5,45	1,15									
EU		8,75	1,25									
Economy		2,3	1,7									

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			14,28%				19%					
Immigration			3,15				3,21					
Authoritarianism			2,94				4,46					
EU			8,24				6,57					
Economy			2,04				6,45					

Radical right parties have historically had a poor electoral profile in Romania. After the downfall of the Great Romania Party, the only classified RRP operating in the country was the short-lived People's Party (PP), which was dissolved in 2015 after the conviction of its leader. No other political actor could fill the electoral void ever after. Romania is therefore an unicum in this essay, being the only country hosting a RRP, although in sharp decline, in 2014, and not anymore in 2019. This story is confirmed also by our data. We show the emergence of a clear coherent radical right demand in 2014, which is also economically coherent with the corresponding radical right actor. While this demand disappears in 2019, which on the contrary shows the emergence of a wider and harsher sentiment towards immigrants. Yet, this is not matched with authoritarian attitudes and Euroscepticism, quite the contrary it is always in pair with support for freedom and Europe, which hint at a political mainstream that could encompass this anti-immigration sentiment without giving the chance to challenger parties to build a coherent support.

Slovakia

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	10,29	3,93%		11,68%								
Immigration	3,22	3,8		3,16								
Authoritarianism	6,19	8,87		3,85								
EU	3,06	9,32		9,22								
Economy	3,46	0,35		4,23								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				17,27%								
Immigration				1,23								
Authoritarianism				4,57								
EU				3,32								
Economy				3,18								

The Slovakian scenario provides one of the highest number of RRPs competing at the same election in Europe. At 2014 European elections, two main parties collected notable results: the Slovak National Party (SNS), which stands as the longest-standing nationalist reference in the country and it also had active support role in four different governments; Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Olano), a social-conservative and anti-establishment party (Malova & Ucen, 2007; Marušiak, 2017). Two new actors joined the family in 2019: We Are Family (Sme Rodina), an entrepreneur party with radical right orientation, and the People's Party – Our Slovakia (LSNS), a party showing a more radical anti-system orientation as confirmed by its militancy within the ultranationalist Alliance for Peace and Freedom European group (Gyárfášová, 2018). On the economic side, they all display a moderately favorable orientation towards public services in 2014, and then radicalize their interventionist stances in 2019, while Olano turned from a more neoliberal standpoint to a more moderate approach. Individual data tell us that both the rather small radical right cluster emerging in 2014 and the wider anti-immigration groups stand on the interventionist side of the economic spectrum. Still, there is no continuous match between the wide supply and the diminishing demand, to a point that, in a country where RRPs obtain 25% of votes in 2019, we find no coherent radical right cluster. Slovakia stands as an unprecedented unexplainable context.

Slovenia

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
				19,16%			10,89%			22,17%		
Immigration				2,76			2,04			1,52		
Authoritarianism				3,86			2,85			6,26		
EU				2,82			5,57			4,24		
Economy				3,5			6,34			5,36		

The Slovenian experience provides a very peculiar case within the development of European RRPs. In fact, it is one of the few cases where an established nationalist actor experienced a dramatic downfall after years of electoral stability and have then risen from its ashes with no major symbolical and political changes. The Slovenian National Party (SNP) had a moderate electoral success throughout the first twenty years of Slovenian independence, then it almost disappeared up until the last elections, failing to find an appropriate stance in economic matters, as argued by recent research (Chládková & Mareš, 2015). The lack of party data measuring the SNP's political orientations in 2014 prevent us from making a comparison between party-level and popular attitudes, still 2019 data tell us we are facing a proper radical right organization holding a moderately conservative economic orientation. Turning to individual data, Slovenia is the only case within this study where no anti-immigration cluster emerged. In fact, the only table regarding Slovenia refers to 2019, when we find a clear anti-immigration sentiment shaping three different clusters, one of which corresponds to a fully-fledged radical right demand which is answered by the SNP but it is not exploited in its entirety.

