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A Grand Council

The formation of a political generation and the Lower Assembly
of the First Cisalpine Republic 1796-1799

Thesis for *Dottorato di ricerca*

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Introduction

“Sì, cittadini colleghi, questo popolo sovrano aspetta da noi (ed ha diritto di aspettarlo) il suo risorgimento e la sua gloria.”¹ These words were spoken in the first speech delivered at the opening of the first session of the *Gran Consiglio* of the Cisalpine Republic by Gregorio Fontana on 2 Frimaire Republican Year VI (22 November 1797). The “popolo sovrano” he is referring to are those who constitute the citizenry of the Cisalpine Republic, formed in modern North-Central Italy in the summer of 1797 with its capital in Milan. Fontana, as the oldest member of the lower assembly of the Cisalpine legislative branch, was selected to serve as the provisional president in the opening session and would preside over the initial election of the first council president.² He took the opportunity to deliver an impassioned and patriotic speech to his fellow representatives on their duties and the trials they would encounter in the next few months because of these duties. For Fontana, and many of his colleagues within the newly christened *Gran Consiglio*, the establishment of this body was an opportunity to restore the mythical glory of the Italian people, which intellectuals and politicians on the peninsula had been constructing for close to half a century.³ The Revolution in France, despite its excesses, seemed to provide an opportunity for the Italian people to implement this long sought-after hope. The development of the legislative branch according to the principals established by the French Constitution of Year III – implemented in that republic from 1795 – and then reaffirmed in the Cisalpine Constitution of 1797, seemed to provide the tools by which the “sovereign people” of Italy could obtain for themselves this ancient glory, steeped in principals of social, political and intellectual reformism and republicanism. “Il

¹ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:86 Discourse of Fontana. Trans.: “Yes, citizen colleagues, this sovereign people waits for us (and has the right to wait) to deliver its revival and its glory.”

² “Estratto de’ Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo. Seduta del giorno 19 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano” *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:8 Articolo 4.

³ De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. the Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796-1943*, 36.

legislatore deve in ogni tempo,” Fontana continued, “in ogni luogo, al popolo ch’ei rappresenta, l’esempio della virtù, della Costanza, dell’applicazione, dell’incorruttibilità.”⁴ The legislator was a servant to his nation and the *Gran Consiglio* was to be the voice of that nation. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* was viewed as being the constructor and exemplifier of republican values in Cisalpine society.

The *Gran Consiglio* was more than simply an organ of government. Constitutionally, if the entire revolutionary government of the Cisalpine Republic was a brain, the *Gran Consiglio* would be the pre-frontal cortex. Laws began their journeys in its halls, as proposals for solutions to the issues which plagued Northern Italian society at the end of the eighteenth century. It was also here that the construction of a modern Italian state was conceptualized. Politically, the *Gran Consiglio* was both the largest and most diverse body in the entire Cisalpine Government. It was constitutionally proscribed at 160 individuals, however over 230 were nominated across the ten-month period of its existence (from 2 Frimaire Year VI [22 November 1797] to 14 Fructidor Year VI [31 August 1798]). Its size allowed it to dominate the politics of decision making by the Spring of 1798 not even 4 months after its institutionalization. But perhaps the greatest strength of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* was that its ranks were filled with some of the most powerful and prolific revolutionaries, reformers, politicians, and legal minds on the entire Italian peninsula (and in some cases in all of the European continent) who would go on to not only control, but design Italian society for the next half-century. The men who made up the *Gran Consiglio* brought the societies from which they originated (for there were certainly more than one society existing in what would become the Cisalpine Republic) out of the shadow of old regime political and legal practices and into the nineteenth century. It was their activity in the fields of law, science, education, politics, social reform, intellectualism, administration, military science, diplomacy, and revolutionary rhetoric which combined in a distinctly Cisalpine fashion to form the legislative culture of the Cisalpine Nation in the year 1798.

Sadly, the *Gran Consiglio* as an entity has remained almost completely lost to history. With the exception of the early twentieth century publication of its *processi verbali* (the formal minutes of the assembly) in the *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, there has been almost no

⁴ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:86 trans.: “The legislator owes in every moment, in every place to the people he represents, the example of virtue, of consistency, of dedication and of incorruptibility”.

scholarship conducted on the impact of the Cisalpine Legislature on the development of its political culture.⁵ Those studies which have made mention of the Cisalpine legislative branch often discuss both the upper and lower house as if they existed as one entity, instead of the politically, socially and constitutionally diverse entities they truly were. Individual members such as Vincenzo Dandolo, Giuseppe Compagnoni and Giuseppe Fenaroli who went on to have storied careers in the later Republican and Imperial periods of the Napoleonic era received exclusive biographies or have seen their own autobiographies published and cited in the two centuries since the Council was reformatted in the autumn of 1798.⁶ However, mention of their time as representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* are extremely limited and do not provide a clear picture of the contributions these individuals made to the development of Cisalpine (and by extension Italian) political and legislative culture. More shocking still are the numerous other representatives who either did not survive to see the Napoleonic period on the peninsula following Marengo in 1800 (such as Fontana, Pietro Dehò, Giuseppe La Hoz) whose contributions to the *Gran Consiglio*'s political and legislative developments were more profound than many of those who found later success in the Italian Republic and Kingdom of Italy. What results from the lack of such a historical study is not only the voices of tens of men whose contributions quite literally built the foundation of Italian society and political culture in the early years of modern era, but a serious gap in constitutional and legislative history. This gap has plagued historians since the mid-nineteenth century, who have attempted to jump the Republican Triennio, and in particular the Cisalpine Republic, as a point of important legislative and political development, instead trying to bridge ancien regime political practices with those found in the later Napoleonic age. It is the Cisalpine Republic, and the *Gran Consiglio* as its legislative and political developmental base, which constructed the civic society of modern Northern and Central Italy.

This thesis seeks to rectify this serious hole in Revolutionary, Italian and Cisalpine history. By using the methodological principles found in late twentieth and early twenty-first century works on the French Revolution⁷, this doctoral thesis will focus on the important role which the *Gran*

⁵ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:I–CCLXXXVIII.

⁶ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*; Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*; Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*.

⁷ Once again, the methodological historiography will be examined in greater detail in Chapter I. However, the principal works which helped me to construct the arguments thesis came from the works of Timothy Tackett, C.J. Mitchell, André Castaldo and Michel Troper, all of whom worked on the construction of French Revolutionary legislative development throughout the 1790s. Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*; Castaldo, *Les*

Consiglio of the Cisalpine Republic – and in particular the individual men who made up its ranks – had on the development of the political and legislative culture of Northern Italy in the age of Revolutions. While the primary focus of the thesis will cover the immediate ten-months in which the *Gran Consiglio* existed under this name – beginning with the activation of the legislative branch on 2 Frimaire Year VI and ending with the Coup brought by French ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic Claude-Joseph Trouvé on 14 Fructidor Year VI – the thesis will also cover in depth the events of 1797 before the activation of the Legislature and in late 1798 and 1799 following the reformulation of the Council under the new constitution imposed by Trouvé on the Cisalpine republic. This time limit was selected for its precise nature, which allows greater focus on the legislative and political developments specifically brought forth by the *Gran Consiglio* during the period of free legislative formulation in late 1797 and 1798.

The thesis will make five principal arguments: First, that the *Gran Consiglio* of the Cisalpine Republic was the center of autonomous political and legislative development on the Italian peninsula from November of 1797 to August 1798. Second, that this political and legislative development was almost exclusively framed by the past and concurrent social, economic, political, professional, geographic, educational and historical backgrounds of the representatives who made up the *Gran Consiglio* during the period in question. Third, that this political and legislative development was formulated internally and can be measured by the structures of power, decision making, accountability and procedure which the Council created for itself during the period in question. Fourth that the political and legislative culture created in the *Gran Consiglio* directly affected the interactions which it had with other institutions and decision-making bodies, both foreign and domestic. And finally, the political and legislative cultures formed in the *Gran Consiglio* were heavily influenced by French Revolutionary Republican precedents and practices codified in the 1795 French Constitution of Year III, as well as the diverse political and legislative practices of the Italian peninsula in the old regime; however differences in interpretation, conditions (social, economic, military and political) and historical circumstance made these political and legislative cultures formed in the *Gran Consiglio* distinctly Cisalpine which had an effect on how it was received by later politicians and historians, both contemporary and modern.

méthodes de travail de la constituante; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*; Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*.

Context and questions

A more complete historiographical analysis will be conducted in Chapter I, however before beginning the thesis itself it is necessary to mention some general aspects of the historiographical context which led to the formulation of this project. The origins of this thesis in reality come from a 2017 Master's Thesis at Trinity College Dublin entitled *La Repubblica una e indivisibile: the formation of Italian Republicanism in the Cisalpine Republic during the triennio, 1796-1799, and its on Franco-Italian political cultural relations*. This thesis argued that aspects of Italian political culture which existed in the nineteenth century had their origins in the political culture formed in the Cisalpine Republic between 1796 and 1799; more importantly this Cisalpine political culture was in and of itself the direct result of a cultural blending of Italian *ancien regime* and French Revolutionary political practices. The production of this thesis guided me towards a historiographical tradition which richly analyzed the effects of the Franco-Cisalpine political relationship on future Italian politics in the Napoleonic and Restoration eras.

Using a largely traditional English historical methodology based on historiographical study and the analysis of historical reproduction, I soon adapted my ideas to the historiographic school first proposed by Professor Antonino De Francesco in the late 1990s.⁸ As will be demonstrated in Chapter I, Professor De Francesco's primary thesis (at least as it relates to the Republican Triennio) placed great importance both on the influence of the French Constitution of Year III and the effects of the occupying *Armée d'Italie* on Cisalpine (and more generally Italian politics).⁹ The work of De Francesco, along with others like French historians¹⁰ attracted me more than other modern

⁸ In reality, it was an Article by Katia Visconti from 2014 which originally led me to the work of Professor De Francesco. Her analysis of the historiography of the Cisalpine republic remains to this day the finest historiographical analysis of Italian Republicanism during the Triennio in the English language. It was her pointing out the serious gaps in Italian history which would be easily resolved with a more in depth look at the Cisalpine Republic and the Republican Triennio as a whole which inspired me to write both my Master's thesis and this doctoral dissertation. It is also thanks to this article that I was introduced to De Francesco's school of thought which has shaped so profoundly both studies. Visconti, "The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic."

⁹ For further information on De Francesco's analysis on the Franco-Cisalpine relationship during the Republican Triennio, and its relationship to Italian constitutionalism see: De Francesco, "Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia"; De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic"; De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*; De Francesco, "Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien."

¹⁰ De Francesco's work has seen complementing French historical research on both that Nation during the Directorial period as well as on the Italian peninsula. As will be explained further in the first Chapter of this thesis De Francesco's work is part of a new historiographical trend which can be applied to many different parts of Europe which focus on the unifying centrality of French political practices under the Constitution of Year III. Along with De Francesco, this new school of thought which focusses on political centrality and republican expansion has been championed by his chief French collaborators Pierre Serna and Bernard Gainot. Serna has been instrumental in the

historiographical traditions which were particularly popular in the anglosphere¹¹ because it set the Cisalpine case within its own context, not simply as a larger part of a past or future political movement. The idea that political culture – the norms and structures which allow political ideas to interact and guide the actions of individual politicians – could have such a profound impact on the progress of history, was compelling, as it disputed the generally materialistic arguments of the late-twentieth century Marxists, but also disputed the importance of purely cultural elements in

revisioning of the French political scene in the second half of the 1790s and has been fundamental in the recognition of what he terms “extreme centrism” a concept of political centralism which policed political radicalism on both the left and right to such a degree that it itself became an extreme in its moderation. For more on Serna’s ideas on extreme centrism and his exploration of Franco-Italian politics at the turn of the nineteenth century see: Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; Serna, “Radicalités et Modérations”; Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*; Like Serna, Bernard Gainot has served as an Important partner to De Francesco in the expansion of the new school of historical analysis of the French Revolution which focuses on political culture. Gainot has been instrumental since the 1980s in highlighting the importance of the Directorial period to later modern political development and has sought to define the concepts of Directorial politics through his understanding of Democratic-republicanism. He has successfully applied these concepts to state-building processes throughout the late 1790s across Europe and the greater Atlantic world. The best examples of these theories come from the following works: Gainot, *La Democrazia Rappresentativa. Saggia Su Una Politica Rivoluzionaria Nelle Francia Del Direttorio 1795-1799.*; Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; Gainot, “I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare”; Gainot, “Vers une alternative à la ‘ Grande Nation’”; Thanks in large part to the efforts of De Francesco, Gainot and Serna in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new generation of French scholars has emerged with a greater appreciation for the critical role which the Italian peninsula played in French political history during the Revolution. Many have come to explore this largely untapped fountain of information in more recent studies. One of the most successful has been Virginie Martin and her exploration of the Bergamasco Republic. Similarly, Annie Jourdan has been important in the continued exploration of French political ideological exploration in the Directorial period. For some more recent works highlighting these avenues of scholarship by French historians see: Martin, “Introduction”; Martin, “Le République de Bergame: Un ‘Avorton sans Vie’? La Réécriture Française d’une Révolution en Trompe-Lioeil”; Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution.*

¹¹ among some of the more popular modern and past English language historians of the period are Jonathan A Davis, Alexander Grab and their mentor Stuart Woolf. These Histories tended to put a much greater focus on both the eighteenth-century Italian Enlightenment movement and the later Napoleonic Imperial period. These histories often completely skipped over the Republican period, or else relegated it to a position of inferiority and a lack of political development which made it irrelevant. This is covered in greater depth in Chapter I. For some general ideas on the arguments made in this work see: Davis, “Introduction”; Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe*; Grab, “From the French Revolution to Napoleon”; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*; However, in modern English-language studies of Napoleonic and Revolutionary Europe, the work of Michael Broers of Oxford has come to be seen as the masterpiece from which most modern English-language scholarship is accomplished. His ideas of cultural imperialism have been applied to explain French actions across Europe but principally in Spain and Italy. However, as will be explained in Chapter I, Broer’s work suffers from a number of shortcomings. Perhaps most notably among these are both a lack of expansive, comparative, and balanced sources (he relies heavily on a highly biased French resource base to expound upon his central thesis of cultural colonialism) and a generic Northern European bias against Southern European tendency toward Machiavellian politics and Catholic inferiority. In reality, Broer’s work does little to explain the phenomena of Italian political diversity the way the theses of De Francesco et al. have attempted to do in recent years, instead choosing to play on old tropes of Italian inferiority at the hands of an imperialistic French state apparatus. Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814.*

historical development such as religion, socio-linguistics and historical memory championed by François Furet.¹²

The interpretation brought forth by De Francesco and others like him, combined the elements found in both Marxist materialism and Revisionist culturalism and combined it with the mid-twentieth century concepts brought forth by men like Robert R. Palmer¹³ and Jacques Godechot¹⁴ which regarded the international connectivity between all of the Revolutions which took place at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The final ingredient for this new historical interpretation was the centrality of Directory era politics and constitutionality on the development of European society. Politics was the unifying factor for aspects of culturalism, materialism and internationalism which had previously been identified in other historiographical traditions. In contraposition to the British and American attempts to justify colonial and post-colonial institutions by pointing to their origins in late eighteenth century revolutionary politics and policy making, De Francesco demonstrated how very new the political culture of the Directorial age was for European Society. His example of Italy was even more profound as the peninsula had long been viewed as a minor player in the larger stage of Revolutionary European politics.

Through the course of conducting my master's work, and finding myself more and more interested in the argument put forth by De Francesco, a question began to materialize: it is evident that this Cisalpine political culture existed, but from where did it materialize? A phenomenon of this scale, with such deep roots and long-lasting effects into the modern age was more than the sum of some intellectual pursuits made by outcast journalists in the periphery of Revolutionary Europe. I began to trace the contacts of some of the more notable protagonists in my master's thesis such as Matteo Galdi, Giuseppe Fantoni, Vincenzo Monti and Ugo Foscolo to understand why their ideas had such a profound impact on Italian political culture. What I discovered was that it was not their ideas which had impact but the laws which seemed to guide their philosophy. I concluded that it was the legislation of the Revolution which had in reality constructed this far-reaching political culture. While my master's research was too far developed to reverse course it

¹² Benigno, *Specchi Della Rivoluzione*, 27.

¹³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*.

¹⁴ Godechot, *Le Gran Nation. L'expansion Révolutionnaire de La France Dans Le Monde, 1789-1799*.

came to me that pursuing a study of the legislative origins of Cisalpine political culture would be a worthwhile doctoral thesis.

The initial construction of the doctoral proposal brought me to the work of Timothy Tackett whose 1996 *Becoming a Revolutionary* examined how the individual members of the French National Assembly – the first revolutionary legislative assembly in Europe during the age of Revolutions – used their political backgrounds to construct a new political culture for the entirety of France in the early phase of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1791.¹⁵ This focus on the prosopography of the legislative branch seemed to solve the methodological question of why certain legislation was constructed in a particular time and place. The original doctoral thesis saw a project which looked at the representatives who were nominated in both houses of the Cisalpine legislature, the *Consiglio dei Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio/Consiglio de'Juniori* and conduct a massive collective biography which would include every representative from birth to death. It became obvious from the initial months of research that the ambition for this project far outweighed the time and monetary resources which were allotted to me for a three-year doctoral project. After all, Tackett had taken ten years and had the financial backing of Princeton University to conduct his study.¹⁶ Instead, the project was scaled down to look at the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio/Consiglio de'Juniori*. This project would concentrate on the collective biography and its effects during and after the Triennio, looking specifically at the men from this Council who would go on to serve illustrious careers in the Napoleonic and Restoration Kingdoms on the Italian peninsula. It was assumed that these men took their experiences from their time in the lower house of the Cisalpine Legislative Assembly, (whose records had luckily been published in the collection *Le Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina* in the early twentieth century) and applied them to their successes in the later periods. Though ambitious, this project seemed much more manageable.

However, the oncoming of the 2020-2021 COVID-19 crisis and the subsequent closure of research centers across France and Italy, forced yet another revision of this original project. Without access to archives in these two nations, the completion of a prosopography would be impossible. It was decided to reduce the scope of the thesis once again, this time down to its bare roots. In the end this thesis was always meant to find the correlation between legislative production

¹⁵ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 13–15.

¹⁶ Tackett, 10.

and the development of political culture. Therefore, the new project would look exclusively at the period of autonomous legislative development between November 1797 and September 1798, in which the majority of legislation dictating political ideology was independently formulated by the members of the *Gran Consiglio*. This body was mandated under the Cisalpine Constitution of 1797 to understand the needs of the Cisalpine nation, formulate resolutions and translate these resolutions in practical pieces of legislation.¹⁷ Before November 1797, the legislature of the Cisalpine Republic did not exist, and politics was dominated by the will of General Napoleon Bonaparte and his *Armée d'Italie*. After September 1797, the Coup of Ambassador Claude-Joseph Trouvé saw the forced institutionalization of a new Constitution which limited Cisalpine political and legislative autonomy. Therefore, if the focus was on understanding the effects of representative's backgrounds on legislation, which in turn defined Cisalpine political culture, it stands to reason that the study should be focused on the period in which representatives' independent legislative creativity was at its highest; thus, under the *Gran Consiglio*.

Structure of the Thesis

The dissertation aims to answer the five main questions by separating the thesis into three parts. Part I examines the sources and methodology used to conduct the study, as well as the preliminary data which was collected and the modes of interpreting this data in a rationalized form. Part II argues that Cisalpine political and legislative development was formulated internally to the *Gran Consiglio* and can be measured by the structures of power, decision making, accountability and procedure which the Council created for itself during the period in question. Part III, seeks to use the various data sets and legislative instruments formulated in Parts I and II to first examine the interactions which the *Gan Consiglio* had with other institutions and decision-making bodies, both foreign and domestic, and second, to understand how the *Gran Consiglio* was influenced by French Republic based on contemporary political practices codified in the 1795 French Constitution of Year III.

Part I is divided into four chapters which look at sources and methodology. Chapter One gives an in depth look at the sources and historiographical context from which the dissertation was constructed. The chapter is divided into two parts: first the historiography of the Cisalpine

¹⁷ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," sec. Title V Article 74.

Republic as well as the methodological historiography which was used to design the project; second the chapter will look at the primary sources, including archival documents, published collections and online resources which were used to conduct historical research. Chapter II presents the first of three data sets, the quantitative data set, which presents the quantified subjective data take from the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*. The results of this quantified data can be found in Appendices B-D. Chapter III presents the second data set, the qualitative set, which defines the various political ideologies and commonalities which allow the representatives to be categorized based on political arguments they made throughout the period. This chapter formulates a three-dimensional political model upon which each of the representatives can be plotted. Chapter VI presents the third and final data set, the prosopographical information taken for the most powerful representatives who were nominated to the *Gran Consiglio*. This data set organizes the various pieces of biographical information into personal commonalities between individual representatives – termed “networks” – which are used to clearly explain the shared political ideologies between various groups and their influence on political alliances and rivalries.

Part II of the dissertation is the shortest and is divided into three chapters. It is devoted to understanding the internal developments of *Gran Consiglio* legislative culture, through the use of the data sets from Part I and argues that these internal developments had an effect on the formation of legislation which fundamentally altered the more general Cisalpine political culture. Chapter V of the thesis and the first in Part II looks at the nature of power and the methods by which its two most important aspects – personal and professional power – were acquired in the *Gran Consiglio*. Chapter VI looks at the origins and formation of legislative commissions in the *Gran Consiglio* and how they contributed to the acquisition of legislative power, perhaps the most important form of power a representative could obtain in order to influence political culture. Chapter VII looks more closely at legislative culture by separating into two segments: procedure and accountability. Both shared overlapping ideological origins which go back to the earliest days of the Revolution in France but were updated or changed to suit the Cisalpine political condition in 1798.

The third and final Part III, is the longest and is broken into four chapters. This final part concentrates on the use of legislative culture to interact with external bodies in Cisalpine society, both governmental and non-governmental. Part III opens with Chapter VIII, which looks at the rivalry between executive and legislative authority embodied in the clashes between the *Gran*

Consiglio and the Executive Directory and Ministry. This chapter also introduces a new concept into the historiography, the idea of the Messidor Crisis between the branches of Cisalpine government in the summer of 1798 and the Cisalpine Thermidorian Reaction. Chapters IX and X were originally meant to serve as a single chapter, but the sheer size of information in addition to a difference in categorization between interaction patterns means the single chapter was divided into two. However, both utilize a similar method of analysis to understand how the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* interacted with other institutions of Cisalpine political society. Chapter IX looks at the relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the *Consiglio dei Seniori*. A special focus is put on the contentious relationship between the two forces within the Cisalpine legislative branch, and how both attempted to usurp the authority of the entire legislature from the other. Chapter X, by contrast examines the interaction between the *Gran Consiglio* and the two most important institutions in Cisalpine society outside of the National government: The Catholic Church and local departmental political cultures. In both cases the *Gran Consiglio* made concessions and political challenges to gain control over the institutional politics of both bodies. Chapter XI closes out Part III and the main body of the dissertation by reinterpreting a long held historiographic preoccupation: the relationship to the diverse authorities of the French Republic and the Cisalpine Republic, though this time through the lens of the *Gran Consiglio*. This Chapter will look at how the diverse elements within the Council, as well as the entity of the *Gran Consiglio* as a whole, interacted with different aspects of the French republic including Bonaparte, Trouvé, the French Directory and the *Armée d'Italie*. It will end by looking at the effects of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship following the fall of the *Gran Consiglio* on 14 Fructidor Year VI (31 August 1798).

Part I

Sources and

Methodology

Chapter I

Sources

The opening chapter of the main text of this thesis is meant to provide a summary of the historiographical and evidence-based research which was conducted to construct the methodological data bases within the other three chapters of this first Part. Understanding the historiographical and primary source background of a study is the bread and butter of any historical research. Without a properly justified resource base the entire purpose of the study is called into question. The sources which came to be relied upon for this project have changed dramatically over the three-years since its original conception. What was originally a biographically heavy research set by the end had become one much more occupied with the legislative debate structure of the Cisalpine lower Legislative Assembly. This shift was the result of a number of technical issues and exploratory measures which included the denial of a long research stay in France, greater interest in the *Gran Consiglio* itself and its internal and external relationships and of course the difficulties imposed upon archival research thanks in large part to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic crisis. This alteration of resources similarly changed the position of this study within the greater historiography. While still innovative it aligned more towards a conventional historical study of Italy in the Revolutionary period, rather than the original ambitious recreation of Tackett's *Becoming a Revolutionary* for north Italy. And while many of the same historiographical sources remained the same (the work of Antonino De Francesco¹⁸, Pierre Serna¹⁹, Bernard Gainot²⁰, Katia

¹⁸ De Francesco, "Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia"; De Francesco, "Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien"; De Francesco, "Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français"; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*; De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic"; De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

¹⁹ Serna, "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio"; Serna, "Le Directoire, miroir de quelle République?"; Serna, "Radicalités et Modérations"; Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*.

²⁰ Gainot, "Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire"; Gainot, "I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare"; Gainot, "Vers une alternative à la ' Grande Nation.'"

Visconti²¹, Robert, R. Palmer²² and Annie Jourdan²³ remaining some of the key authors from which the historical content was based), the methodological base expanded dramatically to include new and multidisciplinary tools. Oddly enough in many ways this gave birth to the most innovative and truly “non-classic” aspect of this study, whose forebearers often relied on a strict historical or political methodology.

The main catalyst for this change in resources and in historiographical methodology is – as has already been hinted at – the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic. Before the pandemic hit Lombardy in February of 2020, the structure of this thesis was predicated on a three-month research mission which would have provided a high volume of biographical information for many of the 238 representatives which were the focus of the original study. These records, housed primarily in Paris with some documents in Grenoble, would have offered insight into the lives of these men before during and after the events of 1797-1798 in Milan. The sample focus group had already been selected from a high volume of work the year before regarding the debates held within the Council and registered within the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio* (a process explained further in Chapters II and IV).

The travel prohibition and the closure of archives and libraries across Europe essentially ended this research line before it could begin. Without the ability to consult these biographical documents it would be impossible to complete a well formulated prosopographical study, especially given the prolonged timeline which the project originally called for. It thus became necessary to reassess which documents could be logically useful for continued study given the circumstances and how then the dissertation could be reshaped to extract a decent history of the legislative and political culture formulated by the *Gran Consiglio* in the years 1797-1798. Thanks in large part to the enormous research undertaken of the previous year, it was decided that the *processi verbali* would become the central document source from which all other primary source material would act as supplements. As such archival research, when the documents finally became available briefly in the summers of 2020 and 2021, became much more highly focused on the actions of individuals inside and outside of the council in the years 1797 to 1799. The *processi*

²¹ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*; Visconti, “The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic”; Visconti, “Liberty of Press and Censorship in the First Cisalpine Republic.”

²² Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*; Palmer, *From Jacobin to Liberal: Marc-Antoine Jullien, 1774-848*.

²³ Jourdan, “La Convention ou l’empire des lois”; Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*.

verbali, and the combination of extracted quantitative data from 2018 and new qualitative data acquired with a revisit to the source material in the months of closure and quarantine in the spring and winter of 2020-2021 allowed the restructuring of the thesis as described in the introduction. It is the source material which dictated the argument not the other way around.

This chapter will therefore present the sources used in great detail. It will begin by looking at the historiography of the Cisalpine republic, and the place of legislative history within this much larger historiographical tradition. This examination will look principally at the three historiographical language traditions utilized for this thesis, English, French and primarily Italian, and see how this study fits into each. This first section will be concluded by looking at the historiographical methodology which helped to shape the structure of the thesis and its development from the initial proposal of the project to its final form today. Next the chapter will delve into the principal primary source utilized for this thesis, the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*. In this section, the structure of the text will be described, the edition used (the early nineteenth century republication of the *processi verbali* with additional documents edited by Camillo Montalcini and Annibale Alberti) and its relationship to the original printed versions of the *processi verbali* found in the 1798 *Il Redattore del Gran Consiglio*. The final section is divided in two parts. The first looks at the archival research conducted both in France and Italy. The second and final section examines other published and republished volumes of primary and biographical texts which can be found online or within the libraries of “La Statale”.

The *Gran Consiglio* from the English, French, and Italian language historiographical traditions

The institution of the *Gran Consiglio*, while playing a seemingly large part within the daily governance of the Cisalpine Republic, has unfortunately been lost within the historiographical interpretations of this period.²⁴ For this reason, the historiographical materials used for this thesis and analyzed in this chapter will not necessarily focus on the accounts made in the past 200 years regarding the *Gran Consiglio* but instead the secondary sources pertaining to the First Cisalpine Republic and the greater Italian Republican Triennio (1796-1799). For purposes of brevity the English, French, and Italian language historiographical traditions will remain the primary focus of

²⁴ Visconti, “The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic.”

this examination, though it may be said that even in other historiographical traditions of the Sister Republics (primarily Dutch, Swiss and German) the *Gran Consiglio* is a side detail, if existent at all.

There is little argument that at an international level the English language has taken a dominant place as the lingua franca in most political, commercial, and academic interactions. Yet, in the historical study of Italy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the English language historiographical tradition remains largely behind contemporary research coming from other continental European language traditions, in particular French and Italian. The lack to archival material – due mostly to distance, but also thanks to a strong tradition of historiography in Anglo-American historical studies – saw an English recounting of the history of the Republican Triennio heavily utilize translated popular works by figures like Benedetto Croce or Carlo Botta.²⁵ One of the early intentions of this doctoral project as it was under development in 2018 was to bring a strongly archival and published primary source based study into the English language historiographical tradition of both Italy during the Republican Triennio, but also of the revolutionary period in southern Europe more generally.

It is difficult to find mentions of the Italian Sister Republics within the Anglo-American traditions before the publication of the second part of R.R. Palmer's *Age of the Democratic Revolution* in 1964.²⁶ Palmer not only acknowledged the importance of the Italian peninsula but dedicated an enormous portion of the second volume of this work to looking at the political, cultural and economic histories of each of the Sister republics developed on the Peninsula between 1796 and 1799, with a particular focus on the Cisalpine Republic. He developed the concept of “Cisalpinization” which he defined as the adaptability of other Sister Republics in the late 1790s to the French Revolutionary system, citing the Cisalpine case as arguably the most successful in terms of constitutional, legislative, executive and administrative development.²⁷ Palmer developed a thesis on the Italian experience at the turn of the nineteenth century which saw the Italian Sister Republics, especially the Cisalpine republic, becoming a central – if not the central – foreign influence on French revolutionary tradition going into the Napoleonic era. Palmer for the first time

²⁵ Some key examples of the work presented by these scholars which have been frequently cited in the English speaking world are Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*; Botta, *Storia d'Italia Continuata Da Quella Del Guicciardini Sino al 1814*; Croce, *La Rivoluzione Napoletana Del 1799: Biografie, Racconti, Ricerche*.

²⁶ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 568–635.

²⁷ Palmer, 617–23.

studied Revolutionary and Napoleonic Italy as a culturally and politically significant entity in itself not simply the foundational period of the more important Risorgimento movement along which it had been defined in Italian historiography for the past 150 years. To this day Palmer's examination of the Triennio within the context of Atlantic revolutions remains the most extensive in English language historiography.

British historians like Denis Mack Smith and Stuart Woolf, both of whom published important works in 1966 and 1969 respectively, examined the Cisalpine experience from the point of view of the Italian unification movement of the early nineteenth century.²⁸ An English language expert on the Risorgimento at Cambridge University and a close friend to Croce, Mack Smith kept within the framework of Croce's theories by bringing to the English-speaking world the importance of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras as an initial point of political development for the Risorgimento movement. Simultaneously, at Oxford, Stuart Woolf was in the process of constructing an entirely new school of interpretation which concentrated on the early years of the nineteenth century under the Consulate and Empire, and almost complete excludes the republican triennio on the Italian peninsula.²⁹ Works like his 1979 *A History of Italy 1700-1860* places the Napoleonic period at the center of a changing political, cultural, and intellectual reality on the Italian peninsula which endured over 150 years.³⁰ Though the first half of the book revolves around the Italian Enlightenment in the major centers of Milan, Rome, Florence, Venice and Naples, for Woolf, the Napoleonic period was a turning point in Italian history which made the administrative and political developments of the early nineteenth century possible on the peninsula. He played up French prejudices from the time and applied his own contemporary biases against southern Europeans into a general idea which saw Italians as incapable of uniting under a collective central administration without the direction of the French Imperial structure.

Yet these histories, and others which followed in the English tradition, failed to mention the *Gran Consiglio*, placing it as a footnote to the much more dramatic recounting of famous figures such as Ugo Foscolo or Vincenzo Cuoco, or the tragic story of the Neapolitan Jacobins.³¹

²⁸ For a more in depth look at Mack Smith's interpretation see Mack Smith, *The Making of Italy 1796-1866*; Woolf, *The Italian Risorgimento*.

²⁹ Englund, "Monstre Sacré: The Question of Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire," 217.

³⁰ For a more in depth look at the interpretation of Stuart Woolf see Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*.

³¹ Miller, "Italian Jacobinism"; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*; Davis, "Introduction"; Grab, "From the French Revolution to Napoleon." These histories, while not by any

The mid-1990s into the early 21st century saw a rise of what Stephen Englund termed “the Woolf pack”.³² This group of largely English historians based in the United States worked off of the general lines of historical study proposed by Woolf which emphasized the failures and successes of the “harsh” imperial Napoleonic regime on the Italian peninsula in the early years of the nineteenth century. They largely ignored the Revolutionary years as footnotes to the more important imperial period, due to what was perceived to be the great failure of the Sister Republic in establishing stable states. John A. Davis, an English historian based out of the University of Connecticut, looked extensively at the impact of the Napoleonic years in the south of Italy and its impact on later interactions with the nineteenth century unification movement.³³ Davis in particular has become renowned for his work with concurrent Italian scholars of the south who continued to place great importance on the patriot movements in Naples especially as one of the roots of radical nationalism in nineteenth century Italy. Alexander Grab is another historian working in the US who focused on the North under Napoleonic occupation, in particular the modern regions of Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna.³⁴ Grab’s work has looked at the important administrative developments of the Republic and Kingdom of Italy such as the administration of state finances, military and police structures and brigandage in the peripheral areas. Grab’s work perhaps more than any of the others in the Woolf pack has remained along lines of Woolf’s original thesis which sought to underline the different interpretations of Revolution in republican Europe while maintaining French supremacy. However, both Grab and Davis have successfully furthered Woolf’s ideas about the Napoleonic period in Italy as an administrative and political turning point for the various states of the peninsula. As a result of this they have successfully augmented the position of the early nineteenth century as the roots of the later unification movement and have been able to move away from older concepts by Mack Smith and the Cambridge historians who

means a complete list of later 20th century and early 21st century works on revolutionary Italy by Anglo-Saxon historians, do follow the formula of set by Woolf and Mack Smith by identifying Revolutionary Italy as the initial stages of the Risorgimento and not as an active part of the greater European Revolutionary experience of the later 1790s. It should also be noted that this section discusses only those historians who publish from the English-speaking tradition and not necessarily all publications in English. It does not include works by French and Italian authors like Pierre Serna, Antonino De Francesco, Anna Maria Rao, Katia Visconti, and numerous others who have published works on the Italian experience in English but whose work largely belongs to the French or Italian historiographical traditions.

³² Englund, “Monstre Sacré: The Question of Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire,” 218.

³³To understand the basic tenor of Davis’s argument see Davis, “Introduction”; Davis, *Naples and Napoleon. Southern Italy and the European Revolutions (1780-1860)*.

³⁴ For information on Grabs interpretation see Grab, “From the French Revolution to Napoleon”; Grab, *Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe*.

continued to insist upon the linear development of Italian politics from enlightenment to Risorgimento.

However, no other recent English historian has had quite the impact on English language historiography of Revolutionary Italy as Michael Broers from Oxford. Broers came to be the preeminent scholar in Napoleonic Italy at the turn of the twenty-first century in the Anglo-American world. His most famous work *Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814* provides the central themes for Broers' conceptualizations on the nature of Italy under the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic regime.³⁵ Broers sought to understand the nature of French systems in the Italian states of the period, and the question of cultural imperialism in which the French seemed to force their own methods of administration and political practice on a resistant or incapable Italian people. According to Broers, there was no toleration of deviation from the French standard and only collaborators would find political success in a new post-Revolutionary Italy. As with other English-language scholars, the republican triennio was offered very little attention, except perhaps to establish the early years of Bonaparte's institutionalization of cultural imperialism through his formation of a hand-picked Italian political elite who would serve as his collaborators against public resistance during the First French Empire. He developed a concept of internal and external empire which saw two distinct Napoleonic regimes being developed; on the interior (France and its annexed departments) rested the fruits of the French revolution and the liberties and rights which had been earned since 1789; on the exterior however (which constituted satellite states such as the Kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Spain and Batavia for example) lied an oppressive French regime founded upon military discipline and harsh repercussions for dissent. The politics of the periphery were the result of forced European centralization.

Broer's work has become in many ways the guiding interpretation of Napoleonic and Revolutionary Italy in the twenty-first century. His thesis of cultural colonialism has been seen as a soft opening of nineteenth century liberal European colonialism across the continent and has been adopted on both sides of the Atlantic as the defining feature of Napoleonic studies. Broers' work however raises a number of questions, in particular those related to sourcing. Stephen Englund points out that while Broers' does tend to be more open than past historians like Woolf and Mack Smith, to the contribution of the French State to nineteenth century Italian political

³⁵ Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*.

culture and administrative structures outside of the nationalist movement, Broers' almost exclusive reliance on French sources often has led to an integration of contemporary French biases against Italian political commentators of the time.³⁶ In reality it is his examination of the internal and external empire which has remained the strongest part of his thesis, although it would perhaps be a more apt argument for the states of the republican triennio and their relationship to metropole both internally (Milan) and in relation to Paris.

Crossing the channel, one finds an entirely different, and yet uncomfortably similar problem with the French language historiography. In France the treatment of the Italian peninsula in the Revolutionary age was, for the majority of its historiographical tradition (until the revisionists of the mid-twentieth century at least), a footnote in the story of Bonaparte's rise to Emperor. One is hard-pressed to find a detailed analysis of the Republican triennio in the works of Michelet, Jure, Lefebvre or Vovelle – to name a few of the most notable French historians of the Revolution. When the triennio is mentioned, it is often linked to the events taking place in France such as the political turbulence stemming from the wars with Piedmont or the Hapsburg Austrians, or else as a part of the story of Napoleon Bonaparte. It is really only with Jacques Godechot, and his seminal work *La Grande Nation* in 1956, that the Italian peninsula and in fact the Cisalpine republic more specifically, received any sort of detailed treatment in the French language.³⁷ Godechot confronted the idea of the Italian peninsula as a breeding ground for political activity and revolution in his article linking the events of the Conspiracy of equals to its Italian actors (namely Buonarrotti).³⁸ However with the *La Grande Nation* Godechot looked at the Cisalpine Republic as an entity in itself. He used contemporary and more modern Italian interpretations of Cisalpine patriotism and married them to his own interpretations of the bourgeois republicanism which defined the Directorial period in France. In this way Godechot provided a place for future revisionists to see Italy not as a footnote, but as a major influence in French politics, particularly those Italians with a more politically centered tone. Godechot's interpretation was in many ways responsible for the birth of Palmers engagement with the Cisalpine Republic some years later in the *The Age of Democratic Revolutions*.

³⁶ Englund, "Monstre Sacré: The Question of Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire," 244.

³⁷ Godechot, *Le Gran Nation. L'expansion Révolutionnaire de La France Dans Le Monde, 1789-1799*.

³⁸ Godechot.

In the wake of Godechot's introduction of the Italian peninsula as a central hub of Revolutionary politics in the Directorial age, French historiography split into roughly two positions on Italy and the Cisalpine Republic. On one side sat more left-wing Marxist historians who began – in a similar manner as the “Woolf pack” in the anglosphere – to look towards the contemporary studies of Marxist Italian historians such as Carlo Capra or Stefano Nutini (a bit later on in the twentieth century). Alain Pillepich, in a style much more similar to that of the Oxford historians, took a keen interest in the critical period of French occupation of the peninsula in his work *Napoleon et les italiens*.³⁹ Pillepich continued to push the narrative similarly championed by Broers and others in Italy (Such as Livio Antionelli covered later in this section), that the true development of Italian political culture only took place after the French reentrance following the Battle of Marengo. He painted the Triennio as a period of education and mistakes which provided the new Napoleonic regime in Italy after 1800 an example of what *not* to do. Similarly, Pillepich draws on older troupes of Italian reliance on the Catholic Religion, administrative disorganization, and a general distrust of an occupying French regime to frame his argument.

However, in France Pillepich seems to be a rare case in which continental historians found themselves in agreement with their less developed English neighbors. Godechot's work simultaneously gave birth to another interpretation of the Directorial period in Italy, thanks in part to the innovations made by Bernard Gainot to the understanding of the Directorial period in Europe as a whole. Gainot developed a thesis which focused on the more politically centered nature of post-thermidorian political culture, looking exhaustively at the controlling interests of the French government in Paris which he termed the “democratic republicans”.⁴⁰ Gainot successfully recognized the changing nature both of politics and legislative structures born from the Constitution of Year III which were based on the concept of representative democracy.⁴¹ Gainot advanced Godechot's ideas of the grand federation of Republican states at the end of the 1790s by placing it within the context of the this centrist political movement;⁴² as a focus for his studies of the application of this new republicanism, Gainot chose the Italian peninsula and in particular the

³⁹ Pillepich, *Napoléon et Les Italiens. République Italienne e Royaume d'Italie*.

⁴⁰ Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire.”

⁴¹ Gainot, *La Democrazia Rappresentativa. Saggia Su Una Politica Rivoluzionaria Nelle Francia Del Direttorio 1795-1799*.

⁴² Gainot, “Vers une alternative à la ‘ Grande Nation.’”

Cisalpine Republic.⁴³ Gainot recognized the strong relationship which existed between the French and Cisalpine Republics from the latter's foundation, and the exchange of political cultural ideas across the alps which were divided by a number of highly factious political groupings, instead of two politically homogenous entities.

The late 1990s into the twenty-first century saw this idea of French Directorial centrism and the fundamentality of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship further expanded upon by the work of Pierre Serna. Serna formulated the idea of what he called the French "extreme center", which was essentially a collection of individuals and ideas which worked hard to maintain an extreme balance of power between left and right, using political savagery and even violence if necessary to maintain a political stability in between the extreme's.⁴⁴ This extreme center saw an ebb and flow of followers from 1795 to 1800 which included members of the French Directory, Legislative Assemblies and military establishment including such important names as Bonaparte, Barras, Ruebell and Le Révellière-Lépeaux. These figures strove for a moderation in politics which was radical in itself.⁴⁵ Serna has understood the universality of this political movement as well, looking transatlantically to its application and its central position within the politics of the Sister Republic system.⁴⁶ His analysis of members of the French Assemblies, such as his biographical work on Antonelle, have consistently mentioned the internationality of this centrist politique and its importance in the political decisions of the Directory period in France. His ideas have heavily influenced the political analysis of Northern Italian institutional and political cultural studies of the Triennio (including this thesis).

Yet, even today within the French historiographical tradition, the study of the Italian peninsula during the Republican Triennio remains rare, and studies of the Cisalpine republic itself practically non-existent. Those which have been published in French generally come from foreign writers (mainly Italian based) or younger French historians - the most successful to this point being Virginie Martin and her work on the Bergamasco Republic.⁴⁷ Another figure who has similarly

⁴³ Gainot, "I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare."

⁴⁴ Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*.

⁴⁵ Serna, "Radicalités et Modérations."

⁴⁶ Serna, "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio"; Serna, "Le Directoire, miroir de quelle République?"; Serna, "Small Nation, Big Sisters."

⁴⁷ Martin, "Le République de Bergame: Un 'Avorton sans Vie'? La Réécriture Française d'une Révolutio En Trompe-L'œil."

supported the internationality of the Directorial model is Annie Jourdan. Jourdan's latest work in particular, has presented the history of the French Revolution, not as an internal struggle which occurred from 1789 to 1794 with an epilogue of the Directorial period 1795-1799, but as an international movement which effected the entirety of Europe from 1789 to 1800.⁴⁸ Jourdan's work has similarly placed the Italian Sister Republics, along with their counterparts in the Netherlands and Switzerland, at the heart of this international movement, placing the Directorial period not as an epilogue but as the majority of the story.

That said, while both French and English language histories of the republican Triennio and the Cisalpine Republic more specifically have arisen independently in their own manner, the tradition with the most developed discourse on the *Gran Consiglio* – and of the concept of republicanism in Italy during the late 1790s more generally – would be from its native Italian. To cover the entirety of this historiographical tradition would constitute a work in itself, as has been done by authors like Katia Visconti and Antonino De Francesco.⁴⁹ Therefore it is perhaps more prudent to highlight the overall trends in the Italian language historiographical tradition, and the way in which authors did or did not integrate the *Gran Consiglio*.

Works like that of Carlo Botta's 1824 *Storia d'Italia dal 1789 al 1814* (edited and published by former *Gran Consiglio* representative Francesco Reina) and his *Storia d'Italia continuata da quella del Guicciardini sino al 1814* written in Milan in 1842-1843, set a tone for authors and former actors of Napoleonic Italy who found themselves on either side of the new political war arising between restoration governments like the Austrian Empire, The Restored Papal states and The Kingdom of Two Sicilies and a burgeoning unification movement among patriots new and old.⁵⁰ Botta remains a prime example of the earliest histories of the Triennio, which often came from important political actors in the period attempting to alter their roles in the rise and fall of the First Cisalpine Republic according to the audience they intended to appease – be it restoration reactionaries or liberal patriots.⁵¹ When mentioned, the *Gran Consiglio* was an

⁴⁸ Jourdan, "La Convention ou l'empire des lois"; Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*.

⁴⁹ De Francesco, *Mito e storiografia della "Grande rivoluzione"*; Visconti, "The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic."

⁵⁰ Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*; Botta, *Storia d'Italia Continuata Da Quella Del Guicciardini Sino al 1814*.

⁵¹ One of the more famous instances of this was the autobiography of former *Gran Consiglio* member Giuseppe Compagnoni republished in 1988. This autobiography paints Compagnoni as a more conservative Italian politician though with strong ties to the young General Bonaparte. It is clearly intentioned to endear the former abbot both to

example to be avoided by future generations, framed as either an anarchical mess of sacrilege and violence or the failed experiment of republicanism manipulated and dominated by corrupting external influences. This attitude pervaded throughout the rest of the century as the Risorgimento progressed, and “patriotic” interests took precedent.⁵²

The onset of the Risorgimento in the mid-nineteenth century saw a rising interest in the republican efforts of the Triennio and Napoleonic years, with a new focus on the men who had constructed the First Cisalpine Republic. This period saw a wave of biographies and legal compositions published, in particular from the years 1796-1802. Following the completion of the unification process after 1871, authors like Trivaroni and De Casto began to look at the politics of the Triennio republics – in particular the nationalist policies – for examples of how to formulate the new Italian political and cultural identity in what remained a largely fractured peninsular nation. Legislative politics however, remained largely points of disinterest, the *Gran Consiglio* not even registering on the radar of many mid to late nineteenth century authors. One exception would be Francesco Cusani’s 1867 work, which highlighted the patriotic efforts of the Cisalpine assemblies, whose fate – according to Cusani – was sealed by the interventionist policies of French authorities (a topic later reintroduced by Zaghi in the second half of the twentieth century).⁵³

By the early twentieth century, historians of the pre-Fascist era such as Francesco Lemmi and Arrigo Solmi began to acknowledge the effects of the French occupation on the burgeoning nationalist movement of the late 1790s. Despite this, these historians remained within the bounds of the purveying political nationalism of the first decades of the 1900s, continuing to insist upon the idea the unification movement itself was born mostly out of the Italian historical context. Solmi’s assessment of the successful implementations of eighteenth-century Italian spiritual nationalism was not built upon the understanding of a new Italian revolutionary political culture

the returned Hapsburg reactionaries as well as former Bonapartists who were able to maintain power following the fall of the Empire in 1815; Savini 1988

⁵² De Tipaldo, *Biografia degli italiani*; Pizzoli, *Notizie Intorno Alla Vita Del Conte Vincenzo Brunetti*; Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche Sopra l’Università e l’istituto Delle Scienze Di Bologna*; Tinelli, *Topografia Storica Di Milano Ossia Prospetto Delle Cose Principali Che Costituiscono La Rinomanza, Il Lustrò Ed Il Benessere Della Metropoli Milanese*; Pisacane, *Saggi Storici, Politici, Militari, Sull’Italia*; Cantù, *Il Tempo Dei Francesi (1796-1815)*. *Brano Di Storia d’Italia*; Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*; Nievo, *Le Confessioni Di Un Italiano*; De Castro, *Milano e La Repubblica Cisalpina Giusta Le Poesia, Le Caricature Ed Altre Testimonianze Del Tempo*; Tivaroni, *Storia Critica Della Rivoluzione Francese*; Tivaroni, *L’Italia Durante Il Dominio Francese (1789-1815)*.

⁵³ Cusani, *Storia Di Milano*.

but the successful formation of national political institutions formulated under the Republic and Kingdom of Italy in the first decades of the nineteenth century.⁵⁴ Others like Ettore Rota and Stefano Canzio, followed this ideological line, going further perhaps by highlighting the Italian eighteenth century intellectual developments as a political, social and economic national awareness, rather a revolutionary republican inspiration.⁵⁵ It is therefore easy to understand why an institution like the *Gran Consiglio*, and in particular its manifestation in the first half of 1798, would be overlooked in these circumstances. Instead, the focus was shifted to the disastrous events of 1799 and the fallout of French heavy-handedness in Italian politics across the peninsula in 1798.

These mostly northern writers highlighted the differences between the more autonomous Cisalpine and Ligurian republics and the failed Jacobins in Naples, who had emulated instead of adapting French ideology. Interestingly, contrary to these more popular Northern writers, proponents of the *Mezzogiorno* in contemporary political thought, like Benedetto Croce, sought to highlight the success of the Neapolitan Jacobin movement without French intervention, hailing the southern patriots as the bastion of Italian liberty and nationalism.⁵⁶ Similarly, other liberal writers followed Croce in highlighting the heroism of Southern patriotism in the 1799 fall of the Sister Republics. Historians like Renato Soriga focused on the political development which many of these southern individuals underwent between the uprisings at the beginning of 1799 and their eventual refuge in France later that year – a story which later historians, particularly English historians from Cambridge following in Mack Smith's steps, would use as the basis for their histories of the revolution in Italy.⁵⁷

The fascist period of Italian politics lead to an even more extreme exaggeration of the Italian role in the development of the nationalist movement at the end of the eighteenth century. Led by important fascist idealists such as Italo Bilbo or Solmi, who over the years had become a leading member of the Fascist historical community, the Triennio came to be seen as a historical justification for the failures of democracy and republicanism.⁵⁸ These historians pointed to 1798

⁵⁴ Solmi, "La Genesi Del Risorgimento Nazionale"; Solmi, *Napoleone e l'Italia*; Solmi, *Storia Politica d'Italia Dalle Origini Ai Nostri Giorni*.

⁵⁵ Canzio, "L'espansione Del Movimento Nazionale Italiano Durante La Prima Repubblica Cisalpina"; Rota, "Le Origini Del Risorgimento 1700-1800"; Canzio, *La Reazione Antifrancesa Duranrte La Prima Repubblica Cisalpina*.

⁵⁶ Croce, *La Rivoluzione Napoletana Del 1799 : Biografie, Racconti, Ricerche*.

⁵⁷ Soriga, "Per La Storia Dei Rifugiati Meridionali Sotto La Prima Cisalpina"; Soriga, "Un Amico Dell'Italia: M.A. Jullien"; Soriga, "La Borghesia Nazionale al Potere e Le Sue Aspirazioni Politiche Durante Il Triennio Cisalpino."

⁵⁸ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 35–37.

as evidence for the failure of the Triennio Republics in 1799. They furthered older nationalist ideas which placed the consequences the Austro-Russian invasion in the north and the Bourbon return to the South squarely on the shoulders of the French left and their “neo-Jacobin” Italian allies. They contrasted this period with the more peaceful and unified Napoleonic era, using the administrative and military developments of the period as a justification for anti-democratic politics. These fascist histories even saw the adoption in some cases of Napoleon as an Italian national hero given his ancestry (though this was not popularized even among fascists).

Interestingly, opponents to this line of thinking, like Delio Cantimori, Armando Saitta and Alessandro Galante Garrone, who came to the forefront of the historical community in the immediate post-war era and viewed the Triennio as the origins of Italian radicalism and republican virtues, would also exclude the *Gran Consiglio* from their histories.⁵⁹ They too looked at the institutions of the Cisalpine Republic with disdain, viewing them as puppets of a moderate French State, working against the interests of patriotic Italian Jacobins, whom they made the focus of their studies. Instead, these historians attempted to draw connections with the French left of the pre-Thermidorian period, in particular during the era of the Convention and the Constitution of 1793. A rise in the study of individual radical figures came to prominence in these histories, in particular Filippo Buonarroti, whose biography written by Saitta came to be the fundamental text of the entire radical school in the post-war period.⁶⁰ Garrone similarly looked at Buonarroti and his relationship to the French left, in particular with Babeuf and the defunct Jacobin movement in the post-Thermidorian era. Though particular individuals inside the council might be given attention, such as Francesco Reina or Giuseppe La Hoz, the *Gran Consiglio* itself came to be seen by left-wing Italian historians as the antithesis of republicanism, despite the advances made in early 1798. Other left-wing historians from the post-war period like Carlo Capra attempted to understand the minority Jacobin movement in the Cisalpine republic.⁶¹ These histories were heavy in their use of radical literature at the time, and attempted to explain the general lack of Jacobin power in Italy along demographic lines, which separated the young Cisalpine nation into an enlightened

⁵⁹ Garrone, *Buonarroti e Babeuf*; Saitta, *Filippo Buonarroti. Contribuiti Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*; Cantimori and De Felice, *Giacobini Italiani*; Saitta, “Spunti per Uno Studio Degli Atteggiamenti Politici e Dei Gruppi Sociali Nell’Italia Giacobina e Napoleonica.”

⁶⁰ Saitta, *Filippo Buonarroti. Contribuiti Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*.

⁶¹ Capra, “Un ricerca in corso: i collegi elettorali della Repubblica Italiana e del Regno Italico”; Capra, “Il Giornalismo Nell’età Rivoluzionaria e Napoleonica.”

aristocracy and bourgeois on one hand and on the other hand, a counter-revolutionary peasantry, who was supported by a Catholic powerbase from Rome and Austrian Veneto.

Ironically, the *Gran Consiglio* finally finds itself the protagonist of a historical interpretation at the hands of the fascist leaning author Carlo Zaghi. A close friend to Italo Balbo, Zaghi's initial work, similar to that of other nationalist historians, looked at the Napoleonic period as the seat of Italian nationalism.⁶² However, unlike other nationalists, in particular Solmi, Zaghi went back to the Triennio period as the origins of this nationalist sentiment.⁶³ Ironically, he used arguments found in the left-wing tradition, principally the polemics which arose within the Cisalpine governmental structures between the interests of the French authorities and their moderate allies and those of the Italian patriots.⁶⁴ The struggle between these two forces pervades through all of Zaghi's work. It stands to reason therefore, that Zaghi used the debates which raged within the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular those concerning finances and administration, as the primary source to argue for the existence of this struggle between these two forces (moderate and patriotic) and their role within the birth of Italian nationalism. In contrast to other previous histories, Zaghi looked to the period from Frimale to Fructidor Year VI, not only for the ratification of the Military and Commercial treaties between the French and Cisalpine Republics, but for the numerous debates which occupied the representatives of the Cisalpine Legislature.⁶⁵ And yet, even for his introduction of this crucial institution into the scholarship of the Triennio, Zaghi continues to simplify, in the most reductive way possible, the debates and figures which dominated *Gran Consiglio* politics. When describing the newly introduced political culture as it was seen at the beginning of 1798 Zaghi describes a government where there "were are not found representatives elected by various classes, but only people designated by Bonaparte" and whose function within the parliamentary debates was more "truly personal interest or that of the department to which they belonged, than public interests."⁶⁶ Zaghi's interpretation failed to understand the complexity of these debates. For one thing the council was not formed of two district partisan blocks, but a number of fluid ideological strains. Secondly, within these debates – as will be demonstrated

⁶² Rao, "Il giacobinismo italiano nell'opera di Carlo Zaghi."

⁶³ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*.

⁶⁴ Rao, "Il giacobinismo italiano nell'opera di Carlo Zaghi."

⁶⁵ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*.

⁶⁶ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:124. original text: "dove non si trovavano rappresentanti eletti dalle varie classi, ma solo persone designate da Bonaparte" ... "del proprio interesse personale, o di quello del dipartimento a cui appartenevano, che delle interesse pubblico".

throughout the course of this study – there is no anti-French or counter-revolutionary sentiment but rather a looking towards the French experience of nation-building as both example and warning. In any case, Zaghi's final work, *Il Direttorio francese e la Repubblica cisalpina* provides the first and seemingly last study of the period of independent Cisalpine legislation in the *Gran Consiglio* from Frimaire to Fructidor Year VI.

Though the *Gran Consiglio* continued to be a point of study into the final decades of the twentieth century, its role was downgraded to one of many important players within a reexamination of the Triennio. There was a resurgence in the work of Siatta in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular his interest in Italian radicalism. From this school, came perhaps two of the most profound publications of primary texts of the Triennio, Paola Zanolì's *Giornali de' patrioti d'Italia* and perhaps even more important Vittorio Criscuolo's analysis and publication of the *Termometro politico della Lombardia*.⁶⁷ Others, like Stefano Nutini, even began to take a keen interest in the individual contributions of *Gran Consiglio* members, notably that of Pietro Polfranceschi.⁶⁸ Emmanuel Pagano focused on the spread of radical politics in the Cisalpine Republic by examining the demographic information regarding those who self-identified as republican or not, and the outcome of administrative placement and election results throughout 1796-1799.⁶⁹ Pagano's work was conducted in an effort to contradict past nationalist histories, in particular those coming from the fascist or right-wing schools like Zaghi's, in an effort to demonstrate the diffusion of radicalism among the populace, as opposed to the idea of the reactionary peasantry.

Still others like Capra, reexamined the role of the intellectual movements of the eighteenth century and how the individuals of this movement provided the intellectual and political ancestry of the republican reforms of the Triennio and the patriotic nationalist movement. Within the works of Criscuolo, or celebrated Neapolitan historian Anna Maria Roa, Italian radicalism and its relationship to French authorities overtook the greater question of total political development.⁷⁰ Or in the case of Capra and his legacy in the work of Stefano Levati, though more open to the idea of

⁶⁷ Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*; Zanolì, *Giornale De' Patrioti D'Italia II*.

⁶⁸ Nutini, "L'esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina."

⁶⁹ Pagano, *Pro e Contro la Repubblica*.

⁷⁰ Rao, *Esuli: L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792-1802)*; Criscuolo, "Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato"; Rao, "Republicanism in Italy from the Eighteenth Century to the Early Risorgimento"; Rao, "Napoleonic Italy: Old and New Trends in Historiography."

external influences, particularly French influences, in the connections between eighteenth century reformism and the revolution in Italy, they remained set within the confines of Italian political intellectualism and economic demography, not practical political developments.⁷¹ Others such as Livio Antonelli continued to ignore the contribution of the triennio to the administrative and institutional development of early Italian national political culture.⁷² Instead, Antonelli focused on the military, judicial and administrative structures of the Napoleonic period after the French reentrance into Milan following Marengo.⁷³ According to him it was this legacy, and not the legislative efforts of the republican triennio which found a legacy in the politics of the nineteenth century Risorgimento.

This changed dramatically with the 1997 publication of a three-part study conducted by Antonino De Francesco along with French historians Gainot and Serna.⁷⁴ Since the bicentennial of the French Revolution in 1989, historians had begun to take a look at the internationality of the Revolution. However even from this new lens, the focus continued to place these Italian patriots of the triennio, not within the confines of their own period but related back to the activities of 1789-1794. With his 1997 study, De Francesco, Gainot and Serna placed the Triennio within a new body of historical scholarship focusing on the Triennio in Italy as part of a larger post-Thermidorean democratic explosion which started in Paris but found its way to far-flung locations like Milan, Amsterdam, Zurich and Naples. The rise in Directorial concentrated work by Gainot and Serna, already mentioned previously, which saw the Directorial period as the breeding ground for modern representative democracy, was augmented by De Francesco's impressive scholarship of political cultural developments which took place during the Triennio.⁷⁵ In fact, De Francesco's work shifted the view of the Triennio as not only the incubation period of Italian nationalism, but

⁷¹ Levati, "Il Mondo degli affari cisalpino e Napoleone tra opportunità e perplessità."

⁷² Antonielli, "Le Choix Des Préfets Dans La République Italienne et Le Royaume d'Italie"; Antonielli, "L'amministrazione Delle Acque Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana"; Antonielli, "L'élite Amministrativa Nell'Italia Napoleonica (Repubblica e Regno d'Italia)"; Antonielli, "L'Italia Di Napoleone : Tra Imposizione e Assimilazione Di Modelli Istituzionali."

⁷³ Antonielli, "Le Choix Des Préfets Dans La République Italienne et Le Royaume d'Italie"; Antonielli, "L'amministrazione Delle Acque Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana"; Antonielli, "Tra Polizia e Militare: La Guardia Nazionale Della Repubblica Cisalpina."

⁷⁴ Gainot, "I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare"; Serna, "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio"; De Francesco, "Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia."

⁷⁵ De Francesco, "Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien"; De Francesco, "Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français."

as the formation point of Italian political culture, within the context of post-Thermidorian Europe, a shift which not only contextualized Italian nationalism as a revolutionary process, but the entire Risorgimento as having a certain European republican origin.

De Francesco, though continuing to incorporate the idea of Italian nationalism into his historical analysis did not make it the central node from which the entire Republican Triennio was viewed.⁷⁶ Instead, his interpretation turned towards the ideas of Godechot and Palmer from the mid-twentieth century which viewed the Cisalpine Republic from the lens of an Atlantic Revolutionary age. Central to this concept was the idea of a Franco-Cisalpine relationship which defined the political, administrative, and legislative developments of Northern Italy in 1796-1799. As opposed to the ideas of Capra or Antonelli which either accredited the developments of the period to eighteenth century Italian enlightened intellectualism, or alternatively Napoleonic imperial administrative structure, De Francesco recognized the influence of political culture on the institutional and legislative decision-making process. In other words, the formulation of the Cisalpine State – and eventually the nationalist movement in Italy in the early nineteenth century – was a direct result of the political ideas, factions, and practices which defined the peninsula during the Republican Triennio.⁷⁷ Fundamental to the development of this was the French occupation, and the import of Directorial political practices to the newly formed Cisalpine state. Additionally, the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte factors heavily in De Francesco's interpretation, placing him as a central figure in the alteration of Italian political philosophy, with both developing in tandem from his first appearance on the peninsula in 1796 to his fall in 1815.⁷⁸ De Francesco innovated the way of looking at the Italian peninsula during the Triennio and Napoleonic periods, not simply as the transition from enlightenment to Risorgimento, but a period of important political, administrative, cultural, legislative and military development wholly unique in itself, which was effected by and effected in turn the other republican states of the late 1790s.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

⁷⁷ De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. the Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796-1943*; De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic"; De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

⁷⁸ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*; De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic."

⁷⁹ De Francesco, "Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien"; De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic."

De Francesco's work led to a new interpretation of the Triennio in the histories of the 21st century. Finally, people and institutions were not looked at individually for the contribution to Italian nationalism, but as a part of the grand collective which made up a new Italian political culture. Prominent among this new wave of historians has been Katia Visconti, whose examination of the Cisalpine Directory in exile in 1799 provides the first in-depth look at the end of the *Gran Consiglio* from the perspective of its role in the formation of political culture, and more importantly the metamorphosis of this political culture when it arrived in Grenoble.⁸⁰ Visconti has also reexamined the influence of eighteenth century reformism in Lombardy, not only from the perspective of institutional or intellectual developments, but by identifying the diverse elements which came together more practically in the formation of Italian political culture.⁸¹ Cecilia Carnino has recently taken on the traditional interpretation of Cisalpine economic and financial history examined by Zaghi, by examining the debates which took place in the *Consiglio dei Juniori* (the name of the *Gran Consiglio* in the second half of 1798 and 1799).⁸² Paolo Conte has done extensive work on Cisalpine influence in Paris during the triennio, and the exchange of practices and ideas across the alps.⁸³ This work has provided vital evidence that the influence was not as one sided as Broers and other English language historians have attempted to highlight, but a true exchange of ideas with Cisalpine political philosophies brought by individuals like Francesco Visconti and Giuseppe La Hoz permeating French radical circles. However, to this point the only historian recently to have recognized the importance of the *Gran Consiglio* itself and the central nature of legislation in the formation of political culture in the Cisalpine Republic has been Francesco Dendena whose recent work on the Coup of 24 Germinal Year VI analyses the profound impact which the *Gran Consiglio*'s relationship with other institutions, both domestic to the Cisalpine Republic and foreign (such as the *Armée d'Italie*) had on the sequence of events in 1798 and 1799.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*; Visconti, "A Patriotic School"; Visconti, "Liberty of Press and Censorship in the First Cisalpine Republic."

⁸¹ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*.

⁸² Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia, "patriota energico."*

⁸³ Conte, "Cesare Paribelli, Marc-Antoine Jullien et Les Rapports Politiques Entre Patriotes Italiens et Néo-Jacobins Français (1799.1802)"; Conte, "The French Revolution Abroad: Le Cas Italien."

⁸⁴ Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine."

Methodological sources and historiography

The previous historiography presented above is fundamental in understanding the place and importance of this dissertation within the overall historical study of the Directorial period in Italy, the Cisalpine Republic more specifically. It is important for the reader to understand the uniqueness of this study if they are to critically evaluate its merit. However, in addition to its significance within a greater historiographical tradition, this study is also unique in that unlike all previous studies of Triennio Italy, it utilizes a methodology, or more specifically a set of secondary methodological material, which has never been applied to the Italian triennio thus far. This secondary source material can be separated into two categories: historical writing and non-historical writing.

Works defined as “historical” in this context is any individual study or historiographical trend from which a methodological process was drawn in the design of the current project. The historical methodology utilized for this project is almost exclusively based on late twentieth and early twentieth century studies of French Revolutionary legislative development from 1789-1795, with a particular focus on the earliest and latest years of this period. Four works from within this historiographical subset were the most heavily utilized: *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790)* by Timothy Tackett,⁸⁵ *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante: Les techniques délibératives de l'Assemblée Nationale 1789-1791* by André Castaldo,⁸⁶ *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791* by C.J. Mitchell⁸⁷ and *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795* by Michel Troper.⁸⁸ Each of these four works will be analyzed in greater depth in this section. There are additional historical methodological writings which will be briefly mentioned, such as a 2019 edition of the French journal *La Révolution Française* organized by Virginie Martin⁸⁹ focusing on the development of

⁸⁵ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*.

⁸⁶ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*.

⁸⁷ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*; Also notable is the precursor article on the same subject Mitchell, “Political Divisions within the Legislative Assembly of 1791.”

⁸⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*.

⁸⁹ Martin, “Introduction.”

legislative commissions, and specific works by both French and English language authors such as Antonino De Francesco, Pierre Serna, Bernard Gainot, Claude Nicolet and J.G.A Pocock.⁹⁰

Non-historical methodological sources essentially consist of any text or study outside of the historical discipline which has been utilized in the designing of the current project. This project prides itself in being highly multidisciplinary. Drawing largely from anthropology, political science, sociology, group communication and group psychology, the study aims to integrate particular aspects from these academic fields into the more general discussion of legislative design and development in a nascent nation. These multidisciplinary methodological sources are not as tailored as their historical counterparts to the larger argument made in the thesis, instead contributing to the more specific subsections related to *Gran Consiglio* structure such as power, multicultural communication, international relations, and societal reconstruction within a legislative body. Among the more important non-historical works used are the various writings on charisma and power conducted by Max Weber,⁹¹ “Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament” by Giuseppe Di Palma,⁹² “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures: Structures, Rules, Norms, Resources” by Ronald P. Hedlund,⁹³ “The Bases of Social Power” by John French and Betram Raven⁹⁴ and “Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations: Testing a Bifactorial Model of Power in Role-sets” by Peirò and Melià,⁹⁵ among many others. These sources were not all present during the initial construction of the thesis but were added as needed when particular arguments lacked the historical research to properly examine and interpret the primary source material. As they are highly specific to the particular arguments which they have helped to design, their significance will be covered within the respective chapters in which they appear. They will not be covered in this specific session as their significance (perhaps with the exception of Weber) was not necessarily fundamental to the overall construction of the thesis.

⁹⁰ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*; Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En France (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*; De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia”; Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Français 1789-2019*.

⁹¹ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*.

⁹² Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*.

⁹³ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures.”

⁹⁴ French and Raven, “The Bases of Social Power.”

⁹⁵ Peirò and Melià, “Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations.”

This section will not be an exhaustive look at the contributions and structural elements of the methodological historiography found within this thesis. Instead, here will be offered a general overview of how each of the works added to the construction of the general argument regarding the *Gran Consiglio*. The particular additions which each author made, or rather the interpretations which are applied from their work will be cited specifically within the main body of each chapter. This section will also not focus on the construction of the individual works themselves, nor their arguments, but instead focus on how these arguments were relevant quantitatively, historically and prosopographically.

Timothy Tackett's 1996 *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790)* remains the central inspiration for this entire thesis. Though its design has been dramatically altered (thanks in large part to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 health crisis) since the original conceptualization in 2018, this project was created to serve as a Cisalpine counterpart to Tackett's prosopography of the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789-1790. It was believed that perhaps it was necessary to reinterpret Cisalpine history and reinvigorate its study – especially from an English language perspective – the way Tackett had done for studies of the early French Revolution in the years following its bicentenary in 1989. Though a legislative examination of the Revolution was not necessarily a new concept (Mitchell had looked at the French legislature as recent as 1989 as will be demonstrated below), it was the manner in which Tackett looked at the National Constituent Assembly which was his greatest innovation. Instead of looking at the institutional construction of the foundational French legislature, Tackett looked at the men who conceptualized its construction.⁹⁶ More importantly he looked at the their shared backgrounds (the collective biography)⁹⁷ and experiences in the years 1788-1790 (the political apprenticeship)⁹⁸ which caused the collective group to make the legislative decisions it did in those years, and to formulate the political culture which has been so widely studied for the early revolutionary period.

Tackett's methodology has been widely lauded for its detail. In the nearly ten years of archival research – ranging in size from the French National Archives to the smallest provincial libraries – Tackett successfully collected information on the delegates elected to the various

⁹⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 3–8.

⁹⁷ Tackett, 19–47.

⁹⁸ Tackett, 77–116.

legislative bodies which ran Revolutionary France in the years 1789-1790.⁹⁹ This research enabled Tackett to derive certain conclusions based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative databases on how the origins of these delegates (age, socio-economic class, geographic origins, family history, education, profession, political involvement before and during the revolution, alliance networks before and after the Revolution, religion, and wealth) defined the political systems and decision making processes of the early Revolutionary period in France. Though research was conducted to reflect individual decision-making processes, the web of collective stories offers a group psychological and sociological rationale to political decision making. This project aims to imitate this methodology – albeit to a much lesser degree – for the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*. Time-limits of the doctoral contract, added to a general poor record-keeping pattern on the part of the Italian archival system, and the COVID-19 health crisis meant that this research was reduced both in its aims (socio-economic class, geographic origins, age, religion, education and political involvement before 1797) and source material.¹⁰⁰ It is hoped that the prosopographical information (explained as Data set III in Chapter IV) will offer sufficient background information on the core group of Cisalpine representative in the *Gran Consiglio* to explain the legislative decision making process of the group as a whole, and the political factionalism and alliance system explained in Chapters III, VII, VIII, IX, X and XI.

Castaldo's *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante: Les techniques délibératives de l'Assemblée Nationale 1789-1791* in contrast to Tackett's study is a much more classic work of French historical research. Focusing on the institution of the French legislature itself in the early days of the French Revolution before the foundation of the French Republic, Castaldo examines the construction of the features of legislative government from their institutional origins. Castaldo successfully dissects each aspect of the legislative process, from the individual offices,¹⁰¹ to the

⁹⁹ Tackett, 13–15.

¹⁰⁰ Tackett relied almost exclusively on direct manuscript material from the individual deputies to construct the political biography for each man which was then tabulated according to the aims recorded above. The reasons cited above made this same study impossible for the *Gran Consiglio*. Though a fraction of the number (Cisalpine representatives numbered 238 while French delegates of the National Constitutive Assembly were more than 1800), the time allotted for this project was originally 36 months, which was reduced by 15 thanks to the pandemic. This meant a much heavier reliance on previously conducted biographical work on individual representatives. In particular works like that of Ugo Da Como and other 19th and early 20th century historians interested in the individuals from the Napoleonic era in Italy. It also meant that not all representatives could be selected for the prosopographical study. The focus was instead placed on the top 118 most powerful individuals – the denomination of which is explained in Chapters II and V.

¹⁰¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 145–57.

rules of the chamber¹⁰², to the construction and origins of legislative committees and bureaus¹⁰³. Where Tackett takes a more personal look at these features, Castaldo extracts their more practical and theoretical aspects, in addition to their historical origins from both sides of the Atlantic. His methodology was highly specific to the legislature itself, looking at commentaries and verbal registries of the period to pinpoint development throughout 1789-1791. He breaks down his examination into 3 points: origins, structures and functions. For each point Castaldo helps the reader understand the arguments and institutional roles which defined early legislative government in the Revolutionary era. Interestingly, though a precursor to the Republican age, many of the aspects of legislative government formulated in the period 1789-1791 in France were found to be objectively similar if not identical during the Directorial period in France as well as the Cisalpine Republic of the Italian Triennio. For this reason, much of Castaldo's methodology and work was heavily utilized, in particular in examining the construction of the Council in Part II of this thesis (Chapters V, VI, and VII).

Mitchell's *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791* provides yet another methodological element to the examination of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio's* legislative and political culture. Where Tackett's history helps one to understand the research necessary for individual representatives, and Castaldo's work that of institutional legislative structures, Mitchell in his examination of the 1791 French Legislative assembly gives this thesis its basis for formulating the political definitions used to explain political fracturing and systems of alliance found in a nascent legislature in the Revolutionary era.¹⁰⁴ While past histories of the French Revolution had traditionally relied on exterior political clubs and public alliances to define political culture and factionalism in the 1791-1792 French assembly, Mitchell instead looked at voting patterns. He objected to tradition terms of left and right, or radical and conservative, as they tended to box individual delegates into large segments which did not necessarily reflect their actual actions in legislating the early constitutional order of the French Revolution.

He instead looked at those who tended to vote in favor of changes (termed *oui*-voters by Mitchell) and those who voted against (*non*-voters).¹⁰⁵ He found that those who voted *oui* generally

¹⁰² Castaldo, 40–114.

¹⁰³ Castaldo, 157–200.

¹⁰⁴ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 19.

¹⁰⁵ Mitchell, 31–32.

avored greater change to the ancient French political order and tended to come from those political extremes often labeled “left-wing”, “radical” or “Jacobin”. By contrast those who voted *non* generally opposed any changes to the political order, often demonstrating so in political debates; these often belonged to the political extremity known as the “right-wing”, the “conservatives” or the “*monarchien*”. Interestingly however, Mitchell’s work demonstrated that not all *non*-voter voted “*non*” for all legislation, nor did all *oui*-voters vote favorably for sweeping changes. Instead, Mitchell demonstrates that while these extreme’s existed, they did not define political culture in the 1791 French Assembly, especially not in the early months. Instead, Mitchell recognized a much larger spectrum of which included absolutist *oui*-/*non*-voters, as well as a majority held center which saw vacillations from right to left depending on the argument at hand.¹⁰⁶ Mitchell’s observation was similarly noted for the research conducted in this dissertation regarding the legislative political factions formed in the *Gran Consiglio*. His political spectrum and timeline for factionalism which were identified for the French 1791 Assembly was astoundingly similar to the political spectrum observed for the Cisalpine Assembly. For this reason, Mitchell’s methodology – which looked at the voting patterns of individuals across the entire timeline of the assembly – was mirrored to formulate the political identities described in Chapter III. As explained in the opening of the chapter, due to a lack of archival information it is not possible to exactly mimic the methodology of Mitchell (there exists no voting record of any individual member of the *Gran Consiglio* largely due to issues of public accountability covered in Chapter VII). This dissertation similarly refuses to understand the legislative culture of the assembly in terms of left and right, instead defining the spectrum (or in this case model) of political identities along political ideas, support and opposition demonstrated within Council debates.

The final author whose work guided the methodological construction of this dissertation is Michel Troper and his 2006 *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*. Unlike the other authors used, Troper’s work is not specific to the legislative function of the *Gran Consiglio* but instead the Cisalpine Constitution which guided its action – or perhaps more correctly the 1795 French Constitution of Year III from which the Cisalpine Constitution was translated.¹⁰⁷ Troper looks at the debates and political arguments which took place in the fallout of the events of

¹⁰⁶ Mitchell, “Political Divisions within the Legislative Assembly of 1791”; Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 31.

¹⁰⁷ De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 10–11.

Thermidor Year II and which defined the constitutional order of the Directorial period in Europe (1795-1799).¹⁰⁸ His work establishes the guiding principles of post-Thermidorian constitutionalism and political interaction and helps the historian of Directorial legislative politics understand the political importance of moderation, history and revolution in the construction of the new Republican European system. As the mother of the Sister Republican Constitutions which appeared from 1795-1797, the Constitution of Year III as expressed by Troper demonstrates the same concepts of constitutional adherence and adaptability which arrived in the early days of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁰⁹ Many of the same arguments could be found in the recorded discourses of the French Le Révellière-Lépeaux in 1795 as those found in the words of Cisalpine Giacomo Lamberti in 1798.¹¹⁰ As such Troper's methodology – which examined the debate of each article of the French 1795 constitution and dissected the rationale for its creation piece by piece – was similarly applied to the *Gran Consiglio* and its interpretation of the Cisalpine Constitution.¹¹¹ Though in the case of Troper's work the Constitution was under construction, while for the *Gran Consiglio* the Constitution had already been in effect for 6 months before the Council convened, the methods used to examine the interpretive discourse of both the French and Cisalpine Assemblies is identical, in that it looks at the individual and commission contributions conducted in full general sessions and how these interpretations led to legislative production.

In addition to the four texts highlighted here, there were also perhaps less foundational but nonetheless significant historical methodological examples incorporated into the structure of the thesis. To begin with Pierre Serna and Bernard Gainot's work on the French political culture in the Directorial age, as noted in the previous section for their historiographical significance, also played a major role in the design of the political and legislative cultural elements observed in the *Gran Consiglio*. In particular among these are *L'extreme centre ou le poison francais 1789-2019* (2019)¹¹², "Radicalités et modérations, postures, modèles, théories. Naissance du cadre politique contemporain" (2009)¹¹³, and "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio: La democrazia rappresentativa" (1997)¹¹⁴ from Serna, and "Être républicain et démocrate entre

¹⁰⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 7–8.

¹⁰⁹ Troper, "La Question Du Bicamérisme En l'an III."

¹¹⁰ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 246.

¹¹¹ Troper, 10.

¹¹² Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*.

¹¹³ Serna, "Radicalités et Modérations."

¹¹⁴ Serna, "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio."

Thermidor et Brumaire” (1997)¹¹⁵, and “Vers une alternative à la " Grande Nation " : le projet d'une confédération des Etats-nations en 1799” from Gainot.¹¹⁶ From the Italian perspective of this same construction Antonino De Francesco’s works “Aux origines du mouvement démocratique italien: Quelques perspectives de recherche d’après l’exemple de la période révolutionnaire, 1796-1801” (1997)¹¹⁷, “An unwelcomed Sister Republic: Re-reading political relations between the Cisalpine Republic and the French Directory” (2015)¹¹⁸, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821* (2011)¹¹⁹, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)* (2016)¹²⁰ and “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia” (1997)¹²¹ all served as fundamental models for explaining the connection between French and Cisalpine constitutional orders. Marcel Morabito’s *Il comando negato: Rivoluzione Francese e potere esecutivo* (1997)¹²² and *Histoire constitutionnelle et politique de la France (1789-1958)* (1993)¹²³ both served in understanding the institutional and ideological conceptualization of the Constitution of Year III and the relationship between the Directory and Legislature which existed within this text. Outside of the exact world of Directorial France other important historical methodological sources included David Bell’s *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (2001)¹²⁴, Claude Nicolet’s *L'idée républicaine en France (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire critique* (1982)¹²⁵, Robert R Palmer’s *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political history of Europe and America, 1760-1800* (1964)¹²⁶ and J.G.A. Pocock’s *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (1975)¹²⁷.

¹¹⁵ Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire.”

¹¹⁶ Gainot, “Vers une alternative à la ‘ Grande Nation.’”

¹¹⁷ De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien.”

¹¹⁸ De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic.”

¹¹⁹ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*.

¹²⁰ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

¹²¹ De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia.”

¹²² Morabito, *Il comando negato*.

¹²³ Morabito and Bourmaud, *Histoire Constitutionnelle et Politique de La France (1789-1958)*.

¹²⁴ Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*.

¹²⁵ Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En FRance (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*.

¹²⁶ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*.

¹²⁷ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*.

Primary and Published Sources

As a historical study and not simply a historiographical reevaluation, this dissertation derives its conclusions from a detailed analysis of thousands of pages of published and manuscript primary sources. Through the historiographical sources (both historical and methodological) serve to frame the primary argument which this thesis presents for the reader, the evidence which backs up the claims which are made comes from the use of documents which give insight into the various aspects of the *Gran Consiglio* and its representatives during the period 1796-1799 (though not exclusively with documentation ranging from 1750 to 1871) . These sources come in many forms, be they digital or analog, original or republication, manuscript or published, archival or open source. Because of the high variability of the primary sources, they will be presented in three main groups. First and foremost are the over 10,000 pages of published records of the *Gran Consiglio* debates from 1797 to 1798 found in the *processi verbali*. This remains the primary source for all arguments made and aspects of the Council examined in this dissertation, which merits its own presentation. Second are archival sources which required in person consultation and reproduction over the course of the three-year study. This section, perhaps more than any other, was greatly altered from the original 2018 program thanks in large part to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic. The final group of primary documents are all other published open-source documents, primarily found online, but also accessible through in person consultation in libraries and open forums. This last group is the least homogeneous and consists almost exclusively of published reproductions and digitized versions of printed sources. They do not contain manuscripts.

The processi verbali of the Gran Consiglio

Following the restructuring of the thesis the singular most important document set from which information was gathered were the *processi verbali*, the published records and minutes of the debates held within the lower chamber of the Cisalpine Assembly from its activation on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) to its collapse with the entrance of the Austro-Russian Army into Milan and the flight of the Cisalpine Government to Chambéry in France on 20 Germinal Year VII (9 April 1799). These records, first published in 1797 by the national press housed in the Palace of the Assembly (Palazzo Serbelloni, now known as the Palazzo del Senato, the home of the Italian State Archives of Milan), offer in excruciating detail the hundreds of hours of discourse which took place in the Assembly, listing details such as names of

individuals, the order in which they spoke, and the official ruling of the Assembly for various polemics. Due to their accessibility during the months of lockdown in 2020 and 2021 – as well as the limited accessibility of archival sources in the same period – it was decided to alter the research program of the dissertation project to revolve around these documents, which had seen little to no attention in the 220 years since their original publication.

For the purpose of this study, the data extracted (which included discourses given, commissions formed, the assignment of internal official positions, interactions with outside bodies, pieces of legislation proposed, absences, dismissal and substitutions of representatives and the date and duration of sittings) was focused on the period from 2 Frimaire, to the final officially recorded sitting of the lower Assembly under the name of the *Gran Consiglio* on 12 Fructidor.¹²⁸ As will be covered in the final Chapter XI of this thesis, the coup which was enacted on 14 Fructidor Year VI (31 August 1798) upon the orders of French Ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic Claude-Joseph Trouvé reformatted the Council under a new constitutional structure and renominated its members under the new name of the *Consiglio de' Juniori*.¹²⁹ The extreme reformatting of the lower assembly significantly changed the ways in which representatives interacted and ended the independent debate structures which had occurred in the first half of the Assembly's existence. The information which was gathered from this first half of 1798 cannot be used to draw the same conclusions for the legislation coming out of the Assemblies after the 14 Fructidor Coup. This is especially true regarding the formation of a Cisalpine political culture as the new constitutional order in the autumn of 1798 changed many elements of Cisalpine legislative and political culture from those found in the first half of the year. Therefore, given the nature of the study, this thesis will look only at information from the *Gran Consiglio* period of the Cisalpine Assemblies, with some minor input at the very end of the final chapter explaining the legacy of the *Gran Consiglio* during the *Consiglio de' Juniori* period (September 1798 to April 1799).

Unlike other sources used in this study, the *processi verbali* had two nearly identical editions from which to extract information: the original 1797-1798 publication created by the

¹²⁸ “Seduta I, 2 frimaire anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:85 Opening of the first sitting of the *Gran Consiglio*; “Seduta CCLXXVIII, 12 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:405 Final recorded sitting under the name *Gran Consiglio* before the Coup of Trouvé on 14 Fructidor.

¹²⁹ Alberti, Cessi, and Marcucci, *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, 8:VII–XXI.

National press of the Palace of the Assembly entitled the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio della Repubblica Cisalpina*¹³⁰, or the *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*¹³¹ published between 1917 to 1938 in Bologna and edited by Camillo Montalcini and Annibale Alberti. Both versions can be found within the library system of the Università degli studi di Milano. The only full collection of the original *Redattore* is housed in the Biblioteca di Scienze politiche “Enrica collotti Pischel”, as a part of the special collection consultable only in that university. That said there does exist a digitized copy of these volumes (of which there are 17), conducted by the Biblioteca di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea in Rome, and available on InternetCulturale.it.¹³²

The republished twentieth century volumes by Montalcini and Alberti can be found throughout northern Italy in university and public libraries. However, the edition used in this project was found in the Biblioteca di Studi giuridici e umanistici “Sottocrociera” at the Festa del Perdono campus of the University of Milan. Held in 11 volumes, the first 7 of which cover the *Gran Consiglio* period, this addition was the primary edition from which Datasets I and II (covered in Chapters II and III respectively) were extracted. The use of this edition was selected for a number of reasons: First it was significantly easier to access and reproduce in a digital edition (even if the Internetcultural Edition existed it was confusing to follow and to download for use offline). Second, the republished edition was formatted in such a way that it was more legible, using modern Latin printed characters from the twentieth century. Third, the reproduction included supplementary documents from the State Archives of Milan, The Biblioteca Briadense and the Civic Archives of Milan, which were useful in understanding referenced materials within the debates. Finally, the republished edition was better structured for historical study as the original prints were for a reading audience in the late eighteenth century; this structuring came with a detailed explanation of the editing process which allowed for greater ease of use when navigating the more than 8000 pages of legislative debates analyzed.

¹³⁰ “Il Redattore Del Gran Consiglio Della Repubblica Cisalpina (1802: Anno VI-N.1 al XLII).”

¹³¹ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina Vol. 3*; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1919; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1935; Alberti, Cessi, and Marcucci, *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina Vol. VIII*.

¹³² “Il Redattore del Gran Consiglio della Repubblica cisalpina” (1802: Anno VI repubblicano-N.1 al XLII) s.d.

The question remained however, whether the republished twentieth century editions could be trusted for their accuracy. This meant that before any study could be conducted, the two editions needed to be compared to demonstrate the accurate reproduction of the second edition. Unfortunately, the original manuscript copies of the *Redattore* and of the minutes of debates registered by the secretaries of the *Gran Consiglio* have either been lost or destroyed. The publication process of the *Redattore* will be described in greater depth in the Chapter VII section on the national press. However, it should be noted that all documented minutes of the Council were redacted and then destroyed once they had been published. This means that any official remaining evidence of the debates which exists from the time of the *Gran Consiglio* either comes from the *Redattore*, the various journals reporting on the Assemblies (who generally utilized the *Redattore*) and external reports such as diaries and correspondences detailing the personal experiences of the representatives (such as Compagnoni's autobiography)¹³³. This study, therefore, works under the assumption that the *Redattore* can be trusted as an accurate source for understand the dynamics of internal debates within the *Gran Consiglio*, though always with the knowledge that these are edited conversations and may leave out specific information from the public record. That said, the new insistence on public accountability and governmental openness, which had been such a central point to the French Revolution, means that a commitment to this same principle within cisalpine politics must have been adhered to (as explained in both Chapters VII and XI of this thesis), meaning the *Redattore* can be trusted as a generally accurate source.

This however does nothing to prove that the twentieth century reproductions of the *Redattore* (which was essentially the goal of Montalcini and Alberti) were faithful to the original source content. In order to establish that the twentieth century edition was an exact reproduction of the original 1798 prints – with added references and reproduced supplementary archival documents – a test was done to establish accuracy. Fifteen randomly selected samples were taken from across the *Gran Consiglio* period (November 1797-August 1798). These fifteen samples consisted of the entire reported sitting for a given day in both the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* and the *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*. Those dates were: 2 Frimaire, 24 Frimaire, 15 Nivose, 28 Pluviose, 4 Ventôse, 9 Ventôse, 19 Germinal, 24 Germinal, 15 Floreal, 22 Prairial, 12 Messidor, 24 Messidor, 6 Thermidor, 15 Thermidor, and 12 Fructidor. These dates included

¹³³ Savini, *Un abate "libertino."*

both politically sensitive or important events, as well as standard or ordinary debates. Ten were randomly selected and 5 (2 frimaire, 9 Ventôse, 24 Germinal, 12 Messidor, and 12 Fructidor) were intentionally selected for their political sensitivity and importance for the greater history of the Cisalpine Republic. Those which were politically sensitive were examined to see if the twentieth century authors had attempted to alter the text of the originals to fit their narratives. Those at random were selected by randomly opening to a page in the various volumes of the republished edition and comparing it to the corresponding sitting of the original text. The entire text of the given sitting was used in both editions and was meticulously examined and compared word by word to make sure both editions matched up. At the end of this examination, it was determined that the text of both editions were identical. The only difference was that the twentieth century edition added references in the notes which attached supplementary documents. However, for the collection of Data sets II and III these notes were not used, only the primary reproduced *processi verbali*. Therefore, it is assumed in the use of the twentieth century text (which is almost exclusively cited as the *processi verbali* from this point forward) is as accurate as the original 1798 *Redattore*, for the reasons given. A number of the compared texts are available within the appendices for verification.

In fact, Alberti explains the process by which the *Redattore* was reproduced into the *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* in the 1917 introduction. The *Redattore* had originally been intended for distribution among members of the assembly to solidify a public record, but were almost impossible to find in the 150 year since their original publication in 1798 because of this limited print and use.¹³⁴ Montalcini and Alberti had originally hoped to gather the multitude of documents utilized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by historians like Cusani and Del Castro, which had been used to reconstruct the events of the Cisalpine Legislative assemblies. The scarcity and diffusion of these documents, however, made this task unbelievably difficult leading Montalcini and Alberti to turn towards the *Redattore*. With this collection of documents, at the time housed by the Biblioteca Briadensa in Milan, the two historians would have a solid source base from which others could now turn instead of attempting to wrestle with the disorganized and often limited archival sources of the period.¹³⁵ They were diligent to reproduce the *Redattore* in a way which was identical to the originals but

¹³⁴ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:CCXCI–CCXCII.

¹³⁵ Montalcini and Alberti, 1:CCXCIV.

organized into a much simpler fashion for historic consultation. They then used the numerous documents they had identified through the citations of Cusani and others as supplements in the notes or in attachments to various sittings in which reference to these documents had been made in the original *Redattore*. However, they did not go so far as to conduct either a qualitative or quantitative analysis of the debates themselves, and despite the numerous citations of this work in the second half of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there has yet to be a study conducted along these lines – until now of course.

The structuring of the republished *processi verbali* continued to utilize the system found in the *Redattore* which broke down the debates by sitting (called *sedute* in Italian). However, unlike the *Redattore* where volumes might split *sedute* into two or three parts for publication purposes, the republished *processi verbali* kept sittings together uninterrupted almost like the chapters of a book. Every *sedute*, with a few exceptions, would begin where the preceding finished. Various *sedute* be followed by attached documents referenced within the *seduta*, but for the most part these referenced documents appear in the footnotes. The number of the *seduta* sits at the top of the first page of the sitting, and beneath in a smaller font lies the date using the republican calendar (with the translated Gregorian date in parenthesis next to it.). Underneath the date is a list of the various topics and debates covered within the *seduta*, listed in chronological order, which was repeated in the thematic index at the end of the volume. Following is an annotated bibliography for the *seduta*, in which the manuscript and printed sources – including the *Redattore* – cited within the *seduta* can be found. The next portion of the document lists the president of the sitting. If more than one president exists for a *seduta* (such as when a new election takes place, or the pro-president takes the president's place due to some absence) both are listed in chronological order of their appearance. Next are presented the debates and proceedings of the *seduta*. The proceedings often open with the time in which the *seduta* officially begins, and in many cases from the beginning of Pluviôse onwards, the number of representatives present at the hour of opening. For the debates, speakers are often bolded, and their speeches appear in paragraph form next to the bolded names typically in the third person tense. The document typically ends with a listing of the time of closure, the name of the President at the end of the session and the Secretary (Secretaries) of the *seduta*. All of this information was registered into a table (the summary of which can be found in the appendices), from which the data sets II and III were formulated.

Archival Sources

In addition to the historiographical sources and the verbal records of the *Gran Consiglio* published in the early 19th century, this thesis relied on an ample and variable archival resource base. These primary sources generally came in both manuscript and published forms dated between the years 1796-1812, with the majority coming from the years 1797-1798 – the temporal focus of the thesis. These archival sources contributed to the construction of all three data bases as well as aided in the construction of the arguments presented in Parts II and III (and in particular the latter, which relied heavily on correspondences between the *Gran Consiglio* and outside political actors). For the construction of the prosopography and the defining of political identities found in the second and third data sets, archival sources provided the primary research sources.

During the initial period of research, the intention of the dissertation project was the exclusive application of Tackett's prosopographical method, where the use of archival sources from across Italy, France and Austria were to be the primary basis of the entire study, with minor contribution from the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹³⁶ Unfortunately, the oncoming of the COVID-19 health crisis in the years 2020-2021 disrupted international travel and closed archives for months on end, limiting access to consult the necessary documents. In fact, it was the limited access to archival sources which prompted the altered orientation of this project more towards the year 1798 and the internal and external relationships of the *Gran Consiglio*, utilizing more heavily the *processi verbali* of the Council, rather than the inaccessible archival sources. Nevertheless, some measure of archival research was accomplished both before and during the COVID crisis which allowed for greater exploration of particular themes. This archival material originated from 6 principal archives located in Italy and in Paris: the State Archives of Milan (Archivio di Stato di Milano or ASMi), the Trivulziano Library at the Historical Civic Archives of Milan (Biblioteca Trivulziano del Archivio civico storico di Milano or ACSMi), the "Angelo Mai" Civic Library of Bergamo (Biblioteca Civico "Angelo Mai" di Bergamo or Angelo Mai), the historic archives of the Defense Services in Vincennes FR (Service Historique de la Défense di Vincennes, or ASDH), the National Archives of France at the Pierrefitte location in St. Denis FR (Les Archives Nationales de la France Pierrefitte or AF) and finally the National Library of France

¹³⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 8–14.

at the Richelieu location in central Paris (Bibliothèque National de la France Richelieu or BNF-Richelieu).

The highest volume of material came out of the Archivio di Stato di Milano (ASMi). Interestingly, the same building in which the archives are held – Palazzo Serbelloni, “Il Palazzo del Senato” – was the location within which the *Gran Consiglio* held session in 1797-1798.¹³⁷ The documents which were collected from this archive held information crucial for the reconstruction of the prosopographical study in Chapter IV, but also significantly contributed to the large examination of internal construction of the Council in Part II as well as the reconstruction of the external relationships of the Council examined in Part III. In fact, for Part III the primary source material came almost exclusively from documents held in ASMi. The documents utilized were similarly more variable from those found in other archives utilized for this study and included reports (military, financial, administrative, tax, foreign relations), correspondences (foreign and domestic, official and unofficial), pamphlets, journals, diaries, memoires, lists (military, civil nominations, attendance registries, census reports, political memberships), biographies, treaties, and official minutes. They were generally written in Italian however there are some French, Latin and German (Austrian) language documents consulted as well.

All documents came from the collection “Atti di Governo”. In a divergence from previous studies which heavily utilized the documents in the Melzi d’Eril, and Marsechalli collections – in particular the work of Zaghi¹³⁸ – this dissertation does not consult documents from any of these collections. This decision was made on the basis of two factors: first, these documents have been thoroughly examined, commented upon, utilized and even published, so much so that there is little more which is up for any measure of interpretation; secondly – and perhaps more importantly – the documents found in these collections, though they do hold some records from the triennio period, are more focused on the period from the Second Cisalpine Republic of 1800 to the end of the Napoleonic period in 1815 (as well as material from the early years of the Restauration in the 1820s and 1830s). The documents which due refer to the proper period are similarly concerned far

¹³⁷ Leonardi, “La Repubblica Cisalpina e Il Direttorio: I Trattati Di Alleanza e Di Commercio e Il Colpo Di Stato Del 24 Germinale VI (13 Aprile 1798).”

¹³⁸ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Rao, “Il giacobinismo italiano nell’opera di Carlo Zaghi.”

more with foreign relations and activities in places like France and Great Britain in the years 1796-1799 than issues of domestic legislation for which this thesis is occupied.

The “Atti di Governo” collection, by contrast, though temporally much larger (roughly mid-fifteenth to mid-twentieth centuries), contains a much richer selection of documents focusing on the domestic administration of the Cisalpine Republic based out of Milan from 1796-1799. Within this the two primary sub-collections utilized were “Trattati” and “Studi P.A.” (*Parte Antica*, meaning before 1800). The Trattati sub-collection in addition to the original manuscript copies of both the Treaty of Campoformio (1797) and the Military and Commercial Treaties of Alliance between the French and Cisalpine Republics (1798), held a series of correspondences between members of the French military delegation (Haller, Kilmaine, Berthier, Le Clerc) and the Cisalpine Government (the Directory, Financial advisor for military affairs Arrigioni, Finance Minister Ricci, the *Consiglio de’ Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio*).¹³⁹ The correspondences discussed at length the financial burden placed on the Cisalpine Republic for the financing of the French *Armée d’Italie* within the Cisalpine borders. Another group of correspondences from this collection discusses a series of polemics surrounding the Treaties of Alliance in which are found a series of letters between the *Consiglio de’ Seniori*, the Cisalpine Directory, the Cisalpine Ambassadors to France (Visconti and Serbelloni) and French *Armée* General Alexandre Berthier and the Parisian Directroy. The other half of these correspondences are held in Archives Nationales de France Pierrefitte location discussed latter in this section.

“Studi P.A.” provides an even more bountiful selection of documents. *Buste* 39-40 hold the entire collection of documents relating to the Constitutional Circles of the Cisalpine Republic from 1797-1798 just before the 14 Fructidor Coup of Trouvé.¹⁴⁰ These documents were fundamental in understanding the discourse of Cisalpine patriots occurring outside of the *Gran Consiglio* (including a number of *Gran Consiglio* representatives) both in the national capital of Milan and in the departmental *capoluoghi* (see Chapter X). Additionally, the various *buste* of Studi

¹³⁹ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1-2.

¹⁴⁰ “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400”; “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40.” *Busta* (plural *buste*) is an Italian archival term referring to the initial division of a sub-collection into folders usually for a specific set of documents or holding a particular temporal or alphabetical ordering. These are further divided into *folio* and then the individual documents. Unlike other archival traditions ASMi does not have an extensive numerical system to cite individual documents leading to their being listed by abridged title in this dissertation typically including the date, place of origin and or the publisher or writer.

P.A. contributed to a number of important points of interest in the construction of this thesis.¹⁴¹ Contributions made by representatives to the republican education system in the form of pamphlets, published legislative discourses, books and official laws were vital in both the prosopographical and political identity data sets (II and III respectively). These documents often provided particular pieces of public positions taken by representatives outside of discourses made within the chamber and often allowed research to be conducted on less vocal or less powerful representatives (according to the power index explained in Chapter II) who may not have had as strong a presence within the *processi verbali*. Finally, documents from this section provide the clearest evidence for contemporary opinions and arguments regarding everything from religion, finance, military affairs and “republican virtues”.

In addition to “Trattati” and “Studi P.A.” a number of other sub-collections were utilized for research in this project. “Militari P.A.”¹⁴² was used to research General Giuseppe La Hoz who served as head of the Cisalpine Military in 1797 and has a number of documents housed from this period within this sub-collection. In “Culto P.A” the writings of Felice Latuada were consulted referring to his ideas on the republican catechism and his correspondences with constituents in Varese for which he served as representative.¹⁴³ Finally “Uffici Regi P.A.”, “Uffici Regi Tribunale P.A.” and “Ufficali Civili P.A.” all contributed vital information both for the prosopographical study of Chapter IV as well as the various examinations of nominations and relations within the departmental administrations examined primarily in Chapter X.¹⁴⁴

In contrast to ASMi, the Archivio Civico Storico di Milano (ACSMi) provides much more focused information from which research was to be conducted. Research from the Trivulziano library housed in this Archive at the Castello Sforzesco di Milano was primary conducted from two collections Famiglia and Dicastri. The Famiglia collection provided a wealth of information on a number of both well-known and unknown representatives to be used in the prosopographical data set.¹⁴⁵ Though the majority came from families either of the nobility or imperial administration from the Duchy of Lombardy in the later eighteenth century, many also had origins from other

¹⁴¹ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 108-113

¹⁴² “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261.”

¹⁴³ “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400.”

¹⁴⁴ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13, 27/28 , 38, 39 ; ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493-494; ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi Tribunale, 10, 481-482

¹⁴⁵ ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 33, 762, 878.

regions of Italy – mainly the Republic of Venice, the upper portion of the Papal states such as Bologna, Ferrara, or the Romagna, the Duchy of Modena, or the Kingdom of Piedmont – and settled within the limits of the Cisalpine (and later Napoleonic) capital city. Documents from this collection provided information not only about the representative but also family connections they may have had within the Cisalpine Republic or outside dominions from the *Ancien regime* or Revolutionary era. The documents tended to be civil records such as certificates of marriage, birth or death, or tax records. Some correspondences were found and utilized, often pertaining, however, to the hereditary or financial issues for the individual in question. The information collected here was not particularly political in nature but rather biographical. The Dicastro collection on the other hand, was almost exclusively political and provided information specific to the political and administrative records of the Civil Administration of Lombardy between 1796-1797 before the declaration of the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁴⁶ Though limited this source provided information vital for the reconstruction of the political apprenticeship and in the identification of past political contributions by a number of important Gran Consiglio Representatives from the territory of Milan, in particular Alberto Allemagna, who served as president of the Administration in 1797.

The final archive utilized in Italy was the Angelo Mai Library in Bergamo in which is housed the letters and papers of Lorenzo Mascheroni, noted mathematician and representative of the *Gran Consiglio*. The collection of Mascheroni's papers can be found in an online inventory in chronological order, along with a description which made them invaluable during the pandemic when access to the library was highly limited. In addition to political commentary on the events of 1797-1798 for which he played a major role, in particular in the development of legislative projects (the projects of citizenship, the education plan, and the weights and measures plan all came directly from Mascheroni) his papers also include a robust collection of correspondences, in particular to other members of the *Gran Consiglio*, many of whom were themselves men of letters including Tadini, Cagnoli, Mariani, Fontana and Mazzuchelli. The primary documents used came from MMB 461, 662, 671 and 672 which are roughly dated from the early 1790s as well as from Germinal Year V (March-April 1797) to Ventôse Year VI (February 1799).¹⁴⁷ These documents

¹⁴⁶ “ASCMiTriv, Dicasteri, 191.”

¹⁴⁷ “‘Angelo Mai’ MMB 662: 62 ‘Lettere Ufficiali’, 1786-1800.”; “‘Angelo Mai’ MMB 672 ‘Epistolario’: 772 ‘Lettere in Ordine Alfabetico per Corrispondenti e Cronologico’, 1771-1800.”; “‘Angelo Mai’ MMB 461: 15 ‘Lettere e Minute Di Lettere Di Lorenzo Mascheroni a Vari’, 1783-1799.”; “‘Angelo Mai’ MMB 671 ‘Epistolario’: 772 ‘Lettere in Ordine Alfabetico per Corrispondenti e Cronologico’, 1771-1800.”

follow Mascheroni's travels from his charge as the representative of Bonaparte to the early Constitutional committee of 1797 (seen in Chapters IV and XI), republican administrator in the Valtellina, Val Bergamasca and Valcalmonica, member of the *comitati riuniti* (Chapter IV), representative of the *Gran Consiglio*, and official mathematician of the French Directory in Paris from August 1798 to early 1799. As not only a fundamental actor within much of the most voracious debates of the *Gran Consiglio*, but as an influential scientific and intellectual personality in late eighteenth century Italy, Mascheroni's papers provide enormous insight into the development of republican politics and education during the period, leading up to, during and following the republican triennio.

Of the three French archives utilized for this dissertation the documents found in the Archives Nationales de France at the Pierrefite location (AF) are by far the most insightful, if also perhaps the most well-known utilized for this study. It is true that many of the pieces examined have been central to other studies of the Directorial period of the Revolution in Italy; from Zaghi to Broers many of the correspondences of Trouvé, Rivaud or Berthier have been cited in past histories of the period to make vastly different arguments.¹⁴⁸ For example the documents housed in Collection III the papers of the Directory, book 71 and 72 contained important political commentaries and observations by French actors working within the Cisalpine Republic, in particular civil administrators like Faypoult, Trouvé, Rivaud, and Haller, in addition to military papers from Bonaparte, Berthier, Brune and Leclerc.¹⁴⁹ Plaque 1 of book 71 provides an almost full series of correspondences and reports from Trouvé justifying and explaining his famous Coup of 14 Fructidor Year VI. It similarly contains letters from Cisalpine Ambassadors Visconti and Serbelloni as they attempted to navigate the difficult waters of French foreign politics. Book 513 served a similarly important function of allowing the historian to see the entire process by which the coup of 24 Germinal was called for, debated, and instituted through the use of official records of the Directory, summaries written by both the Cisalpine and French ambassadors, and the series of arrest warrants and sedition laws created to institute the coup.¹⁵⁰

Though AF may have the most insightful – and most well-known – set of Cisalpine documents for the period under study, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France at the Richelieu

¹⁴⁸ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*.

¹⁴⁹ “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1.”

¹⁵⁰ “AN, AF III/513.”

location (BNF-Richelieu) certainly provides the most abundant source set. This is because BNF-Richeleau houses the Custodi collection, within which specifically lies the enormous library of Francesco Reina – the *Gran Consiglio* representative – containing 22 volumes of biographical documents of individuals from the Republican and Napoleonic period in Italy housed in records ITALIEN 1545-1566.¹⁵¹ Perhaps more than any other single collection, the Reina papers were instrumental in the reconstruction of prosopographical data for members of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular those which constituted the leadership and elite classes described in Chapter II and IV. Luckily, a number of these sources could be found on the BNF online library Gallica, which made their accessibility instrumental during the COVID-19 Crisis. However, ten volumes were not published digitally, which meant their consultation and reproduction had to be done physically in Paris.