Spain

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
	9,35%	7,53%	14,09%	16,16%								
Immigration	2,41	2,27	2,13	3,12								
Authoritarianism	6,79	5,9	4,87	2,61								
EU	2,49	8,59	4,34	5,11								
Economy	2,7	2,32	3,96	2,28								

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
			20,71%			10,64%						
Immigration			2,83			1,3						
Authoritarianism			3,56			7,22						
EU			7,06			4,77						
Economy			2,83			6,08						

The end of the so called Iberic exceptionalism would be incomplete without it happening also on the other half of the peninsula. In fact, researchers declared Spain's radical right immunity over already at 2019 European elections, when a recently founded political party called Vox could reach more than 6% of total turnout and could therefore occupy four seats at the European Parliament for the first time. CHES party data describe its ideological outlook as moulded on economic liberalism, anti-immigration stances and cultural conservatism, which are the same political positions shaping a small cluster extracted from 2019 individual data. The group into question aggregates 10% of the total respondents, which stands in line with Vox's electoral turnout. Therefore, Vox stands as another example of newcomer parties showing a fully-fledged correspondent demand, correctly shaped on every indicator.

Sweden

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		12,62%	4,77%			5,56%						
Immigration		3,62	2,91			2,96						
Authoritarianism		7,25	4,91			7,78						
EU		8,72	9,72			9						
Economy		3,38	2,87			7,21						

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		9,15%		8,74%		27,58%						
Immigration		0,62		1,59		1,09						
Authoritarianism		8,82		3,15		6,02						
EU		4,07		3,7		3						
Economy		3,91		3,52		6,85						

The Swedish Democrats (SD) is one of the most historical European RRPs, dating back at the latest part of the 1980s. It also one of the most successful: once it entered the Swedish Parliament winning seats at the 2010 national elections, it kept on improving its electoral results until it established itself as the third best supported party in Sweden. Its ideological outlook did not change overtime, shaped by social and cultural conservatism, a fierce Euroscepticism and a centrist attitude towards the economy, both supporting the public sector and welfare state, yet chauvinistically framed in order to guarantee good social policies for Swedish citizens. As far as the individual data are concerned, Sweden always shows a strong radical right demand that always doubles the actual SD turnout in terms of clusters' weight, but this demand is never matched by the supply on economic terms. We

considered the SD's positions on economic policies as moderate, as a result of their blurry statements and programs on the economy, still no proper radical right cluster shows such a position, on the contrary they are always firmly characterized as interventionists or neoliberals. The blurring strategy undertaken by the SD could therefore be understood as the way to intercept both clusters and maximize their turnout, or as the further clue for the scarce effect of economic self-placement in shaping an agreement with the radical right actors.

United Kingdom

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
		27,49%	7,75%	15,27%		11,28%						
Immigration		1,35	1,66	1,47		1,6						
Authoritarianism		6,16	4	4,83		7,56						
EU		8,73	2,34	9,29		9,53						
Economy		3,74	3,46	3,19		6,92						

	Anti-Immigration											
	Economic Left				Economic Right				Economic Moderate			
	Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian		Authoritarian		Non-Authoritarian	
	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU	Pro EU	Anti EU
						15,76%				17,61%	18,32%	
Immigration						1,89				1,91	3,68	
Authoritarianism						6,73				5,04	4,39	
EU						0,9				0,82	5,66	
Economy						5,67				4,52	4,68	

Finally, the UK represents quite a unique case in the European scenario. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) have long stood as the only RRP gaining substantive results in the country, still their distribution throughout different elections shows peculiar characteristics, namely: while having gained negligible electoral success at Parliamentary elections, except for 2015 calls, the UKIP reached massive share of votes at the European parliament elections, and it often resulted as the most voted political force in Britain. The second peculiarity regards its recent downfall and subsequent substitution by a new political force, the Brexit Party (BP), which absorbed UKIP vote, reducing it substantially. Founded ex-novo by the same UKIP leader Nigel Farage, the BP was first intended as a single-issue party whose main ambitions were to range across the political spectrum in order to intercept Brexiteers at every political latitude and deliver a clean Brexit after the "betrayal of the establishment" (Tournier-Sol, 2021, p.8). However, as confirmed by party-level issue measurements, both parties convey very similar political messages, all centered on extreme Euroscepticism, anti-immigration stances and a rather liberal, anti-statist and tax-free approach to the