The third and final French archive, the Archives Service Historique de la Défense in Vincennes (AHSD), provided the least documentary information, numerically, though this does not make it less important. The documents utilized, which generally came from folders B3-52 to B3-58 of the collection dedicated to the Italian campaign from 1796-1799, proved invaluable in their description of the perspective of the French *Armée* d'Italie during the events of the 1797-1798.¹⁵² Of these, the reports made by General Guillaume-Marie Brune, head of the *Armée* from April to December 1798, to the French Directory in Paris, proved invaluable, not just in recreating the series of events which defined the Franco-Cisalpine relationship during the period, but in identifying the actions of key individuals outside of their position as government official or *Gran Consiglio* representatives. They were especially useful in the final sections of Chapter XI.

Published materials

The final group of sources are difficult to classify as they are a mix of primary and secondary sources. These materials can be classified as the general term “published materials” as they are all republications or new additions of older works or document collections. These sources are primarily digital and come in a variety of forms which generally consist of collections of laws, newspapers and journals, Correspondence collections, memoirs and biographical resources. The majority of sources were printed after the events of the Republican Triennio; many of the Italian

¹⁵¹ BnF-Richelieu, ITALIENS 1545-1566 s.d.

¹⁵² ASHD B3 53-58

language materials were in fact published in the early years of the Risorgimento movement (after 1830). As with the other sections of this chapter, the examination of these sources will not be an in-depth study on their origins or contents; these are referred to throughout the rest of the dissertation within the notes. Instead, this section will give a generic overview of the sources, why they were selected for the study, and the general contribution they made to the study.

The first group of published materials which have the most significance to this project, given their legal and political nature, are the collections of laws, acts, decrees and proclamations of the Cisalpine Republic and other northern Italian Sister Republics between the years 1796-1799 printed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. These collections of laws provided vital information in the construction and passage of the legal script which organized and regulate government life and informed the citizens the various northern Italian republics from 1796-1815 during the French occupation. Considering this study looks specifically at the formation of legislative and political culture formed in the lower house of the Cisalpine legislature, the finished project of the work of the men who made up the council is nearly as important as the debates from the *processi verbali*. The most central to this study were the editions of these laws printed by the official printer of the Cisalpine Republic Luigi Veladini, whose press was in the Capital of Milan. Volumes III, IV and V of this collection came to be the single most utilized sources in this study after the *processi verbali*, as they provided information for the legislative output of the Republic from mid-1797 to late 1798.¹⁵³ In addition to this collection, similar collections from the Bergamasco and Brescian Republics of 1797 proved useful when identifying origins of early legislative decisions and their roots in past republican attempts in future Cisalpine territory.¹⁵⁴ All of these collections were helpful both in Parts II and III of this thesis in constructing the internal and external relationships of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular its relationship to other functions of the state such as the Cisalpine Executive Directory and Ministry (Chapter VIII), the *Consiglio de' Seniori* (Chapter IX), and the Cisalpine Departmental administration (Chapter X).

After the law collections, the most useful and utilized printed materials were newspapers and journals from the republican Triennio. These sources were both French and Italian language

¹⁵³ *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 1798; *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi V*, 1797; *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 1796.

¹⁵⁴ *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca 1797*; *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano 1797*.

based primarily out of Milan and Paris (one exception was the Brescian *Giornali democratici* compiled edited and published by Carlo Bazzani in 2019).¹⁵⁵ Besides the *Giornali democratici* two other edited and published journals were heavily utilized for this study: Vittorio Criscuolo's *Termometro Politico della Lombardia* in four volumes and Paola Zanolì's *Giornale De' Partioti D'Italia* in three, both edited in the final two decades of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁶ These journals were viewed as the primary voices of the republican movement in Milan during the triennio, and saw contributions by major actors of Republican Milan including Vincenzo Monti, Giuseppe Poggi, Matteo Galdi, Francesco Reina, Giuseppe Compagnoni, and Giovanni Antonio Ranza to name but a few. Running from 1796 to 1798 (ending in fact with the events of the 14 Fructidor Coup in Milan), the *Termometro Politico* was edited by the esteemed Italian patriot Carlo Salvador, himself a frequent speaker at the Constitutional Circle of Milan.¹⁵⁷ The *Gionale de' Partioti* started a bit later than Salvador and ran from early 1797 to 1798, being published by Salvador's brother-in law, Matteo Galdi.¹⁵⁸

A number of French and Italian newspapers published between 1797-1799 are available on the internet for consultation. During the COVID-19 crisis these online editions became the lifeline for which this project was able to survive. The *Monitore italiano* published by Ugo Foscolo, in coordination with other well-known patriots such as Melchiorre Gioia and Giuseppe Compagnoni became fundamental to the research conducted for Chapter IX regarding the relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the *Consiglio de' Seniori*.¹⁵⁹ Marc-Antoine Jullien's *Le courrier de l'Armée d'Italie* became the voice of the French left in Italy, and became an important tool for the historian in interpreting the reception of French politics in Milan and of Cisalpine politics in Paris.¹⁶⁰ It became a central document for the studies conducted in Chapters VI, VII and XI. The French *Moniteur universel* similarly became an important source for its reporting of historical events from 1789 to 1799 which could be used as a reference point for the various political and legislative developments to occur in both republics during this period.¹⁶¹ Finally, in addition to

¹⁵⁵ Bazzani, *I giornali democratici di Brescia (1797-1799)*, 2019.

¹⁵⁶ Zanolì *Giornale De' Partioti D'Italia*, 1989. Only volumes II and III were consulted of this text; Criscuolo *Termometro Politico della Lombardia*, 1989-1996, 1-4.

¹⁵⁷ Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:15.

¹⁵⁸ Zanolì, *Giornale De' Partioti D'Italia*; Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:18.

¹⁵⁹ "Il monitore italiano." 1798

¹⁶⁰ Jullien, "Le courrier de l'armée d'Italie ou Le patriote français à Milan, par une Société de Républicains." 1798

¹⁶¹ *Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel* 1789-1799

their uses as political commentaries, these newspapers became important factual reference points for the dating of the sequence of events which led to the various political and legislative developments of the period, such as the creation of the Constitution of Year III, the invasion of the Italian peninsula, the foundation of the Cisalpine Republic, and the various coups and political upheavals to take place across both France and North Italy from 1795 to 1799.

There exists also a group of miscellaneous primary source published materials which helped contribute to the various aspects of the study. It is not that these collections of documents or volumes themselves are unclassifiable, it is only that those within a given category (correspondences or memoirs for example) are too few to be examined as a group in themselves. That said each of these contributed massively to the larger project in different ways. For example, the collection of Correspondences of Bonaparte published in the mid-nineteenth century at the behest of his Nephew Napoleon III were important to the examination of the Chapter XI study of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship in addition to the Chapter VI examination of the geographic and political origins of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁶² Similarly, to the newspapers mentioned above, Bonaparte's correspondences also aided in the dating of particular events from 1797 and 1798, in addition to the French military perspective of the period. In a similar way, the 12 volume memoirs of French Director La Révellière-Lépeaux, and in particular the collection of letters between him and French Ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic Claude-Joseph Trouvé were important in understanding the perspective of the French Civil authorities of the *Gran Consiglio*, and Cisalpine politics as a whole.¹⁶³ From the Italian side, the memoirs of Giuseppe Compagnoni, republished in 1989 by Marcello Savini, became a voice from inside the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁶⁴ Compagnoni's recollections, perhaps more than any other, provided a behind the scenes look at the political factions, power dynamics and system of alliances and rivalries which are impossible to discern from the rhetorically heavy debates of the *processi verbali*.

The final set of published materials covered here were in fact the secondary source material published as the biographical encyclopedias of the Napoleonic period in the nineteenth century, as well as the use of more modern biographical encyclopedias from today. Biographic dictionaries and encyclopedias play a double role in their use for a prosopographical study. On one hand they

¹⁶² *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier.*

¹⁶³ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux.*

¹⁶⁴ Savini, *Un abate "libertino."*

provide the historian with a framework and a bibliography from which to supplement the biographical material one is looking for. Thus, instead of wandering archives looking for scraps of biographic information, the historian is able to orient themselves using the material found in these sources. On the other hand, the biographical encyclopedias provide a perspective on the individuals legacy in future generations. These encyclopedias must be taken with a grain of salt, in particular those from the early nineteenth century, when historical and biographical methodology did not yet encourage the removal of political bias at all costs from academic works. This meant that an individual representative's political legacy was visible within these sources, even if the information which they contain cannot be viewed as 100% accurate.

The two most used biographical encyclopedias for this study come from the third volume of Ugo Da Como's 1940 edition of *I comizi nazionale in Lione per la costituzione della Repubblica italiana* and Federico Coraccini's 1823 *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia durante il dominio francese*.¹⁶⁵ Though separated by close to 120 years, both similarly focused on providing a high level of biographical information regarding the men who came to play central roles in the political and administrative life of Napoleonic and Republican Italy. Both placed a heavier focus on the post-Merengo age (essentially from 1800 onwards) though did frequently mention events and experiences from the republican triennio as well. For the purposes of the prosopographical study in Chapter VI, both authors provided much of the base information such as age in 1797, place of birth and a socio-economic outline of the individuals. The *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, which has remained in publication from the second half of the twentieth century to today, has provided even more information on individuals than the older biographical compilations of Da Como and Corracini.¹⁶⁶ These new biographical entries provided by experts on the individuals in question are often highly detailed and come from historians across the world. That said the *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* covers individual Italians from all periods of history, meaning

¹⁶⁵ Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*.

¹⁶⁶ Pepe, "Guglielmini, Giovanni Battista"; "Tassoni, Giulio Cesare"; Baldini, "Cagnoli, Antonio"; Rastelli, "Cavedoni, Bartolomeo"; Venturi, "Costabili Containi, Giovanni Battista"; Baldini, "Fontana, Giovanni Battista Lorenzo"; Rossi, "Lattanzi, Giuseppe"; Sani, "Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo)"; Criscuolo, "Latuada (Lattuada), Felice"; Pepe, "Mascheroni, Lorenzo"; Brancaleoni, "Monalti, Cesare"; Rossi, "Paradisi, Giovanni"; De Francesco, "Reina, Francesco"; Badone, "Polfranceschi, Pietro Domenico"; Ogner, "Sabatti Antonio"; Riva, "SERBELLONI, Gian Galleazzo"; Giannini, "Tadini Antonio"; Rosa, "Alpruni, Francesco Antonio."

that the number of individuals for which information is offered is remarkably less than the other two biographical dictionaries, even if the entries are more detailed.

The high variability of historiographic and primary source material which has been utilized to construct this project reflects the intention to bring about new and complex research to reevaluate the Cisalpine Republic from a different perspective. Despite setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic which led to a general disturbance in historical research activity for close to 15 months, this project has successfully adapted from the original 2018 proposition into an examination of a much more universally applicable topic. It has built upon the original intent (that of constructing a prosopographical overview of Cisalpine government through an examination of its legislature) to include an examination of the institutions, legislation and political culture which defined the *Gran Consiglio*. Historiographically, this thesis successfully challenges older interpretations from English, French and Italian traditions while simultaneously integrating aspects from newer iterations of all three linguistic historical cultures. The methodology of this study provides a new multidisciplinary way of confronting history which can be applicable in other places and times while still remaining securely within the fold of a legislative analysis of Northern Italian political culture. Finally, the source base which relies heavily on the voices of the men which the examination explores as well as the outside commentaries and correspondences of the representatives and other important Italian and French political actors, provides a wealth of evidence from the time in order to back up the arguments made in this dissertation. However, while the sources themselves are important, it is the data which derives from their extraction, analysis, and interpretation which provides the most useful information for a historical study. The following three chapters heavily utilize the data extracted from the primary sources as they attempt to rationalize them into a series of data sets from which the interpretations and explanations of the *Gran Consiglio*'s actions and intentions can be explained in Parts II and III of this thesis.

Chapter II

Data Set I: Quantitative Data- Ranks and Ratings

The sources alone cannot provide enough information to formulate the study of legislative and political cultures found within the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*. While they provide the raw information from which can be gained a general understanding of the political and legislative situation of the Cisalpine Legislature in 1797-1798, as with any raw material, this information must be refined to provide a polished and reasonable argument. The remaining chapters in this first part of the study will present the data which can be extracted from the sources presented in Chapter I. This data will serve as the fundamental building blocks of the remainder of the study, the foundation upon which the arguments regarding internal interactions, external relationships and the general political and legislative culture created between 2 Frimaire and 14 Fructidor Year VI will be set. The information extracted can be separated into three separate data sets: quantitative data which numerically calculates aspects of the legislative culture of the *Gran Consiglio* as recorded in the *processi verbali* from Seduta I on 2 Frimaire Year VI to the final Seduta CCLXXVIII on 12 Fructidor Year VI. The second data set will examine the various political ideologies and legislative philosophies which defined the procedural and productive outcomes of the Cisalpine legislative process in the lower council of the legislative assembly, and the elements by which events came to pass and political factions formed. The third and final data set will use prosopographical data of the 118 most participatory representatives from the *Gran Consiglio* to construct a profile of the Council and using information on professional, political, and geographic networks as well as individual backgrounds, will explain the tendencies and ideologies which make up the quantitative and qualitative data sets. The data sets will each process, in their own way, the fundamental political, historical, and legislative material offered by the sources presented in Chapter I. The final result will be a series of statistical points, political models and definitions

and biographical commonalities which will precisely characterize the formation of a legislative and political culture in the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*.

As the title suggests, the first of these data set to be formally examined will be the quantitative data. Unlike the other two data sets, the quantitative data comes from a singular source, the *processi verbali* recorded first in the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* in 1798 and then republished into the early twentieth century *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, both of which have been extensively covered in the first Chapter. The quantitative data set focuses on four primary aspects of the verbal process which are quantifiable and thus allow certain statistical calculations to be made: discourses, attendance, commissions, and council offices. As will be explained, each of these four aspects are in fact much more complex than the generalized titles offered here, and often were segmented into a multitude of different quantifiable variables. Over the course of a year each of the 278 Sedute which made up the ten-month *Gran Consiglio* period were exhaustively analyzed and the various elements of the four aspects mentioned above were registered in a series of data tables. The quantifiable data registered from the *processi verbali* was so massive that it cannot be presented in a single chapter. Instead, much of the raw data can be found in the appendices at the end of this study.

In order to make the quantitative data more usable for a historical study of the Cisalpine legislative and political culture in 1797-1798, the data was refined into a series of ranked variables and ratings. These rankings and ratings were conducted, as explained below, based on a number of complex and highly subjective criteria. This study - as it will constantly be highlighted throughout the chapter - is not a statistical examination of legislative output but instead a much more complex mixed-method analysis of legislative culture. As such the rankings and ratings are based off of subjective variables decided upon by the researcher which can be used to augment various aspects of both the other two data sets, as well as more specific arguments about legislative and political culture, i.e. leadership and power, executive-legislative relations, international relations, legislative production and general points of political culture such as nationalism, citizen involvement and revolutionary society. The quantitative data was divided into four main variable rankings which reflect the four primary quantifiable aspects of the *processi verbali*. However, each variable ranking is constructed by a complex set of criteria and variables which define the Ranks (denominated Ranks 1,2,3 and 4) and give insight into the importance and input of every one of

the 238 representatives nominated to serve as representatives in the *Gran Consiglio*. These Ranks can be used on their own to describe particular aspects of legislative and political culture or can be grouped together into two separate ratings: Participation and Leadership (also called total power). When combined with elements of the other two data sets, the quantitative data found in the Ranks and ratings prove some of the most concrete evidence for aspects of legislative and political culture within the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*, as well as helping to explain the series of historical events which defined the *Gran Consiglio*. In the end they further augment the central idea of this thesis that the legislative and political culture formed by the men of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* was one of the most complex and profound governmental developments of both the revolutionary period in Europe and early Risorgimento Italy.

Variables and Rankings

While the project does rely heavily on statistical data, the variables which make up the statistical criteria are at their very core highly subjective. This study will not be following a specific statistical model when collecting or analyzing the sources. The information which makes up the “statistical analysis” of the research is in fact more a quantification on particular aspects of historical research into the legislative function of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* and operates exclusively from the *processi verbali* of the same from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI (22 November 1797 – 29 August 1798). The variables which were decided upon as the principal categories of study were selected based on a combination of historiographical methodologies (primarily the work of Timothy Tackett, André Castaldo and C.J. Mitchell).¹⁶⁷ Important also in the selection of variables was the availability of particular sources, both due to the COVID-19 crisis which partially interrupted the study as well as availability of materials in archives, libraries, or digital archives. In the end the study focuses on four main quantifiable aspects of the *Gran Consiglio* which could be collected directly from the *processi verbali*: discourses, attendance records, commission appointments and service in council office. In the end the method of defining these variables was completely subjective according to the researcher and as such should be viewed not for the concreteness or statistical astuteness, but instead the political, legislative and

¹⁶⁷ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*; Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*. All three studies use quantitative data to establish precedents and norms of legislative development in the French republic from 1789 to 1792. They serve as the inspiration for the quantitative study in this project but not the model or basis from which it has been constructed.

interpersonal interpretations regarding norms, procedures and practices which can offer insight into the legislative and political of the *Gran Consiglio*.

These variables are useful in understanding the development of political culture within a select sample group – the *Gran Consiglio* of the Cisalpine Republic – and can be combined to relay particular information about this sample group related to leadership, power, legislative output and the secondary research methods of political ideology and factionalism. These variables also provide us with information on which subjects should be selected for the basis of the prosopographical study which serves as the third research methodology. However, the registration and calculation of each variable from the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio* is necessarily unique and provides vastly different results with figures for one variable reaching into the hundreds while others barely escape single digits. Thus, in order to standardize the quantitative data provided by the *processi verbali*, each variable has been placed into a classification - from here on in termed a Rank - so that each variable is valued equally. Labeled numerically and chronologically (Rank 1, 2, 3 and 4) these Ranks follow a standard competitive ranking format. While the various scores are each calculated differently, the classification itself is the same for every Rank. In a standard competitive ranking, subjects with equal values are likewise ranked equally, and are assigned the highest chronological ranking possible after the rank of the subject with the next lowest value. The subject with the next highest succeeding value will be ranked according to the formula $r+n$, where r is equal to the rank of the subject(s) with the next highest value and n is equal to the number of subjects who share this rank. Standard competitive rankings are also referred to as the 1224 ranking because of this pattern.

Rank 1 (Discourses or personal power ranking)

The first and perhaps least complex of the rankings to understand at a quantitative level is Rank 1. Rank 1 is the classification of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* based on the number of discourses they have conducted across the 10-month period from the first (Seduta I) sitting of the Council on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) to the 278th (Seduta CCLXXVIII) sitting (and final under the title of *Gran Consiglio*) on 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798) as recorded in the *processi verbali*. Rank 1 is noted as the ranking of personal power, a facet of the legislative procedure in the *Gran Consiglio* explained in greater depth in Chapter V. The ranking lists the representatives in order from those with the highest number of discourses to

those who made no discourses and assigns them a classification number based on what order they fall into.

Rank 1, therefore, has the least complex criteria within the entire data set: if the representative conducted a discourse during a sitting (as recorded in the *processi verbali* and approved by the Council), it would be marked as 1 for every time he spoke in that sitting. Thus, if a representative has five discourses in a single sitting, then the data for that representative in that sitting is listed as 5. This information was registered in a table marked as discourses, which quantified the number of discourses of every individual representative for all 278 sittings of the *Gran Consiglio*. This number for each individual is the sitting discourse score (SDS) and is marked by the individual and sitting number. Following the tabulation of every representative's sitting discourse score for every sitting, the sum of the discourses for each individual was calculated, by taking the SDS for representative *a* in sitting *b* and adding it to the SDS of the same representative *a* for all other sittings (where *a* is the last name of the representative and *b* is the number of the sitting from Seduta I to Seduta CCLXXVIII). This was done for all 238 individuals for all 278 sittings of the *Gran Consiglio*.

What resulted from this calculation was a total number of discourses for each individual representative across the 10-month period and will be titled the total discourse score TDS. Thus, for the representative Angelo Perseguiti, for example, the TDS following the addition of all SDS from Seduta I to Seduta CCLXXVIII was 823. This number reflected the fact that he presented 823 discourses over the entire 10-month period of the *Gran Consiglio*, which was incidentally also the highest number. He was therefore assigned the rank of 1 within the classification of Rank 1. The next highest TDS was of Pietro Dehò with 684 who was ranked at 2, followed by Felice Latuada at 650 who was ranked 3, and so on and so forth.

Representatives with TDSs which were equal (two or more representatives), received the same rank; for example Alberto Allemagna and Pietro Martire Cadice both had a TDS of 156 and thus received an equal rank of 30. The reason for this is that since the score cannot differentiate the value of the criteria between the two representatives for this specific category of data, they must logically receive the same place in the classification. The representative with the next lowest TDS will be ranked according to the formula $r+n$ in which r represents the rank attributed to the representatives with equal TDS and n is equal to the number of representatives who share this

rank. Continuing with the examples of Cadice and Allemagna, both shared a rank of 30. The representative with the next lowest TDS was Antonio Schiera at 149. His rank is therefore calculated using the formula $r+n$ in which r equals 30 and n equals 2 (Allemagna and Cadice) making Schiera's rank 32. The reason why the rank is 32 and not 31, the next chronological number in the classification, is that because the value of Cadice and Allemagna is equal they in fact take the rank of both 30 and 31 in the classification, since one cannot be classified over the other. They have been given the higher rank instead of the lower rank, since it was decided subjectively within the study that the power inherent in this score merits the higher ranking (though it is assumed both representatives receive both ranks in reality). It will be the same for all other rankings to come. Again, this was a subjective decision made by the researcher in order to ease the statistical calculation, but also to highlight the importance of personal power and discourses in the legislative process of the *Gran Consiglio*. Those who never registered a discourse across the entire 278 sittings, and thus had a TDS of 0, received a rank of 139. This rank is the last possible chronological number following those with a total discourse score of at least 1. As all those with a TDS of 0 must logically receive the same rank, this rank will be the last chronologically according to the formula $r+n$ where r is the rank for all those with a TDS of 1 (124) and n is the number of representatives who share that rank (15).

In order to continue there must be a more thorough explanation of what constitutes a discourse and how is it valued in the classification. For a more in-depth explanation see Chapter V section 3 "Personal Power". As this section looks at the makeup of Rank 1 the focus will be on defining the term "discourses" as a criterion for the rank and explaining its use within the classification table. A discourse refers to any moment that an individual representative is noted as speaking within the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*. These could be speeches made on behalf of the individual representative or a commission, a petition, an opposition or motion of support, a quick remark, an explanation, or any other form of articulation which was registered in the *processi verbali* and approved by the Council. **There is no official length or brevity** by which the discourse is defined. However, the most defining feature of a discourse was that there existed a **political intention** behind its pronouncement. This included moments of approval, disapproval or procedure on the part of representatives since they were conducted from a place of personal power and as such were made in a political fashion (as opposed to when done by a president as noted below).

There are other forms of communication which are present within the *processi verbali* but not considered discourses. First, any petition, motion, letter or any other form of communication made by a person not listed as a representative of the *Gran Consiglio* **at the time that such a communication has been introduced into the Council records** will not be included among the registered discourses. Furthermore, any discourses made by members of the Council must have been pronounced or written **by the individual listed** and not as a letter read out by a colleague or member of the presidential bureau. In cases where an individual presented a discourse which was not originally made by their hand, they will still have the discourse registered under their name since it is an augmentation and demonstration of their own personal power, and not necessarily that of the original formulator. If the discourse was pronounced by a member of the presidents bureau (president or secretary), and the individual who originally produced the discourse can be registered as present within the assembly at the time of reading (for example in cases where a report or essay which had been sent to the bureau by the representative was read aloud before the Council) the discourse will be registered to the original producer and not the member of the bureau. In that moment it is not a demonstration of personal power by the bureau member but instead an expression of personal power through the positional power of another representative (again these concepts will be better explained in Chapter V).

Presidential discourses are in fact not included in the registry of discourses, as their participation was extremely limited according to a motion on internal policy passed in the third session of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁶⁸ Presidents were supposed to be apolitical by nature of the strong positional power inherent in the office and as such the majority of the interventions conducted by presidents were strictly procedural motions of order or of legislative functionality. Therefore, these interventions cannot be considered discourses because they did not (theoretically) contribute to a president's personal power. Even in circumstances when a president was rephrasing a motion or argument made by another representative to clarify their position, as it was not the idea of the president but served to augment the personal power of the original petitioner.¹⁶⁹ There were, of course, exceptions – both legal and illegal according to internal policy – which would allow certain

¹⁶⁸ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:103 “Article IX of the motion of internal policy brought by the commission for internal policy.”

¹⁶⁹ “Seduta XI, 2 di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:201.

presidential interventions to be considered discourses.¹⁷⁰ It should be remembered, however, that discourses are interventions which are made with political intention, meaning they are meant to affect the outcome of a legislative decision and not simply for policy or procedure. There are numerous cases of this occurring from presidents and those which have been found to meet these discourse criteria – use of persuasive language, procedural tactics to end a conversation, approvals, or condemnations of other representatives on non-procedural grounds, etc. – have been included in the discourse calculation.

As already explained in Chapter I, the *processi verbali* provide the bulk of the data from which this entire study was conducted. Both the original printed version of the *processi verbali* in the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* and the twentieth century edited collection the *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina* separate discourses from other forms of communication within the Council. In the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* the speaker of a discourse is put in italics followed by a colon, though all names are italicized (see figure 1). The *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, is much clearer with discourse speakers' names appearing in bold before their interventions (figure 2).

Figure 1. excerpt from issue 123 of the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* (1 germinale anno VI [21 March 1798])





Figure 2. excerpt from *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina Vol. 3* “Seduta CXXIII (1 germinale anno VI [21 March 1798])”



¹⁷⁰ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:102. Legally, if a president wanted to speak he would need to offer his seat at the presidential tribunal to the pre-established vice-president until the end of the debate. In these cases, he was not speaking from the seat of the presidency but as a representative of the people. His name would be listed in the *processi verbali* and as such was included in the discourse quantification. Finally, according to Article 52 of the internal policy, the president, in extreme circumstances (not noted in the article) could address the Council, so long as he was standing. “Seduta XI, 2 di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:203 Article 52 of the internal policy approved 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano.

Rank 2 (Attendance)

Of the four ranked categories which made up this study the hardest to trace, and thus the least concrete, was Rank 2, which registered attendance. The presence of individual representatives in the sittings of the *Gran Consiglio* was never formally published in the *processi verbali*, with the exception of the first session on 2 Frimaire Year IV (22 November 1797).¹⁷¹ This does not mean that there was never an official register of attendance. In fact, before a sitting could formally open, there needed to be an official register taken to meet the constitutionally proscribed minimum of 50 representatives present, or else the sitting would need to be cancelled for the day.¹⁷² Therefore it is assumed that a list of some sort was kept, most likely by the president's bureau or the secretaries, however there is no evidence for these lists within the *processi verbali*. In fact, there exists no evidence of this – at least none yet discovered – in the archival sources of the *Gran Consiglio* either. Most likely this evidence was not considered important enough to maintain, or too time consuming and expensive to print with the rest of the *processi verbali*. That said, beginning on 26 Pluviôse, the number of representatives present at the opening of the sitting was registered in the *processi verbali*.¹⁷³ This remained consistent more or less for every session until the end of the *Gran Consiglio* on 12 Fructidor. Still, this register does not provide any information for the individual attendance of representatives within a given sitting. More so, there was no rule stating that a representative was mandated to remain for the entire session of the sitting (officers of the Council excluded) and it is not impossible, in fact it is most likely certain, that many representatives arrived, left and returned (or not) at various points throughout the sitting. Therefore, it would be impossible to state that the number registered in the *processi verbali* at the beginning of the sitting remained constant throughout the entirety of said sitting, and more likely rose and fell depending on outside commitments of members, the importance of the debate, and the political conditions on that given day.

How then is it possible to provide a data set on attendance for individual representatives in a given sitting which can be used to construct Rank 2? To answer this question, a system of

¹⁷¹ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno IV”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:89.

¹⁷² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title. V Article 73. The article in fact specifies that the discussion could open with 30 members present but if within 2 hours of the opening of the discussion the number had not yet reached 50, the Council would need to close for the day.

¹⁷³ “Seduta LXXXVIII, 26 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:552 Opening declaration of present representatives.

registering individuals' presence has been designed called verifiable attendance. Which registers a representative's presence for a given session if he is mentioned within the verbal process in one of four circumstances. Verifiable does not mean they were necessarily present for the entire sitting, but it is a fact that they participated in the debate and there is a certainty of their presence in that political moment. The first – and most obvious – circumstance is when a representative is noted as having given a discourse. As discourses (according to the definition stated above in the previous section) could only be conducted by the representatives or while they are noted as present within the Council, it can be verified that they indeed were present for the given session. The second circumstance is when they were placed in commissions. Commission appointment, according to a motion for internal policy proposed on 7 Frimaire, could only be offered to those present at the time the commission was approved by the Council.¹⁷⁴ As most commissions were assigned immediately or within the same sitting, it can be assumed that the representatives placed in commission were present. The third circumstance, though rarer, was when a representative would make his oath to serve within the *Gran Consiglio*. This was the circumstance present within the first sitting in which 100 representatives were registered as present (the highest verifiable total across the entire 278 sittings).¹⁷⁵ The fourth and final circumstance is the rarest and came about when members were listed in procedural motions, most often for their arrests or dismissals (as in the case of the 24 Germinal Coup).¹⁷⁶ The idea is that, though these representatives were escorted from the Council chambers, they were present for at least a part of the time and thus verifiable. In other cases, the verifiability of their presence comes from outside sources like journals and diaries that they were present. It was common for the verifiable attendance to be significantly lower (often 25% or less) when compared to the initial registry at the opening of the sitting in the *processi verbali*.

Rank 2 is thus constructed through the use of verifiable attendance for every sitting from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor. For every sitting, the representatives are registered as present **once** if there is mention of them in the *processi verbali* (or attached documents) according to one of the

¹⁷⁴ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:146.

¹⁷⁵ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:89
List of representatives taking oath of office.

¹⁷⁶ “Notes attached to a letter presented to the council on Seduta CXLVIII, 24 Germinale anno VI repubblicano”
Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 4:59

four verifiable circumstances. Letters, petitions, dismissal, or requests are not marked down as present unless (as in the case of the coup) there is alternative proof that the representative was present at the time of reading. For every sitting, if a representative can be verified as present, they will be marked such for the sitting, regardless of the number of verifiable claims that appear. Therefore, if a representative is placed on a commission, but also articulates a discourse during the same session (which was quite common) they will only be marked as present once not twice (or however many times they speak). Once the verifiable attendance has been registered for every individual representative for all 278 sittings, the sum of all sittings will be calculated for each individual representative. This individual sum will be called the verifiable attendance score (from now on referred to as a VAS). Thus, the maximum value a representative could achieve for their VAS would be 278, though there were no representative who were able to achieve this. The highest VAS achieved was 209 out of 278 by Felice Latuada.

Following the calculation of the VAS, the representatives are then ranked according to these scores from highest to lowest similar to the ranking of Rank 1. The representative with the highest VAS - already known to be Felice Latuada with 209 - received a rank of 1 followed by Giacomo Greppi with 204 who received a rank of 2, Perseguiti at 3 (200) and so on. Also similar to Rank 1, representatives with an equal VAS receive the highest rank possible between all those sharing a rank. For example, both Luigi Bossi and Pietro Terzaghi had a VAS of 104 and received a rank of 24, the highest possible as the representative with the next lowest VAS (Giovanni Lupi at 105) was given the rank 23. Also similar to Rank 1, the representative with the next highest VAS after a number of equal scoring representatives receives a rank based on the formula $r+n$ (see above). The case of Terzaghi and Bossi (both ranked 24) provide an interesting circumstance as the next highest score was shared by two representatives as well, Giovanni Bragaldi and Giralomo Coddè, who both had a VAS of 97. Thus, according to the formula $r+n$ the next rank would be 26 ($r=24$, $n=2$ thus $24+2$ or 26), which both Bragaldi and Coddè shared as they too held the same rank. The next highest VAS was held by Antonio Sabatti at 95 and using the formula $r+n$ he was given a rank of 28 ($r=26$, $n=2$ thus $26+2$ or 28). Those who were never verified to be in attendance in any of the 278 sittings, hence receiving a VAS of 0, received the rank of 171, the lowest possible rank available (those with a VAS of 1 received a rank of 155 and numbered 16, thus according to the formula $r+n$ the lowest possible rank would be 171).

Rank 3 (Commissions or legislative power)

Rank 3 and 4, are the most complex data sets because they constitute weighted and mixed statistical representations of power and participation. Rank 3 in particular is difficult because besides being a weighted statistical rank which requires further explanation, the various scores which come together to form the legislative power score – which ultimately defines the ranking classification – are rather subjective in their definitions. They come from legislative structures which are not explicitly defined (as opposed to the elements of Rank 4 which are defined in both the constitution and the internal policy of the Council). Rank 3 is the measurement of legislative power which is expressed through a representative's participation in the various commissions formed between the period of 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) and 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). The commissions of the *Gran Consiglio* are the subject of Chapter VI where it will be better discussed the particulars of the Cisalpine committee system such as the importance of commissions to the legislative process and in the acquisition of legislative power, a definition of legislative power, and most importantly, a detailed analysis of the three forms of committees found in the *Gran Consiglio*. As this analysis constitutes already an entire chapter, this information will not be explained here. However, the final point of analysis, that of the three forms of commissions, is relevant to this study as it is the quantifying and weighting of these commissions which provides the data for the total legislative power score (TLPS) which is the basis for Rank 3.

There were three different forms of commissions which a representative could sit on. Permanent commissions, due to their high level of permanence and institutionalization (see Chapter VI), provided the highest amount of legislative power. Though there were fewer positions available, the legislative output coming from permanent commissions necessarily put them at a higher value than semi-permanent and special commissions. Semi-permanent commissions were few but provided an opportunity for inclusion due to their high turn-over rates. Though originally included with permanent commissions because of their continued existence from 21 Frimaire (Petition Commission) and 8 Pluviôse (Drafting Commission) the short window of decision-making influence inherent in these strictly regulated commission puts them at a lower level of power compared to other permanent commissions, and as such forced the decision to be separated and valued differently when constructing the TLPS. Special commissions had highly specified and

proscribed nature, making them relatively weak, and similar power to semi-permanent commissions. As will be explained further in Chapter VI, only special commissions followed the constitutionally recognized guidelines which regulated the control and authority of the Cisalpine committee system.¹⁷⁷ However, these high numbers contributed heavily to overall influence and while this form of the commission will not be weighted there was no real need, as their numbers were often double the unweighted numbers of the other two forms combined.

Each of these forms were quantified in a relatively similar way and required similar criteria. Once a commission was proposed in a formal motion or by the president of the Council, it needed to be approved by the general council. Only formally approved and recognized commissions **mentioned within the *processi verbali*** would be registered in the data set used to form Rank 3. There is evidence that commissions were formed either outside of the Council, in secret sessions of the council or were purposefully left out of the *processi verbali*. However, since we have no concrete evidence as to their officially recorded nomination lists nor their function in the production of legislation, it is impossible to gage their importance in the acquisition of legislative power and in the development of internal political culture. For this reason, they are not included in any of the calculations for any of the commission forms. Once a commission's formation was formally approved, the presidential bureau was given the right to select the members of the commission, though these needed to be approved by the Council before they could begin operating.¹⁷⁸ If there was a question over the nomination of a particular representative then there would be a selection by secret ballot. Therefore, only those individuals nominated (either by the president or by secret ballot) **and approved** are recorded in the data set for commissions. Each time a representative is placed in commission and approved they are marked 1 for every commission to which they are nominated in a sitting. This process takes place for every sitting from I to CCLXXVIII.

Once all of the commissions have been recorded for every sitting, they would be classified into one of the three forms (permanent, semi-permanent and special) according to the criteria specified in Chapter VI. Once the commissions had been separated into their three forms, it was recorded how many times each individual representative was **nominated and approved** for each

¹⁷⁷ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," sec. Title V Article 67. (see Chapter V)

¹⁷⁸ "Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:179.

of the three. **Dismissal or prorogations are not subtracted from the final score for each form for each individual.** This was done intentionally for two reasons: first, there is no record of the participation for all of the commissions created across the ten-month period of the *Gran Consiglio* and as such there is no way to verify who was present or not and who engaged in the legislative debates. This means that there is no measurable data on legislative power acquisition which can be standardized to all representatives equally, other than the moment of nomination. Secondly, and perhaps more abstractly, the moment of nomination and approval is extremely important in measuring the political atmosphere of the Council across the period as explained in Chapter VI. The final results after each form has been recorded for each individual from Seduta I to CCLXXXVIII are the permanent commission score (PCS) which is the total sum of all nominations and approvals to permanent commissions for an individual representative, semi-permanent commission score (SPCS) which is the total sum of all nominations and approvals to semi-permanent commissions for an individual representative and special commission score (SCS) which is the total sum of all nominations and approvals to special commissions for an individual representative

As participation in all three forms of commissions must combine to identify an individual representative's legislative power, it therefore becomes necessary for the scores for each individual on all three forms of commissions to be quantified and combined in calculating the TLPS. However, as already alluded to, these scores should not be seen as equivalent in value for the acquisition of total legislative power. The calculation of the TLPS, which would serve as the statistical basis for the Rank 3 classification, comes from the sum of the three individual commission scores, though with the PCS being doubled. Thus, the formula for calculating the TPLS is $2(\text{PCS}) + \text{SPCS} + \text{SCS}$. The reason why the PCS was doubled and not tripled or quadrupled or so on, is that – for reasons already cited above and explained further in Chapter VI – the acquisition of legislative power in permanent commission was greater than the other two forms, however it was decided that its importance did not merit an exaggerated weight. Moreover, the doubling of the PCS would provide that a representative sitting on a single permanent commission would have acquired the same amount of power as someone sitting on either two special commissions, two semi-permanent commissions or a single commission in both of these other two forms.

Once the TLPS was calculated for every individual representative, Rank 3 was constructed from it in a fashion similar to the other Ranks. The representatives were put in order from highest to lowest TLPS. The representative with the highest TLPS, which was Giuseppe Gambari with a score of 33, received the rank of 1, while the next highest – Carlo Cocchetti with a TLPS of 22 – received a rank of 2, next highest after him (Bartolomeo Cavedoni, 20) a rank of 3 and so on. As with Ranks 1 and 2 representatives with equivalent scores received the same rank which was the next chronologically following the rank of the representative with the next highest TLPS before them. Thus, Pietro Dehò, Felice Latuada, Luigi Ramondini, Sebastiano Salimbeni, Angelo Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca and Giambattista Venturi who all had a TLPS of 18 all similarly shared the rank of 5, as the rank of 4 was previously taken by Francesco Reina with a TLPS of 19. Again, similar to Ranks 1 and 2 the representative with the next highest score following a group of representatives of equal TLPS will receive this rank according to the formula $r+n$. Therefore, in the case of Dehò, Latuada, Ramondini, Salimbeni, Scarabelli and Venturi, the representatives with the next rank were Luigi Bossi, Giordano Alborghetti and Luigi (Alvise) Savonarola, who all shared a TPLS of 17 and were thus given the rank of 11 ($r=5$, $n=6$ thus $5+6$ or 11). Unlike other Ranks the majority of representatives (outside of the top 4) shared their ranks with at least one other person. Representatives with a TLPS of 0, meaning they participated in no commissions across the entire ten-month period, received the rank of 139 since the next highest TLPS of 1 had received a score of 128 (there were 11 individuals with a TLPS of 1 and according to $r+n$ were r is 128 and n is 11, the next and final rank would be 139).

Rank 4 (council officers or positional power)

The final Rank, Rank 4, is by far the most complex. While it is significantly less subjective than Rank 3, it similarly utilizes a complex weighting system for the three scores which make up the total position score (TPS), the basis for Rank 4. Rank 4 classifies the individual **positional** power of the representatives according to the Councils offices they held in the period of the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire (22 November 1797) to 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). Like Ranks 1 and 3, the specifics of the origins, functions and positional power acquisition surrounding council offices is discussed in greater depth in Chapter V and as such will not be noted here. Instead, the description provided here will further explain how the registration of holders of council offices, recorded in the *processi verbali*, helps define the TPS and thus Rank 4.

There are three council offices which can be found in the *processi verbali* as having been held by representatives: council president, secretary, and inspector of the chamber. Other officers, such as the head of the Legislative Guards, the Council archivist or the editor of the *processi verbali* were also selected in the Council sittings and are mentioned in the *processi verbali* but were not given to representatives; as such they will not be included in the measurement of positional power. Additionally, the renewing nature of the positions of president, secretary and inspector means that they can be quantified based on number of times elected or number of times registered as presiding. In other words, because there was turnover, and multiple representatives held the same position over the entire ten-month period, instead of one person the entire time, they allow us to look at the importance of these offices from a view other than one of procedural or legislative importance, but from the perspective of political influence and a developing political culture.

Due to the diverse nature of the three offices under examination, each has received a different set of criteria and weight when assessing positional power. However, it was decided based on two factors to unite the data on all three offices together into a single rank despite their differences: first, because there was an extremely limited number of representatives who obtained each of the council offices (60 out of 233 for all three offices combined over the entire 10 month period), it would throw off the scores of the leadership and participation indexes. The additional scores which these offices would contribute individually would provide an advantage to a select few and would make the importance of positional power significantly higher than the other forms of power, which is not the case. Second, as they are all lesser reflections of the same conceptual positional power, each office must contribute to the final PS; however not all office positions can be valued the same in the acquisition of positional power due to the high variation in functionality and duration. As such each must be weighted and combined differently to accurately portray the individual positional power of each representative, depending on which office they held, the amount of time they held it and the political and legislative importance to the office.

The least important office for the acquisition of positional power was the office of inspector of the chamber. The inspector's office was important in its ability to furnish the representatives

and commissions with the necessary resources and provide protection and order for the Council.¹⁷⁹ However, there were numerous limitations to the office which made it the weakest for acquiring positional power (see Chapter V). On a more practical level, unlike the positions of president and secretary, the inspector was not listed within the *processi verbali* for every sitting where they held office. While it is possible to reconstruct the list of inspectors based on the rules of mandate in the internal policy, their presence is not explicitly stated and thus must be quantified and calculated in a completely different way. Since the only provable numbers we can access are the number of times each individual was elected to office, the data is based off of this number. However, there were only ever 21 representatives elected to the position between its creation on 4 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor. Of these 21, only two were ever elected one than once (Giuseppe La Hoz and Antonio Porcelli).

Thus, the inspectors score (IS) is composed of the number of times that an individual representative was **nominated and approved** as inspector; this number is then doubled to provide sufficient weight in order to highlight the positional power of the office. The data will not reflect the number of days for which a representative held office because this information was never specifically noted in the *processi verbali* and may have varied; without solid evidence these assumed numbers cannot be counted. The nomination and approval of inspectors generally took place, from the first turnover on 16 Frimaire until the end of the period, at the same time that presidents and secretaries were nominated and approved.¹⁸⁰ The doubling of the number of times approved was decided for two reasons: first the low data points were believed to not fully reflect the positional power of the office – which was low but not so much so that it should be counted as insignificant; second it was simply easier to quantify the weighted sets if all were weighted with whole chronological integers (4,3,2) instead of randomly decided values which would be harder to justify. All of the other representatives who never were nominated and approved to the office of inspector – which is most of them – receive an IS of 0.

¹⁷⁹ Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:112; Cohen, "Le Comité des Inspecteurs de la Salle," 6–8.

¹⁸⁰ "Seduta XVI, 1 of 2 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:261 This sitting did not include the presidential election as Fenaroli was allowed to remain in his position for a period of 30 days as opposed to the 15 days most others sat. There were a few times when nominations of individual inspectors took place outside of the normal election cycle, notably the replacement of Della Vida and La Hoz when they were granted an extension or dismissal respectively.

The quantification of positional power inherent in the presidency was a much simpler and calculable number. This is because the president, like the secretary position, was listed for every sitting of the *Gran Consiglio* between 2 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor Year VI. However much like the inspectors there was a very limited number of representatives (18) who ever assumed this office in the Council. So, while the data was much clearer and provided significantly more information to work with, the sample size was still quite limited. More importantly, the president was by far the most visible of the council officers. Every time a president spoke from his place in office, he was not listed by name but instead by title, a remarked distinction from both the secretary and inspector positions. The limitations and advantages which presidential power gave to individual representatives are covered in depth in Chapter V.

The positional power inherent in the presidency as evidenced by the *processi verbali* is compiled into the council presidents' score (CPS). As already stated, evidence of the president's presence for every sitting was recorded in the *processi verbali*, which means that the positional power could be measured more accurately (as opposed to the inspectors and secretary positions). The data which makes up the CPS is thus the number of times every individual representative sat as president in the *Gran Consiglio* between Seduta I and CCLXXVIII. This number includes all listed references from both the *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina* and the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* (see figures 3 and 4). It also counts all times a representative assumed the position of vice-president. This number covered the entirety of the president's mandate and generally lasted somewhere around 15 (Giuseppe Fenaroli served a double term and thus had a significantly higher CPS than any others). Once this number was calculated for every individual in every sitting the final numbers would be weighted by a multiplier of 3. The tripling of the CPS, was done because it demonstrated a greater importance with respect to the office of inspector, but not as high as the secretary.




Figure 3. excerpt from issue 80 of the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* (18 piovoso anno VI [6 February 1798]) example of listing of president and secretaries from *processi verbali* in 1798




Figure 4. excerpt from *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina Vol. 1 part 2* "18 piovoso anno VI [6 February 1798]" Example of reproduced *processi verbali* with indication of president and secretaries

The final council office to represent position power was the office of the secretary, which coincidentally was the also the most positionally powerful office. Secretaries, while not outwardly as important the council president had a much greater role in the political structure and debates of the council. Secretaries put together the lists of speakers, finalized and approved motions, declared the state of motions brought forth to the council and recorded the events of the sittings (a full list of secretaries' duties can be found in Chapter V). These duties were fundamental in shaping the legislature as it was their responsibility to dictate which political ideas and movements would be heard and approved.¹⁸¹ On a more practical level, the secretary position was more powerful because it was more numerous. Of the 233 representatives, 41 held the office of secretary, more than either of the other two offices. Four secretaries could and did serve at a time though they were stagnated so that two newer secretaries would serve as the primary operators of the office in the council (referred to as the dominant secretaries; see Chapter V for further explanation).

This issue of dominant and non-dominant secretaries is where the quantification of position power into the secretary positional score (SPS) of individual representatives becomes difficult. Like presidents, the secretaries were listed at the end of every sitting (see figures 3 and 4). This explicit indication of which representative was wielding the positional power of the secretary's office in a given sitting is the basis for collecting the data for the SPS. Thus, the data set registers the number of times an individual is listed as secretary between Seduta I and CCLXXVIII. However, those listed at the end of each session were only the dominant secretaries. While it is possible to guess who the non-dominant secretaries are for those sessions (See Appendix F), they are not explicitly listed in the *processi verbali*. The lack of concrete evidence that non-dominant secretaries were acting in their position, and thus using their positional power to influence legislative and political output means that they cannot be included in the count for the SPS. Therefore, the initial quantification of the SPS registered for every sitting of the *Gran Consiglio* the number of times each representative was mentioned as the **dominant secretary**. Once this number has been established for every representative, the score is multiplied by a factor of 4 to form the SPS. The multiplier of 4 was chosen as it properly establishes the highest level of positional power inherent in the secretary position while also remaining within the chronological limit of the positional scores of the other two offices.

¹⁸¹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 218.

The calculation of the final TPS is relatively simple once all of the other positional scores for the three council offices have been established. The TPS is simply the sum of the positional scores of the three offices for every individual representative. The TPS follows the formula $TPS = IS + CPS + SPS$. As these individual scores have already been weighted the only calculation needed is simple addition. Once the TPS has been calculated for every representative, they will be put in order from highest TPS to lowest in order to formulate the classification of Rank 4. The representative with the highest TPS (Giovanni Vicini with 139) receives a rank of 1, the next highest (Giuseppe Luini with a TPS of 122) a rank of 2, the next (Giordano Alborghetti, 121.5) a rank of 3 and so on and so forth. As with all other Ranks, representatives with equal scores receive the same rank, which is the next number following the next highest rank in the classification. Thus, Antonio Sabatti and Giuseppe Fenaroli who both received a TPS of 121 receive a rank of 4 since the next highest rank of 3 went to the person with the next highest TPS, which has already been stated as Alborghetti at 121.5. The rank following the representatives of equal rank similarly follows the formula $r+n$ for the representative with the next lowest TPS. Therefore, continuing with the example of Fenaroli and Sabatti, the person with the next highest TPS was Giacomo Valsecchi with a score of 103.5 who was granted the rank of 6 ($r=4, n=2, 4+2$ or 6). Those who never served in a council office, thus not acquire any positional power, receive a TPS of 0 and a Rank of 61 which was the lowest possible rank (the next lowest TPS for those who held office was 2, held by 9 individuals – all inspectors – with a rank of 52 [$r=52, n=9, 52+9$ or 61]).

Participation Rating and the prosopographical sample set

Once the variables have been quantified from the *processi verbali* and then classified according to the criteria of each specific Ranking, every representative has four distinct numbers which define their quantitative profile in the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*. These numbers can be used in various ways to compare the importance (or lack thereof) of individual representative to various functions of the Council from politics, to legislative output, to internal relations. More importantly the Ranks can be combined in various ways to rate the representatives based on various research questions. One of these questions, which is fundamental both in understanding all others which regard the *Gran Consiglio* and in the establishment of the prosopographical study is the level of involvement overall in council activity.

This rating, termed the Participation Rating, combines all four Ranks to understand and compare the importance of all of the representatives in Council functionality. A representative's level of participation is fundamental when studying any legislative body, as through participation each individual is able to bring a new aspect of their political past, their ideology, their geographical-cultural heritage, their socio-economic or professional status, etc., into the organizational structure of the legislative process. Representatives who participate more, can rightfully be expected to have their ideas, experiences and opinions more visibly integrated into the fabric of the Council political and legislative culture. Not all representatives participated equally and not all in the same fashion. In this way it cannot be said that participation should be valued on the number of times a representative gave a discourse, or participated in a commission, or sat as an officer or was present for a vote. For some participation may have only been as deep as one or two of these variables, while for others it may have been the combination of all four.

Before looking at the construction of the participation rating itself, it needs to be acknowledged how and why each of the four variables is important when understanding the individual participation of representatives in the functions of the *Gran Consiglio*. To begin with the most obvious, discourses provide the most measurable form of participation since they are the most explicit imposition of an individual's ideas, experience, and opinions into Council affairs. As discussed, when covering Rank 1 and further in Chapter V, discourses are the most visible expression of a representative's influence because it is the only form found in the *processi verbali* (outside of the president and secretary headings) which highlights the name of the individual (either by boldening it or putting it into italics) every time they intervene in council. There is no lack of clarity, but instead an explicit and quantitative data set which signals an individual's participation in a variety of functions from debates to motion proposals. For this reason, discourses have often been mislabeled as the only form of measurable participation from the *processi verbali*.¹⁸²

This of course is untrue. A representative's attendance record is fundamental to rating their participation. Some might say it is the most important aspect of participation, if the least obvious, since one cannot offer a discourse, sit on a commission, or serve in an office if one never shows

¹⁸² Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*.; Zaghi, for example, often uses in his arguments, when discussing the Cisalpine assemblies, the number of times an individual intervened in a debate to measure their importance in the political and legislative affairs of the council. The reality is of course more complex.

up for sittings. Attendance looks to see how participation effects the outcomes of approvals or rejections, by discerning who was present for resolutions and voting. Attendance encompasses much of the other three variables since it is constructed from them. It is the most basic form of participation, simply showing up and having a presence, and most importantly contributing to votes if not debates. The verifiable attendance from Rank 2 is important in understanding how even though an individual is not high up in the other Ranks, they were still a large part of the political and legislative processes, which can be proven by their constant and consistent presence. Power and participation are quite different, and while all other ranks help augment the ratings for participation, without Rank 2 to solidify presence – and more importantly consistent presence – less powerful representatives would lose their voices.

Ranks 3 and 4 serve a similar importance to Rank 1, though both are less obviously calculated. While both cannot provide the explicit way that a representative may have participated in the *Gran Consiglio* as Rank 1 does, nor could they define the consistency of this participation like Rank 2, Ranks 3 and 4 shared the quality of helping to explain the extent to which control of legislative functions in the *Gran Consiglio* played into general participation. Though both examined the relationship between control and participation in different ways, they both demonstrate how control not only is a form of participation, but it is also by far the most influential aspect of participation since control sustains the act of legislative creation and leadership, the two fundamental roles of any legislative assembly. Rank 3 measures the creative control over legislation. Greater participation in this process meant a much greater mark left upon the political traditions and political culture for the larger Cisalpine Republic. Rank 4 demonstrates the role of the leadership which drove the ship of legislative innovation. Along with the discourses from Rank 1, council office was the most explicit form of participation one could ascertain from the *processi verbali*, as one could see the influence of presidents and secretaries – and on the odd occasion inspectors – in the passage of resolution and the structure of council debates. And yet despite the differences in participatory perception which they offer, both Rank 3 and 4 provide the concrete evidence that participation is more than just how often a representative spoke, but how they could transfer their interventions into influence and legislative output.

For the reasons given, thus, the participation rating combines all four Ranks **equally**, regardless of an individual's position in one rank or the other, and regardless of biased ideas

surrounding the importance of one variable over another according to historiographical trends. Of course, this does not mean that particular variables could not be more influential than others when looking at the general trends in participation and leadership over time. Chapters V and VI explicitly analyze how the individual influence of personal, positional, and legislative power all furthered competition between representatives and their respective opinions and ideas in the formation of legislative production. In order to formulate an accurate and fair assessment of these advantages or disadvantages all variables must be represented equally first to see which Rank perhaps had more or less influence. This standardization of all variables in participation means that concluding ideas about the importance of particular representatives to the functions of the *Gran Consiglio* can be expressed with less of a bias, and with greater quantitative evidence to support them, despite the high subjectivity inherent in the variables themselves.

Hence the calculation of the participation rating is done in a way very similar to the individual rankings themselves. One of the benefits of using a ranked system as opposed to the individual scores for each Rank is that when combined, as is the case of the participation rating, the value of one rank is equal to the others automatically, the necessity of which has already been thoroughly explained above. The rank a for Rank 1 is equal in value to rank a for Rank 2, as well as that of Rank 3 and that of Rank 4. This of course does not mean that the individual will receive the same rank for every variable. Francesco Reina had a ranking of 6 for Rank 1 and Rank 2, however a ranking of 4 for Rank 3 and 61 for Rank 4 (he never served as a council officer). That being said, the underlying value assigned to each of these numbers is the same. The participation rating is constructed by calculating the individual sum of Ranks 1, 2, 3, and 4 for every representative into a general participation score (GPS). Once this GPS has been calculated for every individual, as with the variable Ranks, the representatives are put in order from highest GPS to lowest, where the representative with the highest GPS is given a participation rating of 1 and all subsequent scores which follow the next number in chronological order using a standard competition ranking (1224). This means that similar to the variable rankings, members with the same GPS receive the same rating and the representative(s) with the next lowest GPS receive a rating according to the formula $r+n$.

However, it is at this point where the participation rating and the variable rankings diverge in their structure. This has to do with the importance of the participation rating in the selection of

individual representative for the prosopographical study. As stated previously, there were a total of 238 representatives nominated throughout the course of the ten-month *Gran Consiglio* period from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI. Though an ambitious project, conducting a prosopographical survey of all 238 representatives in the three-year period allotted for this study would have been an impossible task from the beginning. The scant resources and limited availability of documents and archival material on the majority of these men would mean that a study of that magnitude would require a significantly larger budget of time and money to properly conduct. Add to this the difficulties created by the 2020-2021 COVID-19 Health Crisis, and any hope of conducting a study of this magnitude became impossible, as access to archival and even basic library sources became extremely limited or outright banned. It therefore became necessary to decide on a selection methodology of representatives to include in the prosopographical study who would also correctly reflect the political, ideological, experiential, and legislative factors which served in the construction of a Cisalpine political culture. It was decided that the inclusive and generalized nature of the participation rating, made it an ideal tool for this end. The participation rating was a logical measurement of representatives' importance, and more so their influence on legislative output and political culture. More than this, all of the ranking representatives from the variable Ranks were also within the top-rated lists of representatives more generally. It was therefore decided to examine a sample set of 118 representative who sat in the top 50th percentile of the participation rating. Therefore, any representative whose GPS would give them a rating under 118 was not given a rating at all, and instead provided a notation of n/i (non-influential). Those who fell within the 118 marks (representatives rated 1-118) became the focus of the prosopographical study in Chapter IV and all subsequent chapters.

Leadership or total power rating

The variable Ranks provided information to form another rating system in addition to the participation rating, that of total power or leadership. The specifics on leadership and power are the subject of Chapter V and thus will not be explained here. Instead, this final section on quantitative data sets will briefly outline the way in which this rating is formed, and *why* it is formed in this way. The total power or leadership rating, examines the total influence of a representative over the legislative and political processes of the *Gran Consiglio* based on the three power variable Ranks, 1, 3 and 4. As explained above, each of the three power variable ranks

quantifies a specific variable which also corresponds to a form of power found within the *Gran Consiglio* (personal, legislative and positional). Leadership is the execution of power, which in turn can be defined as the ability to influence the behavior, opinion, or actions of a group.¹⁸³ The rating of leadership helps us to understand the scale and method of combining the different forms of power and how it affected the influence of individual representatives. More importantly it provides a quantitative method to explain internal leadership within the *Gran Consiglio*.

Personal, positional and legislative power all have different modes of acquisition (see Chapters V and VI). That said, their result was the same; those with the ability to better wield and acquire power, had a greater effect on the decision-making processes for political and legislative output. Like the participation rating, the singular values of the individual variables cannot be used to formulate the leadership rating, as the great variance in number may make one form of power more important than the other two. Thus, like the participation rating the distribution of the variables must be standardized to minimize bias as much as possible. The construction of the leadership rating uses the same process of quantification as the participation rating, by using the ranks assigned under the variable Rank system, where the value of rank a is equivalent across all three Ranks. This guarantees that the final rating of most powerful to least powerful will not be slanted to favor those who spoke the most, held the most offices or sat on the most commissions, but instead will successfully recognize the various methods by which representatives influenced and led the *Gran Consiglio* as a whole.

Like the participation rating the leadership rating was created by calculating the sum of the individual Ranks (1, 3 and 4) which would be the total power score (TPS). Once this score had been calculated for every representative, they would be placed in order from highest TPS to lowest TPS where those with the highest would receive a rating of 1 and then descend in chronological order. Similar to all other rankings the leadership rating would use a standard competition (1224) rating system where representatives with a TPS of equal value would receive the same rank; likewise the representative with the next lowest TPS would receive a rank according to the formula $r+n$. However, similar to the participation ranking, this was not the case for all representatives after a certain point. Much in the way that participation was only calculated for a certain number

¹⁸³ Mulder et al., "Power, Situation, and Leaders' Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study," 566; Cummings, "The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures," 4.

of representatives, it was decided that the leadership designation should only be assigned to those representatives that demonstrated a must higher power score. This was because leadership consists of a select few who are able to influence the group. Not only is it sociologically, historically, and politically impossible for all representatives to have an equal amount of influence over group decision-making (even if constitutionally this was the ideal), it would have been a great hindrance to the governing process in the democratic-republican form, something which all representatives vocally avoided. Therefore, it was decided that the method of identifying the leadership would be constructed from the top 25% of representatives with the highest TPS out of the entire 233. This number was enough of a minority to point to a consistent pattern of influence, be it dominated through personal, position or legislative power (and more often a combination of the three). The settled number was anyone rated 1 to 59 which came to include 60 individuals (see Chapter V). All other members not within this scale were given a designation of n/i for non-influential. There was in fact a further designation for the top 12,5 % of all representative according to the leadership rating (which constituted the top 50% of the leadership, around 30 individuals) which was termed the elite and are considered the most powerful and influential according to the quantitative data. The importance of the elite will play a much greater role in the analysis in Chapter V, as it was this body which formed the legislative inner circle and whose ideas served as the political and legislative basis of the *Gran Consiglio*.

However, there still remains an uncertainty which must be addressed: if this rating was only going to pertain to a small sample size of the entire body why not simply apply the term leadership to the top half of the selected representatives for the prosopographical study based on the participation ratings? The answer is actually much simpler than it seems. As previously stated, attendance does not necessarily reflect power. One might be present within the council but without utilizing one of the three forms of power outlined in Chapters V and VI, the said presence doesn't translate into leadership. Therefore, the numbers for participation would not reflect who the true leaders on a political, ideological, and legislative basis would be. It became necessary to form a secondary rating by which the power of individuals could be measured and see how their influence was channeled not simply that it existed. For this reason, the leadership rating was created and became the primary rating used to analyze the various prosopographical and political features of the leadership and the committee system in the *Gran Consiglio* in Chapters V and VI.

The quantitative data collected from the *processi verbali* is, thus, the most concrete way in which a historian of the revolutionary era can define and demonstrate various aspects of legislative culture. This data helps us to understand power-dynamics, leadership, commission formation, legislative output, and active participation in the legislative process of the *Gran Consiglio*. However, what numbers fail to demonstrate is the less concrete nature of the legislative process. This much more subjective and harder to pin down aspect of legislative politics plays into the realm of political ideology, philosophy, and practice. While these aspects are measurable to a degree, they require a much different kind of political and legislative understanding which goes beyond numerical interpretation and looks into historical and political circumstances. One may be able to quantify how often laws are discussed or who supports or opposes their creation, but one cannot count how an individual representative thinks or their ideological justifications. These aspects constitute the following chapter which adds the second element to this study, that of the qualitative data. This second data set looks at the model of political and legislative culture which defined the *Gran Consiglio*. Though it will not explicitly look into the origins of political ideologies and behaviors, it will look at the meat of what being said in the discourses which were quantified in Rank 1, and the opinions which allowed representatives to sit on particular commissions found in Rank 3, or rise to the offices they did and when in Rank 4. Where the quantitative data helps us understand the “who” and the “how” of the legislative processes of the *Gran Consiglio*, the qualitative data examined next will help us to understand the “why”, much as the prosopographical data which examines representative external networks and backgrounds in chapter following that will look at “what” each individual brought to the formation of Cisalpine political and legislative culture in the *Gran Consiglio*.

Chapter III

Data Set II: Qualitative Data or Political definitions and identities

In addition to the quantitative calculations regarding the legislative processes and tendencies of the *Gran Consiglio* representatives, the sources – in particular the *processi verbali* – also provide qualitative information which can be used to assess and label the political and legislative culture of these same men. These definitions are extremely important in understanding the interactions and personal relationships of the representatives who made up the council, as well as the political ideologies which drove the legislative process. Where the quantitative data provided numerical and statistical evidence for the manner in which representatives used power, speech-making, and commissions in the legislative process, the qualitative data and political identities which inspired law-making provides the evidence of the intellectual, political, and cultural background of legislation. In essence, if the quantitative evidence is the muscle which helps us understand the functions of the *Gran Consiglio*, the political definitions and identities are the skeleton which provides the basis and stability of said functions. One cannot work without the other. Politics, particularly in a legislative setting, is the basic relationship function by which government operates. It is thus necessary to define these politics.

The *Gran Consiglio* is an extremely complex institution to define politically, mainly because there were never any established clubs or political parties which were already strongly influential in Cisalpine politics in the years leading up to its creation in November 1797. However, there were distinctly different ideas on the formation of legislative prerogatives which governed the internal politics of the Council, ideas which grew and divided across the ten-month period in which the Council existed. This legislative culture was additionally ever in the shadow of an ever-

present political culture which dominated the entire Cisalpine Republic. In fact – as will be demonstrated by the end of this dissertation – the legislative culture of the *Gran Consiglio* would become fully integrated into the more general political culture of the Cisalpine republic, creating a complex and eventually factional internal political culture which mixed ideas of legislative normalization with revolutionary political philosophy and constitutionalism. The question of what this political culture was, however, has been the ever-present question which historians of the *Triennio Repubblicano* in Italy have been trying to understand since the fall of the First Cisalpine Republic itself. It is the central goal of Cisalpine historiography and has seen iterations based in nineteenth-century nationalism, positivism, fascism, Marxism and ultimately a new transatlantic globalism. It is a historiographical tradition which has seen the main characters be portrayed as the heroes and the villains, patriots and traitors, Italian and French. And yet there is yet to be a portrayal of the Cisalpine Republican political culture which examines it from its own circumstances, its own conditions. This study does not claim that crown, but instead begins to look at a tiny facet of this much more complex system of politics from a legislative perspective; a perspective set in the context of Directorial France and proto-Napoleonic Italy. The definitions which are formed here come from the sources cited in Chapter I, which include the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*, archival resources (principally pamphlets and correspondents between individuals as well as from the constitutional circles of the Cisalpine Republic) and finally a the most recent historiographical examinations of revolutionary republican political culture. Thus, the definitions which will be presented here, and the model of political culture which it is proposed, forms the *basis* of the legislative and political history of Republican and later Imperial Italy (and perhaps beyond). It should be noted however that the terms used in this study were not used by representatives to define themselves in their own-time, and similar terms (particularly those like democratic or republican) were used in vastly different ways, even between the representatives themselves. Therefore, the terms used here are retroactively applied to clarify the various groups and factions in this study, but are unapplicable – for the most part – when looking to Cisalpine politics outside of the *Gran Consiglio*; they have been subjectively applied to define the overarching political nature of the various facets of legislative and political culture within that body.

This chapter will begin with a brief historiographical overview of political identities within the Cisalpine Republic from the early nineteenth century to the present. This analysis will also

include a brief look at the work of C.J. Mitchell and his model for defining revolutionary legislative politics, which serves as the basis of the model presented here. The model which has been developed combines the most recent political and historical interpretations of modern historians – chief among them Antonino De Francesco, Pierre Serna and Bernard Gainot – with Mitchells ideas on legislative and political cultures in revolutionary era state-building. What follows will be a clear defining of this political model along the three axes which characterize the model: the x-axis (progressives, neutrals and originalists) which looks at constitutionalism and national conditions; the y-axis (radicals, rationalists and moderates) which examines urgency of legislation, specifically speed and force in the formation and application of the legislative process; and the z-axis (democrats, representative democrats and republicans) which looks at the outside political culture and ideas on sovereignty, enfranchisement, and popular participation. The z-axis, as will be explained in greater depth, is in fact more apart from the model which in reality only consists of the x- and y- axes. The reason for this is two-fold: first, because – theoretically at least – the *Gran Consiglio* was only made up of the center of the z-axis, at least initially; second because the z-axis does not strictly regard the legislative process like the other axes and as such is less concretely provable, particularly in the initial months of the *Gran Consiglio*. That said, evidence from correspondence and the verbal process does exist (even if in a limited form) for the z-axis in the *Gran Consiglio* and as such will be presented here and used in the rest of the dissertation moving forward.

Historiographical political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*

Defining the political ideologies, factions or parties of the first Cisalpine Republic has been an historiographical obsession for the Triennio period (particularly in Italy) since it was first discussed by Carlo Botta in his 1824 *Storia d'Italia dal 1789 al 1814*.¹⁸⁴ Most often the Cisalpine Republic was viewed as a singular political block, moderate or conservative with a Francophilic fixation. This view was particularly popular in the first half of the nineteenth century and often contrasted the Cisalpine Republicans with their Neapolitan counterparts (often referred to a *giacobini* –the Italian for Jacobin and denominating a sort of zealous radicalism), working almost exclusively off of their different reactions to the 1799 republican collapses on the subcontinent.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*.

¹⁸⁵ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 11–12.

With the annexation of Rome in 1871 along with a calming of the Risorgimento and the ascension of a less radical form of nationalism, the political conditions of the Triennio Cisalpine Republic began to be reassessed in a justifiably more complex fashion. The historians of the second half of the nineteenth century, such as Francesco Cusani or Carlo Tivaroli, formulated two ways of defining the political divisions of the Cisalpine Republic: first they defined the politics of Cisalpine patriots when confronted with the interventionist policies of the French military and civil authorities; second they examined the reactions of the legislature to these French interventions and contrasted them with the actions of the executive Directory.¹⁸⁶ Thus the first political divisions identified in the historiography of the Cisalpine Republic, were Francophile versus Italophile or executive versus legislative authority. In reality the latter was a product of the former, as the Directory was accused of favoring – and being favored by – the French, while the Cisalpine legislature was lauded for its struggle against French intervention in favor of Italian nationalism.

This bipolarity became the trend in historical examinations of Cisalpine politics from the onset of the twentieth century, up until its final decades. And although the specific aspects of political concentration have changed, they have always divided the figures of the Triennio Cisalpine Republic into two different and opposed groups, defined by a pro- or anti- French stance, and whose conflicts always inevitably brought about the fall of the Republic in 1799.¹⁸⁷ The moderation of Italian politics in the early part of the twentieth century saw an increase in the importance of the Cisalpine Republicans when confronted with their more radical southern neighbors (the *giacobini* of Naples) to the unification movement of the mid-nineteenth century. Historians like Francesco Lemmi pointed to the debt owed to the French authorities in the liberation of the peninsula; yet he also highlighted their inability to help strengthen the burgeoning patriot movement, particularly in the Cisalpine territory, against the forces of moderation and conservatism.¹⁸⁸ These histories signaled the differences between the beginning and ending of the republic, highlighting the innovations of early patriotic participation in government – whose radicalism helped develop an identity which was both Italian and republican – in contrast to the government of 1799 whose descent into incompetence was due to the intervention of French

¹⁸⁶ Cusani, *Storia Di Milano*, 150–220; Tivaroli, *L'Italia Durante Il Dominio Francese (1789-1815)*; Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 20,25; Masi, *La Storia Del Risorgimento Nei Libri*.

¹⁸⁷ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 32.

¹⁸⁸ Lemmi, *Le Origini Del Risorgimento Italiano (1789-1815)*, 249.

authorities and the politics of moderation and subordination.¹⁸⁹ Hence, polarities of politics for the historians of the early twentieth century placed patriotic radicalism on one side and Francophile corruption and indifference on the other.

The fascist historians of the 1930s and 40s furthered this notion that French intervention was the cause for Cisalpine ruination, by proposing a history which saw Italy as ready for nationalism as far back back as the mid-eighteenth century (in many cases all the way back into pre-Roman antiquity). Historians like Solmi and Rota viewed the Cisalpine Republic as a lost opportunity, brought about mainly by the weaknesses of radical extremism which brought the “patriots” too far from the needs of the nation. These histories often downplayed the developments of democracy in favor of militant nationalism.¹⁹⁰ Fascist historians from Solmi’s school such as Stefano Canzio, highlighted the impediment of French constitutionalism in 1798 as a major factor in the disintegration of patriotic sentiment in the period just before the 1799 fall.¹⁹¹ The polarity thus came to be defined as one which pit militant patriotism against democratic moderatism.

The final years of the war and the immediate post war period brought with it a new polarity and a renewal of the place of the revolution into the national story. Historians like Saitta and Cantimori, returned to the idea of the early nineteenth century which offered up Italian radicalism – or Jacobinism as they called it – as the true examples of Italian nationalism.¹⁹² The polarities thus changed into one in which radical revolutionary ideology led by Italian Jacobins was confronted by a conservative counter-revolutionary force led by a strong aristocracy and church. While the former was favored by Italian patriots, the latter was favored by the moderate French authority who hoped to transition power peacefully. This period also saw the growth of an international historiography of the Cisalpine republic with works by important authors such as Godechot and Palmer.¹⁹³ These works placed the Cisalpine Republic within the context of the new concept of an “Atlantic Revolution”, in which the Cisalpine Republic found itself in league with the values of Directorial France, reflecting the same internal divisions between the legacy of the Jacobin radicals

¹⁸⁹ Soriga, “Un Amico Dell’Italia: M.A. Jullien,” 143.

¹⁹⁰ Solmi, *Napoleone e l’Italia*, 9, 20; De Francesco, *Mito e storiografia della “Grande rivoluzione,”* 148; Rota, “Le Origini Del Risorgimento 1700-1800.”

¹⁹¹ Visconti, *L’ultimo Direttorio*, 38.

¹⁹² Saitta, *Filippo Buonarroti. Contributi Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*; Visconti, *L’ultimo Direttorio*, 41.

¹⁹³ Godechot, “Le Babouvisme et l’unité Italienne (1796-1799)”; Godechot, *Le Gran Nation. L’expansion Révolutionnaire de La France Dans Le Monde, 1789-1799*; Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*.

and new Directorial moderates. Finally, Carlo Zaghi provided a more fascist style historiographical interpretation in the end of the post-war period, which renewed many of the ideas regarding the Italian origins of the revolution and the failings of the Triennio.¹⁹⁴ However Zaghi united this idea of the noble Italian patriot with the more modern international interpretations of the Atlantic revolution which highlighted the international struggle of radicals and moderates, hence framing the revolution as a struggle for radical or moderate forms of nationalism. Thus, the polarity of political identities according to Zaghi going into the end of the twentieth century was patriot vs moderate.

While the Marxist historiographical tradition of Saitta certainly continued into the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, most notably in the form of Vittorio Criscuolo's publication and introduction of the *Termometro Politico della Lombardia* in 1989, the polarity had largely moved to one which favored an international interpretation of cisalpine politics between radical and moderates.¹⁹⁵ Historians like Rao and Nutini retained the structure which examined the political condition of the Italian peninsula from a perspective of left and right, Jacobin against Centrist, democracy against republicanism.¹⁹⁶ In none of these works was the complexity of the Cisalpine political situation truly highlighted since there did not yet exist a way to track those who did not fit in the bubble, particularly those – identified correctly by Cusani much earlier– within the Cisalpine Legislature.

The innovation came with Bernard Gainot and Pierre Serna's reevaluation of the French center which saw a fusion of democratic principles and representative government in post-Thermidorian France.¹⁹⁷ This idea forms a center area between the polarities, which was neither radical nor moderate but made up the majority of French politicians under the Directory.¹⁹⁸ This idea of a ruling centrism, which now presented politics as a scale and not two opposing sides, was brought over and applied to the Italian condition by Antonino De Francesco.¹⁹⁹ De Francesco

¹⁹⁴ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Rao, "Il giacobinismo italiano nell'opera di Carlo Zaghi"; De Francesco, *Mito e storiografia della "Grande rivoluzione"*, 159–69.

¹⁹⁵ Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*.

¹⁹⁶ Rao, *Esuli: L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792-1802)*.

¹⁹⁷ Gainot, "I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare"; Serna, "Un programma per l'opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio"; Gainot, "Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire"; Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*.

¹⁹⁸ Serna, "Radicalités et Modérations," 16–17.

¹⁹⁹ De Francesco, "Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d'Italia."

successfully demonstrated how the political situation within the Cisalpine Republic, mirrored in many ways that of contemporary France. Thus the focus should not necessarily be on nationalism, as had been the tradition to that point, but on the fusion of nationalism, republicanism, representative democracy and the construction of a new society during the turbulent years of the Triennio in Italy.²⁰⁰ This new concept of a Sister Republic, which was to be viewed as a mirror of the French political condition was fundamental to revisiting the idea of the political culture of a revolutionary state. This new political culture, took on the debates which were seen in post-Thermidorian France between left-wing democrats who took the form of Babeuf and his Society of Equals, right-wing republicans which consisted of the alliance between conservative Thermidorians and the remnant of the Monarchist faction, and finally the majority centrist representative democrats whose highly variable political spectrum found at its most extreme a central authority which worked over the course of 1797-1799 to balance power between the polls.²⁰¹

Thus, this study will work off of the idea of the political condition of the Cisalpine Republic as a spectrum and not a polarity. However, the cisalpine political spectrum as defined by De Francesco et co., while wholly applicable to the entire Republican political culture itself, is difficult to apply to the legislative politics of the *Gran Consiglio*, since the selection of men assigned to serve in this body could all be placed in the middle representative democrat category (though as will be demonstrated throughout the democrat-republican divide would separate them by the 14 Fructidor coup).²⁰² Therefore, this study will define the politics of the *Gran Consiglio* by combining the Cisalpine political culture defined by De Francesco with a model of legislative political structure found in the 1791 French Legislative Assembly as defined by C.J. Mitchell. For Mitchell, the legislative politics of the Revolution – that is the patterns of voting, the formation of structures and the force and speed of changes – needed to be separated from the traditional political definitions found in the historiography which looked at the political development of events in the

²⁰⁰ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 16–34.

²⁰¹ Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; Gainot, “I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare”; Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; Serna, “Radicalités et Modérations,” 13–17; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 3–24; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 213–17; Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799”; Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 103–52.

²⁰² Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137–38; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 215, 217–19.

Constituency, Legislative Assembly and Convention in terms of strict ideological and social restructuring. This of course does not mean he did not mention the important clubs of the Legislative Assembly – the Feuillants and the Jacobins – as important factors in the legislative politics per se.

The existence of the left and the right wings of the Legislative is attested to by mutual abuse and is as indisputable as that of the Jacobins and Feuillants but attempts to bring either win into focus are as unsatisfactory as attempts to pin down club membership... This renders “left” and “right” ghostly terms unable to be connected with individuals and their behavior.²⁰³

Thus, the classical political terms of left and right, and the assignment of the traditional French political parties to one or the other side of the political polarity is impossible in legislative politics, since it is truly impossible to prove political party affiliation results from strict adherence to a radical or conservative voting trend. In fact, most deputies lied within the center, as Mitchell points out – similarly to the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, though under different circumstances – and the spectrum from left to right was much more in line with political spectrum of De Francesco, Serna and Gainot.²⁰⁴ Mitchell uses a quantitative measurement to define legislative politics, which looked at the *appels nominaux* – the points at which deputies had the opportunity to cast votes publicly – placing more radical members on the side of those who tended to vote positively (*oui-voters*) and conservatives on the side who voted negatively (*non-voters*).²⁰⁵ Unfortunately with this categorization Mitchell turns away from the broader spectrum to once again define legislative politics in the form of binary polarities, however his central theme of defining legislative politics separate from philosophical politics remains valid.

Model of political culture in the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* (2 Frimaire to 14 Fructidor Year VI [22 November 1797- 30 August 1798])

²⁰³ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 17.

²⁰⁴ Mitchell, 18–19; Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien”; Gainot, *La Democrazia Rappresentativa. Saggia Su Una Politica Rivoluzionaria Nelle Francia Del Direttorio 1795-1799.*; De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 3–20.

²⁰⁵ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 19.

The political definitions for this study will therefore work off of a system which unites aspects of the political culture spectrum for the post-Thermidorian Directory period created by Gainot, Serna and De Francesco with the separated legislative political designation of Mitchell. The political identities (if you can call them that) of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* defined here should be noted for their specificity to: 1) the political climate of the Cisalpine Republic from November 1797 to September 1798 (though this necessitates explanation of the periods just before – July to November 1797 – and after – September 1798 to April 1799) and 2) the specific political developments of the *Gran Consiglio legislative* process. However, unlike Mitchell who had a consistent and viable data set with the *appels nominaux*, there exists no such concrete voting data for the *Gran Consiglio*. Therefore, the definitions for this study will be based on qualitative and subjective data which takes into consideration discourses and motions from the *processi verbali*, outside correspondences and publications from the representatives, and previous political experience, in order to assign a specific political identity within a model of legislative political culture for the *Gran Consiglio*.

If the historiography has demonstrated anything it is that there are multiple ways to define the politics of revolutionary Italy. For the most part, this has separated the politics into binary polarities, but as already proven with the work of De Francesco, these polarities are in fact more of a sliding scale. Taking together Mitchell's legislative political theory concerning the legislative process and De Francesco's spectrum, one finds that in fact within the *Gran Consiglio* the spectrum is actually two-dimensional. Thus, on the x-axis – as it will now be termed – one finds a legislative political spectrum which looks at the constitutionalism and arguments on adaptability within the Cisalpine Constitution and its base in the French Constitution of Year III. Thus, there existed on one polarity of this spectrum those who sought to **progress** the revolution within Italy and instill new policies specific to the Cisalpine condition while remaining within the framework of the Constitution of Year III (progressives). On the other side of this spectrum exists a group who wanted to remain as close as possible to the **original** interpretation of the Constitution of Year III, applying already existent legislation, particularly that coming from contemporary France to the Cisalpine condition (originalists). There existed in the middle a group who believed instead of taking a **neutral** approach, equally applying new legislation when necessary while encouraging the use of constitutionally proscribed methods when possible (neutrals).

On the other axis – from now on termed the y-axis – the spectrum of legislative politics examines the scale of extremism and level of urgency with which representatives believed necessary for stable legislative production. Thus, on one side of the spectrum existed a group who believed that legislation could not be made with hesitancy and called for extreme urgency and strong enforcement in legislative output. This group believed their ideas merited **radically** extreme measures since the Cisalpine nation was constantly at risk from enemy forces inside and outside (radicals). At the other side of the spectrum rested a group who feared that radicalism would lead to anarchy, impulse and a lack of local acceptance, the very qualities which caused the political chaos in France under the Convention. Instead, they sought to **moderate** the force and speed of legislative output which applied slow-decision-making or even regression and application of archaism in law making (moderates). In the middle of the spectrum sat the majority of the representatives who believed that force and speed were necessary in many cases but only after exploration and logic was applied to the situation. This group believed that **rational** identification of the needs of the Republic should dictate the extremity of legislative output but refused to concede to regression or purposeful indecision (rationalists).

In reality, the *Gran Consiglio* could be defined as three dimensional since there was in fact another spectrum of political ideology often present in the Council. This third axis– from here termed the z-axis – was the measure of a more classical political culture which consisted of a left-right spectrum, similar to that defined by De Francesco, Serna and Gainot. On one side lied a group which sought the inclusion of the citizenry of the Cisalpine Republic in legislation who would interact with the government directly similar to a classical **democracy** (democrats).²⁰⁶ This left-wing of cisalpine society were those most often associated with the French Society of Friends and Babeuf’s failed conspiracy, as well as the remnant of the pre-Thermidorian Jacobin club. At the opposite end of the spectrum was a group, who believed that the act of governing must lay in the hands of a select few, and that the government should avoid mob rule, in the style of the Ancient Roman or modern Venetian **republics** (republicans).²⁰⁷ In reality the Italian version of this conservative polarity was always slightly more centrist, thanks in part to the reformist nature of

²⁰⁶ Lenci 2015, pp. 97, 103 This of course does not mean all people were to be considered citizens, nor have the privilege of enfranchisement. But this group was significantly more inclusive of petit-bourgeoise and working classes (though not the unlanded peasantry) in the actions of government. That being said this did not include all classes, races or genders not those of any age into the citizenry.

²⁰⁷ Lenci, 99–101.

the Italian *ancien regime*; that being said after Fructidor Year V the stain of conservatism remained. In the middle lied a group who sought a *governo misto* which allowed the citizens to select those from among themselves who might **represent** the community and legislate on their behalf; these would look to their constituency for council, but not the final decision on how to construct legislative output (representative democrats).²⁰⁸ Though the z-axis was important as an indication of political ideology, it did not necessarily define legislative production the way that the x and y axes did. That said, the divisions of the x- and y- axes over time broke along lines within the z-axis which came to a final fruition with the Coup of Fructidor Year VI. As such this final axis merits study




Figure 5. Three-dimensional model of *Gran Consiglio* political identities for individual representatives

The x-axis or the measurement of revolutionary advancement

In essence the x-axis separates those who sought to change and advance the precedents, norms, legislative models and political practices of the *Gran Consiglio* – which had been ascribed to them according to the first Cisalpine Constitution (modelled on the French Constitution of Year

²⁰⁸ Gainot, “I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare”; Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 97, 102.

III) – adapting according to the political and legislative condition of the Cisalpine Republic.²⁰⁹ This contrasts with those who viewed the Cisalpine Constitution – and in fact the entire Revolutionary experience – as a perfection stemming from close to a decade of political trial and error in France and Italy, not to be medaled with in any way lest the fragile and volatile political and legislative balance which it struck be ruptured and anarchy prevail.²¹⁰ Now this is not to say that those who hoped to advance the revolution in the Cisalpine Republic did not see the great value of the French historical example found in the Constitution; likewise those who stuck to the original interpretation of Year III were quite conscious of the necessity to adapt to a measurable degree based on the very specific needs of the Cisalpine condition which were not and never had been present in contemporary France. Therefore, the definitions presented here lay out a series of criteria which assign representatives a place on the x-axis spectrum based on opinions or prerogatives espoused through discourses or past political experience. While not all representatives will meet all of the criteria of a particular group, the group with which they seem to check the most boxes will be their political designation for this axis.

Progressives

It should be noted from the beginning that the term used here “progressive” does not seek to align representatives within this ideological category to those movements of the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the same name.²¹¹ These various iterations of “progressivism” played upon the idea that socially, economically, culturally or - rather unfortunately- genetically the human condition was improving itself from primitive origins to a final utopic state of being.²¹² While perhaps there was some element of this within the political attitudes of those labelled “progressives” in this study, it was not a conscious nor a primary goal of these representatives. Additionally, the idea of “progression” as it is used here necessarily and

²⁰⁹ “Seduta XXIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano” *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:218-219 This idea is best summed up in an early debate by Pietro Dehò, perhaps the most progressive of all the representatives to sit in the *Gran Consiglio*, who points out the need to use a different method of confronting the financial and social conditions for the Cisalpine Republic as the French precedents should not and could not be applied in these cases.

²¹⁰ “Seduta LXXIII, 11 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:286 The central idea of this argument is best expressed by Giacomo Lamberti in a speech he makes about domestic servants in which he highlights the “brilliance” of the Cisalpine Constitution, based on the French Constitution “of 1795” as he refers to it, and uses this as a reason to reject any project which would deviate from the previously established precedents on servants in the constitution.

²¹¹ Nugent, *Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction*, 2.

²¹² “Progressivism.”

justly seeks to distance itself within this study from some of the more malicious interpretations of this idea of progressing the human condition, particularly in its references to the early twentieth century eugenics movement.

Instead the use of the word “progressive” in this instance takes on a much more literal meaning. It denotes the definition of “progress” as “a forward or ongoing movement; advance”.²¹³ Thus, here the use of the word progressive is used to mean an advancement or continuation of a preexisting condition, in this case, the political and legislative functions of the French Revolution. The “progressives” as we will call them from here on out, were representatives who felt that they were the heirs to the Revolution.²¹⁴ For them, the Cisalpine Republic had a mandate to further the Revolution, using the Constitution of Year III as a point of reference, but not a literal sacred script.²¹⁵ Progressives saw the revolution in France as different from that of the Italian Peninsula and therefore required political strategies and legislation which were necessarily unique to the Italian condition, and more specifically that of the Cisalpine Republic.²¹⁶ This idea of progress was not specific to the Cisalpine either. In fact, as De Francesco points out, the alliance between the democratic republicans of France and the Italian “patriots” already in early 1797, meant that there was a general popularity in the idea that it was up to the Italian revolutionaries - and specifically the Cisalpine Republic with its vicinity, money and military provisions – to carry the torch of revolution across Europe.²¹⁷ For progressives the Revolution was at its end in France; this was not a criticism but rather an explanation for its expansion. Many, for example Felice Latuada, saw a direct connection to the “slowing” of revolutionary progress (i.e. stagnated advancement in the legislative and political realm) in France as a sign that it was now the mandate of the Cisalpine Republic to continue this forward movement.²¹⁸ They thanked the French for their contribution,

²¹³ “Progress.”

²¹⁴ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 604.

²¹⁵ Crook, “Parliamentary Practices in the Sister Republics in the Light of the French Experience,” 110.

²¹⁶ Carnino 2017, p. 48 Interestingly, the only other use of the term “progressive” when describing the cisalpine patriots comes from Cecilia Carnino’s examination of the *Consiglio dei Juniori* after Trouvé’s coup in Fructidor. She pairs the term with “democratic” which insinuates a democratic element to the progressive wing. Unfortunately, this was not always the case as there existed many prominent progressives (Reina and Dandolo spring to mind) who were not at all democratic. That being said the idea that the left side of the Council tended to have a much more progressive view of the Revolution and was significantly more libertarian in their willingness to change constitutionally is in fact indicative of a much more recent historiography which is redefining the Cisalpine political culture, according to more precise political terminology.

²¹⁷ De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 213.

²¹⁸ “Seduta XX, 19 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:301-302 Discourse of Latuada on the contributions to the cause of Cisalpine liberty by the French Republic.

while acknowledging that more had to be done, particularly as it regarded problems native to Cisalpine territory.

Before moving on to more concrete identities of progressive it should be explained why the term progressives was chosen over “patriot”, a term which many have felt applies more to this group of more nationalized revolutionaries.²¹⁹ Patriot of course is what many of the cisalpine representatives called themselves in fact. The issue remains though, that despite the much stronger Italian-centered aspect of progressives, they did not hold a monopoly on patriotism. Indeed, those in the neutral and originalist camp thought of themselves as patriots as well, as they were serving their national interests, albeit in rather different ways. Thus, to assign the title of “patriots” to this group would serve as a misnomer since they were no more patriotic than any other representative. In fact in many ways the progressive nature of their version of revolution was considered highly unpatriotic at the time, particularly as it viewed particularly hotbed issues such as religion and citizenship (this will be looked at in greater detail in further chapters).²²⁰

Perhaps the most visible quality of the Cisalpine progressives was their focus on Cisalpine sovereignty and determination.²²¹ As Troper points out, within the Constitution of Year III, the sovereignty of the nation and that of the people were the same.²²² The Cisalpine Constitution – which was a near identical copy of the French Constitution of Year III – upheld this idea by declaring the universal sovereignty of citizens.²²³ The progressives believed that it was in the best interests of the Cisalpine nation, if they themselves (i.e. the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, the theoretical voices of the people) had the ultimate ability to decided how the Revolution was to be applied.²²⁴ The issue arose however when it came to matters of French occupation and intervention. Though many progressives had a deep personal loyalty to Bonaparte – whom they often referred to as the leader of the liberation movement – they resented first the results of the

²¹⁹ “Lettera di un patrioto all’estensione del Termometro Politico” Criscuolo *Termometro politico*, 3:18 This open letter speaks about the definition of patriotism and its expanding nature outside of the Cisalpine Republic. An often-cited letter for its nationalist spirit it in fact captures the all-encompassing nature of patriotism which does not limit the idea of nation pride solely to a left or right idea

²²⁰ Trouvé 1799. In this public letter, Trouvé the French ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic in mid-1798, clearly outlines how “unpatriotic” the more progressive elements of the Cisalpine government really were, especially with regards to religion and confronting issues of urbanization.

²²¹ De Francesco, *Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 104.

²²² Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 68.

²²³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title I Article 2.

²²⁴ “Seduta LXXXIV, 22 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:479-480, 481” Objections of Francesco Reina and Sebastiano Salimbeni in defense of the citizenry.

Treaty of Campoformio, then what they considered a series of infringements by the French administration in Paris on Cisalpine sovereignty (the pressure to ratify the Military and Commercial treaty between the two republics, the forced loans the coup of 24 Germinal, the arrival of Trouvé, and the final Coup of Fructidor and the imposition of the new Constitution).²²⁵ This did not mean that progressives were anti-French, but instead felt that in these moments the French had themselves forgotten their pledges to the Revolution. As such only a Cisalpine response could save the ideals of the universal Revolution – for which the Cisalpine Republic believed itself the greatest and most capable protector – which meant innovation, often from a base which mixed Italian enlightenment and French Revolutionary ideas.²²⁶ The progressives continually espoused the idea that only they, the Cisalpine people, could provide for their own happiness.²²⁷

More so this nationalism for progressives extended also to Italians in general. Progressives considered the Cisalpine Republic to be for the Italian peninsula what the French Republic was for the Cisalpine. Early on progressives like Francesco Reina highlighted the need for a united Italian people from Dalmatia to Nice and eventually even south to the end of the peninsula.²²⁸ The heart break of Campoformio ruptured the trust of progressives in the French, more so than representatives on the other side of the x-axis, and in fact it is not a stretch to view it as the moment in which Cisalpine progressivism was born.²²⁹ Again however, it should be noted that this did not make the progressives anti-French; in fact the push for nationalization made the progressives natural allies of the *Armée d'Italie* and its commanders (Berthier, Le Clerc and Brune).²³⁰ Even when French troops sacked Mantua in Pluviose Year III, the progressives remained fully in support of the *Armée*.²³¹ Their ire was turned, however, upon the failings of the Parisian government, whom the progressives began to consider resistant to the Revolution with every instance of

²²⁵ ““Lettera del Cittadino Reina al Generale Bonaparte”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:59–60; “Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:371-377 Discourse of Giovio and Dandolo over the Military and Comercial Treaty in Secret Committee on the second day of deliberations. ; Vianello *Un diario inedito di Pietro Custodi: 25 agosto 1798- 3 giugno 1800*, 39n-41n, 42-44 ; “Il Direttorio Esecutivo al *Gran Consiglio*, Milano il 2 Nervoso Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1 n.d., fol. Nervoso VII

²²⁶ Crook, “Parliamentary Practices in the Sister Republics in the Light of the French Experience,” 110.

²²⁷ Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:104.

²²⁸ “Lettera del Cittadino Reina al Generale Bonaparte”.

²²⁹ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 69.

²³⁰ “Seduta XXXV, 4 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:498 Motion of Reina regarding recognition of Berthier as the General-in-Chief of the *Armée d'Italie*

²³¹ “Seduta LXXXVII, 25 piovosso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:533-534

medaling in Italian affairs. For this reason, many representatives were alternatively mislabeled as either Jacobins (for their resistance to Parisian interference) or moderates (for their continued backing of the war and the French *Armée*).²³² However in reality the progressives had no agenda which would place them in either of these highly generalized (and incorrectly named) polarities. They had no intention of looking back to the French political practices of 1792²³³ nor to the practices of the *ancien regime*.²³⁴ The progressives were a new brand of political identity, be they radical or moderate, which favored revolution in a strictly Italian fashion. Though acknowledging the greatness of the French Republic in its creation of the revolution, they insisted upon the differences, principally the need for Italian unification which could be found in the heart of the Italian people going back to ancient times, and which they believed the Gallic people could never have accomplished.²³⁵ The conditions of the moment are reflected in this philosophy and should not be equated to those before or after for this reason.

Likewise, this idea of furthering the revolution in Italy was present in their opinions on specific arguments. These arguments will be confronted in greater depth in the specific chapter later in the dissertation. However, there were some generalized ideas which characterized progressive politics in the *Gran Consiglio*. As a rule progressives were against the integration of Church and State, particularly as it referred to finances and clerical property, a measure fitting with the revolutionary rhetoric of the era.²³⁶ However progressives (many of whom were current or

²³² Woolf, *A history of Italy 1700-1860*, 171-172; Nutini *L'esperienza giacobina nella Repubblica Cisalpina*, 108-112; Zaghi *Il Direttorio Francese e la repubblica cisalpina: La nascita di uno stato moderno* 1:113-114, 120-121, 141-143

²³³ Woolf, *A history of Italy 1700-1860*, 169. This generalization regarding the Italian left is found across almost all facets of the modern English-language historiographical tradition of Revolutionary Italy. It is mostly attributed to the Neapolitan revolutionaries like Pagano, though Woolf and the heirs of his interpretive tradition have referred to the same in the Cisalpine Republic and applied the title of Jacobin to figures like Galdi and Reina, often without justification.

²³⁴ Capra *Un ricerca in corso: i collegi elettorali della Repubblica Italiana e del Regno Italico*, 483-484. A common misconception of the political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*, is that the representatives followed either a course of French Jacobinism or one of Milanese enlightenment politics found within the intellectual community of the Accademia dei Pugni. This is often because some of the most important names from the Republic and later Kingdom of Italy under the Napoleonic period (Dandolo, Melzi, Fenaroli) did fall into these categories. However, the Triennio politics were not that of the empire, nor were they of the initial years of the revolution. The politics of the *Gran Consiglio* must be placed within their own times in order to understand their alignment with earlier and later political cultures and trends.

²³⁵ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 113 n.d., fol. Tadini "Discorso sull'italica unione del Cittadino Tadini. Detto nella Pubblica Aduanza della Società d'Instruzione. In Milano il dì 14 Mess. an. I Rep. Cis." p 9-10

²³⁶ "Seduta X, 1 di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:191. Discourse on the rights of the Stola ; "Seduta C, 8 ventoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:817-818. Rights of foreign clergy to property within the Cisalpine

former clergymen themselves) were open to clerical involvement and usage of Catholic structures in areas of cultural and societal betterment such as public education, family morality and private religious affiliation, a measure which went beyond the traditional French Revolutionary values which at that point prohibited Church functions point blank.²³⁷ Progressives believed that the Revolution could only survive if the cultural significance of the Church was allowed to remain, and tended to follow a philosophy of Catholic reformism and separation of church and state similar to (though not as extreme as) the ideas of Giovanni Antonio Ranza.²³⁸ This often made the cisalpine progressives targets of ridicule by the contemporary French authorities and later historiographies (both left and right) who often worked from the French sources.²³⁹ Progressives were also generally in favor of Cisalpine citizenship for all Italians, in particular those from the territory of the former Republic of Venice now under Austrian Control.²⁴⁰ This plays into progressive's dual tendencies towards Italian nationalism and the idea of the Cisalpine as the torchbearer of the Italian revolution. In general progressives favored greater legislation and projects of law formulated either by individual representatives, committee recommendations or private petitions by expert scholars. They were remiss to follow blindly the French example, particularly in cases where they felt the precedents did not apply. Again, the progressives were in no way anti-French and were often the biggest supporters of an alliance with the French Republic; they simply preferred greater Cisalpine Autonomy. The progressive attitude was perhaps best expressed by Giacinto Zanni when responding to comment by Fenaroli who insisted upon a French precedent: "Non risponderò se in Francia sia stato fatto così bene come egli forse crede; dirò solo che noi desideriamo di fare meglio..."²⁴¹

Neutrals

Republic ; "Seduta XXXIX, 8 nervoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:563. Debate on motion of Dandolo regarding clerical income and pensions.

²³⁷ "Seduta CII, 10 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:59–63 Debate on ecclesiastical corporations and clergy in the public education system ; "Seduta CLXXVII, 26 florile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:726–30.

²³⁸ Ranza, *Discorso*.

²³⁹ Trouvé Claude-Joseph, "Quelques Explications sur la Republique Cisalpine", 1799 ; Zaghi *Il Direttorio Francese e la repubblica cisalpina: La nascita di uno stato moderno* 1:138-141

²⁴⁰ "Seduta CLXXXIX, 9 pratile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:127–30 Discourse of Bragaldi on the right to Cisalpine citizenship despite claims from the Constitution.

²⁴¹ "Seduta CII, 10 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:64 tras. "I will not respond to whether in France it might have been done so well as maybe one would believe; I will say only that we desire to do better..."

One of the defining features of legislative politics in the Directorial period of the Revolution is the existence of a strong center. Mitchell recognized early on that the majority of deputies in the French Legislative Assembly in 1791 did not necessarily belong to a political club, and more so if they did, they may not have been vocal extremists.²⁴² Even as the separation between the poles of conservative Monarchianism and the extreme Jacobinism of the Montagnards began to radicalize, it is not as though all centrists moved towards less extreme groups like the Girondin.²⁴³ There were in fact many within this center who felt strongly revolutionary on certain issues and ambivalent on others. This broad center remained the most intact of any political ideology into the legislative politics of post-Thermidorian political culture.²⁴⁴ However with 1795, a more moderated trend which had been present in the politics of change since the mid-eighteenth century, but had been scorned for its hesitancy, came to power as the voice of reasoned legislative governance.²⁴⁵ Those concentrated at the very middle of this new spectrum found themselves the base of a political ideology grounded in neutrality, or as Serna puts it “modération...radicale”.²⁴⁶ Hence, there came into being a new paradox in Revolutionary politics: a strong sense of neutrality which came to represent those bodies who had been present from the first half of the 1790s but had lacked a voice. So too was the neutral center a powerful force in Cisalpine legislative politics, in particular those of the *Gran Consiglio*.²⁴⁷

For the x-axis, the center consisted of those who neither invoked an extreme change along pro-Italian lines, nor believed in a strict interpretation and application of the Cisalpine Constitution. However, the x-axis, unlike both the y and z axes had a center which was the least defined and least concentrated. Therefore, the best term to apply to this central “polarity” of representatives is neutral. There was no true defining feature of the middle of the x-axis like one might find with rationalists (y-axis) or representative democrats (z-axis). Instead there was a litany of hesitations towards one pole or the other which tended to waiver based on topic. What this means is that representatives who could be noted as neutral made alliances with both polarities and had a high variance of political philosophies between themselves dependent upon factors of

²⁴² Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 19.

²⁴³ Mitchell, “Political Divisions within the Legislative Assembly of 1791,” 357.

²⁴⁴ Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 77–78.

²⁴⁵ Serna, “Radicalités et Modérations,” 9–10.

²⁴⁶ Serna, 16–17.

²⁴⁷ Serna, “Small Nation, Big Sisters,” 184.

geographic origins, political background, or profession. For this reason, those who cannot be placed firmly in one camp or the other must necessarily be labelled as neutral. That being said, many neutrals at the very center of the spectrum did share certain ideological commonalities regarding the Revolution in Italy and the importance of the constitution in the legislative process. It is from these commonalities, the “modérations radicale”, that we can identify an extreme center of the x-axis for *Gran Consiglio* representatives.

Where progressives believed it was the responsibility of the Cisalpine Republic to continue to advance the Revolution through legislation specific to issues which were confronting the Cisalpine population, and thus making the Cisalpine Republic the new center of the Revolutionary experience in Europe, neutral representatives viewed the Cisalpine Republic less as a reference point and more as another cog in a larger revolutionary machine. Neutrals felt, in fact, that in order for the Revolution to continue, it must necessarily move to other parts of the peninsula, and in fact to other parts of the continent.²⁴⁸ While this was a point they may have shared with both progressives and originalists, neutrals tended to support a revolutionary fraternity which was not necessarily constricted to one metropole (Milan as the progressives claimed or Paris as originalists claimed) but rather could be found wherever there was revolutionary fervor. At the same time neutrals did not believe that the work of the revolution had been completed with the Cisalpine Constitution and the Constitution of Year III. When constitutional and French precedential legislation served to resolve a revolutionary crisis, these practices should have been established. This was particularly true for questions of the roles of the different branches of government (in particular conflicts between the executive ministry and the legislature).²⁴⁹ However, where these precedents failed, innovation according to the revolutionary spirit of the Cisalpine people must dictate the legislative prerogative of the nation, and those who fail in the face of this revolutionary spirit must remain exempt from it.²⁵⁰ This proposes a political attitude in which change is espoused by the people, similar to the sentiments of progressives, though the definition of “the people” is more selective based upon those who are *willing* to participate. Though its true progressives

²⁴⁸ “Seduta XCVI, 4 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:733 Motion of Vicini regarding the recognition of the Roman Republic

²⁴⁹ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:165-167 Discourse and motion of Polfranceschi regarding acts of the Minister of War

²⁵⁰ “Seduta XLIV, 13 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:628–29 Discourse and motion of Perseguiti.

worked within a constitutional framework, cultural, societal, and economic conditions served as the basis for legislation. Neutrals by contrast felt strongly that in order for the revolution to endure, the population had to be willing to endure a measure of societal and cultural change, which was brought about by the Cisalpine Constitution.²⁵¹ Thus, the Cisalpine constitution became the basis from which legislative output was expanded, and resistance to this without merit would be seen as counter-revolutionary.

Thus, the nationalist intentions of neutrals were similar in many ways to that of the progressives but lacking the cisalpine exceptionalism. There was no real homogeneous support or opposition to the war among neutrals, however the tendency of military men to be neutrals did often lend a greater support towards the war effort, and in turn a significantly more bellicose nationalism.²⁵² But at the same time this nationalism was one which acknowledged the place of French Revolution and in particular the French *Armée d'Italie* as having a central role in Cisalpine political development, without which the revolution would not be able to continue within the Cisalpine Republic, the greater Italian peninsula and Europe as a whole.²⁵³ The French were not foreign soldiers, nor overlords, but brothers in arms and in liberty;²⁵⁴ this insinuates a view of neither the Cisalpine nor the French Republic as the greatest amongst equals but instead a singular body of united revolutionary states all working together for the mutual goal of European liberty.²⁵⁵ Neutrals, who tended to come from the military and scholarly classes, favored a revolutionary movement which was instilled through education and a sort of “liberating” conquest, progressively and across all areas of the continent. On one hand the military operations of the republic were necessary to overthrow the tyranny of the old regime, a feat only capable through republican cooperation, and which often needed to be maintained through extraordinary means, for example a military commission of justice. Once order had been established it was through public instruction

²⁵¹ “Seduta XXXV, 4 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:501 Report of Perseguiti, on behalf of the Legislative Commission, regarding religious corporations.

²⁵² “Seduta XLIII, 12 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:620-621 Debate on the sending of the Hussar troops to help in the proposed invasion of Great Britain

²⁵³ “Seduta VIII, 9 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:167.

²⁵⁴ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Studi, 110 n.d., fol. La Hoz “La Hoz Generale di Brigata Commandante la piazza di Milano, alla Guardia Nazionale” Milano dalla Stamperia Patriotica, nel soppresso monastero di S. Zeno N. 543 Anno I della Repubblica Cisalpina

²⁵⁵ “Seduta XLIV, 13 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:643-644 Debate on the motion of the Military Commission to send the Hussar Corp along with the French Armée for an invasion of Great Britain

and education in a constitutional and republican fashion that the people could evaluate and change the political culture of the nation.²⁵⁶ Most neutrals favored a strong plan of public instruction based in revolutionary republican ideas, which would serve as a basis from which the people, through their representatives in the *Gran Consiglio* could engage in meaningful revolutionary changes as the years went on and the Republic grew stronger.²⁵⁷ Therefore the core principle of neutral revolution was order and organic changes rather than advancing an Italicized revolution or enforcing French precedents.²⁵⁸

Originalists

One of the greatest misconceptions within the historiography of the Cisalpine Republic was that those figures who had power and influence in the initial months of the Cisalpine Republic were the same as those who were powerful during 1798. In reality those figures like Melzi d'Eril, Francesco Visconti and Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni who had been instrumental in the formation of the Cisalpine Constitution were quickly shipped off to work as diplomats in Paris or at the Radstadt Congress once the Cisalpine Assemblies had been established in November of 1797.²⁵⁹ The absence of these powerful figures at the beginning of the *Gran Consiglio* in Frimaire Year VI, meant a lack of advocacy for the very constitution they had constructed based on the French model. This left a gap open for more ardent progressives like Reina, Dandolo and Dehò to swoop in and begin advocating for constitutional adaptation, quickly acting to eliminate the presence of the old order figures like Verri or Melzi by eliminating the Constitutional committee.²⁶⁰ These efforts were successful to a degree in minimizing the influences and interpretations of the formulators of the constitution; that being said there remained throughout the entire *Gran Consiglio* period a handful

²⁵⁶ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 112 n.d., fol. Polfranceschi “Milano il 12 Frimale anno I repubblicano. I Consigli Legislativi al Popolo Cisalpino”; Though printed after the *Gran Consiglio* period, this circulatory was written by a neutral controlled Council in December 1798 following the fourth and final coup of the Cisalpine Government. Often after the activation of the Legislature, and then after the coups of Trouvé and Rivaud in the autumn of 1798 one can find references to Years VI and VII as Year I of the Cisalpine Republic. Though more often they are counted in French republican years.

²⁵⁷ “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 111,” fol. Mazzucchelli “Manifesto del governo provvisorio rappresentante il sovrano popolo bresciano a tutti i popoli dell’Italia libera.” Brescia 1797. Anno primo della Libertà Italiana. Cittadino Bendiscioli” p.7.

²⁵⁸ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 112 n.d., fol. Perseguiti “Discorso pronuziato dal Cittadino Perseguiti Presidente del Consiglio degli Anziani e Decreto di stampa nella seduta giorno primo Brumale Anno I. Repubblicano” p. 2-3

²⁵⁹ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:125.

²⁶⁰ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:89–91.

of powerful representatives who remained faithful to the original goal of the Cisalpine Constitution. This goal was to form a government in the Cisalpine Republic made up of a hand-picked group of men loyal to Bonaparte and the French state which would bring stability to the region, while offering aid to the continued military actions of the French *Armée*.²⁶¹ These men believed that regardless of the internal circumstances, the original text of the Constitution must be adhered to since its formulation was created to bring about the a strong internal stability. If disrupted, this anti-constitutional anarchy could bring about the end of the Revolution and a return of counter-revolutionary forces. For this reason, the best way to denominate these representatives is with the moniker of “originalist”.

The term “originalist” as applied here can be applied in a similar (though not exact) way to the American juridical term. This idea, famously espoused by American conservative Supreme Court Justice Anthony Scalia, defined a form of viewing the constitution “in which the meaning of the Constitution is interpreted as fixed as of the time it was enacted”, meaning the context or conditions of the moment in which the constitution was being interpreted were unapplicable.²⁶² While this is a juridical definition and not legislative, it applies well to the argument on constitutional change in the *Gran Consiglio*. Where progressives believed that new conditions required new laws and adaption of the constitution, the originalists were insistent that the solutions already existed in the Cisalpine Constitution, and barring that, within the years of French precedent that the representatives had at their disposal. More importantly, originalists had faith in the formulators of the Cisalpine Constitution, that their reliance upon the French Constitution of Year III was not done to appease an occupying force as some later historians would assert, but instead meant to apply tried and tested revolutionary measures to transform and stabilize northern Italian society, during a time which had been characterized – at least since the French invasion in 1796 – by war and political instability.²⁶³

The originalists were in their own way patriots who felt that they had been given a special mandate by the original revolutionaries to provide support and implement the work of the French republic, particularly in light of the Treaty of Campoformio which originalists saw as a definitive

²⁶¹ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 14–15.

²⁶² Vloet, “Two Views of the Constitution: Originalism vs. Non-Originalism.”

²⁶³ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 13–14.

end to revolutionary struggle and a beginning of republican rebuilding.²⁶⁴ For originalists, the main priority of the *Gran Consiglio* was the creation of a Cisalpine Government, not the adaptation or interpretation of the Constitution, nor the continuation of the revolution. The Cisalpine republic, according to originalists must look to itself first, under the guidance of French authorities and their past experience with nation building, if it were to defend itself against enemies both foreign and domestic.²⁶⁵ This meant following the institutions which had proved functional under the post-Thermidorian French regime, in particular the courts and the law.²⁶⁶ The originalists were some of the most vehemently against the imposition of extra-judiciary military commissions which they saw as violent and setting a dangerous precedent of the legislature attributing to itself special executive and judicial functions. These actions were viewed as dangerously closer to the Jacobin Convention than the Assemblies under the Constitution of Year III.²⁶⁷ The institutions had to be given the opportunity to work properly, which meant application of the Constitution and proper adherence to pre-established laws. Originalists found the notion of progressing legislation as needlessly interruptive, ending the republican process before it had the opportunity to begin. This was particularly true for laws that originalists felt took up unnecessary time (such as the decision of the uniform for Legislative officials) when more important issues, in particular those of finance and internal stability, needed to be dealt with much greater urgency.²⁶⁸ In the end originalists were as patriotic as their progressive and neutral counterparts, though they put their energy into nation building rather than revolutionary expansion and unification.

²⁶⁴ “Seduta XCIV, 2 ventoso anno VI repubblicano” *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:674-675 Motion of Schiera

²⁶⁵ Visconti 2011, pp. 86-87 It should be noted that Visconti was speaking about Giacomo Lamberti, perhaps the most outspoken and moderate of the originalists. Though she does not describe this group in her work, her descriptions of Lamberti are applicable in understanding the originalist ideology. Lamberti was a member of the Constitutional Commission which was suppressed early on in the *Gran Consiglio*. He continually worked towards the application of the original text and French precedents over the passage of new laws. This has consistently led to accusations of Francophilia instead of Italian patriotism. In reality, the opposite was true. Lamberti was horrified but later French interventions, though he understood, according to his own logic their necessity since the Cisalpine legislatures had moved so far from the original intentions of the constitution in 1797. (Visconti, 2011, p 65n)

²⁶⁶ Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En France (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*, 374–75.

²⁶⁷ “Seduta XIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:224 Discourse of Biumi against Military commissions of high police in Bergamo.

²⁶⁸ “Seduta XL, 9 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:571–72 Discourse of Lamberti on uniforms of the Legislative officials and Della Vida motion on the minting of Cisalpine Coinage.

The insistence of originalists on precedent often led to both contemporary and future criticism of originalists as more loyal to the French authorities than to their own nation.²⁶⁹ It was also the basis by which future historiography established a pattern of “moderatism” within the legislative proceedings of the *Gran Consiglio*. In reality this group was extremely small and found itself progressively diminished within the council. That said, despite their small numbers, originalists became increasingly important in the Cisalpine Government as a whole as major figures like Melzi and Lamberti were moved to higher positions such as the ministry, directory or ambassadorship.²⁷⁰ Thus, the accusation of moderatism, at least as it refers to implementation of the Constitution in the legislative sector of the Cisalpine government was unfounded, since even if originalists had influence it was in more in the executive functions than those of the legislature. In fact, most originalists saw themselves as the only revolutionaries left in the Cisalpine republic since they continued – in their mind – the French revolutionary tradition of nation building, properly within the framework of the French experience. This loyalty to a proposed “metropole” of the Revolution in Paris, should not be viewed as a colonial submissiveness, as has been proposed in the English language historiography by scholars like Michael Broers.²⁷¹ Instead, the idea of Paris at the center of the Revolution provides a much clearer idea of how originalists saw themselves in light of the French Republic, as a transnational fraternity of revolutionary republicans attempting to build a new Europe free from the tyrannies of the *ancien regime*, within the context of the French experience of the 1790s.²⁷²

This is not to say that the originalist representatives were so reliant upon French precedent that they did not understand that there were always going to be contexts in which adaption was necessary. Much like the deputies of the French constituency in 1791, historians have always

²⁶⁹ Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:125; Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 4:161–62 “Gran Consiglio” Criticism of Vertemate Franchi and his call for the replacement of goods to the former Grisons estates.

²⁷⁰ “Seduta LVII, 1 di 2 26 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:35; “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:828–29.

²⁷¹ Broers 2005, pp. 4-7 Broers quite foolishly opens his examination of Napoleonic Italy by equating the experience of Italians to that of colonists under the nineteenth century British Empire in which two groups evolved, one loyal to their new overlords and willing at all costs to please the Napoleonic state, and another which held tight to its pre-modern ideas of Roman Catholic religiousness and ancien regime elitism. Not only is this assessment ignorant of European historical contexts and profoundly Anglo-centric, but it also completely dismisses the complexity of the Italian peninsular political dynamic and paints the cisalpine left and right with a very broad and very factually inaccurate brush.

²⁷² Oddens and Rutjes, “The Political Culture of the Sister Republics,” 25–27.

harped upon the unprepared nature of the Cisalpine representatives, particularly those most loyal to the French principles held in the Constitution of Year III.²⁷³ This is often contributed to a reformist attitude within an elite class of the Duchy of Milan who found themselves either among the patrons of the *Accademia dei Pugni*, or revolutionary dreamers who longed for a violent upheaval of political society. This argument is of course the basis for one of the greatest follies of the late twentieth century historiography which chalks up the Triennio political culture to reformism versus revolution.²⁷⁴ The reality is that most of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, and especially those which found themselves in the originalist grouping, had a long history of political, and practical experience in government.²⁷⁵ In fact many of the originalists came from backgrounds which had origins in the reform movements of the late eighteenth century, but thanks to their experiences in government administration found themselves often in favor of revolutionary change according to the French fashion.²⁷⁶ The originalists were some of the oldest proponents of the revolution in Italy. Many watched with great interest the entire progression of the French experience – with all of its violence, confusion and instability – as it unfolded across the first half of the 1790s and tried to understand the legislative mistakes which had taken place, so that they could be avoided in the Cisalpine case. Thus, for originalists, the Constitution was not to be meddled with because it was the result of a logical process which was rooted in both eighteenth century reformism *and* the French Revolution. Moreover, originalists believed that their experience either as administrators, patriotic aristocrats or clergymen – all of which had made them figures of leadership in their respective communities – demonstrated how adaptation and interpretation could and should be applied to the constitution and laws according to local and momentarily specific conditions and not at a national level.

Y-axis or the measurement of legislative speed and force

Where the x-axis looks at the basis by which representatives applied and formulated law, the y-axis looked at *how* legislation was to be constructed in a concrete and less theoretical manner. Much like the political spectrum regarding constitutional adaptation and revolutionary change, the representatives looked to the model of the French for the manner in which urgency was applied to

²⁷³ Dendena, *I nostri maledetti scranni*, 78.

²⁷⁴ Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia*, “*patriota energico*,” 26–28.

²⁷⁵ Dendena, *I nostri maledetti scranni*, 78.

²⁷⁶ Gennaro Barbarisi, *Cronaca Milanese in Un Epistolario de Settecento: Le Lettere Di Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila a Giovan Battista Corniani (1799-1782)*, XIII.

the legislative process. Urgency in this case refers to the speed with which legislation was to be formulated, and the force with which said legislation was to be applied. These two parts of the definition are crucial when understanding where a representative sat on the y-axis spectrum. On one side was a group who felt that the menacing dangers which surrounded, not only the Cisalpine Republic generally, but the *Gran Consiglio* as a body in itself, were likewise a threat to the Revolution as it existed in Italy, and as such required extreme measures to respond to new issues. At the opposite end of the spectrum was a group who felt that legislation without proper research or that was too forcefully applied was destabilizing and could welcome violence when society was not ready to accept changes. This group even went as far as to allow a sort of Revolutionary regression which would look back to ideas or policies from the earlier days of the Revolution, or even the *ancien regime*, which may have functioned, and could be used as a transitional method. The distinguishing difference between the x- and y-axes – other than, of course the primary themes which define them – is the existence of a much more definable center along the y-axis who viewed the use of urgency as necessarily dictated by a measured logic and rationale. This center was much easier to spot and had a much tighter extremity in the middle than that of neutrals on the x-axis. As such the factionalism which came into being across the ten-month life-span of the *Gran Consiglio* was remarkably more visible along the y-axis than that of the x-axis.

So then, why use the term radical or moderate to describe legislative functions, if in fact these terms were retro-actively applied and broadly – and often incorrectly – used? In short the rationale is twofold: first, in the measuring of urgency the literal definitions of radicalism and moderatism fit perfectly in describing the level of extremism which representatives believed necessary to apply to given circumstances of legislative output; second, these terms are already frequently used (or perhaps better misused) when discussing the political structure of the *Gran Consiglio*. The association of “radical” and “moderate” with revolutionary and counter-revolutionary respectively, completely nullifies the idea that a Revolution could be both extreme and not, particularly in regard to legislation. The purpose of using these terms in this study, therefore, is to reapply the terms in a correct way, one which can associate “radicalism” and “moderatism” not to left and right-wing politics, Jacobinism, Babeufism, Conservatism or the Revolution as a whole, but its true definition which is extremism – or the lack thereof. In terms of legislative politics this extremism is best demonstrated in the urgency of the legislative process.

Radicals

To refer to something as radical often implies an extreme position which favors immense changes to an established system. As Serna points out, the Revolution was by its very nature radical.²⁷⁷ It evoked an extreme, sometimes even violent reaction against the established *ancien regime* system wherever it landed. However, the denomination of “radical” is consistently removed by historians – rightly so – from the Revolution after 1795 and is often seen as having a definitive end following the failure of Babeuf in 1796.²⁷⁸ Those “radicals” in the classic sense who survived into the *Triennio* period like Buonarroti, found themselves marginalized. In fact, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* would never have titled themselves radicals, nor would they have laid such a heavy accusation at the feet of those elements like Galdi or Foscolo who advocated a more extreme position. Those titles were applied later on to individuals like Pagano and his “*giacobini napoletani*”.²⁷⁹ But this anti-radicalism within Cisalpine political society often led to false accusation of extreme moderatism within Cisalpine leadership, mostly assigned to the Directory, but also present within the powerful elements of the legislature as well.²⁸⁰ Yet here was another exaggeration of the extremism found within the *Gran Consiglio*, since – as has already been demonstrated – there was no blanket political composition within any facet of Cisalpine government, least of all in the *Gran Consiglio*. Thus, radicals as they will be defined in this study, were those representatives who felt that the laws (whether they were progressive, neutral or originalist) needed to be applied with the most extreme urgency which meant fast paced and with forceful application.

Radicals felt that it was the job of a representative to give to the Cisalpine people the greatest possibility of happiness and liberty.²⁸¹ This was only possible if the revolution could be applied in Cisalpine territory, which in turn was only possible through legislation handed down by the Cisalpine assemblies and instituted by the administration. Any interruption to this process was in their mind an act against the Republic itself. In fact, to slow down or stop legislation could –

²⁷⁷ Serna, “Radicalités et Modérations,” 3.

²⁷⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 548.

²⁷⁹ Rao, *Esuli: L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792-1802)*; Ferrone, *La Società Giusta Ed Equa. Repubblicanesimo e Diritti Dell'uomo in Gatano Filangieri*, 231; Rao, “Il giacobinismo italiano nell’opera di Carlo Zaghi.”

²⁸⁰ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:118–19.

²⁸¹ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–13 Discourse of Coddè on the inability of the Seniori to pass legislation.

according to Angelo Perseguiti, one of the leading radicals in the *Gran Consiglio* – offer an opportunity to alarmists and counter-revolutionaries to seize the will of the people against their own well-being.²⁸² Speed was the tool by which the Revolution would be accomplished. This did not mean, of course, that legislation should be applied by hot-headed populists. It simply meant that the discussions surrounding legislative solutions, and particularly the mandates of commissions, must be held to account with regards to the time in which they have been given to find a resolution to a given problem.²⁸³ This preoccupation with time and governance was, in fact, one of the great innovations of the French revolution, as Joris Oddens points out in his study of the concurrent Lower Assembly of the Batavian Republic.²⁸⁴ The extensive time which it took to perform legislative actions within a “democratic” legislature in which all parties had the right to have their input in the legislative process, was a point of extreme frustration for radicals, who did not understand how a body which titles itself at once patriotic and revolutionary could delay in aiding the people.²⁸⁵ This also played into the usefulness or not of legislation. Legislation which was redundant or led to the loss of time when more important issues such as national finances or military and civil threats were more necessary to confront was considered dangerous to radicals.²⁸⁶

The rules of order, in particular Title V on the internal policy laws of the *Gran Consiglio*, provided a strong support system for radicals to use to make sure the legislative process was streamlined. The internal policy itself will be covered in greater detail in Chapter VII. One of the most useful tools which came from this policy was the use of “urgency” declarations by radical representatives.²⁸⁷ The use of “urgency” was supposed to be assigned to a motion when it was decided by the Council as a whole that the constitutionally proscribed period of 20 days provided

²⁸² Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:16–17 Discourse of Perseguiti on alarmism and the dangers of the Seniori’s ability to pass legislation.

²⁸³ “Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:120-121 Debate on commission time limits and personelle renewals

²⁸⁴ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 115–16.

²⁸⁵ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:15 Discourse of Greppi on the untimely reply of Seniori rejection of legislation; Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 119.

²⁸⁶ “Seduta CXXXI, 9 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:638-640 This debate on the opening hour of the Council, was surprisingly opposed quite vehemently by radicals like Dehò, Cavedoni and Perseguiti. Their opposition was not to the motion which demanded that a majority of representatives arrive at the proscribed time according to the internal policy laws and the constitution, but because the motion had already been established and as such was a waste of representatives time during a moment of particular turbulence in the *Gran Consiglio*.

²⁸⁷ “Internal policy Title V Article 34” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:274

too much time for the Legislative branch as a whole (meaning including the *Seniori*) to deliberate over an issue.²⁸⁸ *Urgenza* was generally condemned by moderates and used sparingly by rationalists; radicals however justified their continued use of urgency by stating that lack of order and political chaos of the Republic necessitated swift action in defense of the people against the proposed counter-revolutionary enemy.²⁸⁹ Urgency was also only one of two methods by which radical representatives could interrupt a debate they felt had dragged on (the other being a motion of order). With an urgency declaration, the matter at hand had to be resolved by the end of the debate, something which to radicals was necessary if the *Gran Consiglio* were to proceed with its work of building the republican state, particularly with the high volume of petitions, proposals and letters from private citizens, foreign officials and other branches of government which all served as continual interruptions of the legislative process.²⁹⁰

Legislative urgency meant more than just quick resolution of debates. Radicals were insistent that commissions and other projects of law were quickly resolved from the moment of their introduction into the Council. This does not mean that they wanted a hurried or inattentive resolution. Instead many sought a process of legislation in which debates and research, either in general council or commissions, could be conducted in a thorough and effective manner. This meant continued calls for project updates and more importantly, checks on inspectors that they were properly providing the resources necessary for proper legislative formulation. This latter point was important because it noted a general openness to Council spending and a work-ethic which implied a full commitment to passing and implementing institutions which would provide for the happiness of the cisalpine people.²⁹¹ For radicals, their mandate was not one of power but

²⁸⁸ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:205-206 Discourse of Cagnoli on the over-use of *urgenza*

²⁸⁹ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:207. Discourse of Greppi on the necessity of frequent urgency in legislation

²⁹⁰ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 119.

²⁹¹ Nutini “L'esperienza giacobina nella Repubblica Cisalpina” 115-116. Interestingly, here Nutini brings up a point which has often been insisted upon, particularly in the more Marxist interpretations of *Gran Consiglio* politics made in the second half of the twentieth century: who the people were was a matter of real subjectivity depending on the representative. This metric plays more into the discussion of democratic versus republican government, however the issue of poor versus rich, landed versus unlanded or even urban versus rural was not homogenized in any of the spectrums we are looking at in this study. In reality one can find examples of people like Latuada or Dehò who had progressive leanings and were a radical and rationalist respectively, but who both supported the plight of the rural poor *contadino* over that of the middle-class urban artisan and especially over the urban bourgeois. At the same time, other notable progressives like Dandolo, Reina or Glissenti were much less concerned with the rural poor and more with what they considered the “citizenry” (those with money and land who inhabited the upper echelons of urban life in the major city centers of the republic). Thus, it is impossible to really define the people, despite its

of service and that meant continued sacrifice for national betterment. Though for many in their time this extreme zealotry of revolutionary spirit may have been looked upon as over-eager or even dangerous (and in later times as Jacobin), radicals viewed their duty as a necessary invert to the old order.

Yet the speed of legislative output was only half of the radical's belief around legislative urgency. Radicals were also strong believers in fierce legal enforcement and tended to favor legislation which would strictly implement the Revolution in the Cisalpine Republic.²⁹² If a resolution was passed to the *Seniori* who approved it into law, it would mean nothing if the law was not implemented correctly by the executive ministry or enforced by the Judiciary. This is often reflected in radically supported legislation which tended to include provisions which strictly enforced the revolutionary order in Cisalpine Territory (extra-judiciary military commissions of high police, checks on various ministerial decrees, quick installation of a supreme court, ecc), and which gave the *Gran Consiglio* a high degree of authority in the continued enforcement of these regulations. There was also a big push among radicals at self-policing within the Council, making sure that order was being maintained and the large bill of issues was being addressed properly and in a timely manner.²⁹³ Light penalties for missing sessions or neglecting debates were proposed such as a fine or censorship.²⁹⁴ Consistent absence or interruption could lead to more severe penalties like dismissal or even imprisonment. Ironically, however, the most severe breaching of these ideals were the radicals themselves, who were the subjects of dismissals during the 24 Germinal Coup (Giovio and Zani were highly outspoken radicals who held up votes on the Military and Commercial treaty with France²⁹⁵) and imprisonment for sedition (Fabbri and Fantaguzzi were

common use in *Gran Consiglio* debates, since every representative had a different idea of the "people" they were representing.

²⁹² "Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina Vol. 3*, 3:12" Discourse of Codde regarding the urgent need for extra-judiciary military commissions of high police .

²⁹³ "Seduta XL, 9 nervoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:568–69 Discourse of Alborghetti on disciplinary actions for illegally absent representatives; "Seduta XLVIII, 16 nervoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:685–87 Debate on procedures of general and secret committees.

²⁹⁴ "Seduta LIII, 22 nervoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:765-766

²⁹⁵ "Notes from Directory meeting of 24 Germinale anno VI repubblicano regarding the expulsion of members of the Legislative Assemblies" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* ,4:59

two young and extremely radical representatives whose outburst at the ineffectiveness of the *Gran Consiglio* had them jailed for ten-days).²⁹⁶

External to the *Gran Consiglio*, radicals were often big proponents of quick and efficient nomination of administrative and judicial posting.²⁹⁷ These offices were responsible for the execution and upholding of Cisalpine Legislation, and as it fell to the *Gran Consiglio* to begin the nomination process, radicals often pushed for a streamlined process.²⁹⁸ Radicals also became the most vehement supporters for extra-judiciary commissions of high police, who could effectively serve as a the enforcer of judicial legislation in the main revolutionary centers of the Republic (Milan, Modena, Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara and Faenza) until the official positions could be filled.²⁹⁹ This often led to accusations of Jacobinism by the more moderate factions of both the Cisalpine and French authorities. In reality, however, these calls for stricter internal and external enforcement played into the radical sentiment of pushing the legislative process to the extreme, not necessarily from a political perspective but with regards to the formulation and implementation of legislation more broadly.

Rationalists

Unlike the x-axis whose central group was highly variable along the spectrum of constitutionality, along the y-axis the central group of representatives tended to share a collective idea of Serna's "moderation... radicale".³⁰⁰ This central group did not trust the radical notion of extreme urgency in applying legislation, as it could lead to confusion and contradictions as new problems arise from new laws; in other words, undue speed causes mistakes.³⁰¹ Additionally, strong enforcement of laws without understanding resistance to them may lead to internal

²⁹⁶ "Seduta CLXXVIII, 27 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 4:732-34.

²⁹⁷ "Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 2:213 Discourse of Perseguiti on the dangers of not posting enough judges and administrators quickly within large departments such as Olona and Verbano

²⁹⁸ "Seduta XCII, 30 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 2:641-642 Discourse of Giovio on the nomination of provisional administrators for the good of the people

²⁹⁹ "Seduta XCIV, 2 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 2:680-681 Discourse of Gambari on the constitutionality of revolutionary tribunals until the institutionalization of regular judicial courts ; "Seduta CIV, 12 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:97-103

³⁰⁰ Serna, "Radicalités et Modérations," 16-17.

³⁰¹ "Seduta XCVI, 4 ventoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* Vol. 3, 3:731-32 Debate on treaties with other nations not France.

instability and a breakdown of the social contract between the government and the governed.³⁰² And yet, despite these strong differences with radicals it would be incorrect to label this central group as moderate. Though they may not have been willing to hurry legislation for the sake of speed, this center group still felt a sense of duty to confront the problems at hand, though in an orderly manner which prioritized resolutions in order of necessity instead of appearance.³⁰³ Moreover a refusal to apply the laws or to allow their application to be dictated locally would lead to a lack of national cohesion between groups which already had to work hard to overcome historic differences (class, geographic location, urbanization).³⁰⁴ The center group in the end simply wanted the proper time to rationally form legislative output, without the specter of urgency hurrying results, nor with the uncertainty inherent in moderation delaying them.

The rationality of this center group is what lends them their proposed title. “Rationalists” believed that all legislative output, like a scientific study, required the proper time to understand the causal and effective factors which define its creation. Once these factors had been sorted out, and preparations had been made to avoid predicted polemics, the legislation must have been presented to the people as being in their best interest, insisting on the trust between the legislative representatives and the cisalpine people.³⁰⁵ Rationalists were insistent upon debating and making commissions for legislation which would impact the lives of the people most, and were not necessarily preoccupied with revolutionary vision, but rather the wellbeing of the populace and the installation of a republican system of institutions.³⁰⁶ Unlike both radicals – who feared the ever lingering presence of counterrevolutionary forces internal and external – and moderates – who rejected the ability of the common man to understand the revolution – rationalists tended to find a more optimistic view of the Cisalpine people whom they believed possible of understanding the complexities of republican government when given the chance to participate.³⁰⁷ This did not mean they were willing to put legislation into the hands of the common man, instead taking upon themselves as representatives selected from the masses for their abilities in reason to create

³⁰² Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En France (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*, 368.

³⁰³ “Seduta LIII, 22 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:764 Motion of Dandolo on the prioritization of resolutions.

³⁰⁴ “Seduta XIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:223 Debate on the role of the *Gran Consiglio* in the enforcement of laws

³⁰⁵ Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En France (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*, 370.

³⁰⁶ “Seduta LXVIII, 5 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:177 Discourse of Savonarola on the Mandate of the *Gran Consiglio* against anarchists and aristocrats.

³⁰⁷ Latuada, “Lettere Filosofico, Politiche d'un Solitario Dell'alpi Verbane,” 3–4.

legislation which would provide the best for the common well-being.³⁰⁸ They acknowledged the continual presence of counter-revolutionary forces, and also a general ignorance among the populace, but felt both could and would be overcome by rational debate and clear outlining of legislation.

This optimism of the revolutionary spirit, in which the *Gran Consiglio* had the trust of the people, who – at least according to rationalists – believed the representatives had the ability to construct a revolutionary government which would benefit all citizens, was born in large part from the professional and personal experiences of the late eighteenth century in Northern Italy, and particularly in Milan. The specifics of shared professional, education and political experiences of the deputies before the *Gran Consiglio* will be the theme of the next chapter, however it should be noted that as the largest group in the Council trends between rationalist representatives in these categories tended to also follow trends for the entire Council itself. For example, many rationalists came from the professional class and many were involved as professors at one of the four major universities of North Italy (Pavia, Bologna, Padova or Modena-Reggio). Many were either scientists – often involved in the medical field like Vincenzo Dandolo³⁰⁹ or Michele Rosa³¹⁰ – or had a background in law like Francesco Reina³¹¹, Lauro Glissenti³¹² or Giovanni Vicini³¹³.

Rationalists tended to have an affinity for the American Constitutional system as well, viewing it along with the French legislative experience as experimental examples from which to draw upon when crafting legislation.³¹⁴ Many rationalists were particularly fond of the American tradition of compromise which was useful in bringing together various perspectives in commissions and general council and formulating a more universal legislative tradition. Indeed rationalism, like neutralism on the x-axis, was a principle which was found for every category of

³⁰⁸ “Seduta LXVIII, 5 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:180; 184 Preamble of the discourse of Mascheroni on the union of comunes and districts; Discourse of Latuada on the injustice of excluding representatives from debates.

³⁰⁹ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 34.

³¹⁰ Piromalli, “L’eredità Del Settecento Nella Cultura Riminese,” 78.

³¹¹ Dettamanti, “Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal,” 299.

³¹² Vedova, *Biografia Degli Scrittori Padovani*, 554.

³¹³ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:138.

³¹⁴ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 595. It should be noted that though there were many commonalities between rationalists and the American Democratic Republicans and the corresponding French party which made up the center of the French Legislative assemblies, there was never any direct mentioning of either group within the Cisalpine *processi verbali*.. Rationalists shared their sentiment of individual liberty and compromise with the Jeffersonian American Democratic Republicans, but only as far as it related to legislative productivity.

the opposing axis (meaning there were progressive rationalists, neutral rationalists, and originalist rationalists). This means that regardless of constitutional opinions, rationalists were unified in their ideas of legislative urgency, and the need for proper debate and research structures. This included the rights of representatives and private petitioners to intervene in the research process, either in commissions or general council.³¹⁵ Rationalists were some of the biggest advocates of outside voices to the chamber, regardless of time constraints. In this way rationalists tended to share more moderate sympathies of external input, in which laws must be formed in a way that they are useful to the common man, and if they have no usefulness they need not be applied;³¹⁶ though, moderates tended to favor the use of existing laws in these cases whereas rationalists would simply continue to rebuild legislation until it fit, rather than refer to *ancien regime* precedents.

The rationalists found necessity in urgency, but not in all manners. Like radicals, rationalists often championed the use of urgency in general council as a way to maintain stability in the legislative process. That being said, the urgency of rationalists was often applied to debates over singular articles in longer plans.³¹⁷ The core of rationalist ideology was the application of well-researched legislation, and once an issue had been put through a rigorous research and debate process both in commission and general Council, continual impediments to its resolution were no more than obstruction of the public good.³¹⁸ Rationalists saw speed as a tool in the revolutionary arsenal which needed to be applied conditionally, not all or nothing. This meant that rationalists had a greater fluidity in siding with moderates or radicals on legislative speed depending on the

³¹⁵ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:337 Discourse by Lupi on the right of citizens to petition publicly.

³¹⁶ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:206 Within this debate on urgency Giambattista Venturi (professor from Modena) made a statement which perhaps best exemplifies the attitude of rationalists towards the relationship between legislation and the Cisalpine people: “Più urgente di tutto è imprimere nell’animo del popolo l’opinione che noi maturiamo gli affari e non li precipitiamo” (trans. Most urgently of all is to impress upon the spirit of the people the opinion that we mature affairs not precipitate them). In essence, rationalists felt that it was important that the Cisalpine people understood the *Gran Consiglio* was not simply a body of squabbling intellectuals but a group of men “maturing” the debate on public affairs – maturing in this case meaning debating, researching and expanding methods of resolution and state-building. More importantly speed was not necessarily the end goal.

³¹⁷ “Seduta CXX, 28 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 4:423, 425-427 Debate on Articles 95 and 108 of the plan of the national guard. This sitting in particular highlights one of the common uses of urgency in some of the longer legislative plans for the construction of institutions like the National guard, the finance plan or the plan for matrimony regulations. In these debates one finds radicals and rationalists working together to expedite the process of rectifying particular articles within the plan of the National guard so that the institution can be successfully created in a logical, yet timely manner.

³¹⁸ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:206–7 Discourse of Castelfranchi on urgency of facts and urgency of consequences.

topic. Interestingly however, unlike neutrals on the x-axis, rationalists were often found working together as a singular unit in these alliances. More importantly, for rationalists the goal was always to have a finished product which had prepared against any possible loophole or incursion against legislation, either at the legislative level in the *Seniori*, or application level in the ministry and administration. Rationalists did not see the use of endless debate, nor in a lack of debate. Instead they tended to take a goldilocks perspective of legislation in which a finished product was apparent to all. If (and *when* quite often) legislation was rejected at the level of the *Seniori* or Ministry, rationalists were often some of the most avid opposition to these bodies since (as a frequent majority) they felt the rejections were for political motives and not due to flaws in the laws itself.³¹⁹ The time which it took to formulate legislative output – according to rationalists – was necessary to formulate a product grounded in reason and logic and as such was highly valuable.³²⁰ Rejection of legislative output from the *Gran Consiglio* meant redoing the entire process from the beginning, and thus a waste of both the original time spent formulating the resolution and now the new time spent changing what was quite often the same results.

This idea of value in legislative output and urgency was similarly applicable to rationalist views on legislative enforcement. Much like radicals, rationalists felt strongly that one of the first institutions which needed to be established were the courts, and more over a judicial system based in legal experience and rational application of the law.³²¹ Without a strong court system to correctly applying the legislation being handed down from the Assemblies, the rationale behind said legislation would instantly be lost. Where rationalists differed from radicals was the creation of provisional judicial and administrative institutions to implement legislation. Provisional measures, particularly those like the extra-judiciary military commissions of high police, were not a

³¹⁹ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:19-21 Discourse of Vicini against the *Seniori* for the blasphemy against the republic in their Chamber and the rejection of the Gran Consiglio’s resolution on the military commissions of high police.

³²⁰ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 119 The rationalists preoccupation with proper timing is similar to a case presented by Oddens in the Batavian Republic at the same time the Cisalpine Republic was going through the process of state building. In the Batavian the patriots found that the timing of legislation was fundamental to the correct implementation of legislation. As Oddens points out, too long and the people become impatient with the system of institutions, yet too short and the legislative output is weak.

³²¹ “Seduta XIII, 22 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:343–44 Debate on judicial experience in the creation of appeals courts. “Seduta XLIII, 12 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:625–27 Presentation for plans on the methods of elections for local judges (While Tadini was a radical both Mascheroni and Fontana were strong rationalists).

reasonable solution since they were temporary and often summary means of applying unnational and instable legislation.³²² Summary justice by its very nature was not rational, and avoiding the court processes – which included the reasoned principles of due process and logical presentation – was not only a violation of the rights of the population but a dangerous precedent for a republican government to set. In other words, the people must understand and accept the legislative arguments put to them, and that was only possible through a legitimate and official tribunal process. This logic was similarly applied to the enforcement of legislation in a central administration, which needed to be specially selected and vetted so that those placed in local theaters of the republic had the ability to carry out national prerogatives in a rational way according to local conditions.

Moderates

Much like the originalists of the x-axis, the other end of the y-spectrum is occupied by a general minority (though much larger overall than originalists). This minority has been labeled moderates. But the term moderatism is a difficult term to apply as it is found commonly – and often not positively – within the historiography, not just of the Cisalpine republic, but for the entirety of the French revolution. Zaghi tended to interchange the words moderate and conservative frequently, associating moderatism in the *Gran Consiglio* to French and Italian conservatism.³²³ Zaghi also had the tendency to equate moderatism with a pro-French and anti-nationalist sentiment, contrasting “moderate republicanism” with “patriotic democracy”.³²⁴ For the Marxist historians of the post-war twentieth century, moderates were an oppositional party who came from the “reformist” Milanese elite of the late eighteenth century and worked in an almost anti-revolutionary manner meant to debilitate the democratic aspects of the government and leave

³²² “Seduta XXIX, 28 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:433 Discourse of Venturi on the difference between application of the law in times of revolution versus in times of the constitution. .

³²³ Zaghi 1989, pp. 155-159 ; Zaghi 1992, pp. 120-121, 126, 132 ; For more information on Zaghi’s convulsion of moderatism and conservatism see: De Francesco 2016, pp. 46-48 ; and Rao 2004 ; For a more concrete definition of Cisalpine conservatism see: De Francesco 2015, p. 215

³²⁴ Zaghi 1989, pp. 164, 193-197 It should be noted however that Zaghi did eventually discuss an “alliance” by mid-1798 between what he termed as the two “Jacobin” groups in the Cisalpine and French Republics. He claimed this alliance was responsible for the intervention and treaty between the French authorities and Cisalpine moderates both of who feared a return to radical revolution under Jacobin control in both places. The reality of course is much more complex as neither the French nor Cisalpine “left” was anything close to the Jacobins of 1793-94. Nor of course were the moderates in the Cisalpine Republic nearly as influential as Zaghi implies, at least outside of the Executive Branch”.

many of the former aristocratic traits of the *ancien regime* institutions in tact.³²⁵ In the English language historiography like that of Palmer or Woolf, the moderates were often attached to an element of the republican movement which favored catholic reform and aristocratic domination and cowardly fled to France in the face of the 1799 Austro-Russian invasion, leaving their more radical compatriots from the Mezzogiorno to perish.³²⁶ It is only more recent work by historians like De Francesco and Serna that have successfully redefined the often mistaken and oversimplified correlation between anti-Jacobinism or conservatism and moderatism.³²⁷ This new definition of moderatism, which identifies a political perspective which is both patriotic and revolutionary, though limited in their willingness to alter society in an extreme fashion, is the closest iteration of moderatism to how it will be defined in this study.³²⁸

Yet, what separates the idea of Cisalpine moderatism according to Serna and De Francesco from the definition in this study, is that while both historians apply moderatism to the grander idea of Cisalpine Republic – and really the entirety of Directorial era Revolutionary political culture – this study is only looking at moderatism as it fits into the idea of extremism in *legislative* culture within the *Gran Consiglio*. Those representatives described as moderates are still “patriotic” and “revolutionary”, though their method of forming and applying legislation is one which favors caution and reflection on historically successful institutions over speed and forced acceptance. Moderates believed themselves to be the true voice of a people who wanted change but feared the violence and social turbulence of the early 1790s in France, particularly in regard to the loss of

³²⁵ Saitta, *Filippo Buonarroti. Contribuiti Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*; Cantimori and De Felice, *Giacobini Italiani*; Nutini, “L’esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina,” 114–15; Visconti, *L’ultimo Direttorio*, 41.

³²⁶ Palmer 1964, pp. 606-610 It should be noted that while Palmer does denote moderates as the furthest right group of the Cisalpine political spectrum, he does also concede that they were not in the majority and did not have a stifling effect on revolutionary changes to institutions and administration of the government. His preoccupation of religion, however, bespeaks the continual obsession of Anglo-American historians with Catholicism in Italian political culture, to a point where its exaggeration has almost become a main stay in English language historiography of the period. This of course comes from the anti-Catholic sentiments present (strongly so) in Anglo-American culture, which paint it as a way to refute political and intellectual advancement in Catholic countries and maintain the idea of Anglo-American exceptionalism. Woolf 1979, pp. 153-154, 181-184

³²⁷ Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d’Italia”; Serna, “Radicalités et Modérations,” 15–16; De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 13–14; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 213–15; De Francesco, *Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 88, 101–12.

³²⁸ De Francesco 2015, pp. 213-214 It should be noted that De Francesco does not specify the word moderate but instead cites moderate “patriots” as he terms them, and places them in a more cautious group of Italian patriots who only came to accept the Cisalpine Constitution after the events of Fructidor in France which saw a much more centerist element come to power. These cautious patriots are essentially the same group who would become moderates during the time of the *Gran Consiglio*

innocent life, even in accusations of national betrayal.³²⁹ At the same time, Moderates also looked to their contemporary counterparts in France as an example of how moderate speed and force could be a great vehicle for change, acknowledging the part played by the French moderate factions as predecessors of Cisalpine legislation, scoring radical calls for rapid and often impulsive decision-making.³³⁰ This allusion to previous revolutionary – and even in some cases Italian and French *ancien regime* – institutions often found moderates being accused within the historiography of counter-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary sentiments. The reality, however, is much more complex, as moderates felt their restrained attitudes towards revolutionary legislation would in fact endear the people to the Republican project since the accusations against the Cisalpine authorities by actual counter-revolutionaries, of extremism and cultural upheaval would then have no grounds.

Moderates found themselves allied often with similar minded authorities in the Directory, executive ministry and diplomatic core.³³¹ Lamberti, for example, even became a member of the ministry and then Directory before the coup of 24 Germinal.³³² Moderates were also often close to the important figures of the French *Armée*, in particular the figure of Bonaparte.³³³ Once again

³²⁹ “Seduta XLVI, 15 neviso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 667,669 Discourse of Lamberti on amnesty for so called “traitors” and cowards. This sentiment expressed by Lamberti, but often parroted by other moderates, reflects a sentiment which often led moderates to be accused of count-revolution. Lamberti explicitly states that while those who actively do harm to the revolution should be punished, those suspected – because of class, education level or religiosity should – of working against the revolutionary state without hard evidence, or not in a capacity which renders them completely complicit, merit the mercy of the state. These sentiments bespeak a complexity in Cisalpine moderatism which hopes for revolutionary and patriotic changes, but not at the price of lives who are resistant. There is a certain call for mercy and compromise for those who know no better which is inherent in Cisalpine Moderatism, and though for many this was seen as explicitly counter- (or even anti-) revolutionary, the reality was that for moderates, strong actions could and often would lead to disastrous consequences for the Republic.

³³⁰ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 2:391 Discourse of Lamberti against the radicalism of Coddè and in favor of the French example as liberators of the Cisalpine people.

³³¹ Visconti 2011, pp. 86, 97-107 Visconti’s work on the Cisalpine Directory in the final months of the Cisalpine Republic and then the exile in France begins where this study ends, and in many ways can be seen as a continuation of this study of the influential men who came to define Italian political culture in the years before the Napoleonic Empire. When examining her lists of important figures in the executive, the names of moderate representatives are the most prominent, among them figures like Melzi d’Eril, Lamberti, Vertemate-Franchi and Birago, all of whom were nominated to the *Gran Consiglio* and most of whom sat, if only for a short period, in the council as members of commissions or even as Council officers. This demonstrates that while moderates found their place significantly diminished in the Council itself, their ideology made them allies of the Cisalpine Executive and French administrative authorities.

³³² “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:828.

³³³ Sani, “Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo).”

we find two common misconceptions by future historians born from this connection between the French authorities and moderates (similar to the way originalists were mischaracterized for their connection to the French). First, moderates were often mistakenly referred to as pro-French, and therefore anti-Italian, an either/or situation which ignores the complexities of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship. Second, it is often stated that French authorities as a singular unit favored moderates, a fact which is automatically negated when one references the fact that the elements removed from the *Seniori* and the Directory during the Coup of 24 Germinal were in fact moderates (though from the *Gran Consiglio* they were radicals).³³⁴ The reality remains that due to their minimal presence inside the *Gran Consiglio*, moderates were largely overlooked by French authorities, and it was in fact connections with cisalpine executive and ministerial characters which provided the outside support necessary for moderate sustainability within the *Gran Consiglio*. Figures like Lamberti, Compagnoni and Vertemate Franchi, though never having enough support to provide a truly united opposition, were important figures in the leadership and commission work of the Council and their influence is notable despite their limited numbers.

Additionally, moderates tended to be much more in favor of local nationalization. This means that moderates hoped that national policies of the revolution would be implemented by local officials who were favorable to both the local population and the national government in Milan.³³⁵ For this reason, moderates were some of the most vocal commentators – moreso even than rationalists – on the nomination and election of local administrators.³³⁶ Moderates felt strongly that the revolution would only survive, and the Cisalpine government only be accepted, if the people felt that the changes being made were organic and the officials enforcing them trustworthy to the local population.³³⁷ Moderates believed the local conditions of the Cisalpine Republic made it dangerous for foreign entities, be they Cisalpine or French, to serve as enforcers, who may not be willing to bend to local ignorance and apply changes in a successful and peaceful manner.³³⁸ More

³³⁴ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:58–59.

³³⁵ “Seduta LII, 21 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:751–52 Report by Somaglia on behalf of the united commissions of finance and departments on a plan for departmental structure and taxation.

³³⁶ “Seduta XII, 12 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:214 Discourse of Scarabelli on the right of local elections for local administrators.

³³⁷ “Gran Consiglio” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:129 Report on punishment for cowardly and anti-revolutionary acts in the Republic.

³³⁸ “Seduta LII, 21 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:749 Motion of Salvioni to remove Leoni, a foreign commissar of police.

than both rationalists and (certainly more than) radicals, moderates held that above all legislative stability was the key to retaining and effectively implementing the revolutionary legislation which came out of the *Gran Consiglio*. In order for stability to be maintained, legislation needed to be conscious of local traditions and biases and play along with these biases. Nationalism was in no way absent from this scheme, but a blanket nationalism was impossible – according to moderates – in a nation so divided for close to a millennium; instead gradual infusion and education of a universally Cisalpine (and later Italian) identity needed to be implemented at a local level gradually replacing those local biases and traditions which divided the people.

Moderates tended to favor minimal legislation, instead opting either for executive action through the ministry, the continuation of functional *ancien regime* practices or large over-arching law projects which would serve as a general scheme of action to be applied to local politics. These processes could at the very least be characterized as slow – at the most regressive – as they were willing to adapt or even adopt *ancien regime* traditions to the political cultural context of the revolution. The religious and social structure of the Cisalpine Republic were particularly strong elements in which the moderates found a footing, considering many rationalist, and even some radical leaning representatives were less hardline on the time frame for institutional legislation in these areas.³³⁹ However, the fact that moderates were willing to accept certain *ancien regime* aspects into the new Cisalpine Government often caused rifts with the more radical elements of the Council who felt that moderates were stalling or refusing to implement the revolution.³⁴⁰ Moderates, like rationalists encouraged rational hesitation and better understanding before a piece of legislation could be officially passed. However, moderates were not willing to implement legislative timetables nor finalize a piece of legislation once a commission or individual had come up with a plan. Many believed outside consultation, either from the executive authorities in the ministry, local administrators or from the cisalpine people in the form of outside reports and petitions, needed to be first applied to the law, almost as a form of experimentation and clarification, before the *Gran Consiglio* could provide its support for a resolution.³⁴¹ In many

³³⁹ “Seduta XLII, 11 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:614–15 Opposition of Savonarola to the election of parish preists and staff.

³⁴⁰ “Seduta LXXXVI, 24 piovosso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:517–18 Debate on the rights of religious corporations to cut wood from public forests.

³⁴¹ “Seduta CXC, 11 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:177 Discourse of Compagnoni on the need to lay out the responsibilities of the ministry in executing legislation passed by the Legislature.

cases, moderates argued against the Council's right to even approach a piece of legislation, citing constitutional or precedential regulations.³⁴²

Moderates unwillingness to act was often considered – in particular by radicals – as purposeful sabotage and a general unwillingness to serve. In many respects, radicals were right in this observation, as moderates views were in a limited legislative function, a viewpoint confirmed by the fact that many like Lamberti left the Council to serve in the executive branch and others like Melzi and Birago never even sat in the Council. However, it was not so much that moderates were sabotaging the legislative process as they were feeding into an overcautiousness which had been present in Cisalpine politics since Bonaparte had declared the republic in Messidor Year V (July 1797).³⁴³ Like originalists, moderates tended to come from the original patriot class of 1796 and as such many were unwilling to depart from the established norms of the previous two years, a rationale which had made them favorable candidates for Bonaparte when selecting members of the Council in Brumaire Year VI (November 1797).³⁴⁴ This hesitation guaranteed – at least according moderates and other allies of Bonaparte in 1797 – a certain stability and rationality in Cisalpine politics which would not threaten the status quo.

This rationale was similarly applied to the moderation in the use of force. Moderates were generally against the use of extra-constitutional means of law enforcement such as the military commissions of high police. Instead moderates tended to favor local administrators who they believed could implement revolutionary legislation through executive bureaucracy rather than judicial means. This did not mean however that moderates were against the use of military force.³⁴⁵ Many were in favor of using the French occupying army as a means of carrying out order. In this way the act of legislating would reside with the Legislature, that of governing with the executive Directory and ministry and judiciary matters with the legally recognized courts. Interestingly however, by the end of the period, when disorder had begun to appear in the peripheral mountain zones of the Republic (in particular in the Valtellina), it was the moderates who proposed a

³⁴² “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:820 Opening to discourse of Compagnoni on the roles of the legislative and executive on the formation of legislation and the building of Cisalpine institutions.

³⁴³ De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 214.

³⁴⁴ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137–38.

³⁴⁵ Zaghi 1992, pp. 435-436

specifically *Cisalpine* force to suppress the unrest and then institute a commission to understand its origins.³⁴⁶

Moderates were in favor, overall, of using institutions to install legislation. By building institutions, like a National Guard, a central finance administration, a public education sector and strong public wellness functionaries, the revolution would naturally integrate into the daily life of citizens, and not be forced upon them as though by an occupying army.³⁴⁷ This is not to say that radicals and rationalists did not favor institution building as well, but both groups were unwilling to leave society be as it was in the meantime. Where radicals and rationalists both supported a provisional form of institutions to immediately transform the political and social situations inside the Republic, moderates believed that society would function well without these drastic measures; it would be more prudent and longer lasting to allow a gradual public ownership of their liberty.³⁴⁸ This meant that institutions needed to be built from the local populations, with the guidance of the national government, and given time to instill themselves in the functions which had previously belonged to *ancien regime* institutions.

The z-axis or the question of democracy versus republicanism

Unlike the x and y axes, the measurement of democracy to republicanism found upon the z-axis was not one which was integral to the political spectrum regarding the *process of legislation* – that is the ideological basis for the production of legislative output. As such it cannot be a part of the measurement of legislative political culture within the Council – and in the second half of the period political factionalism – as the other two were. In reality, the x and y spectrum are, if anything, when put together a measurement of the center of the z-axis (see Figure 2). The ideological divide of democracy versus republicanism was always a lingering question for representatives, particularly when looking at their *external* political backgrounds and opinions.

³⁴⁶ “Seduta CCXLII, 3 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:359–60 Motion to implement a plan to quell disorder in the regions of the Valtellina and Chiavenna and to implement investigative commissions in the departments of Adda ed Oglio e Lario to understand discontent in these areas.

³⁴⁷ “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:821 Discourse of Compagnoni on the roles of the legislative and executive on the formation of legislation and the building of Cisalpine institutions

³⁴⁸ “Seduta LXXXVII, 25 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:546–47 Motion of Salvioni insisting on the nomination of local administrators with central loyalties so that the people can own their patriotism.

Moreover, the z-axis became the major separation point along which the lines were drawn as the factions of the x and y axes became more at odds with each other, particularly between the end of Germinal and the Coup of 14 Fructidor Year VI. Like both the x and y axes, the z-axis was arranged along a spectrum which viewed the Cisalpine Republic – from one perspective – as a rebirth of classical democracy (particularly in the Greek fashion) in which all men had the right to participate as collective sovereigns of the nation.³⁴⁹ The opposite end of the spectrum viewed the Cisalpine Republic as the inevitable dominance of the republican conservative traditions of early-modern Italy and the Ancient Roman Republic in which it fell upon the shoulders of great men to guide the Cisalpine people in their new-found liberty.³⁵⁰ In between lied a central group, which sought to combat the extremities of classical democracy and conservative republicanism to form a new more modern mixed government similar to (though not the same as) that which had become popular in France under the First Directory.³⁵¹




Figure 6. Model of political spectrum for ideological factions in the *Gran Consiglio*

The first group, the more left-wing democrats, believed that the sovereignty of the nation – espoused in the Constitution of Year III and the Cisalpine Constitution – was the sacred right of its citizens, and as such gave the people the right of direct involvement in its governance.³⁵² This meant the direct decision making of the entirety of the populace, regardless of class. But this idea

³⁴⁹ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 98.

³⁵⁰ Lenci, 101.

³⁵¹ Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio,” 322, 326.

³⁵² Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 68; It must be immediately noted that the terms democrats and republicans have absolutely nothing to do with the modern American political parties who share the names and tendencies of the Cisalpine groups to sit on either the left (democrats) or right (republicans). As will be explained the names given to the Cisalpine groups relate to the favored form of classical government structure from antiquity – either Greek pure democracy or Roman republicanism – and it is purely coincidental that they correspond to the American center-left and center-right.

of “democracy” is not what we might think of today – the post-World War American representative democratic principles of equal opportunity and legally recognized “liberty”. The democracy of Italian idealists and political thinkers in the late eighteenth century was the definition used in the classical period and emphasized a returning to the structures of the Ancient Greek secular philosophers.³⁵³ The late early modern and enlightenment tradition – particularly that popularized in France and the Italian peninsula – of citing antiquity as a model for ideal governance was common across the political spectrum by the time of the French invasion in 1796.³⁵⁴ Many of the most radical elements of political society in both places looked towards the ancients, in particular the Ancient Greeks, for inspiration on how to build the ideal equal society.³⁵⁵ But this definition of democracy was not looked upon favorably by the majority of the populace by 1796, and it would be very rare for one to refer to themselves as a “pure democrat” in the classical sense because of the negative connotation it carried with it.³⁵⁶ Democracy was anarchy, mob-rule and violence, a correlation many Cisalpine (and French) authorities found far too similar to the Jacobin Republic of 1793-94 than the post-Thermidorian French Republic; the true *néo-jacobins*.³⁵⁷ The oft cited classical democratic ideal espoused by Terror figures like Robespierre had given a violent intonation to the idea of democracy in the political circles of Italian society in the later 1790s. The Conspiracy of Equals and the failure of Babeuf at the time of the French entrance into the Italian peninsula had furthered this dangerous association.³⁵⁸

And yet there were those who could be placed within this group. While not as radical as the true *néo-jacobin* democrats – often those who found friends (or were active players like Buonarroti) in the Society of Equals– many of those who should be considered democrats became close to Jullien and other members of the French *Armée* who had come from a radical, often

³⁵³ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 103.

³⁵⁴ “Discorso del Cittadino Salimbeni Membro della Società di Pubblica Istruzione di Verona, tenuto nella Pubblica Adunanza della Società di Milano il giorno 30 Pratile anno I Repub. Cisalp.” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 113,” fol. Salimbeni.

³⁵⁵ “N.18 Dialogo fra Socrate e Glaucone. Estratto da Senefonte Lib. III de’ fatti e detti di Socrate” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:133–34.

³⁵⁶ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 99.

³⁵⁷ Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire,” 195.

³⁵⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 574–76.

Jacobin, background in the period before the French occupation of the Italian peninsula.³⁵⁹ This idea of democracy was more centered politically – though remaining still quite far left when compared to representative democrats – and found support among even certain elements of the more educated bourgeois classes such as low-level clergymen, lawyers and scientific professionals like doctors or chemists. After the Coup of Fructidor following the Year V elections in France stigmatized the conservatism of classical republicanism, many of these more moderate democrats were accepted into the fold, so long as they identified as more left leaning representative democrats rather than pure classical democrats.

But even then, those who leaned furthest to the left found themselves often at odds with the more centrist French figures like the administrator Haller and General Le Clerc (and even Brune to a certain extent).³⁶⁰ Those more democratic elements were much less willing to accept what they saw as increasingly oppressive efforts by the French military and administrative forces (along with the centrist Cisalpine allies) and rejected attempts to bring the two nations closer together.³⁶¹ Many of these figures chose instead to follow the more radical elements of the *Armée* south in their quest to “liberate” the peoples of central and southern Italy, rather than remain in a Cisalpine republic which was continually moving more towards – in their opinion – a submissive

³⁵⁹ “Sur les Clichyens” Jullien 1797, pp. 46-47 This article describes a Cisalpine political situation quite reflective of that in France in Thermidor Year V. On one side lied a conservative republican faction which favored the Clichyens and at the other a much more radical underground of *néo-jacobin* Democrats. However, one can note as they follow the progress of Jullien’s *Corrier* into Brumaire that his tone changes slightly and begins to favor the much more centrist representative democrat orientation of Italian politics. In many ways this reflects the growing centrist change after Fructidor Year V which is as much a result as the French Coup as Bonaparte’s general favoritism against divisiveness and extremism. Palmer 1964, p. 610

³⁶⁰ “Serie di lettere tra 4-8 Frimale anno VI repubblicano repubblicano a Milano tra Amministratore Haller, Citt. Melzi e i membri del Dirrettorio Esecutivo cisalpino, che riguarda le spese d’artiglieri e altre spese amministrativo della Armata d’Italia francese” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, I n.d., fol. Frimale VI These series of letters document an early issue which arose regarding Cisalpine spending on behalf of the French *Armée* d’Italie in the confines of the Cisalpine Republic. Melzi, one of the more famous and important republican leaders even at that time, laments along with Haller regarding the slowness and ineffectiveness of the Cisalpine government at conceding payments for pieces of artillery and the maintenance of the French army in Italy. At a certain point Haller even seems to indicate more democratic elements within the Cisalpine government. Ironically enough debates in the *Gran Consiglio* (examined in Chapter XI) find that, in fact, the more democratic elements of the government were in favor of expediting these payments while the holdup was on the end of the more republican leaning representative democrats ; “Lettera da Kilmaine, Général en Chef par interim au Directoire exécutif de la Republique Cisalpine. Milan. 18 Frimaire l’an VI de la Republique un e indivisible.” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, I n.d., fol. Frimale VI

³⁶¹ Extracts from the Secret Committee sitting in “Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblea della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:370–71 Discourse of Giovio in Secret Committee of the Council session against the Military and Commerical treaty between France and the Cisalpine Republic.

state of the French centrist authorities.³⁶² As the French left began to lose its footing in Paris, so too did those on the Cisalpine left find themselves suddenly expelled (as in the case of Giovio and Zani in the 24 Germinal Coup)³⁶³ or moved (as was the case for La Hoz and Tadini in the weeks leading up to the Germinal Coup).³⁶⁴ Though all within the frame of representative democracy, the cracks had begun as the x and y based factions began to split after Germinal, and it became apparent that those centrist and right-wing factions found greater favor with French authorities, pushing the democratic elements to the way side by 14 Fructidor.³⁶⁵

While few in the *Gran Consiglio*, those with more democratic leaning sentiments can be identified by a series of specific criteria. They were often insistent that the laws, particularly regarding public finance, taxation and military or national guard service should be extended to all man (and many women) even those without the franchise, like servants, the poor and foreigners.³⁶⁶ This enfranchisement however did not expand to those who held land inside the nation but resided outside, either for political, criminal, or financial reasons.³⁶⁷ Political involvement and education were central to the democratic mindset. They reopened the Constitutional Circles which had been

³⁶² “‘Eroi della Repubblica Francese!’ Discorso del cittadino Faustino Gagliuffi recitato il giorno 23 febbraio (5 ventoso) anno VI repubblicano repubblicano, I della repubblica romana” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:153–54 Though this article does not explicitly criticize the more centered direction towards which many of the *néo-jacobin* democrats felt the Cisalpine government was heading, it does instead make a point to demonstrate those elements who had been associated with Cisalpine patriotic tendencies in 1797 – such the *Armée* generals Massena and Berthier – which had left the Northern Republics to travel south. Gagliuffi further implies that the efforts of the French in Rome were made due to a sort of lost cause in the north for a more radical revolution as of 1798. This line of thinking was furthered by more radical elements as they went further south, and in fact became the central line of 19th and early 20th century historiography, which portrayed the south as true radical patriots and the north as cowardly moderates more interested in being colonially subjugated than carving out the nation. The truth of course is that - contrary to this idea - the first months of 1798 saw a democratic-republican Cisalpine political establishment which was consistently at odds with both more conservative French civil authorities, as well as internal republican factions in the *Seniori*, Ministry and Directory. Despite these hardships those more democratic leaning Cisalpine politicians continued the more radical and patriotic line of thought found in the summer of 1797, though moderated to fit the more centrist atmosphere of the *Gran Consiglio*.

³⁶³ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:59.

³⁶⁴ “Seduta CXLIV, 22 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXLIX, 27 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:7; 72 Dismissal request of La Hoz; Dismissal request of Tadini.

³⁶⁵ Vianello 1940, pp. 39n-41n

³⁶⁶ “Seduta LXXIII, 11 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:281–86 Debate on the enfranchisement of servants and right to serve in the national guard; “Seduta XXXVIII, 7 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:553–57 Debate on citizenship and asylum of patriots from ex-Veneto.

³⁶⁷ “Seduta XXIX, 28 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:429–31 Debate on the expulsion of criminals and foreigners with anti-republican sentiments and the rights of foreigners to own land in the confines of Cisalpine Territory once they have been expelled.

closed just before the *Gran Consiglio* opened in Frimaire.³⁶⁸ These constitutional circles became the peripheral focal points where the public would have a direct line to constitutional debates and where left-wing ideas preferred by democrats could be more easily disseminated.³⁶⁹ In fact, these circles were closed during the Coup of 14 Fructidor specifically because of their natural tendency to favor more left-wing pure democracy. Democrats were also major advocates for social services for all – but especially the poor – such as public education, healthcare, and mobility within the confines of the nation. Finally democrats were equally in favor of extending all political rights to the entire population such as the right to petition directly to the national government, the right to participate as a government worker, and the right to nominate oneself for public office.

At the opposite end of the z-axis sat the republicans, whose political philosophy was dictated by a general belief in the social contract which placed the most intelligent and powerful men (be it through wealth, knowledge, military or charismatic strength) to lead the decision making process of the Cisalpine Republic on behalf of the sovereign people.³⁷⁰ These republicans felt that the Cisalpine – and by extension Italian – state must reflect the historically successfully incarnations of Italian republicanism, principle among them the Roman Republic of antiquity, and the Florentine, Venetian and Genoan Republics of more recent times.³⁷¹ This idea of republicanism is one which had become popularized in elite circles following the events of the American Revolution, and which combines elements of Ancient Roman ideas espoused by famous political thinkers like Cicero, with more modern political philosophy such as those of Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Locke.³⁷² The innovation however with this form of republicanism, which had been added to thanks in part by the rise of American and French political conditions in the 1790s, was an augmentation of the idea that “freedom” needed to be maintained; this maintenance could only be upheld if the governing institutions were able to exercise a form of heavy control.³⁷³ In essence, the governing bodies must be limited to those men and institutions of a proven “virtue”

³⁶⁸ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400 s.d., f^o Lettere dal Corpo Legislativo« Dal Consiglio di Seniori al Gran Consiglio, 21 ventoso anno VI repubblicano repubblicano » Act of government reopening the Constitutional circles following a request from the Gran Consiglio on 6 Ventôse.

³⁶⁹ “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400,” fol. Bergamo“I Patrioti del circolo costituzionale di Bergamo al Gran Consiglio” Bergamo. 10 Pratile anno VI repubblicano.”.

³⁷⁰ Nicolet, *L'idée Républicaine En FRance (1789-1924). Essai d'histoire Critique*, 395; Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 101.

³⁷¹ “N. 15 Notizie Bibliografiche” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:110–11.

³⁷² Pettit, *Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government*, 5–6.

³⁷³ Pettit, 107.

who could guarantee the freedom of the people and the sovereignty of the nation, regardless of harm to themselves.³⁷⁴ Democracy, with the inability to control unvirtuous men from entering politics and taking hold of these authorities was too weak to be effective, according to republicans. It fails to guarantee that leadership will be safely out of the hands of future despots – or in this case Jacobin anarchists or counterrevolutionaries – who would put self-interest (“the strongest monarch in the world” according to Montesquieu) over the needs of the nation.³⁷⁵

In many ways this philosophy seemingly aligns with Jacobin ideas from 1793. However, the conservative republicans of Year VI, by contrast, believed that the men who were best apt to protect this revolutionary liberty were those with the most to lose if it should fail to be maintained: landed property-holders and the new Seigneurie of the nation – essentially those who had truly benefitted from the revolution.³⁷⁶ This reflected an overall distrust in the general populace (a distrust shared by the American Federalist counterparts who had come to power during this period under the Adam’s presidency³⁷⁷), leading to the “elitism” which would characterize the republican version of patriotic leadership. They similarly favored exclusivity in enfranchising the entire population, in particular the poor peasantry whom they believed lacked the urgency of maintaining a social contract, as they had relatively little to lose. For this reason, many republicans followed a significantly more liberal attitude towards private ownership of property and a disdain for public or communal funding.³⁷⁸ This again reflected a much more American and French conservative shift in thinking, though for many (particularly those which came from the more mercantile societies of the peninsula like Venezia) this liberal ideology was not necessarily strictly connected to conservative views on sovereignty and especially not with noble privilege.³⁷⁹ Overall, republicans

³⁷⁴ Pocock 1975, p. 472 As Pocock explains, this idea of virtù comes from the Machivellian definition in which civic duty and personal morality don’t always equate. That being said, Pocock points out that by the mid-eighteenth century this concept had obtained a more positive notion in which civic duty became a passion of men, and this passion was virtuous. This passion would drive men to risk their own self-interest for the good of their society. Thus, the virtuous man was one who would, and most often had, scarified for the good of the people. For republicans, democracy was incapable of securing that; only these men should be placed in the mantle of leadership since democracy carried with it the risk of unchecked charisma (see Chapter V for more on Weber’s ideas of charismatic leadership).

³⁷⁵ Pocock, 465.

³⁷⁶ Nicolet, *L’idée Républicaine En FRance (1789-1924). Essai d’histoire Critique*, 394.

³⁷⁷ Serna, “Le Directoire, miroir de quelle République?”

³⁷⁸ “Idee generali sopra i fondi detti comuni”, Crisculo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:41.

³⁷⁹ “Seduta CXC VII, 18 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:320–21 Discourse of Dandolo regarding the currency of the ex-Veneto and its use within the confides of the Cisalpine Republic. .

imagine a meritocracy, a model state which would favor the haves over the have-nots and according to Serna, “tenir à distance la masse d’un peuple devenu inquiétant depuis 1794.”³⁸⁰

That said, Italian conservatism more generally was never as extreme as that found in France, mainly because the level of absolutist feudalism was never as extreme on the Italian peninsula – at least not in the northern half; the Bourbon Kingdom of Naples or the Savoyard Kings of Sardinia were perhaps the closest examples of strong absolutist and feudal monarchical traditions similar to others in Europe like France, Spain, Austria or Prussia.³⁸¹ The reformist elite of the Duchies of Milan and Modena were much further removed from their Monarchical center of Vienna and as such had built a much more liberal aristocratic society which was more willing to accept republican changes in the classical style.³⁸² The Republics of Venice and Genoa similarly, while perhaps less accepting of reformism than the Hapsburg duchies, had also grown a classical republican tradition, particularly at the metropolises of these states, which they used to justify their authority. And yet according to the rhetoric of the day the willingness of Italians to keep more conservative elements as a part of their political society was often a point of criticism particularly from Francophiles who saw Italian republicans willingness to accept older elites as proof of French superiority.³⁸³ That being said, the less conservative republicanism of the Cisalpine Republic is perhaps the result of a general distancing of French conservatives after the French Coup of Fructidor Year V, which saw the French right heartily expelled from the government after their successful nominations during the Year V election cycle.³⁸⁴ This stigma as well as that of the French conservative republicans alliance with monarchists in the lead-up to the elections meant that, for the most part, Italians generally attempted to avoid connections to the French right for fear of political shunning.³⁸⁵ Additionally, the occupation of the much more radical *Armée* was a major factor in the less extreme conservatism of the Italian republicans.

³⁸⁰ Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 110.. Trans “keep at a distance the popular masses which had become unruly before 1794.”

³⁸¹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 97–98, 110–11.

³⁸² Venturi, *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment*, 126–29.

³⁸³ “Notizie Bibliografiche” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:117.

³⁸⁴ Kuscinski, *Les députés au corps législatif: conseil des cinq-cents, conseil des anciens de l’an IV a l’an VII; listés, tableaux et lois*, 201–4.

³⁸⁵ De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 275.

It seems that the Italian right, in particular Italian republicans, were much more proto-Bonapartists than French conservatives.³⁸⁶ After the events of Fructidor Year V, those republicans who were willing to shrug off their more conservative tendencies were more accepted into the fold of the *Armée* and in particular the small inner circle of Italians which surrounded Bonaparte in late 1797 just before his departure for Egypt. Those like Pietro Verri, who had acquired a strong reputation for their reformist nature, were still acknowledged for their past, but became less influential as they held on to their more conservative aristocratic values. Yet even within the new generation of centrist republicans there was a spectrum. Those who were more steadfast in their elitism were often placed in higher positions by Bonaparte and his Cisalpine allies, such as Melzi d'Eril Gian Gallazzo Serbelloni and Francesco Visconti.³⁸⁷ Meanwhile those more willing to integrate into the representative democrats – though still more republican leaning – became members of the Legislature, like Francesco Reina.³⁸⁸

This republican proto-Bonapartist progression however was slow moving in the *Gran Consiglio* and cannot be said to have come to fruition until after the 14 Fructidor Coup. Despite early unity from Frimaire to Ventôse Year VI in the *Gran Consiglio*, the more centrist and right wing factions – which had begun to appear in the spring of 1798 – became favored by French forces particularly after the Coup of 24 Germinal in Milan and that of 22 Floréal in France.³⁸⁹ As the democratic elements had been more or less eliminated by the end of Prairial Year VI, the infighting allowed those republican elements who had moved more center following Fructidor Year V to return to the right. It was this split which became more apparent after the 14 Fructidor Coup.³⁹⁰ The political turmoil which took place in the fall of 1798 was thus between the

³⁸⁶ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 15; Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 138.

³⁸⁷ “Estratto Dei Regisitri del Direttorio Esecutivo. Seduta del 4 Nervoso Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2,” fol. Nervoso Anno VI repubblicano Document outlines the nomination of Cisalpine Ambassadors and secretaries in Paris in early 1798.

³⁸⁸ “Lettera del Cittadino Reina al Generale Bonaparte”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:59–60; Capra, “Un ricerca in corso: i collegi elettorali della Repubblica Italiana e del Regno Itatico,” 848.

³⁸⁹ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 19–20.

³⁹⁰ Vianello 1940, pp. 40n-41n The note of Custodi's diary edited by Vianello describes the instance in which the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* discovered the Coup. The particularly interesting bit was the movement by democratic leaning representatives under the leadership of Polfranceschi who removed themselves from the representative lists of the new *Consiglio de'Juniori*, despite being requested to participate. Unlike the period a year earlier when the wings had been forced to move to the center in order to continue their political career, this time they remained firm in their resolve to evade foreign pressure, and in doing so destabilized the fragile Cisalpine political

reestablished republicans who were favored by Trouvé and Rivaud, and the remnants of the representative democrats favored by Brune and Fouché.³⁹¹ The Italian republicans – less conservative than their French counterparts but more so than the French centrists – eventually won out and would become the dominant faction into 1799 and the exile in France.³⁹² In fact the representative democrats who survived the Austro-Russian invasion and subsequent deportations in 1799 would find themselves integrating into the new republican order after Marengo, supporting the more elitist republican (or Machiavellian as Pocock describes it) values of the new Consular and later Imperial *politique*.³⁹³ This republican group had always been personally loyal to Bonaparte and became the backbone of his regime in Italy, and those like Vincenzo Dandolo who hoped to have a career later on in the Republic and later Kingdom of Italy, discovered it was necessary to leave representative democracy behind and embrace Italian republicanism.

Representative democrats – the third and most important political cultural label presented on the z-axis – held a strong majority by Brumaire Year VI, not only in the Legislature of the Republic, but throughout the entirety of the Cisalpine political class. This concept of a mixed government between that of pure democracy and pure republicanism was one which had been developing throughout the eighteenth century, and had been an established aspect of the French

balance which had been deteriorating since Messidor. Perhaps this is because Trouvé lacked the hero status and respect which Bonaparte commanded; perhaps it was because the Military authorities under Brune were not the parties requesting the change and these wing politicians felt less personally threatened were they to stay strong in their resolve. The great mistake of Trouvé, in any case, was his eliminating those who may have been more willing to return to the center and restabilize the situation, such as Reina or Dandolo. These men were expelled, most likely because of the fact they had been so outspoken against the French resolution after Campoformio and then again after the leaked announcement to institute a new constitution at the end of Messidor a month prior. This mistake only serves to demonstrate the lack of understanding of Cisalpine politics by the point of view of French civil authorities when compared to that of the Military authorities who had been present since the inception of the Italian sister Republic.

³⁹¹ Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia*, “*patriota energico*,” 49–51 While Carnino is correct in her analysis of the fracturing of the representative democrats (those which she terms as democrats), her mistake is in asserting that the early days after Trouvé saw movement towards the center by the wings. In reality, those extremists on the right had been reassigned to higher positions as far back as Germinal (as in fact had the most vocal leftists such as Tadini and La Hoz), and those more center and center-left representative democrats who may have challenged Trouvé were expelled or voluntarily refused to accept their nomination. As such the remnants were the center-right and more republican leaning representatives which gave the new *Consiglio de'Juniori* a significantly more conservative balance. However, to say that the representatives themselves made the choice to align at the center is categorically incorrect.

³⁹² Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 136–37.

³⁹³ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, 486–87; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 42–45.

political culture in the early years of the revolution.³⁹⁴ In fact it was already existent and quite functional across the Atlantic in the young republic of the United States of America.³⁹⁵ However the new representative democrats of late 1790s Europe found themselves at the center of a new argument regarding enfranchisement, which had always been present, but without the historical examples from which to draw.³⁹⁶ The *Ancien regime* had provided too limited enfranchisement, the Jacobin years too much. The Constitution of 1791 had seen the errors of an improperly applied representative democracy as had the elections of Fructidor Year V. The Americans could not provide a system as they themselves were too fractured and too young still, and the British system was of the enemy. The solution was a democracy in which complexities, checks and balances at all stages, became necessary to assure the survival and limitations of popular sovereignty, through the use of electors, executive judicial and legislative authority, and finally military success and even intervention when necessary.³⁹⁷ Those who proposed the most extreme measures to avoid these polarities found themselves closer to what has been defined as the “extreme center” of the new democratic republican political spectrum.³⁹⁸

Like the centrist groups of the x-and y-axes, representative democrats were a rather broad designation for a political group which included centrist democrats and republicans, in addition to those who simply moved to the politically convenient position (Giuseppe Fenaroli springs to mind). At the true center of this group lied a political power of “extreme centrism”, very similar to that of the contemporary French, whose power laid in their unwavering commitment to a middle road, neither too conservative nor too radical. This center was a particularly French creation which steered the extremes of the left and right away from an irreconcilable division, and through sheer force of bureaucratic power and extreme checks between branches, not only united the forces of French politics but augmented the entirety of French power.³⁹⁹ Like their French counter-parts, Cisalpine centrists in the post-Thermidorian political sphere found the excess of political emotion on one hand (the left) and excess of political restriction on the other (the right) extremely

³⁹⁴ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 100.

³⁹⁵ Serna, “Le Directoire, miroir de quelle République?,” 13.

³⁹⁶ Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire,” 195.

³⁹⁷ Gainot, 196; Deleplace, “Le Directoire Entre l’anarchie et La Royauté Ou Comment Les Extremes Ne Rejoignent-Ils Finalment Pas (1795-1799),” 272.

³⁹⁸ Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 108.

³⁹⁹ Serna, 108.

dangerous, and in fact worked to refuse these excesses of the wings to permeate the political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*.⁴⁰⁰ That being said the French extreme center was unique in its ability to refuse the fracturing of the center into a center-left and center-right, found in the Anglo-American systems, and which came to dominate the Cisalpine system by the summer of 1798.⁴⁰¹ The expulsion of the conservative elements in the Coup of Fructidor Year V in France had affirmed the ascension of this new centrist authority across republican Europe, and legitimized the intellectual concept of a centrist republic which lasted to the end of the Directorial period.⁴⁰²

In the Cisalpine Republic – who was in the process of building the Cisalpine state and construction the Cisalpine Constitution as the Coup of Fructidor Year V was taking place in France – this more centrist take had come to dominate political thought in the autumn of 1797.⁴⁰³ In reality, however, the defining criteria of the representative democrats at the end of 1797 was closeness to Bonaparte who served as the glue between the left and right factions of the representative democrats.⁴⁰⁴ Bonaparte famously favored order above political change and those willing to adopt a political ideology which would lean neither right nor left but remain firmly in the center.⁴⁰⁵ From this group came those who made up the ever growing representative democratic base which became the early *Gran Consiglio*. His departure for Egypt and the assumption of his role by the politically weak Berthier, saw the reopening of the factions – slowly at first and then suddenly rapid speed following the coup of 24 Germinal – along the lines of the x and y axis which defined internal legislative politics. Those who began to break off from the cohesion of the representative democrats – primarily those more on the democratic side such as Zanni and Giovio – were quickly removed for their dissent, creating an early damage to the centrist cohesion formed by Bonaparte just 6 months prior.⁴⁰⁶ As the various x-y axes combined ideologies began to turn into factions by Prairial, the democratic factions, particularly those regarding the sale

⁴⁰⁰ Cohen, “Des Excès Du Peuple Aux Excès Des Partis Du Peuple: Continuités e Transfers de Représentations,” 43.

⁴⁰¹ Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 108.

⁴⁰² Serna, 134.

⁴⁰³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 610–11.

⁴⁰⁴ Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 139–40.

⁴⁰⁵ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137–38.

⁴⁰⁶ “Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano (seduta segreto)”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:370–71 Discourse of Giovio in secret council in opposition to the Military and Commercial treaty with the French Republic; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:59.

of national property ⁴⁰⁷ and the plan of public instruction, ⁴⁰⁸ while the more republican leaning factions came to support the constitutional changes proposed by Trouvé and French authorities. ⁴⁰⁹

This splintering of the representative democratic bloc panicked both the Military and Civil authorities of the French Republic. The infighting which took place between the executive and legislative branches regarding the choice of a new Director in Messidor, also saw a greater widening of the fault lines between the republicans, the extreme centrists and the ever growing democratic base. ⁴¹⁰ The republicans began to find a greater ally in the French ambassador Trouvé, who had been sent by the French centrists who were suspicious of the close ties developing between the representative democrats in the Gran Consiglio and military authorities under Brune and Le Clerc. ⁴¹¹ As his writings demonstrate there certainly were lingering democratic elements, which he mistook for ignorant idealists because of their tendency to come from the clergy (Latuada, Mascheroni, Savonarola). ⁴¹² Republican leaning representative democrats who feared

⁴⁰⁷ “Seduta CLIII, 1 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:142–47 Motion and Discourse of Alborghetti and Dehò regarding the sale of national property in the comune of Vimercate.

⁴⁰⁸ “Seduta CXCVIII, 1 di 2 19 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:344–45 Discourse of Cocchetti in favor of allocating funds from the same of comunal property in Brescia to pay for public education. .

⁴⁰⁹ « No. 184, Corps Legislatif, Grand-Conseil », Jullien 1797, p. 762 Though Jullien does not explicitly mention the support of more right-wing groups for the new constitution he does discuss how after a number of secret committee sessions on 27–29 Messidor which were regarding the new constitution, many prominent democrats and Cisalpine politician resigned his position. Similarly, one finds evidence in the *processi verbali* between 27 Thermidor and 8 Fructidor Year VI of more left-wing representatives leaving the *Gran Consiglio* and sending correspondences on behalf of their local municipalities or constitutional circles against the new constitution. Finally, the new list of representatives after the coup consist of those in favor of the new constitution, according to Custodi, and the majority of these are center or center-right figures. Vianello 1940, p. 41n

⁴¹⁰ “Seduta CCXVI, 1 di 2 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CCXVII, 2 di 2 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CCXIX, 2 di 2 9 messidoro anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CCXX, 1 di 2 11 messidoro anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CCXXI, 2 di 2 11 messidoro; Seduta CCXXIII, 12 messidoro anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CCXXIV, 14 messidoro anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:750–53, 755–61, 774–76, 780–83, 791–804, 814–24, 868–69.

⁴¹¹ “Lettera di Claud-Joseph Trouvé, 27 Maessidor” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 284–88.

⁴¹² “Lettre di Claude-Joseph Trouvé 1 primaire An VI Rep. e 23 primaire An Vi Rep.” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 243–57 In these letters which document Trouvé’s journey from Naples to Milan and his first experiences with the Cisalpine Directory and Legislature, one truly understands the contempt for the Cisalpine Republic which Trouvé exhibited early on, particularly as it regards the internal legislation. In many ways Trouvé seems to view the Cisalpine self-sufficiency as a denial of the true nature of Italians (according to him one of ignorance and backwardness) which he did not find with the Neapolitans. This translates into his action across the summer months of 1798, but most plainly displays his complete incompetence in understanding the nature of cisalpine politics from the outset and reflects a similar incompetence on the part of French civil authorities back in Paris around the same period. .

this growing democratic trend, particularly during the Dehò administration in Floréal pressed Trouvé for his intervention during the Messidor debates on the new Director.

The events of 12-18 Fructidor in which the new constitution was instituted, and the entire Cisalpine Government purged of democratic leaning representative democrats was the final nail in the coffin for the representative democrat center. The two groups now ruptured into a more republican pro-Trouvé faction, and a united democratic and extreme center representative democratic line which was backed by French General Brune and the new Ambassador Fouché.⁴¹³ However the extreme center once again changed sides to favor republicans after only a month of sharing power with more democratic leaning elements of the new Consiglio dei Juniori, effectively ending this left-ward shift in the party, and allowing for the Frimaire Year VII Coup under the new French Ambassador Rivaud.⁴¹⁴ This z-axis political culture did not reappear again until well into the winter of Year VII, in which the extreme center was able to regroup some opposition to republicans⁴¹⁵ (though without the input of democrats who had either been permanently expelled – many of whom would be captured deported and perish at the hands of the Austrians in 1799). This return of the extreme center would be short lived as in Germinal Year VII, the Austro-Russian forces shut down the Cisalpine legislature. Those who fled to Grenoble from the center and left of the representative democrats threw aside these sentiments and joined with more conservative republicans – who were beginning to coalesce around Bonaparte, particularly after the Coup of Brumaire – or else left public life.⁴¹⁶ As such the representative democratic political ideology in

⁴¹³ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 60.

⁴¹⁴ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 20–21.

⁴¹⁵ “30 Frimale” Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 83–84 This entry from Custodi describes an opposition within the *Gran Consiglio* seemingly led by Vincenzo Dandolo. Dandolo, along with others like Cavedoni and Vismara had shifted their ideology more center but continued to oppose the changes instituted by Trouvé and later Rivaud. However, once the Republic fell it seems so did Dandolo’s resolve to remain in the center, and upon his reentry into Milan after Marengo he seems to have fully embraced the republican spirit.

⁴¹⁶ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 36–37 No fool, Bonaparte quickly realized the advantage he had with the support of the Italians in Grenoble and promises to retake the peninsula, for the now firmly Bonapartist and center-right Cisalpine exiles was as much an effort to expand and reaffirm his hold in Italy – where he had first tasted the power which comes with military victory – as it was to please his original base of Italian loyalists.

Italy died with the Cisalpine Republic, and it was republicans who returned with Bonaparte after Marengo to establish a new Cisalpine government.⁴¹⁷

By in large all representatives entered the *Gran Consiglio* within the representative democratic center of the z-axis. As such the broad range of political markers for this middle section is necessarily defined by a series of combined ideologies (after Germinal Year VI to be referred to as factions) of the x and y axis. The x-axis is, in essence, the identification of legislative origin; that is, from where representatives believed the philosophical base of legislative production originates be it the constitution or local conditions. The y-axis instead is an identification of a representative's ideas on the production of legislative output itself. Put together, the seven groups which existed in the *Gran Consiglio* created a new form of legislative culture specific to the Cisalpine Republic and which helped define the greater political culture. For the most part the political ideologies of the x and y axis which defined the representative democrats can more or less be explained thusly: at the democratic end of the spectrum tended to lie (more or less in this order dependent upon the argument) progressive radicals and neutral radicals. In between the extreme center and the democratic leaning left side of the representative democrats sat progressive rationalists. At the extreme center sat the neutral rationalists. Between the extreme center and republicans sat neutral moderates, the majority of who became republican after Thermidor (Year VI). The more republican leaning members were the originalist rationalists and moderates – the moderates being the furthest right consistently of the two – by Messidor these groups had come to form an alliance, thanks in part to their very limited numbers and effectively separated after the coup of 14 Fructidor to form a new pro-Trouvé republican faction. There was no representative that could be said to have been a progressive moderate, nor any which could be defined as both originalist and radical. As such the qualitative data set will only consist of the seven identifiable legislative identities for the remainder of the study. These seven groups will form the factions which eventually break apart the fragile cohesion of the representative democrats found in Frimaire Year VI.

⁴¹⁷ Serna 2019, pp. 148-149 Though referencing the end of French representative democracy and the ascension of Napoleonic Republicanism, Serna's assertion here rings similarly true with regard to the Cisalpine case. Those who returned and found success after Marengo were those who embraced the need for a political elite, which was still a taboo subject in 1795, but had come into fashion by Brumaire Year VIII.

The final data set presented in the next chapter helps us to better understand who belonged to these various legislative ideological groups by expanding upon the personal and political backgrounds of the 118 most participatory representatives (as explained by the participation index of chapter II). The final data set therefore – that of the prosopographical information for the *Gran Consiglio* – will provide the final piece of the puzzle with which to analyse the policies, interactions and developments of the legislative and political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*.

Chapter IV

Data Set III: The Prosopographical Networks

While the other two data sets came primary from a single source (the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*), the third data set was composed of a two-year study utilizing a combination of Italian and French archival sources, as well as secondary bibliographical sources, notably the biographical encyclopedia *il Dizionario Biografico dei Italiani*, as well as the biographical glossaries in the works of Ugo da Como and Federico Corracini.⁴¹⁸ The lack of availability of source availability due to the 2020-2021 pandemic meant both a change in course in the methodological approach to the prosopography in addition to the creation of the previous two data sets.

Instead of a much larger project which examined everything from religion to education to pre-1797 political experiences, the focus was altered for this data set towards a study of general commonalities between representatives most easily accessible across a large swath of the sample set. This sample set was selected from the Participation index described in Chapter I, which consisted of 118 individuals ranked based on their personal power (Rank 1), attendance record (Rank 2), legislative power (Rank 3), and positional power (Rank 4). The number 118 was selected as it constituted the most influential half of the representatives according to the classification statistics. Before the pandemic it was already impossible to gather a full record of prosopographical information for the full 238 representatives nominated over the course of 1797-1798 to the *Gran Consiglio*, as the three-year time limit was too restrictive to complete a Tackett like project (a feat which took him 10 years in provincial French archives, whose records are significantly better kept than most Italian archives unfortunately). Even after the pandemic forced a reformulation of the

⁴¹⁸ Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*.

prosopography and the source base, information was not uniformly distributed for each representative studied, with some individuals having large full biographies and other no more than their name. Thus, it became necessary to restrict the examination of the collective biography to the four primary categories for which information was available for a majority (meaning more than 60 individuals within the category had accessible information). These categories were age, geographic backgrounds, professional backgrounds and political backgrounds from 1796-1797. The final table of information can be found in Appendix _.

Next it was decided that the clearest way to analyze the data produced for each category was to separate the individuals into sub-structures which were termed “networks”. With the exception of the first category – age – these networks saw representatives being grouped according to common traits such as professional formation, geographic origins or political alliance (among others). The term networks was selected as it was assumed that these common traits often led to the internal legislative alliances which arose across the *Gran Consiglio* period, a fact which becomes more apparent as the thesis looks at internal political culture of the council in Part III. Once the networks had been clearly defined and separated they were compared within a given category in terms of their statistical significance in the *Gran Consiglio* (network size, influence, and the breakdown of other categories within a given network). Similarly socio-economic data was used to understand the variation within networks themselves. The three socio-economic levels were the nobility (those belonging to minor or major titled families throughout northern Italy which were either active or non-active within the aristocratic community), the bourgeois (who belonged to the professional and commercial classed, and remained without noble title, but recognized as having a certain local familial influence nevertheless), and unknown or humble origins (those for which socio-economic information was unavailable either because the individual was not considered socio-economically influential or because the records were lost or non-existent).

Age

Of the 118 representative studied, information on date of birth was available for 73 individuals (roughly 62% of the participation index and 31% of the entire 238 nominated representatives), which allows us to make a relatively informed insinuation regarding the age range of the *Gran Consiglio* in 1797-1798. In many studies of revolutionary legislatures in the 1790s,

age is often not factored in as a major condition for decision making and legislative cultural development – Tackett barely mentions it in *Becoming a Revolutionary*.⁴¹⁹ However by 1797, age mattered, particularly in the case of the *Gran Consiglio*. After almost 8 years of revolution, the actors were beginning to change, both generationally and in terms of age. Those who had been early participants in the Revolution in France in 1789-1790 were getting older and those who had been too young in the early years were coming of age (Bonaparte alone provides a perfect example). Age had come to be a factor in Revolutionary politics by 1795 (one of the reasons why *hommes* was used in place of *peuple* in the 1791 and 1793 Constitutions to delineate that one is of age when participating in government).⁴²⁰ Age meant wisdom, calculated decision making, and an awareness of consequence. But as the post-Thermidorian Convention sought to limit sovereignty from all *hommes* to all *citoyens*, there arose a need to define age as a limiting factor in the national understanding of citizenship. After all some of the greatest hotheads of the terror had been the youth of the Convention (Saint-Juste comes to mind).⁴²¹ Age should not necessarily disqualify one from participation in government – as long as one had reached the age of reason which at this time was 17 for men – but age, like wealth should come with greater privileges, considering those with a greater quantity of both have more to lose.⁴²² For this reason, when the bicameral system was adopted, it was age that dictated the differences in the houses.⁴²³ Youth provided innovation, which was necessary for the development of new means of confronting new problems, the job of the lower chamber.⁴²⁴ But the final judgement of that solution needed the temperance and wisdom of age to function correctly.

Age was of such importance that it lent its name to the upper chamber of the Legislative Assemblies (*Anciens* in France and *Seniori* in the Cisalpine Republic).⁴²⁵ Age limits were set for

⁴¹⁹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*.

⁴²⁰ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 88.

⁴²¹ Tackett 2018, p. 424-430 Though he does not explicitly state that the radical reform movements of Year II and the 1793 revolution were committed exclusively by the youth in the Convention, it is interesting to see that those whom Tackett has highlighted as the most significant proponents of social revolution were also some of the youngest members of the body. Interesting to see that even in the 1790s "cultural revolution" as it would come to be termed in the 1960s had its origins in the revolutionary youth.

⁴²² Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 69–70.

⁴²³ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 263–64.

⁴²⁴ Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l'histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 152.

⁴²⁵ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 266; Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l'histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 152.

both Assemblies which established a ten-year gap between the Chambers. The *Gran Consiglio* required that all members have at least 30 years of age, and for the *Seniori* 40.⁴²⁶ While it was not obligatory that those in the lower assembly be younger than 40, it was expected that those of a higher age pass to the upper chamber once they have met the age requirement, leaving the lower chamber free for the younger generation. This concept was embodied in the exception to the *Gran Consiglio*'s age limit which was lowered to 25 for the first seven years of the Republic's existence – and even here exceptions were made to allow for even younger nominees as long as they were citizens with a good patriotic record.⁴²⁷

Looking at the age range of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, therefore, it is no surprise that the average trends towards youth. Of the 72 representatives with confirmed dates of birth, 44 were under the age of 40 in 1797. Eleven of these were under the age of 30, and four were under the required age of 25 (Giuseppe Piazza, Pietro Dehò, Giordano Alborghetti and Tiberio Fantaguzzi) with one of these (Fantaguzzi) being under the age of 20. Eighteen representatives were aged between 40 and 50 years with the remaining nine being spread out between 55 and 78 (Andrea Terzi). This means that the largest single decade was between 30 and 40 years of age (32 individuals) when the Council was activated in 1797. That said, the reality was that what would be considered today to be middle age – those between 30 and 50 – actually encompassed the majority of individuals at 50 out of 72 confirmed individuals. If one follows the assumption that more radical politics corresponds to younger age, it comes as no surprise then that the majority of representative fell into the progressive rationalist proto-faction. Though it is not a given, it is correct that the most democratic, radical and progressive members of the *Gran Consiglio* (Dehò, Greppi, Alborghetti, Piazza, Giovio) are also some of the youngest, while many of the oldest representatives (Terzi, Alpruni, Scarabelli) are also some of the most republican, moderate and originalist. It should be noted however that not everyone falls within this pattern. Girolomo Coddé was quite assuredly a progressive radical but was on the older end of the curve at 57; Bernardo Ambrosioni at 27 was one of the most devoutly originalist rationalist.

⁴²⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V Articles 71 and 82.

⁴²⁷ Tiberio Fantaguzzi was only 18 when he was nominated as a substitute by Bonaparte. His friend and later accused co-conspirator Antonio Fabris was similarly under the age of 25 - though there is no proof of the exact date - which is known since their accusal of sedition in late Prairial was supported by accusations of being too young and immature to hold positions as representatives. Ugo Da Como 1940, p. 48

Do these numbers change when the sample set is restricted only to the leadership and elite (see Chapter V)? For the leadership there is age data for 46 of the 60 individuals within the power index, meaning that the majority (64%) of the 72 individuals came from the leadership class. That this data is available is not surprising as often those who led in the *Gran Consiglio*, such as Dandolo, Compagnoni and Tadini went on to be important figures in the Republic and Kingdom of Italy in the Napoleonic era after 1800, and as such had extensive biographies written about them in the 200 years since the end of the period.⁴²⁸ Looking at the specific breakdown of age brackets for the leadership, eight members of the leadership were under the age of 30 – of which three (Piazza, Dehò and Alborghetti) were under the constitutionally proscribed age of 25; Twenty representative existed in the 30-39 age bracket, twelve in the 40-49 bracket and 6 were in the 50+ range. Thus, the younger half was much more present than the older half within the leadership (28 for 20–39-year-olds as opposed to 18 in the 40+ range), however the middle age bracket of 30-49 held a solid majority of 32 representatives. This is once again reflected in the numerous progressive rationalist majority which held the political culture of the Council so strongly.

Within the elite only four representatives had no age data allowing us to make significantly more concrete assumptions about the importance of age in the core leadership of the *Gran Consiglio*. Those in the under 30 bracket number five of which Dehò and Alborghetti are under 25. In the 30-39 range there are eleven representatives, 8 between the age of 40 and 49 and only two over age 50. The elite, and thus the true movers and shakers of legislative politics in the *Gran Consiglio* were decisively middle aged (19 of 26), though the younger half (those aged 30-39) remained almost equally potent over the older representatives with over half (16) coming from the younger generation. Interestingly as well, some of the youngest members of the Assembly, Dehò and Alborghetti, were both ranked as some of the most influential individuals. In the end the dominance of the middle age representatives provides insight into the influence which age and maturity had on radical politics; however the presence of a stronger youth core, especially from those at the younger end of the middle age spectrum (30-39) can perhaps go a long way to explaining the more progressive push of the entire Council along the x-axis, as well as its more middle of the road rationalism on the y-axis.

⁴²⁸ Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*; Pederzani, *I Dandolo*; Giannini, "Tadini Antonio."

Geographic division of the Cisalpine Republic

The Cisalpine Republic, having been made up of six distinct states from before 1796 – the Duchies of Milan, Modena and Massa-Carrera, the Republic of Venezia (also referred to here as the Serenissima or the Republic of San Marco), the Valtellina region originally a part of the Swiss canton of the Grisons and the Papal States – was truly an amalgamation of distinct political, social, religious, cultural, historical and in some cases even linguistic elements. Additionally, a number of representatives immigrated to the Cisalpine from outside any of these six-*ancien regime* states, bringing further influences from Piedmont, Rome and Naples. What will follow here is a brief examination of the social and political conditions of each of these six states (in addition to those from outside the future Cisalpine territory) in the final decades of the eighteenth century. This will not be an exhaustive history of each state but will instead look at how the specific regions from which representatives originate connected individuals according to shared political, social, or even economic lines in the period (See Appendix _)

Of the 118 representatives examined in this study, 110 of them have credible information on their geographic origins. These geographical origins are separated into two distinct sections: place of birth and place of residency in 1797. Information about place of birth generally regards where the individual was born and raised. Some – like Sebastiano Salimbeni⁴²⁹ or Antonio Cagnoli⁴³⁰ – were born outside of the Italian peninsula due to their father's work in the military; these cases generally saw the individual moving back to the peninsula at a young age, though their place of birth is mentioned for the major impact it had on their upbringing. Residence, by contrast, often changed many times over the course of an individual's life, with many important representatives – such as Giuseppe Compagnoni⁴³¹, Luigi Savonarola⁴³² and Francesco Reina⁴³³ – living in many or all of the former *ancien regime* nations which would make up the Cisalpine Republic, as well as other parts of the world principally France, Spain and Austria. Thus, it is necessary to specify where the individual was in 1797 when the organization of the Cisalpine Republic was taking place. Unlike place of birth which gives insight into individual's origins, the place of residency demonstrates where representatives had willingly put themselves to be active

⁴²⁹ Ugo Da Como 1940, p. 117

⁴³⁰ Baldini, "Cagnoli, Antonio."

⁴³¹ Savini, *Un abate "libertino."*

⁴³² Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797.*

⁴³³ Dettamanti, "Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal."

in the republican or revolutionary communities across. Some like Giuseppe Lattanzi, had moved from their home to Lombardy to help participate in the French invasion. Others like Lorenzo Mascheroni had departed their homeland in order to more fully integrate into their professional or educational networks.⁴³⁴ Either way it is important to note the distinction between place of birth and residency in 1797, not because the politics, society or economy of the Italian states changed dramatically in this time, but because understanding where a representative began and where he ended up before accepting his position in the Council demonstrates the trajectory of his career and formation in the years before the Cisalpine Republic.

Before looking at the individual states themselves it is worth noting some general information about the collective biography of the 110 individuals examined in this study: 55 representatives (or exactly half) were born within cities which would eventually go on to be *capoluoghi* of the Cisalpine departments in 1798 or were major cities of the ancien Italian states such as Rome, Verona or Venice. 83 individuals would be residing in these cities by 1797. This indicates that there was an overwhelming urban presence in the *Gran Consiglio*. The number of representatives who were born and resided in the lowlands of the Cisalpine Republic, primarily the Val Padano, numbered equally at 48; however, 34 representatives did come from the mountainous zones of the republic, though only 20 resided there in 1797. Finally, only 9 representatives came from the coastal areas of the Republic (Venice, Massa, and the coast of the Romagna), while a mere 5 resided there in 1797.

The Duchy of Milan

The *ancien regime* state with the greatest representation in the *Gran Consiglio* was the Duchy of Milan. This feudal monarchy had seen three hundred years of foreign occupation in one form or another which had been dominated by the French Valois Crown, the Spanish Hapsburgs and following the War of Spanish succession the Austria Hapsburg Emperors. By 1798 the territory consisted of much of the modern-day region of Lombardy framed by the river Ticino to the east, the Adda to the west and the Po to the south. To the north the Lakes of Como and Maggiore delineated a border with the Swiss Canton of Ticino. It similarly included a semi-autonomous Mantuan duchy. Zaghi provides statistics that state that Hapsburg Lombardy by 1799 had passed

⁴³⁴ Pepe 2008 ; « Angelo Mai » MMB 664: 138-140 « Lettere ufficiali », 1786-1800. s.d.

from 1.08 to 1.15 million inhabitants from 1769, an increase which dwarfed its neighbors to the South and west (Kingdom of Sardegna, Grand Duchy of Tuscany and The Papal States) and was identical to its cousins to the east in the Serenissima.⁴³⁵ This population increase lent a large group of young people to come of age in the mid-1790s reflected in its changing political climate.

These young people had been educated within the reform culture of Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II. Milan had long been a center of intellectual innovation in the Italian world, particularly from the early eighteenth century, thanks to Catholic scholars like Lodovico Antonio Muratori.⁴³⁶ When Joseph came to power after a 15-year co-reign with his mother Maria Teresa, he did so with the intention of reforming his empire into a centralized and modern European aristocratic state with tenacles in the politics, economics and social settings from Budapest to Prague to Krakow to Milan.⁴³⁷ Milan, ruled by a royal plenipotentiary viceroy in Joseph's name, would become the symbol of a newfound intellectual aristocracy. Everything from terraforming to legal innovation, to tax reconstruction and administrative reform found itself examined, gutted and rebuilt according to the new modernizing and centralizing project of Joseph and his Milanese allies.⁴³⁸ Religious institutions in particular found themselves under attack as Joseph made contested but ultimately successful attempts to subjugate Catholic institutions like universities, hospitals and public houses under imperial secular administrations.

The group of young intellectual nobles who would come to dominate this scene from the late 1760s to the fall of the duchy in 1796 (and even for some time after), were called the *Accademia dei pugni*, and sought to modernize the city and society through the use of reason and scientific debate.⁴³⁹ Led by internationally renowned political and scientific thinkers like Cesare Beccaria, the brothers Pietro and Alessandro Verri, Paolo Frisi, Giuseppe Parini and Alessandro Volta, Milan would become the symbol of rational government and the center of political discourse, with works like Beccaria's *Dei delitti e delle pene*, or the Verri brothers *Il Caffé* having international acclaim in the enlightenment world.⁴⁴⁰ The ancient university at Pavia became the

⁴³⁵ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 5.

⁴³⁶ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 98; Vismara, "Lodovico Antonio Muratori (1672-1750: Enlightenment in a Tridentine Mode."

⁴³⁷ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 282.

⁴³⁸ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 98-104.

⁴³⁹ Woolf, 99.

⁴⁴⁰ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 287-89; Beccaria, *Dei Delitti e Delle Pene. Terza Edizione. Rivista, Corretta, e Notabilmente Accresciuta Dall'autore Colle Risposte Dello Stesso Alle Note e Osservazioni*

scholastic and scientific leader of Italy and by the 1790s was a center of philosophical and political reform as was the royal “university” at the Palazzo di Brera in Milan.⁴⁴¹ Many future representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* were formed in this environment, having served as pupils in the 1770s, 80s and 90s to the great minds of Pavia, and going on to serve as professors, administrators and lawyers within the duchy. For this reason, it is no exaggeration to say that Milanese culture was by far the most dominant in the intellectual setting of the Cisalpine Republic after 1796.

The duchy of Milan provided the highest number of individual representatives from the participation index: of the 110 with valid geographical information 35 were born in the duchy with 45 residing there by 1797. Milan was by far the best represented municipality in the Council, not just from the Duchy but from the entire Cisalpine Republic, with 9 being born in the city and 19 residing. Following Milan, the best represented municipality was Pavia with 2 born and 5 residing. That said, at least 10 of those residing in Milan in 1797 had professorial jobs at the university in Pavia. Also, Pavia had the highest percentage of foreign-born transplants among representatives in 1797, with four of the five residing in that city not being born there, and two of those having origins from outside of the duchy. Mantua followed as the most represented city at 3 born there and 4 residing in 1797. The remaining cities and towns only contributed one or two individuals and often were the birthplace and residency alone for individuals. Even cities like Lecco, Como, Varese, and Lodi (the centers of the modern-day provinces of the Lombardy region which made up the duchy in the late eighteenth century) could not boast more than 2 representatives for either category of geographic origin.

With regards to the socio-economic representation of the Milanese representatives 21 of the 35 born in the Duchy were of either minor or major noble descent. This number shrinks to 24 of 45 of noble descent for those residing in the duchy in 1797. The Milanese bourgeois was represented by 4 of 35 representatives born to the Duchy and 4 of 45 residing there. Finally, 10 out of 35 representatives either had no socio-economic information or came from humble origins, with a similar statistic of 14 out of 45 for residence in 1797. The Duchy was therefore overwhelming represented by high-born individuals, though it should be said, of these nobles the

Pubblicate in Venezia Contro Quest’Opera Si Aggiunge Il Giudizio Di Un Celebre Professore; Verri and Verri, Il Caffé o Sia Breve e Vari Discorsi Già Distribuiti in Fogli Periodici.

⁴⁴¹ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 347–48.

majority were from minor houses and did not have the exhaustible wealth of the smaller numerically (but still present) higher nobility of the Duchy. These minor nobles, who by virtue of their titles had gained lower positions in Milanese administration, military and education, tended to side politically with the untitled bourgeois. This group together was neither radical nor moderate, neither truly progressive nor originalist and neither democratic nor republican, lying towards the middle in almost every way – with some exceptions such as Felice Latuada, Francesco Reina, Pietro Dehò, and Lodovico Giovio.

The Republic of Venice (The Serenissima)

Following the Duchy of Milan, the Republic of Venice – and in particular the area known as the western Terraferma – was the best represented geographic area within the *Gran Consiglio*. Unlike Milan, the former territory of the Serenissima saw only its western half being included in the territory of the Cisalpine Republic in 1797. These areas came from the historically Lombard dominated zone of the ancient Republic which are a part of that region today and included Bergamo and the Val Bergamasco, Crema, the Valcalmonica, Lake Garda and its surrounding towns and rural zones on the western side, and the city of Brescia. There were also some territories such as Desezano which belong to the modern region of Veneto which were annexed to the Cisalpine Republic in 1797.

Unlike the Duchy of Milan, the cities and towns of these territories seemed to exist independent of the other within the larger Venetian political landscape. By the mid-eighteenth century the cities and territories which made up the western Terraferma seemed to be governed more as autonomous colonies, with seignorial bishops, cardinals and other metropolitan Venetian nobility often leaving more of administration, politics and social engineering to the local nobility of these cities.⁴⁴² Largely run by concentrated aristocratic enclaves of ancient noble families, these cities – in particular the most populous city of Brescia – paradoxically served to be some of the loudest voices for individual and communal autonomy.

But the western Terraferma was not the only part of the Serenissima with representation. After the concession of the eastern part of the Republic of Venice (Verona to the coast and from the Po northward) to the Austrians in late 1797, many individuals from these parts of the

⁴⁴² Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:326–29.

Serenissima, including Padua, Verona, Desenzano, and Venice itself, fled to the Cisalpine Republic where they were accepted as patriotic refugees.⁴⁴³ Some of these cities, like Verona and Padua, had enjoyed a similar autonomy from Venice which naturally put them in alliance with their neighbors to the west like the Bresicians and Bergamascans, Padua as one of the primary centers of Italian intellectualism in the modern era had seen within its borders a growing masonic and scientific movement throughout the late eighteenth century on par with those from Pavia.⁴⁴⁴ Others, particularly those like Vincenzo Dandolo or Luigi Valeriani, who had close contacts to the business and intellectual communities of Bologna, tended to ally themselves to those more radical individuals from the northern Papal States.⁴⁴⁵

The Serenissima boasted the second highest representation in the *Gran Consiglio* between both its eastern and western halves. In total, 31 of the 110 representatives were born within its borders, and 25 resided there (mostly in the western half) by 1797. The best represented city was Brescia (4 born and 10 residing), followed by Bergamo (5 born, 5 residing) and then followed by the small lakeside town of Lonato (3 born, 1 residing). Most of those who came from the western Terraferma generally came as individuals from small towns along lake Garda, from the towns of the Valcalmonica like Edolo or Breno, or from the periphery of the Val Bergamasco. Though these representatives were not individually powerful generally (there existed some exceptions like Vincenzo Federici from Edolo or Lauro Glissentini from Lonato) they tended to support each other as a singular voting block, unlike their eastern compatriots or those from the Duchy of Milan. The eastern non-cisalpine cities of the Republic of Venice such as Verona, Padua and Venice all had one or two individuals who all became powerful voices in the Council such as Luigi Savonarola (Padua), Vincenzo Dandolo (Venice) or Pietro Polfranceschi (Verona).

The socio-economic breakdown of Serenissima representatives in the *Gran Consiglio* is relatively similar to that of the Duchy of Milan. Of those born in the Territory, 16 out of 31 individuals came from minor or major nobility from across the different enclaves in both halves of the Republic of Venice. Of those 16, Brescia and Bergamo saw between them 7 members of nobility serving as representatives in the Council (4 from Brescia, 3 from Bergamo), while the

⁴⁴³ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:105–8.

⁴⁴⁴ Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*; Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*.

⁴⁴⁵ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 53–61.

metropole of Venice had no nobility serving in the Cisalpine lower assembly (Verona contributed two nobles Polfranceschi and Salimbeni, the largest delegation in the east of the Serenissima). From the bourgeois, 7 were born in the Serenissima, all of whom – in stark contrast to the nobility – came from the eastern half of the Republic of San Marco, including one (Dandolo) from the metropole of Venice. That said the contingent of unknown or humble origin representatives born in the Republic of Venice was higher than its bourgeois group at 8 individuals, 3 of which came from Bergamo.

The breakdown is similar for those residing in the Serenissima in 1797. Of the 25 confirmed to be living in the Republic of Venice in 1797 during or before the uprisings of that Spring, 13 were of noble lineage. Once again 7 of those 13 were from either Bergamo (3) or Brescia (the same 4) and none from the metropole of Venice. This number changed however among the bourgeois which number 5 individuals residing in the Serenissima in 1797, 3 of which came from Brescia, and 1 each from Bergamo and Venice. This signifies that the rebellions or the preparations for the rebellions which would take place in the Spring of 1797 seemed to move bourgeois revolutionaries westward into the more independent Terraferma cities of Brescia and Bergamo to participate in the revolutionary movement there. In fact, though they did not all ultimately reside in these cities, many future representatives from both the east and west of the Terraferma came to participate in the uprisings of that Spring. This included almost all of the 7 representatives of humble or unknown origins, 3 of whom came to settle in Brescia and 1 in Bergamo.