economy (Evans & Mellon, 2019). This is however in contrast with what individual data tell us about the British public opinion. Individual data show a strong demand for the radical right in the UK in both waves, still we face the same mismatch on economic preferences we underlined in most cases. If neoliberal radical right clusters always show up with considerable weight in both waves, they do not reach the radical right electoral turnout, which is nonetheless matched by adding the non-neoliberal clusters to the picture. Therefore, given the predominance of the European integration issue within the British scenario, the actual weight of economic preferences in shaping turnout could be negligible. For sure, we found no complete correspondence on such issue between supply and demand.

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the debate on the rise of RRPs in Europe by looking at the radical right party family through the perspective of its ideological outlook and by investigating both the supply side and the demand side through the establishment of a common and shared ideological ground. The academic debate on what really represents this ideological ground and what are the features that clearly separate the radical right from other surrounding and potentially overlapping part families is still open. However, the minimal definition illustrated by Cas Mudde (2007) has put a staple within this debate and most scholars have agreed to ideologically define the radical right family by means of its nativist and authoritarian orientation. On the other hand, the debate on other ancillary traits is far from being appeased, especially when scholars deal with the potential definitory role of RRPs' positions on economic policies. The aim of our study was to put these theoretical studies to an empirical test, starting from party-level data and by checking whether those who have been defined as the core features of the radical right family would have still maintained a crucial role in defining the ideological borders of the radical right or not, and whether the discriminating effect of RRPs' positions on the economy would have shaped within-family heterogeneity. The purpose of this demonstration was not to build a new classification, nor to establish a different and original theoretical approach to the radical right party family. The contribution of the thesis is more specific: we employed a data-driven research strategy to reverse the process of ideological characterization that the most relevant theoretical studies on the radical right have in common. Furthermore, if the debate is still open on what defines and encompasses European RRPs within the radical right family, all scholars seem to perfectly agree on which parties represent the family. Therefore, the requirement to let party data speak for themselves was impellent and necessary: once party data shape a classification, then we can test the ideological attributes of the resulting party gatherings. Results can be summarized as follows. First, the empirical clusters produce a classification which is coherent with the ones provided by the literature: when we compare our classification with others established in the literature, the members of our data driven cluster do not differ from those who were previously (and continuously) classified as RRPs. This trend is consistent through all the year waves we considered. Second, results confirm the centrality of both nativism and authoritarianism in shaping the radical right ideological outlook: the indicators representing both features always reach the highest positions within the variable importance score throughout all selected waves. Third, results also suggest the centrality of Euroscepticism in shaping the radical right family borders. If on the one hand a Eurosceptic position does not represent an issue that is fully owned by the radical right (given that an

aversion to the EU is also showcased by other party families), the anti-EU indicators always gained a high position in the score of importance, just like the two core features identified by the literature. So, even though harsh Euroscepticism is not a radical-right-only feature, it serves a crucial purpose in discriminating within the right side of the political spectrum between a radical (harshly anti-EU) and a center (more moderate on the issue) right. Fourth, results also confirm that economic positions are the main division line that shapes heterogeneity within the radical right family. Whenever we searched for the main discriminating indicators within the family, all economic variables were in first line by shaping two distinct groups: the one we labelled "neoliberal" subcluster, mainly composed by parties with an anti-statist approach and averse to wealth redistribution issues and public spending; and another characterized by more moderate, if not interventionist, economic positions. This sharp distinction has always been represented throughout the selected waves and confirms a solid and continuous separation among RRPs, in line with the branch of literature that highlights issues of heterogeneity even within a party family often perceived as monolithic and ideologically compact. Fifth and last, results also give empirical evidence of a process of radicalization that characterizes a group of center-right parties, which progressively get close to nativist and authoritarian positions. This trend became manifest in wave 2019, when the abovementioned neoliberal subcluster did not merge, as usual, with the interventionist radical right subcluster. Instead, it gathered with a branch of parties that had always been a part of the center-right group. This union was not motivated by a less radical approach from the established RRPs, quite the opposite it was the effect of a radicalization of a branch of the center-right on nativist and authoritarian issues. If the different positions on these issues used to keep neoliberal RRPs and neoliberal center-right parties separated, the sudden narrowing of this ideological gap made them meet. This finding is coherent with the literature on the so-called radicalization of the center-right and puts new questions on the table. Future research should therefore take into consideration the eventuality of an enlargement of the radical right family. Our results suggest that its ideological connotation and its core political issues are not at stake, and its borders could be enhanced to encompass new parties undertaking an evolution towards radicality. Future research could also head towards a refinement of the ideological convergence theories. Are all center-right parties converging into moderate and always less identifiable positions? Our results suggest that a solid branch of the center-right is headed to the opposite direction. However, the ideological core of the radical right family has been confirmed with precision in a three-headed set-up composed by nativism, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism. The rest of our study moved from here and it took this set-up on the other side of the competition, by investigating the radical right demand. Specifically, the main goal was to verify the existence of a potential electorate whose ideological connotations reflect RRPs' complex ideological set-up. We defined the potential voting