The Papal States

In discussing the Papal States as they refer to the Cisalpine Republic, this really only means the states of what is today the modern region of Emilia-Romagna, and at that this only includes the eastern half of the Emilia as the western half was dominated by the duchies of Parma and Modena. This is because most of the representatives from the former Papal States who came to serve in the *Gran Consiglio*, by virtue of its inclusion into the Cisalpine Republic, came from this northern region; only 2 were born in the southern half of the Papacy (Francesco Giani⁴⁴⁶ in Rome and Giuseppe Lattanzi⁴⁴⁷ in Nemi) and one (Monalti⁴⁴⁸) resided in Assisi in 1797 before moving to

⁴⁴⁶ Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*, 90.

⁴⁴⁷ Rossi, "Lattanzi, Giuseppe."

⁴⁴⁸ Brancaleoni, "Monalti, Cesare."

Pavia. The rest either came from the regions around the urban centers of Ferrara or Bologna or from the coastal and commercial areas of the Romagna. Much like the cities of the Serenissima, the Papal States – and in particular those to the north – were not particularly centralized, instead being controlled by a highly independent localized aristocracy and seigneurial clergy. This independence had arisen largely from the decimation of Papal supremacy throughout the two centuries before the Revolution, which saw Rome’s authority continually questioned in the face of a by-then defunct counter-reformational project.⁴⁴⁹ With Rome’s powers waning, Bologna – by virtue of its position as the relative intellectual and cosmopolitan hub in the region – came to enjoy something close to a political and social center for the region, though even here its control was never officially recognized as the urban centers of Milan and Modena would be. While it had more regional control over smaller cities like Ferrara and Ravenna than Brescia (its closest counterpart) would over the cities of Bergamo or Verona, its power was largely superficial and informal.

Unlike The Duchy of Milan who saw a relative population boom between 1769 and 1799, the Northern Papal states seemed to grow little in the eighteenth century.⁴⁵⁰ Bologna, despite its newfound recognition as regional political and cultural center, succeeded in simply rising to the sixteenth century levels in the early days of the counter-reformation before disease and plague had taken a heavy toll in the city throughout the seventeenth century; the same could be said for Ferrara who had seen itself downgraded to a minor region player in Emilian politics. Only the Romagna seemed to enjoy a minor growth in the period thanks in large part to a growing eighteenth century maritime trade.⁴⁵¹ Even here however, the growth was so minor (some hundreds or thousands added to the total population of the coastal territory) and the exodus of the region to Bologna or other major cities of the peninsula so profound by the 1790s, that the region remained relatively desolate. This limiting of population and the concentration of new generations into the urban centers like Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna meant that the youth reform movements were not nearly as common in Romagna as might have been found in Milan in the latter half of the eighteenth century.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 144.

⁴⁵⁰ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 14–16.

⁴⁵¹ Zaghi, 17.

⁴⁵² Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 144.

That said, The papal states did see a burgeoning political discourse and intellectual movement which rivalled the Lombard capital in many ways. Thanks in large part to the reforms of Benedict XIV (himself the former lord-bishop of Bologna) in the mid-eighteenth century, Bologna began to enjoy an intellectual resurgence.⁴⁵³ Benedict's reforms had great effect across the Catholic world, but within the Northern cities of the Papal States – in particular in Bologna – for which he was both a native and sovereign saw some of the most direct impacts of his work.⁴⁵⁴ He simultaneously worked to overthrow the fragments of Jesuit control over educational institutions, and inadvertently allowed the rise of a reliance on public financing for education in the North Papal States, chiefly – once again – Bologna.⁴⁵⁵

Though nothing like the great scientific and political reforms of the Milanese *Accademia dei pugni*, The Papal states saw a number of reforms aimed at fixing social and economic issues including agricultural advancements and an attempt to tackle poverty in the Romagnian cities.⁴⁵⁶ The ancient Senate of Bologna which had run the city for centuries on the basis of aristocratic led initiatives, saw itself moving towards more reform minded projects.⁴⁵⁷ Many of these aristocratic senators had been educated in the scientific and philosophical circles of the University of Bologna, which was enjoying international recognition almost on par with Pavia in the second half of the eighteenth century. Similar again to Pavia – and perhaps even more so – the Bolognese university found itself dominated by a strong aristocratic leadership who unlike its Pavian and Paduan counterparts were much more suspicious of lower-born education, even among the growing bourgeois population streaming in the form of the children of newly wealthy Ferrarese or Romagnolo merchants. The exception to this was perhaps among the legal college who graduated a number of renowned common and minor noble born lawyers in the final decades of the eighteenth century including a number of future Cisalpine representatives like Giuseppe Gambari⁴⁵⁸ and Giacomo Greppi⁴⁵⁹.

⁴⁵³ Woolf, 112.

⁴⁵⁴ Rosa, "Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758): The Ambivalent Enlightener."

⁴⁵⁵ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 113.

⁴⁵⁶ Woolf, 145.

⁴⁵⁷ Varni, "L'Università Di Bologna in Età Napoleonica," 411.

⁴⁵⁸ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:138.

⁴⁵⁹ Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche Sopra l'Università e l'istituto Delle Scienze Di Bologna*, 226.

What grew in Bologna therefore was a separation between the ruling aristocratic faction and the newly wealthy commercial and legal factions. While the former sought often to ally itself politically with the intellectual communities of Pavia, the latter came to find friends in the urban centers of Venezia, Milan and Paris.⁴⁶⁰ These alliances grew with the onset of the revolution in France, but further divided the more radical bourgeois factions consisting of the legal and commercial classes from those of the aristocratic class in the Bolognese university who were much more willing to embrace the moderate republicanism of the later revolution than the extremism of the convention. Interestingly, what brought both sides together once the French had invaded in 1796 was a shared resentment against Catholic heavy-handedness and censorship in public life and education; similarly, both continued to share a commitment to public reforms for the betterment of society including public infrastructural works and the maintenance of public sanitation standards.⁴⁶¹

Of the 110 representatives, 25 were born in the Papal States and 19 resided there in 1797. The best represented city in the *Gran Consiglio* from the Papal States was Bologna with 6 representatives born in the city and 7 residing there in 1797. Bologna was the second-best represented city by birth behind Milan, and the third in terms of residency in 1797 behind Milan and Brescia. Similarly, Bologna remained the single most influential urban center to *Gran Consiglio* politics and legislative development based on historic legal precedent after Milan and just before Modena. The next best represented city was Ferrara with 4 being born and an equal number residing there in 1797. That said, when put together as a single group – as they often voted and debated as a block – the representatives from the cities of the Romagna (Imola, Lugo, Cesena, Cervia, Ravenna, Faenza) had 9 native born representatives and 5 residing there in 1797. Thus, in reality the Romagna delegation was the next largest after Brescia from the Papal States and not Bologna.

Socio-economically the situation was similar to the Milanese and Serenissima examples provided above. Of the 25 Papal representatives 10 were born into minor or major noble families,

⁴⁶⁰ Pederzani 2014, p. 41 In her biography of Vincenzo Dadolo, Pederzani inadvertently demonstrates the profound ties between the bourgeois of Bologna and that of Venice. Dandolo was a close companion to the Romagnolo transfer and Bologna educated Giuseppe Compagnoni. Between these two, a strong political and intellectual network was established between these two cities which included important future patriots like Ugo Foscolo, Giuseppe Oliva and Luigi Valeriani.

⁴⁶¹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 146.

7 into bourgeois families and 8 were of humble origins or lacked proper information on class at time of birth. Interestingly, Francesco Giani is the only representative of which explicit information was provided stating that he was born to servants in Rome.⁴⁶² Of those residing in the papal states in 1797, 9 representative were of noble status, 5 were bourgeois and another 5 were of humble or unknown status. Looking at Bologna, as the largest single urban center, 4 of the six representatives born in the city were of noble blood with the other two of unknown or humble origins and of the 7 residing there in 1797, 5 were noble 1 was from the bourgeois and 1 was of unknown or humble origins. The Romagna by contrast provided less nobility (only 4 out of nine born in the region and 3 out of 5 residing there) and more bourgeois representation (3 born in the region, though these would transfer to Venice, Ferrara and Modena by 1797).

The Duchy of Modena

Like Milan, the Duchy of Modena was full integrated into the Cisalpine Republic in 1797. Unlike Milan, it was a significantly smaller locality and thus received significantly less representation in the *Gran Consiglio*. For this reason, the Duchy had a much less profound impact on Cisalpine politics. While the other three states have received more detailed examinations of their status in the latter half of the eighteenth century – largely because these three states provided the majority of the political and legal basis for the legal tradition in the Cisalpine Republic – the examination here of the Modenese duchy will focus primarily on specific aspects of Modenese society which related to the representatives who arrived from this state to the *Gran Consiglio*.

Having itself been touched by the spirit of Josephian reformism which had swept Lombardy in the last decades of the eighteenth century, Modena found itself adopting many of the same administrative, intellectual, and infrastructural changes of the larger Duchy to the North.⁴⁶³ The ruling Este family of Modena had successfully centralized and strengthened its territorial holdings (including those on the western coast in Garfagnana and Lurigana) and built up a reputation as a strong military power on the peninsula by the mid-eighteenth century, regardless of its small territorial size.⁴⁶⁴ Encompassing the central part of the Emilia, its twin cities of Modena

⁴⁶² Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*, 90.

⁴⁶³ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 107–9 Part of the reason for this adoption of Lombard reform practices is the close relationship between the Hapsburg Monarchy and the ruling Este family in Modena. The younger brother of Joseph II was in fact married to the granddaughter of the Duke of Modena at the time Francis III.

⁴⁶⁴ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 16.

and Reggio Emilia saw population gains in the second half of that century which mirrored (proportionally) that found in the Milanese Duchy to the north and northeast. To the east and south Modena was surrounded by a Papal States struggling to implement its own moderate reforms while simultaneously seeking to retain the aristocratic authority of its main cities. To the West the Duchy was bordered by the territory of the Dukes of Parma, who – after a brief and highly successful attempt at reformism in the vein of the Milanese – had recently sunk back into its previous isolationist and provincial traditionalism.⁴⁶⁵

When Ercole III took the Modenese throne in 1780, he allowed this reformist culture to be dictated by his minister Lodovico Ricci (later the finance minister of the Cisalpine Republic).⁴⁶⁶ Ricci put through a series of financial and tax reforms which – though they heavily benefitted the strong aristocratic leadership who dominated ducal government – provided greater access to funding for civil institutions, principally the Modenese military and the University of Modena-Reggio. He similarly made attempts at reforming the charity networks by wresting them from the hands of the Church and into those of competent civil officials – a tactic he would favor again as Cisalpine finance minister in 1798. Modena would find success as one of the three Italian duchies – along with Milan and Tuscany – to implement intellectual and civic reforms to its systems before the invasion of the French in 1796. These reforms included augmenting the scientific and legal reputations for the University at Reggio. While Modena-Reggio never obtained the level of academic and intellectual acclaim as Bologna, Padova or Pavia, it was able to contribute a number of the most powerful individuals to the *Gran Consiglio* including Giambattista Venturi⁴⁶⁷ (professor of natural sciences), Angelo Scarbelli⁴⁶⁸ (professor of engineering) and Giacomo Lamberti⁴⁶⁹ (professor of cannon law). The military would similarly come to be viewed as one of the areas of great strength for the Duchy of Modena. Francesco III ‘s more bellicose nature saw the Modenese army coming to fight alongside the Austrian regiments from Milan and Tuscany throughout the European wars of the 1760s to the 1780s, including the Seven Years’ War.⁴⁷⁰ The success of the Modenese regiments, and its relatively small population made them renowned on

⁴⁶⁵ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 110.

⁴⁶⁶ Woolf, 147.

⁴⁶⁷ Ferraboschi, *Borghesia e Potere Civico a Reggio Emilia Nella Seconda Metà Dell'Ottocento (1859-1889)*.

⁴⁶⁸ Ceretti, “Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo,” 12–13.

⁴⁶⁹ Sani, “Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo).”

⁴⁷⁰ Ceretti, “Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo,” 10.

the Italian peninsula for their martial prowess and many officers of the Cisalpine Military were pulled from the old Modenese corps.⁴⁷¹

Of the 110 representatives, 8 were born in the territory of the Duchy of Modena (1 of these – Giovanni Pietro Carminati was born in the Este holding of Garfagnana) and 11 resided in that territory in 1797. These numbers are significantly less than the other three major states to comprise the Cisalpine Republic; that said 9 of the 11 who were resident in the Duchy of Modena were within the leadership and of those 9, 6 were among the elite. Thus, proportionally the Duchy of Modena had more representatives among the most powerful members of the assembly than any other state in North-Central Italy. Its largest city, Modena, saw only two of the representatives being born in that city, both to the nobility; however, by 1797 11 of the future *Gran Consiglio* representatives lived in the city of Modena 4 of which belonged to the minor or major nobility of the city, as well as 3 from the bourgeois and 1 of humble or unknown origins. Its second city, Reggio Emilia, saw only one representative being born there, Angelo Perseguiti, who later moved to Modena to join the republican legal network there.⁴⁷² However, by 1797 both Lamberti and Venturi had moved to the city to work as professors before Lamberti left his charge in order to stay in Bonaparte's camp.⁴⁷³ Unlike the other states of Northern Italy, Modena did not have a clear split before the French invasion between a more radical and moderate group. Part of this speaks to the success of Ricci's reform movements in the 1780s and 1790s. Additionally, unlike Milan or Bologna where the aristocratic elements kept close hold of university authority, Modena-Reggio as a much smaller university was willing to open its doors to lower-class students, meaning there was significantly less popular resistance (as opposed to Pavia and Bologna).

Massa, The Valtellina and Foreign-born Representatives

The remainder of *Gran Consiglio* representatives who did not have geographic origins from one of the four major states came from either the Valtellina region of the Alps, the small Duchy of Massa-Carrara or were born in a territory never integrated into the Cisalpine Republic. No single territory (other than perhaps the Valtellina) provided a significant enough number of representatives to have a profound effect on *Gran Consiglio* political cultural development. Massa-

⁴⁷¹ Ceretti, 17–18; “Tassoni, Giulio Cesare.”

⁴⁷² *Il Risogiamiento a Reggio: Atti Del Convegno Di Studi 28-29 Dicembre 1961.*

⁴⁷³ Sani, “Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo).”

Carrara for example, the small duchy sitting in the Alpi Apuane Mountains on the Ligurian coast just north of Tuscany, had no native-born representatives in the Council with only the Bergamasco patriot Agostino Salvioni having brief residency in the main city of Massa before going to fight in his home city in the Spring of 1797.⁴⁷⁴

The Valtellina was (and remains today) an almost entirely rural region at the beginning of the Italian alps in Lombardy. This wide valley had long been seen as an autonomous region within its own unique culture of peasant society mixed with the rugged individuality of the Italian Alps. Its borders extended past the physical area of the Valtellina and encompassed the territories of the Val Chiavenna to the east as well. Long the property of the *Grigioni* as the Grisons was called in Italian, the Valtellina had been seen as a haven for political refugees fleeing the harsh penalties for censorship in the four major states of Northern Italy sited above.

Its capital in Sondrio, not much more than a small town in the late eighteenth century, became a hub of radical press activity, particularly for revolutionary patriots coming from the western Terraferma of the Republic of Venice. Giordano Alborghetti, the radical Bergamasco patriot turned moderate supporter of Trouvé in the summer of 1798, began his political career by escaping to Sondrio from the censors in his native Bergamo where he set up a Jacobin supporting newspaper with his brother.⁴⁷⁵ Other important radical and progressive Italian patriots included the brothers Pelosi, Ignazio and Domenico, and their friends Giuseppe Quadrio and Giuseppe Piazza all from Sondrio (except for Quadrio who was from Bormio, but worked at the press in Sondrio) who participated in the large Italian patriotic enclave in that city in the 1790s.⁴⁷⁶ That said the Valtellina region was also home to some of the most originalist and moderate voices in the *Gran Consiglio* such as Fedele Vertemate-Franchi, nobleman of Chiavenna and one of the leading Gison aristocracy. Interestingly however, despite their more conservative outlook, many

⁴⁷⁴ "Nomina dei Membri del Corpo Legislativo", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 1:65 ; A series of letters between Salvioni and Michelangelo Lucchi make reference to Salvioni's stay in Massa in 1793-1794. As a priest its possible he was assigned to that parish. He was also a librarian who worked around central and north Italy at the preservation of literary material, so it is possible he was there for this reason. His nomination to the council mentions him being from Massa, however, it was more likely his temporary stay in the city allowed him to be nominated to the Council through the Alpi Apuane department of which Massa was the *capoluogo* « Angelo Mai » MMB 461: 15 « Lettere e minute di lettere di Lorenzo Mascheroni a vari », 1783-1799. s.d., f^{os} 66-69

⁴⁷⁵ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:2.

⁴⁷⁶ "Mozione, e dichiarazione d'alcuni Valtellinesi ai loro Compatrioti. De' 29. Maggio 1797", "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A., Studi, 40," fol. Sondrio Declaration of brotherhood and patriotism in favor of union with the Northern Italian states to their south which included the names of the Pelosi brothers and Piazza.

of those noblemen from the Valtellina were supportive of the separation from the Grison canton and unification with the states to the south. Of the 110 representatives for which geographical information exists 7 were born in the Valtellina and 8 resided there in 1797. There was no city with a particularly prominent majority within the Valtellina, though 3 of the 8 who resided in this territory were from Sondrio.

The final geographical group isn't really even a single group at all. A number of representatives came from territories which did not belong to any of the six states which contributed to the Cisalpine republic. However, more often than not these individuals were simply born and/or raised in these outside locations. Francesco Reina for example was born in the Swiss city of Lugano, in the Canton of Ticino, not far from the Milanese city of Como.⁴⁷⁷ He would move during his youth with his family to Malgrate, just across Lake Como from the city of Lecco, and would eventually settle in Milan. Francesco Antonio Alpruni was born in the Austrian alps of Tyrol in modern day Trentino.⁴⁷⁸ He would eventually settle in Pavia as a philosophy professor. Antonio Cagnoli was born the son of Venetian parents on the Greek isle of Zante but would eventually settle in Modena as a professor of mathematics and astronomy.⁴⁷⁹ Only Ottavio Morali would be outside of Italy at the onset of 1797, in the town of Isola in French Savoy, then part of the Kingdom of Sardegna.

Professional networks

Along with age and geographic origins one of the most important factors in understanding an individual representative political background is the professional network – or networks – to which they belonged. Unlike geographic origins (outside of residency) and age, professional networks demonstrate much more clearly the choices which future representatives made in their lives and the processes which allowed them to make these choices. Professional networks engaged within their own ranks differently based on the social, political and intellectual requirements which each network demanded of its members. Where lawyers might have the rhetorical and legal capacity to engage in large debates, men of science had the rational to systematically confront large polemics; clerics often had the local and philosophical knowledge to understand the needs of

⁴⁷⁷ Dettamanti, “Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal”; De Francesco, “Reina, Francesco.”

⁴⁷⁸ Rosa, “Alpruni, Francesco Antonio.”

⁴⁷⁹ Baldini, “Cagnoli, Antonio.”

the masses, as often was the case for those in the medical profession. That said each profession also had significant political and socio-economic differences which often caused developmental differences within the networks themselves. Most often associated with the educational and intellectual reform movements of the mid-to-late-eighteenth century these divisions were generally framed around the struggle for social mobility and aristocratic control. Though often not conscious these struggles would come to define the political developments in the years after the Revolution broke out in France and following the French invasion in 1796.

Of the 118 individuals who belonged to the participation index highlighted in Chapter II, only 84 had concrete information available about their professional biographies. By concrete information it is intended that either through primary source material (tax records, correspondences or nominations) or secondary records (biographies), the profession of the intended representative is explicitly stated with a given start date and duration in their given profession before, during and after the representative's nomination to the *Gran Consiglio* in 1797. Some individuals had multiple careers, or often blended university work and the practical elements of the profession. In these cases, the individual will be noted as having multiple professional titles within the prosopographical table in Appendix A. Any individual that did not meet the given criteria, even if fragmented information did exist, will not be included in the examination of professional networks due to lack of evidence. In the end the professional networks are broken down into seven categories: legal professionals, Catholic clergymen, men of science, doctors and medical professionals, military professionals, state administrators, and merchants and financial professionals.

Legal professionals

By far the most numerous and surely the most influential group in terms of development of the legislative and political culture of the *Gran Consiglio* were those who came from the legal professional network. The legal professions were not simply those terming themselves as lawyers but included similarly judges, notaries, and legal assistants. They included professors of law who were as invested in the politics of the university system as they were in educational pursuits. Many such lawyers were engaged in multiple professional networks. They came from all socio-economic classes and from all across the Italian peninsula. Legal professionals by the nature of their work, were pre-trained in the art of debate and rhetoric. For this reason, lawyers found themselves most

often put forward as advocates (quite literally) for the interests of various groups with whom they would align themselves either for personal, political or professional gain.

David bell claims that lawyers had distinguished themselves early on as a resistance group thanks in large part to the support for the Janseists in their disputes with French royal authority in the first decades of the eighteenth century.⁴⁸⁰ The French parlements had long been viewed as resisters to monarchical authority, and the legal profession which ran parallel to the parlements political culture were similarly inclined towards this view. Lawyers had been active pamphleteers and legal critics for as long as the press had existed and were not shy about their criticism of government function, though typically hidden in legalize of eighteenth-century legal briefs and rhetoric.⁴⁸¹ Their talents became noted by the aristocratic class who often lacked the rhetoric and experience to derive eloquent political arguments against their peers, and as such assumed legal aids to provide the sharp tongues necessary for public debates. In this way by the mid-eighteenth century the legal profession, and lawyers in particular, had come to hold a central role in the political discourses of the age. However, this newfound power for lawyers was not met lying down; critics – mainly aristocratic – began to attack the liberal use of the press which lawyers had access to in their attacks on political rivals, and their involvement in any form in state policy conversation.⁴⁸² In response lawyers came to be some of the strongest supporters of the concept of a free press, and often argued strongly against the use of censorship as a form of political attack.

The rise of the legal profession in France seemed to be mirrored in northern Italy. The late seventeenth century had seen a rise in enrollment to the technical colleges of jurisprudence throughout the major states of Northern Italy.⁴⁸³ However as the legal profession grew in political prestige over the course of the early decade of the eighteenth century, so too did aristocratic fears of a bourgeois takeover of the educational sector. Lawyers had the means and capacity to enact formal legal changes to leadership laws which would grant them power in the long run. Therefore, by mid-century Italian universities were beginning to limit the admission to legal education by instilling new regulations on class privileges which benefitted the nobility.⁴⁸⁴ However, in attempting to curb change, the aristocratic classes had in fact stoked it. Increases in censorship

⁴⁸⁰ Bell, *Lawyers and Citizens*, 70.

⁴⁸¹ Bell, 74.

⁴⁸² Bell, 88.

⁴⁸³ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 79.

⁴⁸⁴ Brambilla, 81.

after the death of Benedict, and attacks on the press in the Serenissima and Lombardy saw legal professionals coming to enter into secret societies like the Free Masons, or else in public salons in order to hone their political muscles.⁴⁸⁵

The second half of the eighteenth century saw a further increase in juridical education, and a transformation of the legal profession from one of political disrepute into one of the so-called “noble professions”.⁴⁸⁶ Local and provincial legal professionals began to flock to urban centers like Milan, Bologna, Venezia or Modena, where they could gain fame and fortune to rise to the level of a new-money aristocracy in their respective states as well as abroad. Barring this many entered into the realm of university education where titles of professor of jurisprudence often accompanied a hefty royal or ducal stipend. Francesco Reina, the son of impoverished minor nobility, would go on to make a career as a sought-after advocate, oft published pamphleteer and vibrant patriotic voice by the time of the French invasion in 1796.⁴⁸⁷ Giuseppe Gambari born to the Bolognese bourgeois, would grow to become the chair of jurisprudence at the University of Bologna and would be considered the greatest legal mind of the age by his peers in the *Gran Consiglio*.⁴⁸⁸ Giacomo Lamberti, son of one of the major noble families in the Duchy of Modena, would become the chair of canon law at the University of Modena Reggio before leaving to follow Bonaparte’s camp. Lauro Glissentti, a relatively unknown lawyer from the small town of Lonato on Lake Garda would become a major figure in the revolutionary struggle of Brescia against the Venetian authorities in that city in the lead-up to the uprising in 1797.⁴⁸⁹

As the enlightenment came to its proverbial climax near the middle of the eighteenth century, legal professionals who had begun to integrate themselves already into the intellectual world through their participation in university politics and secret societies or salons began to blend their experiences in these societies with their work in the courts.⁴⁹⁰ What came from this blending of enlightenment intellectual engagement and legal political rhetoric was a complex and extensive field of legal philosophy. From Milan to Venice to Bologna, lawyers were becoming increasingly

⁴⁸⁵ Rosa, *Cattolicesimo e Lumi nel Settecento Italiano*; Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*; Rosa, “Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758): The Ambivalent Enlightener,” 53–54.

⁴⁸⁶ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 451.

⁴⁸⁷ Dettamanti, “Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal”; De Francesco, “Reina, Francesco.”

⁴⁸⁸ Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche Sopra l’Università e l’istituto Delle Scienze Di Bologna*, 176.

⁴⁸⁹ Vedova 1831, p. 551

⁴⁹⁰ Bell, *Lawyers and Citizens*, 131.

more important in society. As the reforms of Joseph II and Ercole III began to take place in the duchies lawyers were utilized to help express the needs for which reforms were necessary and the means by which they would be accomplished. By the onset of the revolution simply having the title of *avvocato* often lent one a sense of privilege even if one was not necessarily practicing.⁴⁹¹

In the years leading up to the French invasion lawyers are often seen, alongside journalists, as the most visible political commentators on both sides of the dividing line. Some like Reina, were devotees of the ideas of national unity and often pushed this agenda both in the press and in the various patriotic societies popping up across the peninsula in the wake of the French Revolution.⁴⁹² Others became involved with the push for a free press, both from the left and the right, where political advocates would print free from the worry of state retaliation.⁴⁹³ With the invasion of the French, it became legal professionals like Reina, Lamberti, Perseguiti, Vicini and Brunetti who would become the closest non-military advisors to Bonaparte, who utilized their knowledge of the political and legal landscapes of Northern Italy to construct a series of provisional governments in 1796 and 1797.

In the *Gran Consiglio* those in the legal profession were by far and away the most influential, if for no other reason that the fact that they had both the rhetorical and legal skills to be able to debate the formation of legislation even if they perhaps lacked the experience for a given polemic. Of the 84 individuals for which professional information was available, 24 were listed as holding some title within the legal profession. Within this network 10 are listed directly as lawyers (*avvocati*), 5 as solicitors or legal assistants (*legali*)⁴⁹⁴, 4 as magistrates or court officers (*giurista, magistrature, giuridico*), 3 as notaries (*notori*), 2 as canons (*canonici*), and 2 exclusively as professors of jurisprudence or canon law (4 others were listed both as practicing lawyers and professors at various universities). Socio-economically 10 belonged to the nobility (four to the

⁴⁹¹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 35–36 Tackett rather humorously recounts how for the deputies of the National Constituency Assembly, many of those who styled themselves as lawyers in the third estate had simply bought the title and worked primarily as landed aristocrats with very little knowledge of the law or the philosophy of its formation.; the same is most likely true for the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*. Fedele Vertemate-Franchi was listed as a lawyer in his nomination, however his gross misunderstanding of basic legal and constitutional concepts, coupled with his large estate in Chiavenna where his family had served as the feudal lords for centuries states otherwise.

⁴⁹² “Lettera del cittadino Reina al generale Bonaparte” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:59–60.

⁴⁹³ Visconti, “Liberty of Press and Censorship in the First Cisalpine Republic,” 172–73.

⁴⁹⁴ Glissentti is listed as both a Lawyer and a solicitor Vedova, *Biografia Degli Scrittori Padovani*, 551.

high nobility who all served as court officials except for Lamberti of Modena who was a professor); 6 belonged to the bourgeois (4 lawyers, one notary, and a canon); the remaining 7 came from humble or unknown socio-economic origins (4 were lawyers, 2 were professors, and 1 was a notary). Politically the legal network was much more fractious than other professional networks: 12 were progressives (8 rationalist and 4 radical), 7 were neutral (4 rationalist, 2 radical and 1 moderate), and 5 were originalist (3 rationalist, 2 moderate). This was the only professional network to include originalist moderates. Finally, the legal professional network can be considered the most influential as it boasted the highest number of representatives in the leadership of the council (17) and similarly the most among the elite (12), of which 5 ranked among the most influential (Dehò, a doctor, was the only non-legal professional ranked among the top 5 at number 2).

Clergy

Along with lawyers and men of science, the most influential professional network in *Gran Consiglio* politics was the Catholic clergy. One does not generally associate the Catholic Church – the proverbial antithesis of the Revolution in many respects – with republican government. However, to the contrary, the republican movement in Northern Italy, and in particular within the Cisalpine Republic, was heavily influenced by members of the Catholic clergy. That said, this group was no more homogeneous than any other professional or geographic network. The Catholic clergy was generally divided in two forms: those who came from the parochial parishes of the small cities, towns and countryside of the Republic, and those who came from the intellectual and urban centers of the peninsula. The second division is between those who accepted the concept of the Republican catechism, and those who embraced the anti-clericalism and anticatholic-institutionalism of the Revolution in France.

Clerical participation in republican and revolutionary projects has its roots in the reform movements found in northern Italy from the early days of the eighteenth century. Much of this can be traced back to the Modenese priest Lodovico Anotnio Muratori, whose studies of history and philosophy helped to define the early Italian unification movement by highlighting the historical, cultural and linguistic similarities which were shared across the peninsula.⁴⁹⁵ Though a

⁴⁹⁵ Vismara, “Lodovico Antonio Muratori (1672-1750: Enlightenment in a Tridentine Mode,” 249–54.

devout Catholic pastor and supporter of the idea of enlightened absolutism among the princes of Europe, Muratori was also a strong supporter of reforming the civic side of the Church, in particular the ways in which it engaged with the worshipping public and its centrality in public welfare institutions like schools, hospitals and charities.⁴⁹⁶ Muratori was part of a movement termed historian Ulrich Lehrner as the “Catholic Enlightenment”.⁴⁹⁷ Though not a new concept – and generally not accepted within Italian historiography as a legitimate title for the phenomenon – Lehrner has revisited a term first coined in the mid-twentieth century to explain the reforms and opening of scientific exploration taking place, not just within the Catholic world, but often at the behest of its leaders.⁴⁹⁸

Besides Muratori a number of other advancements in this so called “Catholic Enlightenment” opened up catholic clerics to a new world of reformism and civic mindedness which had not existed since the Renaissance. First, the introduction of Newtonian science, married with Catholic theological and philosophical studies in the traditional research centers of the universities, seminaries and technical colleges, saw the rise of a movement called “physico-theology”.⁴⁹⁹ Clerical scholars now attempted to use the reason of enlightened science to redefine the Catholic principles which governed God’s world. Second, the counter-reformation had effectively ended by the mid-eighteenth century as calls for toleration following the disastrous religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century final came to an end.⁵⁰⁰ This does not mean that Catholic restrictions on “heretical” material ever ended (this continued in Italy right through to the mid-nineteenth century); however, the standard for heretical material was much less strict and was permissive of protestant philosophical and scientific material which saw the diffusion of Locke, Hobbes, Kant and Smith (among others) find their way into Italian catholic enlightened circles.

⁴⁹⁶ Vismara, 255–57.

⁴⁹⁷ Lehrner, *The Catholic Enlightenment. The Forgotten History of a Global Movement*.

⁴⁹⁸ Rosa, “The Catholic Aufklärung in Italy,” 215.; Rosa in his contribution to Lehrner’s volume – like many of his Italian colleagues – is hesitant to apply the English term “Enlightenment” to what occurred in among the Italian clerical scholars in the mid-to-late- eighteenth century, preferring instead the German “*Aufklärung*” or the Italian *rischiarimento* as he deems it to be a more neutral idea of a clarification of Catholic doctrine along new lines of reason and not a replacement by “enlightened” philosophy and science.

⁴⁹⁹ Lehrner, *The Catholic Enlightenment. The Forgotten History of a Global Movement*, 42.

⁵⁰⁰ Lehrner, 48.

Thirdly, in a response to growing criticism of the Jesuit stranglehold on Italian secondary and university education, the Jansenist movement – based on the ideas of early sixteenth century Dutch bishop Cornelius Jansen, which highlighted predestination and was a popular anti-monarchy religion in France in the mid-sixteenth century – became increasingly more popular in Northern Italian university faculties, in particular those in Pavia who sought to challenge their rivals at the Jesuit University at Brera in Milan.⁵⁰¹ Jansenism, by virtue of its acceptance into the halls of the more reform minded Sorbonne in Paris and its rivalry with the more conservative Jesuits, became the Catholic movement which embraced both the new reason based scientific movement, the ideology of political and religious reform and a new focus on the social reform of institutions proposed by Muratori. The dissolution of the Jesuits by Clement XIV in 1773, effectively made Jansenism the reigning theological philosophy in the major universities of Northern Italy until their own eventual suppression in the 1780s.⁵⁰² Finally the reformist nature of Benedict XIV's Papacy from 1740 to 1758 formally opened up the Church to new ideas of political philosophy and popular social reform which would see the Catholic Church taking a leadership role in the management of public welfare institutions in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁵⁰³ This critical period in Catholic history in Italy permitted the Catholic clergy on the peninsula, both in universities and at the ground level in local parishes, to begin engaging more actively in social reform. While theology was still the central goal of the Church, it began expanding the social responsibilities of the clergy and leave political and administrative management to the lay governments.

Thus, by the early 1790s, these changes in Catholic perceptions of both its place in the intellectual world and its role within society as a social healer had seen greater engagement of Catholic clergymen within the political and social reformism of the peninsula. That said, the period after Benedict the institutional church reverse course and effectively close off the intellectual openness which had permitted these new ideas to infiltrate Catholic philosophy in the mid-eighteenth century.⁵⁰⁴ What allowed the survival of this mindset, particularly within the university systems of Milan and Modena, were the reforms of Joseph II discussed above in the section on

⁵⁰¹ Burson, "The Catholic Enlightenment in France from the Fin de Siècle Crisis of Conscious to the Revolution, 1650-1789," 68–70; Lehrner, *The Catholic Enlightenment. The Forgotten History of a Global Movement*, 52; Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 341–42.

⁵⁰² Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 333,342.

⁵⁰³ Rosa, "Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758): The Ambivalent Enlightener," 45–49.

⁵⁰⁴ Rosa, "The Catholic Aufklärung in Italy," 229–30.

geographic networks. As Jansenists began to turn towards social reform as their primary philosophical and theological goal, they permitted Joseph – by no means an enlightened ruler – and his *Accademia dei pugni* (which itself contained a number of clerics) to formally subject the Church to the State in the 1780s.⁵⁰⁵ As such territories like Modena and Milan were much more protected from the anti-intellectual backlash of the post-Benedictine Catholic church in the second half of the eighteenth century. This resulted in a much more reform minded and intellectually aware Catholic clergy in these territories.

When the Revolution broke out in 1789, and the persecution of Catholic clergy became more prevalent in France throughout the early 1790s, though they condemned the violence of the Jacobin Republic, many of Catholic clergymen in Italy like Felice Latuada, Luigi Savonarola and Giuseppe Compagnoni saw the advantages a republican government could provide in advancing the social and political reforms needed, and more importantly viewed the central role which the Church could play in the advancement of this new republican social revolution.⁵⁰⁶ However there was disagreement between these catholic republican patriots as to the extent to which Italian society was to be changed and the new role the church would play in civic government. Some like Francesco Alpruni hoped that the church would retain its preeminence in society by retaining its official hold on social institutions.⁵⁰⁷ Others like Antonio Tadini instantly rejected their clerical status and embraced laity and the democratic lifestyle almost as a new religion.⁵⁰⁸ The final group of clerics, led principally by Latuada, believed that the church itself needed to be reformed and democratized. The new Catholic Church would be subjected totally to the rule of the nation and the constitution, but retain its status as the state religion and its charge of social institutions like hospitals, schools and universities.⁵⁰⁹ This ideology, known as the republican catechism was developed and championed by piedmontese former priest Giovanni Anotnio Ranza.⁵¹⁰ Ranza's philosophy became popular among republican circles who recognized that any attempt to eradicate the Church in Italy would be met with hostility by the populace, already on edge thanks to

⁵⁰⁵ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 114–15.

⁵⁰⁶ Savini 1988, p. 253 ; Lazzarini 1990, p. 15-16 ; « Dopo la risposta alla domanda “cosa è la morale” del mio catechismo morale e politico li feci la sequenti spiegazione... » ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 40 s.d., f° Varese letter, Milan, 1795; letter attributed to Felice Latuada describing his beliefs on the role which the Catholic church and Catholic morality will play in the new republican government were it to come to the Italian peninsula.

⁵⁰⁷ “Alpruni A Como, 19. Marzo 1792”, “BnF-Richelieu, ITALIENS 1545,” fols. 224–225.

⁵⁰⁸ Giannini, “Tadini Antonio.”

⁵⁰⁹ “Dopo la risposta alla domanda...”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Varese.

⁵¹⁰ Ranza, “Discorso in cui si prova la sovranità civile e religiosa del popolo.”

prompting from the counter-revolutionary wings of the Church. Within the council the concept of republican catechism was heavily pushed by Latuada and other parish priests whose primary function before becoming representatives was interaction with the public and not university or administrative work.

Of the 84 representatives for which professional biographical data available, 16 were listed as members of the Catholic clergy. That said, only 4 of these were purely ecclesiastics, the other 12 belonging to other professional networks, generally the legal profession or men of science. Nine are listed as parish priests, 3 belonged to monastic orders (of which 2 served as the abbots of these orders), 3 are listed simply as ecclesiastics, and 1 as a canon. In a similar fashion, 9 are listed as belonging to the minor or major aristocratic families; 5 belonged to the bourgeois and only one is listed as having humble or unknown socio-economic origins. Finally, looking specifically at the percentage that came from the reform minded duchies of the *ancien regime*, only 4 were born (all in the Duchy of Milan); however, by 1797, exactly half of the total clerical representatives (8) came from the Duchy of Milan.

Men of Science

After Lawyers and Catholic clergymen, the most influential professional network was the “Men of Science”. This group was an all-encompassing term to refer to those in the late eighteenth century who participated and embraced the scientific revolution of the Italian enlightenment. The term refers to professors and school instructors, engineers and pharmacists, mathematicians and “hard” scientists. Geographically they tended to have no single origin by birth, coming from all across the peninsula; however, by 1797 these men had gathered around the campuses of the four main universities of Northern Italy: Pavia, Bologna, Padua, and Modena-Reggio. Not all – in fact it could be argued that most – were not exclusively professional scientists, engineers or mathematicians, but took on scientific exploration as a hobby. Unlike other professional networks, for brevities sake this section will focus primarily on two aspects: the university and scholastic networks, and the three sectors of the sciences to which most representatives belonged – hard sciences, mathematics and engineering.

University and Scholastic Education networks

Before the French invasion in 1796, education had been a prerogative of the Catholic church. The exceptions lied in the creation of trade colleges formed by the guilds who controlled the noble professions of Northern Italy from the Middle ages.⁵¹¹ These professional colleges, though often connected to the larger theological universities like Pavia or Bologna, were secular and independent of Church intervention – though they were still subject to the Church censors. The benefit of these professional colleges being secularized is that they encouraged the exploration of scientific endeavors (even if they were set within the parameters acceptable to Church doctrine), in particular in the colleges devoted to medical and engineering/architectural sciences. When Benedict XIV sought to enact reforms within the education sector in the mid-century, one of his aims was to break these guild monopolies by integrating (or at the very least permitting) a higher degree of scientific pursuit within the ancient catholic university systems.⁵¹² The 1760s saw and increase in transfer of power from local patricians to the university administrative center, in doing so unlocking the study of the natural sciences to a much larger population outside of the urban guild elite.⁵¹³ The Hapsburg monarchs sought a policy of enticing foreign born Italians to Pavia and Modena for the purposes of increasing the international credibility of these universities, and initiating educational and research networks with other Italian states (in particular the Papal States and the Republic of Venice). The suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 opened up new positions within the ancient Catholic Universities across the peninsula and saw lower aristocrats and bourgeois scientists taking high-chairs in the faculties not just of the sciences, but in the humanities as well.⁵¹⁴

The situation was similar for the scholastic systems of the Northern Italian states as well. The end of the eighteenth century saw an increase in state control over formerly private and religious secondary school institutions.⁵¹⁵ While many of these institutions remained connected to the Church, in particular the seminaries, state regulations on educational models and curriculums became increasingly present. Many future representatives in the *Gran Consiglio* would begin their

⁵¹¹ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 320.

⁵¹² Rosa, "Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758): The Ambivalent Enlightener."

⁵¹³ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 329.

⁵¹⁴ Pruneri and Bianchi, "School Reforms and University Transformations and Their Function in Italy from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," 124.

⁵¹⁵ Pruneri and Bianchi, 126.

education in seminaries like that of Bergamo or Brera, and many of those such as Giovanni Antonio Tadini and Lorenzo Mascheroni would go on to serve as professors at these schools.⁵¹⁶ State officials would begin, in the later decades of the eighteenth century, to persuade students interested in a clerical career to seek the theological schools at the universities for their training and leave the seminaries to train lay students, with a focus on courses in history, philosophy, arithmetic and the aspects of the new natural sciences such as astronomy and physics.⁵¹⁷ As theology was left to the universities, these private and catholic secondary schools and seminaries began to attract low-born or minor noble scientists who previously found their access to the university systems restricted by ancient privileges and political corruption.⁵¹⁸ As a consequence, while aristocratic men of science enjoyed their new found freedom to enter into the administration of professional colleges away from the stranglehold of the guilds and the Jesuits, the bourgeois and lower nobility found success in the secondary school systems. Due to the more open and inclusive trends in secondary school education, many of these men became abruptly and shockingly confronted by the plight of the urban poor in cities like Ferrara, Bergamo, Brescia, Bologna, Modena and Milan.

Though Italy had around 26 major universities across the peninsula by the late eighteenth century, the four most prominent for what would become the future Cisalpine Republic were the universities at Pavia, Bologna, Modena, and Padua.⁵¹⁹ A fifth, the “royal” university at Brera would similarly find itself playing a role in the cultural and political reforms of the late eighteenth century university system, however with regards to the future representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* it was not an integral part of the development of legislative culture.⁵²⁰ With regards to the education of individual representatives, there is only unfortunately information on 52 of the 118 individuals examined in the study. This is often because many individuals, in particular those from the upper aristocracy were privately educated and would not be registered in a university system. Similarly, many on the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum had little education past secondary school as they were often not permitted to enter based on socio-economic privilege and university

⁵¹⁶ Pepe, “Mascheroni, Lorenzo”; Giannini, “Tadini Antonio.”

⁵¹⁷ Pruneri and Bianchi, “School Reforms and University Transformations and Their Function in Italy from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” 125.

⁵¹⁸ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*.

⁵¹⁹ Pruneri and Bianchi, “School Reforms and University Transformations and Their Function in Italy from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” 129.

⁵²⁰ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 347–48.

corruption. Of the 52 for whom information is available, 27 individuals had a university education; of these 10 attended Pavia, 6 attended Bologna, 6 attended Modena and 5 attended Padua. Outside of the University system 3 attended military academies in Milan, Modena and the Republic of Venice; 2 attended the elite academies of science and the religious seminary at Brera; 6 attended independent professional colleges in Ravenna, Rimini, Reggio, Milan and Padua; 3 attended exclusively religious institutions such as the Barnabite school in Genoa or the Pontific Academy in Rome. Finally, only 4 of the 52 received no more than a secondary school education. The remaining 7 received private aristocratic educations. Thus, while information is only available for less than half of the prosopographical study and only 22% of the total nominated, it can be assumed that based off these numbers most representatives were educated to at least a secondary school level if not higher.

Mathematicians, Engineers, and “Hard” Scientists

Beyond the bond of educational backgrounds which brought many of these individuals together in their formative years, the professional pursuit of scientific, mathematic and engineering innovation in the final decades of the eighteenth century created a professional network of men of science. This network was primarily based around the university faculties and saw the constant exchange of ideas and publications, not only regarding scientific study but also of political and revolutionary material as well.

Mathematics, for its part was not a new science in a way. However, it became one of the central nodes of study for scientific, political, social, statistical, architectural, engineering and economic reforms in the latter half of the eighteenth century, as states sought to use their new intellectual prowess to build, reformat and innovate their respective societies. Mathematics was a central part of the eighteenth-century enlightened idea of empiricism which encouraged the use of hard facts in logic in place of speculation.⁵²¹ Within the *Gran Consiglio* there were three mathematicians, Giovanni Antonio Tadini, Lorenzo Mascheroni and Giovanni Battista Guglielmini. Tadini and Mascheroni were close lifelong friends, who both shared careers at the Seminary of Bergamo and then the College of the Mariano, the engineering college in Bergamo,

⁵²¹ Brambilla, 366.

before Mascheroni was made the head of Mathematics at Pavia in 1786.⁵²² Mascheroni was in fact perhaps the most famous of the Italian mathematicians of his time. Records of his correspondence from 1790 to 1798 demonstrate that in the lead-up to the Cisalpine Republic and his nomination as representative of the *Gran Consiglio*, he was well connected with some of the most important scientific, philosophical and political minds of the age including Alessandro Volta, in addition to a number of future representatives already known in that time for their scientific exploits such as Antonio Cagnoli and Gregorio Fontana.⁵²³ Mascheroni's talents were so renowned he was even invited to Paris in July of 1798 to help with the creation of the new revolutionary weights and measures system which would eventually become the modern metric system.⁵²⁴

Like mathematics, the science of engineering had ancient roots, but had seen a resurgence and massive technical innovations thanks in large part to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This innovation in engineering was felt most strongly in civil works and infrastructural reforms as well as military ingenuity, all of which saw sharp increases in the mid-to-late-eighteenth century.⁵²⁵ Unfortunately, many of the technical schools who trained engineers were controlled by tight guild supervision and selection, and the Jesuits who ran the universities looked down upon engineering as a lesser study than either theology or philosophy. Engineers, therefore, more often came from low-born engineering corps soldiers who used scientific and physics skills learned while employed in the military to rise to prominence in civilian society. A sudden influx of new money bourgeois coming from the engineering corps in the mid-century sparked aristocratic led education sectors to suddenly change tact. The dissolution of the Jesuits and the relaxing of censorship on the physical sciences allowed engineering programs to be integrated into the university systems, and therefore placing its lucrative career prospects back into the hands of the aristocracy.⁵²⁶

⁵²² Pepe 2008 ; Giannini 2019 ; "25 dicembre, 1786, Bergamo. Tadini G. Antonio a Mascheroni Lorenz" « Angelo Mai » MMB 665 Letter discussing work which Mascheroni needs to wrap up before leaving from Pavia

⁵²³ « 20 maggio 1784, Pavia. Alessandro Volta a Lorenzo Mascheroni », « 12 ottobre 1786, Pavia. Gregorio Fontana a Lorenzo Mascheroni » « Angelo Mai » MMB 665, f^{os} 58-59, 135-137 ; "29 novembre 1788, Verona, Antonio Cagnoli a Mascheroni ", « Angelo Mai » MMB 666, f^{os} 619-622

⁵²⁴ "Milano 6 Prairial Anno VI repubblicano, Il Direttorio Esecutivo della Repubblica Cisalpina a Cittadino Mascheroni" "'Angelo Mai' MMB 662: 62 'Lettere Ufficiali', 1786-1800.," 75-78 Letter nominating Mascheroni the Cisalpine representative to the weights and measures committee in Paris.

⁵²⁵ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 388.

⁵²⁶ Rosa, *Cattolicesimo e Lumi nel Settecento Italiano*; Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 388-89; Pruneri and Bianchi, "School Reforms and University Transformations and Their Function in Italy from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries," 129.

The trends for engineering professionals seen in northern Italy in the late eighteenth century seem to have been reflected in their representation within the *Gran Consiglio*. Of the 84 individuals for which professional biographical information was obtained, four were listed as engineers or mechanics. Of these four, two – Angelo Sacarebelli and Leopardo Cicognara – both came from the aristocratic class (Cicognara was a mechanic not an engineer).⁵²⁷ Scarabelli enjoyed an illustrious career in engineering, serving as a part of the engineering corps in Modena during the Wars of Francesco III, and then going on to join the faculty of Modena-Reggio as a chair in engineering.⁵²⁸ He became renowned almost as much for his design and engineering abilities under the civic reforms of Ercole III as for his military abilities under Francesco and later as a member of the Cisalpine military. From the lower classes, Antonio Sabatti, a bourgeois from Brescia, and Luigi Gianni, a Milanese of unknown or humble social status, were both well-known engineers.⁵²⁹ Though little is known about Gianni before the *Gran Consiglio* he is often denominated as “Gianni the engineer” to differentiate from Francesco Gianni, the famous Roman poet, *Gran Consiglio* representative and friend to Ugo Foscolo. Sabatti, for his part, was extraordinarily important in the Brescian scientific community, serving both as the tutor to his later colleague in the Council Luigi Mazzuchelli, and as the lead surveyor for the Venetian state in the Western Terraferma from 1786.⁵³⁰

The enlightenment had made the study of natural sciences a fashionable pastime in the mid-eighteenth century.⁵³¹ However despite reforms, universities and educational professional continues to be more preoccupied with the the fields of philosophy, theology and law rather than the work of natural scientists, whose early experiments were seen more as eccentric hobbies than true academic work.⁵³² The formation of scientific societies along the lines of those found in the French salons, or within the lodges of the Free Masons meant that scientific discourse often found itself mixing with that of political philosophy and legal debate.⁵³³ Science, therefore, quickly

⁵²⁷ Ceretti, “Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo,” 10–11; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:38.

⁵²⁸ Ceretti, “Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo,” 11–18.

⁵²⁹ Ogner, “Sabatti Antonio.”

⁵³⁰ Ogner.

⁵³¹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 81; Rosa, “Pope Benedict XIV (1740-1758): The Ambivalent Enlightener,” 43.

⁵³² Tongiorgi, “LE Arti e Le Scienze ‘Dopo La Rivoluzione’. Note Sulle Orazioni Inaugurali Nll’Università Di Pavia (1800-1809),” 393.

⁵³³ The Masonic lodge of Padova for example, established by future cisalpine representative Luigi Savonarola, became a place in which men of science who were barred from discussing political issues at their chairs in the University could come together to discuss the political issues of the day. As the meetings in the Masonic lodges

became a means by which political dissenters would meet to discuss taboo subjects – or after 1789 the events occurring in Revolutionary France. Science also became the medium through which these political dissenters from old world traditions could make interstate contact without suspicion of conspiracy. Vincenzo Dandolo travelled to Paris and Milan to discuss his work on chemistry; through his contacts with the roving revolutionary cleric Giuseppe Compagnoni, Dandolo was able to use these scientific tours to meet with members of the *Accademia dei pugni*, or important revolutions like Condorcet in the early years of the French revolution, profoundly shaping his political views.⁵³⁴

Much like in the medical and legal settings, as aristocratic powers began to feel their control slipping over education and intellectual research, it became apparent that the natural sciences need to be integrated into the university systems. The professional schools, such as those of engineering and medicine were quickly added as chairs across Italian universities.⁵³⁵ Positions began to open within these universities for aristocrats who had been relying on the secret or scientific societies to conduct scientific experiments or discuss scientific pursuits. This led – contrary to the original intent of the old aristocratic elite controlling the universities – to a general move towards revolutionary politics after 1790, as members like Antonio Campana, Giambattista Venturi and Antonio Cagnoli accepted positions in universities and advocated for political and social reforms.⁵³⁶ Though not as radical as their colleagues who remained in the scientific societies, they did encourage movements towards revolutionary reforms which hitherto had not been seen. Their students and the students of those from the legal and philosophical professions who had already begun to radicalize, led many of the student institutional rebellions throughout the early 1790s. When the French finally arrived in 1796 some of the first to greet them came from the Universities of Modena-Reggio and Pavia, where this revolutionary openness had been the strongest of the four major universities by virtue of their states more lax attitudes towards scientific reformism.

were secret, scientific discussion would serve as a front for these subversive political discussions. Many a time these discussions were leaked leading to reprisals by the Venetian inquisitor and the eventual dismantling of the lodges. Lazzarini 1990, p. 15-25

⁵³⁴ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 45–51.

⁵³⁵ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 347–48.

⁵³⁶ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:76; Baldini, “Cagnoli, Antonio”; Sermonti Spada, “Campana, Anotnio.”

Of the 84 individuals examined in this section, 10 were noted as being natural scientists. This does not mean that others did not engage in scientific study, however these ten in particular were renowned for their success in scientific endeavors. Of these 10 individuals, 6 (Vismara, Venturi, Rosa, Campana, Conti and Cagnoli) were noted as being professors or full-time scientists. The other four individuals (Dandolo, Mangili, Marieni and Valeriani) all had other main careers though successfully published and were recognized for their scientific abilities. In contrast to other professions, only 3 of these individuals came from the noble class. The majority came from the bourgeois (5), most likely a consequence of university exclusions which forced these individuals to engage in secret and scientific societies. Only 2 are of unknown or humble origins.

Doctors and Medical Professionals

Medical professionals in Revolutionary government had been present since the National Convention in France had first arisen in 1789.⁵³⁷ They represented the highest educated strata of society and generally came from the wealthier segments of the middle classes. Medicine in the medieval era was often viewed as peasant magic; however, with the scientific revolution and the marrying of medicine with scientific education, the question of privileged education clashed with traditional social roles for healers.⁵³⁸ What developed from this polemic was the formation of medical colleges where education was divided according to the class of the intended patient (and in doing so dictated the class of the doctor treating them). Added to this was the difference between the practicing and research medical professional. The nobility who had always found themselves atop the hierarchy of university education, saw the threat which lowborn doctors educated at elite institutions posed to this institutional control. Medical research became an important field, particular in Bologna where institutional control often translated to political control given the centrality of the University in Bolognese political and social life.⁵³⁹ While the lowborn medical practitioners were forced to stifle epidemics and attempt to cure the hunger and suffering of the Italian urban poor, noble “men of letters” could take control over the education system guaranteeing that while the lower class doctors would receive an education, its value was

⁵³⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 37.

⁵³⁸ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 157.

⁵³⁹ Brambilla, 162–68.

dictated by ones connections to the ruling elite (as well as the Catholic church) and not ones merit.⁵⁴⁰

The coming of the French revolution to the Italian peninsula in 1796 brought with it, among many other things, a hope among lower-class medical professionals of an opening of medical education to all classes.⁵⁴¹ Many from this stratum of society saw themselves mingling with the patriot classes of Milan, Bologna, Modena and Brescia sharing a desire to revolutionize their own networks. Interestingly, those at the top of this professional hierarchy similarly found themselves frequenting the patriotic societies. The push for empirically led medical science saw many top researchers becoming well integrated into the enlightenment community of Europe in the later eighteenth century, where they adopted French and Italian revolutionary politics.⁵⁴² Despite aristocratic attempts to segregate the practical and theoretical elements of medicine, both groups came together to reject the social and political structures which regulated their profession – and in reality their society as a whole – in an effort to bring about a greater meritocracy.

However, these groups continued to remain divided along former lines between those favorable to extensive social change and stricter political and civil revolution. Pietro Dehò presents a good example for the former. Though little is known about his early life, it is clear Dehò was born the son of a local town administrator in Chignolo near the city of Pavia.⁵⁴³ He enrolled in university at the medical college of Pavia in 1792 at the age of 17 and upon completion of his course – just before the entrance of the French in 1796 – he worked as a town doctor in his native Chignolo. It seems that his time working as a medical professional before being called to serve as a representative saw Dehò become a staunch advocate for medical reforms for the poor. Dehò had been educated in a Pavian medical college which had seen great social upheaval against the segregated practicing of medicine, and saw a number of violent uprisings amongst students of that faculty between 1790-1796 against the enlightened aristocracy.⁵⁴⁴ Dehò would go on to be one of

⁵⁴⁰ Brambilla, 154–55.

⁵⁴¹ Cosmacini, “Teoria e Pratica Della Medicina,” 316.

⁵⁴² Cosmacini, 318–19.

⁵⁴³ Most of this information comes from an appendix written by Dehò’s colleague and friend Rasoni in his description of the plague which hit Genoa in 1800 during the siege of the city by the Austrians in that year. During this event Dehò worked alongside Rasori and his friend Mazzoni (the father of the future celebrated writer Alessandro) to care for the poor and the soldiers held up in that Genoa. Dehò would eventually die from this disease when he returned to his old position as town physician in Chignolo in late 1800 just before Marengo Rasori 1801, p. 171

⁵⁴⁴ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 267.

the leading voices for social change during the *Gran Consiglio* and would be *the* leader of the progressive and radical proto-factions, especially after the coup of 24 Germinal when he would serve as president of the council.⁵⁴⁵

Of the 85 representatives for whom data is available relating to profession, only six were medical professionals. Three of the six (Dehò, Mochetti and Stefani) were practicing physicians before being nominated to the *Gran Consiglio*⁵⁴⁶; the other three (Rosa, Conti and Campana) all worked as medical researchers at the University of Bologna.⁵⁴⁷ Dehò and Mochetti were both staunch advocates for reforms and the implementation of a public health system in the cities. They were similarly both the youngest doctors of the six and both graduated from Pavia. By contrast Rosa, Conti and Campana all belonged to the neutral rationalist faction at the exact center of the *Gran Consiglio* political spectrum and were all consequentially closer to the men of science described above by virtue of their university affiliations.

Military

Though one of the larger professional networks numerically, representatives with military backgrounds are much harder to define as a singular unit. While there were a number of professional soldiers among the group, there also existed a large corps of citizen soldiers who had entered into the profession only after the French invasion. Moreover, much like lawyers and administrators, representatives came from differing military backgrounds based on the *ancien regime* state for which they served. Experience in combat and command differed between those who served in Austrian military units in the later eighteenth century (such as Giuseppe La Hoz⁵⁴⁸) than those who had served in the less bellicose Papal Army (such as Alessandro Guiccioli⁵⁴⁹).

Much like other functionaries of the state, privilege and family history weighed heavily in the *ancien regime* Italian military structure, which saw aristocrats and nobility enjoying long

⁵⁴⁵ Dehò also took the Presidency after the Coup of 29 Vendemnaire Year VII (Second Coup of Brune) where radicals took back power from the moderate allies of Trouvé (See Chapter IX). “Seduta del Giorno 29 Vendemnaire”, “Il Redattore Del Gran Consiglio,” 841; “Seduta CLXVIII, 16 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:487 Election of Dehò as president of the council.

⁵⁴⁶ Rasori, *Storia della febbre eplidica di Genova*; Roda, « Mochetti, Francesco ».

⁵⁴⁷ Sermonetti Spada, “Campana, Anotnio”; Gasnault, *La Cattedra, l’altare, La Nazione : Carriere Universitarie Nell’Ateneo Di Bologna, 1803-1859*, 6; Antoni, “Elenco Del Fondo Michele e Michelangelo Rosa Nella Biblioteca Civica Gambalunga.”

⁵⁴⁸ Rossi, “Lattanzi, Giuseppe.”

⁵⁴⁹ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:64.

military careers – obviously with those higher on the social hierarchy similarly enjoying an evasion of combat (Alberto Allemagna⁵⁵⁰ serves as a prime example). Still even this varied upon the state. Both Angelo Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca and Giulio Cesare Tassoni (related to the ruling Este family of Modena on his mother’s side) were both members of the high nobility of the Duchy of Modena, but both similarly became renowned as successful combatants and commanders during Modena’s many *ancien regime* wars under Francesco III.⁵⁵¹ Military academies in smaller cities like Mantua, Modena or Verona became the educational centers for many future *Gran Consiglio* representatives including La Hoz and Polfranceschi.⁵⁵²

With the onset of the revolution, the exclusivity of aristocratic military institutions changed overnight. Suddenly, patriotic fervor and the revolutionary charisma were all that was required to enlist within the new military structures appearing across Northern Italy. For example not much is known about Giovanni Lupi before he appears in a description of the actions of the unit of Bergamasco soldiers for which he served as the commander, during the Brescian uprising in the spring of 1797.⁵⁵³ That said, by virtue of their past education and past combat experience the highest leadership came to be claimed (in a fashion similar to that of George Washington for the American Continental army) by mid-ranking generals from the Austrian, Modenese and Venetian military structures. Giuseppe La Hoz left his position in the Austrian military and crossed lines to lead first the Lombard Legion of the French *Armée d’Italie*, then the head of the Milanese volunteer rebel army which aided the French as a separate unit in 1797 and then ultimately serve as General-in-Chief of all Cisalpine forces from the summer of 1797 onward.⁵⁵⁴ Under his command served many future influential *Gran Consiglio* representatives including Scarabelli, Tassoni, Bartolomeo Cavedoni, Filippo Severoli, Alessandro Isimbardi and Ettore Martinengo.

⁵⁵⁰ Ugo Da Como, 3:2.

⁵⁵¹ Ceretti, “Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo”; “Tassoni, Giulio Cesare.”

⁵⁵² Badone, “Polfranceschi, Pietro Domenico”; “Altezza Reale” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261;” This document is a witness statement written by La Hoz’s father, himself a military commander who had served in Germany throughout the wars of the Hapsburg empire in the mid-eighteenth century, which details the last wishes of a certain Don Carlo whom the Senior La Hoz had come to befriend. The will essentially states that Don Carlo left a significant sum to the La Hoz Family for Giuseppe’s education in a military academy.

⁵⁵³ “Brescia addì 29 Vesntoso (19 Marzo 1797. V.S.)”, *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca*, 15 Description of the surrendering of Venetian cavalry troops to the Bergamasco division of rebel soldiers in Brescia.

⁵⁵⁴ Il Direttorio Esecutivo al Generale La Hoz, Li 15 Messidoro anno V”, “Milano li 2 Termidoro anno V. Rep.° Il cittadino Birago Ministro della Guerra al Direttorio Esecutivo.”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261.”

Those from the old aristocratic military background tended to view the Cisalpine Constitution of Messidor Year V, and subsequent laws which structured the republic from Messidor Year V to Frimaire Year VI, as orders or directives coming from the French military command and Bonaparte in particular. Their older military discipline and loyalty saw these men (Scarabelli and Martinengo are perhaps the clearest examples) being significantly more faithful to a strict application of the Year V constitution and thus holders of more originalist views. For the newer revolutionary patriot soldiers, the Republic was founded to upend old rules and traditions, and they tended to view the texts which regulated the new order as fluid and ever growing, aligning them more on the progressive end of the *Gran Consiglio*. Add to this the general passion for revolution, and these new military men reflected a hot-headedness and radicality in debates. Polfranceschi pulled a sword on Compagnoni when he disagreed with a premise.⁵⁵⁵ Cavedoni, Lupi and Salimbeni all found themselves often being staunch opponents of procedure in favor of action. La Hoz presented the more complicated case as many of his interventions in debates seemed to be constant conflict between the imposition of public discipline and social revolution. Of the old order military professions he alone was perhaps the most passionate revolutionary, whose loyalty to Bonaparte was surpassed by revolutionary fervor; when in the summer of 1798 he found his nation “betrayed” by a French Directory and foreign service officer who wanted to impose greater French control over the progressive Cisalpine legislative branch, this revolutionary fervor completely replaced his military loyalty to the French – a sentiment which would prove fatal a year later following his attempted uprising against the French in 1799.⁵⁵⁶

Of the 84 representatives for which information is available regarding their professional history, 15 register having had some sort of military experience. Of those 15 men, 13 came from families of major or minor nobility from the Duchies of Milan or Modena, The Republic of Venice or the Papal States. Only Cavedoni came from a modest family near Modena – Lupi’s family history is unknown though he is not registered as part of the Bergamasco nobility in any records.⁵⁵⁷ That said only eight of these had true professional military experience and education before the revolution (in reality only six as Salimbeni and Polfranceschi, though educated in military academies only really had a combat career after 1796). Nine of the 15 were members of the *Gran*

⁵⁵⁵ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 283.

⁵⁵⁶ Rossi, “Lattanzi, Giuseppe”; “AN, AF F/7/6194/B, Pla. 3, Dossier 2653,” fols. 315, 318.

⁵⁵⁷ Rastelli, “Cavedoni, Bartolomeo.”

Consiglio leadership and were split evenly between radical progressives (5) and original rationalists (4); of these three were in the elite (Scarabelli, Cavedoni and Salimbeni).

Public work and Administration

Reforms in civics during the second half of the eighteenth century across the Northern Italian states saw an increase in merit-based administrative leadership, as governments began to understand the increased need for competent public employees, regardless of class, instead of the relatively limited options of the nobility.⁵⁵⁸ What developed therefore was a mixed back of class and merit-based administration and public leadership whose level of competence or privilege was defined by the role, the importance of that role in reform projects and historical tradition.

Those administrative and public work positions which tended to go see appointments based on privilege tended to be grounded in either the historical tradition of a position (such as city Senates like those of Bologna, Modena, Brescia or Milan) or a perceived lack of importance (such as municipal positions in small towns). Positions based on privilege was the norm across the board.⁵⁵⁹ Merit based assignment only tended to be utilized when the privilege-based employee was proven unfit, and even in these cases the merit-based appointment worked in conjunction with (if not outright underneath) the privilege-based appointee. Giuseppe Necchi d'Aquila for example came from a family which had worked for the census in Pavia, a role which he took over from his father – and then quit for intellectual pursuits.⁵⁶⁰ When these intellectual pursuits failed (he attempted to be a playwright at the new Scala theatre in Milan, as well as a journalist for *Il Caffé*), he was able to obtain a post in less prestigious and backwater town of Lodi, thanks in large part to his family history of municipal leadership – considered in itself a qualification.⁵⁶¹

However, while incompetent or uneducated nobles could be trusted to make general decisions in the leadership positions like the city senates – where their poor judgement could be ignored by more competent bureaucrats – the execution of the large reform projects found in states like Milan or Modena required more skilled individuals. Thus, by the final decades of the eighteenth century, the proper bureaucratic credentials came to include education, experience and

⁵⁵⁸ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 85–86.

⁵⁵⁹ Zaghi, *L'Italia Giacobino*, 18–19.

⁵⁶⁰ Gennaro Barbarisi, *Cronaca Milanese in Un Epistolario de Settecento: Le Lettere Di Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila a Giovan Battista Corniani (1799-1782)*, V.

⁵⁶¹ Gennaro Barbarisi, XIII.

competency in addition to pedigree.⁵⁶² While thousands of highly skilled individuals were still excluded from entering the public work force to their lack of title and status, traditionally held positions in key offices could find themselves replaced with a different noble family (or even those from the new money bourgeois classes) if the current administrator and his heir (if they existed) were found unfit. As a result, noble families who had previously shunned education or kept it private, began to send their sons and heirs into the new technical colleges and universities where they would learn the necessary skills to retain their traditional positions.⁵⁶³ In addition to creating a (more) competent civil administration, it also saw many young people entering civil administration with a reformist mindset gained from their time in the university system. Though these were not necessarily willing to open up civic administration to revolutionary changes like those found in France, these reformist nobles and administrators were often strong advocates for social and political change which would liberate them from the constraints of *ancien regime* privilege and corruption to execute large and much needed public works projects.⁵⁶⁴

Of the 84 individuals studied in this category of the prosopography, 20 held public positions in *ancien regime* civic leadership or administration. Seven of these twenty served in executive positions in local government such as the podesta, chancellor or provost of the local government. Two served as senators for the city of Bologna. There were 12 individuals listed as serving in various offices within the municipal governments of their various states, either as librarians, archivists, tax officials, water officials or land surveyors; of those twelve, two were also executives at one point in their career. With regards to class breakdown an overwhelming majority of 14 individuals belonged to the nobility, while 3 came from the bourgeois (none from the Duchy of Milan), and 3 were of humble or unknown status. That said, politically, administrators and public workers were much more heterogeneous with respect to other professions. The majority were progressives (10) though of these only 2 were radical. Of the other 10 representatives 7 were neutral of which the majority were the less politically active neutral rationalists (5) and the other

⁵⁶² Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 103.

⁵⁶³ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 50.

⁵⁶⁴ "Aux fonctionnaires Publics de Milan", "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 110," fol. Leris F. pamphlet, 25 October , 1796. Milan; This short pamphlet written by the French radical F. Leris describes the spirit patriotism which public administrators must put into their work if they are to build up the republican state together. His aim with this pamphlet is to play on the already existent social revolutionary tendencies of many of these individuals.

two moderates. The remaining three were all originalist rationalist, all of whom were Milanese aristocrats.

Finance and Commerce

With *ancien regime* Italy having a primarily agricultural economy, there were very few representatives who occupied the commercial and financial sector, despite their great importance in the debates of the *Gran Consiglio*.⁵⁶⁵ The Cisalpine republic – purposefully or incidentally – did not come to include of the major trading hubs on the Italian peninsula, with the port cities of Genoa and Venice remaining either independent of Milan or delivered into the hands of the Austrians. Milan and Bologna, as major stops along the trading routes which connected the south of the peninsula to the north and with the rest of the European continent remained important areas of commercial and financial interest. That said, most merchants and traders preferred to remain on the coasts where their livelihoods relied on the constant attention to business interests.

This is not to say that commercial interests did not play their part in the political debates of the late eighteenth century. Tax laws, customs duties and the endless series of contradictory and complex legislation which was passed to prevent the impending financial crisis of the mid-eighteenth century made commerce difficult in a society where capital interests were only just beginning to play a role in state economic policies.⁵⁶⁶ Merchants and financiers strongly opposed the growing complexity and cost of doing business on the Italian peninsula, especially with regards to inter-state business between the various Italian states. They were often supported by economists and those in the banking industries, both strong believers of the free-trade arguments coming out of Great Britain.⁵⁶⁷ In many ways it was the opposition to this complexity which saw many in the financial sector adopting the popular calls for national peninsular unification between Italian peoples. Figures like Dandolo – who established a pharmaceutical business in Venice in the early 1790s – became some of the most vocal voices of pan-Italian unification by the time the French invaded in 1796.⁵⁶⁸ Not only would unifying the country open up new financial and commercial markets, but trade could also become the medium through which republican culture could be spread on a national level. If forming a nation was indeed the intention of the revolution, and the

⁵⁶⁵ Levati, “Il Mondo degli affari cisalpino e Napoleone tra opportunità e perplessità,” 295.

⁵⁶⁶ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 88–89.

⁵⁶⁷ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:109.

⁵⁶⁸ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 36–37.

financial straits of the peninsula in the late 1790s so dire, then wouldn't an open and republican trade policy be more desirable than anything remotely close to the smothering tax-farms of the anicene regime?⁵⁶⁹

That said, despite their more radical politics in the areas of Italian politics and economics, the merchant class and finance professionals such as bankers and economists were far from social revolutionaries.⁵⁷⁰ To begin with, those in the commercial and financial sector included both members of the bourgeois and the nobility. Their tendency towards financial liberty already put them at odds with more those coming from the social revolutionary side of the democratic wing of *Gran Consiglio* politics. They opposed land-grants for peasant farmers and sought to keep government spending from going towards social programs such as hospital and public houses. These funds were better invested – according to merchants and financial workers – in the maintenance of infrastructure and security to help protect and speed up trade. There was little pandering to the people among these men, who saw the dangers of popular action occurring in Jacobin France and feared permitting that level of public involvement in government decision making. Though they were staunch supporters of the nation-building project, these men were often simultaneously in support of initiatives from the more moderate and originalist side of the *Gran Consiglio* for their willingness to avoid popular sovereignty stipulations, instead citing the 1795 French Constitution's more restrictive political regulations against pure democratic involvement of the public.

Within the *Gran Consiglio* only 5 representatives out of 84 belonged to the commercial and financial professional network. However, 4 out of the 5 belonged to the leadership of the Council, with 3 of those (Dandolo, Cochetti and Ressi) being a part of the elite. The commercial class is the only professional network to include the only two representatives with Jewish origins to hold influence in the Council – Della Vida was Jewish himself coming from the community in Ferrara, and Dandolo was the son of a converted Paduan Jewish father.⁵⁷¹ Each of the five individual represented a different aspect of the financial and commercial sector. Dandolo was a

⁵⁶⁹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 103.

⁵⁷⁰ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 22–23.

⁵⁷¹ Interestingly there existed another Samuele Della Vida from Ferrara who went on to be the founder of Generali Assicurazioni group in the 1820s. Unfortunately, this Samuele must be a son or nephew of the *Gran Consiglio* representative as he was born in the 1790s, which would have made the representative Della Vida under the age of ten when serving. Ugo Da Como 1940, p. 44 ; Pederzani 2014, p. 31

retailer and entrepreneur⁵⁷²; Della Vida was a banker⁵⁷³; Adeato Ressi was a professor of economics and commerce law at Pavia;⁵⁷⁴ Carlo Cocchetti was a merchant and banker⁵⁷⁵; Giambattista Franzini was a landowner and merchant farmer.⁵⁷⁶ In terms of class, the professional network is split at 2 nobles (Franzini and Ressi) and 2 bourgeois (Dandolo and Della Vida) with only Cocchetti of unknown or humble origins. Though they all voted together in aspects of economic and financial politics in reality each belonged to a different proto-faction thanks in large part to their ranging views on non-economic issues.

Political Networks (The political apprenticeship 1796-1797)

The political networks are that which defined the political philosophy, agenda and actions of the representatives, and which bound representatives to one another based on the various connections they had developed in the political realm before their appointment to the *Gran Consiglio*. While in many cases this political connection stretched back long before the revolution ever took place (Compagnoni and Dandolo⁵⁷⁷ provide a good example, as do Bossi and Aquila⁵⁷⁸), this examination will focus solely on the political networks formulated between the years 1796-1797. The choice of this period was important for a number of reasons. First, 1796 represents a major shift in political practices and state philosophy, as the states of Northern Italy quite literally shift from an *ancien regime* aristocracy/monarchy to a French-styled republic occupied by a foreign French “liberating” army.⁵⁷⁹ Second these years saw a slow union of the various political societies which had controlled Northern and Central Italy for centuries, into a modern nation-state

⁵⁷² Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 43–51.

⁵⁷³ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:44.

⁵⁷⁴ Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*, 121.

⁵⁷⁵ Fappani and Andrico, “Cocchetti, Carlo.”

⁵⁷⁶ “Nomina dei membri del Corpo legislativo” Montalcini – Alberti 1917, p. 69

⁵⁷⁷ Savini, *Un abate “libertino”*; Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 35–51.

⁵⁷⁸ Gennaro Barbarisi, *Cronaca Milanese in Un Epistolario de Settecento: Le Lettere Di Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila a Giovan Battista Corniani (1799-1782)*, XIII–XV.; Bossi and Aquila were constant rivals within the political and philosophical circles of Milan in the late 1780s. Bossi was a high aristocrat with close allies like Pietro Verri and Paolo Frisi, which he often utilized to his advantage in the airing of political status and publication rights. Aquila by contrast came from minor administrative nobility in the Pavian countryside, and though supported by the powerful scholar Giuseppe Parini – a connection he shared with other future representatives like Francesco Reina – his lack of connections often saw his ventures failing where Bossi succeeded. Though their politics were similar – both were originalist rationalists in the Council and more republican overall – they were constant academic and personal rivals going back nearly twenty years before the declaration of the Cisalpine Republic.

⁵⁷⁹ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 51.

with participating members coming from across the peninsula.⁵⁸⁰ Finally, these years saw the first concrete establishment of institutions which were specifically Italian *and* republican, albeit modeled upon those constructed in and for the French Republic; with these new institutions came the advent of an entirely new and robust political culture which was constructed from a combination of French legal and constitutional precedent, revolutionary philosophy, eighteenth century enlightenment ideas on science, philosophy and reason and an acknowledgement of the Italian political, social and economic condition at the end of the early-modern age.

The years 1796-1797 represent the period for the Cisalpine Republic, and in particular for the *Gran Consiglio*, of what Tackett defined as the “political apprenticeship” for his study of the French National Assembly.⁵⁸¹ As Tackett explains, before the union of the Estates General in 1789, what would be considered modern legislative politics did not yet exist on continental Europe. The English, in their own way, had been experimenting for close to 150 years, but were closed off from other European societies, spending most of that period at war against the very societies which later adopted these legislative and parliamentary political practices. Even the young American Republic across the Atlantic, though important in its influence on political and philosophical discourse on the European Continent, and in particular in France, was not applied as a viable alternative to *ancien regime* absolutism before 1789.⁵⁸² Thus, the early years of the National Constituent Assembly saw the French legislative branch attempting to reconcile the highly variable cultural, social, economic, and – most importantly – political traditions of late eighteenth century France into a coherent parliamentary culture which would govern the new revolutionary French Nation. It was essentially a period of political exploration, legislative problem solving, and the transition from theory into practice, a period which was fraught with disagreement, numerous (and costly) mistakes and even violent resistance.⁵⁸³ But through these uncertain and unstable times came the very foundations of French Republicanism which can be seen in its constitutional legacy to this day.

⁵⁸⁰ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 10–11.

⁵⁸¹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 77–78.

⁵⁸² Serna, “Le Directoire, miroir de quelle République?”; as Serna points out in his introduction to the volume *Républiques soeurs* the American model would eventually become a much more influential model following the restructuring of Thermidor Year II, in a period of what can only be considered a second political apprenticeship according to Tackett’s definition.

⁵⁸³ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 78.

The same can be said for the period of 1796-1797 in Northern and Central Italy. Even more so than France – who, despite its fractured politics in the late eighteenth century had at least been unified under the same monarchy – the Italian peninsula was divided into an array of separate polities each with its own governmental and hierarchical structures, unified only (and marginally) by language and a shared mythologized history.⁵⁸⁴ The years 1796 and 1797 saw a very slow progression from rival states to a shared political identity and political culture, which – though by no means unified – was specifically crafted from the experiences, both good and bad of the early experiments in revolutionary republicanism in 1796-1797. This period was defined by the invasion of the French *Armée d'Italie* under the command of a young and inspiring Napoleon Bonaparte – the Corsican artillery general turned General-in-Chief of the *Armée*. Bonaparte's constant influence made him a key shaper of this political culture, and often both the direct and indirect maker of an individual's political fortune. That said, though Bonaparte played a fundamental role in the political developments of these years which would shape representatives' future political ideas and contributions after the activation of Councils on 2 Frimaire Year VI, not all of these political developments were guided by his hands. Numerous events, particularly in the winter and spring of 1797, sprang entirely from the will of Northern Italians to institute what they saw as their revolutionary inheritance in their own individual societies. From these actions sprang entirely new networks, which would come together in the summer and fall of 1797, following the proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic on 15 Messidor and begin knitting together the fabrics of these networks into the political culture of a unified Cisalpine Nation. The discussion which follows will not examine all aspects of these two years but focus specifically on the shared experiences of the Representatives of *Gran Consiglio* from the moment of the French invasion to the activation of the *Gran Consiglio*, and how the events of these years created the political networks which would eventually serve in the formation of legislative political groups in 1797-1798.

1796: the Attraction of Bonaparte

The role of Bonaparte will be examined in greater detail in Chapter XI and thus will not be given an in-depth analysis here. Instead, however, this first section will look at how the first passes as republican politics which arrived with the French in 1796 came to revolve themselves around

⁵⁸⁴ De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. the Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796-1943*.

the person of Bonaparte and the effects which this had on later developments in 1797. 1796 was perhaps the most chaotic year for the future representatives of the Cisalpine republic, as it lacked the structures, institutions, and perhaps most poignantly, the peace which defined the latter half of the political apprenticeship. Similarly, it was not a year which saw great inclusion across the Peninsula, as the western Terraferma of the Republic of Venice and much of the Adriatic coast would remain excluded from the political developments occurring within the “liberated” western half of the peninsula. It would, however, see Milan become the center of republican power and come to see it take its place as the future capital of the new Cisalpine (and really Italian) Nation.⁵⁸⁵

The purpose of the initial French invasion of the Italian peninsula had little to do with the expansion of republicanism to the rest of Europe and much to do about the dire financial problems plaguing the new Directorial government after 1795.⁵⁸⁶ Palmer argued that the war was intended to relieve these debts by ending the war as soon as possible and using to its advantage the sudden military success the French Republic seemed to be enjoying in 1795-1796 as both foreign and domestic propaganda of the Directory’s success on two fronts.⁵⁸⁷ The invasion of Italy was in many respects part of a much larger offensive against the Austrians which spanned the European continent and sought to weaken the Hapsburg states to focus on the British menace to the North.⁵⁸⁸ However Bonaparte’s military success – and perhaps even more so the speed at which it came – astonished French leaders back in Paris who had made the young artillery commander the head of the *Armée* both at the insistence of his patron Barras, and with the hopes that his time in Italy would stall the petulant young Corsican’s career.⁵⁸⁹

By May 1796, the *Armée d’Italie* had not only been the only branch of the offensive against the Austrians to begin as intended in February of 1796 but had successfully expelled the Austrians from their long held seat of power in Milan by 17 May.⁵⁹⁰ The success of the young general meant a sudden influx of resources back to the metropole, but also a sudden wave of patriotic affection towards Bonaparte on the part of his men and among the French

⁵⁸⁵ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 48.

⁵⁸⁶ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:23; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*, 31–33.

⁵⁸⁷ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 570–71.

⁵⁸⁸ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 37.

⁵⁸⁹ De Francesco, *Il Naufrago e Il Dominatore. Vita Politica Di Napoleone Bonaparte*, 72–75.

⁵⁹⁰ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:48,52.

citizenry as a whole.⁵⁹¹ Following the rapid and successive defeats of the army of the Kingdom of Sardegna in their home territory of Piedmont, Bonaparte signed an armistice at Cherasco with the Savoyard King without the knowledge or permission of the Directory.⁵⁹² This armistice effectively permitted the Kingdom of Sardegna to remain in existence as a satellite state under the direct control of the occupying French forces who would use it as a resource center, relieving the lack of funding coming from Paris and allowing the *Armée* to advance against the Austrians well stocked. After sweeping across Lombardy, Parma and Modena – most notably his victory at Lodi – Bonaparte established himself at Montebello where he declared the Italian Duchy liberated.⁵⁹³

In addition to the resources coming from Piedmont, the Italian peninsula was full of Italians in favor of the French invasion who styled themselves as “patriots” and were both ready and willing to participate in the overthrow of *ancien regime* functions and the construction of a new republican government on the peninsula.⁵⁹⁴ In reality this was not exactly news back in Paris where Filippo Buonarrotti – the one-time leader of the Pantheon Club in Paris and co-conspirator of Babeuf and his Conspiracy of Equals – had been pushing for an Italian revolution led by native Italians with the support of the French military.⁵⁹⁵ Though Buonarrotti eventually fell out with the efforts for the Italian campaign, his connections on the peninsula served Bonaparte well as they enthusiastically aided the French military in their struggle against the Austrians. When he established his headquarters for the continued push in the norther Papal states in the summer of 1796, it was to these Italian patriots whom he looked for support and maintenance of the newly “liberated” territory in Lombardy.

What arose in these territories in the summer of 1796 was a revolutionary movement which found enthusiastic support particularly within the urban centers like Milan. With the entrance of the French military many of the administrative and university elite who had run the city along the

⁵⁹¹ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 38.

⁵⁹² Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 574.

⁵⁹³ De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 9–10.

⁵⁹⁴ De Francesco, 6.

⁵⁹⁵ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 573–74.; Interestingly the same day that Bonaparte entered into Milan (10 May 1796) Buonarrotti was arrested for his part in the Conspiracy. He already resented Bonaparte for his part in closing the Pantheon club and what he saw as a hostile takeover of the Italian Revolution by the *Armée* who used the campaign less as a means of bringing about revolution on the peninsula and more as a war of conquest and personal political gain.

counter-revolutionary views of Leopold II fled for the Austrian or Papal front.⁵⁹⁶ In their place, Italian patriots who had been operating in secret in clubs began to take over administrative and political roles, opening up pro-revolutionary journals like the *Termometro Politico della Lombardia* – opened on 25 June 1796.⁵⁹⁷ Others like Matteo Galdi or Giovanni Antonio Ranza moved to the protection of French forces in Milan and in doing so formed a more radical segment of the patriotic class, which to that point had been dominated by the intellectual legacy of the *Accademia dei pugn*i and the student movements of the early 1790s in Brera and Pavia.

As the *Armée* pushed both north into Brescia and Verona and south into the Papal states towards Bologna, Ferrara and the Romagna, Bonaparte established civilian commissioners to act as municipal administrators; these were mostly made up of members of the former patriot aristocracy like Lamberti, maintaining a steady flow of resources to the military campaign.⁵⁹⁸ By late June, as Bonaparte was marching into Bologna, civil administrators in Modena, Milan, Pavia and Parma were all looking to institute new provisional governments in tandem with the French military commands.⁵⁹⁹ These new governments was by no means revolutionary or republican, but governed by a strict martial code. However, unlike the past regime, the new order saw appointment of individuals based on their commitment to the revolutionary cause, or more importantly their loyalty to the French invading forces.

However, not all were fond of the new order. Despite being in the hands of the patriots, many resented the French occupying forces, who seemed to plunder and destroy property wantonly, leading to animosity between soldiers and the locals. Perhaps worse were the roving gangs of patriot militias who utilized their affiliation with the French *Armée* to act more like bandits than revolutionary freedom fighters. The chaos particularly in the periphery led to instability as the war was now being waged on multiple fronts against a cacophony of enemies. Thus, in order to restabilize the situation Bonaparte signed an armistice with the Venetian Republic and the Papal states which gave the French Direct control of the Emilia and Romagna but refused

⁵⁹⁶ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 7.

⁵⁹⁷ “N. 1. 7 Messidor IV repub. (Sabato 25 Giugno 1796 v.s.)”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:121, 124.

⁵⁹⁸ “593. Au Citoyen Lambert [Giacomo Lamberti]. Quartier général, Milan, 20 Prarial an IV (8 juin 1796)”, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 467.

⁵⁹⁹ « 657. Au citoyen Faypoult. Minisre de la République à Gènes, Quartier général, Bologne, 2 messidor an IV (20 juin 1796). », « 658. Au Légat du Pape, à Ferrare. Quartier général , Bologne, 2 messidor an IV (20 Juin 1796) », *Ibid*, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 510, 511.

to turn further south against Rome, and saw them having free reign to cross the Terraferma but abandoning civil control.⁶⁰⁰ With the war now oriented concretely against the Austrian homeland, and direct French controlled lands limited to Lombardy, the Emilia (comprised of Modena, Parma and the Emilian Papal cities like Bologna, Cento and Ferrara) and the Romagna, a centralizing political campaign could begin to stabilize the “liberated” territory. Having taken the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and forcing a similar armistice upon them, Bonaparte returned to Milan in mid-July, which he would establish as the military headquarter and political center of the occupied territories.⁶⁰¹

With Milan now established as the firm center of revolutionary administration and politics, the Lombard capital soon became a haven for those same allies which Bonaparte had established as provisional commissioners throughout the spring and early summer. By late September men like Melzi D’Eril, Serbelloni, Lamberti, La Hoz, Cavedoni, Compagnoni and Giuseppe Fenaroli had all come to pay homage to the *Général-en-chef* in Montebello.⁶⁰² Each of these men would come to play a major role either in the administration of the conquered territory (Allemania for example would come to play a major role in the Administration of Lombardy), serve as important military figures (La Hoz would be made general of the Lombard Legion) or else serve as valued political counsel (Compagnoni often discussed his closeness to the general – with great embellishment).

As part of his centralizing political effort Bonaparte established a series of formal states in Italy, some of which blended older *ancien regime* states into entirely new republics and other retaining their former government systems though under the thumb of the occupying French Army. Despite calls for unification of all conquered territory under the administration of a single Italian republic, Bonaparte felt it more effective to retain many of the older borders, creating new states only where political and administrative stability was strongest. This led to the formation of the

⁶⁰⁰ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:54–55.

⁶⁰¹ “756. A l’Adjutant Général Vial. Quartier général, Milan, 25 Messidor an IV (13 juillet 1796).”, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 592.

⁶⁰² “Introduzione” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:CI–CIV; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:2; Rastelli, “Cavedoni, Bartolomeo”; Pigni, “La Hoz, Giuseppe”; Sani, “Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo).”

Ligurian republic in the former Republic of Genoa, while the Duchies of Parma and Tuscany retained their old regime governments.⁶⁰³

In Lombardy, the old aristocratic administrators who had gained Bonaparte's favor saw themselves leading a new executive run administration called the Administration of Milan.⁶⁰⁴ However the radical factions of patriots which had begun to appear in the early months of the French occupation had seen a steady increase so that by the end of 1796 men like Reina, Gerolamo Coddé, Cavedoni, Felice Latuada and Giuseppe Luini had risen in favor with Bonaparte and had come to occupy leading positions in the Lombard administration. These more radical patriots coalesced in the patriotic societies (covered in Chapter X). These often formed in opposition to the former intellectual societies of the more moderate political commentators like Beccaria and Pietro Verri who often scorned the socially radical policies of the patriots.⁶⁰⁵ These older intellectual voices were soon drowned out by those coming from the patriotic societies. That said, these newer more radical patriotic voices were careful, particularly in 1796, not to give the impression of wanting the Jacobinism of 1793. The discovery of the Conspiracy of Equals on the same day Bonaparte had entered into Milan, and Buonarrotti's part in that plot, had seen those who had previously advocated for a more "Jacobin-like" revolution in Italy, gravitating towards the more controlled political views of Bonaparte's inner circle. They focused on nationalization and creating mass support for the French project, and not in the social revolution they were often accused of by their moderate counterparts (such a Verri).⁶⁰⁶ By the end of 1796 those able to tame their rhetoric to support an unfettered loyalty to Bonaparte and his republicanizing project saw themselves admitted to his inner circle and assuming positions in the provisional governments. Those like Verri who refused to accept the social and political restructuring of the new order, or Buonarrotti who called for more extreme (and Italian led) revolution in the style of 1793 found themselves ostracized from the controlling body of Lombardy (based on the inner circle of Bonaparte) with the onset of 1797.

⁶⁰³ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 24.

⁶⁰⁴ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 68–70.

⁶⁰⁵ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 167.

⁶⁰⁶ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 49–50.

The Cispadane Republic

While in Lombardy those who would eventually take places in the *Gran Consiglio* worked either as members of the French backed executive administration or were known contributors to the patriot movement, in Emilia and Romagna the unification of the Northern Papal regions with the former Duchy of Modena created a truly new opportunity for internal legislative development through the newly created Cispadane Republic. September saw an uprising against the French occupation in the coastal cities of the Romagna, which turned Bonaparte's scorn upon the region.⁶⁰⁷ Bologna similarly was met with French derision for its maintenance of the old Senate structures which favored only the governmental participation of the upper aristocracy.⁶⁰⁸ In Modena and Ferrara the connections to the old Este ruling family (different branches) saw the continued dominance of the older nobility (enlightened or not) over the political policies of that city.⁶⁰⁹ The reformed aristocracy of Modena clashed with the Catholic nobility of Bologna, and both of their bourgeois classes clashed over which was worse, the old military nobility or the seigneurs of the Catholic Church. The congresses of the Cispadane, was therefore an unexpected network to remain so tightly connected across the Triennio, even into the *Gran Consiglio*.

When Bonaparte declared the unions of the occupied territories in Emilia and Romagna, it was both a great excitement to the nationalist Italian patriots who saw the congresses as an opportunity for legislative advancement in a unified Italian experiment, and simultaneously met with suspicion by aristocratic groups hesitant to see their privileges watered down. Bonaparte in his fusion of the two states refused to also include the former Duchy of Milan, insisting that a third – and significantly more powerful – society would destabilize the cautious patriotism which existed in both Modena and the northern Papacy.⁶¹⁰ In essence the Cispadane Republic was not intended to be an independent experiment in Italian republicanism, but instead a measured experiment in whether or not republicanism along the style of the French Constitution of Year III could be accurately instituted in Italy. Bonaparte for his part expressed great faith in his friends

⁶⁰⁷ "1035. Au Sénat de Bologne. Quartier Général, Milan, 5 vendémiaire an V (26 September 1796). *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 16–17.

⁶⁰⁸ "N.31. 17 vendemmiajo V repub. (sabato 8 ottobre 1796 v.s.), 'Senato excelso di Bologna'", Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:420–21.

⁶⁰⁹ Savini, *Un abate "libertino,"* 248–49.

⁶¹⁰ "1095. Au Directoire Exécutif. Quartier général, Modène, 26 vendémiaire an V (17 October 1796).", *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 73–74.

and allies nominated to the congress announced in Modena to formulate an Italian Constitution modeled on its current French counterpart.⁶¹¹

The initial congress was principally called from delegations of Ferrara, Reggio, Modena and Bologna, which they called the *confederazione cispadana* due to the orientation of these cities along the Po' river.⁶¹² Modena and Bologna were both the primary urban centers of their respective former states, while Ferrara and Reggio were both the dominant second cities (see chapter X for an explanation of urban centers and secondary cities). Ferrara, Bologna and Reggio all had universities, which Modena did not, although only Reggio and Bologna served as major university centers in the years leading up to the French occupation. Ferrara, Reggio and Modena all had a past political history connected by the ruling Este family, while Bologna was controlled by its historic Senate. Perhaps most obvious of all was that Ferrara and Bologna had survived under the censorship of Papal rule throughout the eighteenth century, while Modena had shared in the Hapsburg reform movements found in Milan and Tuscany.

The first Cispadane congress held in Modena would see the first entrance of a number of later famous *Gran Consiglio* representatives into the theatre of Italian republican and legislative politics for the first time. Giuseppe Compagnoni represented Ferrara and was much perturbed to leave his intellectual life in Venice to serve, despite his abject loyalty to Bonaparte.⁶¹³ Giulio Cesare Tassoni and Francesco Leopoldo Cicognara, nobility and military men who had strongly supported Bonaparte's campaigns and had flocked to his side in the wake of his conquest of Bologna (much to the chagrin of Ercole III) were nominated as part of the Modena delegation, as was Bonaparte's close friend Giacomo Lamberti, and the radical military commander Bartolomeo Cavedoni.⁶¹⁴ From Reggio, the patriot lawyer Angelo Perseguiti, as well as the professor of natural sciences Giambattista Venturi, all served.⁶¹⁵ From Bologna, Giuseppe Gambari became an

⁶¹¹ Savini, *Un abate "libertino,"* 247.

⁶¹² "N.36. 4 brumaio V repub. (martedì 25 ottobre 1796). 'Confederazione cispadana'", Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:642-43.

⁶¹³ Savini, *Un abate "libertino,"* 246.

⁶¹⁴ Rastelli, "Cavedoni, Bartolomeo"; "N.31. 17 vendemmiajo V. repub. (sabato 8 ottobre 1796), 'Il duca di Modena'", Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*, 1:422; Sani, "Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo)."

⁶¹⁵ *Il Risogiamiento a Reggio: Atti Del Convegno Di Studi 28-29 Dicembre 1961*, 21-23.

important voice along with Giovanni Domasco Bragaldi, Giacomo Greppi, Vincenzo Brunetti and Giovanni Vicini.⁶¹⁶

Bonaparte noted to the Directory in his explanation of the events of that first congress that the men of whom it consisted were generally more moderate than their Lombard cousins to the north, breaking them into three categories: those who wanted to return to their old states, those who hoped for the formation of an aristocratic republic, and those who wanted to formulate a republic along the French model, though perhaps with more democratic institutions. Of the three Cispadane groups the second was dominated by Bolognese aristocrat and lawyer – and future leader of the Cisalpine Consiglio de' *Seniori* – Antonio Aldini; the third was controlled largely by Compagnoni who disagreed soundly with the constitutional arguments made by Aldini who became his primary rival. These fault lines would remain generally intact throughout 1797 into 1798, as Aldini and his more aristocratic delegation would come to dominate the *Consiglio de' Seniori*, while continually being opposed by the allied rationalist and radical factions of Compagnoni.⁶¹⁷ In place of social revolution, the Cispadane congress was much more oriented towards legal arguments around constitutionalism, sovereignty and financial rights.⁶¹⁸ Issues of religious rights, public education or socio-economic mobility were secondary to considerations on territorial administration, property rights and popular participation. Nevertheless, some more extreme positions were taken and accusations of “Jacobin imitation” were launched, in particular towards Greppi and another radical Bolognese Giovannetti.⁶¹⁹

These radical elements of Cispadane politics became much more prevalent in the wilder debates of the second Cispadane Congress of Reggio, when Greppi (backed by his younger colleagues) proposed incorporating elements of the 1793 French Constitution into the new Cispadane constitution. However, the majority during the Reggio congress remained more attached to the moderate model of Modena, with the competition between Aldini and Compagnoni

⁶¹⁶ Pizzoli, *Notizie Intorno Alla Vita Del Conte Vincenzo Brunetti*; Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche Sopra l'Università e l'Istituto Delle Scienze Di Bologna*, 174; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:27, 138.

⁶¹⁷ It should be noted that Compagnoni, though a leading opposition to Aldini and the *Seniori* in 1798, was on the more conservative side of the *Gran Consiglio*. While still a member of the leadership, he was outnumbered by his progressive rationalist and radical colleagues who were influenced by the much stronger Lombard and Western Terraferma radicalism which sought greater social revolution.

⁶¹⁸ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 101.

⁶¹⁹ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 254.

becoming increasingly fierce in the first months of 1797. There was within these measures a definite attempt to reassure a hesitant Parisian Directory of the merits of the Italian Republics.⁶²⁰

That said, despite the outward signs of adherence to the post-Thermidorian French regime, the Cispadane attempts at constitution building did reflect some of the elements of the 1793 French Constitution which had become popular among Italian patriots at this time. For example, the Cispadane legislature would be constructed from direct elections, a stark contrast to the electoral assembly structure of the French and later Cisalpine systems. The Reggio Congress also put in stricter regulations against the aristocracy and clergy which were favored by Compagnoni but vehemently opposed by Aldini. Nevertheless, the structures of legislation in the Cispadane Constitution were nearly identical to the Constitution of Year III, giving the precedent for later Italian constitutional formulations.

The Cispadane congresses were the first foray for many of the future representatives into the complicated and often dramatic politics of republican legislation and would provide lessons in political maneuvering which their Lombard colleagues would not have. However, their relative moderation put them at a political disadvantage when united with their less structured and more divisive colleagues to the North. Though moderate Cispadane colleagues tended to stick together (in particular men like Compagnoni, Lamberti and Tassoni) they were much fewer and refused to ally with their likeminded colleagues from places like Brescia, Pavia or the Romagna. In the end perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Cispadane republic was the invention of the Italian tricolor at the first Cispadane congress which went on to be the flag of the First Cisalpine Republic and then the modern Republic of Italy after 1948.

The Spring Republics of 1797 in the Western Terraferma

The uprisings which took place in Crema, Bergamo, and Brescia in March and April of 1797, and resulted in the establishment of separate republics in those cities and their surrounding territories from March to July, created a vast network of revolutionary leaders which was largely separate from the other major political networks to the west and south. Unlike the coming of the revolution in Lombardy, the Emilia and the Romagna, in the western Terraferma of the Serenissima the uprising which occurred were encouraged and executed by the natives of those

⁶²⁰ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 52.

cities with little involvement on the part of the French *Armée*. And while these territories were almost immediately and voluntarily occupied by the French, they developed political cultures – if only briefly – which would impact the construction of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*. The involvement of representatives from these regions was so significant that the department of Serio – the Cisalpine department with the *capoluogo* at Bergamo which constituted much of the 1797 Bergamasco republic – was the only department to have all of their nominated representatives present from the first sitting of the Council on 2 Frimaire.⁶²¹

The Western Terraferma, and in particular the city of Brescia, had a long and difficult relationship with the metropole in Venezia. Though for a long time these municipalities existed as relatively autonomous centers along the frontiers of the Duchy of Milan, the revolution had seen an increase in aggression on the part of the Venetian center to keep her peripheral territories in line.⁶²² The Venetian authorities for their part tried hard to maintain a relative peace and neutrality in the wars between Hapsburg Austria and Revolutionary France after 1792.⁶²³ However the position of the Serenissima, both geographically between the southern borders of the two warring powers, and politically as one of the few remaining – and still absurdly wealthy – trading republics of medieval Italy, made this neutrality difficult as both sought the state both for its military positioning and its resource base. The Venetian state could not tolerate dissent among its ranks and was careful to avoid allowing revolutionary activity within its borders without stifling republican voices for fear they might draw the eyes of the increasingly radical French Republic in the first half of the 1790s.⁶²⁴ However, this policy of increased pressure throughout the Serenissima only provoked the traditionally autonomous aristocracies of the western Terraferma, who saw the moves of the metropole as an attempt to usurp local authority. When the French invaded Italy in the spring of 1796, the controlling interests of these cities in Venetian Lombardy saw the potential to escape their metropolitan overlords and obtain a measure of independence. Thus, from the onset the interests of the revolutionaries from the Terraferma were much less occupied with the promise of a French style revolution and more with the possibility of independence from the economic and political stranglehold of the venetian center.

⁶²¹ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:89
List of representatives who took their oaths of office on the first sitting of the Gran Consiglio.

⁶²² Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:343 Vol 8.

⁶²³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 594.

⁶²⁴ Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*.

This is not to say that the Western Terraferma did not have its share of revolutionary supporters.⁶²⁵ Though the urban centers had a political life which revolved around the aristocratic administration, its educational sectors were dominated by intellectuals like Mascheroni, Manenti and Tadini who sought to bring modern political philosophy to the masses.⁶²⁶ In other cities of the Serenissima like Padua, where the aristocratic run university dominated intellectual life, secret societies like the Free Masons and French style salons served as the educational centers of Revolutionary ideology for the bourgeois and lower class subjects of the Serenissima.⁶²⁷ However in the cities of Brescia and Bergamo where there were no universities to dominate political and philosophical discourse, political philosophy was often found to traverse social classes and saw aristocratic and bourgeois intellectuals engaging in much more radical social and political reform policies that were found in the other major urban centers of Northern Italy. The secular seminaries like the Marianna College in Bergamo, who accepted high and lowborn students, produced a series of social reformist faculty and students (of which the previously mentioned Mascheroni, Manenti and Tadini were the most renowned). The increased censorship of the Venetian metropole forced many of the more radical actors in this new revolutionary movement to flee to other parts of the peninsula, like Giordano Alborghetti who, along with his brother, would set up a radical newspaper in Sondrio advocating for Jacobin style political and social revolution.⁶²⁸ That said, unlike their counterparts in the Duchies and the Papal states, the Terraferma aristocracy was much more permissive of social welfare and education, if it meant they could retain their leadership positions; however, this meant a much firmer hand against social mobility and political universality.

Thus, when the French occupied the territory in their efforts to drive out the Austrians in the summer of 1796, they found very little resistance from the local population or the aristocratic leaders of the various cities. That is not to say that these cities – and in particular their aristocratic leadership were particularly content either with the French presence.⁶²⁹ In reality the French presented a different sort of menace to the Senates of Bergamo and Brescia who worried that their former disdain for one metropole would simply be transferred to the new occupier. However, the armistice with the Venetian state which allowed the French free access to move north into Austria

⁶²⁵ Simonetto, “Bergamo e La Crisi Finale Dello Stato Veneziano (1796-1797),” 117–18.

⁶²⁶ Pepe, “Mascheroni, Lorenzo”; Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*; Giannini, “Tadini Antonio.”

⁶²⁷ Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*, 14–15.

⁶²⁸ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:2.

⁶²⁹ Simonetto, “Bergamo e La Crisi Finale Dello Stato Veneziano (1796-1797),” 118.

soon expelled that fear, and the western Terraferma quickly returned to its former hostility towards the Venetian metropole, though now with the knowledge that if needed they had a strong ally in the French.⁶³⁰ Though the French presence remained in these territories – albeit to a lesser degree – they did not occupy themselves with the daily administration of the Terraferma city-states as they had with the Hapsburg territories. Over the next 10 months as local administrative power increased in cities like Bergamo and Brescia, it became increasingly clear to both radical revolutionaries and moderate aristocrats in these cities that the Venetian presence was significantly weakened thanks to the French invasion.

The first of the cities to enact an uprising was Bergamo on 13 March; by 24 March the city had declared itself and its surrounding territories a separate republic and immediately allied themselves with the occupying French.⁶³¹ The coming of the uprising had been planned by the combination of local “enlightened aristocrats”, and a the strong patriot group which had been growing in the city’s bourgeois throughout the 1790s. The conspiracy had received aid from the patriot groups in Milan and their allies in the French Military who were eager to see the east of Lombardy reunited with their Milanese cousins after centuries of Venetian domination.⁶³² More importantly the fall of Bergamo was expected to set off a chain reaction (which it did) which would move eastward allowing the French and Italian patriots to take full control of the Serenissima, instead of relying on the Venetian government to uphold the terms of the armistice. Bonaparte – by now battling the Austrians in their homeland in the Corinthian regions near Villach and Klagenfurt – saw the advantages of an Italian led revolt against the Venetian state, so long as they preceded to ally themselves with the interests of the *Armée*. In a letter to the French Directory – worried about the consequences of a violent uprising outside of French control in Italy – Bonaparte feigned preoccupation with the Bergamo (and later Brescian) revolts; however in the same letter he admitted the part played by the French in the conspiracy and reenforced that the real enemy were the Austrians not the loyal Italian patriots.⁶³³

⁶³⁰ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:54–55.

⁶³¹ “Adi 13. Marzo 1797. Bergamo”, “Viva la Repubblica di Bergamo”, *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca*, 3–4.

⁶³² Mori, “Per ‘Un Felice Governo’. La Costituzione Provvisoria Della REpubblica Bergamasca (24 Marzo-5 Aprile 1797),” 54.

⁶³³ “1629. Au Directoire Exécutif, Quartier général. Goritz, 4 germinal an V (24 mars 1797)”, *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 540.

The Bergamo uprising immediately led to the formation of a provisional government in the municipality guided by a central committee. The central committee comprised at least four members of the titular nobility in the city, one of whom (Marco Alessandri) would go on to serve as the president of the Cisalpine Directory in 1798.⁶³⁴ However by 24 March, the provisional government had given way to a constitutional government which would dictate the structures of a new Bergamasco Republic. Interestingly, unlike other constitutions of Northern Italy the Bergamasco did not have a singular base in the French Constitution of Year III but rather a mix of French and American constitutional practices.⁶³⁵ The circulation of American political texts in the Serenissima had been popularized among the more independent minded citizens of the western Terraferma, who applauded the American and English insistence on individual liberties and American local autonomy from centralized control.⁶³⁶ This included an end to tariff duties between the municipalities which belonged to the new Bergamasco Republic and a general economic liberalism which allowed for greater flow of goods between cities and even outside of the new Republics borders (in particular with the other French occupied territories like the Cispadane and Lombardy).⁶³⁷ Perhaps most poignantly the new Bergamasco republic was tolerant of aristocratic elements in the new Revolutionary order, so long as they accepted the independence of the new Republic from the Serenissima.

The advent of the Bergamo republic brought with it also the early political careers of a number of future *Gran Consiglio* members. Lorenzo Mascheroni, Antonio Tadini and Pietro Marieni, each of the Marianna College of Bergamo all participated in the municipal government of Bergamo with Tadini taking part in the uprising itself.⁶³⁸ Giuseppe Mangili similarly returned from Pavia to play an active role in the new municipal government.⁶³⁹ Finally both Giovanni Lupi and Giordano Alborghetti served as military leaders both during and after the Revolt, with Alborghetti leading the division of Bergamasco patriots to the aid of the Brescians in their own

⁶³⁴ Mori, “Per ‘Un Felice Governo’. La Costituzione Provvisoria Della REpubblica Bergamasca (24 Marzo-5 Aprile 1797),” 54–55.

⁶³⁵ Mori, 59–61.

⁶³⁶ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 595; Mori, “Per ‘Un Felice Governo’. La Costituzione Provvisoria Della REpubblica Bergamasca (24 Marzo-5 Aprile 1797),” 61.

⁶³⁷ “Sessione della sera 29 Marzo 1797. V.S. Nella Municipalità Bergamasca”, *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca*, 42.

⁶³⁸ Pepe, “Mascheroni, Lorenzo”; Giannini, “Tadini Antonio.”

⁶³⁹ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:76.

uprising some days after the Bergamo uprising.⁶⁴⁰ In fact the earliest mention of Lupi found in the research for this prosopography came from a mention of him as the lieutenant of the Bergamasco division in Brescia who eventually disarmed the Venetian soldiers.

If Bergamo was the first uprising, that of Brescia was by far the largest in the western Terraferma. The more autonomous nature of the western Terraferma meant that Brescia never was able to amass the same level of central authority over other cities in the western Terraferma such as Bergamo, Cremona or Verona which the Bolognese Senate acquired over the course of the centuries in the Papal States. The occupation of the French had left a similar impression on the Brescian aristocracy as it had on that of Bergamo. Many Brescians saw the French advance as an opportunity for political and economic independence from the Serenissima. And while they may not have had political ambitions against the other major municipalities of the area like Verona, Bergamo and Cremona, it was clear their intentions to take control of the rich Lake Garda region which saw a lively trade economy between the Swiss, Austrian and Terraferma peoples by the late eighteenth century.

Much like the Bergamasco revolt the conspiracy to enact the uprising was conducted in early March. French, Milanese and Bergamasco patriots all contributed to planning the overthrow of the Venetian military authority in Brescia, whose presence had been notably greater in the Garda region following the armistice with Bonaparte.⁶⁴¹ On 15 March, just days after the success of the Bergamo uprising, the Brescian Conspirators met to plan the uprising in their own city. On the evening of 17 March, the leaders of the revolt organized the distribution of arms and printed the declaration of the Republic to be distributed. The following morning a combination of revolutionary aristocrats and bourgeois patriots enacted the uprising which saw a violent – though brief – clash with Venetian soldiers. Later that day the Lombard Legion led by La Hoz along with Alborghetti's Bergamasco division arrived with artillery offered by the French *Armée*.⁶⁴² By the evening the Venetians been disarmed and the Brescian Republic had been declared in the city and surrounding territories.

⁶⁴⁰ “Brescia Addì 29 Ventoso (19 Marzo 1797 v.s.)”, *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca*, 15; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:2.

⁶⁴¹ Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:55–56 Vol. 9.

⁶⁴² Odorici, 10:63 Vol. 9.

The Brescian Republic never declared a constitutional order like that of Bergamo or the Cispadane Republics. Instead, it was led initially by a series of six provisional committees which administered to specific sectors of the Brescian government such as public instruction, finance, the military and a central administrative committee.⁶⁴³ These committees were run principally by members of the major aristocratic families in Brescia. As the Brescian Republic expanded into the surrounding regions of Lake Garda and into the Valcalmonica in the Alps north of the lake, these committees remained in the hands of the same, principally Brescian noble figures, a factor which would serve as a point of tension within the coming months as the central municipality would be unable to control these peripheral Territories to great effect. As with the Bergamasco Republic – and perhaps even more so – the Brescian Republic was committed to the revolutionary concepts of individual freedom and economic and political liberties.⁶⁴⁴ They were not committed to the establishment of a new social order nor a French style constitutionalism. This independence seemed to call back to an American style of localized aristocratic independence (particularly in the southern states of the young American Republic), than the French style of revolutionary nationalism.⁶⁴⁵ Brescian aristocrats like Fenaroli and Mazzuchelli had become enamored with French military strength and the gentility and heroism of its generals, Bonaparte above all. However, this did not mean that the Brescian nobility was looking to enact the same kind of social changes which came with the French Constitution of Year III. They welcome the French occupation as it brought order but spurned French style republicanism for its destabilizing effects. Bonaparte for his part, was quite happy to allow the Brescian aristocrats their autonomy as long as they tolerated the French presence and continued to aid in the funding of the *Armée*'s struggle against the Austrians.

Perhaps more than any other of the Terraferma uprisings that which took place in Brescia saw the largest number of future *Gran Consiglio* representatives taking place either in the revolt itself or in the republican government afterwards. Those radical politicians who did participate in the Brescian Republic like Vincenzo Federici (Montevecchio della Valcalmonica), Giacomo Moccini (Lonato) Felice Mozzini (Lonato) or Lauro Glissentini (Salò) often came from the

⁶⁴³ “Il popolo sovrano di Brescia Municipalità Provisionale e Relativi Comitati”, *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano*, 2.

⁶⁴⁴ “N.7, N.8, N. 9, La municipalità provvisoria” *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano*, 6.

⁶⁴⁵ Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 159–68; Isreal, *The Expanding Blaze*, 70–89.

peripheral regions of the Republic.⁶⁴⁶ Even then these were far from the radical patriots found in the patriotic societies of Milan. The majority of future *Gran Consiglio* representatives from the Brescian republic were members of the military aristocracy like Antonio Sabatti, Ettore Martinengo, Federico Mazzucchelli and Giacomo Lecchi.⁶⁴⁷ Others like Giuseppe Fenaroli (Brescia), Marc'Antonio Cismondi (Edolo), or Pietro Calvi (Edolo) came from influential aristocratic families in their respective historic feudal territories who had come to form a friendship with the French Military command. Bonaparte, for example, would remain at the house of Fenaroli while in this region of the peninsula from 1796 to his deposition in 1815.

The final uprising and republic to arise in the Spring of 1797 was that of Cremona in late March. As none of the major players from its occurrence came to sit as members of the *Gran Consiglio* (at least as has been discovered in the course of this research), it will not be given the same in-depth treatment as the Brescian and Bergamasco uprisings.

The final event which defined this political network was in fact one contrary to the other three in that it was an uprising *against* the revolutionary establishment. In this case it was the suppression of the anti-French uprising in Verona – not its fulfillment – which defined the final piece of the Spring 1797 network. The city of Verona had long been the more conservative of the western Terraferma cities; for example, it hosted Louis XVIII while in exile in the early 1790s before the French invasion.⁶⁴⁸ On 17 April reactionary forces from within the city of Verona staged a revolt to overthrow the French.⁶⁴⁹ These reactionaries were met with swift military action on the part of the *Armée*, the Lombard Legion (commanded by La Hoz) and local revolutionary militants, among which were the aristocratic former venetian commanders Pietro Polfranceschi and Sebastiano Salimbeni. The violent suppression of the Veronese reactionaries unified the various members of the western Terraferma political networks which had arisen in the spring revolts. The local aristocracies of Bergamo, Brescia and the rest of the western Terraferma came to see themselves as much as national revolutionaries and patriots as citizens of their local municipalities, a trait which would come to define these representative understanding of the nationalist agenda.

⁶⁴⁶ Vedova, *Biografia Degli Scrittori Padovani*, 551; Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:235.

⁶⁴⁷ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:78; Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*; Ogner, “Sabatti Antonio.”

⁶⁴⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 601.

⁶⁴⁹ Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:93–94.

The Comitati Riuniti: a union of pre-Cisalpine Political networks

In reality, the final political network which shall be covered in this chapter was more of a combination of the previous three networks. As such its roots will receive less attention and instead focus on how it worked to unify the political networks of Lombardy, the Cispadane and the western Terraferma into a singular Cisalpine political network in the three months between the proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic in Messidor Year V (July 1797) and the nomination of the Cisalpine legislative assemblies in Brumaire Year VI (November 1797). The formation of the Cisalpine provisional government by Bonaparte in the days following the proclamation demonstrated a concerted effort on the part of the French – and in particular the military command of the *Armée* – to unify the series of Italian allies which they had made in the years since the initial invasion. The *comitati riuniti*, a series of committees meant to replace the legislative branch of the Cisalpine government before the activation of the Assemblies on 2 Frimaire Year VI, were constructed from the leading figures of the previous three political networks covered, many of whom went on to be nominated as members of the *Gran Consiglio*. Others went on to serve as provisional administrators and organizers in the process of constructing an executive administration in the Cisalpine departments. These men made up the bulk of the *Gran Consiglio* thanks in large part to their regional experience and specialized knowledge.

There existed four committees established by Bonaparte which constituted the *comitati riuniti*.⁶⁵⁰ The first committee mentioned was the constitutional committee, which was the primary committee charged with the construction of the Cisalpine administration and the verification of laws according to the Cisalpine Constitution before they were passed onto Bonaparte for final approval. In effect this latter charge permitted the constitutional committee a greater responsibility over the other three committees as they had the right to review the declarations, acts and laws which the other committees hoped to pass. The constitutional committee also had the primary legislative responsibility until the Assemblies were activated on 2 Frimaire. Of the six members on this committee, five (Fontana, Mascheroni, Longo, Oliva and Lecchi) came to serve as members of the *Gran Consiglio*, contributing more than any of the other three committees. The second committee was the Judicial/legal committee, charged with the construction of the judiciary system

⁶⁵⁰ “Legge d’esecuzione dell’Atto Costituzionale.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:70; *Nomina dei Comitati consulenti*”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:31.

of the Cisalpine Republic according to the structures assigned in the Cisalpine constitution.⁶⁵¹ In addition to their role in the nomination and assignment of temporary magistrates and agents of the provisional court and tribunal system, this committee similarly acted as a temporary supreme court making judiciary decisions and constitutional interpretations until the councils were activated. This committee saw only one of its members (Perseguiti) going on to serve in the *Gran Consiglio*. The third committee the finance committee was charged with the construction of the Cisalpine financial plan as well as the administration of government finances such as taxation, basic administrative expenditures, and evaluation of seized goods. The financial committee did not have the authority to authorize funds which would be utilized by the Cisalpine Executive Ministry and Directory, leading to a number of conflicts once the assemblies had been activated (see chapters VII, VIII, and XI). The only member nominated to the *Gran Consiglio* from the Finance committee was Melzi d'Eril, who never took his place as a representative being nominated as the Cisalpine ambassador to the Radstadt Congress in Brumaire.⁶⁵² The final committee was the military committee, charged with the organization and mobilization of the Cisalpine military. Though this committee worked the closest to Bonaparte, the lack of funds from the Cisalpine Directory left the committee virtually powerless. Nevertheless, they were successful in establishing the models of the Cisalpine military and national guard organizational units. Of the six members only one (La Hoz, also the commander of the Cisalpine Military at the time) would go on to serve as a member of the *Gran Consiglio*.

The *comitati riuniti* were strongly under the thumb of Bonaparte without whose permission legislation could not be passed.⁶⁵³ This indicates that the defining factor of this political network is not necessarily a commitment to revolutionary government, the application of modern constitutionalism or local independence, but rather a notable loyalty to the French republicanizing project and more importantly to Bonaparte and the French *Armée*. This influence of Bonaparte – already the preeminent power as all legislation required his mark of approval – was augmented by the presence of Cisalpine legislative and executive authorities whose politics would have been

⁶⁵¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title VIII, Articles 202-273.

⁶⁵² “Seduta XXIX, 28 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:425 Melzi first requested an extension in order to take his position in the chamber on 18 December 1797 but eventually resigned to focus on his duties at the Radstadt Congress on 15 January; “Seduta LVII, 1 di 26 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:34–35.

⁶⁵³ “Nomina dei Comitati consulenti”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:31 “Legge d’esecuzione dell’Atto costituzionale. Articolo II.”

reflective of Bonaparte's goals in the region regardless. This influence in Cisalpine politics born from Bonaparte served many of these same men – even in the absence of Bonaparte from Brumaire Year VI⁶⁵⁴ – to acquire personal power (see Chapter V) early on. These men would become the initial authorities in the *Gran Consiglio* to direct early legislation in such a way as to continue the political aims of Bonaparte and his inner circle.

This of course begs the question, what were those political aims? The record of legislation “passed” by the *comitati riuniti* and affirmed by Bonaparte between Messidor Year V and Brumaire Year VI provides the historian with a large data set from which to understand the political direction of this network. The legislative agenda which the *comitati riuniti* put forward was strongly based on French models brought by Bonaparte and other civilian advisors from the French republic. They also drew heavily on the various institutional organizations formatted in the three political networks from 1796-1797. These projects included: the formation and organization of a Cisalpine National guard;⁶⁵⁵ the establishment of the twenty Cisalpine Departments and their central administration;⁶⁵⁶ the creation of a public education program;⁶⁵⁷ the establishment of civil marriage regulations;⁶⁵⁸ the suppression and administration of religious corporations and aristocratic societies;⁶⁵⁹ the creation of a generic tax and customs system;⁶⁶⁰ and the organization and celebration of republican festivals.⁶⁶¹ After the activation of the Legislative Assemblies in

⁶⁵⁴ “Estratto de’ Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo. Seduta del giorno 19 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:8 Preamble to the law nominating the original list of representatives to the *Gran Consiglio* in which Bonaparte passed his authority to the Legislative Assemblies from the moment the Assemblies are activated on 2 Frimaire Year VI.

⁶⁵⁵ “Piano di Organizzazione della Guardia Nazionale della Repubblica Cisalpina”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:22–29.

⁶⁵⁶ Il Direttorio Esecutivo, ne’ di cui atti venne depositata dal Generale in Capo la seguente Legge di riparto dei Dipartimenti della Repubblica Cisalpina, e del numero de’ Rappresentati nel Corpo Legislativo competente a Ciascuno di essi. Milano 13. Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:4–5.

⁶⁵⁷ “Avviso. Milano dalla Casa del Comune 18 Vendemmese anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:162.

⁶⁵⁸ “Estratto de’ Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del 6 Termidoro... una Legge relativa agli Fedecommissi, alla Succession interesata, ed alla Minor Età del tenor seguente”, “Estratto de’ Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del 6 Termidoro... la Legge relativa ai Registri delle Nascite, de’ Matriomj, delle Morti, e de’ Cittadini attivi, del tenore seguente.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:87–88, 90–91.

⁶⁵⁹ “Milano 15 Fruttidoro anno V. Repubblicano. Il Direttorio Esecutivo ai Comitati riuniti Consulenti”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:146–47.

⁶⁶⁰ “Tassa Mercontile”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:149–52.

⁶⁶¹ “Avviso... Miano 5 Complementario anno V.” *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi VI*, 3:141 Law establishing the celebration in the Cisalpine Republic, the commemoration of festival of the founding of the French Republic.

November of 1797 many of these early provisional legal structures came to be used as the basis for the future official resolutions and legal plans instituted by the *Gran Consiglio*.

Dataset III and its examination of prosopographical networks provides the historian with extremely useful information about the highly variable backgrounds of the individual representatives which effected their place on the *Gran Consiglio* political spectrum formulated in Chapter III. This prosopographical data already can allow the historian to draw some specific conclusions: The representatives were generically quite young, sitting well within the 25–40-year-old range proscribed by the Cisalpine Constitution. The majority came from the former Duchy of Milan or had at least settled there by 1797 meaning that they most likely took part in the Lombard political Network from 1796-1797. The other main geographic influence came from the Western Terraferma, in particular the cities of Bergamo and Brescia, both of which put a strong focus on local municipal independence which fit within a larger national identity. The other major center of Bologna, while influential, particularly in its contributions to future Cisalpine legislative commissions, was intellectually and politically weaker than the other two areas, though had a legal professional network on par with that of the former Duchy of Milan. Finally, the experience of each of these groups, rooted in a shared loyalty to Bonaparte and his version of the French Republicanizing project, in addition to each networks own experience during the *ancien regime*, helps to explain the ways by which the *Gran Consiglio* adapted French constitutional, legislative and political precedents to their own specific histories and conditions, which in turn effected the development of political and legislative cultures. The remainder of this thesis combines the extensive information provided in this and the other two data sets to explain how these political and legislative cultures were formed based on internal and external political interaction patterns and practices from November 1797 to September 1798.

Part II
Political
Structures of
the *Gran*
Consiglio

Chapter V

Leadership and Power in the *Gran Consiglio*

While the origins and experience of a representative might be important in understanding the ideological background of an individual, it was his contribution to the events of the Cisalpine Republic through *Gran Consiglio* which make him worthy of study. The *Gran Consiglio* was opened for the first time as a government body on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797). It remained an independent legislative body - one of two under the Cisalpine Constitution— and endured until the Coup d'État of 14 Fructidor Year VI (31 August 1798) instituted at the direction of French ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic, Claude-Joseph Trouvé. Its final officially recorded sitting as the *Gran Consiglio* under the 1797 Cisalpine Constitution was 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). Within this ten-month period, the representatives analyzed in the previous chapters, utilized their specific educational, professional, and political backgrounds to create the longest period of largely autonomous democratic-republican government yet then known on the Italian peninsula.

This chapter will look at those who found themselves serving as leaders within the *Gran Consiglio*, and who amassed enough power and influence to affect the trajectory of legislative and political history. This influence would serve as a foundation for the political ideology which evolved within *Gran Consiglio*, and would eventually dominate the political culture, not only of the Cisalpine Republic, but of Napoleonic and Risorgimento era Italy. This argument will be accomplished by first understanding the nature of power and social relationships in a legislative setting, as well as the defining features of political leadership within the Council. Then, by examining the quantitative data from the *processi verbali*, it will be possible to make some conclusions regarding how these features applied to influence and power within the *Gran Consiglio*. Finally, there will be an analysis of the two major divisions of power, personal and

positional, and the mediums through which they were expressed - discourses and official legislative offices - in order to understand the construction of influence by particular individuals. As Part II of this study looks more generally at the structure, relationships, and instruments of the *Gran Consiglio* and not the prerogatives or policies, the focus for this chapter will be on look more on how the men examined in the prosopographical study in Part I formed and defined leadership as it applies to the theme of legislature building. Instead, the examination of policy making, and the laws and ideas generated from this newly formed legislative structure which created a truly new and Italian Revolutionary political culture will be defined in Part III.

Leadership, by definition, is the implication of power within an organization;⁶⁶² power in turn is the relationship between two actors in which one – the agent – carry's influence over the behavior of the other – the target.⁶⁶³ Influence in this scenario is the change which occurs in the behavior, opinions, attitudes, goals and/or values of the target.⁶⁶⁴ Leadership figures, therefore, are those which are endowed with the power to effect change within others in order to obtain a goal. In a legislative setting leadership takes on many forms, but effectively serves the same function of influencing the passage of particular pieces of legislation, and in doing so establishing the political culture of the nation. Leadership figures are fundamental to the establishment of legislative norms, which often proceed in effecting the forms and methodology by which legislation is adopted, and which can mutate, alternate, or die according to successive changes to the internal elite within a legislative body.⁶⁶⁵

With respect to the *Gran Consiglio*, the internal elite which led the new legislative council was constructed on the basis of social relationships which controlled the balance of power and which directed legislation. For the purposes of this study the internal elite will be constructed from the individuals who were able to harness the highest amount of total power (the highest combined rank of personal, positional, and legislative power described below and in chapter V), which is constructed from Ranks 1, 3 and 4 described in Chapter II. For statistical reasons explained below, 60 individuals – or half of those selected for the prosopographical study (two individuals shared the rank of 59 which is in fact the true half-way point) – made up the leadership. However, as will

⁶⁶² Cummings, "The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures," 4.

⁶⁶³ French and Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," 150.

⁶⁶⁴ Mulder et al., "Power, Situation, and Leaders' Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study," 566.

⁶⁶⁵ Ronald D Hedlund, « Organizational Attributes of Legislatures: Structures, Rules, Norms, Resources », *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9, n° 1 (1984): 65-66.

be demonstrated, leadership was not solely restricted to overall influence and there will be mention and analysis of individuals who were leaders in individual aspects of power (personal or positional) but failed to gain any meaningful influence across all facets of the *Gran Consiglio*. The question remains then, how is it possible to judge who belongs to this leadership class within the Council?

Charisma and Power in Leadership

The idea of leadership as a figure of power within an organization begins with the individual's ability to grow influence. In most cases this ability came from a momentary call to power within a certain situation, a quality defined by Max Weber as "charisma".⁶⁶⁶ According to Weber:

The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognise him, he is their master – so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through "proving" himself.⁶⁶⁷

When applying this idea of "charisma" to legislative politics, it can therefore be defined as a spontaneous moment in which the verbal message of the speaker provides an image which stimulates an emotional response from other members of the group and evokes dissatisfaction from the originalist, in favor of the resolution offered by the charismatic speaker.⁶⁶⁸ The speaker has a momentary power to enact influence (hence the ability to change the behavior or attitudes of others), but lacks the control (according to Weber, the security that a directive will be obeyed).⁶⁶⁹

Thus, charisma in the context of the *Gran Consiglio* refers to a representative using revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) imagery to influence the attitudes of the Council.⁶⁷⁰ Often

⁶⁶⁶ Max Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, S.N. Eisenstadt (ed., trans.), The Heritage of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 77

⁶⁶⁷ Weber, 20.

⁶⁶⁸ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *The Communication of Leadership: The design of leadership style* (New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 48; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 52 Weber in fact discusses how charisma is by nature revolutionary. A leader's charisma lasts only as long a society undergoes a structural change. When that society stabilizes, the charisma is either left by the side or legitimized through a rationalized discipline of the members to adopt the charismatic ideology as an official doctrinal authority.

⁶⁶⁹ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 15–16; Peirò and Melià, "Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations," 15; French and Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," 151–53; Mulder et al., "Power, Situation, and Leaders' Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study," 566.

⁶⁷⁰ Charteris-Black, *The Communication of Leadership: The Design of Leadership Style*, 49–50.

these images were of the security of the nation, the cause of Italian liberty and patriotism, or the progression of the French Revolution. This imagery in discourse could be used for simple issues like housing arrangements for public workers, or more complex affairs such as raising funds to pay French troops rioting in Mantua due to lack of payment by their own government.⁶⁷¹ But charisma alone is too unstable to facilitate long-term power as its legitimization exists only for as long as the speaker is recognized by his peers.⁶⁷² Thus, often within a debate, one finds multiple bids for leadership, through the use of charisma to influence the outcome of the argument and in doing so gain power over his colleagues. This may mean, that representatives would compete, even amongst allies, by evoking charismatic discourse in support of another's proposition, which has the alternate effect of transferring power in the moment to the supporter, and not the original speaker. This was often the case for previously recognized leadership figures.

A good example of this would be the speech presented on 9 Ventôse (27 February 1798) by Girolamo Coddé in which he denounces the Consiglio dei *Seniori*, an event covered in greater detail in Chapter IX. His accusations of counterrevolutionary activity are presented with strong patriotic imagery against a counter-revolutionary foe, meant to evoke a strong emotion from the patriotic revolutionary representative body.⁶⁷³ He is instantly recognized as influencing the council's attitudes in that moment and thus he is able to derive power. Yet, it is Giuseppe Fenaroli who makes the motion to have a permanent sitting.⁶⁷⁴ In doing so power is officially transferred to Fenaroli who acted upon the sentiments first raised by Coddé, but presented them in a more legitimate form of power – through the motion - hence in that moment taking on the leadership mantle.

It is power therefore, the marker of leadership, which gives charisma its ability to influence behavior and opinion, and in this case legislation. Power, the influencing ability of the individual, must be converted into authority, which is the influencing ability of the organization.⁶⁷⁵ In our case while a singular representative may have power within the Council, it is the Council itself which has the authority to pass resolutions, and as such when a representative is able to pass a piece of

⁶⁷¹ “Seduta LXII, 30 nervoso VI” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:100–102; “Seduta LXXXVII, 25 piovoso VI” Montalcini and Alberti, 1:532–35.

⁶⁷² Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 22.

⁶⁷³ “Seduta CI, 9 nervoso VI” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:12–15.

⁶⁷⁴ « Seduta CI, 9 ventoso Year VI » Montalcini et Alberti, 2:15-19.

⁶⁷⁵ Cummings, “The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures,” 5.

legislation to the *Seniori* for approval as Fenaroli did, he has both power and authority behind his actions. In this example as well, one finds a good example of leadership politics, in which a previously recognized authority figure (Fenaroli was the first and longest president of the council) establishes the ultimate authority of the measure.

But power must derive from somewhere. A 1959 social psychology study by John R.P. French and Bertram Raven explained five generic bases of power – the method by which an individual is able to exert influence over a target – which are selected based on the condition of the target and the agent to obtain a goal: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert.⁶⁷⁶ Raven later added a sixth form of power “informational power”.⁶⁷⁷ The choice of these bases when channeling a charismatic discourse into more concrete power is dependent upon the needs of the leader. Someone seeking affiliation may use a strategy based in referent or reward power, while someone seeking to achieve a goal may use informational or expert power to carry out their objective.⁶⁷⁸ Other factors may include the relationship between the agent and the target, the strength of the target, and the urgency of the agent.

A 1984 study by Dutch social psychologists Mulder et al., further expanded the ideas of French and Raven’s power bases to explain the forms of power and how they are legitimized by leadership. They identified eight bases of influence (sanctioned, formal, referent, expert, reciprocal open consultation, expertise, upward and outward influence) which they separated into two forms (forceful and mild) which will dominate dependent upon whether a situation is crisis or non-crisis.⁶⁷⁹ Power therefore can be seen as having two forms, one which uses force and legitimized

⁶⁷⁶ Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,” 5; French and Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” 154–60 “(a) Reward power, based on P’s [‘P’ is the agent upon which influence is being exerted] perception that O [O the agent exerting the social influence] has the ability to mediate rewards for him; (b) coercive power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate punishments for him; (c) legitimate power, based on the perception by P that O has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for him; (d) referent power, based on P’s identification with O; (e) expert power, based on the perception that O has some special knowledge or expertise.”

⁶⁷⁷ Peirò and Melià, “Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations,” 16; Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,” 2. Informational power is the ability of P to persuade O to carry out a directive due to information which is only privy to P that he is willingly sharing with O. In this case as P has the information which O needs to carry out the directive P is in a position of power over O.

⁶⁷⁸ Raven, “The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence,” 6.

⁶⁷⁹ Mulder et al., “Power, Situation, and Leaders’ Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study”, 566-67 “*Sanction power*. The behavior of a person is determined by his hope that another person will reward him, materially as well as psychologically, if he complies to O’s wishes—or P’s fear that O will punish him if he does not... *Positional power*. A person follows the leader because as a consequence of his own and his leader’s position in the organization of which both form a part, the person feels he ought to do so... *Referent power*. A person feels that he and O are one of

legal authority, and one which tends to use more persuasive and interpersonal social relationships to obtain a goal. In addition to French and Raven's study, the Dutch study also looks at forms of leadership which include external influence and influence based on mutual respect, where the balance between the leader and the led is more fluid, and not necessarily internally derived.

These two forms of legitimized power can be defined as positional (Formal) power and personal (Informal) power.⁶⁸⁰ Positional power generally derives from a recognized leadership position, and tends to take the form of sanctioned, legitimate/formal, or coercive power.⁶⁸¹ This is not necessarily always the case as there may be positions in which positional power is derived from a necessary expertise, such as a military general or a professor. In the case of the *Gran Consiglio*, these leaders take the form of council presidents, inspectors of the chamber, and secretaries. It is not the *person* in which legitimate power resides but the *office*. Positional power generally relies heavily on hierarchical structures to maintain its legitimacy. Personal power, contrastingly, generally derives from the personal abilities or characteristics of the individual, and tends to take the form of expert, referent, informational or charismatic power, upward or outward influence, or expertise. Personal power is based on the skills, abilities, or experience of the individual.⁶⁸² This does not mean however that elements of legitimate, coercive, or sanctioned

a kind; consequently, P is receptive to O's influence. An extreme form of this relationship exists when P, whether consciously or unconsciously, attempts to imitate O in thought or action... *Expert power*. According to P, O possesses more relevant abilities and/or more knowledge than does P himself; therefore, P will tend to follow O's directives... *Reciprocal open consultation*. In reciprocal open consultation or influence by open argumentation, P and O are equally willing to let themselves be persuaded by the other's arguments. The content of the communication, not a difference in sanction power, positional power, referent power, or expert power between O and P determines the communication's effect... When P and O disagree in a particular situation, it cannot be predicted who will be put in the right. Therefore, equality and reciprocity are the essential features of this relationship... *Expertise*. In a relationship characterized by expertise, or professional skill, according to P, O has great expertise, without P comparing O's expertise to his own. This is different from expert power, in which, in a clearly unequal relationship, P attributes a lesser amount of relevant abilities and/or knowledge to himself than to O... *Upward influence*... This is the influence O exerts upward in the system or organization as a whole. This influence is unspecified as to the equality or inequality of power in the relationship between O and P; it is left open if P attributes upward influence to O based on, for instance, expert power and/ or referent power and/ or open consultation... *Outward influence*. Finally, the concept of outward influence was added to the IAQ because it was assumed that, organizations being relatively open systems in which a great deal depends on the way the external environment is handled, a leader's effective functioning is also related to the influence she or he exerts on this environment. Once more unspecified as to its base, this concept refers to the influence O has, not only in his own unit, but outside the organization as a whole."

⁶⁸⁰ Peirò and Melià, "Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations," 17.

⁶⁸¹ Peirò et Melià, 6-7 "Positional power," when capitalized will refer to the overall form of power and not the base; "positional power" not capitalized will refer to the power base/ influence structure defined by French and Raven and the Dutch study.

⁶⁸² Peirò and Melià, 6.

power cannot also aid in the exercising of personal power since often experience is rooted in formal appointment to a position. In the *Gran Consiglio*, personal power is more common since it is exhibited in charismatic discourse, expert opinions in both general assembly and commissions, revolutionary reputation, and outside relationships. Personal power can also be expressed through reciprocal open consultation, in which two representatives of seemingly equal influence face off in a debate setting and the winner of the debate is awarded the leadership position; the outcome of the debate is not predicated on the expertise of the individual and the points and counterpoints are resected and understood by both parties.⁶⁸³ While this is certainly present in the discourses analyzed later in the chapter, it is in fact a much more dominant aspect of commission structure examined in the following chapter.

Legitimized control is defined as when an agent is able to exercise either form of power (personal or positional) and can have the expectation that his wishes will be obeyed by the target. According to Weber, legitimate control comes from three forms of authority: traditional legitimization which is based “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority),” such as monarchs, *Seniority* based leadership or aristocracy; rational legitimization based “on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)” such as elected officials or merit based nominations; and charismatic legitimacy which is based on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns and order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)” such as a religious figure, a political speaker or popular celebrity.⁶⁸⁴ While traditional authority can only legitimize positional power, and charismatic authority can only legitimize personal power, both forms of power can be legitimized through legal/rational authority.⁶⁸⁵

It is therefore fair to view the *Gran Consiglio* as the replacement of traditionally legitimized authority with that of charismatic authority. After all, by embracing the French Revolutionary ideas, the Cisalpine patriots had theoretically done away with almost all forms of

⁶⁸³ Mulder et al., “Power, Situation, and Leaders’ Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study,” 567.

⁶⁸⁴ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 46.

⁶⁸⁵ Peirò and Melià, “Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations,” 7–8.

traditional government.⁶⁸⁶ Yet at the same time, limits were placed to make sure the events of the French Terror during the years 1793-1794, were not imitated on the Italian peninsula, in which charismatic leaders like Danton, Robespierre or Hébert were able to gain rapid and unchecked control of authority through pure charismatic legitimization.⁶⁸⁷ This demonstrates then the retention, and in fact augmentation of *legally* legitimized power which worked alongside *charismatically* legitimized power under the Cisalpine Constitution of 1797.

This was not a sudden transition however; when Bonaparte first entered into Italy, his aim was both to expel the Austrian presence while maintaining order.⁶⁸⁸ After securing the support of traditional authority figures (Giacomo Lamberti, Carlo Arici, Carlo Filippo Aldrovandi-Marsecotti)⁶⁸⁹, Bonaparte also successfully used his personal charisma to attract and elevate particular individuals such as Francesco Reina, Bartolomeo Cavendoni or Giuseppe La Hoz.⁶⁹⁰ The closeness of these individuals to the figure of Bonaparte combined legitimized traditional and charismatic leadership figures who would be able to exercise greater personal power (through upward/outward influence) already before they participated in the debates of the *Gran Consiglio*. More importantly, however, membership to the Legislature, and therefore the *Gran Consiglio*, was based on nomination, a legal form of legitimization. The direct nomination by Bonaparte of the

⁶⁸⁶ Carlo Zaghi, *Il Direttorio Francese e la repubblica cisalpina: La nascita di uno stato moderno*, 1^{re} éd., vol. 1, Italia e Europa: Bicentenario della Rivoluzione Francese (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea, 1992), 123-25. In reality from the onset the idea of doing away with all forms of *ancien regime* authority was immediately contested, not only by conservative but more moderate members of the Cisalpine political establishment in 1796-1797, as has been rightly pointed out by Zaghi. However, this idea of overhauling the *ancien regime* system and replacing it with a more modern revolutionary government structure is the fundamental principle behind the Cisalpine Constitution and despite objections was the end goal overall for most Cisalpine republicans.

⁶⁸⁷ Antonino De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, Scritti di Storia, historical writings, écrits d'histoire (Milan-Torino: Pearson Italia, 2016), 50-53; Ian McIntosh, « Legitimacy and Authority », in *Classical Sociological Theory: A Reader* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 172-74; *Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina*, anno V della Repubblica Francese (MDCCXCVII), Year V della Repubblica Francese (MDCCXCVII), Tit. V Art. 45-47; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 63 In fact Weber specifically notes Robespierre as having gained a sort of charismatic authority which when legitimized took on an anti-authoritarian religiosity. This was necessary for the continuation of the charismatic leadership exhibited by the Mountain, which became a sort of revolutionary charismatic dictatorship, consistently transitory and thus unable to stabilize successfully; Antonino De Francesco, « Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français », in *Républiques Soeurs: Le Directoire et la Révolution atlantique*, éd. par Pierre Serna (Rennes: Press Univeritaires de Rennes, 2008), 274-76.

⁶⁸⁸ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:54-58, 74-76; De Francesco, «Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,» 273-74.

⁶⁸⁹ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione per la costituzione della Repubblica italiana*, vol. 3, R. Accademia D'Italia Commissione per gli Atti delle Assemblee Costituzionali Italiane (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1940), 2 (Aldrovandi and Arici), 66 (Lamberti); For more on Lamberti see also V. Sani, « Lamberti Jacapo (Giacomo) », in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, 2004).

⁶⁹⁰ De Francesco, «Reina, Francesco»; Rastelli, «Cavedoni, Bartolomeo»; Rossi, «Lattanzi, Giuseppe.»

original delegation of representatives means that their personal power was no longer derived from their charismatic authority, nor their traditional authority but their expert, informational, or outward/upward influence in addition to the legal authority bestowed upon them by Bonaparte.⁶⁹¹

Personal and positional power were both fundamental to the establishment of an internal elite. Interestingly however, the formation of political parties - the ultimate union of both these forms of power - never fully manifested itself during the *Gran Consiglio*. Party formation was based on the necessary transformation of personal power inherit through an individual's skills and informational, charismatic or expert power, into more concrete positional power which took the form of party leadership, a process which helped in the party formation of the early French Republic.⁶⁹² Political party formation within the Italian Sister Republics was, if not actively avoided, at the very least circumvented by both the Cisalpine and French political establishment - still cautious of charismatic authority and the toll it took on Europe during the Terror years - and was consciously limited in both the Cisalpine Constitution and the French Constitution of Year III.⁶⁹³ This does not mean that a sort of proto-factionalism - defined along the lines of political ideology from Chapter II – never came into existence. The following Chapter on commissions will discuss this phenomenon more clearly, since these factions were most apparent due to the institutionalization of a committee system, particularly after the events of 24 Germinal. However it should be noted here that while unofficial the beginnings of a party system were very much present, at least in the second half of the *Gran Consiglio*.

Leadership and influence trends in the Gran Consiglio based on the data sets

In order to consider an individual as a part of the leadership class, it is necessary to understand their influence over the entire council across the ten-month period from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI (22 November 1797 to 29 August 1798). The *processi verbali* provide the specific and useful raw data (explained in Chapter I and the results of which can be found in the appendices) which offer insight into discourses, commissions, and official positions. The data from the *processi verbali* presents us with two different forms of generalized individual leadership expression: personal power expressed through the numbers on discourses and positional power

⁶⁹¹ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137–38.

⁶⁹² Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 226–27.

⁶⁹³ De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 174; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 215.

expressed by the total of positions held. The calculation of this total combined influence is defined as total power. Commission participation is also a major factor in this calculation of influence, though it serves the unique role of expressing both personal and positional forms of power, and will be discussed further in Chapter V regarding legislative power and politics of the leadership.

Individual influence of representatives across the entire *Gran Consiglio* period is demonstrated by the individuals total power ranking or as will be referred to from now on, the leadership index. This index is constructed by combining the three main forms of power visible in the *processi verbali*: discourses (personal power), positions: president, secretary, inspector of the chamber (positional power) and commissions (legislative power). These three forms of power are quantified and ranked according to the rankings already described in Chapter II and correlate to Ranks 1 (personal power ranking), 3 (legislative power ranking) and 4 (positional power ranking), from here on out referred to as the Power Rankings. As these ranks have already been explained in depth, here the specifics of their subjective qualifications and criteria will not be addressed for the sake of brevity and to avoid redundancy.

This index ranks according to total power, not necessarily participation, the index which includes attendance records, and which is important in the decision of which representatives were to be included in the prosopographical study. Power and participation are not mutually exclusive. Power, as had already been established in the previous section, indicates the ability to influence. Participation by contrast gives no indication of influence, and in fact only refers to those whose input was noted at some point in the verbal process. Attendance does not denote power and as such cannot be included in its ranking. The index for leadership must therefore necessarily be constructed of similar but not the same data. For this reason, it was decided that leadership would only include the three quantitative classifications (i.e. the individual Rankings from Chapter II) which correspond to a form of power, as leadership is in fact the wielding of power.

Calculating total power

As already explained, the leadership index is constructed through the addition of the three forms of Power Rankings (1,3,4) into a final leadership score. This score is the sum of the rankings, thus the classification from 1 to the ultimate number possible in the specific ranking classified in Chapter II (Rank 1 and three both went from 1 to 139 and rank 4 from 1 to 61). This ultimate number, as previously established in Chapter II takes into consideration all of the representatives

of equal quantifiable score for the individual rank and those which share a given score receive the same rank. This is because both representatives carry the same amount of power in that category and thus cannot be ranked differently (again see the ranking criteria described for each in chapter II). The next rank down however will not be the next chronological number but registered according to the formula $r+n$ in which r equals the rank of the previous representatives, and N equals the number of individual representatives who share said ranks. Therefore, if three individuals share a discourse rank of 124, where r would equal 124 and n would equal 3, the rank of the next non-equal representative for discourses would be 127.

Once the ranking for the individual classifications have been added together into a total power score, these sums are then put in order from least to greatest. As with the category rankings, the final leadership index gives representatives with the same total power score an equal ranking, and likewise the next non-equally ranked representative the value according to the formula $r+n$ defined above. The final classification is therefore the numerical order in which the total power of each representative has been assessed once the quantitative data has been converted into a statistical ranking and then ordered based on that total. The criterion for this score is therefore the place an individual representative found himself in the order within the individual power classifications (personal, legislative or positional). The higher in these classifications a representative was, the lower his total power score, and thus the higher up in the leadership index.

Those in the top 50th percentile (which was rounded up to 30 since 59 is not an even number and a half of a person of course cannot be counted) who have been termed the elite, were the most important members of the *Gran Consiglio*. They found themselves ranking high in some or all of the three Rankings and as such had significantly lower total power score. This low score is what pushed them into the elite and allows an assessment into the influence that they wielded overall in the legislative process. This elite is differentiated from the leadership for two reasons: first it provides evidence of a legislative hierarchy and thus of decision making. This decision-making power will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter VI however the hierarchy which arose is necessary to understand as this means that there was – at least in some sense – a differentiation within the elite between those who made the laws and those who had the final decision. It points to a sort of leader of leaders which becomes important when discussing political ideological cohesion and early proto-factional formation. Secondly, the focus of the elite from the leadership

offers a more practical rationale. As the leaders of the leaders, the political make-up and backgrounds of this subset of representatives offers a smaller sample size which can be statistically justified to explain the formation of political culture.

The application of the leadership and elite formula can also be applied to the individual rankings, as discussed in Chapter II. Though numerically the individual Power Rankings may have differences in leadership and elite, they generally tend to be between 55-60 individuals for the leadership and 30-35 for the elite. They do not encompass the entirety of any the Ranking, the exception being for Rank 4 for which all 60 representatives who had sat in a council office were made part of the leadership. This was done to retain statistical and terminological consistency, and coincidentally also served to demonstrate how all positional power was generally accorded only to those considered leaders. This is not to say that a representative's total power ranking was dependent upon their positional power, in fact 12 of the 60 (20%) with positional power were not even listed in the Leadership index. In fact, when the leadership and elite of both Rank 1 (personal power) – consisting of a 59 representative leadership and 31 representative elite – and Rank 3 (legislative power) – consisting of a 57 representative leadership and a 32-representative elite – are compared to the classification from the Leadership index one finds some interesting results. The leadership of Rank 1 is made up of 50 of the 59 members of the General Leadership of the Council, and among them are all 30 of the General elite, of which 21 of these sit atop the Rank 1 elite. Similarly Rank 3 had a leadership from which 49 came from the General leadership, and 25 of the 30 General elite, all of whom sat in the elite for legislative power as well, though at different places. This tells us then that personal and legislative power contributed the most to a representative's overall influence and thus his rank in the Leadership index, with powerful have a slight advantage though most probably due to the slightly larger sample size.

The tendency towards personal power reflects similarities to the French legislative assemblies of the early 1790s.⁶⁹⁴ This could possibly indicate three things: 1) The Cisalpine republic provides proof that leadership in fledgling republics trends towards a more charismatic and revolutionary form of legitimization, as opposed to a more rationalized legal legitimization, despite the presence of a bureaucratic constitution. 2) Limits on party formation designated under the Constitution of Year III had the opposite effect than intended and in fact increased the personal

⁶⁹⁴ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 226.

power of individuals and regulated positional power along particular legislative, temporal and argumentative constitutional rules (a concept looked at more in depth in Chapter V when discussing majority versus minority centered legislatures). 3) personal power is the dominant form of leadership for debate structured government (i.e legislature) regardless of advantages which positional power may have under the constitution.

The prosopography and geography of total power

When combining the information on total power with the prosopographical data from Part I, one is able to establish particular tendencies of leadership along geographic lines. The geographical tendencies can be broken down into 3 categories: influence by department representation, influence by place of birth and by place of residence before the institution of the *Gran Consiglio*. This last tendency was selected because it is the closest temporally to the the geocultural conditions individual representatives found themselves in just before their participation in the *Gran Consiglio*. These categories give us the most measurable idea of the political map, as they fix concrete space and time.

The first tendency under examination would be the breakdown of leadership by department. It should be remembered that Title V Articles 49 and 52 explicitly states that while “Ciascun Dipartimento concorre in ragione della sua popolazione alla nomina de’ Membri del Consiglio dei *Seniori* e del *Gran Consiglio*”⁶⁹⁵, in practice “I Membri del Corpo Legislativo non sono Rappresentanti del Dipartimento, che gli ha nominate, ma della Nazione intiera, e non si può loro dare alcun mandato”⁶⁹⁶ Despite this, it does seem that particular departments were able to garner more influence by fielding more influential representatives.

Further analysis of departmental leadership should be broken down in two ways: first which departments had the highest ratio of leadership representatives to non-leadership and second which departments had the most leadership figures to the entire body. Let us begin with the latter as it is easier to understand. The five departments which had the most leadership figures were Serio (Bergamo) with 7 , Verbano (Varese), Olona (Milano) and Mela (Brescia) all with 5, and Panaro

⁶⁹⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” p. tit. V art. 49. Trans. “Each department will reasonably contribute to the nomination of members of the Council of Seniors and the Grand Council from within their population”

⁶⁹⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” p. tit. V art. 52. “The members of the Legislative Body are not representatives of the departments for which they are nominated, but of the Nation, and cannot be given any mandate”

with 4 representative. The departments with the most in the elite were Mela (Brescia) with 4, and Panaro (Modena), Olona (Milano) and Rena (Bologna) all with 3 representatives each. The department with the highest ratio of leadership to non-leadership Serio (Bergamo) with 6 of the total 12 representatives, followed by Verbano (Varese) with 5/11, Olona (Milan) 5/12, Mela (Brescia) 5/13 and Alta Padusa (Cento) 2/6. The departments with the highest ratio of elite representatives to their total representatives were Mela (Brescia) with 4/13, Olona (Milano) with 3/12, Rena (Bologna) with 3/12, Benaco (Desezano) 2/9, and Panaro (Modena) 3/14. The ratioed lists therefore provide us with a better understanding of how influence was spread across departments, particularly those from which were among the elite. They demonstrate that even though a department may not field a large number of representatives (For example Alta Padusa or Benaco) when compared to other larger departments (Panaro or Olona), these smaller departments were able to find a voice within the council leadership. That being said, one finds also can note greater participation from departments which had been centers of revolutionary activity before the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic (Milan, Brescia, Bologna to name a few) becoming members of the elite. This data can be further consulted in Appendix G.

Moving on from departments the breakdown of geographic origins of the representatives also plays a major role when analyzing the prosopographical and geo-political trends of total power. However, it should be noted that in fact the “origins” of representatives and their political ideologies, as well as their friends and allies within the council is significantly more subjective and harder to define since the majority of these men changed residencies multiple times between their birth and the point of their nomination. Giuseppe Compagnoni for example was born in Lugo in 1754, moved to Bologna at a young age after the death of his father, spent most of his adult life in Venice but had settled in Milan in the years just before the French invasion.⁶⁹⁷ Nor was his experience unique; many, in particular members of the clergy, had been moved around for academic or administrative reasons throughout northern and central Italy. However, for the purposes of this study, it is necessary adhere to the concrete quantitative data of birthplace and residence in 1797, in order to establish a provable pattern of leadership based on state origins. This information can also be found in its raw numeric form in Appendix G.

⁶⁹⁷ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 123, 141–43.

Leadership figures came from all of the former *ancien regime* states which made up (either entirely or in part) the Cisalpine Republic. It is no surprise that the largest number of representatives had origins from the former Duchy of Milan, since it hosted the future Cisalpine Capital and – along with Modena – was entirely consumed by the Cisalpine republic in July of 1797. 18 leadership figures were born in the former Duchy, and 24 resided there in 1797. Of the elite representatives, 6 were born in the Duchy of Milan and 10 resided there in 1797. The city in the Duchy from which the most leadership representatives came was overwhelmingly Milan (5 born, 12 residing) followed by Varese (2 born, 1 residing), and Pavia (1 born, 3 residing). Milan had the most elite born within its borders at 3 equal only to Bologna within the entire Cisalpine Republics and for elite residents it sat at 5, tied with Brescia and Modena. Milan and Pavia served as two of the most influential cities of the reform movements of the late eighteenth century academically, politically, and religiously. As such they were attractive for many sympathetic to the revolution, particularly from the intellectual class (scientists, political philosophers, lawyers, doctors, and revolutionary clergymen). Similarly, Milan would have been the largest urban area (after Venice) and the center of the largest and densest population center in Northern Italy, making it the first major city for any person travelling from Western Europe.⁶⁹⁸ Its geographic centrality made Milan a political, ideological, cultural, and economic exchange hub which significantly influenced its importance in the post-revolutionary world.

The state with the next-highest number of influential representatives was the Republic of Venice with 19 leadership representatives having been born there, and 16 residing in the territory by mid-1797. The Serenissima did contribute more to the elite overall (11 born, 10 residing), though only Brescia stood out as a major contributor city with 5 residing in 1797. While there was no overwhelmingly dominant city like Milan, the leadership tended, unsurprisingly, to come from the western part of the Terraferma (Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, Crema). The Spring of 1797 had become a hotbed of republican activity in this inland zone of the Serenissima. Brescia seems to provide the most influential representatives (2 born 6 residing), followed by Bergamo (3 born, 4 residing), Verona (1 born, 2 residing) and Padova (1 born 1 residing). There was also a significant delegation which came for the Lake Garda region and the surrounding mountains (Lonato, Rovato, Salò, Val Camonica all were the birthplaces of leadership and many elite as well). This is perhaps

⁶⁹⁸ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 5–14.

due to the fact that Brescia was - for many patriots from the Terraferma - the ultimate establishment of republicanism in the region before the integration of the Brescian, Cremese and Bergamasco Republics into the Cisalpine Republic.⁶⁹⁹ However, the statistics on birthplace and residence do not paint the full picture. Padova was one of the most robust university cities in all of Italy at the time and as such many representatives from the Papal States, Modena, and Milan in addition to the Serenissima passed through its walls.⁷⁰⁰ Likewise, Venice, as the largest trading port on the Adriatic in Italy at the time, was a hot bed of revolutionary activity and development, not only for representatives like Vincenzo Dandolo and Sebastiano Salimbeni but monumental figures like Ugo Foscolo and Melchiorre Cesarotti.⁷⁰¹ The Serenissima also contributed the largest number of representatives to the leadership (Luigi [Alvise] Savonarola [Padova], Pietro Polfranceschi [Verona], Salimbeni [Verona] and Dandolo [Venice]) who resided in cities left out of the Cisalpine Republic. Salimbeni, born in Split, was also the only leadership figure besides Reina (Lugano) to be born outside of modern Italy.

Following the Republic of San Marco, the cities of the former Papal States furnished the third highest number of leadership figures according to the total power rankings with 12 born and 8 residing there in 1797. The majority of the representatives came from the Emilia and Romagna – the areas of the former papal states annexed to the Cisalpine Republic – though Montalti was resident in Assisi in 1797. The trend is similar for the elite, with 7 born in the Papal States and only four continuing to reside there in 1797. Bologna was the most dominant city in the territory (3 born, 3 residing), followed by Ravenna (1 born 2 residing) and Ferrara (1 born, 1 residing). Many of the leadership figures born in the Papal States were academics (Michele Rosa for example), who would have been attracted to the more open minded universities like Reggio-Modena or Pavia, and left their place of birth to teach in these places (Brunetti for example).⁷⁰² This is not to say that the annexed areas of the Papal states were not still major centers. They were firstly, the most important parts of the Holy See after Rome itself, from an economic and trade perspective. Bologna remained the most influential University city in all of central Italy, and

⁶⁹⁹ Bazzani, *I giornali democratici di Brescia (1797-1799, I (Aprile-Dicembre 1797):13–15.*

⁷⁰⁰ Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*, 33–44.

⁷⁰¹ Pederzani, *I Dandolo*, 59,64.

⁷⁰² Pizzoli, *Notizie Intorno Alla Vita Del Conte Vincenzo Brunetti.*

counted among its residents some of the most influential members of the *Gran Consiglio*.⁷⁰³ Romagna was also the most densely populated area in all of the Papal States and its loss was extreme for the Roman economic, political and cultural heredity.⁷⁰⁴

The Duchy of Modena was the last major state to contribute a high number of representatives to the Council leadership, six being born within the territory, and nine residing there in 1797. Like the Duchy Milan, its entire territory was included in the Cisalpine Republic. However, Modena, in terms of size and population was not nearly as massive as Milan, and as such its presence in the leadership was proportionally smaller. It did contribute to the revolutionary movement, thanks in part to the importance of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, which played a similar role to Pavia in the development of the late eighteenth century reform movement in Hapsburg territories, and the renowned military excellence of the Modenese Regiments which provided important Cisalpine military authorities to the *Gran Consiglio* such as Angelo Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca.⁷⁰⁵ The duchy sits in last regarding number of leaders who came from the Duchy (6 born and 9 residing) when compared to the other large Northern Italian States of the *ancien regime*. Of the elite, 4 were born in the duchy and 6 were residing there in 1797. Modena was the most influential city (0 born, 5 residing) followed unsurprisingly by Reggio Emilia, the second city of the Duchy (1 born 1 residing).

The last major zone to contribute to the leadership of the Council were the unspecified mountain regions of the Alps who belonged to the Swiss Confederation or at various times the Serenissima or Duchy of Milan. The Valchiavenna contributed two names of on the lower end of the leadership ranking (Bianchi and Vertemate-Franchi). From the Valtellina came only Giuseppe Piazzi, a revolutionary journalist from Ponte.⁷⁰⁶ The final category for geographic influence regards foreign-born representative. None of the representatives resided outside of the Republic at the time of its declaration, however two were born to foreign states in 1797. Francesco Reina was

⁷⁰³ Giuseppe Gambari, for example, was the most legislatively powerful members of the *Gran Consiglio* and was an extraordinarily important member of the Bolognese Legal and Accademic *corpis internis*. see: Serafino Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche sopra l'Università e l'istituto delle scienze di Bologna e sopra gli stabilimenti e i corpi scientifici alla medesima addetti* (Bologna: S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 1840), 176.

⁷⁰⁴ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 5.

⁷⁰⁵ Ceretti, "Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo," 9.

⁷⁰⁶ ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 40, "Mozione e dichiarazione d'alcuni Valtellinesi ai loro Compatriotti, 29 Maggio 1797"; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:99.

born in Lugano, though at a young age he moved to Malgrate near Lecco.⁷⁰⁷ Francesco Antonio Alpruni was born in Borgo Valsugana in Trento, then a Bishop-Principality under the Hapsburgs.⁷⁰⁸ He moved to Pavia to work as a professor before the arrival of the French in 1796.

Finally, the information on total power ranking can offer insight into the political makeup of leadership and the elite. By understanding the political ideology which dominated generally within the leadership it is possible to make certain assumptions about the general political nature of the entire body. Of course, this nature changed throughout the entire ten-month period based on a number of specific factors which will be covered in the remainder of the thesis.

Based on political profiles of the individual representatives there are some generalities we can claim regarding the leadership and the elite. The political breakdown in Fig. 7 demonstrates the general outline of the leadership according to the specific political ideology along both axes. Progressive radicals sat in the leadership at 10 representatives; neutral radicals sat at 8; progressive rationalists made up the largest portion of the leadership with 18; neutral rationalists had 9 representatives; neutral moderates 8; originalist rationalists 4; Giacomo Lamberti and Gaetano Vertemate-Franchi remained the only two originalist moderates.




Figure 7. Political Breakdown of Leadership by ideology (proto faction)

⁷⁰⁷ Dettamanti, “Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal,” 298.

⁷⁰⁸ Rosa, “Alpruni, Francesco Antonio.”

These numbers provide us with some interesting insight regarding the political culture of the leadership within the *Gran Consiglio*. Looking at the graphic in Figure 8 it is clear that the progressive members of the Council hold a slight majority at 29 representatives to the neutral representatives at 25 individuals. The lowest number is by far the originalist representatives at 6 individuals. This demonstrates that within the Council there was a general consensus that there was a need to progress, or at the very least adapt the constitution to fit Cisalpine conditions. This generalization means that one finds a much stronger sense of national interest and an understanding that the political situation in Italy was dramatically different than the French case. While all the representatives appreciate the French efforts in the Italian “liberation”, it is clear that the leadership of the *Gran Consiglio* saw themselves as necessarily progressing the revolution and not maintaining or retracting it. However, when one looks at the political axis regarding force and urgency the numbers indicate a strong sense of general rationalism. Rationalist members numbered 32 compared to radicals at 18, and moderates at a mere 10. It should be noted that rationalism in this circumstance does not equivocate to the moderatism defined by Zaghi which in fact seems to reflect more originalist ideology in its singularity.⁷⁰⁹




Figure 8. Leadership political ideology

⁷⁰⁹ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:117-18 The moderates that Zaghi refers to and uses as examples (Melzi, Moscati) tended to support the French position at all odds. In fact, one might even see figures like Melzi more as an originalist moderate. These figures however, despite Zaghi’s claim, and despite having massive popularity outside of the legislature were non influential members of the *Gran Consiglio*, let alone members of the leadership or elite.

The numbers offer a similar picture when looking at the elite. 9 were progressive rationalists, followed by progressive radicals at 7. Neutral radicals and moderates both numbered 4 and neutral and originalist rationalists shared equal numbers at 3 (Figure 3). There were no originalist moderates in the elite. What is interesting about the elite when compared to leadership as a whole, the numbers regarding progressive and neutral ideological dominance over the ten-month period with progressives sitting at 15 and neutrals at 13 (Compare this to the leadership with progressive [29] and neutrals [25]). Proportionally the originalists have the same presence in the elite as the leadership (3/30 and 6/60 respectively) however those originalists who made it to the elite were not so far to the right.




Figure 9. Political Breakdown of Elite by ideology (proto faction)

However, it is the opposing axis which separates the elite from the leadership. Neutral moderates take a significantly larger proportion of the seats, particularly when compared to the other neutral representatives (Figure 10). This could possibly signify that while the representatives look for slower or more retractive means of legislating, they still acknowledge the need to change the revolution according to Italian circumstances. More interestingly, the radicals make a better showing proportionally in the elite than they do in the leadership as a whole. Though the trend is more in favor of rationalism overall within the elites (14 total deputies), more radical methodology was considered permissible if and when the rational course failed (for example the case of 9 Ventôse). Radical methodology also indicates a much stronger presence of charismatic power

visible in the elite. This completely contradicts the ideas of an overwhelmingly moderate or conservative base within the *Gran Consiglio*, espoused within the historiography, particularly that of the early to mid-twentieth century. Instead, it seems that the more rational proto factions looked more towards radical means of leadership rather than moderatism when the moderation failed to produce results.




Figure 10. Leadership political ideology

Discourse structure as the measurement of personal power

Discourses provide the most informative data used to plot political, social and ideological relationships between various representatives, and hence, they offer the most concrete examples of personal power expression in the *Gran Consiglio*.⁷¹⁰ A discourse, as defined in this study, refers to the expression of a representative in an attempt to influence the behavior, attitude or actions of the Council in a given moment. Discourses create influence and are therefore expressions of power, and as power infers leadership, discourses can then too be understood as an expression (or attempted expression) of leadership. More specifically discourses are completely based on personal power, in particular through the use of informational, persuasive or charismatic power

⁷¹⁰ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 226.

expression, often considered the most utilized forms of personal power for leadership figures.⁷¹¹ Reciprocal open consultation is also a valid form of personal power present within debates, however the mutually exclusive respect between parties is generally lost when bids for leadership come into play, and as such this form of power is much more present within commission power structures (explained in Chapter V). Part of this is due to the fact that representatives formed lateral social relationships and not vertical, as the base rules of revolutionary republicanism refuted the idea of hierarchical superiority between members of the assembly. In such lateral social relationships, coercive or legitimate force have less impact upon the targets (as proved by the previously established data analysis).⁷¹² As such the agent must rely on personal power to influence his peers.

It has already been established that charisma according to Weber's definition plays an important role in understanding how influence was displaced between the representatives.⁷¹³ Charismatic leadership characterizes those who were the most vocal within the assembly.⁷¹⁴ However not every speech or intervention made within a sitting could be characterized as charismatic, as many lacked the spontaneity and novelty necessary to resolve a particular issue. For example, interventions by the president were not counted among the discourses (as noted by the explanation of data sets in Chapter I) and therefore are not a defining factor in an individual's personal power, since often the intervention of the president was purely for procedural purposes, making it an expression of formal or sanctioned power, thus positional power. As an organizational structure, the president served a bureaucratic function (constitutionally regulated and prescribed), the opposite of charismatic authority (spontaneous and momentarily relevant), and thus a function of the legitimate positional power.⁷¹⁵ The president could however participate were he to step down momentarily, leaving his position of sanctioned power to attempt a moment of expert, informational, or charismatic power as a regular representative.

⁷¹¹ Yukl and Falbe, "Importance of Different Power Sources in Downward and Lateral Relations," 416.

⁷¹² Yukl and Falbe, 419–20.

⁷¹³ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 51–52.

⁷¹⁴ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 226.

⁷¹⁵ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 66–67.

Persuasive and Charismatic speech

The personal power inherent in the discourses registered from the *processi verbali* can be separated into two methods of influence: persuasive speech and charisma.⁷¹⁶ Persuasive speech (also called informational influence) generally regards forms of discourse which utilize particular information to offer logical reasoning in order to change the attitude or behavior of the target.⁷¹⁷ In doing so, persuasive speech generally relies on informational or expert power, and expertise due to the implication of knowledge and logic inherent in each. However, persuasive speech may also utilize referent power or outward/upward influence, all of which rely on previously established reputation to back-up the opinion of the influencing agent in the minds of the targets. Charismatic speech is similar to persuasive speech in its attempt to influence the attitudes of a target. However, it accomplishes this through the insinuation that the agent possesses an extraordinary ability which would imply trustworthiness.⁷¹⁸ As charisma is not rational, this form of influence does not come from logical argumentation but rather from a personal relationship created between the agent and the target.⁷¹⁹ Therefore the persuasive nature of these discourses is much stronger in emotional rhetoric and use of imagery which might affect the attitudes of the target in a much more evocative way. For example, charismatic speech in the *Gran Consiglio* often evoked patriotism, fear of counter-revolution and solidarity with the French Republican authorities (though which authorities depended on the political alliance explained in Chapter X).⁷²⁰ Persuasive speech on the other hand would look more towards facts, figures and legal explanation to formulate an argument against or in favor of a proposal.

To demonstrate how both persuasive and charismatic speech were used in debate, one might look to the example of the debate on 5 Floréal (24 April 1798). Pietro Polfranceschi opened the discussion by expressing opposition to an article he believed dangerous in its acceptance of foreign nationals into the military and proposed a change to the article to resolve the issue, which

⁷¹⁶ Yukl et Falbe, « Importance of Different Power Sources in Downward and Lateral Relations », 416, 420 In this article in fact Yukl and Falbe discuss how personal (Informal) power is divided into persuasive and informational, and persuasive and charismatic. However, over the course of this examination it seems more that in fact all three forms of influence in discourses are relevant in the *Gran Consiglio*. Therefore, it is not simply a binary comparison since all three are present and relevant.

⁷¹⁷ Raven, "The Bases of Power and the Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence," 2.

⁷¹⁸ Yukl and Falbe, "Importance of Different Power Sources in Downward and Lateral Relations," 416.

⁷¹⁹ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 22–23.

⁷²⁰ De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic," 213.

was approved.⁷²¹ This discourse, while seemingly charismatic in its evocative imagery, is actually more logic based, hence persuasive, since it is based on previous “experience” and constitutionally based legal rationalization. This however was quickly opposed by Agostino Salvioni, who believes that Italians, regardless of Cisalpine citizenship, should not be considered foreign. The argument made by Salvioni was completely charisma based, since it played on the strong emotions surrounding the concept of Italian patriotism. Polfranceschi refuted Salvioni’s argument, backed by a logical examination of Salvioni’s statement that Italians cannot be considered foreigners by in fact stating Salvioni’s argument applies to a different article (article 12). In doing so Polfranceschi’s informational power, overcomes Salvioni’s charisma to take back influence, without negating the imagery of Salvioni’s argument. In this case persuasive speech provides a better conduit for personal power than charismatic speech.

However, the second half of the debate proves that also the contrary is possible. When the article in question (article 12) was finally addressed, Salvioni received support from Sebastiano Salimbeni.⁷²² Salimbeni’s support was opposed by Pietro Dehò in an immediate response, which provided reasons for why non-cisalpine Italians should not be labelled equal to Cisalpine citizens, but remain prioritized amongst foreigners.⁷²³ In his opposition of both Salvioni and Salimbeni, Dehò used a logical constitutionally grounded argument with experiential expert power. At this point Dehò, Salimbeni and Salvioni all have attempted to establish personal power. However, in the end it is Salimbeni who was able to obtain legitimacy by responding to Dehò through an appeal to the other representatives’ sense of Italian patriotism. He declared that opposition to the recognition of all Italians as equal to Cisalpine citizens under Cisalpine law was monstrous and filed a motion to change the wording to exclude the word *altri*, when referring to Italians from different nations on the peninsula.⁷²⁴ This expression of charismatic speech, which uses charismatic power through the imagery of Italian patriotism, and the instigation of counter-

⁷²¹ "Seduta CLVII, 5 fiorile Year VI" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:236.

⁷²² "Sedduta CLVII, 5 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:236.

⁷²³ "Seduta CLVII, 5 fiorile anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, 3:237. Dehò’s exact reasoning is two-fold. First, he states that while theoretically all Italians should be considered co-citizens, the constitution explicitly states what constitutes a Cisalpine citizen and all Italians are not included in this. Second, he says there are two potential problems for those who enlist: they are either from a state which has not yet risen against their *ancien regime* oppressors and are considered “cattivi soggetti” (evil subjects) or they come from already free states within Italy and refuse to contribute to the advancement of their own nation. In either case the enlistee would not be a good republican and therefore should be disqualified from service.

⁷²⁴ "Seduta CLVII, 5 fiorile anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, 3:237.

revolutionary fears often brought forth through the use of the term “others”, had a stronger influencing effect than Dehò’s more information based argument and hence was agreed upon and legitimized by the Council.

Aspects of discourse in the Gran Consiglio

In both cases the legitimization for Polfranceschi and Salimbeni, regardless of the form of discourse utilized, came through a formal motion. Motions (labelled as propositions in the constitution) are a constitutionally recognized form of discourse which proposed an official request for the council to approve, augment, reject or further explore in commission a resolution, proposition or project of law.⁷²⁵ Motions were therefore the best way to secure legitimization for a representative’s personal power as the adoption of a motion into a resolution meant its official recognition amongst all (or at least a majority) of members to be passed onto the Consiglio di *Seniori* for approval. It is the physical manifestation of a representative’s power as it offers concrete proof of the representative’s ability to influence the behavior, attitudes and opinions of the Council. Avid rhetorical speakers often gained the most influence, be it through persuasive or charismatic methods, and were recognized more often as examples of leadership, at least early on.⁷²⁶ For this reason lawyers like Reina or Glissentini, or clergymen like Latuada, Savonarola and Stanislao Bovara, all of which had a high amount of personal power, and experience as public speakers excelled in pushing through motions.

Motions could be propositional, supportive or oppositional. Propositional motions were most common and tended to come from petitions or commissions, but also from individual representatives, particularly in the early stages of the *Gran Consiglio*. These motions offered a solution or recommended a law in a formal capacity for consideration. Supportive motions were

⁷²⁵ *Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina*, Tit. V Art. 75 As the argument of this chapter regards understanding the political distribution of the *Gran Consiglio* and the social relationships which effected legislation, the specific regulations covered in the Cisalpine Constitution are not discussed. The specific rules for proposal of motions, and their adoption into resolution will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII which regards the rules and regulations of the new structures of republican government, and the accountability of these new rules.

⁷²⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 229 In the examples Tackett gives for major orators in the early months of the National Assembly names like Barnave, Mirabeau, or the abbé Maury were all well-known and reputable speakers going into the events of 1789. They, therefore, brought with them a traditional authority which led men to listen when they spoke and lent to the personal power they might find from session to session. As Tackett points out, Durand even notes that the more interesting speeches were found on the first day of discussion, leading to the idea that charismatic power early on was more prevalent as more renowned speakers took the podium. Likewise, in the early days of the Cisalpine Republic, important figures with previously established reputations and a stronger traditional authority often delivered the more passionate speeches.

those which either officially seconded a previously proposed motion or put in official form an idea presented in the speech of another representative. The former often took the form of an “insistence” where the representative would provide a reason (charismatic or persuasive) for seconding a motion and insist on its being brought to a vote. The latter, best exemplified by the motion of Salimbeni or Fenaroli in the above examples, takes a particular idea offered in a speech presented by a different representative and requested that it officially be adopted by the Council as a resolution. Oppositional motions, were those which requested that a discussion be ended, put into the order of the day, or postponed, or which opposed previously proposed motions which had not yet come to a vote. Similar to supportive motions, oppositional motions utilized both charismatic and persuasive speech to influence the behavior of the Council. However, in cases of oppositional speech, the oppositional representative actively sought to end the leadership capability of the original proposer, by discrediting their idea or motion. In this way they display a much more aggressive and forceful personal power, which necessitates either greater charisma or stronger logistical rhetoric. Oppositional motions, when successful, had a greater impact overall on the influence over Council actions and opinions.

However not every discourse was a motion; these ordinary speeches were expressions of personal power which were in turn informal recognitions of a representative’s influence in a debate. As such speeches also utilized persuasive or charismatic language. These speeches can be characterized as presentational, charismatic, supportive, critical, or bureaucratic. Presentational speeches often utilized informational or expert power to present an idea or issue. These speeches could be public readings, by a representative or a Council official, of a petition or letter, or might be a report from a commission, such as the presentation of the general plan for public instruction presented by Dandolo on 18 Thermidor.⁷²⁷ More often, however, presentational speech was used to add clarity to an argument which lacked sufficient expert information. Charismatic speeches, for example Coddé’s 9 Ventôse speech against the *Seniori* (See Chapter IX), utilize charismatic power.⁷²⁸ In some cases, for example a 5 Nivôse speech delivered by one of the Pelosi brothers regarding aristocratic restrictions, this charisma was also backed up with informational power from

⁷²⁷ « Seduta CCLVII, 18 Thermidor Year VI », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1927), 5:668-73.

⁷²⁸ « Seduta CI, 9 Nivose Year VI », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:12.

experience.⁷²⁹ In any case charismatic speeches were highly influential in moments of “revolutionary” events such as the permanent sitting of 9 Ventôse or the crisis of power between executive and legislative authority in early Messidor.⁷³⁰ Supportive and critical speech were essentially the same as supportive or oppositional motions with the exception that they did not carry the formal power of a motion. Both relied on charismatic and persuasive forms of personal power, in particular upward/outward influence – which enabled representatives to draw on outside power to legitimize their opinions - and informational or referent power. Similarly, critical speeches required much more aggressive displays of personal power to establish leadership in a particular debate. Finally, bureaucratic speeches were discourses which utilized legal, constitutional, or precedential arguments to influence the actions of the Council. These speeches relied almost exclusively on persuasive speech structures, as well as formal power, a form of positional power, since they required complex logical argumentation based in established written law and were used to correct a procedural error on the part of representatives. For this reason, bureaucratic speeches often came from Council officials such as presidents and inspectors of the chamber. They were also favored by lawyers like Reina, Vicini or Glissenti.

The final element to discourse structure is the length and frequency of discourses over time. Tackett noted when analyzing early French legislative discourse structure in 1789 that initially speeches in the National Assembly were long, over-extended sermons that insisted on repeating and reconstructing the same type of arguments continuously.⁷³¹ The opposite seems to be the case for the *Gran Consiglio*. Constant calls for urgency and the need to establish basic precedents

⁷²⁹ « Seduta XXXVI, 5 Nivose Year VI », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:529-31 This speech made by one of the Pelosi brothers (its not clearly designated which but most likely Ignasio due to his participation record) which uses republican fears of counterrevolutionary plots on the part of the aristocracy to introduce a debate on regulating aristocratic activity outside the city, where they may meet in secret societies along the borders or in the remote country of the Mountains or Padana countryside. Pelosi was a revolutionary figure from the Valtellina which had experienced firsthand these kinds of counterrevolutionary activities. In this case he is using both charismatic and informational power to provide seemingly credible and emotionally stirring debate.

⁷³⁰ « Sedute CCXVI, CCXVII, CCXIX-CCXXI, 8-11 messidoro anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 4:750-53, 755-61, 774-76, 780-83, 791-803 While the particulars of this crisis - which concerned the extraction of a member of the Directory, and which government body had the right to commit this extraction - will be covered more fully in Chapter VIII, the Crisis of Messidor is filled with examples of charismatic speech. Notable examples are: Giuseppe Luini on 8 Messidor (p 751) in which he defends the constitutional rights of the legislative body and accuses the Directory of denying the patriotism of the *Gran Consiglio*; Giuseppe Gambari on 11 Messidor (p. 795-96) in which he denounces Salimbeni for rejecting the proposal of the council; Salimbeni also on 11 Messidor (p.804) in which he denounces members of the *Gran Consiglio* as not having the interests of the people at heart.

⁷³¹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 228.

initially saw shorter debates and discourses. More influential figures like La Hoz, Reina, Savonarola and Latuada, reputable figures with pre-established upward/outward influence or informational power were given the opportunity to speak more often. This led to little dissent from oppositional figures who required more complex persuasive speeches to fall on sides with an issue and as such there was less need for longer discourses. Early on in the *Gran Consiglio* many representatives had not been able to raise a sufficient level of personal power outside of the Council at a national level and thus could not rely on their expertise or informational power to carry enough influence. Therefore, it is safe to say that, initially at least, these locally known or nationally unknown figures (i.e. Giuseppe Necchi dell’Aquila, Girolamo Coddé, Pietro Polfranceschi to name a few) who would come to dominate the debates by the end of the period, were forced to use charismatic power to have their voices heard, thus lacking the large rationalization found later. For example, the debate which took place on 2 Pluviose, regarding the *ministro del interno* over his opposition to the festival of the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic by the French Republic.⁷³² The initial discourse made by Giovanni Lupi was a short paragraph with brought charges against the *ministro* for overstepping his role and treading on the work of the *Gran Consiglio*. The following interventions are short and to the point, condemning the minister with hard words and fiery images, but resolved the issue in short order due to Lupi’s previously established credentials and the alleged urgency of the situation (the festival was to take place that day).⁷³³

However, as the months progressed and the projects became longer and more complex, so too did the discourses. Projects, such as that of public instruction, contained tens of articles, each of which was backed by years of French and Italian republican political theory. Large plans like that of the finance plan or the national guard went through numerous reiterations and required long winded discussions on the part of the committee members and others who felt called to take the lead on particular aspects of these plans.⁷³⁴ More importantly discussions often digresses into debates heavy in persuasive speech, in which representatives (in particular lawyers like Glissentini and Reina) utilized their informational power to formulate long logically driven arguments to

⁷³² “Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:116–17, 122–23. This is covered more in depth in Chapter VIII.

⁷³³ “Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:117,123.

⁷³⁴ « Seduta CCXXXI, 22 messidoro anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:117-150 This particular sitting truly demonstrates this principle. Multiple speeches were made about debates concerning finance and the Guard of the Legislature that spanned pages in the *processi verbali*.

support, oppose or propose various changes or additions to these intricate plans. Oddly enough it seems that Tackett's findings for the length and complexity of arguments is much more prevalent in the sittings from Messidor and Thermidor (mid-June to mid-August) than those of Frimaire to Ventôse. At the same time, the exchanges became significantly more aggressive between the representatives, so much so that on 28 Messidor (16 July 1798), Ramondini as president was forced to reprimand the council as a whole and enforced brevity and a sense of urgency regarding all discourses.⁷³⁵

The quantitative breakdown of personal power

When looking at the statistical information regarding the elite for discourses, and thus the most personally powerful in *Gran Consiglio* across the entire ten-month period, one begins to notice some trends regarding the geographical, professional and political traits of the representatives. The elite for discourses can be found in the appendices however Angelo Perseguiti (823), Pietro Dehò (684), Felice Latuada (650), Lauro Glissenti (612), and Giacomo Greppi (564), constitute the top five and the elite finishes with Giovanni Lupi (204), Luigi Oliva (181) Pietro Polfranceschi (178) Vincenzo Massari (161), and finally Alberto Allemagna (156). The majority (11 born⁷³⁶, 15 residing) of the elite thirty came from the Duchy of Milan, then from the Republic of Venice (7 born, 6 residing), from the Papal States (7 born, 4 residing), and finally from Modena (4 born, 5 residing). Six were members of the clergy (Latuada, Vismara, Savonarola, Bossi, Bovara, Compagnoni) ; six were university professors (Brunetti, Gambari, Vismara, Venturi, Bovara, Savonarola; five were soldiers or came from military backgrounds (Cavedoni, Scarabelli, Salimbeni, Polfranceschi, Lupi); nine served as notaries or administrators (Luini, Brunetti, Cavedoni, Aquila, Bovara, Mozzini, Allemagna, Coddè, Olica); two were journalists (Compagnoni, Dandolo and Lattanzi) and Dehò alone worked as a doctor, though Dandolo also worked in the medical field as a pharmacist; yet the majority – (Latuada, Cavedoni, Reina, Luini, Brunetti, Greppi, Glissenti, Vicini, Gambari, Perseguiti, Bossi)- were lawyers or came from the legal field. Four of the thirty were recognizable aristocrats who had renounced their titles (Allemagna, Terzaghi, Luini, Scarabelli), though Reina, Bovara, Savonarola, and Latuada either

⁷³⁵ “Seduta CCXXXVII, 28 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:247.

⁷³⁶ Francesco Reina was born in Lugano but moved at a young age to Malgrate, a small town next to Lecco on Lake Como. Dettamanti, « Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal », 298.

came from branch families or direct lines who had lost their noble status over the course of the eighteenth century. The rest came from bourgeois, petit bourgeois or municipalist families.

What then can be said about the elite who dominated the council discourse? For one thing, there exists massive leaps in numbers of discourses between representatives. Perseguiti more than quadruples Polfranceschi, and in fact nearly doubles Bovara who is ranked tenth. This demonstrates two things: First that the majority of the council, even amongst the leadership, did not tend to speak unless they could contribute meaningfully to a given debate, either informationally or charismatically. It was not normal to find a single representative who would dominate the discourse in all situations. In fact, Perseguiti may have spoken the most but he was unable to translate this personal power into positional power, since he lasted only three sittings as dominant secretary at the beginning of the period and was forced out of the presidency by the Coup of Trouvé at the end. Instead, the numbers around discourses must be compared to the total power ranking of the elite. For this reason, it is possible to say that figures like Latuada, Brunetti, Scarabelli, or Dehò, all successfully formulated a strong personal power since they were also able to occupy offices and lead commissions. Interestingly, despite Reina's moniker – "la cicala del *Gran Consiglio*" – he was not the dominant speaker, nor the voice of the Council as one would expect looking at mid-twentieth century historiography.⁷³⁷ It must be concluded therefore, that while discourses and personal power were the primary mode of acquiring influence, they were not the only way a representative could become a dominating force in the Council. Reina for example was a constant presence in commissions, which gave him an edge over more vocal representatives like Perseguiti or Greppi.

There is also something to be taken from the breakdown of professional and class status. All the professions listed (clergy, soldier, administrator, doctor, journalist and especially lawyer) were all professions which heavily utilized personal power in their daily activities. More importantly, as Tackett points out in his analysis of the early months within the French National Assembly, the most dominant voices necessarily came from those representatives already in possession of "an exceptional degree of lung power".⁷³⁸ Jobs like priests, soldiers and lawyers necessarily required exceptional communication skills, and more importantly needed to be well

⁷³⁷ Capra, "Un ricerca in corso: i collegi elettorali della Repubblica Italiana e del Regno Itatico," 484.

⁷³⁸ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 229.

versed in methods of persuasive and charismatic speech making to successfully accomplish their goals. Similarly, these jobs were exceptional preparation for revolutionary politics, as has already been pointed out in Chapters III and IV. Lawyers in particular had acquired over the course of the second half of the eighteenth century as part of the job description a necessary ability for political speech making.⁷³⁹ For this reason they already played an instrumental role in the events of the French Revolution (notable figures of course being names like Danton or Robespierre). The Cisalpine case was no different. Lawyers, like Reina, Glissenti or Vicini took on fundamental roles in the debates of the *Gran Consiglio*, which of course helped to further augment their personal power and their direct influence over legislation. Also, quite similarly to the French case, some of the most prolific speakers came from the noble and clerical classes. Men like Latuada, Allemagna, Luini and Bovara, all of whom had governmental or administrative experience, and all of whom saw and rejected the privileges they enjoyed under the *ancien regime*, were some of the most outspoken revolutionary figures, particularly within the early month of the *Gran Consiglio*. And similar to the early French cases, they happened to be some of the biggest sticklers for propriety and order within the Council debates.⁷⁴⁰

Finally, when examining the political breakdown of personal power within the *Gran Consiglio*, one sees a continuation of the trend present in the political breakdown of the general leadership and elite. In fact, the numbers of the leadership regarding the political breakdown of elite on the change axis are equal to those in the Leadership index (progressives at 29, neutrals with 25 and originalists with 6). This trend is the same for the elite (progressives at 16, neutrals 11 and originalists 3). This offers consistent evidence that personal power was the main driver behind the aquation of overall influence, and it remained so along ideological lines. Withing the state building axis, half of the representatives came from the progressive wing of the Council. Neutrals, whose political interests were not defined by their loyalty to the maintenance or alteration of the constitution, but rather generally mor occupied with speed and force found themselves a close second because they posed no threat to the progressive majority. Originalists had little personal power because they're political ideology would have blocked them from speaking up.

⁷³⁹ Bell, *Lawyers and Citizens*, 175.

⁷⁴⁰ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 230.

Additionally, other than Lamberti, no originalist moderate found use in the general council, favoring commission participation (explained further in Chapter VI).

Looking at the other axis of political ideology, there continues to be a similarity to the numbers of the Leadership index. Rationalists held the majority of the personal power leadership with 31, with neutrals contributing 20 representatives and moderates only 9. There is a 2 man increase for radicals from the Leadership Index, which comes at the price of one representative a piece for both rationalists and moderates. This comes as no surprise as radicals, who favored speed and force, would have preferred open discourse and quick resolution to committee work, and as such would be much more vocal in the general assembly. For the elites however the changes from the Leadership index are much less dramatic with radicals remaining at 11 (same as the total power elite), rationalists losing one in favor of the moderates, placing them at 14 and 5 respectively. Therefore, though remaining still in the minority, there is a higher involvement in the assembly discourse than one might assume looking at total power. Rationalists continued to hold a majority in terms of discourses, though the gap between them and the polarities was tightened

Altogether, while discourses saw progressive rationalists maintaining the dominant position for personal power leadership at 19, and 9 in the elite, the augmentation of progressivism more generally saw a further left-leaning debate structure as progressive radicals (the further left ideology) remained at 10 for the leadership and 7 for the elite. Since we know the number of radicals in the leadership increased (and that originalists could not be radicals) this means an increase in the personal power of neutral radicals (who number 10 up from 8). The decrease hit for neutral rationalists (7) who saw two of their ranks not included from the general leadership. Again this comes as no surprise since neutral radicals tended to favor more eclectic methods of legislation where rationalists favored slower commissions. Where neutral moderates remained the same (8), originalist moderates reduced by one from the total power leadership (1) though this increase was absorbed by the rationalist ideological win of the originalists (5). The elite remained the same when broken down into the seven ideologies, with that one change coming from the neutral moderates (5), who gained a place up from the total power elite from the neutral rationalists (2).

In other words, progressives successfully obtained and utilized personal power to further advance revolutionary activity in the Cisalpine legislature, and in doing so pushed the conversation in a way which saw the Cisalpine republic as the heir to the revolution. As such they became

responsible for its advancement on the Italian peninsula through the promulgation of new and revolutionary legislation. This meant a greater divide between the methodology of pushing the revolution, so that while rationalists retained the majority, moderates and radicals found themselves more influential in the wielding of personal power through discourse. In this way the structure and of debates could take on – if interpreted through the lens of French Directorial authorities – a seemingly anti-French (some have even mistakenly labeled it as “Jacobin”⁷⁴¹) in tone. Even though this was not the case, since progressives saw themselves as the heir to the French and not their enemy, this seems to be the interpretation, which was mistakenly taken on by French authorities, further discussed later in Chapter XI.

Council Officials and Positional Power in the Gran Consiglio

Unlike the fluidity and instability of personal power, positional power manifests itself in the fixed and constitutionally prescribed offices of the Council: the president, secretaries, and inspectors of the chamber. They are disciplined and rationalized authority where the personal power of discourses are normally charismatic and informal.⁷⁴² Positional power enables the agent to control the social goods of the group and redistribute them along an organizational hierarchy.⁷⁴³ Offices are the legitimate form of bureaucratic authority, as defined by Weber, which derives its power from legitimate/formal power, sanctioned power, reward power and informational power.⁷⁴⁴ Yet close scrutinization by fellow representatives and limitations on tenure often made the long-term influence of these men (necessarily) muted.⁷⁴⁵ This tendency in republican legislative assemblies dates back to the early day of the Revolution in France, where large personalities

⁷⁴¹ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:113-14; Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change* (London: Methuen & Co LTD, 1979), 162-76, 178 It is unfortunate that this trend has grown particularly strong in the English-language historiography of the Triennio, in particular those ideas coming out of the school of Stuart Woolf and Michael Broers who have quite incorrectly and, not too uncharacteristically for British historians, painted the entire revolutionary movement with the broad "Jacobin" brush. For more information regarding the problem of Italy and the Triennio in English historiography see: Steven Englund, « Monstre Sacré: The Question of Cultural Imperialism and the Napoleonic Empire », *The Historical Journal* 51, n° 1 (2008): 216-50; Carlo Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, Storia Degli Stati Italiani Dal Medioevo All'Unita (Torino: UTET Libreria, 1989), 161-63.

⁷⁴² Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 33.

⁷⁴³ Peirò and Melià, “Formal and Informal Interpersonal Power in Organisations,” 18.

⁷⁴⁴ Peirò and Melià, 17 Informational power is defined by Peirò and Melia as a form of Formal or positional power. Interestingly, Raven defines it as a form of informal or personal power since information is often based on personal knowledge. In this study, therefore, it can be seen as contributing to both forms and as such relative to the conversation on positional power and council offices; Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 18,46.

⁷⁴⁵ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 217; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Tit. V Art. 61.

competed for positional power, only to find themselves unequipped for the duties and influence that they wielded.

In the case of the French Assemblies the legitimization of a representative's personal power, also meant legitimate authority was given to the political party which he led, since often presidents, secretaries, and later inspectors were all often chosen from the same political party.⁷⁴⁶ However, since the *Gran Consiglio* never had legal party formation, this trend in party domination or factional control of positional power cannot be definitively established for the Cisalpine case. Instead, officials' ability to introduce, table or record particular pieces of legislation, or adjust the physical presence of the council, made positional power fundamental to the resolution or refutation of particular motions or debates.⁷⁴⁷ In this way, one can better understand the political leanings of the Council at a given time, despite the lack of official party control. Positional power not only derived its strength from formal or legitimate power inherent in the office itself, but in reward or sanction power;⁷⁴⁸ the office holder is rewarded with legitimization and recognition for bringing particular issues up for debate, but also is given the power to sanction the participation of like-minded representatives and their political ideology over potential opposition.

This final part of the chapter will therefore look at the three primary offices a representative could hold (there were many more offices within the *Gran Consiglio*, however they were restricted to representatives). For each office there will first be an analysis of its origins in revolutionary government (in France as in Italy) followed by the political and prosopographical breakdown which defined the leadership quality of these offices. The way in which positional power is measured is through Rank 4, the criteria of which has already been explained in Chapter II. Again this chapter will not repeat the information already provided there but instead will clarify the formula that makes up the Rank 4, which is the weighted sums of the 3 primary positions which could be held by representatives according to the *processi verbali*. This final portion of the chapter should help to explain why particular positions were weighted differently so as to reflect their importance in terms of determining participation and power within the *Gran Consiglio*. Positional power, as an aspect of leadership more generally, must be recognized by the group as a whole,

⁷⁴⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 217–18.

⁷⁴⁷ Tackett, 217.

⁷⁴⁸ Mulder et al., "Power, Situation, and Leaders' Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study," 566; French and Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," 155–60.

much like personal power. Hence, these offices represent more than just internal leadership, but a recognition of a political ideology which set the tone for legislation across the entire ten-month period.

Inspectors of the chamber

The position of inspector originated in France when the National Assembly moved location from Versailles to Paris in October 1789.⁷⁴⁹ The intention of the office was the day-to-day organization of the assembly, which included regulating spectators, organizing the collection and publication of important documents, and making sure the assembly building was well-maintained. Under the Convention, inspectors were given the right to speak in assembly regarding technical issues of the legislature and offered greater authority over the public workers employed by the Convention.⁷⁵⁰ More importantly, due to fears of betrayal by military leadership, command of the Corps of Invalides who protected the Convention chamber was concentrated directly into the hands of the committee of Inspectors.⁷⁵¹ This, combined with their charge to administrate the chamber, meant it was often the inspectors who were responsible for the numerous purges of the Convention in 1794.⁷⁵² Following the events of Thermidor in Year II, the Inspectors retained their powers of internal and external policing in the area around the Convention hall. As such the roll of Inspector under the Directory was significantly more militarized and occupied with control and order both of representatives and the public, than it had been at its inception in 1789.

The position of inspector was not constitutionally prescribed in the Cisalpine Republic (as in France), and in fact did not appear until the third sitting of the Assembly, when the discussion of the internal policy plan came to a vote. Article I of Title II of the plan states that:

Verranno eletti tre ispettori della sala tratti dal seno del Consiglio i quali vigileranno sulla polizia generale, tanto intern ache esterna al palazzo del Consiglio.

⁷⁴⁹ Cohen, “Le Comité des Inspecteurs de la Salle,” 2.

⁷⁵⁰ Cohen, 5.

⁷⁵¹ Cohen, 6–8. The Committee of Inspectors was liberated from the commissaire after the abolition of the 1791 Constitution. Under the convention they took on much greater authority, particularly within the Convention hall as a quasi-military police force. This power grew over time so that by the time of the Terror, internally the inspectors were secondary only to groups like the Committee of Public Safety who were composed of only the highest-ranking Mountain deputies.

⁷⁵² Cohen, 18–19 It was the Inspectors, for example, who carried out the March 1794 purges of the Indulgents and Exagérés and eventually the events of Thermidor Year II.

Dovranno provvedere alle spese tutte occorrente e renderanno conto ogni quindici giorni al Consiglio delle spese incontrate.

Ogni quindici giorni ne sortirà uno tratto a sorte, sicchè vadano per turno quello che sorte verrà tosto rimpiazzato. Quelli che sortono non possono essere rieletti che dopo due mesi.

Gli ispettori non possono occuparsi che della parte materiale della polizia che loro è assegnata col presente regolamento, ed ogni volt ache loro si presenterà qualche oggetto sraordinario, non poreYear agire senza consultare il Conglio.⁷⁵³

While regulated by the council, the inspector also retained the right to control internal policing. Similarly, the Cisalpine inspector, had the power over funding and organization of council needs, similar to the original position created under Guillotine in 1789. A notable change from 1789, however, was that inspectors could not stay in their position permanently. This does not mean, however, that inspectors could not remain in power for a long period of time. La Hoz and Porcelli were re-elected as soon as it was legally possible; La Hoz even remained in this position until his dismissal on 22 Germinal.⁷⁵⁴

While the inspector could not act against a representative without the consent of the Council, his recommendation for punishment or denunciation was often enough for the Council to accept his proposition due to the formal (and in some respects referent) power which was endowed into the office; the arrest of representatives Fabbri and Fantaguzzi for seditious speech in Floréal, provides an example of this power in action.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵³ « Seduta III 4 Frimaire Year VI », Camillo Montalcini et Annibale Alberti, éd., *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina Vol. I, parte I*, vol. 1 (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1917), 112. Trans. Three inspectors of the chamber will be elected from the Council and they will monitor the general policing, both inside and outside of the Council building. They will have to pay all the necessary expenses and will be accountable every fifteen days to the Council, of the expenditure they have spent. Every fifteen days, lots will be drawn so that they may see whom among them is to be replaced. Those that are selected can only be re-elected after two months. The inspectors can only deal with the policy material that is assigned to them under this regulation, and whenever they are presented with some unordered object, they will not be able to act without consulting the Council.

⁷⁵⁴ « Seduta CVIII 16 Ventôse Year VI », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:193; « Seduta CXLIV, 22 Germinal Year VI », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:7.

⁷⁵⁵ « Seduta CLXXVIII, 27 Floréal Year VI » Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:732.

La Hoz and Antonio Maria Porcelli were the only representatives to be elected twice as inspector. Unlike the secretary position, inspectors rarely made moves towards higher office, such as the presidency. Out of the twenty-one representatives to serve as inspector only four were elected to the presidency (Giovio, Luini, Polfranceschi and Sabatti) and only Montalti and Sabatti made it to the vice-presidency. However, 15 of the 21 nominate inspectors were within the general leadership, and of those 15 only 6 were within the general elite. The men who occupied the position often did so during a period in which their particular professional background was most necessary. For example, the turbulent months of Ventôse, Germinal and Floréal saw the election of well-respected military figures to the position of inspector (La Hoz, Scarabelli, Tassoni, Polfranceschi) along with strong administrative figures (Castelfranchi and Porcelli). Meanwhile the earlier period of Frimaire, Nivôse and Pluviôse saw the establishment of important financial, engineering and administrative figures (Porcelli, Allemagna, Mozzoni, Giovio, Della Vida). This of course does not mean that there were never inspectors elected for pure political reasons, as exemplified by the early election of Giacomo Greppi. Geographically the origins of the inspectors follow the trend of other leadership factors examined in this chapter. The former Duchy of Milan remained the dominant place of origin (9 born and residing) followed by the Papal States (5 born, 6 residing) and the former Serenissima (5 born, 5 residing) who were almost equal, and finally the former Duchy of Modena (2 born, 1 residing).

Politically, 13 were within the discourse leadership, as well as the same amount for legislative power leadership, though different individuals. Many of these came from the military commission (the case study of which can be found in Chapter V). The representatives elected to this office tended to be more rationalist and neutral, though only by a slight margin. Once again progressive rationalists were the most dominant ideological faction numerically (7), followed by neutral radicals (5), then progressive radicals and neutral moderates (3), neutral rationalists (2) and finally originalist rationalists (1); there were no originalist moderates elected to the inspector's office. Before the Coup of 24 Germinal, the inspector's office was dominated by neutral representatives, with the exception of two progressives (Porcelli and Greppi) and one originalist (Della Vida). Following the coup, the inspector's office was almost entirely progressive except for three neutrals (Porcelli, Tassoni and Sabatti). Similarly, before the coup the inspector's office seemed to be split evenly between radicals, rationalists and moderates; afterwards, the inspectors were mostly rationalist, with some fewer extreme radicals like Polfranceschi and Tassoni

occupying office immediately following the coup. The only change to the progressive rationalist hegemony was the election of Cocchetti at the end of Thermidor which, along with other similar trends in the president and secretary offices, signaled a growing progressive radicalism, just before the Coup of Trouvé, most likely brought on by the rumor of constitutional alteration at the end of Messidor.

Secretaries

Secretaries held a unique place in the power structure of the *Gran Consiglio*, or truthfully in the entire revolutionary republican leadership structure. While secretaries conducted politics within a positional power framework, the relative lack of regulation over their intervention meant that often secretaries were able to garner both positional and personal power while occupying the office, thus having a greater influence than even the president at times.⁷⁵⁶ For this reason, secretaries were weighted the heaviest in the criteria for Rank 4, since they effectively had a greater influence from their positions. Secretaries cannot be said to exercise any particular form of power over another, though the continual augmentation of their personal power through referent power due to their positional power, and vice versa, meant they were able to rely on charisma, and charismatic speech making, to a much higher degree of success inspectors, and certainly more so than presidents.

The secretary position did not change dramatically in terms of positional power between the advent of revolutionary legislative government in 1789 and the *Gran Consiglio*. Secretaries often were selected among the more reputable, knowledgeable, or charismatic representatives. Interestingly, Mitchell points out that early secretaries in France tended to come from the more radical segments of the legislative body (the *oui*-voters as he terms them), at a much higher rate than the presidency.⁷⁵⁷ Similarly the tendency for secretaries to arise to the level of vice-president and then on to presidency - as was common in the French legislative assembly - seems as though it did not translate immediately into the *Gran Consiglio*.⁷⁵⁸ In fact it seems that secretary positions were often either filled by former presidents who had already established leadership qualities or influential representatives like Greppi or Dandolo who had enormous personal power, but who

⁷⁵⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 218.

⁷⁵⁷ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 26.

⁷⁵⁸ Mitchell, 27–28.

demonstrated such a propensity for charisma in debate that they were not selected for the more restrictive function of president.

This gave secretaries significantly greater influence overall in the Council. In this way it seems Cisalpine legislative procedures tended to mirror those of the French. In the early French republic (and into the Directorial period under the Construction of Year III), though a secretary's primary task was to transcribe the debates into the *processi verbali*, secretaries tended to throw themselves more into the political functionality of their position; this included finalizing the wording of motions, distributing important texts to representatives and commissions or handling the speaking lists.⁷⁵⁹ The same seems to be the case in the Cisalpine Republic. For this reason, lawyers (Perseguiti, Giovio or Vicini), or other educated professionals (Dehò, Vismara or Dandolo) found early political success in the office of secretary. Many were doctors and lawyers but also a number were professors from Reggio, Bologna, and Pavia or revolutionary bourgeoisie from Bergamo and Brescia. This also explains why clergymen like Latuada, Bovara and Valsecchi were all successful secretaries. The literary, organizational, and public speaking functions of catholic clergy made them excellent options for secretary, whose job required strength in the organizational arena as well as the political. And while not all clergy (or former clergy in the case of Montalti and Tadini), were of the same opinion in confronting the state building process (for example Latuada was progressive, Bovara was originalist and Valsecchi was neutral), they did tend to be more rationalist overall, which reflected the rationalist views of the entire assembly in the periods they were in power.

Thus, while the office of the presidency was a tool for better understanding the important political issues of the time, secretaries are far more useful in understanding the political culture of the council. The French case - where political parties had officially formed and come to dominate the political culture by 1790- had presidents as the dominant figure for the passage of a certain political ideology, since often the party dominated all positions underneath.⁷⁶⁰ The Cisalpine case is different in its lack of official party formation, which meant political ideology was more fluid between the different officials, who were not required to stick to a party line. Due to harsh restrictions on presidential discourse, secretaries who were able to participate in debates and grow

⁷⁵⁹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 218.

⁷⁶⁰ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 27.

their personal power through the expression of informational, referent, expert power and upward/outside influence in discourse, had a better chance of pushing through legislation which followed their own political ideology as they also had the positional power to sanction and codify these ideas. Therefore, like minded representatives, were much more likely to nominate a similar thinking colleague to the secretary position, before the presidency, since it was the secretary who truly wielded the influencing ability in the Council, and thus was the true leader (a trend which remains in modern Italian party politics).⁷⁶¹

There were always four secretaries, however not all would serve at the same sitting. Instead, most official records of the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio* list one or two (sometimes, though rarely, three) secretaries as sitting at the tribunal along with the president. These secretaries were often listed because they either transcribed the sitting or were simply seated at the tribunal for whatever reason, most likely exercising another political function of their office. In either case they were what will be called the *dominant* secretary or secretaries for that particular session; the others who were not listed are to be thought of as alternates. According to the constitution no secretary could remain in their position for more than a month.⁷⁶² Every 15 days secretaries would be sorted and two would be selected to step down from their posts (always the two longest serving who had already reached the month limit). From the first change in the first sitting of 16 Frimaire, the precedent was set that the new secretaries would become the dominant secretary, as was the case when Compagnoni and Vismara were nominated in place of Perseguiti and Giovio.⁷⁶³ Thus, former dominant secretaries would take a backseat as alternates to the incoming secretaries, who would then become dominant. Interestingly, this trend seemed to falter during the fall out of the 24 Germinal coup and was never truly reestablished for the remainder of the period before Trouvé's coup. The registration within the *processi verbali* table which help to calculate influence do not count the entire time a secretary was in their position, but rather only when they were the dominant secretary. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the positional

⁷⁶¹ Giuseppe Di Palma, « Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament », *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1, n° 2 (1976): 158 It should be noted that the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* and the modern Post-War Parliament of Italy, share little in common structurally, politically, or historically. However Di Palma's use of modern committee secretaries to get a feeling for the general political feeling of the entire legislative body is reflective of a trend throughout Italian legislative history: the secretary was and remains, the greatest thermometer of Italian politics.

⁷⁶² "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Tit. V Art. 61.

⁷⁶³ "Seduta XVI, primo dei 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:261.

power of secretary was only as strong as the number of times a representative was made the dominant secretary.

The information from the *processi verbali* also gives us a better idea as to the political make-up of the entire *Gran Consiglio*. The initial meeting on 2 Frimaire began with four provisional secretaries - Giovio, Perseguiti, Guiccioli, and Vicini - of which three were retained with Guiccioli being replaced by the originalist moderate Lamberti.⁷⁶⁴ This first sitting however, was registered with Giovio and Vicini as the dominant secretaries, one (Giovio) a progressive radical and the other (Vicini) a neutral moderate. This gives us an early idea into the way that politics was to be viewed in the *Gran Consiglio*; though the president Fenaroli was a respected patriot and friend of Bonaparte, the true political power rested with secretaries which held the balance between left and right to form a more moderate agenda (at least in the first month). In fact, with the first change over the two progressive representatives (Giovio and Perseguiti) were replaced neutral representatives (Compagnoni and Vismara).⁷⁶⁵

The geographic breakdown of the secretary position demonstrates some interesting aspects regarding which former states had greater ideological influence over the others. The first differentiating factor from both the presidency and the inspector's office, is the greater presence of representatives from the Serenissima (16 born, 14 residing), in particular from the republican hotbeds of the Western Terraferma (14 born, 13 residing). This zone of Northern Italy saw some of the most prolific and violent revolutionary activity in the Spring of 1797 and secretaries from this area manifested their revolutionary ideology into the positions they held. The Serenissima was followed by the former Duchy of Milan (13 born, 15 residing). Unlike the cities of the former Republic of Venice, the Duchy of Milan contributed less politically minded secretaries and instead provided representatives whose experience as professors, lawyers and priests made them apt for the more technical and less political aspects of the position (Valsecchi, Varesi and Bovara come to mind as some of the most dominant and also neutral moderates). That being said important political figures like Giovio, Dehò and Latuada also took on the position, coming from the former Duchy. Following Milan, the Papal States presented a strong showing within the secretariat (9 born 7 residing), though proportionally to the presidential and inspectors office they were significantly

⁷⁶⁴ "Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 1:85,88.

⁷⁶⁵ "Seduta XVI, prime dei 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 1:261.

less important. Modena similarly had a much weaker showing as secretaries than other positions (3 born, 4 residing), and of those who occupied the position they tended to come from academic backgrounds. The outlier with secretaries was the presence of the Valtellina representatives (1 born and 2 residing). In fact, across the board, representatives from mountain regions furnished more secretaries (12) than other positions (only 3 of the 18 presidents came from the mountains, and 2 of the 21 inspectors).

In analyzing the overall political breakdown of secretaries, the political trends that by this point are universally recognizable for the *Gran Consiglio*, continue. Compared to other positions the majority of secretaries (33 of 42) came from the leadership and more than half of the leadership would serve as an inspector compared to only a quarter as inspector (15 out of 60) and presidents (18 out of 60 – though all presidents were part of the leadership). Eleven presidents served as secretaries before or after their term. Only Luini served in all three positions. Interestingly, though unsurprisingly, the 9 representatives outside the leadership who claimed the office of secretaries were not high ranking in personal power. This data once again reinforces the notion that personal power contributed far more to both the acquisition of positional power and total power, as those with higher discourse ranking also served as secretaries.

Along the state building axis of political ideology, progressives once again dominated among secretaries (24), followed by neutrals (14) and finally originalists (3). Similarly, along the other axis, rationalists form the majority (22), followed by radicals (16), and finally moderates (3). However, when put together, the axes of political ideology for secretaries is rather different when compared to the breakdown of presidents and inspectors. While progressive rationalists had the highest number of secretaries (13), the next largest group was progressive radicals (11). Compared to the breakdown of inspectors and presidents where neutral radicals served as the primary or secondary ideology, for secretaries they were outnumbered by their progressive counterparts (neutral radicals only had 5 secretaries). This is not particularly surprising since progressive radicals were more interested in making changes to national legislature, not necessarily its procedure or internal workings, which meant most of their focus would have been on securing political authority, for which the secretary position was the best route. Both presidents and inspectors had more authority in the regulation of internal policy and as such neutrals radicals tended to have greater interest in occupying these positions. Neutral rationalists, however, made a

much larger showing in the secretary position (7) than for inspectors and president. Again, this can be explained in a similar manner as to why a higher number of clergymen were secretaries: secretaries required excellent writing skills and as many neutral moderates came from the educated classes, they fit this criterion well. It was also useful to have a relatively apolitical secretary as a partner if a more politically minded secretary hoped to occupy their time with the more political material. Originalist rationalists and neutral moderates (both 2 each) served a minority in the secretariat, as with the general leadership. Finally, Lamberti, the sole originalist moderate to serve as secretary was initially influential but soon lost that power following the entrance of Greppi and Dandolo in Nivôse.⁷⁶⁶

The position of secretary is unique, however, in its distinction between dominant and non-dominant positional power. As explained earlier, since there were always four secretaries but only two (sometimes three) positions at the tribunal, only those secretaries with the most personal power were able to exercise their positional power. Whereas inspectors rarely intervened from their position - which was more strongly based in formal power anyway - and presidents were alone in occupying their office, the power-balance of secretaries must necessarily be examined through the lens of ideological dominance across the five-month period. Interestingly the secretary who sat the most was Giacomo Valsecchi (a priest from the area around Como) at twenty-three, who was a neutral moderate. The other most dominant secretaries (Latuada and Federici [21 each]) similarly were priests from the mountains, both progressive rationalists. In fact, as one begins to go down the line, the pattern holds that the most dominant secretaries tended to be more rationalist, with a sprinkling of moderatism and radicalism. However, when examining the totals of influence, not individually, but along ideological lines, the trend tends to reflect the overall political equilibrium of leadership. In total there were 546 opportunities for a representative to be the dominant secretary over all 277 recorded sittings of the *Gran Consiglio*. This number comes from the fact that every sitting would list from one to three secretaries, who are noted as the dominant secretaries for that session. The least dominant group, unsurprisingly, were the originalist moderates who were dominant 1,5% of the time (8 times sitting dominant out of 546), with only 1 representative serving as secretary out of the 41 over the ten-month period. Originalist rationalists came next with 4,8% (26 out of 546) dominance with 2 of the seats. Interestingly, neutral moderates, who also fielded 2

⁷⁶⁶ « Seduta XXXII 1 nervoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, 1:461.

dominant secretaries like the originalist rationalists, were able to gain greater dominance (7,1% or 39 out of 546) than both the latter group and neutral radicals who had 7% dominance (38 out of 546) despite holding 5 of the seats (more than double their moderate counterparts). Of the neutrals, the neutral rationalist spent the most time as dominant (19,2% or 105 out of 546), which was the most of any non-progressive political ideology. Unsurprisingly progressives came out as the most dominant across the board with radicals at 25,6% (140 out of 546) with 11 of the 41 seats held, and progressive rationalists successfully obtaining a strong control at 34,8% dominance (190 out of 546) with 13 seats held. Therefore, if we understand the secretary position as a reflection of the political ideology of the council as a whole, progressive rationalism was by far the most powerful ideological faction driving legislation, followed closely by progressive radicalism. Defining this in more classic terms, there is a greater sense of center-leftism in the true political leadership than the traditional center-right moderatism espoused by historiographic trends like that of Zaghi.⁷⁶⁷

Presidents

At least ceremonially, the president remained the representative of the entire *Gran Consiglio* when confronted with the other branches of government.⁷⁶⁸ To be elected meant that one had already amassed enough personal power through his contribution in council debates, that it was collectively agreed his personality should represent the body as a whole. This transformation can be seen as the institutionalization of a representative through the recognition of his personal power, institutionalization in this case referring to the separation of the office from the person.⁷⁶⁹ This institutionalization however could act as a double-edged sword. The Council presidency was perhaps the most regulated of all the offices because of the massive amount of positional power which came from the office. As the president regulated the right of other representatives to speak, to propose motions or express opinions, he naturally was imbued with incredible reward power. While it is true that secretaries had the capabilities to formulate the speaking lists, it was the president who acknowledged and finalized this list. The president alone could open and close discussions. As such it became necessary for the presidency to be regulated by term limits and

⁷⁶⁷ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:142–43.