base by following the ideological characterization that empirically emerged through the cluster analysis we performed and, given that our results confirmed the main conceptual classifications in the literature, a common ideological outlook would have become what make both ends meet. The identification of a coherent radical right attitude within the public becomes important when put into the light of the main demand side studies on radical right voters. Despite the large number of socio-demographic, ideological, attitudinal, and value-based variables used to frame radical right voting and the characteristics of radical right voters, there is still no wide agreement on who votes for the radical right and, most crucially, why. Specifically, the only condition on which all scholars agree is the centrality of individual attitudes towards immigration in shaping radical right voting. An almost paradoxical scenario where multiple-issue parties correspond to single-issue voters. Therefore, the confirmation of a potential voting base which is structured on the base of individual attitudes that reflect the radical right complex ideological set-up would sustain the hypothesis that the conjunction among nativism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism does not only happen at the party level but is also relevant within the public. Given the still ongoing wide debate on the determinants for radical right voting and given that negative attitudes towards immigration are the only features which are agreed as a fact by the academic community, it is crucial to assess whether the complex ideological package that characterizes the radical right family also exists as a consistent attitude within the public. The results of our cluster analysis on the attitudes of European citizens (nested in 25 countries) indicate that we can indeed speak of a consistent radical right attitude spreading in most contexts in both the selected year waves. So, we can argue there is a coherent set of radical right ideas in the minds of voters. The negative stigma towards immigration is generally accompanied by a strong sense for authority (namely law and order) and harsh Euroscepticism in most European countries. On the other hand, economic preferences are often disjointed from this set-up. Along with the expectation to find a set of radical right attitudes within the public, we also formulated another expectation on the economic position. In a few words, we expected the radical right potential base to reflect the same economic position of the RRP operating in the selected country. This expectation was not confirmed by the analysis, given the lack of evidence for a coherent correspondence between supply and demand on economic issues. This leaves the debate on economic positions open. In any case, we were however able to determine the coexistence of radical right parties and radical right people: the complex ideological set-up that characterizes the radical right party family is mirrored by the same set-up of attitudes among the public. The last part of our empirical work focused on the connection between these two sides of political competition, namely whether holding what we called a radical right attitude could really enhance the probability to vote for a RRP. Therefore, first we extracted a radical right attitude indicator by performing a PCA on all three attitudinal variables we used to measure

nativism, authoritarianism, and Euroscepticism, then we used that indicator as the main independent variable within the probit model we employed to check the probability to vote for RRPs. We confirmed that *being* radical helps to *vote* radical across Europe: radical right attitude has a positive and always significant effect on the probability to vote for a RRP. Findings on the role of complex sets of ideological features on both party and public sides are our main contributions to a literature that has turned onto investigating single issues maybe too much in the past. We believe that, if on the one side multifaceted ideological outlooks can best frame party families, on the other the combination and the interaction among a set of ideological and attitudinal elements can enhance the understanding of party support, probably more than explanations based on social structural factors or single attitudes or preferences. This is our main suggestion for future research, also when dealing with new parties.

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