⁷⁶⁸ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 217.

⁷⁶⁹ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 62. Institutionalization as defined in Hedlund’s study refers to the separation of one organizational structure within a larger organization. Thus, in this case the office comes to be defined by the personality of the representative, his individuality no longer mattering.

limits to personal interventions, both of which hit hard at the personal power of the representative occupying the presidential position.⁷⁷⁰

The role of the president in a legislative assembly long predated the revolutionary era. However, at the beginning of the National Assembly in 1789, Sieyès confronted the idea of the legislative president, offering up a new solution to internal leadership.⁷⁷¹ *Ancien regime* presidencies were necessarily endowed with a heavier formal and referent authority, which was traditionally legitimized by the structural hierarchies of the period.⁷⁷² As such the *ancien regime* president was seen as separate from the regular assembly, higher in status and authority, “Leur influence, leur autorité se sont accrus par mille moyens”.⁷⁷³ To combat this problem, Sieyès proposed the presidency should hold a position not above the assembly but of the assembly, and to do this the nomination would come from the ranks of the assembly itself. Similarly, there should be necessary restrictions to the authority and functionality of the position, like term limits, or restrictions to debate participation. From this concern, came the policy known as the *texte de règlement*, a document which underlined the responsibilities, but more importantly, the limits to presidential power.⁷⁷⁴ The ideas about presidential authority from the *texte de règlement* remained the dominant perception of how a president should conduct himself in the chamber, according to both constitutional and internal policy throughout the revolutionary period.

Despite the reduction of presidential authority, the position was still seen as highly honorific and as such attracted some of the bigger personalities.⁷⁷⁵ It also did not make the job easier. The strict regulations had to balance with the management of the council discourse, which often carried with it numerous burdens, such as having to argue with deputies about time constraints, order or relevance of their opinions. In a certain sense the president served as the nanny to the Assembly, instilling individual discipline but also necessarily remaining servile to its whims.⁷⁷⁶

⁷⁷⁰ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Tit. V Art. 61; “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:114.

⁷⁷¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante: Les techniques délibératives se l’Assemblée Nationale 1789-1791* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 196-98.

⁷⁷² Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 46; Mulder et al., “Power, Situation, and Leaders’ Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study,” 566.

⁷⁷³ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 196–97. Trans. “Their influence, their authority was accrued a thousand ways”

⁷⁷⁴ Castaldo, 200-201; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 217.

⁷⁷⁵ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 25.

⁷⁷⁶ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 204.

To avoid diminishing too greatly the necessary functions of the president – and in doing so also diminishing the attractiveness of the position - the presidency was endowed with a high degree of formal and referent power, which allowed the president to make executive decisions in debates as to the pertinence or necessity of interventions. This formal control over other's personal power, allowed the president a higher immediate influence than the other offices, and while he may not necessarily dictate policy long term, his decisions within debates granted him the ability to drive the direction of discourse. As the course of events progressed within the National Assembly, the formation of political parties added another function to the presidency: representative of partisan authority. Presidential and vice-presidential elections were easier to manipulate, with particular parties being able to throw their weight around and earn the most powerful offices, thus taking direct control of the debates and the legislative process.⁷⁷⁷ As such the president of the Assembly during the first half of the revolution became representative of the party in power. The role of the president remained more or less the same during the transition into the Directorial period in France. Under the new Constitution of Year III, the president remained restricted by term limits. Likewise, a president's function as representative of the dominant party also remained fundamental to the role.

Secondary to the president came the role of vice-president. In the early days of the Revolution in France, this position developed as a sort of secondary honorific office which served to support the president in his duties or replace him in his absence.⁷⁷⁸ The vice president, however, soon became the stepping stone to the presidency. As party politics became more involved in obtaining legitimate positions, the holder of the vice-presidency was seen as the successor to the current president. Therefore, often partisan struggles for power came to be more hotly contested in the vice-presidency than the presidency. This did not mean that there was always partisan hegemony between the two positions, however it did mean that as an individual sought to establish their own positional power they would not have to (theoretically), contend with party politics once they had victory as the vice-president.⁷⁷⁹

The role of the council president in the Cisalpine Republic mirrored in many ways, its French counterpart. They were constitutionally limited to a 15 day, term which prohibited

⁷⁷⁷ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 26.

⁷⁷⁸ Mitchell, 26.

⁷⁷⁹ Mitchell, 28.

immediate re-election.⁷⁸⁰ The president was prohibited from taking an active role in debates, unless he requested permission from the council to step down from his position momentarily, at which point the position would be filled by the vice-president until the relative discussion had finished.⁷⁸¹ The president was additionally awarded many of the same rights as seen in France. All discourses had to be requested to and approved by the office of the President, as well as the lists of speakers. The president also had the right to decide when a discussion had reached its conclusion, either because of some sort of resolution, a breach of order, or a major digression in the conversation. Additionally, the president was offered the ability to open letters on behalf of the *Gran Consiglio* (though only within the Council), call members to order or end a discourse which he decided to be against regulation.⁷⁸²

That being said, there were some differences between the French and Cisalpine cases. The most obvious was the lack of official political party formation, and the role of the president in party domination over legislation. As the Cisalpine legislature was careful to avoid party formation, this meant that the office of the president no longer took upon itself the mantle of representing a dominant party or ideology. This does not mean however that the office of the president is not still a valid mode of measuring political thought inside the Council. As in France, where shifts in presidency also reflected shifts in important debate topics, the president of the *Gran Consiglio* was an important position to obtain for those seeking to bring about a change to a particular issue. While not formally tied to a club or party, presidents were often selected because of a combination of personal power attributes which they had accumulated since their introduction into the Council. These attributes were often articulated during debates regarding issues for which a representative offered particular informational, expert, or charismatic power, due to their knowledge or passion in the subject. Logically the particular issues championed by the representative can be found within the debates listed during their occupation of the presidency. Polfranceschi for example first introduced the petition to allow citizenship for citizens of the parts

⁷⁸⁰ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Tit. V Art. 61.

⁷⁸¹ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:107. Interestingly this article came under debate. Originally the position was to be filled by the next closest ex-President. There was also some discussion about whether a president could return to his chair, and for how long he had to wait. This was done to avoid presidents continually abusing this privilege to intervene in debates, hence using their personal power in what should be a positionally powerful roll. It was eventually decided that the president must remain away from his post until the discussion is closed either by the dismissal or resolution of a motion, the order of the day, or council approval to adjourn.

⁷⁸² “Seduata XI, 2 di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:199–203.

of the former Serenissima which had not been included into the borders of the new republic;⁷⁸³ a month later under his presidency the first list of ex-venetians were awarded cisalpine citizenship at his direction.⁷⁸⁴ That being said over the course of 1798, as the *Gran Consiglio* began to institutionalize and decentralize more, and the powers of the president became less focused and ceremonial (a sequence of events better explained in Chapter V), their political allegiance to the early proto-factions did in fact become more important in their selection (for example Dehò as de-facto leader of the progressive radicals came to power in Floréal when progressive radicals also saw a spike in their decision making power).⁷⁸⁵

Seven of the eighteen presidents came from the territory of the ex-Republic of Venice (Fenaroli [Brescia], Savonarola [Padua], Tadini [Bergamo], Polfranceschi [Verona], Mazzuchelli [Brescia], Alborghetti [Bergamo], Sabatti [Brescia]). All came from the Terraferma region to the west of the Serenissima and had connections to the states in the Emilia and ex-Duchy of Milan. All but Savonarola played a direct role in uprisings of Spring 1797; it is therefore interesting to note that these figures, reputedly more revolutionary than others in the Council, were also three of the first five presidents (Fenaroli, Tadini, Polfranceschi). From the Papal States came four presidents (Gambari [Bologna], Brunetti [Bologna], Ramondini [Finale Emilia], Vicini [Cento]). All participated as members of the Cispadana congress and had a measure of expert power regarding revolutionary government. Gambari and Brunetti along with Tadini and Polfranceschi who were among the elite, served as presidents in the months Nivôse to Germinal, and approved more progressive legislation. After the Serenissima presidents, the next largest group came from the ex-Duchy of Milan with five (Giovio [Milano], Alpruni [Pavia], Vismara [Milano/Pavia], Dehò [Pavia], Luini, [Luino]). Unlike the other geographical regions, the Lombard presidents tended to be far more polarized along lines of progressive (Giovio, Dehò, Luini) or neutral (Alpruni, Vismara). Interesting all seemed to be clumped together in the middle of the period. Perseguiti and Vertemate-Franchi, were outliers, coming from the ex-Duchy of Modena and the former Swiss Valtellina respectively.

⁷⁸³ “Seduta XXXV, 4 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:505.

⁷⁸⁴ “Seduta LXXXVIII, 26 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:560.

⁷⁸⁵ “Seduta CLXVIII, 16 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:487.

Additionally, the political ideology of presidents takes a bit of a different direction than both the general leadership and the secretary statistics. The most interesting information comes from the state building axis, which sees neutrals and progressives tied for overall influence (both had eight presidents). Originalist presidents are only two - Alpruni and Vertemate-Franchi - not surprisingly a more rationalist priest and revolutionary aristocrat, both of whom served during periods of greater instability and both of whom were considered failures by their peers.⁷⁸⁶ Looking at the other axis, the radicals held the slightest of majorities over rationalists (9 radicals; 8 moderates) which moves away from the more rationalist trends of the overall leadership and the secretaries. Only one moderate (Savonarola) made it into the presidency, and it was at the very beginning of the period. Yet it is the combined ideologies which prove the most interesting. The most influential group in the presidency were the neutral radicals (5) followed by progressive radicals and rationalists (4 each) then neutral and originalist rationalists (2 each) and finally neutral moderates (1). The presidency, therefore, sits much further to the left with respect to the other positions and the general leadership, though not to the extreme. This seems to demonstrate a desire to portray the *Gran Consiglio* (as the president was the face of the council) as forward thinking, though still in line with French Revolutionary values, despite the fact that the true politics (embodied by the secretaries) was much more rationalist and progressive in the direction of an Italian revolutionary experience.

When looking at the presidents it is interesting to note two trends. First, that the Emilian and Serenissima presidents, all of whom had previous experience with building revolutionary governments, tended to be grouped at the unstable beginning and end of the ten-month period; while the Milanese deputies (and Vertemate-Franchi) tended to be grouped in the middle months (Germinal-Prairial). While these middle months might seem unstable due to the 24 Germinal coup, this coup in fact had a greater impact on the *Consiglio dei Seniori*, and served to actually stabilize the political climate of the *Gran Consiglio*.⁷⁸⁷ This suggests that leaders with higher charismatic and referent power were put in charge of the process of governmental construction in unstable

⁷⁸⁶ “Seduta CXXXVIII, 16 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, , 2:763–64 In fact, In his parting speech Alpruni actively acknowledges he failed to bring either meaningful resolutions or stability to the Gran Consiglio, despite the fact that it was a period of relative stability and autonomy for the Council more generally. .

⁷⁸⁷ « Seduta CXLVIII, 24 Germinale anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:59.

times, while the more stable periods saw those with higher informational and expert power being offered the highest office of the council.

The other notable trend regards the political movements of presidents. Periods which saw stronger French alignment in the *Gran Consiglio* - such as the first month and a half of the Council, the period after the Franco-Cisalpine Commercial and Military Treaty, and the arrival of the French ambassador Trouvé - saw presidencies which often utilized greater positional power, in particular sanctioned power, to direct the debates away from major legislative progression and more towards the reestablishment of a stable originalist (Savonarola, Alpruni, Vismara, Vertemate-Franchi). They also tended to be the least progressive or radical presidents. The other presidencies, which existed in longer periods of relative Cisalpine autonomy, were occupied by representatives with strong personal power before their election - specifically with strong charismatic and informational power – who would utilize their positional power to favor more progressive legislation which would confront particularly Cisalpine issues and was unafraid to break with French political and governmental precedent to do so. These also tended to be greater in number, reflecting a much more autonomous (from the French authorities that is) attitude towards legislation in the *Gran Consiglio*, than has been imagined in the historiography.

However, one must remember that while the president was endowed with certain powers which helped in the immediate passage of legislation, it was the secretaries who were often the true influencers of long-term projects. In fact, the most notable limitations which the secretaries could impose on presidents, was the fact that presidents could not pronounce judgments on the passage or rejection of motions but had to rely on communicated their judgments through the secretaries.⁷⁸⁸ There was often correlation between the ideologies of presidents and dominant secretaries. For example, the more neutral moderate presidency of Savonarola which was dominated by neutral moderate secretaries Compagnoni and Vismara. These sittings which saw a greater focus on support for French troops and the establishment of law and order, staples of contemporary French politics in Paris. This contrasts with the following period (16 Nivôse-1 Germinal), dominated by more progressive or radical presidents (Tadini, Gambari, Polfranceschi, Brunetti and Giovio) who would be supported by increasingly more progressive secretaries. While

⁷⁸⁸ “Seduta XI, 2 di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:202–3.

this period was not necessarily anti-French, it was much more occupied with breaking from the French mold and confronting political issues of the Cisalpine Republic head on. The secretaries and presidents of this period developed a political leadership much more in line with the state building efforts of the 1791-1795 French government, than with the established French politics of 1798 favored by the originalist politicians like Savonarola or Alpruni. It was a leadership much stronger in a mix of charismatic, sanction and informational power than the formal, reward and referent power utilized by their originalist counterparts.

This trend of presidents and secretaries working together was common with the exception of the first (Fenaroli), and last (Perseguiti) presidents. Fenaroli, a theoretically more progressive president, was confronted by the dominant secretaries Vinci and Lamberti, both of which favored a more originalist style of governance (Lamberti more so than Vicini). In the end, Fenaroli, was a relatively weak president, which meant that the greater focus on more superficial aspects of governance such as law and order and internal policy and ceremony for the *Gran Consiglio* took precedence over larger institutional changes.⁷⁸⁹ The 16 Frimaire removal of progressive secretaries Giovio and Perseguiti, confirms the tendency towards less institutionally progressive representatives, which were reflected in the debates.⁷⁹⁰ The case of Perseguiti at the end of the period is similar in that the dominant secretaries, Moccini and Bertanzo, were more neutral and moderate than the newly elected secretaries Gambari and Sabatti. The leak of the new constitution to be instituted by Trouvé on 28 Messidor, and the friction between the ambassador and the French General Brune over the future of the Republican Assembly had tensions running high between the progressives who tended to favor Brune and the originalist politicians who tended to favor Trouvé.⁷⁹¹ Perseguiti, a neutral radical and viciously vocal revolutionary was put at odds with the more moderate neutrals Bertanzo and Moccini. In the end Perseguiti's time in office was cut short

⁷⁸⁹ “Seduta XI, secondo dei 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta XIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta XVII, secondo di 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:119–204, 223–25, 267–78. This was in part due to the fact that the Council was not yet fully functional and had to establish many of these superficial aspects in order to begin passing legislation, especially in the first half of Fenaroli's time as president. As a close friend of Bonaparte, it can be assumed that it was his upward/outward influence which allowed him to assume the presidency and not his charisma or informational power as with his successors.

⁷⁹⁰ « Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, 1:337-41. An interesting example is the relationship with France. There is much adulation regarding the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic by the French Republic and in fact the speeches regarding this go on for many pages within the *processi verbali*. This issue is heavily debated under the progressive presidents, and it can be believed that this has to do with the change in secretary politics from one of originalist to progressive. .

⁷⁹¹ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 831.

by the Coup of 14 Fructidor which saw him replaced and moved to the *Seniori*.⁷⁹² These instances differ from other presidents where French authority was strong like Alpruni or Savonarola for two reasons: first the presidents in these cases were more progressive but were weakened, in Fenaroli's case because he had not established a legitimate form of personal power, and in Perseguiti's case due to the brevity of his term; second, there was no sense of hegemony between the secretary and president positions ideologically which caused internal struggles for positional power. The restrictions to the presidential office made the position weaker and allowed secretaries to dominate political discourse in these cases.

Leadership is determined by power, and power is determined by influence, which is the ability to affect the behavior, attitudes, or opinions of others. The power to influence comes in two forms: personal power or the ability of an individual to use his own charisma, expertise, influence or experience to drive influence; or positional power, which derives its strength from the legitimately recognized office of leadership in an organization and makes decisions for the group as a whole based on this recognized power. Within the data of the *Gran Consiglio*, one finds both forms of power utilized heavily to influence the direction in which legislation was formulated. Personal power manifested itself through the discourses and interventions of representatives in general assembly and took the form of persuasive or charismatic speech meant to gain influence through emotion or logic. Positional power took the form of council offices, who led the debates through legitimate means of regulations and limitations. In the end, however, it is both forms together which defined leadership in the *Gran Consiglio*, and in particular the elite, who had the greatest influence on the formulation and direction of Council opinions and behavior.

Hence, in defining leadership, one must look to the overall trends which exist in the data from the *processi verbali* and personal profiles of the representatives to better understand the formation of the internal elite. What conclusions, thus, can be made about leadership in the *Gran Consiglio*? Geographically, the representatives from the former Duchy of Milan may have dominated the leadership numerically, but ideologically they shared this authority with representatives from the former Western Terraferma of the Republic of Venice, who had a slight

⁷⁹² Annibale Alberti, R. Cessi, and L. Marcucci, *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, vol. 8 (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1938), 8:16.

statistical advantage in the position of secretary. From this it must be remembered that it was the secretary - the single position who had the rights to intervene in general council - who truly controlled the leadership of, and whose ideological dominance would define the political culture, not just of the leadership and elite but of the entire legislative body. Finally, we can conclude that this leadership was overwhelmingly progressive and rationalist across all aspects of the leadership, except for the presidency, whose position as the face of the *Gran Consiglio* needed to be both revolutionary facing, but still in line with French political goals.

Yet power alone does not give us the full story of how the *Gran Consiglio* successfully constructed and put to paper the ideological, conditional, and geographical politics present both internal and external to the *Gran Consiglio*. The leadership may have directed the way in which legislation was discussed and confronted by particular ideologies or opinions, but its construction was left to the commissions. This in fact represents the third major aspect, along with positions and discourses, to the construction of total power. While leaders could be vocal, or sit as an officer of the Council, until they had a hand in the construction of laws and acts, their influence meant little outside of demands to change particular aspects of legislation - demands which may or may not be heeded during construction. It was commissions, who built and studied the conditional and ideological aspects of laws along the axis of political ideologies described in this chapter, and who had the final say on how the political culture of the council was truly to be constructed. Dominating commissions was more important for representatives than obtaining any official position, and the more commissions one could sit upon, the more successful they would be at obtaining true influence. For this reason, Francesco Reina became as powerful as he did, despite never sitting as president, secretary, or inspector of the chamber. Reina along with other well-known and highly influential representatives (Latuada, Dandolo, Luigi Bossi, Carlo Cocchetti, Perseguiti) used commissions to enforce their ideologies – in particular progressive moderatism – and in doing so claim true power within the assembly, outside of the superficiality of general discourse and Council office. The next chapter will examine commissions and bureaus, how they were constructed and the forms they took, and most importantly their role in the construction of legislation, leadership, and the overall political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*.

Chapter VI

Commissions

“At the heart of the Legislative were its committees.”⁷⁹³ So said C.J. Mitchell in his 1988 book *The Legislative Assembly of 1791* and is a sentiment equally applicable to the *Gran Consiglio* in 1798. The commissions which were created between 2 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor were the organs of the *Gran Consiglio* which helped to sustain legislative output effectively pumping the lifeblood of the council. These commissions came from an ancient tradition by which individual smaller organizational units provided the informational and resource directives of the whole legislative body. The commissions of the *Gran Consiglio* however, and really the entire democratic-republican world, had come from a new revolutionary framework in the last years of the eighteenth century which redefined the functions and instruments of a legislative assembly. Commissions were to be not only the organs of legislation, but also the incubators of legislative culture, for it was within their ranks that arose (at least in Europe), first in France between 1789 and 1795, and then across the continent to the Sister Republics beginning in 1795, a new revolutionary and republican idea of how legislation and political culture went hand in hand. It became the conduit for institutional innovation and governmental reconstruction. This idea was at its core, the belief that logic and reason would dictate the law and that the historic use of traditional authority and the use of pure charismatic power in legislation would give way to a new rational authority led by expert and informational power structures; commissions would play a large and heavily concentrated part in the acquisition of these power structures in the new republican constitutional order.

This idea became what will be termed from here on out as a “committee system”. A committee system is an organizational structure found within a legislature, which exists for the

⁷⁹³ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 30.

purpose of exploration, research, innovation, and decision making on behalf of the whole legislative body. The committee system is made up of many different and highly variable organizational units, which are necessarily composed of the members of the legislature; they do not and cannot include the direct participation of external forces to the legislative body, however they can be affected by those external forces. The committee system can be formed in infinite ways depending on the social, economic, historical, geographic, and political conditions of the legislative body. More importantly the committee system of a legislature is the primary mode by which legislative power is formed and harnessed by individual members of the legislature. The concept of legislative power is one which was briefly presented in the previous chapter when discussing total power and was used in Chapter II to explain rank 3. It is the power of a representative to influence the decision-making behavior of the entire legislative body. As a representative increases in legislative power, so too does his ability to decide on the construction, mitigation and publication of legislative output. However, this legislative power is almost exclusively available through participation - and indeed domination - of the legislature's committee system, since it is the committee system who provides the tools for this decision-making process.

This chapter will continue along the themes found in Chapter V of examining the tools used by the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* in their construction of a new Revolutionary Republican political culture. The committee system of the *Gran Consiglio*, denoted by its extensive use of commissions in the formation and resolution of legislative output, provides an interesting case study in the nature of legislatures in the nation-building process following the events of Thermidor Year III. While the *Gran Consiglio* was formed in the image of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1795, it was also uniquely Italian, or perhaps even more accurately, Cisalpine. The committee system which it formed and the ways and means of accumulating legislative power on an individual (and later proto-factional) basis weaved constantly between loyalty to the principals of the French Revolution and a need to confront the peculiarities of the Cisalpine condition.

This chapter will thus begin with an examination of the French origins of the *Gran Consiglio* committee system. It will trace the modern historiographical tradition of the evolution and developmental iteration of the French Revolutionary committee system from 1789 to 1795.

Section two will then turn to the more theoretical elements of legislative committees more generally. Here we will define what a committee system does for a legislature, as well as the multitude of ways in which it could develop depending on political, social, and cultural elements. Most importantly this section will examine the ways in which the French and *Gran Consiglio* committee systems formed in similar and starkly different fashions, and why. This section will also look at how legislative power was acquired in the *Gran Consiglio* committee system, and the battles for control of legislative power came to define the leadership and make up of this committee system. The final section which makes up the bulk of this chapter will look at the three primary elements of the *Gran Consiglio* committee system - permanent, semi-permanent and special commissions – and how each played a unique role in the evolution of political culture and the acquisition of individual and proto-factional legislative power. This section will demonstrate the statistical data which provides the greatest insight into the committee system such as who sat on committees, when they were created and the legal and political conditions in the Council at the time of their conception.

The Historiographical assumptions on the French origins of the *Gran Consiglio* committee system.

Like many of the procedural and organizational structures of the *Gran Consiglio*, the Cisalpine committee system has many similarities to the development of Revolutionary French committee systems between 1789 and 1795 according to the multitude of studies conducted on this system in French legislative historiography. It seems that Cisalpine representatives looked to the developments of the French committee system both for inspiration and as a cautionary tale which then guided the development of the legislative process and the political gamesmanship found across the ten-month *Gran Consiglio* period. The revolutionary committee system was perhaps one of the greatest innovations of the entire Age of Revolutions. While not an entirely new concept (small research bodies who existed to inform the whole legislative branch on particular issues can be traced back to the classical period), the frequency and power inherent in the various iterations of the French revolutionary committee system made it unique in forming a new and modern legislative branch even when compared to contemporary legislative systems (for example, the newly formed US Constitutional system). What will be presented here is not necessarily a history of French committee system development (the focus of the dissertation is on

the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* after all) but rather the interpretation of this systems development as it has been viewed by the historical community looking at French legislative development during the revolution. More importantly, this section will argue that the *Gran Consiglio* was influenced by its French processors and should be inserted into the larger discourse of French legislative committee systems in the Revolutionary age.

Modern historiography of the French committee system

It should be stated before beginning that the history of committee systems during the revolution is one sparsely written. This of course does not mean that there has been no work done on committee systems at all. In almost every analysis of legislative processes of the French Revolution (as well as the greater European context after 1796) there has been, to some extent, mention of the importance of the committee system in political development.⁷⁹⁴ For clarity and brevity this dissertation will not pick through the mountain of two centuries worth of historiography regarding the French Revolution; instead it will focus on four significant and more modern studies of the French Revolutionary legislative development which explicitly highlight the importance of the committee system. Of these works, the greatest attention will be paid to three of the four primary studies highlighted in Chapter I as the methodological basis for this entire dissertation (Castaldo, Tackett and Mitchell), in addition to recent edition of *La Révolution Française* dedicated to the study of French committee development and contributions to overall French legislative Development organized and directed by Prof. Virginie Martin.

Perhaps the most detailed and in-depth historical study on the French committee system comes from André Castaldo's 1989 book *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante: Les techniques délibératives de l'Assemblée Nationale 1789-1791*.⁷⁹⁵ Though only a chapter within a much larger study of the first French legislative experiment during the Constituent Assembly, Castaldo explores the beginnings of the system in 1789 as well as the various role it took on over the course of 1789-1790. The work is notable for the level of detail it utilizes to explain the various elements and factors of committee design and functionality which simultaneously deconstructed the *ancien regime* institutions while formulating a new legislative production process according to

⁷⁹⁴ Betlem Castellà i Pujols, "Introduction," 3.

⁷⁹⁵ André Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante: Les techniques délibératives de l'Assemblée Nationale 1789-1791*, 161–98.

the burgeoning constitutional order in France. Castaldo's work remains the only book to date which explicitly lists the formation and functionality of each of the early permanent commissions, setting up a later base for historical events to come.

Contemporary to Castaldo's French language study of the early formation of the French committee system, Tackett's *Becoming a Revolutionary* also takes a look at early committee formation.⁷⁹⁶ While Castaldo focuses more on functionality and the impending needs which forced committee formation, Tackett's study takes a look at the interpersonal relationships of Constituent and Legislative Assembly deputies, and the developments in political culture (as opposed to political practice) which brought about the rise of committees as a center of politics. Tackett's study relies much more heavily on actions taken by individuals within the system itself which in turn defined the practical and procedural elements of the committee system. Looking at aspects like expertise, leadership and outside influence, Tackett's examination of the committee system chronologically tracks the formation of the system from 1789-1791. Where Castaldo insists on the development of governing, Tackett focuses on the political story.

C.J. Mitchell's 1988 work *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, though published before both Tackett and Castaldo, in fact provides a continuation of both studies on the committee system from the National Constituent Assembly into the Legislative Assembly of 1791-1792.⁷⁹⁷ Mitchell dedicates the first part of his examination of the committee system to explaining how the newly elected members of the legislative assembly went about renewing - or more often recreating - the functions and duties of the committees whose origins are traced in Castaldo's work.⁷⁹⁸ He looks at how particularly influential committees like the Extraordinary Committee or that of Surveillance began to take on auxiliary roles in the legislative process which made them more susceptible to becoming political battlegrounds between developing political factions. The second part of this study on the committee system seems to take up where Tackett left off, by applying Mitchell's political analysis of *oui*- and *non*-voters to the political cultural developments of the committee system throughout 1791 into early 1792.⁷⁹⁹ Like *Becoming a Revolutionary*, Mitchell's

⁷⁹⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 219–26.

⁷⁹⁷ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 30–39.

⁷⁹⁸ Mitchell, 30–35.

⁷⁹⁹ Mitchell, 35–39.

analysis looks at the political battles conducted by the men and factions who made up the committees and how they effected a larger war for legislative decision-making control.

The final influential work on the French committee system is actually not a singular study, but a collection of articles published in the April 2020 issue of *La Révolution Française* – the historical journal run by l’Institut d’histoire de la Révolution française – which focused on the formation and function of individual aspects of the French committee system between 1789 and 1795.⁸⁰⁰ This issue, summed up best within the introduction by Virginie Martin, goes beyond the developmental or political history of the French committee system and instead profoundly investigates the ways in which various committees fought to change or over take aspects of governance which to that point had traditionally been considered the responsibility of the executive.⁸⁰¹ Additionally, the issue of *La Révolution Française* includes two studies into the function of the committee system in the post-thermidorian era.⁸⁰² These studies, while not the only to examine the roles of committees in legislation under the Directory, do for the first time link the philosophy and politics behind the committee system in the early years of the Revolution, to the post-Thermidorian nation-building process.

The historiographical conceptualization of the French committee system (1789-1795)

These four works can provide the historian with some basic concepts of how the French committee system developed in the first half of the 1790s and this developments effects on legislative and political culture within the Gran Nation. This following section will provide a generic outline of the French committee system according to these authors. As this dissertation is not an exhaustive study of the French committee system, to save research time and more importantly for brevity’s sake the reader is reminded that the following is simply an amalgamation of the concepts presented by these authors and not a new conceptualization of French committee system development. The sources used for this are almost exclusively secondary making this portion more of a study of the historiography than a presentation of an evidence-based definition

⁸⁰⁰ *La Révolution française*, no. 17 (2020),

⁸⁰¹ Martin.

⁸⁰² Parcé, “Les papiers de la Commission de Seize”; Fiszleiber, “La pratique des finances publiques sous le Directoire.”

of the French committee system. Instead, this presentation will be of the general concepts and definitions outlined by the authors cited in the previous section.

The need for a committee system in France was born from a need to organize the National Assembly. In fact, according to Tackett, one can really trace the need for organization back to the early days of the Estates General when delegates found themselves congregated into their provincial “governments” in order to discuss objectives of public policy and finance.⁸⁰³ While these bodies continued to meet well into early 1790, by June 1789 a general fear was growing that these regional affiliation would make difficult any attempt at formulating a sense of national unity in confronting national problems since every region would have its own interests at heart. The proposed solution was originally to be the formation of *bureaux*, a system of organization by which deputies would be separated upon the basis of alphabetical order within the lists for the purposes of reflection and debate.⁸⁰⁴ The idea was that these smaller, randomly selected groupings would allow for more intimate discussion without the menace of regional particularities.

The concept of utilizing legislative “committees” which would create small groups of experts on particular topics from among members of the Assembly to conduct specialized research appeared soon after the initial formation of the *bureaux*.⁸⁰⁵ It was decided that the committees would take a form similar to *bureaux* in that they would be run by a nominated group of officers (presidents and secretaries) who would be responsible for organizing, recording and leading discussions.⁸⁰⁶ However, unlike the *bureaux* these committees would be selected based on expertise instead of at random, in order to stimulate more effective and faster discussion. These committees were not seen as being a replacement for *bureaux* but would provide specific information and facts leaving the *bureaux* open to focus on debate and reflection, instead of forcing deputies to delve into topics they knew nothing about.⁸⁰⁷ As Mounier pointed out, the *bureaux* system would need to take on significantly more responsibility to formulate a constitution for the

⁸⁰³ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 219.

⁸⁰⁴ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 158–59.

⁸⁰⁵ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 221 The first committees appeared on June 19 (Verification, Drafting, Substantance and Rules) in order to establish the most pressing needs for organizing the assembly and on July 14, 1789 the Constitutional Committee was formalized to create a new French Constitution. .

⁸⁰⁶ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 165.

⁸⁰⁷ Castaldo, 162–63.

French people in any reasonable amount of time, and so the committees removed that burden so the deputies could focus on the business of creating the Revolution.⁸⁰⁸

Restrictions were placed on the number of committees which an individual might sit in on, but these regulations were unclear and led to abuse by many of the most personally powerful figures like Barnave, La Rochefoucauld and Alexandre de Lameth.⁸⁰⁹ Further committees often sprang out of these initial committees to confront problems which might further arise in the discourse, which would find deputies occupying more than one committee simply by virtue of the continually evolving nature of the Revolution.⁸¹⁰ All in all this initial phase of state building constituted the largest expansion of the committee system during the National Constituent Assembly.⁸¹¹ Thus 1790 serves as the period of stabilization and institutionalization for the French committee system, and by the end of that year committees had become vital to the formulation of laws and revolutionary politics.

With the Constitution of 1791 and the formation of the Legislative Assembly, the committee system was firmly established as the primary way to develop legislation in the new Revolutionary government.⁸¹² As Mitchell describes, the committee system under the new Constitution was transformed from a method of establishing legal and legislative norms, into a powerful political weapon which became the center of a new French political battle between the increasingly fractious elements of the new Legislative Assembly.⁸¹³ The most interesting innovation to this politicization of the committee system was the way by which the dominant

⁸⁰⁸ Castaldo, 164.

⁸⁰⁹ Castaldo, 164,167; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 223. The initial restriction would not allow a deputy to sit on more than one committee at a time. By the end of the Constituent Assembly, Barnave sat on at least 6 recorded committees, La Rochefoucauld 7 and Lameth 8.

⁸¹⁰ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 167 The period of uncertainty which came with the chaos of July-September 1789, was followed by the formation of new committees of Research and Reports, and from these between October 1789 and January 1790 came the Judicial, Ecclesiastical and Feudal committees. Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 222–23.

⁸¹¹ Pons, “Comment remédier à la « disette de numéraire » sans « avilir » la monnaie ?,” 3–8.; By August 1790, for example, the gigantic Financial Commission found itself complemented by the Money and Assignat Committees hoping to relieve some of the immediate financial strain of formulating a new revolutionary economy.

⁸¹² Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 30 The Committee of Twelve, created in March 1791, came into being to solve problems of “public peace” and the “Extraordinary” Committee (French *Comité extraordinaire*) was formed with the “simple” task of fixing all issues which had arisen due to the Revolution. The two committees became central and emblematic of the growing political tensions which had arisen with the Legislative assembly. In his note on page 30 Mitchell provides the original description of this committee which was to examine the state of the nation from all points of view and to determine the best way to protect the “Constitution, Liberty and the Empire”.

⁸¹³ Mitchell, 31, 35, 37–39.

faction in the general assembly – thus the majority faction – was also the dominant faction in the committee system, a seemingly obvious innovation but as Mitchell puts it, the “uniform presence throughout the committees makes it notable”.⁸¹⁴ As political factions began to compete for dominance in the committee system, the officers positions in committees (much like the officers positions in the General assembly as described in Chapter V) became the primary battle ground between the different groups attempting to harness the collective legislative power of the committee.⁸¹⁵ This development also meant that the officers positions for particularly important committees – for example the Committee of Twelve, the *Comité Extraordinaire* or the Surveillance committee created in November 1791– came to be valued higher than even the president of the general assembly, particularly as the central system gave way to the committee system in the decision making process.

However, as the political situation became more divisive within the Legislative assembly, the regulations which governed the committee system made political control of this system difficult for the majority faction at a given time.⁸¹⁶ To overcome these regulatory obstacles, factions attempted to garner control of the committee system simply by forming new and more powerful committees, or by increasing the numbers of particularly important committees to stack said committee with faction members.⁸¹⁷ This tactic was used in the Military Committee and the Surveillance committee – perhaps the most powerful throughout late 1791 and 1792 – while committees seen as uncontroversial or unimportant like the Public Instruction Committee were left virtually untouched.⁸¹⁸ By July 1792 this strategy had worked to such a degree for the radical factions, that they met little resistance to the changes which occurred to bring about the First French Republic on 10 August.⁸¹⁹

The increased strain on the French nation due to the war and the increasingly dire economic situation, coupled with the fall of the Monarchy and the lack of a strong administrative or executive

⁸¹⁴ Mitchell, 32.. Mitchell does point out 3 exceptions to this rule. The Decrees Committee and the Feudal Committee were both consistently occupied by individuals coming from the minority factions. The Military Commission, which was unique in its need for career soldiers and not politicians tended to always be occupied by the generally more conservative (*non-voters* as he puts it) military personnel regardless of majority or minority of the same in the general assembly.

⁸¹⁵ Mitchell, 32–33.

⁸¹⁶ Mitchell, 36.

⁸¹⁷ Mitchell, 37.

⁸¹⁸ Mitchell, 36.

⁸¹⁹ Mitchell, 38.

branch of government, meant that by the beginning of 1793, the newly established Convention needed a more powerful and unified system of decision making to lead the Nation.⁸²⁰ In order to accomplish some sort of order and stability, the delegates of the Convention turned back to the committee system as a way to organize themselves. Over the course of 1793 the Convention granted judicial and executive functions to various committees, such as the Surveillance Committee or the newly created Committee of Public Safety. The latter in particular, created in April 1793, was intended to serve as a powerful supplement to the Convention.⁸²¹ The Committee of Public safety, came to not only lead the functions of the entire committee system itself, but the legislative, executive and judiciary systems which it was supposed to protect.⁸²² The Committee was organized so each member served as a sort of envoy from the other power committees in the system – a committee system within a committee system.⁸²³ The Decree of 12 Germinal Year II finally abolished the executive committee and instead gave complete control to the legislative committees of the Convention, with the Committee of Public Safety confirming its control over the entire Revolutionary government.⁸²⁴

The events of Thermidor Year II put into stark relief the power inherent in the committee system.⁸²⁵ While the committees were not dissolved or weakened within the immediate post-Thermidorean period (at least until the enactment of the Constitution of Year III in 1795) the Thermidorians were careful in their 7 Fructidor Year II (24 August 1794) decree to limit the executive and judicial authority exercised by these bodies, and instead focus the attention of the various committees on the tasks originally assigned to them.⁸²⁶ They formed a new committee on 13 Frimaire Year III (3 december 1794), the Commission of Sixteen, who was charged with formulating a new executive body and keeping a close eye on the committee system of the Convention as it completed a new Constitution. With this designation, the Convention seemed to formulate the Constitution of Year III in a way which would return to the system before the 1791

⁸²⁰ Conchon, “De l’articulation des pouvoirs législatif et exécutif,” 1.

⁸²¹ Duvignau, “Le Comité de salut public,” 1.

⁸²² Duvignau, 2–3.

⁸²³ Duvignau, 7. The formation and subsequent control exerted by the Committee of Public Safety between April 1793 and August 1794, brought the danger posed by extreme decentralization of legislative authority and unchecked decision-making power on the part of committees into the forefront of the Thermidorians fears as they sought to break down the system built during the period of the Great Terror.

⁸²⁴ Duvignau, 8–9; Conchon, “De l’articulation des pouvoirs législatif et exécutif,” 4.

⁸²⁵ Martin, “Introduction,” 3.

⁸²⁶ Cadio, “Le Comité de sureté générale (1792-1795),” 13; Conchon, “De l’articulation des pouvoirs législatif et exécutif,” 5.

Constitution when the committee system had been a function of state building and not of political domination.

In the end the French committee system served an actual function in the legislative process, that of formulation and innovation in confronting new problems born of the revolution and old problems left over from the *ancien regime*.⁸²⁷ For Virginie Martin the committee system served as a check on the forms which the executive power took during the Revolutionary period, be they the Monarchy, the Executive Committee or the Directory.⁸²⁸ Tackett and Castaldo in their own way insisted the committee system was the result of institutional organization which arose from the decline of the bureaus - itself a development born from a need to organize a method by which debates could take place amongst delegates early on which would not inhibit the legislative process with lengthy addresses in general committee.⁸²⁹ For Mitchell the committee system became the route by which power could be acquired and change effected depending on one's political position.⁸³⁰ In a way it is the combination of all these interpretations which touch upon the most important development which the committee system brought about during the Revolution; namely, the idea that specialization and concentration of legislative functions into the hands of smaller, more competent groups provided a necessary and useful check on internal and external non-legislative influence, while providing a path to political change and innovation within the legislature, the branch most directly linked – at least theoretically – to the will of the Nation.

Committee Systems and Legislative Power

There are a number of factors which effect the formation of committee systems within legislative government; in fact, these factors can be used to explain why every legislature is in itself unique, even if, as in the case of the Cisalpine and post-Thermidorian French legislative bodies, both systems are bound by identical constitutional restrictions. These factors include the developmental conditions of committee systems, decentralization, the influence of political parties on committees, the development of bicameralism versus unicameralism. All these factors also help

⁸²⁷ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 168–69.

⁸²⁸ Martin, "Introduction," para. 2.

⁸²⁹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 220–21.

⁸³⁰ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 39.

contribute to an individual's capacity and eligibility to augment or lose legislative power, the third element behind the Leadership Index discussed in Chapter V.

Organization, Procedure and Structural Relationships of the Legislative Committee System

One of the key factors when looking at legislatures is the way in which outside elements interact within the legislative branch. These are typically political, economic or social conditions introduced into the closed society of the legislative body (the "*interna corporis*") through outside means (petitions, reports, correspondences) but which inevitably effect the environment within which legislative norms develop.⁸³¹ These conditions present themselves most visibly through the organization and development of the committee system. A committee system often forms along a spectrum where, at one polarity sits a legislature in which decision making tends to be conducted in the larger general council with little to no input at the committee level; at the other end exists a form of legislature which "is in effect the sum-total of several smaller parliaments".⁸³² Where the specific legislature sits upon the spectrum depends upon the degree of specialization and permanence of the commissions within a system. As a legislature begins to organize and mature, its committee system begins to "institutionalize" itself – committee membership becomes more stable with rules of seniority, leadership, internal normalization, and regulation; along with this institutionalization comes greater specialization and permanence.⁸³³ Committees and commissions cease to be simply modes of expediting the legislative process and limiting debates, they become the primary *modus operandum* for the formulation, argumentation and publication of legislative output, an indication of legislative performance.⁸³⁴

As a committee system institutionalizes, continually expanding both its legislative control and sophistication, so too does it begin to decentralize. Decentralization occurs from a "natural outgrowth from the large number of units existing in legislative organizations".⁸³⁵ The central administration (i.e. the Council officers), ceases to be the regulator of debates or the arbitrator of decisions making, and instead becomes more ritualistic in its approval of legislation. Innovation

⁸³¹ Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 74.

⁸³² Di Palma, "Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament," 148.

⁸³³ Polsby, "The Instiutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives"; Di Palma, "Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament," 149.

⁸³⁴ Di Palma, "Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament," 149; Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 78–79.

⁸³⁵ Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 80.

and the formulation of legislative development now take place at the committee level, with arguments coming under the umbrella of particular specialized committees and subcommittees.

More importantly a decentralized and institutionalized legislature no longer requires the aid of outside sources like the executive to satisfy “legislative demands” but can sufficiently rely on its own internal norms and resources. A truly decentralized legislature becomes an autonomous authority from the rest of the government, its roles “are defined more by the institution’s [the committee system’s] ‘*intera corporis*’ than by the bodies from which legislators are recruited”.⁸³⁶ In essence the committees themselves become like individual members, each competing for dominance within the assembly. The most obvious example of this would be the Committee of Public Safety, which successfully overtook all other elements of government during the Great Terror. In France by 1794, the committee system had decentralized and institutionalized to such a degree that especially powerful committees (the Committee of Public Safety the most prominent) were able to direct policy making and application in all aspects of the government.⁸³⁷ The Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* never made it to this level of decentralization in its ten-month existence (this is partially by constitutional design and partially due to outside influence), however the months before the 24 Germinal Coup, particularly Nivôse and Pluviôse, saw the rapid expansion of both permanent and special commissions which indicate massive institutionalization and decentralization in its early phases.

Once a system has been institutionalized, it develops procedurally in one of two ways: either they become individually (minority) centered or group (majority) centered.⁸³⁸ In minority centered systems, the individual legislator is given the full protection of internal regulations. It is at the individual level that the ability to propose or amend legislation or ideas is established and there is no limit to debate length or scope. While there is some recognition of outside forces, in particular the input from other branches of government like the executive administration, the greatest allocation of power goes to the internal bodies (committees or commissions) of the legislature, and in particular the individuals able to dominate these bodies (committee officers, field experts, those with high personal or position power acquired in general council etc.). This focus on internal power protects from external influence and tends to give full power of decision

⁸³⁶ Di Palma, “Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament,” 149.

⁸³⁷ Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 365.

⁸³⁸ Di Palma, “Institutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament,” 149.

making to the collective sum or majority of individual legislators, the results of which are entrusted to an “impartial” officer for enactment (president or secretary).⁸³⁹ As there is no singular political or philosophical party line for individual members to follow under this system, there is a much greater fluidity in political alliances, and personal powers of persuasion are applied at a much greater rate internally, as are connections due to outside networks applied internally such as educational, professional or geographic similarities. For minority centered systems, there tends to be less public engagement and openness in order to guard against external influence, and as such tends to utilize commissions and committees as a way to discuss innovation away from prying eyes.⁸⁴⁰

Contrastingly, majority centered legislatures place the power to propose or amend ideas and legislation into the hands of like-minded groups or political parties.⁸⁴¹ While the individual still has the theoretical right to these legislative functions, their power to utilize them is often strictly regulated by party leadership. Debates become highly planned out displays of consistent and regulated discourse, where individuals hold strictly to party lines or risk a loss to both personal and positional power. Committees and commissions are therefore dominated by external party leadership and are no longer subject to the supremacy of commission officers or individually powerful or persuasive figures.⁸⁴² In these systems the ability of individuals to act upon their own opinions and interests is regulated by their ability to retain or increase power and influence (be it due to fears around re-election or ambition within the party).⁸⁴³ Individuals who do take on decision making, do so as a representative of the group, such as a party leader, and can only take on this role if their position has been agreed upon by the entire group and the decision being made falls in line with the ideology of the party.⁸⁴⁴ This means individual ability to amend personal ideology is impossible or at the very least highly restricted. For this reason, dominance of the committee system by way of numbers and not ideological pre-eminence becomes the key to gaining control of the entire legislative process.

⁸³⁹ Di Palma, 149.

⁸⁴⁰ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 81.

⁸⁴¹ Di Palma, “Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament,” 149.

⁸⁴² Di Palma, 150.

⁸⁴³ Martin, “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote and Legislative Organization,” 341.

⁸⁴⁴ Di Palma, “Insitutional Rules and Legislative Outcomes in the Italian Parliament,” 150.

Essentially, the object of these groups is transferred from winning ideological majorities in general council, to establishing numerical majorities based on outside partisan influence. This form of procedural development tends to exist where strong majority vs opposition politics reside outside of the legislative body and have existed for some time prior to the establishment of a legislative body's organizational norms (the United States for example, or the modern Italian parliamentary system).⁸⁴⁵ Thus, in contrast to minority centered systems, majority centered committee systems tend to be more "open" and publicly involved due to the external involvement of the party.⁸⁴⁶

Minority centered systems can often develop into majority centered systems over time as shared political and philosophical preferences bring into alliance individual representatives to form political parties. This process transfers the personal and position power of the individual from the general council as a whole to the party. The early French Revolutionary governments followed this pattern. While the National Constituent Assembly had a greater focus on individual aptitudes for oration and innovation, particularly in 1789, the development of an organized committee system by 1790 became a way for likeminded political clubs to inject their political and philosophical opinions directly into the law making process.⁸⁴⁷ This does not mean that the predominance of committees as an extension of political parties was willfully accepted.⁸⁴⁸ However by the time the French Legislative Assembly was formed in 1791 the committee system had taken on a number of majority centered characteristics, principally the competition between political groups to numerically dominated committees and then enact partisan legislation.⁸⁴⁹ The growth of radical factions into full blown parties by early 1792 fully established the majority centered style of legislature which carried into the Convention and the republican era.⁸⁵⁰ This majority centered element of French government carried over into the post-Thermidorian regime, and while greater limits were placed on the powers of the committee system and political parties

⁸⁴⁵ Di Palma, 150.

⁸⁴⁶ Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 81–82.

⁸⁴⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 223–24, 226–27.

⁸⁴⁸ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 179–80; Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 407.

⁸⁴⁹ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 37–39.

⁸⁵⁰ Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 208–19, 311–17; Martin, "Introduction," para. 13.

under the Constitution of Year III, the instinct to dominate commissions and committees on a partisan level was still prevalent to both houses of the Directory era legislative assemblies.⁸⁵¹

As previously stated, the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* never reached the organizational development level which would have led to full decentralization. It did however reach the level at which the committee system was institutionalized, that is that the committee system had developed severally fully formed organizations independent of each other and the general council as a whole from which a certain level of decision making could take place.⁸⁵² The lack of decentralization but presence of institutionalization, particularly in the first months of the Council (Frimal-Germinal) demonstrates that the *Gran Consiglio* was a minority centered system. This was primarily due to restrictions in commission permanence and party formation.⁸⁵³ The minority centered committee system still had significant amounts of political dissidence between members, a factor which was most apparent in the turbulent period of 9 Ventose to 24 Germinal, which saw the beginnings of proto-factionalism as like-minded representatives began to take sides on important issues like the Military and Commercial Treaty with France or the establishment of the Military Commissions of High Police.

The final element which justifiably differentiated the committee systems of the *Gran Consiglio* from those of the earlier French Revolutionary governments was how committee systems develop in bicameral legislatures versus unicameral legislatures. Though seemingly obvious initially, one must remember that unlike bicameral legislatures where one house constructs and designs legislation and the other passes them into law, unicameral legislatures serve both functions.⁸⁵⁴ Therefore, in a unicameral legislature, a powerful committee-system – be it minority or majority centered – can often overpower the general legislative structure, as was the case during the French Convention. More importantly the strongest parties and individuals within the committee system of a unicameral legislature have no check on their decision-making power (their

⁸⁵¹ Martin, “Introduction,” para. 9; Fiszleiber, “La pratique des finances publiques sous le Directoire”; Parcé, “Les papiers de la Commission de Seize,” paras. 11–14.

⁸⁵² Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 62; Polsby, “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.” This institutionalization of the committee system is one of the major criteria which separates the *Gran Consiglio* period from the *Consiglio di Juniori* (Fructidor Year VI to Germinal Year VII [September 1798-April 1799]). Under the revised constitution of Trouvé the independent legislative capacities of commissions became heavily restricted, as did the predominance of the commissions over their ministerial counterparts.

⁸⁵³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Tit. V Art. 67.

⁸⁵⁴ Cotta, “Il Problema del Bicameralismo-Monocameralismo,” 550.

legislative power), which can allow the committees they dominate to become the sole decision-making body for the entire legislative branch and enact sweeping systematic changes to the *entire* governing structure. That said, with a unicameral system, the committees enjoy greater access to the full resources of the entire assembly, which often means faster, more direct, and stronger laws meant to confront issues of the state without censorship.

However, the bicameral system is significantly more complex when attacking issues of legislative organization, regardless of the procedural or organizational structures. Bicameral legislatures tend to develop differently based on factors of structure (isomorphic or heteromorphic) and relations (equal or unequal), meaning that there are four conditions within which a committee system can arise.⁸⁵⁵ For each condition the limitations to a committee system's ability to organize itself and establish a procedural format are different, meaning the extent to a committee system's power, not only within the legislature but within the government as a whole, changes. When added to the factors of organization and procedural format, these limitations increase. For example, in an institutionalized, decentralized, majority centered system, isomorphic equal legislatures (where the committee systems will share political interactions across cameral lines) and heteromorphic unequal legislatures (where one committee system holds complete power over the other), the bicameral nature of the legislature seems non-existent, allowing entry for some of the same issues found in unicameralism. However, with the same organizational and procedural formats, isomorphic unequal and heteromorphic equal legislatures seem to provide the necessary checks between houses which speed up and monitor the legislative processes of the other houses.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵⁵ Cotta, 51 Isomorphic equal legislatures have both houses made of the same number and resources with equal amounts of power shared between them. There have been few if any examples of this in history as the two houses would most likely end up merging. Isomorphic unequal legislatures have both houses structured the same way, but one house has significantly more power over the other; an example of this would be the historic Parliament of Great Britain during the height of the British Empire. A heteromorphic equal legislature has one house structured differently than the other (this could be in terms of size, function, voting composition) but both houses end up having an equal amount of power over final legislation. The best example of this would be the Congress of the USA. Heteromorphic unequal legislatures generally have one house being superior to the other in both structure and relationship, so much so that the superior house can act almost as a unicameral body. This is most common in modern parliamentary governments such as the Modern UK Parliament, or the Italian legislative body. While both the French Republic and Cisalpine Republics under the Constitution of Year III would be considered heteromorphic equal legislatures, in reality, for reasons which will be presented in Chapter X, the Cisalpine Assembly seems to reflect a significantly more heteromorphic unequal style of legislature, with the *Gran Consiglio* wielding a much larger influence, particularly in the period during and just following the 26 Germinal Coup. .

⁸⁵⁶ Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 76–77.

For the purposes of this study, the Cisalpine Legislature to which the *Gran Consiglio* belongs can theoretically be described as a centralized, semi-institutionalized, minority centered heteromorphic equal legislature, at least for the initial months of its existence. However, one can see that the *Gran Consiglio*, by virtue of its rapidly institutionalized committee system, and strong minority centered procedural format, came to overtake the *Seniori*, particularly following the 24 Germinal Coup, when the *Seniori* saw 11 of its members forcibly removed to the three removed from the *Gran Consiglio*.⁸⁵⁷ This superiority came from the higher number of special and permanent commissions which were established in the early months of the Gran Consiglio's existence, which saw a much faster expansion of legislative power among individual representatives much earlier on in the winter of 1797-1798 than the *Seniori*. This is perhaps because of the greater personal power which came along with being a *Gran Consiglio* representative, as it was their job to formulate innovative revolutionary responses to local problems. However, it can also be noted that the representatives were much more successful at translating their legislative power (their ability to enter into commissions and thus effect legislative output) and translate it into external authority.

Legislative Power and the Gran Consiglio

To this point it should have been noted by the reader that the committee systems of Revolutionary Europe brought about a new form of power which could be harnessed by individuals hoping to play a role in the nation building process of the 1790s. All elements, be they organizational or procedural, evolved over the course of the 1790s as a way for individuals or groups to obtain and direct this newly formed power over decision making in the legislative process, which could then be used to implement particular philosophical or political goals. It must be remembered that power is the ability to influence the behavior or attitudes of others in such a way as to reach a goal.⁸⁵⁸ Committee systems are designed to organized and streamline decisions making, and as such the commissions and committees which make up a system can have a large amount of influence over the decisions taken by the General assembly which concern legislative function. This control over decision making is power, a legislative power, the strengths and limits

⁸⁵⁷ "Seduta CXLVIII, 26 germinale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:58-59.

⁸⁵⁸ French and Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," 150; Mulder et al., "Power, Situation, and Leaders' Effectiveness: An Organizational Field Study," 566.

of which change depending on the organizational and procedural structures which bind the commissions.

Legislative power is different from personal power and positional power because it does not come from the qualitative bases of power explained in Chapter V. Instead, legislative power derives exclusively from the committee system and the level of participation and personal/positional power a singular representative can obtain within this closed system. Yet the question remains, where does the power of the committee systems derive from in the first place? One must look back to the three basic sources of power, from which the organization of the committee system originates: 1) access to group resources 2) access to other recognized powerful figures 3) a central place in the accomplishment of tasks within the framework of a given set of rules.⁸⁵⁹ The committee system in France for example, originally formed as a way to allocate resources to confront particularly difficult problems, without wasting or misdirecting said resources.⁸⁶⁰ The *bureau* system which had existed at the beginning of the National Constituent Assembly was ill equipped to allocate these resources, as they were made up of groups which were often accused of particular regional or class self-interest.⁸⁶¹ As a result, the first committees were formed from expert or notable figures within a given context (bankers and financiers for budgetary matters, lawyers for the formulation of a constitution and judiciary, military officials for issues of war, etc.) and established a traditions of committee specialization which would endure throughout the Revolutionary period.⁸⁶²

The legislative power of the *Gran Consiglio* derives in much the same way. Commissions were formed to allocate resources, and were made up of experts or personally powerful representatives, who could be trusted to make correct decisions for the group and work within the framework of the Cisalpine Constitution and the internal policy of the *Gran Consiglio*.⁸⁶³ Unlike the French case where the idea of legislative power developed over the course of years, in the Cisalpine Republic, the inheritance of French political traditions from the first part of the 1790s

⁸⁵⁹ Shafritz, Ott, and Jang, *Classics of Organizational Theory*, 246.

⁸⁶⁰ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 164–65.

⁸⁶¹ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 220.

⁸⁶² Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 168–69.

⁸⁶³ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:146.

meant that legislative power already existed as an established aspect of the Cisalpine legislative process.

However, the difference between the French and Cisalpine Assemblies was the adherence to procedural and organizational norms in the early months of the *Gran Consiglio* which restricted partisan decision making and legislative decentralization. The more centralized and minority-based nature of the Cisalpine assemblies allowed a high level of individual involvement in the decision-making process within the committee system. This contrasts with the French system, particularly after 1791 where partisan presence based on personal power was first necessary to establish legislative power.⁸⁶⁴ For the representative of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* in 1798, the conditions of the assembly, particularly in the early months when the power and relational dynamics were still being established and political and ideological divisions were not as profound, allowed representatives to significantly augment their total power through the committee system and the amassing of legislative power.

The politics of the committee system can be broken up into two categories: how representatives were assigned to commissions, and the number and permanence of commissions. Beginning with the former, according to the internal policy resolution regarding commissions approved on 7 Frimaire, representatives would be elected by the general council from a short list of interested or nominated members; these members had to be active on the day that the commission was elected, meaning representatives not in the council at the time were prohibited from nomination.⁸⁶⁵ However, soon after the passage of this resolution, this method was called into question. Following a presentation by Vincenzo Dandolo on 10 Frimaire on behalf of the Commission established to write the internal policy of the Council, the method of nominating and then voting for representatives was refuted due to the danger it posed of particular members or their allies coming to dominate the various commissions.⁸⁶⁶ This preoccupation was clearly born from the fear of the formation of a system which might mirror the developments of 1790-1792 in France (a period which the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* hoped to avoid in the formation of their own more “rational” republic). Several ideas were put forth, most notably those by

⁸⁶⁴ Mitchell, *The French Legislative Assembly of 1791*, 37–39.

⁸⁶⁵ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, , 1:146–47.

⁸⁶⁶ “Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:179.

Savonarola – who proposed that the Council simply follow the preestablished French norms – and Mascheroni – who proposed a sort of lottery system in which representatives are randomly selected out of an urn. In both cases the proposals were met with hesitancy by the Council because they were much too time consuming and lacked the guarantee of expert input.

Finally, on 15 Frimaire the council adopted a format proposed by Giuseppe Biumi by which the bureau of the president (the president and the 4 secretaries) would nominate the representatives for a commission.⁸⁶⁷ If rejected, the nominations would go to a secret ballot for whom anyone present and active that moment could be nominated. The interesting thing about this adopted format is that it helped to strengthen the centralized organization system by forcing commission formation to come through the presidency and not the general assembly. While not strictly partisan it added a new element to the positional power of the presidency, which gave him and the secretaries considerably greater capabilities to affect the legislative process. For this reason, as the months progressed and political boundary marks began to appear between the different groups, it became important to have like-minded presidents and secretaries in office. Ultimately, the 15 Frimaire resolution began a process by which specialization became a conduit for legislative power. So while figures like Angelo Perseguiti or Felice Latuada would utilize their tremendous discourse abilities to gain personal power in the centralized general council, or Giovanni Vicini or Giuseppe Luini used the positional power of council office, figures like Giuseppe Gambari or Michele Vismara who were much less vocal yet no less passionate about the formation of the Cisalpine nation could use their alliances in the council president's bureau to augment their authority through legislative power. As the months progressed, they came to be the leading voices of internal politics, Vismara siding with the Trouvé backed Cisalpine Thermidorians and Gambari the anti-Trouvé progressive faction (See Chapter XI). Their dominance by the end of the period was thanks to their significant accumulation of legislative power in the winter and Spring of 1798.

The second category regards the number and permanence of commissions within the committee system of the *Gran Consiglio*. These factors are primary indicators of the level of institutionalization of a committee system and the degree of decentralization which has taken place in the legislature to that point. The higher the number of commissions often signifies greater decentralization which in turn indicates a higher degree of legislative power invested in the

⁸⁶⁷ “Seduta XV, 15 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:248.

committee system. Additionally, it means greater opportunity for individuals, particularly in a minority centered system like that of the *Gran Consiglio*, to integrate themselves into the committee system and obtain legislative power.

While legislative power may be more accessible than either personal or positional power, within a committee system the individual commissions and committees compete for a larger share of the resources and the decision-making power. Thus, it is not only important that representatives belong to a high number of commissions and committees but that these have a longer and more institutionalized presence. Permanence of commissions and committees is fundamental to the acquiring of legislative power since the longer a commission endures, the more decisions it is entrusted to make, growing its general specialization. Thus, an individual hoping to acquire a high degree of legislative power will want to have influence over several committees which are either permanent or special. As decentralization occurs and the committee system overtakes the general council in importance, having a high degree of legislative power across multiple commissions or committees can allow a representative to fundamentally direct the legislative process for the entire body. In this way legislative power has the potential to overtake both personal and positional power, or at the very least help in the augmentation of both for a single individual. This is what happened more or less for the Mountain between the end of 1792 and early 1794.⁸⁶⁸ Similarly this is the case made in Chapter XI for why Vismara and Gambari became the voices of their respective factions after the Messidor Crisis and the decentralizing of the *Gran Consiglio*.

The restrictions present in the *Gran Consiglio* against commission permanence attempted to limit the acquisition of legislative power. However, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* quickly found ways to avoid these restrictions. The most obvious (even if it seems the silliest) was changing the name of the organizational structures from “committee” to “commission”.⁸⁶⁹ It was

⁸⁶⁸ Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 357–65. As the *Montagnards* gained more positions in the permanent commissions over the course of the second half of 1792, their legislative influence grew. They were able to build the substructure of what would become the Great Terror by gaining seats across the necessary commissions to make the decisions on all aspects of fighting the counter-revolutionary elements present in French society. In fact, the majority centered nature of the system meant that it became significantly easier for Mountain leaders like Robespierre to take control of the legislature since all that was necessary was holding a numerical majority in most committees. Legislative power surpassed the personal power of great speakers like Danton, or positionally powerful figures like Barère by the end of 1792 and by 1794 the central authority of the convention had given way to the Various Revolutionary commissions who came to direct not only the legislature but the entire government

⁸⁶⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Tit. V art. 67. This article banned the existence of permanent committees in the Cisalpine Assemblies. By naming the bodies commissions, the *Gran Consiglio* could have a

a similar trick to what the French had done in their own Assemblies under the Constitution of Year III to establish a permanent committee system to outsource and expediate legislation. However by nature of its newness, the *Gran Consiglio* remained more minority centered than its French counterpart, allowing individuals to acquire legislative power on their own without having to worry about partisan alliances preventing commission nominations, offering representatives greater flexibility. Giordano Alborghetti, a minor aristocrat from Bergamo involved in the Bergamasco Revolt of 1797, was able to find seats on 5 of the 22 permanent councils which were formed over the course of the Council's existence which ranged from the military commission to the public charity commission.⁸⁷⁰ Though a progressive radical he was able to gain access to a number of rationalist and moderate controlled commissions thus increasing his opportunity to influence legislative decision making. In fact, many of the discourses made by Alborghetti throughout the ten-month period are noted as having spoken on behalf of one commission or another. Finally, as already discussed the policies of allowing the bureaus to nominate commissions meant that special commissions were often made up of politically similar colleagues to the presidents or secretaries, which pushed the system more towards a majority centered system by the end of the *Gran Consiglio* period, particularly in the months of Messidor, Thermidor and Fructidor.

As mentioned in Chapters II and V, legislative power is represented as Rank 3 in the statistical index of the verbal process of the *Gran Consiglio* and contributes to both the participation and total power (leadership) indexes. As the Rank 3 variable has already been explained in detail in Chapter II it is not worth reiterating here for purposes of redundancy. However, there are important aspects which should be note now that there has been a better explanation of the nature of commissions and legislative power more generally. First, the information which is used to make up Rank 3 comes only from the information provided in the processi verbali of the *Gran Consiglio*. A complete record of all commissions' work throughout the period of 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor does not exist. Unfortunately, as explained in Chapter II,

number of permanent and semi-permanent commissions which would serve the same function as the permanent committees but would not violate the Constitution.

⁸⁷⁰ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:2; Interestingly after Vismara, Alborghetti became one of the most significant pro-Trouvé voices following the Messidor Crisis. Custodi even tells us that Alborghetti would go on to be Trouvé's biggest ally in the Cisalpine Legislature before he was unceremoniously pushed aside by Antonio Aldini and his group of expelled *Seniori* representatives. Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 41.n;

this means a large, unknown quantity of commissions (the commission of organic laws for example) whose membership is never officially confirmed within the *processi verbali* will be left out of the calculation for legislative power even if some evidence to their formation exists.⁸⁷¹

Due to the higher frequency of equal ranks within this classification, the product of a much smaller number of quantitative data to work with, the officially tabulated leadership of commissions includes all those who acquired a rank between 1 and 47 which includes 56 individuals (see figure 5). As this quantity is relatively similar to the 59 individuals which encompass the leadership based on total power (the sum of personal, positional and legislative power) it was decided to place the elite at 31 individuals who rank between 1 and 28. While most of the individuals in the leadership and elite for legislative power were similar to those in for personal, positional and total power, for many their positions within the classification have changed dramatically. Even more surprising is the exclusion of many of the most influential names, such as Giacomo Greppi, or Giovanni Lupi, who placed within the *elite* for most other forms of power but were excluded from the legislative power leadership all together.⁸⁷²

⁸⁷¹ “Seduta IX 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, , 1:178; “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale VI”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:830. In both of the cases cited here the commission of organic laws was mentioned. In the first case, that of 10 Frimaire, it is given a letter by the Directory to examine. The second case, that of the 19 regards the replacement of Lamberti – who had been moved into an administrative role for the Directory that day. However, neither case provides a list of members of this committee nor of when it was established. There is no record within the *processi verbali* of the concrete details of its existence and therefore it cannot be included in the calculation of legislative power.

⁸⁷² Lupi ranked 26 in personal power and 23 for attendance, with a total power ranking (leadership index) of 48 and a participation index ranking of 43. Greppi ranked 5 in personal power, 2 in attendance, and 14 in positional power with a total power ranking (leadership index) of 23 and a participation index ranking of 16. Despite their higher power numbers with regard to the general assembly, they both ranked 66 in legislative power, signifying that despite their high power in general council, they were generally left out of major legislation. This could mean a number of things 1) they may be a proto-factional leadership (both were progressives although Greppi was significantly more radical than Lupi) and chose to take a back seat to direct legislative decision making. 2) They were both younger members of the assembly and thus did not have the trust of the assembly to be considered experts worthy of extensive committee participation 3) They found themselves much more influential in general debates and as such were selected to advocate for legislation which had already been formulated by less personally powerful allies such as Gambari or Cocchetti.

Fig. 10 List of Legislative Power Ranking (Leadership and Elite) ⁸⁷³

Giuseppe Gambari	1	Felice Mozzini	28
Carlo Cocchetti	2	Alfonso Longo	28
Bartolomeo Cavedoni	3	Adeodato Ressi	32
Francesco Reina	4	Vincenzo Massari	32
Felice Latuada	5	Fedele Bianchi	32
Pietro Dehò	5	Antonio Campana	32
Giambattista Venturi	5	Giuseppe La Hoz	32
Sebastiano Salimbeni	5	Vincenzo Federici	37
Luigi Ramondini	5	Pietro Martire Cadice	37
Angelo Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca	5	Giuseppe Mangili	37
Godano Alborghetti	11	Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila	37
Luigi Bossi	11	Ottavio Mozzoni	37
Luigi (Alvise) Savonarola	11	Giacomo Moccini	37
Vincenzo Dandolo	14	Cesare Montalti	37
Michele Vismara	15	Giuseppe Antonio Sabatti	37
Giuseppe Compagnoni	15	Andrea Terzi	37
Giuseppe Luini	15	Giuseppe Carbonesi	37
Giovanni Domasceno Bragaldi	15	Pietro Polfranceschi	47
Giovanni Maria Fontana	19	Alberto Allemagna	47
Giovanni Antonio Tadini	19	Lodovico Giovio	47
Giuseppe Fenaroli	21	Gaetano Vertemate-Franchi	47
Angelo Perseguiti	21	Filippo Severoli	47
Lorenzo Mascheroni	21	Pietro Antonio Calvi	47
Lauro Glissentì	24	Francesco Giani	47
Giovanni Vicini	25	Giulio Cesare Tassoni (Estense)	47
Stanislao Bovara	25	Girolamo Coddè	47
Vincenzo Brunetti	25	Gatano Conti	47
Francesco Antonio Alpruni	28		
Federico Mazzucchelli	28		

On the x-axis, progressives formed the majority of the legislative leadership at 25, followed by 21 for neutrals; similarly, the progressives took an even larger portion of the elite at 17 (just under half) while neutrals numbered 10. Originalists had the lowest level of influence over decision making at 5 in the leadership and 3 in the elite. This follows the trend of the general leadership where progressives followed by neutrals held the greatest influence in both positional and personal power while originalists had a generally diminished importance in the decision-making process.

⁸⁷³ Those in yellow boxes in Figure 5 represent the elite while the entire table lists the leadership. This table does not constitute the entire Rank 3, the quantification of legislative power, only the top 25th percentile.

When both axes were taken together it would once again be the progressive rationalists, who held the majority spot overall for legislative power at 17.




Figure 11. Political Leadership of Legislative Power




Figure 12. Political Elite of Legislative Power

On the y-axis, the numbers similarly reflect the trends found in the total power leadership, though perhaps a bit more exaggerated: Rationalists took a large majority at 35 individuals (19 for elites) while radicals and moderates remained in strict minorities, at 15 (9 in elites) and 6 (3 in elites).

elites) respectively. Even if radicals and moderates were to combined forces (which as opposite ends of a polarity would seem unlikely), they would not be able to overcome the numbers of the rationalists, who tended to dominate commissions across the entire ten-month period. This contrasts slightly with higher influence of radicals in the total power leadership (radicals had 18 and rationalists were 31). This however can be easily explained by the fact that rationalists, who tended to favor greater use of planning and research over impulsive general emergency votes, would have been more willing to utilize the tool of commissions, and thus legislative power, in effecting the legislative process. Radicals on the other hand, by virtue of their preference towards speed and force, tended to favor quick emergency voting evading the need for commission work.

That being said Gambari, Cocchetti, and Cavedoni the most legislatively powerful representatives in the Council were all radical and progressive; this presence of progressive radicals being higher up in the legislative power classification, despite their lower numbers more generally, most likely signifies an understanding by radicals of the importance of the committee system to the legislative process, and a desire to keep commissions - in particular special commissions - on track and resolved in a timely manner. Moderates and rationalists, particularly if they trended towards a more originalist perspective could have dragged their feet in project resolution.

The Committee System of the *Gran Consiglio*

While legislative power is perhaps the most important result of the *Gran Consiglio* committee system, the system itself is in fact a unique result of the historical, political, and international conditions from which it developed. The development of a revolutionary committee system in the Cisalpine Republic was rooted in a project of state building born out of the French experience from 1789 right through to the moment the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* sat for the first time on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1798). The representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* were well aware of this history as they embarked on their own nation building project. They understood the risks of unchecked legislative power, and its potential to become unchecked legislative authority.⁸⁷⁴

⁸⁷⁴ Cummings, “The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures,” 5.

Yet while “permanent committees” may have been prohibited, the formation of “commissions” without a definitive end to their mandate provided a loophole by which particular generalized commissions (Legislative Commissions, Commercial Commission, Financial Commission, Military Commission to name the most important) could retain some sort of permanence throughout the period.⁸⁷⁵ Another tactic utilized by the *Gran Consiglio* was the construction of semi-permanent commissions (Petitions first nominated on 21 Frimaire and Drafting on 8 Pluviôse) which cycled out representatives on a 10-14-day basis.⁸⁷⁶ The final tactic used by the representatives to increase decentralization while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution was to nominate a large number of independent special commissions. Since there was no limit to the number of commissions which could be created, and the three commission maximum per representative was abolished with the 10 Frimaire resolution, representatives would often work to place like minded individuals on these special commissions.⁸⁷⁷

Permanent Commissions

Article 67 of Title V of the Cisalpine constitution explicitly states:

Nessuno de' due Consigli può creare nel suo seno alcun **Comitato permanente [sic]**; ma ciascuno di essi quando la materia gli sebra suscettibile d'un esame preparatorio, ha la facoltà di nominare tra I suoi Membri una commissione speciale, che si stringe semplicemente all'oggetto, per cui sarà state nominata. Questa commission si scioglie tosto che il Conislgio ha decretato su tale oggetto.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Tit. V Art. 67; “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta II, 3 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:90, 98–100, 146–47, 179.

⁸⁷⁶ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:339; “Seduta LXXI, 8 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:250–51.

⁸⁷⁷ “Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:179.

⁸⁷⁸ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Tit. V Art. 67. tras. “No one of the two Councils can create within its confines any permanent committee; but each one of these [Councils], when the matters at hand seem susceptible to a preparatory examination, has the faculty to nominate from its members a special commission, which will restrict itself simply to the objective, for which it will have been nominated. This commission will dissolve itself immediately that the Council has degreed its objective [made a decision to approve or reject the motion of the commission]”; *Comitato permanente* was put in bold by this researcher in order to emphasize the words presence to the reader and does not appear as such in the original text

Interestingly while the constitution prohibits the existence of permanent *committees* (*comitato* presented in bold for emphasis purposes above), *commissions* were whole accepted. Therefore, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* simply changed the title of these more generalized permanent bodies to commissions, though they ended up serving the same function. This was not a Cisalpine specific concept but was actively used across the legislatures of both the French and Sister republics. The permanent commissions of the *Gran Consiglio* were never labelled as such, in that it was never explicitly stated by the Council in either the general policy approved between 7 and 10 Frimaire, nor in any of the nominating procedures which took place throughout the ten-month period under study.⁸⁷⁹

How then can one differentiate and define these “permanent commissions” when compared to semi-permanent or special commissions? In fact, these “permanent commissions” reflect those labelled previously as committees under the French system from 1789-1795. Many of these early committees during the Constituency were first instituted as short-term options meant to exist only for as long as they were necessary to bring forth an agreeable resolution to a specific issue which was made their objective.⁸⁸⁰ The problem of course with this mandate, both during the Constituency in France and for the *Gran Consiglio* in the Cisalpine Republic, was that in nation-building, issues are often more complex than they might seem initially and tend to compound over time. However, what mainly differentiated Cisalpine permanent commissions from the French permanent committees of 1789-1795 was the eventual mandate the latter received to be the voice of expertise and reason within the French Assembly/Convention on particularly broad subjects which dealt either with the deconstruction of the *ancien regime* state (Feudal Committee, Judiciary Committee or the Committee of particular liquidation), or with building and maintaining the new revolutionary order (Constitutional Committee, Military Committee, Legislative Committee, Finance committee, etc).⁸⁸¹ While these committees may have originally existed to serve a specific purpose, their role was eventually promoted to a generalized leadership within the Assembly/Convention pertaining to specific topics; bodies to whom questions could be referred to where they would be disseminated or answered as necessary. This is therefore the way in which

⁸⁷⁹ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:146–47, 179.

⁸⁸⁰ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 164.

⁸⁸¹ Castaldo, 169–80.

this study will define the role of permanent commissions within the *Gran Consiglio*: a generalized body formed of representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* which offered general and expert solutions to further the constitutional or legislative mission of the Council in deconstructing the old state while building up the new revolutionary republican nation.⁸⁸² Long duration was not necessarily the sole requirement (semi-permanent and special commissions could last for weeks and many special commissions like the commission for inspecting the qualifications of representatives never dissolved); permanent commissions served a general function (legislation, military, finance etc.) and delegated tasks to individuals or formed new off-shoot special commissions for more specific issues. Also, permanent commissions tended to have a higher number of nominated representatives at the onset, typically between 5 and 20, which could increase or decrease over time (semi-permanent commissions had a fixed number at the time of renewal and special commissions always had 3-5 members trending generally on the smaller end).

Finally, permanent commissions were not always constructed along the basis of expertise. Particularly in the earlier sessions, permanent commissions were made up of notable figures with high personal power or political connections outside the Council, as was the case with the Ecclesiastical commission (whose membership included only one member of the Church, Francesco Antonio Alpruni) or the original Finance Committee (among whose membership only Giuseppe Necchi d'Aquila, Adeato Ressi and Giovanni Battista Guglielmini can be said to have had any practical expertise in mathematics or public finance).⁸⁸³ That being said, many of the more powerful commissions counted as members those personally powerful representatives who were also top experts in their field such as the Military Commissions or the Commission of Public Instruction.⁸⁸⁴ Therefore while expertise was not necessarily a motivating factor for one's participation in a permanent commission, the commission with the greatest number of experts found themselves in a better position to affect decision making since they did not need to export issues to smaller special commissions.

⁸⁸² Castaldo, 180.

⁸⁸³ For information on Aquila's career as administrator of Lodi see Gennaro Barbarisi, *Cronaca Milanese in Un Epistolario de Settecento: Le Lettere Di Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila a Giovan Battista Corniani (1799-1782)*, XIII–XIV; For more information on the mathematical and budgetary experience of Guglielmini see: Pepe, "Guglielmini, Giovanni Battista"; For more information on Ressi see: Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:109–10.

⁸⁸⁴ For the academic career of Mascheroni at the Mariano College of Bergamo: Pepe, "Mascheroni, Lorenzo"; For more information on the academic career of Tadini see: Giannini, "Tadini Antonio."

There is evidence of the existence of other permanent commissions (for example, the Commission of Organic Laws) but for purposes of accuracy and accountability the construction of legislative power which came from these commissions can only come from the data provided in the *processi verbali*.

In total there existed twenty-two permanent commissions formed between Frimaire and Fructidor Year VI in the *Gran Consiglio* that have been recorded within the *processi verbali*. These commissions were formed mostly in the early period of the Council's existence (Frimaire to Ventoso) however a few such as the Coinage and Money Commission were not formed until Floréal, or others like the Sanitation Commission were established into a permanent commission despite originally being formed as a special commission.⁸⁸⁵ The full list of permanent commissions can be found in Appendix F.

This section will focus on the representatives who gained the most legislative power through their inclusion into the permanent commissions and how this effected the political ideology which dominated the legislative process. There were 92 representatives that sat on at least 1 permanent commission over the course of the *Gran Consiglio*: 37 sat on only 1 total, 29 on 2, 10 on 3, 9 on 4, and only 7 representatives were able to find themselves on 5 permanent commissions which was the maximum number which was achieved by any representative. These seven men were Alborghetti, Cocchetti, Gambari, Reina, Savonarola, Scarabelli, and Venturi. All were within the total power (leadership index) elite, and all within the personal power leadership, with 5 of them within the personal power elite. Politically, however there was not hegemony between these 7 dominant figures within the permanent commissions. Alborghetti and Reina were progressive rationalists, Gambari and Cocchetti progressive radicals, Scarabelli and Savonarola neutral moderates and Venturi the sole neutral rationalist. While seven names can in no way indicate the total political breakdown of the entire permanent committee system, it does show that there was competition within the leadership of the various proto-factions to conquer the permanent commissions in hopes of establishing their ideological supremacy.

However, of the 202 total permanent commission positions occupied over the ten-month period, the trend fits with other indications of political power within the *Gran Consiglio*.

⁸⁸⁵ "Seduta CLIV, 2 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:177.

Progressives were the most dominant group with over half of representatives who sat on permanent commissions following this political ideology (105 positions occupied); of these, the majority were rationalists (65) and the remaining radical (40). This provides us with a sense that the permanent committees tended to be quantitatively run by a progressive majority (although not always as will be demonstrated by the case study on the military commissions) which runs with the general trends of total legislative power as well as personal, positional and total (leadership index) power more generally. Neutrals were the second most powerful group in the permanent committees (75), though unlike other aspects of the *Gran Consiglio*, moderates were the most prominent among this group (27) followed by rationalists (25) and radicals the least common (23). This trend towards moderation within neutral groups is not particularly unexpected since these permanent commissions were meant for long term study, a political strategy favored by moderates and rationalists. The split however between progressives and neutrals, as well as rationalists, moderates and radicals is highly dependent upon the theme of the commission. For example, the Public Welfare Commission (*commissione di beneficenza*) was occupied exclusively by progressives with 6 of the 7 being rationalists (the other was a radical). However, the Military Commission consistently had a neutral radical majority for most of its existence, and particularly after the events of 9 Ventose. Originalists were not much in the picture occupying a total of 22 positions of the 202 permanent commission seat created, with 19 going to originalist rationalists while only three were given to originalist moderates (all were occupied by Lamberti).

An exhaustive study of the permanent commissions themselves merits its own separate work due to the extensive information provided by the verbal processes regarding motions and petitions referred to them. To highlight the impact of proto-factionalism and the political importance of the permanent commissions to the legislative process, this study will instead focus on two of the most important permanent commissions in comparative case studies. The case studies of the Legislative and Military Commissions while perhaps not the most powerful (it is difficult to establish one singular commission who sat over the others the way the Committee of Public safety had in France) were selected since they were certainly two of the most referenced throughout the period. The primary purpose of these particular case studies will be to look at the specific political and geo-political changes made to the composition of these commissions and how they reflected, or not, the political make-up of the entire council – or at least the committee system.

The Military commission

While other commissions perhaps had a small number of “expert” representatives who could be called upon to provide informed leadership instead of merely progressing their political wills, the Military Commission was made up exclusively of soldiers or at the very least men who had been involved in the Revolutionary military operations in the two years since the French invasion of 1796. The Military Commission was also different from all other permanent commissions – with the exception of the Finance Commission – in that its origins can be traced back directly to *Comitati riuniti* who had run the legislative branch of the Cisalpine Republic before the legislative councils opened on 2 Frimaire.⁸⁸⁶

However, the Military Commission was not formed until the eighteenth sitting of the *Gran Consiglio* on 17 Frimaire. Seven individuals were nominated to sit on the commission: Ambrogio Birago, Giuseppe La Hoz, Giovanni Lupi, Ettore Martinengo, Galeazzo Mugiasca, Antonio Sabatti and Angelo Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca.⁸⁸⁷ Birago had served as the Cisalpine Minister of War following the declaration of the Republic in Messidoro and had been responsible for the elevation of many of his representative colleagues, especially La Hoz, to important positions within the Cisalpine Military.⁸⁸⁸ Mugiasco had grown up in a noble house from Como and became involved with the French Army upon their arrival in 1796.⁸⁸⁹ Martinengo, Sabatti, and Lupi had all been involved in the Brescian and/or Bergamasco uprisings in the Spring of 1797 and had been instrumental in the military organization of both cities during their own respective republics and then following their inclusion into the Cisalpine Republic.⁸⁹⁰ Scarabelli had perhaps the longest Military career of the group, having been a member of the Austrian Cavalry since 1767, and then enjoying a long career throughout the 1770s, and 80s as an officer under Modenese Duke

⁸⁸⁶ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:90 The Finance, Military, Constitutional and Legal committees of the *Comitati Riuniti* had actually been renewed with the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* on 2 Frimaire and were set to be confirmed the next day in a law set down by the Directory. However, it was established that these committees were unconstitutional and annulled quite immediately. Instead, the first recognized permanent commissions which followed these committees were nominated on 17 Frimaire. .

⁸⁸⁷ “Seduta XVIII, 17 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:283.

⁸⁸⁸ “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261,” fol. La Hoz; Serie di lettere tra Ministro di Guerra Birago, il Direttorio Esecutivo e Generale di Brigata Commandante delle truppe della Repubblica Cisalpina Giuseppe La Hoz.

⁸⁸⁹ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:87.

⁸⁹⁰ Raccolta dei Decreti del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano 1804, p. 155. Lupi was first listed among the ranks of the Bergamasco rebels and then went on to serve as an officer of the Brescian company under La Hoz in the Cisalpine Army ; Ugo Da Como 1940, p. 78 ; Ogner 2018

Francesco III and then his son Ercole III where he obtained the rank of Major General in 1786.⁸⁹¹ La Hoz was perhaps the most important of the group, having been brought up in a Military family and then serving as an officer in the Austrian Army until 1796 when his republican sympathies saw him leave the Austrian Army to fight with Bonaparte.⁸⁹² La Hoz became one of the principle commanders of the National Guard in Milan, and was eventually made the General-in-Chief of Cisalpine Troops in July 1797.⁸⁹³

The political breakdown of the Military Commission along the x- and y- axes presents a group which was overall politically centered. First looking at the x-axis, with no originalists in this group, neutrals barely edged out progressives for dominance at 4 to 3 in this original iteration of the Military Commission. Similarly, along the y-axis the progressives in the group were all rationalists. The two radicals on the Commission were both neutral and their radical intentions were more reflective of their military backgrounds (La Hoz for example consistently made clear his position about speed and efficiency in law making). The two moderates did not seem to be particularly strong in their sentiments either, favoring more disciplined legislative initiative (Scarabelli for example made numerous discourses in the general assembly with discourses more akin to the battleplans of an old general rather than the more popular charismatic political speeches common in that the time). This more measured and centrist composition of the Military Commission similarly reflects the relationship to Bonaparte whose choices for the Assembly in 1797 favoured men whose politics would not interfere with his own political agenda in the Cisalpine republic, and who he could count on to be personally loyal. As many if not all had served under Bonaparte in some capacity in 1796-1797 this connection would have guaranteed personal loyalty to Bonaparte and his successors as General-in-Chief of the *Armée*.⁸⁹⁴ Geographically this original commission was also a good balance of perspectives with 3 coming from the ex-Duchy of Milan (La Hoz came from Mantova which though fairly autonomous was still a part of the Duchy), 3 from the Western Terraferma of the Republic of Venice, and one from the ex-Dutchy of Modena.

⁸⁹¹ Ceretti, "Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo," 9–25.

⁸⁹² Rossi, "Lattanzi, Giuseppe."

⁸⁹³ "Lettere tra Birago Ministro della Guerra e La Hoz riguardando il suo nomina a posizione di Generale in Capo delle truppe cisalpine." (29 messidoro anno V) "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261," fol. La Hoz.

⁸⁹⁴ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137.

However this initial iteration of the commission did not last long. Birago and Mugiasco left quite immediately, with Birago going on to serve again as a member of the Executive Ministry following his dismissal on 10 Nivôse, and Mugiasco was dismissed on 15 Nivôse along with 8 other members of the *Gran Consiglio* who all had yet to present themselves for a session of the general council after 2 Frimaire for various reasons.⁸⁹⁵ These dismissals led to the nomination on 8 Nivôse of two new members, Pietro Polfranceschi and Giulio Cesare Tassoni.⁸⁹⁶ Polfranceschi, a member of the lower Veronese nobility who had attended the military college of the city at Castello Scalgero, had made a name for himself during the Brescia Uprising of 1797 and then had been instrumental in helping to suppress the counter-revolutionary offensive of the Pasqua Veronese.⁸⁹⁷ Tassoni was born to a father of the minor nobility and a mother related to the ducal Este family, had served as a prominent member of the Modenese military throughout the 1780s and 1790s where he had risen to the rank of captain of the Ducal Guard before becoming a republican officer fighting alongside the *Armée* following the French invasion.⁸⁹⁸

The loss of the two Milanese representatives and addition of one from Modena (with ties to the former Papal city of Ferrara) and another from the Serenissima changed the geographic balance of power. Similarly, both were neutral radicals who had replaced rationalists in the commission. The politics of the commission suddenly jolted into a neutral radical majority of 4 with rationalists and moderates splitting the other 4 positions evenly at two each. This coincided with the progressive radical presidency of Greppi and the progressive rationalist secretariat of Dandolo and Glissentì. This radicalization of the military commission indicates that the general leadership which made up the bureau of the president in the beginning of Nivôse was looking to extend their reformist agenda into the military relationship with the French, which they hoped to do without intervention from a more politically unaligned (or even moderate) military commission. The neutral and radical majority allowed this intervention to happen as was demonstrated in the reform of funding for French troops by the Cisalpine Republic and the hope to further involve

⁸⁹⁵ “Seduta XLI, 10 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta XLVI, 15 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:582; 664-665

⁸⁹⁶ “Seduta XXXIX, 8 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti 1:563

⁸⁹⁷ Badone, “Polfranceschi, Pietro Domenico.”

⁸⁹⁸ “Tassoni, Giulio Cesare.”

Cisalpine troops in the revolutionary struggle by offering the Ussari corps for a proposed invasion of England.⁸⁹⁹

The military commission remained within this compositio until an increase was made to its membership on 1 Germinal to bring the total up to nine representatives from the previous six.⁹⁰⁰ Martinengo had been dismissed on 19 Pluviôse to serve as the Cisalpine Ambassador in Naples, however, the political breakdown had not much shifted as his progressive rationalist views were already in the minority.⁹⁰¹ The 1 Germinal addition was interesting, as none of the new representatives (Angelo Perseguiti, Giambattista Venturi, and Luigi Ramondini), had any profound military experience. Perseguiti was a lawyer from Modena, Venturi a professor of engineering from Reggio and Ramondini a minor noble from the former Modenese city of Finale. All were all high up in the total leadership (Perseguiti and Venturi were members of the elite and Ramondini barely missed out at 33 on the power index) and all came from Modena.

Interestingly, this addition was instituted under the contentious presidency of originalist rationalist Francesco Antonio Alpruni, which remained the longest during the politically charged period from 9 Ventoso to 24 Germinal and was marked by a general cautiousness in the face of commission autonomy and power. This led to a constant battle with his progressive dominant secretaries Cavedoni and Mangili, of which the radical Cavedoni had already acquired a massive amount of legislative power. The mixed nature of the bureau is reflected in the mixed nature of the new additions. While the three new representatives added two neutrals and a progressive, they also added two rationalists and a radical. The total now sat with neutral radicals still in the majority at 5, though now having to compete for commission authority with 2 progressive rationalists a neutral moderate and a neutral rationalist. The neutral dominance of the commission was most likely instituted to secure the passage of the Military and Commercial Treaties with the French Republic which was to be debated that month. Neutrals had been the largest group to support (or at least remain neutral) the treaties in these debates (see Chapters IX and XI). These new additions also

⁸⁹⁹ “Seduta XL, 9 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta XLIV, 12 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta XLV, 13 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:575; 620-621; 644-645; See Chapter XI section II

⁹⁰⁰ “Seduta CXXIII, 1 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:476.

⁹⁰¹ “Seduta LXXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:407.

had the effect of placing the majority into the hand of the Modenese who now held a majority of 5 to the Serenissima 3 and Milanese 1 (La Hoz). With the dismissal of La Hoz on 22 Germinal, the Military Commission found its radical majority now tied with the more tempered rationalists and moderates, and the continued dominance of Modenese representatives meant that the commission found itself in a stable center position just before the 24 Germinal Coup; this coup had no effect on the make-up of the Military Commission.⁹⁰²

The final alteration to the Military Commission took place more or less a month after the 24 Germinal coup - once the progressive rationalist proto-faction had taken firm control of the general Council - on 22 Floréal with the addition of Giordano Alborghetti and Sebastiano Salimbeni.⁹⁰³ Alborghetti, a revolutionary noble, had made his name in 1797 as one of the principal organizers of the uprising in his home city of Bergamo, and then as head of the Bergamasco Legion during the Brescian uprising in March and April of that year.⁹⁰⁴ Salimbeni, similarly, was the son of a Venetian general in the Balkans, and had moved between Modena and Verona where he had followed in his father's footsteps as an officer in the Veronese company of the Venetian military.⁹⁰⁵ Like Polfranceschi, Salimbeni had played an important role as the head of the Veronese revolutionary militia which had helped in the suppression of the Pasqua Veronese.

The addition of the two important Serenissima military figures reflected a general increase after 24 Germinal in overall judicial policies which favored a more progressive agenda and brought the Cisalpine Republic further from the extreme centrist ideology of the contemporary French Republic.⁹⁰⁶ Not much changed ideologically other than the replacement of La Hoz with Salimbeni to sure up the neutral radical control of the commission and the addition of the progressive rationalist Alborghetti to add more progressive pressure to the commission's work (neutral radicals continued to hold the majority with 5, followed by progressive rationalists at 3 with neutral moderates and rationalist sitting at 1 each). The addition of these legislatively powerful

⁹⁰² "Seduta CXLIV, 22 germinale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:7-8.

⁹⁰³ "Seduta CLXXIII, 22 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:596.

⁹⁰⁴ *Raccolta Degli Avvisi, Editti, Ordini Ec. Pubblicati in Nome Della Repubblica Bergamasca*, 11,14; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:4.

⁹⁰⁵ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:117.

⁹⁰⁶ "Seduta CIV, 12 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:101-3; "Seduta CLIX, 7 fiorile anno VI repubblicano"; "Seduta CLXX, 18 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina* 3:289-92; 530-34; Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 127-30.

representatives to the commission can be seen as the beginnings of an attempt to introduce more majority center politics as a means to control important commissions in a similar fashion to that seen in France at the end of 1791. This would of course not come to pass as the commission was reformed after the 14 Fructidor coup, which saw a massive drop in commission authority over military matters and a severing of its connection to the *Armée* in favor of ambassador Trouvé and the French civil authority in Milan.

Legislative Commission

The Legislative committee was nominated on 19 Frimaire, two days after the nomination of the Military Commission, and was the last of the major permanent commissions to be formally established by the *Gran Consiglio*.⁹⁰⁷ The Legislative Commission was similar to the Military Commission in its origins; the Legislative Commission was born from a need to continue the work of the Constitutional Committee which had existed under the *comitati reuniti*.⁹⁰⁸ However, the *Gran Consiglio* was restricted in its ability to call a new Constitutional Committee, since the constitution had already been activated, and further interpretations were seen as redundant or rather work for the general council. Instead, the mandate of the legislative committee would be to formulate laws and acts based on the already existing constitutional articles which might interpret or supplement these articles based on the internal and external conditions of the Republic. Therefore, this new Legislative Commission came with it an extraordinary level of power over the very heart of the constitutional republic. As such, those nominated (by a general vote and not a bureau nomination) had to fit the ideological needs of the nation as well as the professional and legal experience befitting the position.

The original representatives nominated to the Legislative commission were Giuseppe Gambari, Felice Latuada, Felice Mozzini, Angelo Perseguiti, Francesco Reina, Antonio Schiera and Giacomo Lamberti.⁹⁰⁹ Reina, Latuada, Perseguiti, Schiera, Mozzini and Gambari had all

⁹⁰⁷ “Seduta XX, 19 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:300 This does not mean that there was no permanent commissions established after this date. In fact, the majority of the 22 commissions established came after 19 Frimaire (17 in fact). However, this was the final permanent commission to be nominated with the express purpose of serving as a general commission the way the permanent committees of 1791 had functioned in France. The boldness of nominating these commissions in this manner most likely spooked the extreme centrist members of both the Cisalpine and French administrations and from this point on, permanent commissions were first nominated as special commissions with a non-fixed mandate term.

⁹⁰⁸ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:90.

⁹⁰⁹ “Seduta XX, 19 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:300.

established themselves in the first twenty sessions as personally powerful figures and Lamberti's closeness to Bonaparte before the activation of the Council on 2 Frimaire had made him a well-known entity, despite his absence of interventions in the early debates.⁹¹⁰ Of course this does not mean that profession did not play some factor in their nomination. All seven members nominated originally came from some sort of legal, administrative or judicial background. Though Reina and Schiera were the only full-time attorneys on the commission, Gambari had served as a lawyer before becoming a professor of law at the University of Bologna in 1791.⁹¹¹ Similarly, Latuada and Lamberti both had practicing law before Latuada turned to a full-time ecclesiastical career as a provost in Varese in 1792 and Lamberti took over as chair of canon law at the University of Pavia.⁹¹² Perseguiti had made a name for himself in Modena as a skilled solicitor.⁹¹³ Only Mozzini didn't serve as a sort of lawyer but was the notary in this hometown of Lonato before becoming involved in the revolutionary activity in Brescia in 1797 and was educated in law.⁹¹⁴

Politically the commission was a hodgepodge of political ideologies with progressives carrying a precarious majority of 4 representatives, though they were split evenly between radical and rationalist. What is interesting is the strength of the originalists (2) Schiera and Lamberti who though one was rationalist and the other moderate, had an unexpectedly higher visibility than the only neutral representative Perseguiti. Along the other axis, radicals and rationalists were split evenly at 3 representatives while moderates only had Lamberti to interject a slower and less forceful enactment of early legislative procedures and constitutional application. The early commission was represented relatively equally geopolitically with 3 members coming from the ex-Duchy of Milan (though none themselves from the city rather the mountainous regions of

⁹¹⁰ Sani, "Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo)."

⁹¹¹ Mazzetti, *Memorie Storiche Sopra l'Università e l'istituto Delle Scienze Di Bologna*, 176; "Nomina dei membri del Corpo Legislative, dalla seduta del Direttorio esecutivo 19 brumale, anno VI repubblicano repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:66; Dettamanti, "Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal," 298–300; De Francesco, "Reina, Francesco."

⁹¹² Sani, "Lamberti Jacapo (Giacamo)"; Criscuolo, "Latuada (Lattuada), Felice."; The use of the word "barrister" is the closest to the Italian term "avvocato" which signifies a professionally recognized lawyer who works in the court system under the bar during this time.

⁹¹³ "Angelo Perseguiti"; *Il Risogiamiento a Reggio: Atti Del Convegno Di Studi 28-29 Dicembre 1961*, 22.; The choice of the word "solicitor" most closely translates to the Italian term "legale" in this period which was a professional lawyer more concerned with the preparation of legal briefs as opposed to work in open court.

⁹¹⁴ "Memorie Storiche Lonatesi", Biblioteca Queriniana Di Brescia, Fasc. Rivoluzione Di Lonato e Controrivoluzione 1797, Fasciolo Primo Libero Trentesimo."

Varese, Como and Lecco), 2 from the ex-Duchy of Modena, 1 from the ex-papal city of Bologna and 1 from the ex-Serenissima (Brescia).

Unlike the Military Commission, whose first substitutions were made to replace experienced members of the commission with other experienced members, the first replacements to the Legislative Commission came earlier, when it was decided on 2 Nivôse that due to the complexity of the material it, along with the finance and ecclesiastical commissions, merited expansion.⁹¹⁵ The nominated representatives were Giuseppe Calcaterra and Giuseppe Luini. Not much is known about Calcaterra's early life other than that he came from a minor noble family in Milan with connections to the north western part of Brianza near Como where he probably began his law career (most likely Cassano).⁹¹⁶ Luini's early life is also relatively unknown, only that he too came from minor Lombard nobility based in Luino, a small town on Lake Maggiore north of Varese, and served as *pretore* and *podestà* for the district of Martesana su Naviglia in Milan.⁹¹⁷ Both representative, therefore had legal and administrative experience necessary for their addition to the commission.

However, unlike the previous group who all had a high level of personal power, neither Luini nor Calcaterra were even in the leadership by this point (this would of course change significantly for Luini would eventually be ranked 9 in personal power by the end of the period and 3 in total power; Calcaterra, on the other hand would find himself excluded from leadership completely in all facets of power). The reason for their inclusion is most likely due to a combination of three factors beyond their professional experience. First both had notable and powerful allies (Latuada for Luini and Reina for Calcaterra) who had known them outside of the

⁹¹⁵ "Seduta XXXIII, 2 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:472

⁹¹⁶ "Nomina dei membri del Corpo legislativo", Seduta del Diretorio esecutivo del 19 brumale, anno VI repubblicano repubblicano", Montalcini – Alberti 1917, p. 66 ; Liva 2001, pp. 200-202 The information on Calcaterra comes from a will which detailed patronage to various institutions of the City of Milan and surrounding districts which is now housed in the Azienda di Servizi alla Persona Golgi-Redaelli. This will notes his place of birth as the parish of San Satiro di Milano and his parents as minor nobility. It also notes his affection for and longtime involvement with the city of Cassano in Brianza, not far from Como, the capital city of the department of Lario for which he was nominated to serve as representative in 1797.

⁹¹⁷ "Nomina dei membri del Corpo legislativo", Seduta del Diretorio esecutivo del 19 brumale, anno VI repubblicano repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:69; Pagano, *Pro e Contro la Repubblica*, 7:159; "ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 878," fol. Luini "Lettera da Cons. Giuseppe Luini, Podestà di Giunerigo[?] alla Municipalità di Milano, 1796"; "Geneologia della eredità di Bernardo Stefano Luini."

Council for political or personal reasons.⁹¹⁸ Second, geopolitically they had similar origins: both from minor nobility with connections to northern Lombardy but raised and established in Milan. This trend for extra-milanese Lombards with connections to the capital city was a trait similar to other Lombard members of the council (Reina, Latuada and Schiera).⁹¹⁹ This put the representatives of the ex-Duchy of Milan in the majority, which meant now much of the legislative and legal material would be interpreted from a perspective based on a Milanese historical, legal, social and administrative heritage. This influence of the former Duchy's political and legislative heritage was felt most significantly in the legal plans which would be presented by the Legislative Commission throughout 1798. These plans tended to have their roots in older Josephian laws formulated in the 1780s and 1790s by the *Accademia di Pugni* and were altered to fit with the new republican constitutionalism developed by the Revolution in France and imported to Northern Italy by Bonaparte and the Armée.

The political ideology of both men helped to boost the democratic tendency of the council in this early period, as both were rationalists, Luini more progressive, while Calcaterra was more neutral. These additions stabilized the commission by first giving a concrete majority to progressives (now at 5), and within the progressives a majority to rationalists over radicals (3 to 2). Neutrals and originalists both shared control at 2 representatives each but the split nature of both (neutrals had a radical and a rationalist, while originalists had a rationalist and a moderate) meant more middle of the road policy making was often the norm, with a tendency towards more progressive legislative production being formulated by the Legislative commission across 1798. Overall, the addition of rationalists put them ahead of the radicals who had shared power in the previous iteration.

⁹¹⁸ "ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 878," fol. Luini; "Lettera da Felice Latuada alla Municipalità di Milano 29 pratile anno 4 della Repubblica francese."; Luini and Latuada had contacts through their shared connections in Milan and Varese when both had familial seats. Reina and Calcaterra were both patriot barristers from the Lake Como region and Milan which meant they often would have come in close contact. It's very likely that Luini and Reina, who shared a similar political ideology would have been in contact, as well as Calcaterra and Latuada. All four would have known Schiera, similarly through his legal work in Milan, and particularly Schiera and Calcaterra through their work in Como.

⁹¹⁹ Dettamanti, "Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal," 299–305; Criscuolo, "Latuada (Lattuada), Felice." Reina who was from Lecco but worked in Milan, Latuada who was from Milan but lived most of his career in Varese, and Schiera who had worked in Milan but was originally from Valintevi north of Como

The Legislative Commission remained in this form until the 14 Fructidor Coup with the exception of one notable change, that of Lamberti.⁹²⁰ His dismissal on 19 Germinal to join the ministry ended the originalist moderate influence on the commission and as such securely rooted the progressive tendency in the constitutional and legal reports and production to come from the Legislative Commission. Lamberti was the final resistance for the originalist ideology on the Commission, and with his exit so too exited any resistance to constitutional adaptation or a looser interpretation of French legislative precedents. There is little known about the background of the man who substituted him, Antonio Menagliotti from the department of Ticino, other than he is noted as a *podestà* in the original nomination list.⁹²¹ However we can note based on his interventions and discourses in the General assembly that he trended towards a progressive and rationalist political ideology. With his addition, the legislative commission would remain with a firmly established progressive rationalist majority until the 14 Fructidor coup.

The legislative commission with its great power over constitutional and legislative decision making would naturally become the primary target were the factionalism one sees developing in the lead-up to the 14 Fructidor coup. Unfortunately, with the coup and the rewriting of political lines, the factionalism drew less upon the standard political matrix of constitutional progressivism versus speed and force, than it did upon loyalty to the French administration or the French military command (Trouvéists versus Bruneists).⁹²² This move away from the politics of state building and into the petty world of constitution control and French political games abroad took away from the personal political prot-factionalism of Cisalpine committee system and severely damaged the burgeoning political culture which had come to exist since 2 Frimaire. In any case, the legislative commission, particularly after the addition of Menagliotti became a prime example of the progressive rationalist force behind legislative development after 24 Germinal. The resistance of the Legislative Commission following the Messidor Crisis (see Chapters VIII and XI) and into

⁹²⁰ “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 2:828.

⁹²¹ ‘Nomina dei membri del Corpo legislativo’, Seduta del Diretorio esecutivo del 19 brumale, anno VI repubblicano repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:68. It is possible that this Antonio Menagliotti could be the same as a Giuseppantonio Menagliotti, a noted legal and philosophical scholar from Pavia whose 1779 treaty on Church criticism throughout history was praised at the time for its pro-enlightenment viewpoints, a rare thing in eighteenth century Italy. If this is the case his appointment would continue the trend of profession and revolutionary experience. However, there is no concrete evidence which link the two figures, let alone name them as the same, other than similarities in name and origins.

⁹²² Visconti, *L'ultimo Diretorio*, 68.

thermidor were perhaps the reason why the progressive anti-Trouvé force was able to survive into the late summer of 1798, despite attempts by the Cisalpine Thermidorians and Trouvé to disrupt their power base.

Semi-Permanent Commissions

While permanent commissions served as a symbol of political will power, the institution of the semi-permanent commission came to be a symbol of political practicality. The first of these commissions, the Petition commission – more commonly referred to as the *commissione decedaria* for its 10-day renewal cycle – was first formed on 21 Frimaire. This commission was born from a motion by Perseguiti which was presented as a way to resolve the organizational issue of private citizen and administrative petitions (discussed in Chapter VII) which were overwhelming the president office, who was constitutionally charged with their handling and presentation.⁹²³ The motion, which was approved by the Council, demanded the formation of a commission of five representatives elected by the Council from among its ranks every ten days, and would be charged with analyzing and proposing resolutions for all petitions received by the bureau within the period of their mandate. Following the ten days the commission would be re-elected with new members. In this way the commission itself would be a permanent fixture of the assembly, however its *membership* would not be fixed, making it constitutionally valid.

The petition commission was not the only semi-permanent commission in the *Gran Consiglio*. A motion by Lamberti on 8 Pluviôse saw the formation of a Drafting Commission, based on a need (according to Lamberti) for clearer and more constitutionally accurate laws to be presented both before the Council and before publication to the Cisalpine public.⁹²⁴ Lamberti declared that the format should mirror that of the petition commission. The commission would be made up of three representatives instead of five but would remain on a 10-day cycle. Like the Petition Commission, the Drafting Commission was charged with collecting all of the approved motions which came from the office of the president in the previous 10-days and editing them in

⁹²³ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:338.

⁹²⁴ “Seduta LXXI, 8 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:237–39.

a logical and clear fashion so that they might be presented before the other facets of government and the public.⁹²⁵

Semi-permanent commissions served a useful purpose in the decision-making process – and thus the accumulation of legislative power – for two reasons. First, on a more functional level, both were used for direct communication with external functionaries, one receptive (the Petition Commission) and the other productive (the Drafting Commission). Control of these commissions meant that a representative became the voice of the *Gran Consiglio* to the outside world, more so even than the president, who in reality had his powers over legislative decision making significantly reduced with the introduction of these commissions. Even though they had to wait for the general approval of the Council before moving forward with resolutions, the Petition Commission had the ability to select which petitions would find their way to the lists for the day and the proposed methods of resolution (which were often approved without argument by the council). The Drafting Commission had perhaps even more freedom since their role was to reword approved motions in a way which would get them approved by both the other facets of government (mainly the *Seniori* and the *Directory*) as well as the public. This meant that the Drafting commission could change wording in such a way as to fit their political agendas on a pre-approved motion, with little restriction.

The second way in which the semi-permanent commissions served to influence the decision-making process of the *Gran Consiglio* was in its structure and politics. The constant changing nature of the semi-permanent commission meant that dominant political ideologies had more opportunities to interject their political agendas into the formulation and promulgation of laws. Since the semi-permanent commissions only remained the same for a ten-day period, fluctuations in political ideologies, depending on the dominant theme of argument or perhaps outside events, meant that the burgeoning factions would have had a more direct route to legislation. The semi-permanent commissions became a place where less powerful figures within the *Gran Consiglio* could participate in the decision-making process. The limited nature of the mandate meant that less powerful representatives could not make a truly significant impact on legislative decision making if their political ideology did not meet up with the contemporary trend. The presence of less powerful representatives was of course much more frequent in the more

⁹²⁵ “Seduta LXXI, 8 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:238.

controlled environment of the Petition Commissions. The Drafting Commission still tended to have at least one personally or legislatively powerful member for every cycle, who could be expected to have led the drafting and editing process.




Figure 13 Political Make-up of the Petition Commission

In total there were 23 iterations of the Petition Commission between 21 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor and 20 of the Drafting commission from 8 Pluviôse to 12 Fructidor (see Appendix F). The high turnover meant that the semi-permanent commissions could function as a thermometer of the general trend of political ideology across the entire period within the General Council. Figure 7 demonstrates the political fluctuations which took place in the Petition Commission over time. One instantly notes the overwhelming progressive rationalist domination of commission positions over the entire time frame (38) followed by neutral rationalists (26), progressive radicals (18), neutral radicals (13), neutral moderates (9), originalist rationalists (8) and originalist moderates (2).⁹²⁶

The first iteration of the Petition Commission, composed of Gaetano Conti, Francesco D’Arco, Lauro Glissent, Cesare Montalti and Luigi Ramondini had a progressive rationalist majority (3) with participation from a neutral rationalist and originalist rationalist, thus placing the

⁹²⁶This visualization represents the political makeup based on the ideology of each individual who was nominated for each iteration of the Petition committee only. The key designates the specific ideology, but the range of color designates each ideology from left to right with the lightest color being the most left and the darkest the most right. It must be remembered however that all of these ideologies laid within a framework of general centrism with no extreme left or right existing within the *Gran Consiglio* as it had in the French Case.

commission very much at the centre of the political spectrum. However, as the Petition Commission began to renew itself, more progressive and radical elements held commission positions, particularly during the months of Nivôse and Pluviôse. This reflects a similar tendency in the presidency and secretary positions where radical and progressive representatives held office during these months as well. In Ventose and throughout most of Germinal progressive rationalists won a heavy majority, reflecting once again the difficult period of political turmoil in these months before the 24 Germinal Coup. At the end of Floréal, there was an increase in originalist and neutral moderate and rationalist participation in the commission which overtook the commission throughout the month of Prairial (a period which coincided with the arrival of Trouvè). Messidor saw a return of the radicals and progressives to the petition commission, a reflection again of the *Gran Consiglio*'s more progressive and radical move against the executive inroads of the Cisalpine Directory and Trouvé during the Messidor Crisis (see Chapters VIII and XI).⁹²⁷ This more progressive and radical trend in the Petition Commission remained until the end of Thermidor, after which the commission was dominated by neutral and originalist rationalists and moderates, most of whom (such as Dure, Gambazzocca, or Gaggini) had little to no power (personal, positional or legislative) in the Council. This shifting towards less powerful representatives taking Petition Commission positions was a sign of the changing nature of the Council as important radical and progressive figures were systematically excluded from legislative decision making in the weeks leading up to the 14 Fructidor Coup.

The Drafting Commission, while similar in its selection process to the Petition Commission, had some noticeable differences in structure and role which made it significantly more attractive to Council leadership. Even though the Drafting Commission could not formulate the ideas behind the legislation, they could reword or configure the legislation in such a way as might reflect their views. As such, the political ideology that could dominate the drafting of legislation could in a certain sense dominate the legislation itself. Add to this the fact that the commission only had three positions, making individual representative influence much stronger than the five-man Petition Commission. Of the 42 men who sat on the Drafting Commission 30 came from the leadership, 17 from the elite. Similarly, 17 out of 42 on the Drafting Commission were renominated multiple times, compared to 22 out of 78 on the Petition Commission.

⁹²⁷ "Sedute CCXV- CCXXII, 7 messidoro-12 messidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*

Interestingly, there are very few cases of cross over between the commissions, with only Ramondini sitting multiple times on both commissions, Campana sitting twice for the Petition Commission and once for the Drafting Commission and Piazza and Salimbeni sitting twice on the Drafting Commission and once on the Petition Commission; 11 others sat once for both commissions out of a total 105 who sat on at least one semi-permanent commission.

The differences between the number of Drafting Commission positions occupied by each proto-faction is less profound than the Petition Commission, largely due to the smaller sample size (60 total Drafting positions as opposed to 114 for the Petition Commission). Progressive rationalists once again held a majority (17) of the total positions between 8 Pluviôse and 12 Fructidor. However, the margins narrow significantly compared to the Petitions Commission, with neutral rationalists taking 13 spots, followed by progressive radicals at 12. Neutral moderates follow with 7, then neutral radicals at 5, originalist moderates at 4 and interestingly, originalist rationalists remain the least represented at 2. This gives us the inclination, perhaps because of the later start date of 8 Pluviôse, that the Drafting Commission trended towards a much more progressive and rationalist composition, though the closer percentage and numerical value of progressive radicals to neutral rationalists indicated a greater involvement of the former in their quest to control the legal discourse.

Due to the lower number of participants, the Drafting Commission was generally controlled by absolute or unanimous majorities as demonstrated in Figure 14. The Drafting commission was first proposed by Lamberti, an originalist moderate, on 8 Pluviôse, doubtless as a way to counter the more progressive and radical tendencies of the general council at the end of Nivôse.⁹²⁸ In fact, the first iteration of Lamberti (originalist moderate) Cagnoli (neutral rationalist) and Glissentini (progressive rationalist), had a strong democratic-republican, if not slightly more republican leaning composition. However, on 18 Pluviôse, with the first turn-over of the commission, it was sharply thrown to the democratic side of the Council, with the progressive radical leadership Dehò, Gambari, and Tadini, having a unanimous majority.⁹²⁹ Though this would be the most radical iteration of the Drafting Commission for the rest of the *Gran Consiglio*, it did establish a continued

⁹²⁸ “Seduta LXXI, 8 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:237–38.

⁹²⁹ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:402. Dehò was the highest-ranking progressive radical in personal, positional and total power, Gambari was the highest ranking in legislative power, and Tadini was close behind Dehò as most personally and positionally powerful progressive radical in the Council.

alternation of power between center and center-left majorities on the Drafting Commission through the turbulent months of Ventose and Germinal. The “stabilization” of the post-coup political situation in Floréal, saw two consecutive unanimous majority democratic leaning iterations of the Drafting Commission, first the neutral rationalists from 1 Floréal-11 Floréal and then progressive rationalists from 11 Floréal to 22 Floréal. The end of Floréal and early Prairial saw a more extreme democratic shift as neutral and progressive radicals shared positions.

However, similar to the Petition Commission, mid-Prairial saw a mixed composition which had Dehò (progressive radical leader), serving on the committee with Bossi (originalist rationalist) and Vismara (neutral rationalist).⁹³⁰ Yet there then followed the most stable period for the commission with a four-iteration consistent power-sharing model between the progressive radicals, neutral radicals and progressive rationalists which lasted from 22 Prairial to 2 Thermidor. Much like the Petition Commission, this coalition seemed to have collapsed in Thermidor (most likely as a result of the Cisalpine Thermidorian reaction to the Messidor Crisis) and early Fructidor, as progressive leadership was slowly filtered out of the Council in preparation for Trouvé’s 14 Fructidor Coup.




Figure 14 Political Make-up of the Drafting Commission

⁹³⁰ “Seduta CXC, 11 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, , 4:161.

Special Commissions

Special commissions were the most constitutionally legitimate forms of commissions within the entire *Gran Consiglio* committee system as they followed the limits and restrictions established within the Cisalpine Constitution.⁹³¹ One must remember that the commission, as it was intended to exist according to the constitutional framers both in France and in the *comitati renuiti* of the Cisalpine Republic, was as a research tool meant for the streamlining of legislative function. However, more importantly the committee system was not to serve as a replacement for the ministry and commissions needed clear limitations to separate the legislative from the executive.⁹³² Therefore the instalment of short-term specific commissions – so highly specialized they could not exercise administrative functions even if they wanted – became the preferred method of legislative procedure.

The special commission is therefore a commission formed to confront a specific problem with a limited mandate (could last anywhere from a single day, which was the most common, to a ten-day cycle, though there were examples of longer special commissions as well). Special commissions were often composed of smaller groups of 3 to 5 representatives, chosen by the president's office according to the 10 Frimaire resolution which gave the power of nomination to the bureau.⁹³³ While not always the case, the special commissions were supposed to be selected based on credentials relating to the exact theme of the commission's function and not for politics, though as will be demonstrated, this became difficult to justify as the months went on in 1798. This was the distinguishing factor between special commissions and permanent or semi-permanent commissions. While permanent and semi-permanent commission had highly generalized objectives to analyze – objectives which could be politically important or not depending on the theme – special commissions were created due to the specialized expertise which were necessary for their proper handling.

While not capable of making large general decisions, special commissions had control over the minutia of arguments. For example, while the permanent Finance Commission was charged with the formation of a general plan to stabilize the Cisalpine financial situation, the particular

⁹³¹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," sec. Tit. V, Art. 67.

⁹³² Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 102.

⁹³³ "Seduta IX, 10 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:179.

handling of credits held by the Banca di Sant’Ambrogio of Milan was given to a special commission of Ressi, Isimbardi and Allemagna, three members of the Milanese elite who had experience dealing with the public functions of the bank.⁹³⁴ As the number of these special commissions began to rapidly increase, particularly in the early months of Nivôse and Pluviôse (which saw the formation of 38 special commissions), controlling them became exponentially more important to the acquiring of legislative power. In the end the most legislatively powerful representatives would not be those who sat on the most permanent commissions or the most iterations of semi-permanent commission but those who found themselves sitting on the most special commissions such as Giuseppe Gambari (20 special commissions), Carlo Cocchetti (10) or Bartolomeo Cavedoni (12).

Once again, it should be stated that the scope of this study is not the individual decisions of every commission, nor the projects they brought to bear. It is a study of the men who made up the Assembly, and the structural organs and fundamental political ideas of a nation which these men used in the formation of legislation. While this examination will not – and more importantly cannot – provide the individual contributions of all members to all 130 special commissions created in the ten-month period of the *Gran Consiglio*, it can offer in the greatest detail the representatives (and their politics) who had the greatest decision making power at the most minute level of law making. Finally, it should be noted, that the study does not include special commissions nominated from permanent committees outside of general council, which would have existed as an appendage of the permanent commission itself, even though it carried out the function of special commissions. Similarly, it can be expected that several special commissions were created, either in secret council sessions or completely outside of the Council, which were never listed. Only those explicitly mentioned by the *processi verbali*, with a specific mandate and member list were included in the statistical information.

The first half of the *Gran Consiglio* period (2 Frimaire to 24 Germinal) saw the largest monthly increase in commission formation with 15 commissions being created in Frimaire, 18 in Nivôse, 20 in Pluviôse, 15 in Ventôse, and 8 in Germinal, for a total of 76 commissions, slightly more than half of the 130 created across the entire period. This correlates to a period of general

⁹³⁴ “Seduta XXXII, 1 Nivôse anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:463-464

progressive political control over both the Council offices and the permanent and semi-permanent commissions. It can therefore be assumed that progressives in this period – though not yet as powerful or dominant as one will note by the end of Floréal – had begun a transition towards a more majority center mindset which would see a high level of motions coming from this proto-faction and supported by progressive representatives in special commission. Similarly, the numerical advantage of rationalists overall in the Council, particularly in Council offices, would have encouraged the formation of special commissions given rationalists greater dispensation towards commission work. The notable decrease in commissions in Germinal, is most likely due to one of two factors: either the turbulence of the political situation between 9 Ventose and 24 Germinal saw the placement of legislation into the hands of permanent commissions or the focus on highly politicized and complex issues such as the Military and Commercial Treaties with France created a general diminishing in legislation overall, and thus less of a need for special commissions.⁹³⁵

The second half of the *Gran Consiglio* period (25 Germinal to 12 Fructidor) saw a general decrease in the amount of special commission formation with only 54 commissions being formed. Interestingly the numbers decline only slightly the same as the first half in the first few months after the 24 Germinal Coup (there was even a slight increase from the Germinal numbers), with 14 special commissions created in Floréal, 18 in Prarial, and 14 in Messidor. This gives one the impression that the political stability brought about after the 24 Germinal Coup, came with an increase in legislative initiatives by the dominant progressive rationalists, which in turn called for an increase in special commission formation. Interestingly, despite the more moderate and originalist trends in leadership which appear temporarily in mid-Prarial, the number of special commissions actually increases this month. However, commission formation dropped dramatically

⁹³⁵ For information on the formation of the Military Commissions of High Police see: “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano; Seduta CIV, 12 ventoso anno VI repubblicano; Sedute CXXXIV-CXXXV, 12-13 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; For the deliberations on the Military and Commercial Treaty between the French and Cisalpine Republics see “Sedute CXV-CXVII, 23-25 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”; Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:11–23, 101–3, 690–91, 710–11; 365–81 In fact, on this point one is more inclined towards the former explanation than the latter. The two other major arguments in the Council during this period dealt with the French forced loans (See Sedute CXXVII-CXXX [6-8 germinale], CXXXIII [11 germinale], CXXXV-CXXXVI [13-14 germinale], CXLI [19 germinale] and CXLIII [21 germinale]) which was referred to the Military and Finance Commissions and the Guard of the Legislature (See Sedute CIX-CX [17-18 ventoso], CXXIII-CXXIV [1-2 germinale], CXXVII [5 germinale], CXXXVII [15 germinale], and CXLI [19 germinale]) which was remanded to the Commission of the Guards of the Legislature. All three of these commissions were permanent commissions leading one to wager that these fundamental issues which were at the heart of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship were considered too important and politically crucial to be handled by temporary special commissions.

in the final months of the period following the Messidor Crisis with 7 commissions being formed in Thermidor, and only a single commission being formed in Fructidor. This is further evidence that the legislative functions of the *Gran Consiglio* seemed have been dissolving in the final weeks before the 12 Fructidor coup as representatives, particularly the more progressive members, were left out of decision making (as evidenced by the low number of special commissions) or were moved to positions within the departmental or ministerial administration.

Special commissions were by far the most numerous, position wise, of any other part of the *Gran Consiglio* Committee system, with a total of 489 positions made available between 2 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor. On the x-axis, progressives held the most positions with 244, followed by neutrals at 203 and originalists taking a resounding backbench at 42. This of course is no surprise being that numerically there were simply more progressives overall who participated in the *Gran Consiglio*, and that progressives, a group more willing to adapt the legal side of the revolution to the Cisalpine condition, would have also been more willing to participate in commissions whose role it was to formulate these changes and breaks with the French tradition. Originalists would not have seen use for these commissions since they believed the Constitution of Year III and other political innovations made in Paris between Thermidor Year II and Fructidor Year VI, already provided a stable model for Cisalpine legislators to mirror. Neutrals, whose opinion was less inclined one way or the other towards legislative change would have been willing to enter commissions to better come to decisions about how legislative output should be conducted, be it through the imitation of French norms of adaptation, both of which they were open too.

On the y-axis, rationalists were once again dominant, with a resounding majority of 261 positions filled to the radical 150; moderates found themselves dragging behind once again at 78. The extent of the rationalist majority in special commissions demonstrates a much more studied approach to legislation at the basest level. Rationalists needed legislation to be based on a study of complexities but within the limits of reasonable expectations. Special commissions were going to always have an obvious attraction for the rationalist members of the *Gran Consiglio* since they held closest to the original research-based commissions made popular in the early 1790s by French political thinkers which provided limits to time and resources, favoring logical rationale over charismatic grandstanding in debates. Where radicals tended to favor quick decision making which could be altered at a later time, and moderates more attracted to overestimation or even regression

when applying laws, rationalists always sought the sweet spot which allowed legislative output to be precise but logical.

The majority of positions over time belonged to the progressive rationalists at 142, followed by progressive radicals at 102, neutral rationalists at 89, neutral moderates at 66, neutral radicals at 48, originalist rationalists at 30 and ultimately originalist moderates in the lowest minority at 12. When broken down monthly however (see Figure 15), special commission numbers can be viewed as representative of the legislative prerogatives of the entire council across the period.




Figure 15 Political make-up of special commissions by month

The first month of Frimaire, saw special commission appointments which were overall relatively balanced, with progressive radicals, progressive rationalists, neutral rationalists, and neutral moderates all taking a similar number of positions. However, by Nivôse the progressives – and particularly the progressive rationalists – had taken a large majority of the positions assigned; this trend would continue into Pluviôse. The rise of progressives in Nivôse and Pluviôse is reflective also of the higher total of legislation going into commission and not being debated in General Council.

In fact, the increased presence of republican politicians like originalist moderates and rationalists and neutral moderates, at the end of Pluviôse created a much more balanced special commission composition throughout Ventôse. And while the progressives and their neutral radical

allies (for it seems looking at the numbers, that while limited in numbers the neutral radicals often sat in company with progressives) retained their majority strongly in Ventôse, the presence of republican leaning representatives, may have been a reason why legislative output went down overall. This seems so much so that by Germinal, not only had the numbers shrunk overall but power now seemed more even across the board in special commissions, since most likely legislative output was being transferred to the more politicized permanent commissions in this month.

With the stabilization of progressive power over the general council and committee system in Floréal, there was a rapid increase in legislative output and as such a return to progressive dominance of special commission assignments in this month. Progressive rationalists took their largest majority during this period, signaling the democratic movement of power within the council following the coup, despite the expulsion of the most progressive elements. This can most likely be attributed to a general acknowledgement of the progressive's alliance with Armée leadership in the form of Brune, which silenced republican opposition for fear of looking anti-French.⁹³⁶ The return to the use of special commissions in Floréal for the formulation of legislation leads one to understand that representatives, particularly progressive rationalists, had a keen interest in forwarding their legislative conceptions in a more detailed fashion. Interestingly, however, the data shows a massive upswing in radical participation in Prarial, despite the presence of a republican-leaning trend in other facets of the *Gran Consiglio* political and legislative culture such as the Council offices of the presidency and secretariat.

This upswing in neutral and progressive radical assignments to special commissions during a period in which the presidency and secretaries were originalist moderates and rationalists, leads one to believe that following the Germinal Coup, the legislative process had in fact decentralized in such a way that though the presidency had the right to nominate commissions, there was pressure by the general council on who he was able to choose. This would of course be in line with the more democratic views of progressives and radicals who hoped to take power away from the council officers in favor of commission and general council legislative production. Progressives and radicals who were blocked from a higher participation in general council would have looked to

⁹³⁶ Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine."

special commissions to push their objectives. Similar logic could be used for the backsliding in commission assignments in Messidor, as progressives once again found themselves in charge of the general council just before the Crisis with the executive begins. During Messidor, progressive rationalists saw their majority re-established, and there was an increase in neutral moderates and rationalists which in fact pushed the legislative output of the special commissions back to the center. However, following the events of the Messidor Crisis, the admonishment of Trouvé⁹³⁷ and the rise of the Cisalpine Thermidorians, the months of Thermidor and Fructidor saw the lowest level of special commission assignment of the entire period, and the progressive rationalists finally lost their majority as neutral moderates and originalist moderates and rationalists took over newly formed special commission positions in the weeks leading up to the 12 Fructidor Coup.

The committee system of the *Gran Consiglio* was the defining feature in the legislative process which gave individual representatives the ability to participate more directly in decision making. Its heritage from the French Revolution between the years 1789 and 1795 had a direct effect on its development, whether it was from imitation or fears of the same. It was in essence, a perfect sample for the study of the process of legislative institutionalization and decentralization, since unlike the French case where trial and error were the main factors behind the committee systems evolution, the *Gran Consiglio* operated under a specific set of regulations and limits with a historical past which provided better safety nets for legislative failures. It also enables us to see with clear quantifiable data the ways in which political ideology, geopolitical origins, culture, economic conditions and external interventions, interacted to help define and construct a political culture. Legislative decision making was not only instrumental to this political culture on a national level, but it effected relationships between groups and individuals on a more personal level.

However, commissions were simply the most important of a series of legislative tools designed to make production and institutionalization of laws smoother in their application to Cisalpine Society. In reality there existed many more instruments available to the Council which regulated legislative procedure and guaranteed public accountability. Both regulation and public accountability were major revolutionary themes inherited from the French Republican legislative

⁹³⁷ “Seduta CCXVII, secondo di 2, 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:755–56; Letter of Trouvé to Directory meant for the Gran Consiglio.

design which played a central role in the development of *Gran Consiglio* legislative and political production. While committee systems and systems of power were instrumental in the internal formation of legislative production, regulation and accountability will be the first examples analyzed in this study of internal constructs for the *Gran Consiglio* which contributed to external relationships for the representatives in addition to their obvious internal purposes. The following chapter will examine accountability and regulation as a bridge between internal and external structures of legislative and political culture and conclude Part II by explaining how external factors play a role in internal legislative and political development.

Chapter VII

Procedure and Accountability:

the regulation of internal and public interaction

By and large, the most concrete evidence for political interactions between representatives as seen in the *processi verbali*, personal writings and correspondences and external journalistic sources is in the formation of procedures meant to regulate legislative output and hold accountable members of the *Gran Consiglio*. This was done in two ways: first by formulating policies and regulations which structured debate, organized legislative production and held representatives accountable for their behavior under the new norms and decorum of republican social interaction; second by striking the balance between accountability to public opinion and a commitment to the preservation of national sovereignty through the regulation of public accessibility, interaction and education regarding legislative matters both in person and through the press.

Accountability as a principle was perhaps the central undercurrent which had directed the development of political and legislative culture in the Cisalpine Republic of 1798. From the onset of the Revolution in France, legislative production was only thought to be possible through the support of the population, the so called “general will” of the nation.⁹³⁸ Where leaders of the monarchies and aristocracies of the *ancien regime* had been accountable only to themselves (for the most part), the new revolutionary republican world forced up and coming leaders of government to be answerable to the people.⁹³⁹ Democratic republicanism was only legitimized if “the people” were willing to adhere to the laws coming from the legislators who created them. In order to adhere the general population first had to be informed and understand.⁹⁴⁰ More importantly

⁹³⁸ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 236.

⁹³⁹ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 100.

⁹⁴⁰ Lenci, 103.

however, corruption had to be torn up by the roots and to do this there needed to be public and private accountability for those now in charge of leading the nation.

No longer could ministers and favorites run unchecked to pillage the nation while the authorities turned a blind eye. The revolution allowed the people to challenge their leaders to keep members of their ranks in line – politically and behaviorally – when forming the nation’s legislative production, in such a way that individuals could not gain undue influence or favorable conditions for personal gain;⁹⁴¹ were these leaders to fail in holding each other accountable it was the duty of the public to do so, either in the press, through the pressure of public opinion or through physical intervention (or force). The ideas of a representative, and the agenda he brought forth, suddenly became the public persona he presented, and his stances and opinions in debates became his point of judgement.⁹⁴² Yet by 1795, it became universally agreed that this accountability needed to be itself regulated so that it did not become mob rule. Accountability was important to hold representatives to task but not at the risk of limiting a representative’s ability to follow his conscience in securing the nation, regardless of the general will.⁹⁴³

Along with accountability, the revolution brought with it a general ritualization and organization of the legislative process which served to better fulfill the needs and understanding of the general will. The *ancien régime* had formed laws from traditions of limited and authoritative doctrines which resisted innovation and general consensus.⁹⁴⁴ These traditions could not be applied to the new revolutionary government in the France of 1789 and certainly not the republicanism which was adopted by the Cisalpine Republic in 1798. This was the reason for the construction of a constitution, which would provide new procedures for modern law making, in addition to delivering to the people a mechanism through which to redefine themselves.⁹⁴⁵

While the concept of revolution changed dramatically between 1789 and 1798, at its core was the idea that written procedures for legislative production would serve as the base for legislative functionality and popular and national sovereignty.⁹⁴⁶ Procedures and ritualization also

⁹⁴¹ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 122.

⁹⁴² Mitchell, “Political Divisions within the Legislative Assembly of 1791,” 359.

⁹⁴³ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65; Goldoni, “At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power.”

⁹⁴⁴ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 40.

⁹⁴⁵ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 211.

⁹⁴⁶ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 326.

served to organize the chaos which was inevitably present in the formation of a new state. Early days of a legislative body come with a strong sense of uncertainty, as political games and bids for power by outspoken or well-known legislators could often overwhelm legislative production.⁹⁴⁷ Moreover, inexperience often meant that the legislative process was more fluid in early days and lead to inconsistency. While this inexperience was obviously stronger in the National Constituent Assembly of 1789 France than the *Gran Consiglio* of the 1798 Cisalpine Republic, there existed in both cases a hesitancy and disorganization risked putting the state building process at a standstill. Procedure was, thus, a way to erase these hesitancies and disorganizations by ritualizing the process of law-making. Through the establishment of rules of accountability, research and consensus, the responsibility for legislating is removed from the hands of the individual and put into that of the institution.

Both accountability and procedure in the political and legislative cultures of the revolutionary republican legislative bodies of Directorial Europe were rooted in their constitutions. The written instructions for behavior and legislative processes were the essential building blocks of revolutionary government in France in 1789, 1791, 1793 and 1795 as in the Cisalpine Republic in 1798.⁹⁴⁸ Yet political gameplaying, external and internal threats and shifts in public opinion all led to a changing philosophical, political or legislative topography which in turn altered the rules of procedure and accountability according to geographic and temporal conditions. What worked in Paris in 1791 would not necessarily function in Milan in 1798. To resolve this issue, Article 63 of the Cisalpine Constitution provided that each of the legislative councils had the right to form a set of internal policies for which their legislative procedures and accountability would be organized.⁹⁴⁹ This internal policy would become the primary document, along with the constitution, by which the structure and form of legislative and political culture inside the *Gran Consiglio* would be formed.

The internal policies of the Gran Consiglio were in no way a Cisalpine invention but had been adapted from French traditions as far back as 1789 and the National Constituent Assembly. The, *règlement* as the document was to be called, was originally adapted from the ideas of English

⁹⁴⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 214–15.

⁹⁴⁸ De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 275.

⁹⁴⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 63.

parliamentary practices of the House of Commons.⁹⁵⁰ The immensity of doctrinal and procedural information which the National Constituent Assembly inherited from the *ancien régime* needed organizing at least until the constitution could be completed.⁹⁵¹ While these English practices could work temporarily it became necessary to formulate a set of practices and procedures which would allow for public accountability and support – fundamental to the survival of the revolution – while also organizing the legislative and administrative systems which were to serve the new French nation.⁹⁵² Though there were opposing views on the level of popular involvement and limitations to deputy authority, the general tenor of the *réglement* was one of openness and ritual which provided the greatest clarity both for the public and the deputies themselves.⁹⁵³ It married the procedural doctrines of the English parliamentary and American legislative practices with *ancien régime* legal traditions, in addition to new political, legal and philosophical ideas from famous intellectuals and politicians such as Brissot, Mirabeau and Condorcet.

The *réglement* established the basic structures of the assembly, and set forth rules of procedure, behavior, and order.⁹⁵⁴ It began by establishing officially the offices of president and secretary and laying out clearly their positions and duties in the assembly (similar to those discussed in Chapter V). From there it explained the expectations and standards for decorum and behavior to be used by both deputies and members of the viewing public. The *réglement* instituted structural aspects of legislative procedure such as demands to speak, the speaking order, the process of declaring motions and public petitions. It defined the roles of individual deputies, committees and bureaus (as seen in Chapter VI). Finally, it established the basis for distributing the *processi verbali* of the National Constituent Assembly. Altogether, the *réglement* was composed of 8 sections, called chapters and a total of 66 articles.

The *réglement* established in July of 1789, though it went through minor changes with the various political events of the next 9 years, remained at its core the same in nature by 1798. When the Council of Five-Hundred sat for its initial sessions in November of 1795 (Brumaire Year IV), one of its first major debates was the establishment of a *réglement* based in the ideas of that of the National Constituent Assembly of 1789 yet with some additions and changes to better regulated

⁹⁵⁰ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 216.

⁹⁵¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 69.

⁹⁵² Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 217, 235–36.

⁹⁵³ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 70–71.

⁹⁵⁴ “Texte Du Règlement de l’Assemblée Nationale, Lors de La Séance Du 29 Juillet 1789,” 300–303.

against the excesses of the past 6 years.⁹⁵⁵ The internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio* would not be a carbon copy of any of the French versions, but would mirror many of the same basic principles of procedure and accountability which had been present in all French *réglements* from 1789, similarly adding or changing articles specific to its own conditions and experiences, as the French had done in 1795. In fact, were one to read the internal rules of order for any of the sister republics formed in the French image between the years 1796-1798, one would find that despite their minor differences in confronting particular issues such as petitions, public access or the debates on motions and commission, the core ideas which first established the assembly structures in 1789 remained virtually the same.⁹⁵⁶

The establishment of a set of internal regulations for the *Gran Consiglio* was first considered by the Council in its second session on 3 Frimaire.⁹⁵⁷ The issue was put to a commission of five men, Vincenzo Dandolo, Alessandro Guiccioli, Pietro Dehò, Giuseppe Mangili and Carlo Arici who would be responsible for the collecting of resources and formulating the internal policies based on political research and their knowledge of the revolutionary republican legislative norms. The following day, 4 Frimaire, the commission provided a vast report which covered issues from the order of speaking, requesting the floor to make a speech, the role of the president in the opening, closing and regulating of debates, to the opening of sessions (including the hour, processing of representatives and seating in the chamber), the rights and limitations of the presidency and secretaries offices, the establishment of the *tribune*, process of delivering motions, the roles, functions and nomination of the Inspectors of the Chamber, and finally the rights and number of the viewing public in open council.⁹⁵⁸ In addition to procedural precedent, the internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio* also came to include responses to institutional problems of organization which occurred in the first weeks of Frimaire. On 5 Frimaire, the discussion of archiving the *processi verbali* and a correspondence from the state archivists led

⁹⁵⁵ No. 46, 16 Brumaire, l'an 4 de la République Française une et indivisible (s. 7 9bre 1795 vieux style) Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel 1795, pp. 1-2 <https://www.retronews.fr/journal/gazette-nationale-ou-le-moniteur-universel/07-nov-1795/149/1994831/1>; Extract from the *processi verbali* of the French Convention. Discourse of Rouzet on the need for internal regulations of the Council of Five Hundred

⁹⁵⁶ Oddens, "Making the Most of National Time," 121.

⁹⁵⁷ "Seduta II, 3 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:100 Proposal of the president Fenaroli for the establishment of the internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio*.

⁹⁵⁸ "Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 1:101–2, 105–7, 111–13 Presentation and debates on the initial report of the Commission for Internal policies.

to the formation of the outside office of *redattori*.⁹⁵⁹ On 7 Frimaire the commission was sent a plan by the representative Savonarola for the establishment and nomination of commissions, and the Council also discussed ways to confront the issue of representative absences.⁹⁶⁰ On the morning session of 11 Frimaire, the Council was forced to confront the issue of verifying the credentials of their colleagues with the suspicions launched against the abbot Giudice.⁹⁶¹ These issues were finally organized in two special evening sessions, first on the 11 Frimaire and the final on 16 Frimaire, both dedicated to the establishment of the internal policies, the latter date also being that of ratification of the official plan.⁹⁶²

Thus, this chapter will use the deliberations of the *Gran Consiglio* from the *processi verbali*, the constitution and overall, the internal policies to examine the two ways in which the Council handled matters of accountability and procedure in forming the political and legislative cultures of the Cisalpine Republic. The first section will examine these aspects through the internal social interactions between the representatives themselves and the procedures which were formulated to bring organization and accountability to the chambers during the legislative process. The examination will begin with the “unwritten and written rules” of conduct which the representatives were expected to follow. The unwritten rules are those norms, behaviors and interactions patterns which were seen as polite and civil in the discourse and debate structures of the legislative system. The written rules were those aspects of interaction which were more heavily regulated (quite literally written out in the internal regulations of the Cisalpine Constitution) due to their more direct effects on the legislative process. Both cases will be explained in terms of their impact on interpersonal relationships between the representatives, as well as on the production of legislation and most importantly the punishments – called sanctions – which were handed down when they were breached. The final part of the examination on internal regulations will look at the procedure of legislation itself, which was developed to better organize the legislative process and guarantee the maintenance of written and unwritten rules of conduct.

⁹⁵⁹ “Seduta IV, 5 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:121–22.

⁹⁶⁰ “Seduta V, 6 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:146 Motion of Savonarola.

⁹⁶¹ “Seduta X, primo di 2 per il 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:195 Discourse of Dehò regarding the lack of precedent on reporting the credentials of Giudice and suspensions around his person.

⁹⁶² “Seduta XI, secondo di 2 il 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:199–204. Special session for the discussion of the internal policies; “Seduta XVII, secondo di 2 il 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano” and the “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:267–78. Special session for the ratification of the internal policies and the publication of the internal policies in attachment.

Part two of this chapter will turn to the relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the public and in particular the importance of public opinion on the legislative process. When compared to the state building process of France in 1789, the construction of the Cisalpine state in 1798 was more strongly guided by the principle of the maintenance of the balance between public accountability and legislator freedom of conscience. As such, the Cisalpine case was more strongly affected by the inherent conflict between the two in the interactions between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Cisalpine public. The examination will begin by looking at the role of general and secret council sessions and the limitations on public viewing both from a political and physical perspective. The next section will look at the right to petition and focus primarily on the political uses of petitions and the petition commission with regards to public and interpersonal relationships between representatives. The chapter will end by examining how the publication of the actions of the *Gran Consiglio* was not only critical for the installation of accountability and procedure but became a political flashpoint. This will be done by focusing on three particular arguments about publication of the *Gran Consiglio* materials: the installation of a press of the *Gran Consiglio*, the method of printing laws, acts proclamations and resolutions, and finally the publication of the *processi verbali*.

Behavior, Order, and Procedure- The legislative policies of the *Gran Consiglio*

Rules of order and behavior as well as the punishments which are set for breaches of these policies are perhaps the most fundamental element to legislative functionality and output. When we refer to behavior, it is defined here as the social actions of an individual used when interacting with other members of an organization.⁹⁶³ Order, likewise, is the general adherence of all members of the organization in a given time and place to agree upon rules of accepted behavior, be they social norms or legal prerogatives.⁹⁶⁴ Punishments, or “sanctions” as Posner and Rasmusen term them in their 1999 article, are the actions agreed upon collectively by the majority of members

⁹⁶³ “The types of Social Actions” Weber 1968, p. 6. While the term "behavior" has been selected here to refer not only to actions, but also attitudes, expressions and words, Weber's "social actions" provide an equally accurate definition of these aspects of human interaction. The actions and words used by individuals, particularly in the period we are looking at comes from a place of personal ambition, rationalized values or virtue, emotional response or traditional learned patterns of expression (local and temporal manners). Thus if one wants to better understand my definition of behavior, it is enough to look at Weber's ideas of social interaction.

⁹⁶⁴ Weber, 14–15. Similarly, the term order used here is close to Weber's idea of order within a corporate organization, which stipulations that the concept of “order” with a corporate organization is the system of rules which “governs other kinds of social action and thereby protects the actors in enjoyment of the benefits derived from the relation to the order...” .

which are taken against individual members of the organization for a singular or a series of transgressions against the body's order.⁹⁶⁵ For the purposes of this study the organization, as it has been established within each of the previous chapters, will be the lower house of a bicameral legislative system. Therefore, breaches of legislative order – which are agreed upon notions of poor behavior – are met with set sanctions based upon the transgression of the legislator and which are agreed upon by the authority inherent in the legislative Council – in this case the *Gran Consiglio*.

“The written rules” of order for a legislature which apply to its members when seated as a representative in a parliamentary system serve multiple purposes in the legislative process. These rules establish times of meetings and make sure an adequate percentage of legislators are present so voting on legislation is conducted in a fair manner.⁹⁶⁶ They help to hasten and narrow debates, by controlling sudden outbursts and keeping legislators on topic.⁹⁶⁷ Likewise, they furnish punishments for misbehavior which serve a practical purpose of maintaining order and demonstrating to the public that representatives are to be held accountable for their actions. The “unwritten rules” called norms of behavior similarly have a set purpose in legislative functions.⁹⁶⁸ The unwritten rules are meant to avoid divisiveness, interpersonal conflict, and political gamesmanship, which in turn foster greater tendencies to compromise.⁹⁶⁹ Compromise is necessary

⁹⁶⁵ Posner and Rasmusen, “Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions,” 374–77. Posner and Rasmusen identify 6 forms of sanctions which are taken when norms - the rules of order - are breached within a society (Automatic sanctions, guilt, shame [or humiliation is the same], informational sanctions, bilateral costly sanctions, and multilateral costly sanctions).

⁹⁶⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V Article 62, 64, 73; “Ordine delle deliberazioni e la polizia del Gran Consiglio : Title II Article 7, Title III Article 11, 12, 13, 14” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:272.

⁹⁶⁷ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e la polizia del Gran Consiglio : Title III Articles 19, 20; Title IV Article 27” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:272.

⁹⁶⁸ Posner – Rasmusen 1999, p. 369 In the opening of the article on creating norms, Posner and Rasmusen define norms as any sort of regulation which is not reliant upon the government for its promulgation or enforcement, i.e. a law. Thus, the unwritten rules of behavior, while serving a function within the government, are not officially proscribed and enforced by official acts of the government itself. By contrast, the written rules of behavior are in fact explicitly and diligently formed and enforced as official acts of government and are thus not norms but laws. In many ways a rule can be both written and unwritten, as in the case of murder, theft or other violent offenses, which are prevented both by norms and laws. Within a legislature, most times only the most serious offenses, such as sedition and disruption with the intention to cause a stoppage in production, are treated in such a way as to be both ascribed as norms and laws..

⁹⁶⁹ Matthews 1960, p. 1074 While Matthews analysis regards the U.S. Senate, the upper house of a bicameral system remarkably different to that of late eighteenth-century Northern Italy, his sentiments concerning the interpersonal social interactions and unspoken rules of cooperation seen in the American case, are remarkably similar to the very same forms of interactions seen in the Cisalpine Gran Consiglio.

for proper legislative functionality and occurs only when all members of a legislature are seen conforming to norms of behavior.⁹⁷⁰ Those who are the most adept at adhering to – and often time excelling within – these social and political norms within a legislature are also the most successful at acquiring power in all its forms. Conversely, punishments for breaking these unwritten rules, while perhaps not as physically taxing on individuals, have significantly greater impact on the political and personal reputation of members, and can be much more devastating regarding the acquisition of power. The unwritten behaviors of a legislature are necessary to establish a minimum set of core values that are universally accepted by all members of the body, regardless of party affiliation or political ideology.⁹⁷¹ In this way the unwritten rules become the basis for the political culture of the body, which in turn influences the legislative culture and design of parliamentary practices.

Unwritten rules of behavior in the Gran Consiglio

As discussed in the previous two chapters, power is the ability to influence the behavior of individuals. In a legislative body, power guarantees the holder (or more often in a functioning legislature *holders*) the ability to manipulate rules of behavior and punishments. Though often much harder for written rules, which have been either constitutionally or legally proscribed by past leadership, unwritten rules are significantly easier to manipulate, in particular for more charismatic leaders within a legislature's internal elite.⁹⁷² As unwritten rules have no existential proof, they are subject to a new interpretation once a different group or individual seizes power. Unwritten rules are based on norms, which are the culturally dictated behavioral models within a given social organization. Norm themselves cannot be fundamentally altered or erased, since norms by their very nature are rules and customs meant to benefit the public, existing because of the cultural setting within which they were created.⁹⁷³ Thus when the leading figures within an organization formulate the unwritten rules to be used under their administration of the of said organization, they

⁹⁷⁰ Hedlund, "Organizational Attributes of Legislatures," 65.

⁹⁷¹ Hedlund, 67.

⁹⁷² Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 48.

⁹⁷³ Posner and Rasmusen, "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions," 377. This is quite common in everyday society, as we often have multiple sets of norms which are followed based on time and place even within a singular cultural context (for example one often behaves differently when encountering new people than they would with life-long friends).

are not creating new norms nor erasing old ones, simply changing the *set* of norms used by choosing which norms in a society are to be enforced.

In cross-cultural contexts – as in the case of the *Gran Consiglio* – the leadership has a much more numerous and variable set of norms to select from, in order to create unwritten rules. However, this also could mean, within these cross-cultural contexts, that there is also a greater chance of conflict arising between contradictory norms from differing cultural sets, which could lead to political and social sanctions both against the leadership and oppositional individuals or groups. For example, the use of improper language may cause offense to some, but for others it is simply an expression of passion for a topic. If a leader decides to enforce norms against improper language, they risk political sanctions by those who feel improper language is necessary for emotional discourse; however, if the leader decides not to enforce these rules against improper language those who are offended by its use will place political sanctions against the leader. In these cases, it is necessary for the leader in a democratic situation to favor the majority, or else be able to combat political sanctions put against them (compensation to the opposition, resignation, or even military force). Pure charismatic leaders of course have the ability to ignore the majority since their popularity allows them great opportunity to actually alter the norms, away from the ordinary routine of society, as their will is seen as being in the public benefit.⁹⁷⁴ However as with all charismatic leadership this is only valid as long as a leader's charisma is maintained.

All legislatures which share the same basic concepts of what constitutes norms of polite and courteous behavior within society seem to function on similar rules of order as well, because the collective origins of a society at one time saw these norms as part of the public benefit.⁹⁷⁵ In stronger or more stable legislatures, sudden or dramatic changes to unwritten rules, or else extreme breaches of these rules by the controlling forces themselves could lead to sudden political losses or other even more extreme sanctions (the fall of Robespierre and the Thermidorian reaction are

⁹⁷⁴ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 51–52.

⁹⁷⁵ Hedlund 1984, p. 66 Hedlund uses the example of the various state legislatures of the United States. Though there existed minor differences in the particularities, the general American sentiments on what is considered polite or not, overall led to the institutionalization of similar unwritten rules of order. The same is true for Revolutionary societies in 1798. The French and Cisalpine Republics, though relatively different, were still rooted in an ancient Catholic and aristocratic culture which dictated what were considered proper forms of communication. These similarities were shared in their approaches to what constituted order, despite the poor communication of the written rules between both groups.

perhaps the greatest examples of this in the revolutionary context).⁹⁷⁶ Thus, in a decentralized legislative system, be it minority or majority centered, leaders with hairline margins or even coalition governments have little to no ability to alter unwritten rules of behavior, since the entirety of their power relies upon using these same previously established rules to obtain and maintain power. The more charismatic the leadership forces are, the greater their ability to alter unwritten and written rules of behavior and punishment. Thus, when an individual or group takes an overwhelming majority within a legislative body – either through internal politics or external military force – it is normal for the first act of this new *interna corporis* to be the alteration of both the written and unwritten rules of behavior and punishment.

In contrast to other rules which governed *Gran Consiglio* internal functions, behavior and the way in which representatives were expected to comport themselves were very much a product of unwritten rules. Of course, each political ideology can be paired with a variation of what behavioral norms were acceptable or not, and factionalism was the primary cause for differing perceptions of the unwritten rules.⁹⁷⁷ Progressives, particularly progressive radicals like Cadice, Coddé and Gambaro, had a much greater impact on political and legislative culture in the form of political interactions and rules of decency than in perhaps any other political structure within the Council.⁹⁷⁸ Radical members of the *Gran Consiglio*, both progressive and neutral tended to use direct and impassioned language and were much more willing to attack and defend on a personal level. These members belonged to the most ideologically democratic segments of the Council and as such valued extreme equality, meaning titular or seniority privileges were not valued by these individuals. Rationalists and moderates, on the other hand, were often more cautious in their language, though of the two, moderates were much more likely to engage in harsher attacks and breaches of decorum.⁹⁷⁹ This has much to do with the fact that rationalists held a larger majority

⁹⁷⁶ Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 451–56.

⁹⁷⁷ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 68.

⁹⁷⁸ “Seduta XCIV, 2 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:677–78 Discourse of Cadice against Dandolo regarding taxation for absences. “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–15 Discourse of Coddé denouncing the *Consiglio di Seniori* as counter-revolutionary for their rejection of the resolution for the creation of extra-judiciary military commissions of high police (See Chapter X); “Seduta CCXVI, 1 di 2 a 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:740–41 Discourse of Gambari requesting urgency in a resolution to combat counter-revolutionary activity by the central executive of the city of Bologna.

⁹⁷⁹ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 280 In a rather comically narrated excerpt from his autobiography, Compagnoni describes an instance in which he disagreed with the censorship of representatives who refused to arrive for the Trial

and thus had more control over the rules of decorum, meaning they were less likely to break them. That said *ancien regime* practices of aristocratic privileges which enabled individuals to outwardly condescend against socio-economically, politically, or intellectually “inferiors”, were often retained by the more republican leaning segments of the *Gran Consiglio* who favored elite rule.

Similarly, on the other axis of political ideology, progressives had a greater hand in formulating the unwritten rules of behavior, not only because they held a majority, but because these representatives were naturally more willing to build and construct legislation based on local behavioral norms, making their ideas easier to understand by the general Assembly. Neutrals tended to side with progressives in this, particularly neutral rationalists, who found the lack of practical evidence in the form of written manuals of revolutionary decorum or of French Republican behavioral norms unacceptable to guess at. However, many neutrals, particularly those from military backgrounds, tended to look to the ways in which the *Armée* - in particularly higher ranks like Bonaparte and Berthier - interacted with each other as examples of proper republican behavior.⁹⁸⁰ Originalists, in fact seemed to be less interested in this, tending to simply conform to the norms set by progressives, though they too looked towards the *Armée* as an example. Many had in fact been close to Bonaparte in 1797 and had learned while in his camp the “proper” way to compose oneself as a republican. This, of course, was a setting vastly different than the legislative political interactions of the Council of 500 in Paris from which the *Gran Consiglio* was supposed to model itself.

Culture is perhaps the most important factor when defining organizational order, and dictates its success and failure, in particular in a cross-cultural setting such as the *Gran Consiglio*.⁹⁸¹ Geography was simply a hypothetical limitation to old regime order; cultural behavioral norms and ideas of decorum were often identical between the various Italian eighteenth-century states, breaking more along lines of socio-economic status and profession rather than geographic origins. For example, the rising intellectualism within the elite of the former Duchy of Milan in the second half of the eighteenth century, led to a culture of debates and political

of Monti and Oliva. While he states his attacks were benign and Polfranceschi took them personally, it can be assumed they certainly breached decorum as Polfranceschi waited outside the council chambers (according to Compagnoni) with a sword ready to duel the former clergyman over his previous statements. .

⁹⁸⁰ “Seduta XXX, 7 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:545–46 Debate by Scarabelli and La Hoz concerning the exclusion of foreigners from the military.

⁹⁸¹ Yu, “A Review of Study on the Competing Values Framework,” 40.

disagreements which often took on a highly formalized ritualism, in which arguments would be laid out methodologically and often rooted in eighteenth century intellectual precedent.⁹⁸² For this reason, representatives who came from the intellectual society of Milan – Luigi Bossi,⁹⁸³ Francesco Reina,⁹⁸⁴ Pietro Dehò,⁹⁸⁵ or Michele Vismara⁹⁸⁶ – often retained this debate structure when delivering discourses in the *Gran Consiglio*. In fact, this came to be the dominant form of debate norms for the council, as many representatives from non-Milanese intellectual societies (Bologna, Reggio, Padova etc.) had similar or even identical unwritten rules of behavior rooted in elite intellectualism.

The differences were more apparent in secondary cities (see Chapter X) which lacked the powerful intellectual communities of universities and academies or were much more vigilantly repressed by the central authority of their state. These cities – for example Bergamo, Mantova, Brescia or Sondrio – often saw the rise of a debate style which utilized local customs which was characterized by a tendency not necessarily to use exclusively rational argumentation but also integrate local traditions and methods of communication in order to validate a point.⁹⁸⁷ This did

⁹⁸² “16 Termidor Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano, Il Pretore di Pavia Alla Commissione Criminale presso il Tribunale d’Appello” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A., Studi, 40,” fol. Pavia letter, 3 August 1798. This letter explains how the member of the Pavian constitutional circle was among those who hoped to proceed in terms of reason, against those of delinquency. The letter goes on to explain the use of reasoned discourse by the processes of legislation and justice to combat this delinquency and bring a measure of respectability to the Nation which the author found lacking..

⁹⁸³ “Seduta CCXXXVII, 28 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:250-251 Discourse of Bossi in favor of the discourse of Mascheroni regarding the plan of public instruction.

⁹⁸⁴ « Seduta CLXXXIX, 28 fiorile anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:763-66 Discourse of Reina citing Locke and Rousseau regarding the family and marriage laws.

⁹⁸⁵ “Seduta LXXXV, 23 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:502, 507-509 The example of Dehò for this particular sitting is perhaps one of the best for demonstrating this concept of Milanese structures of debate. All of the instances in which Dehò intervenes are either to support or oppose motions made by other members of the assembly. In every case Dehò either augments the motions by providing further empirical data to sustain their motions, or as in the case of his opposition to Gatti on page 508, lays out an argument against his motion without resorting to personal attacks. Dehò, who will eventually become one of the most prominent progressive radicals in the *Gran Consiglio*, was an early master of this form of polite politics and used the norms of the council to gain power.

⁹⁸⁶ “Seduta LIX, 27 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:55–56 Interventions of Vismara in favor of clarifying the 48th article of the constitution in Debate concerning its function, and then a defense of his position against other members of the assembly.

⁹⁸⁷ Thompson 1993, pp. 100-101 The use of local customs here refers to the definition provided by EP Thompson. In essence it is a local praxis or law that might not necessarily be written down but is used as a commonly inherited aspect of a culture. Thus, in peripheral cities where university intellectualism hadn’t overtaken local customs of political debate, popular participation in political discourse meant that their natural customs of communication would similarly integrate themselves into debate structures. This did not necessarily make them more primitive or ruder, but strikingly different to the universal intellectualism of the urban centers and state metropolises like Milan, Rome, Modena/Reggio, and Venice in addition to the princely courts of these peripheral cities who often excluded non-intellectual elitist debate structures.

not mean the debates lacked intellectual depth or gentility; instead, the norms of the debates were significantly more democratic as they did away with lofty speech making so that the common man (still referring to the bourgeois of the city rather than the peasant classes of the rural areas) could attempt to participate.⁹⁸⁸ This new more democratic way of conducting debates was popular in peripheral constitutional circles like those found in Sondrio⁹⁸⁹ or Ferrara⁹⁹⁰ and which they brought to the *Gran Consiglio*. More importantly the tone of these peripheral debates was significantly more confrontational and contained many more alarmist sentiments such as accusations of counter-revolution and religious plots.⁹⁹¹ This did not always mean that representatives from these groups were more radical or progressive either, simply significantly more extreme in the charisma of their rhetoric than those from the intellectual centers.⁹⁹² This of course was not universally the case as some of the least ritualistic representatives like Greppi (Bologna), Giovio (Milano) or Perseguiti (Reggio) were all from these university intellectual centers. Similarly, there were many from the periphery like Reina (Malgrate), who in fact adopted more intellectual norms of debate. Thus, the unwritten rules of order which we see as the base of political and legislative culture in the Gran Colegio are a compromise of culturally acceptable behaviors from across the Cisalpine Republic, which united different forms of urban intellectuality with peripheral traditional charisma.⁹⁹³

⁹⁸⁸ “Seduta XXIV, 23 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:358–59 Debate on national paper for better communication across the entire republic; “Sondrio 26 fiorile Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. Bernardo Piazza Commissario del P.E. presso l’amministrazione dipartimentale d’Adda, ed Oglio al cittadino Ministro degli Affari Interni”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Sondrio lettera, 15 May 1798. This letter exemplifies the more democratic nature of these smaller peripheral cities. In the letter Piazza makes it a point to note who even the “least illuminated class” can participate in the Revolutionary march and contribute to the public spirit of Sondrio. While this did occur in some of the greater centers of urban intellectualism (Bologna and Milan come to mind) there was little participation from the upper classes, and certainly not the level of inter-class communication we see occurring in Sondrio.

⁹⁸⁹ “Mozione, e Dichiarazione D’alcuni Valtellinesi ai loro Compatrioti. De’29 Maggio 1797”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Sondrio Published pamphlet, 29 May 1797.

⁹⁹⁰ “Lettera a XXX” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Ferrara letter, date and author unknown. The author of this letter found in the papers of the consitutional circle of Ferrara for an unspecified date, gives an in depth look at the chaos which could be found within the consitutional circles of these peripheral cities when mobs of radical revolutionaries were given access to participate. The author, who we can assume to be a member of either the clergy, aristocracy or some other category marked for scorn by more radical segments of the patriotic movement in Ferrara, describes the heated arguments and abuses lauded towards himself when discussing the closure of religious corporations in the city by order of the Cisalpine government.

⁹⁹¹ “Bergamo il 16 messidoro Anno VI repubblicano della Libertà. Il Commissario del Potere Esecutivo [del dipartimento di Serio] al cittadino ministro di Polizia Generale” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 39 n.d., fol. Bergamo. letter, 4 July 1798

⁹⁹² Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 283 Once again we can turn to Compagnoni to illustrate this point. Himself from Ferrara, once sees his most heated debates occurring with other peripheral city representatives like Polfranceschi and Salimbeni - both of Verona.

⁹⁹³ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 66; Schein, “Organizational Culture,” 111.

The unwritten rules of behavior also tended to differ based on profession, which – similar to geographic distinctions – were significantly affected by class status. Lawyers, for example, had a form of behavioral norms which made them preferential towards ritualization in debate.⁹⁹⁴ It is unsurprising to find legal debate norms as the accepted form of unwritten rules in the Gran Consiglio since legal norms cut across class and demographic distinctions.⁹⁹⁵ Similarly, these norms were championed by the intellectual class, particularly those who came from university backgrounds, or else were heavily involved in the sciences like doctors and chemists.⁹⁹⁶ Many of the intellectual class found the debate structure of lawyers shared the values of rational argumentation with a basis in empirical evidence. Many within the scientific professions came from the aristocratic classes but could adapt to the norms of civil and ritualized debate found in lower class discourse as well for its focus on respect and intelligence⁹⁹⁷. Many of the most powerful representatives came from the scientific community, such as Dandolo, Dehò, Vismara and Ressi, and often allied closely with those from the legal profession like Reina, Vicini or Brunetti. Many of those who came from a military background were strong proponents of honor and discipline in the debates of the *Gran Consiglio*. Men like Martinengo and Scarebelli held ideas of honor as fundamental in debates, spurned personal attacks against other representatives and were often quite harsh in their criticism of wrongdoing or violence perpetrated by their

⁹⁹⁴ “Seduta CLXVII, 15 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:772-473 The discourse of Glissenti noted here provides a perfect example of an intervention by a legally trained member of the assembly in a debate setting. In this discourse concerning the elimination or retention to religious bodies and nun cloisters, Glissenti establishes an argument in which he politely refuted point by point the arguments made by fellow lawyer Perseguiti, and then proceeds to follow up with proposals of his own. This sequence follows a discourse tradition commonly accepted by this point in the *Gran Consiglio*, which encourages civility by not attacking the patriotism or personal benefits of members of the opposition, but instead uses logical reasoning to refute their point. Additionally, the discourse provides alternative resources. In this way Glissenti avoids breaking with decorum (ironically Perseguiti is one of the many firebrands who does not often keep with these behavioral norms and as such is punished by having little to no positional or legislative power) while maintaining a hard argument against his opponent

⁹⁹⁵ Bell, *Lawyers and Citizens*, 164.

⁹⁹⁶ “Seduta CXCI, 12 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:199-200. Discourse of Dandolo regarding the establishment of a cisalpine coinage. This discourse by Dandolo, a chemist by trade but a veritable renaissance man of his time, is one of his many discourses in which he adopts a legally structured argument. He cites French precedent and scientific and economic evidence to back up his claims in favor of a coinage. Most importantly the words he chooses are charismatic without attacking any particular individual nor calling upon exaggerated imagery. This kind of straight forward political discussion, championed by lawyers and adopted by the scientific community was a stark contrast from the more patriotic but also more exaggerated rhetoric one sees in the state building projects in France in the early 1790.

⁹⁹⁷ “Seduta XXIX, 28 frimale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta XXXV, 4 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:425-427, 499-500 Discourse of Ressi regarding the forced loan of 5 million lire; Discourse of Allemagna regarding the abolition of private academies of arts and sciences.

colleagues.⁹⁹⁸ Finally, the clergy made up a large part of the *Gran Consiglio*, and many brought with them norms of charity and piety. Representatives like Latuada⁹⁹⁹ and Valeriani¹⁰⁰⁰ constantly referenced back to the needs of the nation, and in particular those from the rural lower classes. On a more superficial level, clergymen, and particularly those who came from poorer peripheral areas like Federici and Latuada, understood the necessity of moderating legal and intellectual language to allow for popular engagement and better understanding.¹⁰⁰¹

The written rules

While the unwritten rules dictated the communicative and social aspects of legislative politics inside the *Gran Consiglio*, the primary driver of internal policies and functions of the Council came from the written rules established in the Cisalpine Constitution and the internal policies passed on 16 Frimaire.¹⁰⁰² These aspects of legislative culture were deemed too vital to the functioning of the legislative process and of the internal workings of the *Gran Consiglio*, that they could not simply become common behaviors and norms which risked misinterpretation or even alteration for political or personal gain.¹⁰⁰³ In essence the written rules are the instructions which ensure that the machine of legislation continues to produce with minimum interruption.¹⁰⁰⁴ In this section, the structures which were created – and which technically remain within the purview of written rules – to serve as the framework for legislative production (motions, voting, urgency ect.) will not be covered. Instead, the aspects examined here will be those designed to

⁹⁹⁸ “Seduta XXXIX, 8 nevozo anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:560 Reaction of Martinengo to the demand for explanation by Latuada; “Seduta CLI, 29 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:98–107 Interventions of Scarabelli in the debates in which he scolds his colleagues over their handling of the administration of the Guards of the Assembly. Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 280.

⁹⁹⁹ “Seduta LXXVI, 14 piovozo anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:337. Response of Latuada to Dandolo on the rights of servants to serve in the National Guard. Latuada as a legally trained priest was a combination clergyman and lawyer in his method of delivering discourses. While he used clear language to explain his position he always used strong constitutional evidence. In this way his rhetoric was appealing to both more intellectually driven representatives as well as those who heeded better more colloquial speechmaking.

¹⁰⁰⁰ “Seduta XLVI, 24 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:45 Appeal of Valeriani against the exclusion of the Roman people from the rights of all republicans.

¹⁰⁰¹ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:102–4 Discourse of Latuada on the responsibilities of the *Gran Consiglio* towards the people of the Cisalpine Republic.

¹⁰⁰² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V Article 62.

¹⁰⁰³ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 95.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Hedlund, “Organizational Attributes of Legislatures,” 72.

streamline the legislative process and police debate behavior at a level higher than unwritten rules of decorum.

The internal policy guaranteed by Articles 62 and 63 of the Cisalpine constitution were meant to help representatives catch their bearings as they entered into the new experience of national legislation.¹⁰⁰⁵ As Oddens points out in his examination of national time in the Batavian Assembly, establishing written rules for the timing of legislation and the processes of the Council were seen as necessary for proper efficiency and accountability.¹⁰⁰⁶ Something as serious as efficiency and accountability could not be left up to good faith; thus, the rules of national time needed to be written down to make clear the gravity of wasting the time of the *Gran Consiglio*. Some measures had already been established by the constitution such as the time necessary for motions to sit in debate before resolutions or prohibition on committee permanence.¹⁰⁰⁷ However, the opening of public sessions needed to be addressed. Public sessions of the Council were fundamental in establishing transparency and accountability which would garner better public trust and interaction with the government.¹⁰⁰⁸ It, therefore, became immediately necessary to establish a time to open sessions which could be easily followed by both the public and the representatives. From the second sitting on 3 Frimaire, the President Giuseppe Fenaroli had taken to establishing the hour of the next sitting for 10:00 the following morning.¹⁰⁰⁹ For extraordinary sittings, like that of the evenings of 11 and 16 Frimaire, Fenaroli had used his own discretion to set the opening hour. It seems these precedents were adopted by the internal policy commission who established the official opening time of 10:00 but allowed for the president to alter this time in extraordinary circumstances.¹⁰¹⁰ End times were less fixed, as they were generally dependent upon the seriousness of discussions, however the sessions tended to end between 16:30 and 18:00.

¹⁰⁰⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V, Article 62,63; “Seduta II, 3 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:100 Motion of President Fenaroli to set up a commission for the formation of an internal policy.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 119–20.

¹⁰⁰⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V, Articles 67, 75. See below for more information on motion structures.

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:113 Debate on the number of spectators allowed to enter during public sessions of general council; Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 122.

¹⁰⁰⁹ “Seduta II, 3 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:100.

¹⁰¹⁰ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti 1:272 Title II, Articles 7, and 10

The establishment of an opening time was similarly important not just for better public access, but because it would allow the council to address the problem of representative attendance which had been ongoing since 2 Frimaire. One of the largest impediments to the legislative process was the inability of the *Gran Consiglio* to function due to a lack of present personnel.¹⁰¹¹ The constitution established that the minimum number of representatives necessary to open discussions and debates – and hence begin the legislative process – was 50, although the sitting itself could be opened without beginning debates with only 30 present.¹⁰¹² By the second sitting of 16 Frimaire when the internal policies were officially ratified by the *Gran Consiglio* 124 representatives had sworn their oaths, so that more than double the constitutionally regulated number of representatives were eligible and obligated to appear at the opening of sessions. However, all of the sittings from 7-13 Frimaire – including the evening session of 11 Frimaire – were between 30-60 minutes late in opening due to lack of representatives.¹⁰¹³ This could potentially be explained by the long registration process which took representative attendance at the opening of sessions.¹⁰¹⁴ However, the creation of the Commission for Dismissals and Substitutions of representatives on 5 Frimaire provides evidence that in fact the situation may have been more complex.¹⁰¹⁵

As previously stated, 124 representatives had come to swear their oaths of office by the time the internal policies were ratified, however this 124 was out of a total 160 nominated originally by Bonaparte in addition to substitutes.¹⁰¹⁶ Many of the 124, such as Glissentini or Perseguiti, had in fact not been nominated at all but served as substitutes and were sworn in early in the month of Frimaire. There remained an unsettlingly high number of representatives who either failed to show up to do their duty – with or without a reason – or came very late in the

¹⁰¹¹ Savini, *Un abate "libertino,"* 279 The initial confrontation between Compagnoni and Polfranceschi took place because of Polfranceschi's outrage at the constant lack of attendance by members of the Council.

¹⁰¹² "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," sec. Title V Article 73.

¹⁰¹³ « Sedute VI-XIII, 7-13 frimale anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:144, 154, 166, 176, 182, 199, 205. It is assumed that all sessions between 2 and 16 Frimaire in which the opening time was not reported opened according to the designated time established in the preceding session by Fenaroli, which was typically 10.00 for morning sessions and 19.00 for evening sessions. Those mentioned were all after the designated hour leading one to believe they were noted within the *processi verbalies* for their tardiness.

¹⁰¹⁴ « Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute », Montalcini and Alberti, 1:272 §Title II, Article 8; § Title III articles 11 and 13; Though applied after the dates mentioned here the process of registration was in existence before the 16 Frimaire ratification. The debates which took place over internal policy during this period helps provide evidence for this. .

¹⁰¹⁵ « Seduta IV, 5 frimale anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, 1:121 Motion of Reina and subsequent nomination of the commission for dismissals and substitutions of representatives.

¹⁰¹⁶ "Nomine dei membri del Corpo legislativo", Montalcini and Alberti, 1:63–69.

process. There were even those like Antonio Scarpa, Luigi Malaspina and Luigi Castiglioni who outright refused to serve, sending in letters of dismissal on 15 Frimaire.¹⁰¹⁷ Progressive and neutral radicals, as well as a few progressive rationalists like Dandolo, felt that renouncing the charge of representative was as bad a treason and proposals for sanctions against those who renounced their titles could be as extreme as the use of capital punishment.¹⁰¹⁸ On the other side, originalist and neutral moderates believed that representatives were fully within their rights to refuse to serve in the Council, particularly considering they had not been elected according to the constitution.

It was hoped that the internal policies would establish a series of rules surrounding dismissals which could provide a centered solution by uniting the views of both sides of the issue. First, according to the new policies everyone was forced to register their name upon entering and then those who wished to speak would be required to register themselves in order with the secretary.¹⁰¹⁹ In this way attendance was made more flexible so that representatives would not be forced to remain following the initial opening of discussions and could return to listen to issue which they found to be relevant to their experiences. However, if a representative were found to be absent for a period of five days or longer, they would be censored in the *processi verbali* for the next sitting they attended.¹⁰²⁰ The reality of course was not so clear cut. Despite their initial outrage at the auto-dismissals of representatives in the first half of Frimaire, progressives and neutral radicals began to see the political advantage the dismissals and substitutions gave them according to the written rules of the Council. As the Commission for Dismissals and Substitutions was manned by progressive representatives from the onset - many of them progressive radicals (Pietro Dehò, Felice Latuada, Giacomo Lecchi, Francesco Reina, Giovanni Maria Fontana and Pietro Severoli) - these groups established and maintained their philosophy through the insertion

¹⁰¹⁷ “Seduta XV, 15 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti 1:248-249 Report of Severoli on behalf of the commission for the dismissals and substitution of representatives.

¹⁰¹⁸ “Seduta XVIII, 17 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:281 Debate on the punishment for nominated representative who refuse to swear an oath.

¹⁰¹⁹ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizza delle sedute” Montalcini and Alberti, 1:272. Title II Article 8, Title III Article 11.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid.* Montalcini and Alberti, 1:272 Title II Article 9.

of like-minded substitutes.¹⁰²¹ Between 30 Frimaire and 28 Nivôse the committee nominated 43 individuals, the majority of whom supported the adaptive view of the constitution.¹⁰²²

In this way, despite the intention behind the internal policies to limit political gamesmanship within the legislative process of the *Gran Consiglio*, they instead provided a legal framework along which political ideologies could compete for authority. Chapter V already examined the roles of the presidents, secretaries, and inspectors, and as such will not be repeated here. That said their competencies are laid down within the written rules of the internal policies and it is worth examining how the written rules made the offices of the council important in the political games of the *Gran Consiglio* based on the privileges and restrictions afforded them. The president had enormous powers over the management of the council, being able to open and close discussions, regulate the order and timing of discussions, and pronounce the final results of a vote or resolution.¹⁰²³ Most importantly, the president had the full rights of deciding upon the rules of order and the maintenance of such. In fact, Articles 20, 21, 47 and 51 explicitly grant the president the ability to judge order that is out of order, thus in turn giving him the power to officially dictate the norms of the Council in a given moment.¹⁰²⁴ Similarly the entire first title of the policies dictates the right of the inspectors over unruly or absent representatives.¹⁰²⁵ The internal policies also allowed the inspector the power to control the purse strings internally to the *Gran Consiglio* which were fundamental to the legislative operations of the commissions.

However, the greatest political weapon was given to the secretaries who had control over the formation of the speaking lists. Power acquisition, debates and legislative production were all determined by who spoke, when they spoke and what they were able to say. While the president had the right to open and close discussions, he could not select the individual speakers, nor the order in which they were allowed to address the general council. Secretaries were charged with the recording and organizing of the affairs of the council, and as such they had complete control

¹⁰²¹ “Seduta IV, 5 Frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:121. Nomination of the commission of dismissal and substitutions.

¹⁰²² “Seduta XXXI, 30 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta XXXIX, 8 nevoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:448–49, 562 Nomination of substitutes; “Seduta LX, 28 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:70–71 Confirmation of substitutions to the Gran Consiglio.

¹⁰²³ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:273. Title IV Articles 26, 27, 30, 31, 32.

¹⁰²⁴ *Ibid* 1:273, 275. Title III, Articles 20, 21; Title VI Articles 41, 51.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid* 1:271–72. Title I, Articles 1–6.

over internal and external communications.¹⁰²⁶ It is known from the French case that in the early days of legislative production for an assembly, the biggest or most renowned orators would all rush to talk over one another in an effort to gain some measure of power over their colleagues.¹⁰²⁷ While time, experience, and constitutional measures had prevented such extremities in the *Gran Consiglio* nine years later, there was still a general chaos which existed as prominent representatives such as Reina, Dandolo or Savonarola made similar attempts to have their own political philosophies dominate legislation. To avoid this, secretaries were given the power in the internal policies to organize speakers, in a sense giving a literal “order” to the order of the chamber.¹⁰²⁸ With this authority, secretaries could elevate within the order of the day, the speakers they felt would be the most relevant or urgent to the impending needs of the nation. However, this power could also be used to elevate political or ideological allies of the secretaries, thus allowing their own legislative prerogatives to take precedent and have a greater voice in the *Gran Consiglio*.

In addition to the speaking lists, the internal policies also established a number of other important regulations to bring order to the debate process. To begin with, besides registering in the lists, speakers could not have the ability to make a statement without first being acknowledged by the President, even if his name were next in order.¹⁰²⁹ Similarly remarks or acknowledgements of approval or disapproval made without the consent of the President could be met with sanctions.¹⁰³⁰ To limit outbursts all speakers would be required to speak from a central podium called a *tribune*.¹⁰³¹ Officers from the Guards of the Legislature would be stationed on either side of the *tribune* in order to protect the speaker from any unruliness, either by the viewing public or other representatives.¹⁰³² These officers were also responsible for policing the Council, under the orders of the inspector. No remarks made outside of the *tribune* would or could be acknowledged as a part of the debate, except for interventions by the council president. On rare occasions when representatives hoped to make a short response to someone speaking from the *tribune*, they could only be afforded the word if they raised themselves at their assigned position, were granted the

¹⁰²⁶ *Ibid* 1:272-273 § Title II Article 8, Title III Article 16, Title IV Article 28

¹⁰²⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 228.

¹⁰²⁸ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:273–74 §Title IV Article 28, Title V Articles 34 and 35.

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid* 1:274 Title VI Article 44.

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid* 1:278 Title XI article 89 and 90.

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid* 1:275 Title VI Article 52.

¹⁰³² *Ibid* 1:277-78 Title XI Articles 87 and 88.

acknowledgement of the president and the speaker at the *tribune* had finished their discourse.¹⁰³³ Even the president, when he sought to make a statement, could only do so when at the *tribune* and had to leave his place in office to the vice-president in the meantime.¹⁰³⁴

Finally, the internal policies also provided explicit sanctions to be taken against rule breakers. Unlike the sanctions for the unwritten rules of the Council, which relied upon public shaming and political consequences, the sanctions for infractions of the written rules were more immediate and concrete in their application. The constitution afforded the legislative bodies the right to self-police, however they could not themselves enforce any penalty higher than internal censorship, or in some extreme cases imprisonment of the guilty or disorderly representative.¹⁰³⁵ This, for example, was the consequence for Fantaguzzi and Fabris when they were accused of sedition for a letter delivered to the *Gran Consiglio* in a sitting on 26 Floréal.¹⁰³⁶ Only in the most extreme cases – where a serious crime was being accused such as corruption or impersonation of a public servant – could the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* punish one of their own with the heaviest sanction of expulsion. Expulsion was considered the most extreme punishment because members of the legislative body were given immunity to accusation of criminal misconduct against them according to the constitution.¹⁰³⁷ Once expelled, however, the representatives would become ordinary citizens which made them liable for criminal or civil prosecution. This was of course the principle under trial during the Oliva affair.¹⁰³⁸

¹⁰³³ *Ibid* 1:275 Title VI Article 50.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid* 1:275 Title VI Articles 54 and 55.

¹⁰³⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V Article 63.

¹⁰³⁶ “Seduta CLXXVII, 26 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CLXXVIII, 27 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:706–7, 732 Presentation of a letter by Fantaguzzi and Fabbri accusing the Departments Commission of purposefully formulating a plan to partition the district of Cesena in Romagna against the resolution made previously by the Council; Announcement of imprisonment for seditious materials presented by Fantaguzzi and Fabbri.

¹⁰³⁷ Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina Anno V della Repubblica Francese (MDCCXCVII), Title V, Articles 108 to 121. These articles of the constitution describe the impeachment process by which a representative, either of the *Seniori* or *Gran Consiglio* is accused of a criminal offense. The arrest must be made only by members of the high court of the Cisalpine Republic who would bring the individual accused to stand trial before first the *Gran Consiglio* and then the *Seniori*. Both houses had to agree before the impeachment could take place, at which time the representative would be stripped of his immunity guaranteed in articles 108 and 109 and be tried by a regular judiciary court.

¹⁰³⁸ « Seduta LXXIX, 17 piovoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:385–86 Debate on the procedures of the trial of Oliva; This affair remains the only extensive trial of a member of the *Gran Consiglio* during the period under study. Luigi Oliva was accused in a petition from a former municipal worker in Emilia of being corrupted by local aristocrats and abusive towards the local population - along with his partner Vincenzo Monti - while serving as the Executive Commissioner in Emilia in 1797. These charges were brought just after Oliva sat for the first time as representative in early Nivose. These claims were backed up by

The president had the ultimate sanctioning power, except in the most extreme cases, such as mass censorships or expulsions, where a simple majority vote was necessary within the Council. Censorship was the most common form of sanction for breaking the internal policies. This was often as simple as the president cutting off speakers at the tribune which he felt were either provocative or out of order.¹⁰³⁹ When outbursts took place, the president could send the guards of the *tribune* to subdue the transgressor.¹⁰⁴⁰ In heavier cases, such as when an argument became too personal or aggressive, the president could simply close the discussion or delay it to the following day when cooler heads prevailed. However, the cloth cut both ways. If the president broke a rule of the internal policies, the representatives could call for a vote to sanction the president, which could either force him to self-censor statements made or could even have him leave his position temporarily in favor of the vice-president.¹⁰⁴¹ If a president closed a discussion, the Council could reopen it against the president's wishes if backed by a simple majority.¹⁰⁴² In cases of important votes, the president could ask the council for the right to censor all those members who were absent. This was the case, for example, at one of the votes concerning the sale of public goods on 26 Pluviôse, when a number of representatives, the majority progressive and neutral radicals or originalist rationalists and moderates were absent for a secret committee vote and subsequently censored.¹⁰⁴³

the representative Guicciardi, himself a resident of Emilia and a known political enemy of Oliva. While Monti was tried by a criminal court, Oliva by virtue of his position as *Gran Consiglio* representative had immunity from trial. Guidicardi motioned for formal sanctions against Oliva which meant an official trial. Unfortunately the proceedings of this trial were held in secret committee which means the arguments made and by whom have been lost. Oliva was a progressive rationalist and had strong allies in men like Reina, Cadice and Dandolo who continually defended him and attempted to shape the policies for the proceedings in a way which might benefit Oliva. After a lengthy trial process which took over the months of Nivose, Pluviôse, Ventose and part of Germinal, Oliva was acquitted of all charges and remained in the *Gran Consiglio* for the remainder of the period. Guidicardi by contrast was shunned and eventually resigned his position.

¹⁰³⁹ "Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:273–75 Title III Articles 19, 20 and 21, Title IV Articles 25 and 26, Title V Article 41, Title VI Articles 47, 51.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid* 1:278 Title XI Articles 89 and 90.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid* 1:275 Title VI Articles 54 and 55 .

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid* 1:274 Title IV Article 31, Title V Article 36.

¹⁰⁴³ « Seduta LXXXVIII, 26 piovoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:558–60, 563. Secret committee session to discuss sale of public goods, then debate on sanctions against extremist politicians who refused to participate in debates, followed by their subsequent censorship; Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*, 279.

The legislative process

Beyond the rules of order, both written and unwritten, the internal policies – along with the Cisalpine Constitution – also provided a strict framework for the process of law making. Up to this point the study has looked in depth at the more abstract aspects of the council such as power, legislative philosophies and social interaction and norms between members of the *Gran Consiglio*. This section looks at the more concrete aspect of the law-making process, namely, the formation of problem solving into resolutions, or the “*strumentazione politica*”.¹⁰⁴⁴ According to the Constitution, the *Gran Consiglio* was the only governmental body that could propose an official law, though they did not have the right to pass said law, a right given to the *Consiglio de’ Seniori*.¹⁰⁴⁵ In fact, most of the conflicts which arose between the two councils came from a rivalry over legal supremacy, where each house felt they had superior authority to dictate the production of the legislative branch. However, after the 24 Germinal Coup – which saw a significantly more devastating purge of the *Seniori* – the *Gran Consiglio* established a firm control over the legislative process, where their resolutions found little-pushback from a now hamstrung *Seniori* (See Chapter X).

The process first began with the introduction of a polemic into the order of the day. These polemics could have a variety of sources from discourses made by representatives¹⁰⁴⁶, a commission report,¹⁰⁴⁷ letters from other facets of government (Cisalpine Directory,¹⁰⁴⁸ ministry,

¹⁰⁴⁴ Cotta 1971, p. 553 According to Cotta, the *strumentazione politica* differs from the *strumentazione tecnica*, as the former is the procedures of legislative output, while the latter are the external instruments which can be utilized by assembly members in the production of law i.e. commission research, reports, staffers etc.

¹⁰⁴⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 74, 84, and 90.

¹⁰⁴⁶ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:102–4 Discourse of Latuada on the need to sell public goods to benefit the people.

¹⁰⁴⁷ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:391-392 Report by Bossi on behalf of the Commission for the use of force which details the unconstitutionality of forced labor for the condemned.

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Seduta XCVII, 5 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:738–39 Series of messages from the Directory to the Gran Consiglio; “Il Direttorio Esecutivo. Milano li 23 Termidoro Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano al Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 27/28,” fol. Amministrazione-Bovara Letter, 10 August 1798.

administration,¹⁰⁴⁹ or the Consiglio dei *Seniori*¹⁰⁵⁰), letters from foreign bodies (French Military,¹⁰⁵¹ Foreign ambassadors¹⁰⁵², or the French civil authorities¹⁰⁵³), letters from private cisalpine citizens or citizen groups¹⁰⁵⁴, or in person petitions made by private citizens.¹⁰⁵⁵ Once a polemic made it to the council floor it could either be immediately debated upon, sent to a commission in order to form a project of law or put into the order of the day. However, it would not be officially put forth as a legal proposition until a formal motion was made by a representative. Simply put motions were any proposition made by an individual or commission which consisted of a constitutional or legislative function, or a point of internal order;¹⁰⁵⁶ motions could also hold a political value.

A motion needed to meet a series of criteria in order to be counted as such: First the bringer of the motion and the motion itself had to be formally written into the order of the day and recognized by the presidents bureau long before the beginning of the sitting, or else placed at the back of the list.¹⁰⁵⁷ The motion would be officially recorded by the secretary with the proper date and time of entry to be put in order of arrival in the speaking lists. The motion needed to be formally written down before it was entered or else it would not be recognized by the bureau.¹⁰⁵⁸ Once a motion was properly enrolled, the motioner would be asked to read their motion from the

¹⁰⁴⁹ “Seduta LXXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:408 Letter from the administration of the Department of Serio regarding an unconstitutional assembly reported in its confines.

¹⁰⁵⁰ “Milano 14 frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. Sessione XII. Il Consiglio de’ Seniori al Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13,” fol. Atto legislativo Letter, 4 December 1797.

¹⁰⁵¹ “Seduta CXV, 23 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:367–68 Letter from French General Alexander Berthier regarding the military and commercial treaties.

¹⁰⁵² “Riceivemnto diplomatico dei rappresentanti di Toscana e di Parma”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:428–30.

¹⁰⁵³ « Seduta CCXVII, secondo di 2 8 mesidoro anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:755-56 Letter transmitted to Gran Consiglio through the Directory from French Ambassador Trouvé. As the members of the *Gran Consiglio* were constitutionally restricted from having direct contact with foreign emissaries all correspondence to the *Gran Consiglio* from abroad had to go through the cisalpine Directory first.

¹⁰⁵⁴ “Seduta LXXIII, 11 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:271 Honorable mention of a discourse by Poggi regarding the Festival of Recognition of the Republic; “Ferrara 20 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano. Il Circolo Costituzionale di Ferrara al Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Ferrara letter, 9 April 1798.

¹⁰⁵⁵ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:336 Petition of citizen Asperti.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 245.; See Chapter V and the remarks on personal power and the different forms of motions and discourses for a further explanation of the different types of motions seen in the *Gran Consiglio*

¹⁰⁵⁷ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:274 Title V Article 34.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Ibid* 1:274 Title V Article 35.

tribune.¹⁰⁵⁹ The motion generally consisted of a series of polemics and considerations – called *considerandi* – followed by a series of proposed resolutions to the aforementioned polemics.¹⁰⁶⁰ This structure was not always strictly followed and could be more fluid, generally only proposing a resolution without plainly stating the polemics.¹⁰⁶¹ The more formal method was generally adopted for plans of law or official resolutions, while the informal method was generally used for issues concerning the internal policies. It was also the form used for publication discussed later in this chapter.

Once a motion had been read aloud, the president would open up the floor for debate. The debate surrounding a motion was a fundamental aspect of the legislative process since here the Council could officially call for alterations or provide objections – either to the wording or substance – of the proposal. Simultaneously, there was also a political component to the debates. Words of support or opposition were the only time where an intervention could be made by representatives who were not enrolled in the list and allowed them time play at legislative politics without being accused of disorderliness.¹⁰⁶² The political opponents of a motioner would have their opportunity to refute the legislative aims brought forth by the motion.¹⁰⁶³ Similarly, political allies of the motioner would be able to utilize the time to highlight the importance of the proposal to their overall political program, potentially gaining allies from more neutral representatives on the matter.¹⁰⁶⁴ To this end, political allies were a necessary step when filing a motion, since the motion needed to be seconded for it to progress to the next step in the legislative process.¹⁰⁶⁵

¹⁰⁵⁹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 245.

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Seduta XVIII, 17 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:284-85; *Considerandi* is the Italian word for considerations, meaning the particular issues which the motion is meant to address; *Motion of Aquila*: this motion presented by Giuseppe Necchi d'Aquila, brought before the council the day after the internal norms had been established, perfectly embodies the formal structure of a motion in which the motioner makes a speech outlining the reasons behind his motion, the polemics presented in the *considerandi* and then the proposed resolutions separated into articles for debate.

¹⁰⁶¹ "Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 1:91. Motion of Bragaldi calling for the formation of the president's bureau.

¹⁰⁶² "Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute" Montalcini and Alberti, 1:274 Title V Article 39.

¹⁰⁶³ "Seduta XLVII, 16 nevoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:675-81 Debate following the motion of Luini regarding conscription and amnesty for political criminals. .

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:16-19 This was the case in the debate following the motion by Coddè to sit in permanent committee in order to resolve the rejection of the *Seniori* and his accusations of counter-revolutionary activity against them. Many progressive radicals including Alborghetti and Greppi stood up in support of their colleague and successfully convinced the Council to vote in favor of the motion.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 246.

The motioner had the right to retract their motions at any time themselves for any reason – for example if a more reasonable argument or refutation was offered by another representative or the Council seemed to generally disprove of the motion for some reason – however if four representatives were to protest the retraction the discussion was able to continue.¹⁰⁶⁶ Similarly if a speaker contributed to a debate more than three times for the same topic, the president could request the permission of the entire Council before the speaker was allowed to make a fourth intervention.¹⁰⁶⁷ Motion debates were a period of much deeper legislative discussions, particularly when regarding projects of law. Projects of law were larger institutional constructions which often included tens of articles.¹⁰⁶⁸ These projects were extraordinarily complex and could take months to complete, with each article being the subject of numerous changes. In these cases, representatives had the right to request the splitting of articles into separate motions, perhaps because of doubts about wording or the concepts in an article, making the process even longer.¹⁰⁶⁹ For every change which took place a motion was filed, and a debate occurred.

Once the president felt that a debate regarding a motion had reached a natural end – or that the discussion had become out of order – he could decide to end the discussion.¹⁰⁷⁰ Except for in matters of urgency, the motion would be placed aside. According to the Constitution, all propositions needed to go through three official *lettura*, which were the official cycle of rereading aloud the motion from the *tribune*, preceded by a debate.¹⁰⁷¹ Between each *lettura* there would be a ten-day reflection period, which was believed would provide the necessary cooling off period of reflection and to rationally review the concepts being proposed for resolution. Two days before the second *lettura* a published copy of the motion would be distributed to the representative for

¹⁰⁶⁶ "Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute", Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:274 Title V Article 36

¹⁰⁶⁷ *Ibid* 1:274 Title V Article 37.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Seduta CLXXXVII, 7 pratile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:20-25 Plan of the National Guard ; "Piano di Pubblica Istruzione" Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:691-733. Both of the examples highlighted here – the plan for the national Guard and the plan of public instruction – are prime examples of projects of law which included many long and complex articles and titles. The projects were often the result of multiple motions, perhaps even multiple motions for each article, which extended the projects out over the course of almost the entire ten-month period of the Gan Consiglio. These plans were also some of the primary factors which have been identified as contributing to public dissatisfaction because of how long and arduous the process of creating them was.

¹⁰⁶⁹ "Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:274 § Title V Article 38.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *Ibid* 1:274 Title V Article 41.

¹⁰⁷¹ Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina Anno V della Repubblica Francese (MDCCXCVII), Title V Article 75 *Lettura* literally translates into English as reading.

private deliberations. These published *lettura* copies could be modified from the first or second debates and often were leaked to the press for publication republican newspapers, allowing for public reflection on pieces of legislation. After both the first and second debate each, if called for by council members, the motion would be put to a vote by the president. In these instances, the motion would proceed to a final vote on whether to make the motion into a resolution or would remain for a second or third *lettura*. However, following the third *lettura* the council had to either reject or accept the motion in its current form. When the motion was voted on it was published – either as a rejected or approved resolution – as a declaration of *non proroga*”, which prohibited the continued delay of a final decision on the motion.¹⁰⁷²

Voting was a complex process and occurred in many forms in the *Gran Consiglio*. It is known for example that for the nomination of council offices a secret ballot was used to elect presidents, secretaries, and inspectors.¹⁰⁷³ The secret ballot would similarly be used for the nomination of commissions when representatives challenged the nominations made by the president’s bureau.¹⁰⁷⁴ For more mundane votes, it can be assumed that the *Gran Consiglio* adopted a form of voting similar to that of the French Republic. The French from 1789 on had utilized one of two strategies to count votes: either the *lever* in which the representative would stand up for the adoption of a motion and then those who wanted to reject it would stand after; or through a roll call in which the representatives would be named publicly in alphabetical order and would respond with their vote.¹⁰⁷⁵ Article 65 of the Cisalpine Constitution stipulated that the preferred method of voting was the lever and the roll call would only be used in cases of doubt.¹⁰⁷⁶ However, Article 43 indicates that in fact the *Gran Consiglio* often used the latter method to count votes when it states “Negli appelli nominali sono chiamati I rappresentanti per ordine alfabetico. A quest’oggetto sono stampate delle tavole contenenti in quest’ordine I nomi di tutti I rappresentanti.”¹⁰⁷⁷ It is assumed that upon being called to cast a vote the individual would either sign his vote next to his

¹⁰⁷² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 78.

¹⁰⁷³ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:87, 115 Initial election of president, secretaries and inspectors. “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:273. Title IV Article 26.

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 1:275–76 Title VII Articles 57, 58 and 59.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 265.

¹⁰⁷⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 65.

¹⁰⁷⁷ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:274. Title V Article 43; trans. In the roll call the representatives are called in alphabetical order. The names of all of the representatives will be contained in tables printed upon an object.”.

name on the roll call table, or else it would be registered by a secretary after the individuals name was called out. However, there is almost not precise evidence of how these votes were registered because the roll calls either do not exist any longer or have been lost with time.

Once voting was conducted the results would provide one of four different outcomes for the motion: approval, rejection, *aggiornamento* (either by the motioner or a separate commission) or returned to the order of the day. The approval of a motion meant that the propositions it contained would be adopted as a formal resolution within the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁰⁷⁸ Once a resolution was adopted it had two courses to take. If the resolution concerned internal procedure, such as the establishment of order, opening or closing of a discussion, formation of a secret committee session or minor internal sanctions like censorship, the resolution would be applied immediately. For any resolution which regarded anything more serious which needed outside consent from the *Consiglio de' Seniori*, such as a law, act, decree, joint-assembly communication, etc., the resolution would be transferred to the *Consiglio de' Seniori* who would deliberate to either pass the resolution as a law or reject the resolution.¹⁰⁷⁹ When a resolution was rejected by the *Seniori* it could be returned to the *Gran Consiglio* to be reformatted or corrected according to the suggestions of the *Seniori*, though they themselves could not alter the law.¹⁰⁸⁰

The rejection of a motion by the *Gran Consiglio* were more definitive than approvals. Once a motion had been rejected it could no longer be discussed in its current form, nor could it ever be considered for a resolution. Rejections were one of the least common results of a motion vote as to have a motion rejected was a definitive rejection of the motioner's ideas which could lead to bad feelings and possible political retaliation.¹⁰⁸¹ Rejections were often reserved for more

¹⁰⁷⁸ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title V Article 77.

¹⁰⁷⁹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title V Article 84.

¹⁰⁸⁰ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title V Articles 94-100.

¹⁰⁸¹ "Seduta CXXXV, 13 germinale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:707 The rejection of a motion by Bovara regarding the rejection of a resolution by the *Seniori* which had allowed the use of extra-territorial funds to pay the forced loans owed to the French; Bovara, an originalist rationalist felt that the measure needed to be reviewed again, according to both the constitutionally proscribed procedures of rejected resolutions and the fact that funds needed to come from somewhere to pay for the forced loans. His proposal for a commission contradicted the radical proposal to simply rework the resolution and resend it immediately, stating that the reworded resolution would only continue to prolong the problem, instead believing that the entire motion needed to be reworked. Unfortunately for Bovara, while protected by a like-minded president under Alpruni, mid-Germinal had seen a resurgent strengthening of the progressives and radical members of the Council who rejected the motion of Bovara. They sought to send a political message to him and those who shared in hesitancy that the *Gran Consiglio* would have the final say on the working of a law and strengthen their resolve that the original solution they had sent which had been rejected was quite fine for the Council.

disruptive motions, particularly those of urgency, frequently employed by radicals in an attempt to speed along the legislative process.

The *Gran Consiglio*, instead, tended to favor the other two results to avoid the adoption of motion into a resolution, which were significantly more politically secure. The use of the *aggiornamento* (literally translated in English to mean “update”) allowed the original motion to be altered either by the motioner or a separate committee. In these cases, the motion was generally criticized, though not heavily, within the motion debates.¹⁰⁸² It was expected that motions which were put in *aggiornamento* would eventually pass if minor changes were made to wording, format or content. It was quite often used when politically tricky motions were favored by the *Gran Consiglio* majority but were perhaps worded poorly or contained a particular aspects seen as potentially politically contentious. Similarly, motions that were sent back by the *Seniori* were often put into *aggiornamento*, as many – particularly the more progressive and radical members of *Gran Consiglio* – felt that the original text simply needed minor reworking.¹⁰⁸³ The final result, that of placing in the order of the day, was used for motions which were not at all likely to pass as a way to avoid the political insult of rejection. When a motion was sent to the order of the day, it was sent to the back of the list of topics for discussion. However, lists were often so long that it was unlikely the motion would be heard. Since the secretaries had the ability to manipulate the order lists a sympathetic secretary could move an old motion to the forefront of the topics, however this was rarely the case, and as such the order of the day was as good as a rejection.

Radicals in particular found the process of motions and *lettura*, order of the day and *aggiornamenti*, and rejected resolutions, extremely arduous and a waste of public time.¹⁰⁸⁴ They argued that when change was not forthcoming, counter-revolutionary forces had an opportunity to worm their dangerous arguments of inefficiency and accountability into the minds of the public. Thus, when radicals and progressives began to take control of the Council functions in Nivôse, they simultaneously began to exploit the use of the urgency clause. Understanding the rules of urgency can only begin with what urgency did to the order of the day. A declaration of urgency would allow a proposal or debate topic to be put at the top of a list for the order of the day, for

¹⁰⁸² “Seduuta LXVIII, 5 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:175 Numerous motions put in *aggiornamento*.

¹⁰⁸³ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:16 Discourse of Alborghetti on the reworkings necessary for the rejection of the resolutions of urgency in the *Seniori*.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 125.

current and subsequent sessions until the matter is resolved.¹⁰⁸⁵ This allowed council majorities to dictate which topics deserved special attention, regardless of the opinion of the secretary or president. Similarly, urgency allowed motions to bypass the normal three *letture* and proceed straight to a vote of resolution.¹⁰⁸⁶

However, urgency, once accepted by the *Gran Consiglio* was not an immediate remedy for the lengthy legislative process as radicals viewed it. When a resolution was marked as urgent, this sense of urgency had to be similarly adopted by the *Seniori* before the debates regarding the substance of the resolution could be held.¹⁰⁸⁷ If the motion of urgency was rejected by the *Seniori*, then the entire resolution would be rejected and would need to be reworked by the *Gran Consiglio* from the beginning.¹⁰⁸⁸ In the months of Nîvose and Pluviôse this became a common occurrence, as the *Seniori* was controlled in this period by a group of representatives led by Aldini who tended to favor republican leaning legislation. This continued rejection of urgency was in fact one of the primary motivators behind the events of 9 Ventôse covered in Chapter IX, which saw a breakdown of relation between the two councils.¹⁰⁸⁹

Public opinion and Interaction in the *Gran Consiglio*

In addition to internal regulations and structures which provided order and accountability between the members of the *Gran Consiglio* itself, the principles of the republicanism by 1798 favored a sense of public accountability which had its origins in the earliest periods of the Revolutionary era. As has already been stated, the need for public transparency was perhaps the corner stone of a functioning representative democracy, and in particular a functioning legislature.¹⁰⁹⁰ In principle, as well as constitutionally, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* were speaking for the citizenry and as such that citizenry had the right to know and understand the laws, principles and politics which were defining their new republican lifestyles. According to Castaldo, this concept had its origins in French Revolutionary legislative culture from the very

¹⁰⁸⁵ “Ordine delle deliberazione e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:273 § Title IV Article 24.

¹⁰⁸⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 75.

¹⁰⁸⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 87.

¹⁰⁸⁸ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 88 and 89.

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–19. Discourses of Coddé, Greppi, Aldrovandi, Perseguiti, Fenaroli and Giovio against the *Consiglio dei Seniori*.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Oddens, “Making the Most of National Time,” 122.

early days of the National Constituent Assembly, where public viewership and participation was integral to the organization of the Assembly structures.¹⁰⁹¹ The written rules examined in the previous section above were largely established to help the public participate more clearly in the political machine of the legislative branch. The speaking lists, *tribune*, and ritualistic nature of motions, besides having an organizational role, also made the spectacle of the legislative process more accessible to the public.

However, according to many conservative politicians of the Directory period invasions, occupations and even violence, which were brought into the legislative assembly, in particular after the declaration of the Republic in 1792, were a result of a general sense among “the people”, of their right to participate directly in government.¹⁰⁹² This was one of the primary concerns of the framers of the Constitution of 1795 following the events of Thermidor, as they attempted to balance the sovereignty of the nation – i.e. the right of the government to rule – with the sovereignty of the people – i.e. the right of the public to select and participate in that government.¹⁰⁹³ The Constitution of Year III established a series of measures to mix the two concepts, which gave the public the right to bear witness to the proceedings of the Assemblies, participate directly with the right to petition and educate themselves using published material directly from the legislature such as laws acts and decrees from the national press or the debates of the *processi verbali*. However, the ideas of national sovereignty pushed by political idealists like Sieyès also imposed strict rules and protections to avoid the chaotic interventions of earlier phases of the revolution, in particular those seen under the National Convention in 1793-1794.¹⁰⁹⁴ This was the attitude towards public interaction and opinion which the *Gran Consiglio* inherited in 1798, and which came to hold itself at the center of much of the political games and factionalism by the summer of that year.

General and Secret Committees: the public nature of the Gran Consiglio

The *Gran Consiglio* followed a policy of open general committee sessions as basic norm for every sitting of the Council, in which all debates were made openly before the sitting public and press, holding accountable all representatives for the positions they took and the words they

¹⁰⁹¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 223.

¹⁰⁹² Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 221.

¹⁰⁹³ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Heurtin, *L'espace public parlementaire*, 45.

spoke. These debates were considered “ordinary” in their treatment of the topics and themes, and thus followed the standard rules of order established in the constitution and internal policies.¹⁰⁹⁵ However unlike in past iterations of revolutionary legislatures, the general committee of the *Gran Consiglio* was not answerable to the public. This was because the mandate of the representative under the Directory system was not as a delegate of the people, but rather a spokesperson on their behalf.¹⁰⁹⁶ According to the constructors of the Constitution of Year III, and thus similarly those who constructed the Cisalpine Constitution, the representatives should always acknowledge the will of the people, those who were considered supreme in the nation.¹⁰⁹⁷ However, the representative should *follow* public opinion, not – at least according to Sieyès – popular opinion, which was simply the chaos of the mob.¹⁰⁹⁸ Public Opinion was more than just the people, but the institutions, ideas, and values of the nation, aspects of society evaluated and executed by those experts of the “social art” tapped with leading the legislative process of the nation.¹⁰⁹⁹ Thus, an educated public would hold a representative to task, not solely based on the individual needs and prerogatives of a single citizen but based on the representative’s ability to conform to the republican and revolutionary values which governed Cisalpine Society.¹¹⁰⁰

That said, the general committee needed order, and more than that the general committee needed protection. The guards of the assembly had existed from the beginning of the Revolution in 1789, however according to Castaldo their function was always seen less as one of protection for the delegates and more as an enforcer of order in the location of the Assembly, and were under the authority of the head of the national guard of Paris – at the time Lafayette – not the assembly itself.¹¹⁰¹ However, under the Constitution of Year III, this changed as the guards came to be situated firmly under the control of the representatives of the assembly in which they served.¹¹⁰²

¹⁰⁹⁵ “Seduta XLVI, 15 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:666 Discourse of Vismara on the differences between secret and general committees.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65.

¹⁰⁹⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,”. Diritti XVII and XVIII; Preamble Article 2; Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 68.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Heurtin, *L’espace public parlementaire*, 46.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Heurtin, 47.

¹¹⁰⁰ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,”. Diritti VI, XVII, XXII; Doversi III, IV, V, VIII, IX; Preamble Articles 1 and 2.

¹¹⁰¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 237.

¹¹⁰² Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina Anno V della Repubblica Francese (MDCCXCVII), Title V Articles 69 and 62 ; Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:126-127 Motion published 19 Nîvose Year VI establishing the Guards of the Legislature

The *Gran Consiglio*, thus had a police service, under the command of the Inspectors of the Chamber who could watch for signs of unruliness among the viewing public.¹¹⁰³ Interestingly, this further goes to demonstrate the general centralism of the Council, as even some of the most radical and progressive members of the *Gran Consiglio* like Latuada and La Hoz were in favor of strong measures against disturbances and interventions by public forces.¹¹⁰⁴

However general committees were the norm not the exception and so certain rules were established so that order could be maintained without the use of force. First, as mentioned in the previous section, the official opening hour was established at 10.00 in the morning so that members of the public could be present from the onset of the proceedings.¹¹⁰⁵ This time was important however, because not everyone who arrived would be allowed into the building. Beyond the obvious confines of space which existed as the Palazzo Serbelloni where the *Gran Consiglio* held its sessions¹¹⁰⁶, there existed a general fear of a mob forming which could potentially overwhelm the combined force of guards. The Cisalpine Constitution set the number of members of the public allowed into the building during a session to 100.¹¹⁰⁷ However, this number was seen as too restrictive, particularly amongst progressives who felt it was important to have a public presence proportional to the representatives, to allow for the perception of public expression, a concept which was adopted on 4 Frimaire.¹¹⁰⁸

Yet despite all of the attempts made by the *Gran Consiglio* to allow the public to bear witness to the legislative process in an orderly manner, there continued to be hesitations for particular debates which were thought to be not appropriate for the public and press. For this

¹¹⁰³ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:277–78. Title X Articles 87, 88, and 89.

¹¹⁰⁴ “Seduta V, 6 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:124-125 Discourses of Latuada and La Hoz on the organization of the Guard of the Legislature

¹¹⁰⁵ “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute” Montalcini and Alberti, 1:272. Title II Article 7.

¹¹⁰⁶ Tinelli, *Topografia Storica Di Milano Ossia Prospetto Delle Cose Principali Che Costituiscono La Rinomanza, Il Lustrò Ed Il Benessere Della Metropoli Milanese*, III:46.

¹¹⁰⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,”. Title V Article 64.

¹¹⁰⁸ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:91, 113. Discourse of Severoli and Dandolo on augmenting the number of the spectators allowed into the general committee sessions to make it proportional. This was a concept first offered by Dandolo at the initial sitting of the *Gran Consiglio* on 2 Frimaire, in which he insisted that the number of individuals allowed in be raised from the constitutionally proscribed 100 spectators, since the number of representatives was also raised just before the first session. He similarly proposed a motion which separated journalists from the regular public, allowing them easier access to report more accurately the proceedings of the Council. The second reading of Dandolo’s motion saw it set as an internal resolution and adopted. As such the public now could attend sittings but in the orderly fashion established in the internal policies.

reason, the *Gran Consiglio* began to utilize early on the practice of going into a “secret committee” session when these topics came to the top of the order of the day. Secret or closed sessions in legislative government had ancient roots dating back to Roman times – at least according to *Gran Consiglio* representative Giuseppe Paribelli – in which the Roman senate would close the forum off to the public.¹¹⁰⁹ In fact secret sessions had constituted the norm for legislative government until the formation of the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789. The American Constitution implied the right of both chambers of congress to use secret sessions when discussing issues of national importance (impeachments, national security, sensitive communications from the president, and all other materials deemed confidential by the members of the congress).¹¹¹⁰ The French Revolution had changed the way legislatures were conducted by opening up their work to the scrutiny of public accountability.¹¹¹¹ However, there remained those who favored limitation on public knowledge of the government, most prominently Sieyès.¹¹¹² The secret committee was used as a form of protection of the representative mandate in the new Directorial government after 1795, since it allowed representatives to make difficult decisions for the nation which may not be popular.¹¹¹³

But secret committees had to have rules. While complete secrecy as the Americans had done was never an option, legislatures needed to feel comfortable going into secret committees when they deemed it appropriate. Article 66 of the Cisalpine Constitution stated: “Ciascun Consiglio sulla dimanda di più di un quarto de’ suoi Membri può formarsi in Comitato Generale e Segreto, ma soltanto per discutere non per deliberare”.¹¹¹⁴ The necessary number of members to form into a secret committee was quite low. As such even political minority groups like the originalists and moderates could potentially force the Council into secret committee to discuss a matter. However, the vagueness of the article immediately caused controversy for the *Gran Consiglio*. The use of the expression “Comitato Generale e Segreto” left more rationalist and

¹¹⁰⁹ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevozo anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:685 Discourse of Paribelli on the uses of secret committee sessions.

¹¹¹⁰ Mildred Amer, Mildred Specialist in American Government and Finance Division, “Secret Sessions of the House and Senate,” sec. Authority in the Constitution and Rules.; In fact the Continental Congress, and Constitutional Convention had been completely closed off from the public, as had the American Senate until 1794.

¹¹¹¹ Heurtin, *L’espace public parlementaire*, 21–22.

¹¹¹² Heurtin, 50.

¹¹¹³ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65.

¹¹¹⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,”. Title V Article 66 trans: “Each Council can form into a General and Secret committee at the request of one fourth of its members, but only to discuss not to deliberate.”

neutral representatives, like Michele Vismara questioning the limitations to the use of secret committee sessions, and more importantly who was allowed to witness the discussions taking place.¹¹¹⁵ Vismara's solution was to interpret that the constitution allowed for two separate forms of legislative session, according to the method used in France: general committees in which ordinary discussions took place would be public, and secret committees would be reserved for extraordinary discussions. Therefore, the decision was no longer on whether a debate needed to be secret or general, but if it was ordinary or extraordinary.

Vismara's resolution was opposed however, by those more progressive members of the *Gran Consiglio*. The priest Vincenzo Federici for example, opposed the use of secret committee sessions in this way, as certain polemics – such as an accusation against a member of the Assembly or the final vote for a major plan – needed to be public for the sake of accountability but remained extraordinary circumstances nonetheless.¹¹¹⁶ Closed sessions may have allowed representatives to speak more freely, but they did not account for procedural changes based on the circumstances of the issues at hand. Vismara responded that secret committee sessions could not change approach or treatment of a polemic, because looking at the end of the Article 66, the secret committees were simply for discussion and not deliberation.¹¹¹⁷ In this way there could exist no true “secret committee” in accordance with the principles of the revolution, since all final votes were public and the representatives still accountable for their decisions.

Ironically it was at this point that the Council entered into a secret committee and the final decision on Vismara's definition remains unknown. However, based on the tendencies in the following month of Pluviôse it can be assumed that his ideas remained the precedent for deciding on when secret committees should be formed, as issues deemed secretive became very broad and secret committees were used with increased frequency. The *Gran Consiglio* established ten rules which guided the debate structure of the secret committees from that point forward which included

¹¹¹⁵ “Seduta XLVI, 15 nevosio anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:666 Discourse and motion of Vismara defining general and secret committee sessions.

¹¹¹⁶ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:683 Discourse of Federici on the definition of general and secret committees; He stated that the assumption made by Vismara was that while the topics were extraordinary, the definition under Vismara's precedent would not have allowed for a difference in approach or treatment of the topic at hand, as was the case in the polemics mentioned above.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 1:686. Rebuttal of Vismara concerning secret committee sessions; Interestingly, it seems this argument swayed more progressive elements. However, originalists like Guiccioli found the interpretation strayed too far from the constitution and these men sought to reject the precedent of Vismara.

the minimum number of representatives required to continue a secret committee session (three-fourths of all members), requirements for speaking, rules on absences and punishments, and the time limits for the session.¹¹¹⁸ During the months of Ventôse, Germinal and Floréal, secret committee sessions became a commonality. While there is little record of what occurred in these meetings, diaries and correspondences give us insight into the debate structures.¹¹¹⁹ They became vital political weapons, used frequently by oppositional representatives like those from the originalist and neutral moderate and neutral groups, to speak plainly against the work of progressive radicals and rationalist and neutral radicals who held the majority in these months. Similarly, they became settings where sentiments against the French occupiers could be vocalized without fear of retribution. By the time of the Messidor Crisis, secret committee sessions were being used in almost every *seduta* as a way for the Trouvé backed Thermidorians – who had arisen as a political force in early summer 1798 (see Chapter VIII) – to implement the new constitutional order which the French ambassador was sent to enact in the Cisalpine Republic, away from an unfavorable Cisalpine public.

Petitions

Along with open sessions, the *Gran Consiglio* maintained a direct line of communication with the public through the use of public petitions presented by private citizens or groups before the Assembly. Petitions were in many ways the most original and strongest form of direct democracy to exist within the legislative practices of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹¹²⁰ However, petition brought with it the potential for danger, as the petitions brought before the Council could not be controlled – at least not initially – which meant taboo topics could find their way to the order of the day. Thus, as with most other policies, the Cisalpine representatives looked to the historical

¹¹¹⁸ “Seduta LXXXIX, 27 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:565–66 Rules of the secret committee session and subsequent debate.; Absent representatives or representatives who refused to participate in the discussion were subject to severe penalties ranging from censorship to imprisonment for up to three days. The president had the responsibility of opening and closing the session and following the closing of the secret committee deliberations needed to be made publicly, though further discussions were not allowed. However, motions made during the secret committees were subject to the same procedures, meaning that while the deliberations made were public, the motion debates and subsequent *letture* could only be conducted in secret council. The public would be removed by the Guards of the *Gran Consiglio* at the order of the inspector and would not be allowed in until the president officially closed the session. No recording of the secret session would be taken for the publication of the *processi verbali*.

¹¹¹⁹ “Seduta CXVI, 24 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:370–77 Extract of secret committee papers from the debates on the Military and Commercial treaties with the French Republic; Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 280–83.

¹¹²⁰ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 272.

examples of the French Republic, when constructing their regulations for petitions.¹¹²¹ However, as with most issues, the degree to which these petition regulations might mirror those of the French, or instead move in a new direction which either limited or opened participation from the public, was a topic of stark debate, especially in the initial month of Frimaire. Similarly, the practicality and urgency of petitions saw some of the earliest the fracturing of representative ideological factions in 1798 as disagreements between radicals and moderates, erupted over everything to petition relevance to their presence in the law-making process.

The right to petition, had its origins in old governmental practices which many believed to have existed from ancient times. However, the term petition as it will be used here has its origins in mid-seventeenth century England.¹¹²² As Pocock points out, many of the civic duties and rights which the English attributed to their protestant customs in the mid-seventeenth century, were fundamentally similar to the civic responsibilities to Florentine citizens, and renaissance Italian culture.¹¹²³ Thus the idea of direct civil involvement, while not explicitly the idea of the petition, was long existent in Italy before the Revolution had even began in France. However, it was not until the adaptation of the petition to the American case in the 1770s that one begins to see the application of the modern petition take shape.¹¹²⁴ From even before the Declaration of Independence (a petition of a sort in its own way) established the right of the American people to govern themselves, the colonial customs of petition were used to introduce local legislation and resolve judicial disputes.¹¹²⁵ The American Congress took this tradition of petitionary initiation and made it the starting point for the legislative process in the young Republic, as “the people’s right to instruct their government.”¹¹²⁶ However the American petition soon became overwhelmed

¹¹²¹ Betlem Castellà i Pujols, “Métamorphoses d’un comité,” 4.

¹¹²² Zaret, “Petitions and the ‘Invention’ of Public Opinion in the English Revolution,” 1499.; This definition, while not explicitly mentioned this way by Zaret, implies a petition is a form of direct communication between “the people” and the government which was meant to invoke public opinion in order to somehow effect legislative, administrative, judicial, or executive functioning.

¹¹²³ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, 87–90.

¹¹²⁴ Pocock 1975, 467-477 If one looks at Cato’s letters for example, one can see the movement away from a system which sees public opinion as a nuisance which needs to be expressed to make the people content, but the very center of republican government. Using ancient examples from Sparta and other Greek states, the Americans made the argument that the successful society was governed by popular opinion and thus the petition became the central way by which they might bring the popular will into the legislative process. Higginson 1986, 152 ; Zaret 1996, 1513-1515; The Americans took the British idea of petition as a means for criticism and popular political expression and removed the limitations to their centrality in the legislative process.

¹¹²⁵ Higginson, “A Short History of the Right to Peition Government for the Redress of Grievances,” 145.

¹¹²⁶ Higginson 1986, p. 158 Of course, any American could tell you that the theoretical opening for any bill would be a petition made to a local House representative.

by the sheer number and complexity of petitions in the early decades of the young republic, and failed to establish a system to better structure petitions towards a concrete legal end.

This innovation fell to the French at the onset of the Revolution in 1789. Petitions flooded the deputies from their home regions in the opening days of the National Assembly, and it became apparent that they all could not be heard.¹¹²⁷ It was decided that, as representatives of their constituencies, deputies of the National Constituent Assembly would have the sole responsibility of deciding which grievances required urgent resolution and which did not.¹¹²⁸ However, Castaldo points out that this reduction was not universally agreed upon, as some deputies feared that the petitions with particularly ambitious political consequences would be used by deputies for personal notoriety, leading deputies to attempt to outdo each other in placating the most outrageous requests of their constituency.¹¹²⁹ In late 1791, the vast number of petitions forced the Legislative assembly to establish the Committee of Petitions, in place of the Committee of Reports, tasked with sorting the petitions, reports, requests and correspondences addressed to the president.¹¹³⁰ However from late 1792, the Committee would be the primary receiver and handler of such documents, and took on a number of other functions by mid-1793, including that of Public Surveillance, losing its initial function as collector of public grievances and transforming into the inquisitor of counter-revolutionary accusations.¹¹³¹ Thus, after Thermidor Year III, it became apparent that the structure and limitations of petitions needed to be reimagined. Sieyès, ever mindful of the balance necessary between constituent responsibility and public opinion, came up with a scheme which allowed for better accountability for petitions and political allies within the Assembly, by enforcing a hefty fine for making a complaint or grievance without valid grounds.¹¹³² In this way the good of the sovereign nation could still be accomplished by allowing for open communication between the

¹¹²⁷ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 272.

¹¹²⁸ Castaldo, 273.

¹¹²⁹ Castaldo, 274 Mirabeau, for example, was quite hesitant to give the deputies this ability to select petitions to bring fourth to the Assembly, for the very reasons cited.

¹¹³⁰ Betlem Castellà i Pujols, “*Métamorphoses d’un comité*,” 2.

¹¹³¹ Betlem Castellà i Pujols 2012, 10, 12 Interestingly, the Committee was also stripped of its ability to deal with correspondences, this function taken on almost exclusively by the Committee of Public Safety created in April 1793. In this way the Committee for Petitions, by late 1793, early 1794 firmly under the control of the Committee of Public safety, became a sort of surveillance committee over the local populous, used extensively to expose counter-revolutionary plots. In reality it became used as a political tool by the Mountain in order to provide public support (fabricated or not) for the use of Terror tactics.

¹¹³² Goldoni, “At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power,” 226.

people who make up the nation and the government structures which run it, while also avoiding abuse and exploitation of the system by those wishing to harness public opinion for personal gain.¹¹³³

By the time of the *Gran Consiglio* in 1797, the petition was thus used as a measurement of public opinion, and a means of understanding the needs of the nation, without serving as either an exclusively political tool or a basic means of legislative prerogative.¹¹³⁴ Yet the purpose and function of petitions became an immediate flashpoint for division between Cisalpine legislative ideologies. To begin with, radicals felt that while the right to petition was necessary for understanding popular opinion, it could become burdensome on the legislative process, and thus sought to prohibit the use of petition for individual demands.¹¹³⁵ Petitions should not be used to measure public confidence; this instead radicals felt needed to be handled by the use of proclamations and then a formal invite of an older citizen to provide the peoples response, thus ritualizing and organizing the report of public opinion, making for streamlined legislation.¹¹³⁶ Rationalists, by contrast, felt that the use of commissions would allow the expression of public sentiment found in petitions to be properly synthesized and expressed, which could then be used to formulate a response in the form of legislation.¹¹³⁷ Moderates, for their part, believed that the legislative branch of government had no right to even hear petitions, believing that they first must

¹¹³³ Troper 2006, 68 Though he does not explicitly list petitions as an example, the idea presented here lends to the overall idea presented by Troper concerning the differences between popular and national sovereignty which differentiated the various constitutions of the French Revolution. The Constitution of Year III differentiated "the people" from the nation while simultaneously making them a singular unit; it did this by making the people the majority of the nation but not its entirety. In this way, public opinion was central to government functions, and thus petitions as the most measurable tool of popular opinion remained central to legislation. However, the Assemblies of the post-Thermidorian Revolution were no longer solely accountable to this concept of popular opinion and could circumvent it if they felt it was within the interest of the nation, meaning more than the people but the institutions, society, and culture which the people inhabited. Thus, petitions lost much of their power as the sole articulator of legislation, as was present in the American and earlier French iterations of republican constitutional government. While petitions remained more important than *ancien régime* practices associated with the English Civil War above, they did seem to reflect a much more muted importance overall in the political and legislative process under the Directory.

¹¹³⁴ Goldoni, "At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès' Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power," 226.

¹¹³⁵ "Seduta IV, 5 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:118 Motion of Dehò against private demands of the Gran Consiglio.

¹¹³⁶ *Ibid* 1:116 Motion of Tadini.

¹¹³⁷ *Ibid* 1:118 Discourse of Savonarola for the creation of a joint assembly commission.

go through the Executive Directory and then transmitted to the Assemblies where they could be discussed at length in an open session.¹¹³⁸

In order to accommodate the various ideological positions which were attempting to compromise on aspects of the legislative process, a system was created to provide for direct but regulated petitioning to the *Gran Consiglio*.¹¹³⁹ Petitions – regardless of the source, private or public – would only be accepted if they were sent to the president’s bureau. Once the message was received by the bureau it would be transmitted to the Petition Commission (one of the two semi-permanent commissions discussed in Chapter VI) for closer examination. The Petition Commission was renewed every ten days and would acquire all petitions over the following ten-day cycle.¹¹⁴⁰ The Petition commission on the final day of their mandate would provide a report on the past ten days in a specified general committee session designated for the presentation of petitions.¹¹⁴¹ For matters the commission viewed as urgent, they could provide a report on petition in question before the designated day. All reports would present the original petition as well as the commission’s suggestion for any necessary resolutions from there being handled like all other motions.

The ten-day renewal of the commission meant that the controlling ideological faction could guarantee control over direct communication with the public. Moreover, there tended to be at least one powerful representative who anticipated the political movement of the next controlling ideological group for each iteration. For example, the initial iteration of the Commission – nominated on 21 Frimaire towards the end of the Fenaroli (progressive rationalist) presidency, though under the influence of neutral secretaries Vismara (rationalist) and Compagnoni (moderate) – saw the powerful Lauro Glissenti (a progressive rationalist with a power index of 10 and Rank 1 of 4) serving among significantly less powerful representatives from the neutral, originalist and progressive rationalists groups, demonstrating a republican leaning trend.¹¹⁴² The next iteration –

¹¹³⁸ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:336–37 Discourses of Scarabelli and Aquila.

¹¹³⁹ *Ibid* 1:338 Motion of Perseguiti for the handling of petitions and the commission of petitions

¹¹⁴⁰ « Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizie delle sedute » Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:377 Title IX Article 76.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid* 1:377 Title IX Article 77; « Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:228"Articles 4 and 5 of the motion by Perseguiti on the handling of petitions and the Petition commission.

¹¹⁴² “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:339 Nomination of first Petition Commission; The other members were significantly less powerful than Glissenti

nominated on 3 Nivose during the Savonarola (neutral moderate) presidency, under the influence of the same secretaries Vismara and Compagnoni – began to move the Petition Commission towards the more democratic elements of the Council, where Giuseppe Piazzi (progressive radical) was the leading member.¹¹⁴³

Thus, petitions became less important in their role in public communication, and more important in the political gamesmanship of the Council. However, it was not done in the same fashion as the Committee of Petitions under the French Convention, where petitions would be used to justify political attacks, by claiming they came from public will. Instead, the public nature of petitions became less important, than did their place as the starting point for legislative output. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* seemed to follow a much more American strategy of handling petitions, which placed them at the root of legislative and judicial decision making on a lower level¹¹⁴⁴ – doing so by leaving their confrontation in the hands of lesser representatives – and left the larger political plans to the powerful representatives and their political ideologies. At the same time, the system of petitions in fact found its greatest reflection in the original ideas of Sieyès and the constructors of the Constitution of Year III, where the individual freedoms of petitioners were never done away with but severely limited, much more so than the American and earlier French forms of petition confrontation.¹¹⁴⁵

Publishing the Gran Consiglio

While general committee sessions and petitions provided a direct and living communication between the public and the *Gran Consiglio*, the greatest interaction between these

within the First iteration and generally trended towards a more republican and conservative political and legislative ideology, reflecting the trends of the secretaries at the time. See Chapter VI or appendix D section 2 “Semi-permanent commissions” for further information on the first Petition Commission.

¹¹⁴³ “Seduta XXXIV, 3 neviso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:490. Nomination of the second Petition Commission; The make up of this commission once again anticipates the political movement of the next controlling ideological faction as the other members – Antonio Campana (PIR-n/i, Rank 1-139), Giuseppe Carbonesi (PIR- n/i, Rank 1-92) and Giacomo Lecchi (PIR-n/i, Rank 1- 108) were all from an extreme center of the democratic-republican position. This demonstrates the trend in political preferences found in the following presidency under Gambari. and the Glissent/Dandolo secretariate, which was progressive and rationalist. Interestingly, this particular iteration was one of the few not elected by the general committee but selected by the president’s bureau. This is perhaps because, though tending to be a neutral moderate in the later months of the *Gran Consiglio* – in particular after the turbulent months of Ventose and Germinal – Savonarola was actually much more rationalist and progressive, bordering on radical during most of Frimaire and Nivose.

¹¹⁴⁴ Higginson, “A Short History of the Right to Peition Government for the Redress of Grievances,” 215.

¹¹⁴⁵ Goldoni, “At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power,” 226.

two bodies took place within the printed word. The topic of the press and the Cisalpine Republic has been the primary subjects of other more profound studies by historians like Carlo Capra, Paola Zanolì, Vittorio Criscuolo and Katia Visconti.¹¹⁴⁶ As the scope of this thesis is the contributions of the representatives to the legislative and political cultures of the *Gran Consiglio* the complete history of the press and its relationship to the Council must unfortunately be excluded. However, this does not mean that there will not be mention of certain fundamental aspects of this relationship which regard accountability, in particular, the publishing and distribution of the actions conducted within the Council.

The *Gran Consiglio* utilized two different forms of publication to interact with the public, which were organized, approved, and mandated by the Council itself. First, there was the official publication of all acts, proclamations, and resolutions which the *Gran Consiglio* approved, whether for future legislation or simple communication. This was done through the controversial action of creating a national press within the halls of the *Gran Consiglio* itself. Similarly, the second form was through the printing of debates and individual opinions and actions within the *processi verbali* found in the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio*. Both forms were meant to communicate the individual and general legislative ideas of the members of the Council, expose the public to the process of legislation, and allow the public to hold individuals – as well as the entire *Gran Consiglio* itself – accountable for their actions.

The formation of a national press

From the onset of the Revolution in France, the idea of publishing the actions of the legislature were seen as a crucial step in national unification and transparency before the public. While it would be ideal for all citizens to witness in person the law-making process, the physical constraints, not just in terms of distance and travel in the late eighteenth century, but the actual space available to house the public during sessions, meant it was necessary to publish the events and actions taking place inside the National Constituent Assembly for maximum public accessibility.¹¹⁴⁷ Early on these materials were often reported through an informed press or else

¹¹⁴⁶ Capra, “Il Giornalismo Nell’età Rivoluzionaria e Napoleonica”; Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico*; Visconti, “Liberty of Press and Censorship in the First Cisalpine Republic”; Zanolì, *Giornale De’ Partioti D’Italia II*.

¹¹⁴⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 200 As Tackett points out the lack of space only became more problematic when the Assembly moved to Paris where the delegates barely had enough room for themselves, let alone a viewing public.

the publication of deputies reports and letters in their home constituencies.¹¹⁴⁸ It was decided that the debates themselves needed to be recorded, organized, printed and distributed by the National Constituent Assembly itself to provide some uniformity to the reports making their way to the periphery of the nation, and allowing the deputies some measure of independence from their constituencies – for whom they had been tailoring reports to present the Revolution and its goings on in a rather biased light, both negative and positive.¹¹⁴⁹ For this purpose it became necessary to construct a national press, which would handle not only the printing and dissemination of the *processi verbali* across the new French Nation (and eventually the French Republic), but eventually all communications from the National Constituent – and then Legislative – Assembly, which included public correspondences, acts, decrees, proclamations and laws.¹¹⁵⁰ The national press would remain one of the consistent tools of the government in communicating with the French public, through the Convention and the events of Thermidor and into the Directory period.

There was already a conversation within the first week of the *Gran Consiglio*'s existence regarding how the cisalpine government could transmit communications to the public in an official capacity.¹¹⁵¹ According to the Constitution, the promulgation of laws and other acts of the Legislature could only occur through the Cisalpine Directory.¹¹⁵² When the Cisalpine Republic had been established in Messidor Year V, the Directory required that they receive a copy of all published acts by non-government publications.¹¹⁵³ However, early on, radicals like Giuseppe La Hoz hoped to curtail the monopoly over publication by forcing the Directory to also allow the Cisalpine Assemblies to review all published materials before they officially go into mass print.¹¹⁵⁴ Regardless of political ideology, the representatives tended to unite around the idea that the national press could only be functional if it was erected through the *Gran Consiglio* – though of

¹¹⁴⁸ Tackett, 235.

¹¹⁴⁹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 209.

¹¹⁵⁰ Castaldo, 208.

¹¹⁵¹ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:147 Proposal from the Directory about a national press.

¹¹⁵² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title V Articles 128 and 129.

¹¹⁵³ “Avviso. Milano 24 messidoro anno I (12 luglio 1797) Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:104.

¹¹⁵⁴ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:147 Motion of La Hoz regarding accountability of the Directory and Ministers for all printed acts, proclamations, and declarations.; this motion was made in response to a proclamation published on behalf of the Minister of Internal affairs, which many representatives, in particular radicals like Dehò and La Hoz felt had violated the constitution. To avoid a repetition of this La Hoz declared that all proclamations from the executive should first meet the approval of the Legislative body.

course the exact ways and means for doing this without treading on the constitutional authority of the Executive branch varied.¹¹⁵⁵ A plan for the national press with all necessary funds was declared urgent by the *Gran Consiglio* on 16 Frimaire, then confirmed by the *Seniori* the following day.¹¹⁵⁶ However, the Legislature immediately found itself at odds with an Executive, who was dragging its feet in the publication of official materials.¹¹⁵⁷ Whether due to a power struggle or simply out of a lax view of public necessity, the national press took well into Nivose to be constructed. Yet, despite the backlog of material which had accumulated, the Executive powers seemed more interested in publishing its own proclamations and materials – quite illegally according to the law introduced by La Hoz almost two months prior – which was cause for universal annoyance among the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹¹⁵⁸

By mid-Pluviôse, progressives had decided to break with the French constitutional precedent and to combat this apparent indifference which had permeated the Executive, by establishing a branch of the national press within the buildings of the Legislative Assemblies.¹¹⁵⁹ The famous printer Veldini, who was already charged with the printing of official materials, offered to donate five printing presses to be housed in the *Gran Consiglio* office.¹¹⁶⁰ The idea was that with these presses, printers – though they remained employees of the Executive and not the *Gran Consiglio* – would receive materials for printing directly from the Council and be able to print immediately the resolutions, *processi verbali* and communications of the Council without the interception of the executive authority. While progressives, and in particular progressive radicals, supported this idea, those more republican elements like the neutrals (rationalists and moderates, not necessarily radicals) and originalists were hesitant to take such extraordinary measures against

¹¹⁵⁵ “Seduta VIII, 9 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:175. Discourse and plan for the erection of a national press and character foundry; “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 1:104. Motion of Allemagna regarding the collection of published materials from private journals sent to the Directory.

¹¹⁵⁶ “Seduta XVI, primo di 2 a 16 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta XVII, 17 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:263, 288. Urgent resolution for the erection of the national press; subsequent confirmation and law of said resolution by the *Seniori*

¹¹⁵⁷ “Seduta XXIV, 23 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:351. Message to Directory from *Gran Consiglio* requesting haste for the erection of the national press in order to print and distribute the *processi verbalies*.

¹¹⁵⁸ “Seduta LXV, primo di 2 3 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:128. Letter to the Directory regarding the *Gran Consiglio*’s displeasure with the continued publication of proclamations by the Minister of Internal affairs.

¹¹⁵⁹ “Seduta LXXIV, 12 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:300–301. Motion of Latuada for a branch of the press to be housed in the *Gran Consiglio* building with support from Lattanzi and Greppi.

¹¹⁶⁰ *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 2:300. Discourse of Lattanzi supporting the motion of Latuada and offering the services of Veldini.

the executive.¹¹⁶¹ It was resolved to send a message to the Directory requesting the division of the national press, instead of resolving the matter officially through a legislative directive. The Directory, as expected, refused the request by the *Gran Consiglio*, citing it as unconstitutional¹¹⁶²; in response the *Gran Consiglio*, led by the strong progressive majority in control at this point, established in an official resolution, the separation of the press into three branches; one for the executive as the main branch and then one for each of the Legislative assemblies.¹¹⁶³ The rejection of the Directory reunited the hesitant neutrals and originalists like Otavio Mozzoni and Giambattista Venturi with progressive radicals and rationalists in forming the new press of the *Gran Consiglio*, complete with its own unique letter-head and paper supply.¹¹⁶⁴ Using Article 62 of the Cisalpine Constitution, even originalist moderates could accept the argument that, according to the rights of the Legislative assemblies to form their own internal policies, the Directory had no right to stop the *Gran Consiglio* from forming its own internal national press as a way of communicating to the public.¹¹⁶⁵

The promulgation of the laws and acts of the *Gran Consiglio*

As the *Gran Consiglio* was seeking to establish its own press, it was simultaneously coming up with a plan to promulgate the laws, acts, resolutions, proclamations, and declarations which it either passed or had a hand in passing (in the case of laws). The method of publishing laws had been a point of reflection in the *Gran Consiglio*, long before the conflict with the Directory over the establishment of the national press. On 4 Frimaire, the directory had sent a plan which had been established in Thermidor Year V to the *Gran Consiglio* for the method of publishing laws, and which they believed should be applied as the primary method of publication under the new

¹¹⁶¹ “Seduta LXXV, 13 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:317–18. Debate between Venturi and Greppi over the consitutional authority of the Legislature to hold a branch of the national press in the Legislative palaces.

¹¹⁶² « Seduta LXXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, 2:424. Letter from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio* rejecting the request to establish branches of the national press in legislative buildings.

¹¹⁶³ “Seduta LXXXIV, 22 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:491. Resolulution of Reina and Greppi to divide the national press.

¹¹⁶⁴ “Seduta LXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:425–27. Debates on the establishment of the *Gran Consiglio* printing press.

¹¹⁶⁵ “Seduta LXXXIX, 22 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:581–82. Motion of Venturi regarding the logical establishment of the national press in the *Gran Consiglio* building; it should be noted that here the radicals opposed the motion, not because they disagreed with its sentiments, but because they felt that there was no need to justify the creation of the press since it was already allowed according to the consitution – at least according to Greppi.

legislative system.¹¹⁶⁶ A commission was nominated to understand whether or not this method would apply to the current constitutional legislative system. Among the members of this commission sat Lorenzo Mascheroni, who was the only remaining member of the committee from Thermidor Year V who had passed the original plan. Mascheroni, a progressive rationalist, stated that the original text sent by the Directory was identical to the French policy of publication.¹¹⁶⁷ He proposed that a new commission be established to form an updated method of publishing laws, one which respected the liberty to adapt the constitution which the French had given them and in doing so adopt a method which Mascheroni felt would be better suited to the Cisalpine political condition.

Mascheroni himself, presented this new plan of the new commission on 21 Frimaire.¹¹⁶⁸ The plan seemed to follow established principles at first. All published laws must first meet all of the constitutional requirements to be named as such before they can be published. This meant that all procedures of motions, urgency, resolutions, and confirmation had to be acknowledged by the legislative assembly before the law could be made public. The law itself must be written clearly according to the form proscribed by the constitution with the letter head of the Cisalpine Republic and the acknowledgement of both the *Gran Consiglio* and *Seniori*. For proclamations, declarations, advisories and acts, the title of the publication should express clearly its function using the official paper and letterhead of the Cisalpine Republic. All documents meant for publication in the national press would be sent as manuscripts first and signed by the presiding head of the body – the presidents of the Assemblies or Directory, departmental administrators or ministers. All published works would be printed either as wall leaflets to be read in public, as a libretto or both.

Where this new plan differed from the old model was that it also called for the direct publication of all resolutions and projects of law formed by the *Gran Consiglio*, even before the *Seniori* approved them into law. While they would be denoted as non-laws with a special notation at the top of the text, they allowed for public awareness of projects of law in the process of being formulated. This had the effect of allowing more direct communication between the *Gran*

¹¹⁶⁶ “Seduta III, 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:109–10. Letter from Directory on the method of publishing the law.

¹¹⁶⁷ “Seduta VII, 8 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:162–63. Discourse and motion of Mascheroni.

¹¹⁶⁸ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:335–36. Presentation of the new method of publishing laws and resolutions for the Cisalpine Republic.

Consiglio and the public and allowing blame to be shifted away from the lower council and onto the other bodies who would be more likely to reject them, such as the *Seniori*, executive authorities or departmental authorities. As such the *Gran Consiglio* even within the first month of its activation attempted to establish itself as the institution within government most attuned and most representative of the needs of the citizenry.

The method of publishing the law remained more or less the same according to the plan of Mascheroni until after the Coup of 24 Germinal. A 3 Ventôse law by Giuseppe Fenaroli, established that all titles and subscripts for officially published materials from the government would be in capital letters, while the substance of the text itself would remain uncanceled for purposes of clarity.¹¹⁶⁹ On 7 Ventôse, Lamberti presented an official plan by which laws were to be published.¹¹⁷⁰ It provided justifications for the publication both of resolutions and laws, which stated that the publication was constitutionally obligatory, was necessary for public instruction in republican government, and saved money that might be spent correcting privately published letters from unknowledgeable sources. This ultimate point was originally cause for political split, as originalists held that the laws could and should only come from the legislature and their interpretation the judiciary and executive. Instead, progressives held that freedom of the press allowed for the republishing of public laws, along with commentaries, so long as the publication did not insight sedition.¹¹⁷¹ It was decided in mid-Germinal that the government would have sole responsibility of publishing the laws, acts, resolution and proclamations of the Nation, both as single published laws to be hung in public spaces and as a book entitled the *Raccolta delle leggi della Repubblica cisalpina*;¹¹⁷² however once published the government could not control republications nor commentaries due to the guaranteed freedoms of the press.

Once the *Gran Consiglio* became the dominant authority in the legislative process after 9 Ventose, they began to take greater pains to exhibit this power before the people. Already on 23 Germinal, the *Gran Consiglio* established a form of publication which highlighted its work over

¹¹⁶⁹ “Seduta XCV, 3 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:693. Motion of Fenaroli.

¹¹⁷⁰ “Seduta XCIX, 7 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:787–91. Motion of lamberti establishing the official method of publishing the law.

¹¹⁷¹ “Seduta CXXXVIII, 6 germinal anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:597–602.

¹¹⁷² “Seduta CXL, 18 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:810–12. Motion of the Commission for the method of publishing laws.

that of the *Seniori* in the law-making process (Figure 16). As all resolutions would already have been printed, it was decided in Floréal that instead of recreating the entire resolution with a new letterhead which attributed the law to both assemblies, the resolution would simply be reprinted to include a tag at the end that the resolution had been confirmed by the *Seniori*.¹¹⁷³ While it was argued that this strategy proved a clearer presentation of the law to the public, it had had the simultaneous effect of attributing the laws to the *Gran Consiglio* and not the Legislature as a whole. At the end of Prairie, the *Gran Consiglio* further highlighted their supremacy in the legislative process by reformatting the publication of laws so that the bulk of the law was seen to have derived from their ranks, diminishing the roles of the *Seniori* and Directory to that of approval (Figure 2).¹¹⁷⁴ In fact, to counter this vision of legislative supremacy in the *Gran Consiglio*, the new constitution of Trouvé and subsequent changes to the legal system as a whole in the final months of the Cisalpine Republic nullified many of the formats put in place by the *Gran Consiglio* in the spring and summer of 1798.




Figure 16.




Figure 17.

¹¹⁷³ “Seduta CLIV, 2 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:147. Project of Mascheroni for the method of publishing the laws.

¹¹⁷⁴ “Seduta CCIV, 25 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:461–64. Revision of the publication of laws according the Mascheroni on behalf of the Commission for the publication of acts of the Legislature.

The *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio*

This final section will look at the regulations of the *processi verbali* as a form of public communication between the people and the *Gran Consiglio*. The original intention behind the creation of the verbal records of the Assembly in 1789 France was as a means to justify to the public the decrees and laws coming out of the new legislative branch.¹¹⁷⁵ Though not a new concept as minutes of government meetings had been a tradition from ancient times, the new verbal processes of the French Revolution made the complexity of legislative discussions more widely available as a tool for public instruction. As mentioned before, the legislative process in the early days of the Revolution was based on the consent of the local constituency of assembly members, and the printing and distribution of the minutes of the Assembly would have allowed the local public to understand the position of their representative, and either accept him or condemn him.¹¹⁷⁶ As such the published minutes of the Assembly provided for the first time a sense of openness between the government and the governed.

However, as time progressed, the openness of these published minutes came to require limitations and regulations. Some of this was simply natural human error, as the secretaries charged with taking the notes of the assembly sessions were not professionals and made numerous mistakes.¹¹⁷⁷ While nefarious censorship by secretaries was rare, even a whiff of suspicion could debilitate the credibility of the new revolutionary legislature. One of the first regulations applied to the construction and publication of the official minutes of the Assembly was the distribution and approval of their content to members before publication, who could refute or accept the contents of the recorded debates from past days.¹¹⁷⁸

Deputies like Sieyès felt that knowledge of the legislative process was important but should not be divulged in full for reasons of public and national security and unity.¹¹⁷⁹ In other words, while debate and disagreement was good for the deputies making the laws, the public needed to be united in their support for the final piece of legislation; were the true nature of these debates to leak into public discourse, disagreements could fracture society. Thus, redaction of the minutes of

¹¹⁷⁵ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 209.

¹¹⁷⁶ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 235.

¹¹⁷⁷ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 210.

¹¹⁷⁸ Castaldo, 210–11.

¹¹⁷⁹ Goldoni, “At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power,” 222.

the Assembly focused not just on accurately recounting what was said but on the regulation of tone and language. This was the principle which the constructors of the post-Thermidorian French Republic – principally Sieyès – brought with them when trying to understand the line between public rights to interaction in the legislative process and the limits to the public’s knowledge of legislative debates.¹¹⁸⁰

The Cisalpine system once again sought to mirror French practice when designing the public nature of the *processi verbali*. The constitution stipulated that the *processi verbali* of all sessions held in general committee would be printed after the fact.¹¹⁸¹ Outside of this mention, the constitution left the arrangement of this printing to the *Gran Consiglio*. Hence, I was largely the internal policies were concerned with the regulation of the *processi verbali*. The minutes of the session would be manually recorded by the dominant secretary.¹¹⁸² At the following session the minutes from the previous session would be examined by all members present and approved. If a discrepancy arose then a debate would take place over whether to provide a correction or not. These manuscripts would have been sent monthly, following their redaction, to the council archives by the president’s bureau who would be able to access them and all other documentation for the sitting at any time.¹¹⁸³ These would not be accessible to the public, but only council members themselves.

Once the session was over, the minutes as well as all other messages, correspondences and official documents which were utilized in the session were to be collected by three “compilers” called *redattori*.¹¹⁸⁴ The position of *redattori* had actually come into existence in the early sessions of the Council, when the archivist had requested the election of three people who would make sure all documentation is correctly collected and sent off for printing and then to the archives.¹¹⁸⁵ The first *redattori* were originally selected from the *Gran Consiglio* itself (Severoli, Carboinesi and Guiccioli), though they were to remain temporary until the Council could elect outside personnel. It was decided that the *redattori* needed to come from outside of the *Gran Consiglio* for two

¹¹⁸⁰ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 66.

¹¹⁸¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 64.

¹¹⁸² “Ordine delle deliberazioni e polizia delle sedute”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:273 § Title IV Article 28.

¹¹⁸³ *Ibid* 1:273 Title X Articles 83, 84 and 85.

¹¹⁸⁴ *Ibid* 1:273 Title X Articles 78 and 79.

¹¹⁸⁵ “Seduta IV, 5 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:121. Letter from archivist and motion of Guiccioli.

reasons: representatives were barred from serving in another capacity which might distract them from their duties as legislators; additionally, it was believed that outside workers who were selected with the full consent of the council might avoid any potential political prejudices in the compilation and publication process. On 7 Frimaire, the Council selected three renowned political minds to serve as the *redattori*: Pietro Custodi, Flaviano Massa and Melchiorre Gioia, all foreign-born Italian journalists with political ties to the progressive rationalists in the *Gran Consiglio*.¹¹⁸⁶

There was often criticism by members of the *Gran Consiglio* over the veracity of the *redattori*'s transcriptions of the secretaries minutes.¹¹⁸⁷ It should be noted again that the mandate of the representative was not to his constituency, but his nation, a measure taken to avoid the problems of early revolution in France where deputies were bound to the wills of their local electors.¹¹⁸⁸ Along with the constitutional Article 52, the editing of the *Gran Consiglio* minutes was meant to mimic concurrent French practices which sought to minimize the effect which the provincial public had on representative decision making, and serving to augment positive public opinion.¹¹⁸⁹ Once edited, the minutes would be published in the *Redattore del Gran Consiglio* by the national press under the care of the editor Veladini. This journal would be distributed first to members of the council and then sold to the public.

Public access to the *Redattore* and the *processi verbali* became an instant point of political division, not only within the *Gran Consiglio* – who in fact remained largely united in their efforts to get the *processi verbali* and law projects published – but between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory who was originally charged with their reproduction in printed form. The initial printing of the *processi verbali* at the end of Frimaire was late, a situation which the Directory explained away as internal accidents and mistakes to be expected due to inexperience, it being the first edition.¹¹⁹⁰ The progressive radical Giuseppe Lattanzi found this excuse unacceptable, believing

¹¹⁸⁶ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 1:147. Nomination of the *redattori*; the word “*redattori*” with a lower case “r” indicates the title of editors of the *processi verbali* and is different than “*Redattore*” with a capital “R” the title of the 1798 publication of the *processi verbali*; Interestingly all three were foreign born Italians (not from the Cisalpine Republic). The ability to hire foreign political minds was approved by the Council just before the nomination took place, indicating that the intention to hire these three had already been in place before the vote.

¹¹⁸⁷ “Seduta LXII, 30 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:92–93. Accusation against the *redattori* and motion to move them to the tribune to allow for better transcriptions.

¹¹⁸⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 234–35.

¹¹⁸⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 52.

¹¹⁹⁰ “Seduta XXXVII, 6 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:535. Intervention of Alborghetti against Lattanzi.

that a recent rejection of a resolution by the *Seniori* was due to the lack of available debate materials which could have been provided by the *processi verbali*. He recommended that the *Gran Consiglio* “requisition” a number of printing presses to speed along the process of getting the *Redattore* to the public.¹¹⁹¹ This proposition was rejected, even by likeminded progressive radicals like Tadini and Alborghetti, who felt the implicit violence in Lattanzi’s proposal was a dangerous precedent to set, especially so early in the life of the legislature. Lattanzi responded that his only intention was to make their debates more accessible to the public, and he hoped to avoid using the term requisition in the “strictest French sense”, implying distance from Jacobin tactics of the past.¹¹⁹² This was however the event which began the turbulent fight over control of the national press mentioned above.

Once the *Gran Consiglio* took control of its own branch of the national press at the end of Pluviôse, it seems that printing of the *Redattore* became more regular as criticisms for its tardiness did not reappear again until the summer of 1798. That said, the turbulent months of Ventôse, Germinal and even into the peace of Floréal, there was an increase in the use of secret commissions which prohibited the publication of minutes from these sessions. While the publication of secret sessions remained prohibited for constitutional reasons it did demonstrate the growing rift between those more democratic members who sought greater public engagement and feedback, even for more politically fragile cases, and those who trended more towards the republican side and hoped for greater public exclusion and representative liberty according to the norms of the French Republic.¹¹⁹³

This problem similarly manifested itself in the reporting of debates by outside journals and reports. While all members strongly supported liberty of the press, those more republican members such as the originalist and neutral rationalists and moderates believed that the right to report particularly delicate political topics, such as public finances, corruption or alarmism, needed to be the exclusive responsibility of the *Redattore*.¹¹⁹⁴ They hoped to avoid a populist resistance, much like the French constitutional framers in 1795 had hoped to allow for the discussion of

¹¹⁹¹ *Ibid* 1:534-35. Lattanzi’s denunciation of the national press and proposition for requisition.

¹¹⁹² *Ibid* 1:535. LAttanzi response to criticism of Tadini.

¹¹⁹³ “Seduta L, 19 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:723. Discourse and motion of Mingarelli .

¹¹⁹⁴ “Seduta LXVIII, 5 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:177. Discourse of Savonarola banning private journals from reporting on the finance plan and its debates.

difficult topics without popular intervention. By contrast more democratic elements like the neutral and progressive radicals and progressive rationalist, felt that outside journals provided the greatest access to public opinion. Similarly, public expertise might prove useful, as many of the greatest, economic, administrative, and military minds were not among the members of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹¹⁹⁵ Unfortunately as the months progressed, the political turbulence of spring 1798 saw an increase in the number of members willing to censor outside sources, particularly regarding the Military and Commercial treaties with France.¹¹⁹⁶ In Prairial, the *Gran Consiglio* began to see itself and the *Redattore* as the ultimate source of information regarding debates, and sought to make itself competitive in the press market across the Republic, especially as more left-wing newspapers and journals had found themselves increasingly censored by the new French ambassador Trouvé and his allies in the ministry and Directory.¹¹⁹⁷ Unfortunately, following the conflict of Messidor between the *Gran Consiglio* and the combined forces of the Executive and Trouvé, which led to the mass vacating by progressive and radical members of the *Gran Consiglio* (examined in Chapters VIII and XI), the remaining democratic leaning representatives found that the *Redattore* had lost its place as the seat of public accountability.¹¹⁹⁸

The internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio* – together with the regulations of the constitution and the resolutions passed after 16 Frimaire – help in understanding the developmental progression of procedure and accountability as they relate to the political and legislative cultures of the Cisalpine republic. Moreover, these texts offer a clearer picture of the structures within which political, ideological, and legislative movements took place. Thus, it seems that politics and

¹¹⁹⁵ *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 2:178. Response of Lattanzi against Savonarola.

¹¹⁹⁶ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La République Cisalpine.” 295–97.

¹¹⁹⁷ “Seduta CCII, 23 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:410-11 Motion of Gambari to set a competitive price and seek to distribute the *Redattore* across the republic particularly in remote areas effected by counter-revolutionary activity; It is known for example, that of the newspapers censored in the late spring and summer of 1798, there included all of the journals of the *redattori* themselves. Melchiorre Gioia, who had resigned his position in early spring prior, found himself jailed for sedition on numerous occasions for speaking out against the growing French political presence, a sentiment shared by progressives radicals and rationalists and neutral radicals by Messidor Year VI; Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*, 285.

¹¹⁹⁸ “Seduta CCLV, 16 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:629–30 Motion of Gambari to reform the *Redattore*.

legislative actions taken by representatives, especially within the first three months of the existence of the *Gran Consiglio*, have a direct connection to motivations of accountability and procedure.

Accountability is more tied to political culture, demonstrated by the growing divisions between political ideological proto-factions which often arose from debates related to both internal and external accountability such as secret committee sessions, behavioral issues, the national press, or representative presence. The political aspects of these debates became most apparent in the sanctions which were dealt to transgressors of the regulations of accountability. Censorship, expulsion or even imprisonment were sanctions reserved for those who breached, not the procedures of law-making, but the ideas of revolutionary accountability – transgression which included impersonation (the Giudice affair), corruption (the Oliva affair), absence (the Oliva affair) and sedition (the Fabris and Fantaguzzi affair). Thus, the greatest crimes which representatives could commit were perceived or actual attempts to circumvent accountability to the nation and acts of self-interest. Interestingly accountability did not mean a strict-reverence for public opinion – nor in reality an acknowledgement of the same – but a continued effort to preserve the general will of the nation. This was of course the full intention behind the original framing of the French Constitution of Year III and the *réglement* of 1795 as theorized by Sieyès and the Thermidorians. However, it also became a flash point of political division between the ideological factions of the *Gran Consiglio* of 1798. While originalists tended to favor the ideas proposed by the French system, progressives – who were often accused, particularly towards the end of the period, of going against the will of the nation – held to more democratic views which saw a greater inclusion of public opinion in the legislative prerogatives of the Council, thus expanding the definition of national general will to also include greater public involvement and acknowledgement of public opinion.

As political culture was influenced and constructed around ideas of accountability, the legislative culture of the *Gran Consiglio* was constructed around the procedures which underlined the legislative process of the Cisalpine Republic. Though perhaps not as thematically dramatic as the political realm and the questions of power and accountability, procedure was the structural base for all political, ideological, and philosophical realization in the post-Thermidorian revolution of the Directorial period. The procedures of legislative production exhibited in the internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio* and the Cisalpine Constitution are still present in the parliamentary practices

of the modern Italian Republic. Procedure was the vehicle by which legislative culture was formatted and included a cultural specificity which made it uniquely Cisalpine in nature, a basis for future Italian legislative cultural developments into the imperial period and early nineteenth century origins of the Risorgimento. Though it lacked the conflict of action and reaction seen in the debates on accountability, procedure kept the wheels of government churning, even when politics threatened to grind it to a standstill. Despite political threats, external setbacks or even military intervention and coups, the legislative machine remained intact thanks to the procedural innovations of the Constitution of Year III and the concepts of rationalized and disciplined ritualization it imbued into the legislative process. However, when these procedural mechanisms are broken down – as occurred in the Cisalpine Republic beginning in the summer of 1798 and the institutionalization of a new Constitution by Trouvé – the entire body politique of the Republic collapsed including the legislative, juridical, executive, and administrative functions. Hence the great strength of the Cisalpine Republic, especially in the months of Frimaire to Messidor Year VI, was its ability to formulate and institutionalize the procedural skeleton of the legislature based on the French model but adapted to the Cisalpine condition.

The third and final part of this dissertation takes the aspects of political and legislative culture defined in Part II – power and authority, commissions and legislation, accountability, and procedures – and examines the effect they had on the external connections and relationships. As such, Part III will look at the interactions of between the *Gran Consiglio* and the other parts of the Cisalpine government structure which includes the Cisalpine Directory, other institutions in the Cisalpine politics (The *Seniori*, The Catholic Church, and local departmental administration) and finally with both the civil and military authorities of the French Republic. By using the information regarding the political, personal and statistical backgrounds of the individual representatives from Part I and the generalized information about the political and legislative cultures of the Council as whole from Part II, this ultimate analysis will examine the level of success which the *Gran Consiglio* saw in pushing the ideas and structures which it had created to the forefront of Cisalpine government.

Part III

The *Gran*

***Consiglio* and**

the Republican

Project of 1798

Chapter VIII

The Cisalpine Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*:

Executive vs legislative authority

Though the *Gran Consiglio* had a new and complex system of internal functions progressed of legislative development of the Cisalpine Republic in 1797-1798, it is in fact the external relationships which the representatives cultivated with outside institutions, foreign and domestic, which truly defined their influence over Cisalpine political culture. None were more complex, more integral to Cisalpine society and more challenging to maintain than with the Cisalpine Directory, and with the executive branch of the Cisalpine state more broadly. While perhaps not the most dramatic relationship of the Council's ten-month it was perhaps the most influential in that the patterns of legislation which came out of the *Gran Consiglio* – especially in the months of Pluviôse to Prairial – were often direct results of this relationship with executive authority.

Authority as a concept was already briefly explored in Chapter V, particularly in how it pertains to institutional power. Where power is defined as an individual's ability to influence the behavior, actions or attitudes of others, authority applies this capacity at an institutional level, above the capacity of any single personal will.¹¹⁹⁹ Authority delivers to the institution a high degree of "imperative control", according to Weber's definition, which demonstrates the probability that a command will be followed; greater authority provides greater group discipline and in turn leads to high imperative control.¹²⁰⁰ The individual – or individuals in the case of representative legislatures – which hold the power (personal, positional or legislative) to direct, augment or even monopolize this authority within a society will therefore be omnipotent in deciding the destiny of

¹¹⁹⁹ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 15; Cummings, "The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures," 5.

¹²⁰⁰ Weber, *On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers*, 16–17.

the society. The relationship between executive and legislative authority, personified by the relationship between the Cisalpine Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*, is defined by a paradox in which both branches sought to simultaneously defend and usurp the authority of the other as defined by the Constitution of Year III.

This paradoxical relationship was not new nor unique to the Cisalpine Republic, nor the republican system as established in the Constitution of Year III. From the onset of the Revolution in 1789, the primary disagreement at the root of most conflicts regarded the balance of authority between the executive and legislative branches. While the Constitution of 1791 seemed to place them on an equal playing field, some at the time argued that it favored the executive, while others insisted that it favored the legislative. In the end the former group won out, and under the Convention the authority came to rest almost exclusively in the hands of the legislative branch.¹²⁰¹ The restructuring of the republican system following the events of Thermidor 1794 saw a new means of looking at the formation of executive and legislative authority. To begin with, both forms of authority came to be divided, the executive between the new five-member Directory, and the legislative into the bicameral assemblies.¹²⁰² This division helped to provide necessary checks and balances within the authority of each branch which would lead to stability and productivity, without the potential for extremist politics to uproot the system through the wielding of personal power (as had happened in both the *ancien regime* and the Mountain led Convention of 1793-1794). Secondly, between themselves, both the legislative and the executive divided their authority over the many sectors of government, in order to guarantee that neither could gain authority over the other.¹²⁰³

However, while this idealized form of division of authority seemed to almost guarantee mutually beneficial coexistence, the reality of revolutionary politics made it an impossibility. Personal opinions on government, political philosophy, administration, and social revolution – in addition to personal hopes for power and influence – meant that the authority of both branches was under constant threat and pressure from those seeking to gain imperative control over the entire nation. Instead of a peaceful coexistence, the division of authority – marked by what Troper has called the equilibrium of powers – was instead defined by a system of constant challenges and

¹²⁰¹ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 82.

¹²⁰² Morabito, *Il commando negato*, 116.

¹²⁰³ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 81–82.

conflicts between the branches, with each branch consistently looking for the transgressions of the other and immediately attempting to rectify these transgressions with sanctions. While in a certain sense this did help to maintain the equilibrium of powers, it forced both branches to become preoccupied with this game of cat-and-mouse, rather than advancing the will of the nation. This was as true for the Cisalpine Republic as it was for the French Republic.

The Directory which led the Cisalpine executive branch was made up of five-members – as with the French version of the institution – which simultaneously denied the right of imperative control to any single person, while guaranteeing that political squabbling would not intervene with state function.¹²⁰⁴ The original iteration of the Directory nominated by Bonaparte in Messidor Year V (July 1797) was Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni, Marco Alessandri, Pietro Moscati, Giovanni Paradisi, Giovanni Costabili.¹²⁰⁵ Serbelloni had been the Duke of San Gabrio, and came from a vassal family who served under the Gonzaga in the old Duchy of Milan.¹²⁰⁶ Educated by Giuseppe Parini along with other important republicans like Giuseppe Necchi d’Aquila, he had renounced his titles to join the republican cause when Bonaparte had entered the Duchy in 1796 and had become a powerful ally of the General in Milan in the lead up to the declaration of the Cisalpine Republic in Messidor Year V. On 26 Brumaire Serbelloni was dismissed from the Directory to take up the charge of cisalpine *ambasciatore straordinario* to the French Republic and was replaced by Giovanni Battista Savoldi, a republican from Lonato who had been involved in the Brescian uprising in 1797 and who had been serving as a member of the *comitati riuniti* to this point.¹²⁰⁷ Alessandri – who was perhaps the most well-known of the Directors during the *Gran Consiglio* period of the Cisalpine Republic since he sat as the president of the Directory for most of the early months of the Legislature’s existence – was an established patriot before becoming Director. Having come from a noble family in Bergamo he was instrumental in the organization of the Bergamasco Revolt and subsequent Republic in the Spring of 1797.¹²⁰⁸ He was also a close friend to other republican nobles like Serbelloni, Melzi d’Irill and Giuseppe Fenaroli. Moscati was the son of a prominent Milanese surgeon; following his father’s career path he eventually became

¹²⁰⁴ Morabito, *Il commando negato*, 117.

¹²⁰⁵ “Proclama BONAPARTE Generale in Capo dell’Armata d’Italia... Nontebello preso Milano 11 Missidoro anno V”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 63.

¹²⁰⁶ Riva, “SERBELLONI, Gian Galeazzo.”

¹²⁰⁷ “Proclama del Direttorio Esecutivo”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:48.

¹²⁰⁸ “ALESSANDRI, Marco.”

one of the most respected medical professionals in the Duchy, securing a place as the Chair of Medicine at the University of Pavia.¹²⁰⁹ His renown in the administration of public health in Austrian Milan and his disdain for Austrian discrimination in medical treatment of the common man made him a popular figure among republicans. Like Moscati, Paradisi came from an intellectual background, son of a minor Modenese count from Reggio and professor at the university of that city.¹²¹⁰ Paradisi himself became a University Professor in Reggio after studying under Giovanni Battista Venturi (the future *Gran Consiglio* representative), where he became a prominent republican figure in the lead up to the French invasion. The final Director, Constabili, had perhaps the most profound republican resumé after Alessandri. Born into poverty and orphaned young in Ferrara, he became one of the leading administrators in that city under the Papal government and a devout republican, having served as a leading member of the Cispadane Congresses in 1797 before becoming Director.¹²¹¹

The members of the Directory, all nominated by Bonaparte before the activation of the Legislative Assemblies on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797), brought to the institution a republican prestige. All had reputations for being highly educated gentlemen with a strong belief in the republican project which had been brought to Italy. However, despite their vastly different professional, demographic and political backgrounds, they all tended to favor a form of republicanism which centered around a political republican elite. For this reason, they tended to direct the executive branch as great patrons of the Cisalpine Republic, guaranteeing the success of the greater republican project imposed by the French, by furnishing the tools – be they military, financial, diplomatic or administrative – which the other branches could use to build the new nation.¹²¹² Along with the ministry which they ran, the Directory became the symbol of republican supremacy, particularly from Messidor V to Frimaire Year VI, when the executive branch was the supreme authority of the Republic as the *comitati riuniti* (which was serving as the legislative branch in this period) focused on the construction of the legislative branch. However, this supremacy in the second half of 1797 brought with it an assumption, particularly on the part of the executive ministry, that this made the executive branch omnipotent, a sentiment which would lead

¹²⁰⁹ Zocchi, “Moscati, Pietro.”

¹²¹⁰ Rossi, “Paradisi, Giovanni.”

¹²¹¹ Venturi, “Costabili Containi, Giovanni Battista.”

¹²¹² Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 111.

to conflict and crisis with other branches of Cisalpine Government throughout the first half of 1798, in particular the *Gran Consiglio*. This rise in tension would eventually lead to a great constitutional crisis of authority in Messidor Year VI in which the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* would accuse each other of usurpation. Both institutions would work to undermine the authority of the other, not in an effort to bring down the republican system, but in order to save it and the idea of an equilibrium of powers, believing the other to be incapable of safeguarding the very basic elements of republican government. This crisis would prove the undoing of the *Gran Consiglio* and would be a contributing factor in the 14 Fructidor Coup brought about by French ambassador Claude-Joseph Trouvé.

This chapter will examine the complex history of the tension which existed between the executive and legislative branches of the Cisalpine Republican national government, by studying the conflicts, challenges and crisis of authority which took place between the Cisalpine Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*. The examination will begin by looking at the challenges to power which took place in an effort to maintain the equilibrium of powers, with a particular focus on the three major sectors of authority which both the legislative and executive branches shared: finance, military and foreign affairs. The following section will examine the more nuanced conflicts between the executive ministry and the *Gran Consiglio*. This section will look at the relationship of the ministry with both the legislative branch and the Directory itself, ultimately looking at the conflicts of two ministers in particular, Martin de Vignolle, Minister of War and Giuseppe Ragazzi, Minister of Interior Affairs. The final section of the study will look in depth at the most important crisis of authority to take place between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* – the Messidor Crisis – by examining its causes, the sequence of events during the two weeks of crisis and ending with the complex political fallout in the month of Thermidor Year VI.

Equilibrium of Powers

One of the more notable concepts to come out of the Age of Revolutions was the idea of separation of powers. The old aristocratic concepts of Montesquieu from 1748, which assigned particular rights, duties and privileges to the various functions and institutions of the state, had survived through the various iterations of revolution to occur throughout the Atlantic world in the

second half of the eighteenth century.¹²¹³ These concepts had of course been adapted or even rewritten as the institutions and ideas which controlled revolutionary life – particularly after 1789 and then again after 10 August 1792 – changed extensively and organized into a more concentrated yet simultaneously more universal system of government. When the legislative branch was created in 1789, it separated from the executive monarchy the right to legislation, clearly dividing the rights, duties, and privileges of those who make the laws from those who enact, administer, and enforce them. The 1791 Constitution guaranteed the rights of the legislative while limiting those of the executive, in a way which provided a measure of equality in the legislative decision-making process.¹²¹⁴ Yet the coming of the French Republic saw that these checks on the executives and guarantees for the legislative allowed the former to be dominated by the latter. By the time of the events of Thermidor Year II, it became clear that the separation of powers needed guarantees and limits for both parts, one which placed the executive and the legislative in a state of constant competition which would lead both to checks on authority and a push for innovation.

This balance of guarantees and limits between the branches is what Michel Troper has called the “equilibrium of powers”.¹²¹⁵ Unlike the concept of separation of powers, in which the power within each branch is relegated to particular duties over which they are given total authority, the equilibrium of powers also guarantees that these duties themselves are shared by all branches, making all innovation in governance a collaborative event. The Constitution of Year III which the Cisalpine Republic inherited in 1797, went to painstaking lengths to enact this equilibrium.¹²¹⁶ In almost every facet of Cisalpine society, there existed a function to be carried out by the executive as well as by the legislative. Many of these duties were explicitly laid out in the Constitution itself, between Titles V and VI which dictated the structures and functions of both the legislative and executive branches.¹²¹⁷ Yet while the Constitution guaranteed that neither branch could function without the other, it also set up a conflicting relationship between the legislative and the executive. Which led to a number of individual challenges to the equilibrium of powers by both branches in their capacity to guide the institutional and political direction of the Cisalpine Republic.

¹²¹³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 44.

¹²¹⁴ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 76.

¹²¹⁵ Troper, 81.

¹²¹⁶ Troper, 82.

¹²¹⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Titles V and VI.

Presented here are perhaps the three most visible challenges which took place in the period following the activation of the legislative assemblies in Frimaire Year VI (November 1797) in the sectors of financial, military and foreign affairs. While there were of course other challenges which took place between these two bodies, such as the establishment of the departmental and municipal administrations, these three challenges highlighted here involved almost exclusively the executive and legislative branches, represented by the Directory – charged with the direction and execution of these three sectors – and the *Gran Consiglio* – charged with the funding and organization.

Finance

The financial woes of the Cisalpine Republic were often blamed for the political and social collapse of the Republic and have been cited as the fundamental weakness to the Cisalpine government. Carlo Zaghi's 1992 book *Il Direttorio francese e la Repubblica cisalpina* in particular provides a more recent in-depth study of the financial problems which plagued the Cisalpine Republic.¹²¹⁸ This study will not repeat the numerous examinations of the Cisalpine financial situations as its scope is limited to the construction of legislative and political culture. However, as a major part of the functional relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory, the financial operations which brought these institutions into both accord and conflict will be examined.

The equilibrium of powers under the Constitution of Year III had a direct effect on the management of national resources, in particular the management of finances for the Cisalpine Republic.¹²¹⁹ The framers of the 1795 constitution hoped to avoid the rigid separation of powers which had been so earnestly called for in the various phases of the revolution, but in particular after 1792.¹²²⁰ Breakdowns in communication, political rivalry and a general lack of governance

¹²¹⁸ Zaghi *Il Direttorio francese e la Repubblica cisalpina* 1992, 183-219 While elaborately detailed, a word of caution for this financial analysis presented by Zaghi. The personal nationalist politics of Zaghi can be seen on full display in what is perhaps his most outwardly anti-French examination of Cisalpine finances. As with most twentieth century histories, Zaghi places the blame of financial strain squarely on the shoulders of the French and their forced loans. He similarly attributes much of the continued inability to manage these debts to the general incompetence of the Directory and ministry, and the argumentative nature of the Councils whom he paints as indecisive and combative in the face of an incompetent executive and administration. The majority of his report only focuses on the conflict which appears in the summer of 1798 and which can be traced back, not necessarily to financial strain (although that was also a present and clear aggravation between the legislative and executive branches), but to the political and legislative conflicts brought about by the election of a new Director and the introduction of Trouvé into Cisalpine politics.

¹²¹⁹ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 81.

¹²²⁰ Troper, 78.

all contributed to the Thermidorians hesitancy, particularly in the financial realm, to separate the functions of the branches of government. Calling back to Part II on the importance of power and accountability in legislation, there was no greater direct power in the formation of a nation than over the monetary resources. Thus, the equilibrium of powers which Troper proposes was at the heart of the Constitution of Year III is perhaps even more powerfully felt in the realm of national finances.¹²²¹

The Directory was charged with the management of the national funds, the execution of financial decisions and the supervision of the National Treasury.¹²²² However the Legislature was charged with the establishment of contributions, the regulation of the national budget and had access to all treasury records on spending, which could be used to regulate the sources of national funding.¹²²³ While the nomination of the Minister of Finance and the Commissioner of the Treasury came from the legislature, both were directly answerable to the Directory as their primary proctors; however both branches had the capacity to impeach these officers.¹²²⁴ With regard to the monetary system of the Cisalpine republic, here too there was an apparent mixing of powers which sets a strict system of checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches. The sole right to regulate the manufacturing of all official coinage and money, including the naming, valuation, weight, and type, was exclusively held by the legislature.¹²²⁵ However the physical creation of coins and money, to include the quantity and quality, as well as the inspection process, was put under the care of the Executive Directory.¹²²⁶

At the end of Floréal, Mascheroni put forth a plan which would eradicate the use of *ancien regime* coinage being used in the Republic and create a new cisalpine currency based on the French model.¹²²⁷ Using the new metric system which Mascheroni himself had helped to develop, the *Gran Consiglio* hoped that the new coinage would help with the instability of currency and value of the national goods which were to be sold to help the ever present financial crisis, as had happened in France (or so he believed). His motion was backed by a number of important

¹²²¹ Troper, 83.

¹²²² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Articles 304 and 313.

¹²²³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Articles 301-304.

¹²²⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Article 314.

¹²²⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Article 311.

¹²²⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Article 312.

¹²²⁷ “Seduta CLXXIV, 23 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:623–27 Report of Mascheroni.

representatives with backgrounds in mathematics and finance like Venturi, Bossi and Massari, who would join him in forming a commission. This commission would present a project establishing the ways in which the monetary system would be created.¹²²⁸ Once the project had been approved in mid-Messidor the Directory, however found itself in difficulty. The presence of older currencies, and their continued circulation made the substitution of newer currencies impossible to replace them.¹²²⁹ The Directory was unable to carry out the function afforded it constitutionally, however the new currency was eventually put into circulation. This unfortunately became lost within the greater crisis of authority which took place towards the end of Messidor and Thermidor.

The financial crisis had begun to rear its ugly head as far back as Brumaire Year VI. The young Cisalpine Republic led principally by an executive directory and administration between the months of Messidor Year V and Frimaire Year VI (roughly July to November 1797), which had to contend with growing expenses for the formation of the new republican institutions, but almost no way to replenish the national treasury.¹²³⁰ Simultaneously, the French civil administrator Haller had been pressing the issue of providing funds for the continued provisioning of the *Armée d'Italie* within the confines of the Cisalpine Republic – funds which saw the Directory paying millions towards the French.¹²³¹ Theoretically the hemorrhaging of Cisalpine funds would be stopped with the activation of the *Gran Consiglio*, who could raise funds through various means – most likely taxation and/or the selling of public goods.

¹²²⁸ “Seduta CCXI, 3 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CCXXIII, 13 messidoro anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:604–6, 853–55. Presentation of plan for money and coinage; presentation of second plan following the rejection by the *Seniori*.

¹²²⁹ “Seduta CCXXII, 12 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:825–27, 828–35. Letter from the Directory explaining the problem of foreign currencies in circulation, particularly currency from the former Papal states, now banned in the Roman Republic, which were circulating in the cities of the former Papacy; letters from the Minister of the Interior as well as the municipalities and departments along the Po where these currencies were being used continually.

¹²³⁰ “Milano 2 Brumitero [Brumaio] Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano, In Nome della Repubblica Cisalpina Il Commissario della Tesoreria Nazionale al Directorio Esecutivo”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493,” fol. Directorio Esecutivo 1797 letter, 23 October 1797, Milan.

¹²³¹ “Al Directorio Esecutivo, Melzi 14 Brumale [Brumaio], An^o6.^oR^o”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1,” fol. Brumaio Anno VI repubblicano letter, 4 November 1797; “Au nom de la République Française, Milan le 4 Frimaire an VI de la République Française une & indivisible, Haller administrateur des Contributions & Finances d’Italie Au Directoire Executif [français]”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1,” Frimale Anno VI repubblicano letter, 24 November 1797, Milan.

In fact, early communications between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* show that from the onset this relationship was tense. A 12 Frimaire message insisted that according to the laws established by the *Comitati Riuniti* on 21 Brumaire, a series of customs points were to be established at the borders of the republic and duties raised on imports and exports immediately.¹²³² However, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, particularly the more democratic elements like the progressive radicals and rationalists and neutral radicals, were hesitant to take these measures.¹²³³ Some, like Dandolo, Federici and Latuada, felt these duties would put undue financial strain on the common merchants and farmers who would pay the brunt of the fees. Others like La Hoz believed that the current budget already provided for the needs of the nation, it just required time for accumulation. Their opposition on the more republican wing felt that the financial situation was too dire to wait for the budget to balance, and that the people needed to help provide funds in order to enjoy the blessings of republican government. The Directory for their part insisted upon the importance of placing into action legislation which would help to exploit the growing economy in border cities like those of the Emilia (in particular Ferrara and Bologna) and Brescia, which had seen a boost in commerce since their separation from the ex-Papal States and ex-Veneto respectively.¹²³⁴ Though the matter was resolved on 23 Frimaire with the creation of the customs duties, the challenge to the Directory by the democratic elements of the *Gran Consiglio* left an early cloud of animosity between the two bodies from the onset, particularly regarding the right to financial decision making.¹²³⁵

As the Cisalpine Republic began to grow and spending increased into the months of Nîvose and Pluviôse (see Chapter X), it became apparent that the original budget was woefully underfunded. Despite claims from later historians like Zaghi, it seems that there was a general consensus between the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* (including progressives and radicals)

¹²³² “Seduta XII, 12 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:212. Message from Directory regarding the law of 21 Brumaire and attachment of the law with Declaration by French authorities of the erection of customs posts at the borders of the Cisalpine Republic.

¹²³³ “Seduta XIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:217–219 Debate on the raising of customs duties at the border.

¹²³⁴ “Seduta XV, 15 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:249–51. Letter from the Directory to the Gran Consiglio.

¹²³⁵ “Seduta XXIV, 23 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:352–53 Complaint of the Directory and resolution on customs duties by the Commission examining the law of 21 Brumaire.

and the Directory, that the situation of public finances was getting out of hand.¹²³⁶ The Finance Commission of the *Gran Consiglio* urged the raising of funds through the use of customs duties, taxes, the erecting of a national lottery and finally the selling of national goods.¹²³⁷ However, by the beginning of Pluviôse it was clear that the Council could not raise funds as fast as the administrative machine was spending them. Added to this was a growing panic over the costs necessary for the payments towards the French. Many, like Dandolo and Reina, viewed any overdue debts towards the *Armée* or reparations towards the French State as a danger to the stability of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship.¹²³⁸ However, they pushed blame on the Directory, who they noted as being in control of the funds necessary for the payment of these debts, despite the fact the legislature had not yet come to a consensus on how to raise them. It was around this time that the tensions over the national press and the Directory's seeming indifference towards the implementation of a republican political and social structure began to further separate the two bodies. One of the more critical aspects of this conflict was the accusation of the *Gran Consiglio* against the Directory of not wanting to publish the finance plan proposed by the Finance Commission in Nîvose.¹²³⁹

Throughout Nîvose and Pluviôse the Directory and its ministers published a series of proclamations which detailed the payments and reimbursements incurred in the costs of setting up municipal and departmental administrations, according to the structures established by the Legislature.¹²⁴⁰ The Directory also returned blame for public debt on the legislature itself, making

¹²³⁶ Zaghi 1992, p. 185 Zaghi also incorrectly claims that the brunt of the costs came from the imposition of the costs for sustaining the French military on the Cisalpine Republic as well as the reparation taxes established after Campo Formio. While these certainly did not help the situation, its more likely due to the institutionalization of the departmental and municipal administrations, as well as the early judiciary which had the greatest costs. "In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina, Milano li 7 Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano, LAmministrazione Centrale del Dipartimento d'Olona al Corpo Legislativo ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 27/28 n.d. letter, January 1798, Milan; This letter in particular demonstrates the inability of the budget to fund all projects being proposed both locally, departmentally and nationally in the Cisalpine Republic. In this instance the Administration of the Department of Olona, the district based out of Milan, was desperately in need of funds to pay public workers, funds not considered in the initial budget of the *Comitati riuniti*

¹²³⁷ "Seduta XXXIII, 2 nevoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:477–81. Report of the Financial commission by Aquila.

¹²³⁸ "Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:113. Motion of Dandolo encouraging the Directory to immediately pay off any debts to France.

¹²³⁹ "Seduta LXV, primo di 2 il 3 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:132. Message from the *Gran Consiglio* to the Directory..

¹²⁴⁰ "Milano, 8 Nevoso anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano, Il Ministro degli affari interni all'Ispettore Centrale della Contabilità", "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 494" letter, 28 December 1798, Milan; This letter from the Minister of Internal affairs details the work of the Directory in the last months of 1797 and their efforts to pay off national debts incurred before and after the activation of the legislature in November. More importantly it

accusation of high spending on behalf of the legislative branch, whose funds were monitored by the Directory.¹²⁴¹ However, the Directory continued to preoccupy itself with the administration of French troops, which they viewed as the largest and most dangerous cost to the Republic in this period (see Chapter XI). In Ventose, the Directory sent a detailed explanation of the total funds of which the *Armée* had cost the Cisalpine Treasury in the months of Nîvose and Pluviôse.¹²⁴² Included in this letter were examples of what could occur if the costs were not met, citing the French troop uprisings in Mantua, Peschiera and Salò. The Directory blamed these uprisings on the fact that the Republic was only able to afford 863,000 *scudi* of a 1,600,000 *scudi* administration cost, considering that the administrative and legislative spending was over 15,000,000 *scudi*. There was a greater need for drastic measures, which the Directory believed could only be through a “forced loan” which would tax the Cisalpine people at a high rate but would also necessarily maintain the high costs of administering both the French *Armée* and the Cisalpine Republic.

The initial reaction of the *Gran Consiglio*, while perhaps not positive, did acquiesce to the fact that the maintenance fees for the French military needed to be properly handled, as it was with this force that the Cisalpine Republic remained safe from external and internal counter-revolutionary enemies. On 15 Ventose the *Gran Consiglio* proposed a resolution which would have provided a sum of over 36 million *scudi* by the end of Nîvose of the following year, which followed current projections for spending for the rest of 1798.¹²⁴³ The plan would apply the “forced loans” in a way similar to an obligatory bond. The bond would be guaranteed by the funds raised through the sale of public goods. However, around the time that this motion was being put forward, the outside press had become preoccupied with the Military and Commercial Treaties with the French Republic. Many radical outside commentators in Milan opposed a particular aspect of these treaties which increased the fees due to the French state both as a form of reparations for the “liberation” of the Cisalpine territory from anti-revolutionary forces, and for the maintenance of

seems to attack a motion by the Finance Commission which placed the blame for these debts on wanton spending by the Directory in the opening months of the Republic..

¹²⁴¹ “Seduta XC, 28 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:585–86. Letter from the Directory regarding funds requested by the Inspector of the Chamber for the *Gran Consiglio* for the reimbursement of Council employees..

¹²⁴² “Seduta XCVI, 4 ventose anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:726. Message from the Directory detailing spending on the administration and support of French troops in Cisalpine territory..

¹²⁴³ “Seduta CVII, 15 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:185–88.

the standing French army in cisalpine Territory.¹²⁴⁴ The most radical representatives such as Giovio or Zani sided with the radical Cisalpine press in their assessment that the French Republic was using exploitive means towards the Cisalpine Republic with no interest in the Republican project, and accused the Cisalpine Directory of turning a blind eye to this abuse.¹²⁴⁵ Yet, the majority of the *Gran Consiglio*, though troubled by the increased cost, agreed with the Directory that the requests according to the treaties needed to be met so as not to risk the disintegration of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship.¹²⁴⁶

This insistence on the maintenance of friendly contacts with the French put a strain however, on the relationship between the Directory and *Gran Consiglio*. Already back in early Nivose when the Finance Commission had presented one of its first reports on raising funds for the nation, the sale of national goods proved a point of contention, being set aside for a secret committee session on 2 Nivose.¹²⁴⁷ The resolution which came from this secret session put seized lands, like those from the suppressed Catholic abbeys and convents or from aristocrats who had fled the Republic before the French invasion in 1796, at the disposal of the Directory to sell in order to fund the formation of the new state and the administration of the *Armée*. It similarly allowed the Directory to make a list of potential properties or other goods which could be seized for sale to raise funds for the national treasury.

¹²⁴⁴ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.” 295–96; “Trattati di Alleanza” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2,” fol. Ventose VI published pamphlet, 1798, Milan.

¹²⁴⁵ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:370–71. Extract from the secret committee session of 24 Ventose regarding the deliberations on the treaties with France, in which Giovio criticizes the treaties, the French Republic and the Cisalpine Directory.

¹²⁴⁶ Montalcini and Alberti, 3:371–77. Excerpt from the secret committee session of 24 Ventose in which dandolo makes a long discourse in favor of the treaties and the French position; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:334, 347–54. While Zaghi points to the weakness of the Cisalpine Directory in the face of the French, and the conflict between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory which seemed to be exacerbated by the arguments over the treaty, his argument ignores some clear facts. The majority of the *Gran Consiglio* in fact supported the treaty, and those arguments made within the council against its passage were less economic and more along the lines of national sovereignty and liberty. It is true that the majority were not thrilled about the costs which the treaty would incur, and his assessment that these were thrown back in the face of the Cisalpine Directory by those in Paris is also valid. However, the Directory actually found greater allies in the *Gran Consiglio* who felt that the counter-revolutionary forces which they perceived to exist in the *Seniori* were using the treaties to drive a wedge in the good relations between the two republics, and that the situation was not as dire as a radical press aide it seem. More importantly losing the French meant the potential for external invasion which the Cisalpine Republic would not survive. Thus the final support for the treaty was less due to Directorial weakness and more due to the financial and military strain of the republic as a whole.

¹²⁴⁷ “Seduta XXXIII, 2 nevoso VI”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:481. Resolution on the sale of public goods.

However, by Pluviôse, when the more radical democratic groups (progressive rationalists and radicals and neutral radicals) took control under presidencies like Tadini, Gambari or Polfranceschi, the *Gran Consiglio* sought to take more extensive control over the sale of national goods and the allocation of these funds.¹²⁴⁸ The plans more radically seized lands and goods and sought to distribute them towards Cisalpine administration instead of towards the payment of the French *Armée*. Yet, once again the *Gran Consiglio* came to reverse their position during the turbulent months of Ventose and Germinal as it became apparent that the national goods would be the only way to pay off both the debts accruing from the growing state and those implemented by the new Military and Commercial treaties with France. However, in an effort to extend the use of this funding source, the *Gran Consiglio* passed legislation which called for a more extensive and aggressive seizure of aristocratic lands to be sold off, particularly in the peripheral zones of the Valtellina and Valchiavenna.¹²⁴⁹ These activities alarmed both the Directory and their allies in the *Seniori* and *Gran Consiglio* who felt the democratic elements of the council were overstepping their authority.¹²⁵⁰ They suspended these sequestration and sales citing laws of private property, leading progressive radicals like Piazza and Dehò to accuse the Directory of treating with aristocratic and other counter-revolutionary elements.

This undercurrent tension continued to stew below the surface following the Coup of 24 Germinal and the expansion of great plans of legislation such as the plans for the National Guard or public instruction which added to national costs. The progressive legislative program began to call on departmental executives to take control of the sale of departmental and municipal goods in order to fund more localized administrations, releasing the national government in Milan from the financial burden.¹²⁵¹ These measures were often supported by departmental administrators who

¹²⁴⁸ « Seduta LXIII, 1 piovoso anno VI repubblicano »; « Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano », « Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:107-11; 113-23; 389. Resolution to sell ecclesiastical goods as national goods for the raising of public funds; Debate between progressives and originalists regarding the use of ecclesiastic and national goods to raise public funds for the implementation of the Cisalpine administration; Discourse of Latuada and Dandolo regarding the proclamation of the Directory on the sale of national goods.

¹²⁴⁹ « CXIV, 22 ventoso anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini et Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:331-32. Message to the Directory regarding the seizure and sale of the estates tied to former *Grisons* nobility.

¹²⁵⁰ «Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano», Montalcini and Alberti, 3:369–70. Message from the Directory regarding the suspension of the sale of Griggioni land.

¹²⁵¹ "Seduta CXCVIII, primo di 2 19 pratile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:342-43, 345-47. Debate on the communal goods in Brescia reserved for the funding of public instruction in that city.

viewed the hand of the Directory at the same time heavy yet indifferent.¹²⁵² The Directory for their part opposed these measures insisting on their constitutional right to control the sale of national goods.¹²⁵³ The Directors along with their more republican allies in the legislature feared that the export of the sales of national goods at a local level would necessarily over time disintegrate national loyalties, as different departments set varying standards, not just for the price of national goods, but in the establishment of border customs and internal taxes and duties.¹²⁵⁴

The battle over the sale of national goods brought out the major flaw with the equilibrium of powers as there was no clear definition over who had the right to sell these goods; on the one hand, only the legislature could raise funds and set taxes, yet on the other, only the directory could put these plans into action and conduct the transactions. The issue of the sale of national goods remained unresolved even into the turbulent autumn months of 1798. In the final month of the *Gran Consiglio* in Thermidor Year VI, the conversation for the raising of funds had once again turned back in favor of the Directory. Their allies who had taken control of the *Gran Consiglio* in that month worked to impose a series of tax reforms at the national level which would take financial power away from departmental and private sellers.¹²⁵⁵ Again this coincided with the Crisis of power taking place in these months and as such remained largely unresolved going into the autumn of 1798 when the *Gran Consiglio* was restructured into the *Consiglio de' Juniori* by the 14 Fructidor Coup of Trouvé.

Military affairs

Interestingly, in an effort to curtail the power which both the executive Directory and Legislature might have had over the military, the framers of the Constitution allowed a certain amount of self-determination within the military structures themselves, which allowed it to rise to

¹²⁵² “Seduta CLXXXIX, 9 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:125. Report from the departments of Serio and Mela requesting release of unsold national goods in these territories so that they may be sold at the departmental level.

¹²⁵³ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:193.

¹²⁵⁴ “Seduta CXCI, 12 pratile anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927, 5:196–97. Discourses of Bianchi and Compagnoni opposing motion to allow the rights to set custom and exportation fees at a departmental level.

¹²⁵⁵ “Seduta CCLVI, 17 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CCLVIII, 19 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927, 6:653–54, 734–35. Motion by Ressi on behalf of the Finance commission for the establishment of a merchant tax; Petition from comune of Masspaga against the imposition of personal duties on individual goods of merchants and the support of Sabatti and Perseguiti (radicals) in the reforming of this law; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:204–5.

the head of government authority through the figure of Bonaparte in Brumaire Year VIII. Even in the time of the *Gran Consiglio* in 1798, the military had already become a tool for political force, being used in the uprisings of Vendemnaire Year IV and the Coup of 18 Fructidor Year V.¹²⁵⁶ Thus, for the Cisalpine case, perhaps even more so than in the circumstances of the French republic in 1795, control of military forces was an implied necessity for the executive and legislative power-holders. That said, the Cisalpine military in 1798 never became the powerful political institution like the French military had between 1795 and 1799. However, the success or failure of the executive-legislative equilibrium relied heavily on influence and control of military structures, not necessarily the constitutional authority to command it – already decidedly vague – making it relevant for this study.

The concept equilibrium of powers over military affairs – despite its antithetical reality in the Second Directory use of military power in the political arena – was central to the consolidation of revolutionary authority in the new European republican order after 1795. War was a tool by which a republic could harness revolutionary enthusiasm and give it an enemy, foreign or domestic.¹²⁵⁷ The Terror years in France had seen war on all fronts, but more importantly demonstrated the destructive effects which war would have if military authority was not shared by the branches of government. Internal stability marked external military success – and vice versa; this internal stability could only be accomplished through shared power, at least according to the framers of the 1795 French Constitution.¹²⁵⁸ By allowing the legislature to worry about the technicalities of military structure, the Executive Directory and under their authority the Minister of War, could focus on the maintenance, discipline, and most importantly the direction of a nation's military force in the political and international arenas.

In their capacity as the protectors of the Republic, the entire cisalpine military force was put at the disposition of the Directory, though they were not at the head of this force nor could they command it before or after their time in office.¹²⁵⁹ The Directory and ministers enjoyed honorary military positions while serving in their office, however, they were separated from military service

¹²⁵⁶ Sottocasa and Chavanette, “Le Directoire Face Au Brigandage: Criminalité, Protestation Politique et Violence d’Etat,” 65.

¹²⁵⁷ Belissa, “Can a Powerful Republic Be Peaceful? The Debate in the Year IV on the Place of France in the European Order,” 74.

¹²⁵⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 83.

¹²⁵⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title VI, Article 144.

outside of ceremonial duties.¹²⁶⁰ Similarly the laws, regulations and modes of discipline for the Cisalpine military were dictated by the regulations passed by the legislature, all formulated by the *Gran Consiglio* though they could not enforce the laws they made nor could they direct the military forces themselves while in the position of representative.¹²⁶¹ In this way both the executive and the legislative branches had a large measure of control over the structures of the Cisalpine military, however neither had the ability to command the forces directly and thus could not use it to gain political force over the other.

However, while neither branch had control over the military directly, they both enjoyed a certain amount of influence, both direct and indirect over the Minister of War. While the Directory could nominate the ministers, including the Minister of War, and remained their superior in government matters, the precise attributes and powers of the ministers were determined by the legislature, who could add or retract ministerial powers at will.¹²⁶² The Directory did have greater control over the selection of the General in Chief of Cisalpine forces, who they directly nominated, though were heavily regulated.¹²⁶³ The Legislature was, however, able to counteract this by controlling the prerequisites according to which military officials were nominated, as well as controlling the allocation of resources to the military both in peacetime as well as during times of war.¹²⁶⁴

It was in fact this latter point which was the seed of much of the conflict for control over the military force of the Cisalpine Republic which lied between the Directory and *Gran Consiglio*. This military force was broken into two segments: the National Guard and regular troops (*la truppa asoldata*).¹²⁶⁵ While the regular troops were fashioned on the French *Armée* and were significantly better defined in the Cisalpine Constitution,¹²⁶⁶ the National Guard was made up of largely

¹²⁶⁰ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 169.

¹²⁶¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title IX, Article 278.; La Hoz for example served as head of the Cisalpine Military before and after his time serving as a representative. He would eventually go on to lead a rebellion of Cisalpine Military following the collapse of the Republic where he would be killed fighting against the very French soldiers whom he had once considered allies.

¹²⁶² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI Articles 148, 149, 150 and 152.

¹²⁶³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 146; In order to avoid corruption or nepotism the Directory was banned from nominating family or close relations or business partners and their families to positions of authority, in particular the General in Chief who may be predisposed to backing executive authority in more difficult situations.

¹²⁶⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XI, Article 286.

¹²⁶⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title IX, Article 276.

¹²⁶⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title IX, Articles 285-293.

untrained civilians and did not have the level of constitutional regulation as ordinary military. As such the *Gran Consiglio* had more authority to construct legislatively the structural and institutional aspects of the of the National Guard which would augment its political authority over the military corpus. As early as 6 Frimaire a commission was requested by the members of the Council in order to begin forming a plan of organization for the National Guard.¹²⁶⁷ It was rationalized that due to the already high costs of supporting foreign troops – the *Armée* – within the confines of the Cisalpine Republic it was necessary to quickly draw up a civilian force which could protect against internal and external enemies while regular troops were fighting with the French military.¹²⁶⁸ Progressives in particular favored this idea as they believed it would help elevate the status of the Cisalpine Republic as the heir to the Revolution by quickly constructing their own republican institutions. More republican representatives, however, such as originalist rationalist Bianchi and neutral moderates like Savonarola felt that the National Guard would simply be another unnecessary cost.¹²⁶⁹

The Directory initially acknowledged the need for some form of organization, as the current National Guard was more trouble than it was a useful institution, as exclaimed in a complaint by departmental executives to the Directory in early Pluviôse.¹²⁷⁰ The Directory were supported by those *Gran Consiglio* representatives from military backgrounds like Scarabelli, Lupi, La Hoz and Cavedoni, who saw political as well as administrative and military benefits to the formation of a more organized National Guard unit. That said, some more republican members worried that those on the democratic end of the spectrum like the progressive radicals and rationalists Dehò, Greppi, Latuada and Federici would open up service to unwanted elements such as servants and foreigners with uncertain allegiances.¹²⁷¹ In fact, the more social revolutionary goals of democratic leaning representatives – especially progressive rationalists like Glissenti and Latuada – such as higher wages and education for soldiers did find their way into the National

¹²⁶⁷ “Seduta V, 6 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:136. Motion of Lupi to form the Commission of the National Guard.

¹²⁶⁸ “Seduta XXIII, 22 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:346–47. Discourse of Salvioni justifying the need for a National Guard.

¹²⁶⁹ *Ibid* 1:347. Discourses of Bianchi and Savonarola on the costs of the National Guard.

¹²⁷⁰ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:195–96. Letter from the administration of Lamone through the Directory complaining about the disorganized and criminal nature of the National Guard in that department.

¹²⁷¹ “Seduta LXXXIII, 11 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 2:281–87. Debate on foreigners and domestic servants in the National Guard.

Guard plan by the end of Ventose.¹²⁷² These sorts of movements to the left alarmed republican leaning representatives and the Cisalpine Directory, since a potential radicalization of the National Guard, particularly at such an early stage in the construction of the Republic, was far too reminiscent of the French experience in 1791-1792.

Germinal saw the nomination of democratic leaning representatives Tadini and La Hoz – sympathetic to a legislative controlled military force – to positions in the ministry. The 24 Germinal Coup, which effectively stripped the republican elements of power in the *Seniori*, opened up the road for progressive representative in the *Gran Consiglio* to further integrate their social programs into the National Guard plan in Floréal.¹²⁷³ Integrating their programs into the plan for the National Guard, meant that the *Gran Consiglio* no longer needed the Directory to be involved in executing and applying social programs throughout the Republic, since the Directory lacked the control over these military units to counter more radical policies through a lack of enforcement. As all citizens were to serve in the National Guard, all citizens would have direct access to these services. In essence the legislature would be able to control the patriotic will of the masses in a way that the Directory could not touch, circumventing the equilibrium of powers. The survival of these programs throughout the spring and early summer 1798, speak to the success of the strategy.¹²⁷⁴

Foreign affairs

As the president of the *Gran Consiglio* was the public face of the lower council, so too was the Directory the public face of the Cisalpine Republic. Its successes and failures in the international arena were existentially tied to the Directory and not the *Gran Consiglio* – regardless of the latter’s contribution to constitutional and legislative development for the entire Italian peninsula – or at least it has been presented as such in the historiography of the Cisalpine

¹²⁷² “Seduta CXX, 28 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:423–25. REview of the plan of the National Guard and discourse of LAtuada and Salimbeni.

¹²⁷³ “Seduta CLV, 3 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:189–201. Debate on the National Guard.

¹²⁷⁴ “Seduta CLXXIV, 23 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 4:618-623. Debate on the NATIONAL guard; “Seduta CLXXXVII, 7 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CLXXXVIII, 8 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CXC, 11 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:20–25, 92–98, 157–61. Final discussions on the National Guard plan and the execution of justice within the ranks of the Guard.

Republic.¹²⁷⁵ This old historiographical assertion was quite viscerally extinguished by Katia Visconti in her 2011 book *l'Ultimo Directorio*, in which she effectively proved that far from either cowardly or subordinate the Cisalpine Directory was in many ways responsible for the continued existence of the Cisalpine political culture into the Consulate and Republican years which followed the fall of the first republic in April 1799.¹²⁷⁶ However, Visconti's work only covers the final months of the Cisalpine Republic's existence and – though presumably not her intention – leaves in place the ideas of a Directory who was weak in their grasp of foreign affairs in 1797 and the first half of 1798.

The truth is of course remarkably more complex. In fact, the Cisalpine Republic has long been considered politically and historically as a complement and a parallel to the French Republican project between 1795 and 1800.¹²⁷⁷ This paradoxical relationship was a direct result of both executive and legislative successes in the management of foreign affairs, despite conflicts over jurisdiction. While the Directory would demonstrate to the world the power of Italian republicanism in the face of adversity – coming from revolutionary and counter-revolutionary enemies both foreign and domestic – the *Gran Consiglio* would demonstrate the institutionalization and creativity behind this project, which would have long lasting effects for future generations.¹²⁷⁸

Thus, foreign affairs played a fundamental role in the Directory/*Gran Consiglio* dichotomy which underscored much of Cisalpine politics. It was the instrument of political communication between the various allied groups across republican Europe, especially between the French and Cisalpine republics.¹²⁷⁹ The complexity of this relationship, perhaps even more so than the other two sectors examined above, was more prominent in foreign affairs since there was a much more explicit constitutional definition of each branches' respective duties and in the international sphere. Constitutionally, only the Directory (or through them the Minister of Foreign Affairs) had the right

¹²⁷⁵ Visconti, *L'ultimo Directorio*, 10.

¹²⁷⁶ Visconti 2011 An interesting aspect of this book was how it highlights the political biographies of the Directors who took control of the Cisalpine executive after the Rivaud Coup in December 1798. Among them were Giacomo Lamberti and Vincenzo Brunetti, two of the most influential members of the *Gran Consiglio*, particularly in the first half of 1798, when the greatest legislative development occurred. Interestingly, this is despite their more republican leanings.

¹²⁷⁷ De Francesco, "Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français," 274–78.

¹²⁷⁸ De Francesco, "An Unwelcomed Sister Republic," 217–18.

¹²⁷⁹ De Francesco, 218.

to officially meet with foreign diplomats and officials, though they could only do so publicly.¹²⁸⁰ Initially, the legislature was explicitly prohibited from meeting in any capacity with foreign agents, either public or private, accept in rare cases when given permission by the Directory, or as private citizens.¹²⁸¹ All treaties or negotiations proposed to the Cisalpine Republic needed to go through the Directory or agents specially selected by them for the purposes of negotiating on their behalf (as in the case of Melzi d'Eril at the Rastadt Congress).¹²⁸² However no negotiation or treaty was officially implemented until the members of the legislature (both houses) analyzed, debated and ratified the matter in open session.¹²⁸³ Thus the *Gran Consiglio* could stall all negotiations by refusing to resolve treaties to the *Seniori*, though in fact this never occurred.

The process is similar for instances of war, and perhaps is even more clear cut. The Directory was charged with the protection of the Republic, and as such had the right to initiate military proceedings, either for war or peace.¹²⁸⁴ However, when formal war is declared, the Directory must have first proposed the matter to both Councils who needed to pass a bicameral decree declaring war.¹²⁸⁵ Only the legislature could allow the entrance of foreign troops into Cisalpine Territory, regardless of negotiations or treaties made by the Directory, however in cases of imminent war or invasion these restrictions to the Directory were lifted.¹²⁸⁶ The powers of the Directory were also constitutionally passed to the Minister of War or of Foreign affairs, in such circumstances where the Directory is unable to physically attend to the leadership of the nation (as was the case following the flight of the Directors to Chambéry in 1799).¹²⁸⁷

In addition to their powers in protecting the nation in times of war, the Directory was also the head of the Cisalpine diplomatic corps through the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic

¹²⁸⁰ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title V Article 74 and Title VI Article 156, Title XII Article 329.

¹²⁸¹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina", Title V Article 74 The Cisalpine Legislature passed a law in mid-November which retracted this article and gave the various houses the right to directly treat with foreign dignitaries. This was in fact the earliest known conflict with Trouvé when he arrived in Prairial. In a letter to La Révellière-Lépeaux, Trouvé complained that he was being beckoned to the *Gran Consiglio* like a dog which he very much resented. It's possible that this event prejudiced Trouvé early on against the *Gran Consiglio* in favor of the Directory during the Messidor Crisis.

¹²⁸² "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title XII, Articles 324, 330 and 331.

¹²⁸³ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title XII, 333-334.

¹²⁸⁴ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI, Article 144.

¹²⁸⁵ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title XII, Article 325 and 326.

¹²⁸⁶ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title XII, Article 327.

¹²⁸⁷ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*; "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI articles 148 and 149, Title XII Article 324.

agents who were sent to treat with foreign governments, both hostile and allied, such as ambassadors – ordinary and extraordinary – secretaries or military personnel all fell under the authority –and more important the payment – of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹²⁸⁸ This meant all lines of communication between Cisalpine agents in foreign countries were sent to the Directory who could then in turn circulate them where necessary, including to the *Gran Consiglio*. This ability of the Directory to take first hold of international communication meant that discrepancies between ambassadors in different locations and with different political backgrounds could be better synthesized.¹²⁸⁹ Additionally, the Directory could use the information which they had been furnished to attempt to resolve issues through the ministry, allowing a new check over legislative involvement. Only after all ministerial options were exhausted (or exposed) would the Directory be obligated to extend messages to the legislative branch.¹²⁹⁰

The initial nomination of ambassadors took place in the months leading up to the activation of legislature. This meant that much like military and financial affairs, the Directory was already well versed in diplomatic issues long before the *Gran Consiglio* could involve itself in the management of external relations. Those initially nominated to serve as ambassadors, like Melzi, Serbelloni, Visconti or Marescalchi all had close connections to Bonaparte and the *Armée* meaning that they all had a vested interest in the continuation of the republican projects according to its original aims in July of 1797.¹²⁹¹ By this fact alone it became apparent that the diplomatic corps was going to follow a more republican style of governance, despite Parisian directorial prejudice

¹²⁸⁸ “Diplomatici stati in attività di servizio in tempo dell’invasione nemica” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 494,” fol. Direttorio Esecutivo register of indemnity, 1798/1799?, Milan.

¹²⁸⁹ « Al Direttorio Esecutivo, Melzi, 29(?) Brumale [Brumaire], An.° 6.° R.° [Anno sesto Repubblicano] », « Milano 4 Frimale anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano Cittadino Arrigoni Delegato al Direttorio Esecutivo » « ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1 », f° Brumaio VI letters, 19 and 24 November 1797, Milan (and most likely Rastatt); These two letters are an example of the diplomatic issues which the Directory confronted in leading the diplomatic corps. Both men described a conversation between Melzi and Haller regarding the funding of French troops in Cisalpine territory and subsequent payment of French creditors in Cisalpine territory, but both had differing interpretations and resolutions to the issues presented with this polemic. This is covered in great depth in section two of Chapter XI.

¹²⁹⁰ “Il Direttorio Esecutivo al Gran Consiglio, Milano li 2 Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano Repubb.-°”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1,” fol. Nevoso VI This letter was sent over a month after the initial letters from Melzi and Arrigoni after the Directory had attempted to raise funds through the Ministers of War and the Interior. .

¹²⁹¹ “Estratto dei Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del 4 Nevoso anno VI repubblicano Repub_no, Il Direttorio Esecutivo in Virtù del potere che gli da la Costituzione Nomina il Cittadino Gio. Galeazzo Serbelloni ambasciatore straordinaria presso la Repubblica Francese...”; “Estratto dei Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del 4 Nevoso anno VI repubblicano Repub_no, Il Direttorio Esecutivo in Virtù del potere che gli da la Costituzione Nomina il Cittadino Francesco Visconti ambasciatore ordinario presso la Repubblica Francese...” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2,” fol. Trattato di Campo Formio Decrees, 22 December 1797, Milan; “Melzi 29(?) Brumale”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1,” fol. Brumaio VI.

against those like Visconti who they believed to be consorting with neo-Jacobins.¹²⁹² The choice of strongly representative democrat ambassadors who trended towards a more republican political view reflected a similar tendency on the part of the Directory to present the Cisalpine Republic as the model of strict constitutionalism on the Italian peninsula which fell in line with the political concepts of the Parisian extreme center.¹²⁹³

By early 1798, the Directory had begun a diplomatic campaign to prove that the Cisalpine Republic was worthy of a position as first among the Sister Republics for its continued commitment to the concepts of the Constitution of Year III. This of course put the Directory at odds with progressives in the *Gran Consiglio* who hoped to formulate a more adaptive constitution, and similarly made allies of the originalists in the Council like Lamberti who were more committed to instituting the original project of the French in 1797. However contrary to certain historiographical perspectives, this neither constitutes cultural subjugation to the French nor political-economic inferiority to Paris.¹²⁹⁴ In many ways the ambassadors of the Cisalpine Republic, and by extension the Cisalpine Directory, were walking an incredibly precarious line in attempting to juggle the interests of all major French political interests including the democratic republican, and neo-jacobin factions of the French legislature, the Parisian Directory and Ministry, the French diplomatic corps (Haller, Trouvé, Fouché) and the various commanders of the *Armée* (Bonaparte, Berthier, Le Clerc, and Brune).¹²⁹⁵ Attempts to disrupt this already fragile international political equilibrium through innovative and rapid-fire legislation – as the *Gran Consiglio* was succeeding to do between the months of Nivose and Floréal of 1798 – alarmed Cisalpine diplomats in Paris, who in turn hoped to scare the Cisalpine Directory into acting against progressive and radical legislation either through a constitutional means, or if necessary through a coup.¹²⁹⁶ The Directory for its part tried to defend the *Gran Consiglio* against the accusation of extremism, citing a revolutionary zeal against aristocrats; that said by late spring even the

¹²⁹² Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 462.

¹²⁹³ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 54.

¹²⁹⁴ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:292–95; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*, 4–5.

¹²⁹⁵ “Milano, li 11 Fiorile anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. Rapporto Del Ministro degli Affari Esteri Al Direttorio Esecutivo”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2” report, 30 April 1798, Milan.

¹²⁹⁶ “Milano 20 Ventose an 6eme Rep.n. Au Directoire Exécutif de la République Française. Le Direcotire Exécutif de la République Cisalpine” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2” letter, 10 March 1797, Milan.

Directory found it difficult to justify the actions of the progressive legislature, who no longer seemed interested in humoring the interests of the French Republic.

As always, the reality was in fact a complex grey area of political compromises. As a testament to this fact, one has only to look at the movement of representatives from the *Gran Consiglio* into the diplomatic corps. The first instance of this came when Ambrogio Birago was assigned as the Cisalpine ambassador to the new Roman Republic, a popular figure both within the *Gran Consiglio* and the Cisalpine Directory from his time as Minister of War in the second half of 1797.¹²⁹⁷ On 15 Pluviôse the neutral rationalist Francesco Leopoldo Cicognara was assigned as the plenipotentiary representative to the Kingdom of Sardinia in Torino.¹²⁹⁸ Though not staunchly in favor of any legislative agenda in particular, Cicognara was known to favor legislation of progressive rationalists and his modest nature made him an agreeable diplomat according to both the *Gran Consiglio* and Directory. The same could be said for the installation of Ettore Martinengo, a neutral moderate and popular military personality famous for his contribution to the Brescia Revolution a year prior, as the plenipotentiary in Naples at the same time Cicognara was going to Torino.¹²⁹⁹ These figures were models of compromise between the branches, on one hand espousing the extreme centrism which the Cisalpine Directory was attempting to demonstrate to French authorities, and on the other popular legislators who had backed many positions of the progressive rationalist majority as well as opposed them in the first months of the *Gran Consiglio*. The only member who did not fit this profile was Giuseppe La Hoz, sent as the Cisalpine plenipotentiary representative to Paris in Germinal.¹³⁰⁰ The events which lead up to the nomination of La Hoz are covered in greater detail in the final section of Chapter XI.

For the *Gran Consiglio* however, the focus seemed to be less concerned with the state of international relations with European states (like France), and much more preoccupied with

¹²⁹⁷ “Seduta XLI, 10 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:582 Dismissal of Birago.

¹²⁹⁸ “Seduta LXXVII, 15 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:352. Dismissal of Cicognara

¹²⁹⁹ No. 13 26 piovoso VI repub. (mercoledì 14 febbrajo 1798 v.s), “Seduta 86 del Gran Consiglio, Milano li 22 piovoso anno 6 repubblicano. Il Gran Consiglio al Consiglio de’ Seniori”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:99.

¹³⁰⁰ “Seduta CXLIV, 22 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:7 Dismissal of La Hoz.

relationships on the Italian peninsula. The fact that the three main diplomatic assignments to arguably the most powerful Italian states outside of the Cisalpine Republic (the concession of the Veneto to Austria meant that relations with this territory were more conflicted than the other three and hence had a stronger French presence in the figure of Marescalchi, a personal friend to Bonaparte) came from the *Gran Consiglio*, and were all powerful military figures, meant that there was already from the onset a greater focus on the development of a more belligerent revolution in newly republicanized or –in the case of the Kingdom of Sardinia – occupied Italian states. The Directory, for example in their dealings with the Papacy in 1797, seemed to follow a course of diplomacy which encouraged little political structural change for the oncoming republicanizing project in this territory, instead focusing on pacification and stabilization.¹³⁰¹ The *Gran Consiglio*, however, saw diplomatic a relationship between the Cisalpine Republic and the new Italian Sister Republics (Liguria, Rome and by the beginning of Year VII Naples) as a mirror of its own connection with the French Republic.¹³⁰² The new Italian sister republics would be guided towards a stable form of representative democracy, while simultaneously being encouraged to contribute to the military and financial burdens of the Cisalpine Republic.

There similarly seemed to be a focus in *Gran Consiglio* foreign policy on the “cisalpinization” of all Italians. As early as Frimaire, progressives sought to extend the right to citizenship to all those Italians living under “persecution” which they defined as under any *ancien regime* institution (referring at that point to anyone living in the Kingdom of Sardinia and under Hapsburg-Austrian rule in the ex-Serenissima).¹³⁰³ It was the aim of the *Gran Consiglio*, progressives in particular, to create within the Cisalpine Republic a place in which revolutionary rhetoric could flourish and militant republicanism could grow and extend into those places like Venice and Torino. The extension of Cisalpine citizenship to popular extra-cisalpine republican figures like Gioia, Porro and Ranza, would encourage a growth of republicanism across the

¹³⁰¹ “Seduta XXVIII, 27 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:420. Letter from Directory detailing plans to pacify Rome; “Serie dei documenti tra la corte di Roma e la Repubblica cisalpina” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2,” fol. Brumaio VI libretto, 1797, Veldini, Milano.

¹³⁰² “Seduta XCVI, 4 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta XXXIII, 2 nevoso VI”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:731-736. Debate on treaties with neighboring nations and proclamation on the celebration of the Roman Republic

¹³⁰³ “Seduta VIII, 9 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:168 Motion of Alborghetti to extend citizenship to all persecuted italians.

peninsula which put Milan at the center.¹³⁰⁴ This eventually extended to a concession of citizenship for all Italians by the summer of 1798, as it became clear that revolutionary advancement champions by progressives was not moving fast enough.¹³⁰⁵ By these standards, the *Gran Consiglio* no longer needed the Directory in order to communicate with “foreign” Italian nations as constitutionally they saw themselves as representatives of these people in the Roman, Ligurian and Neapolitan republic, as well as those subjects of Hapsburg Austria, Parma, Florence and Sardinia, in the same way they represented the people of the Cisalpine Territory.

The Executive Ministry and the *Gran Consiglio*

The challenges to power which existed between the executive and legislative branches of the Cisalpine government was a defining feature of the republican system formulated according to the Consecution of Year III, the basis for the Cisalpine Constitution. Yet also a defining feature of this system was a further division of powers within the branches themselves. The Executive branch had a two-tier structure, consisting of the Directory and the Ministry. The Directory served as the overall head of state, the primary governors of the Republic. They had final executive decision on the application of laws and represented the Cisalpine Republic abroad; it was the Directory which was invested with the authority of the nation.¹³⁰⁶ The ministry was a subordinate body who spoke and acted with the authority of the Directory (i.e. executive authority) but not its power. In a sense they served a similar function to legislative commissions in that they were specialized decision-making entities which existed within the executive system. However, unlike legislative commissions the ministers had an autonomy to act and establish proclamations and norms without first proceeding through the Directory. Though liable to Directorial discipline they were also free to carry out their functions with a degree of free will.

It was this free will which often brought Ministers into direct conflict with the *Gran Consiglio*. Similar to the sectoral challenges examined in the previous section, the conflicts between the Ministry and the *Gran Consiglio* were reciprocal challenges to the opposing party’s influence and control over their various sectors. Thus, these challenges can once again be seen as

¹³⁰⁴ “Seduta CLIV, 2 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:180.

¹³⁰⁵ “Seduta CLXXXIX, 9 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:126–31 Motion and debate for the extension of citizenship to all italians.

¹³⁰⁶ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 102.

norms meant to maintain the balance of the equilibrium of powers. There were six Ministers who presided over six different sectors of executive authority: Carlo Testi as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (replaced by Ambrogio Birago upon Testi's appointment to the Directory following the 24 Germinal Coup), Gaetano Porro as the Minister of Police (replaced by Fedele Sopransi in Brumaire Year VI and then by Diego Guidiccardi after the 24 Germinal Coup, and finally by Vincenzo Brunetti after the Messidor Crisis), Martin de Vignolle (preceded by Ambrogio Birago) for the Minister of War, Carlo Ricci as the Minister of Finance, Giuseppe Luosi as the Minister of Justice and Giuseppe Ragazzi as the Minister of Internal Affairs (replaced by Giacomo Lamberti on 19 Germinal, followed by Antonio Tadini on 27 Germinal following Lamberti's appointment to the Directory after the 24 Germinal Coup and finally by Diego Guidiccardi after the Messidor Crisis).¹³⁰⁷ Each Minister was expected to remain within the purview of his mandate, providing leadership internally for the execution of laws made externally by the legislative branch. However, as will be demonstrated, this authority as the "executor" of Cisalpine legislation was adapted and interpreted to have a wide purview, particularly in the early months of the Republic from July to November 1797 when there existed no concrete legislative body to watch for blurring of legislative and executive powers. In this way, what originally began as confrontations of power became confrontations of authority, a trait most visible in two examples studied here: the conflicts between Vignolle and Ragazzi with the *Gran Consiglio* in the spring of 1798.

Ministerial Authority

Constitutionally the Cisalpine ministry was an independent executive institution within the executive branch, whose members were nominated by the Directory to serve as the principal administrators of Cisalpine executive functions.¹³⁰⁸ The ministry was nominally – and financially – under the control of the Directory as official head of the Cisalpine executive branch, and as an institution was intended to serve an exclusively executory function with no political power.¹³⁰⁹ Of course, any individual or institution which is given control over the management or administration of others is going to have a measure of power, since the administration of a state requires decision making capabilities. And while perhaps more measured than the *ancien regime* ministry, the

¹³⁰⁷ "Proclamazione Bonaparté Generale in Capo dell'Armata d'Italia", "Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami," 63.

¹³⁰⁸ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI, Article 148.

¹³⁰⁹ "Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:218 Discourse of Latuada on the role of the ministry.

institution of the Cisalpine ministry wielded an incredible authority as head of the Cisalpine administration, and though it was checked by Directorial – and in rare cases legislative – authority, ministerial authority was often the most visibly implemented, since the contestation of this authority was retroactive to the application of ministerial management and administrative directives.¹³¹⁰

Cisalpine ministerial authority can be traced back to the first months of 1797 and the early independence enjoyed by ministers in the establishment of the Cisalpine State before the activation of the legislative assemblies. As with the Cisalpine Directory, the burden of running the provisional state fell on the executive branch and more so perhaps on the Ministry, entrusted with the earliest organizational projects of the Cisalpine Republic, such as the establishment of a financial system, building up a military and setting in place a system of public administration to continue the functioning of civil works.¹³¹¹ These ministers were the national government's points of contact between the military, departmental and municipal leadership, which offered them the authority to nominate, dismiss and delegate these positions based on their own judgement.¹³¹² Though these decisions could not be enacted without first passing through the Directory, they were more often than not accepted without contest. This method worked well in the late summer and early autumn 1797 to build up the institutional credibility of the Republic, particularly in more peripheral departments where there was little contact with the republican intellectual center in Milan. This credibility emboldened ministers in their proclamations so that by Brumaire they were passing temporary proclamations off as legislation.¹³¹³ This new tendency was the result of a lack

¹³¹⁰ "Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, 2:123. Discourse of Greppi against the right of ministers to propose and implement their own legislation.

¹³¹¹ Zagli, *Il Direttorio*, 1:184–86.

¹³¹² "Milano 7 Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. Il Ministro degli Affari Interni al Direttorio Esecutivo "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A., Uffici Civici, 13" letter, 28 September 1797, Milan; Letter requesting the dismissal of department administrator from the Olona and nomination of replacement; "Al Ministro di Giustizia" "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi Tribunale, 10" letter, 16 July 1797 (?), Milan; Letter from Greppi(?) to the minister of Justice requesting the implementation of a court in "far off departments and the creation of organic laws to control the court system. "Milano li 9 Termidoro V anno della Libertà. Testi Ministro degli affari Esteri al Direttorio Esecutivo "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493," fol. Direttorio esecutivo 1797 letter, 27 July 1797, Milano; Letter reporting the acknowledgement by the King of Sardinia of the Cisalpine Republic and the establishment of a network of Cisalpine plenipotentiary representatives in provisional governments around the peninsula. "Milano li 11 Thermid.º anno V Rep.º. Il Cittadino Birago Ministro della Guerra al Direttorio Esecutivo", "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261," fol. Giuseppe La Hoz letter, 29 July 1797, Milan; Letter nominating Giuseppe La Hoz General in Chief of the Cisalpine armed forces by Minister of War Ambrogio Birago.

¹³¹³ "PROCLAMA. Luosi Ministro della Giustizia e Polizia Generale", "PROCLAMA. Luosi Ministro della Giustizia e Polizia Generale" *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:5, 22–23 Proclamation regarding the organization of Constitutional circles, Proclamation regarding the liberty of the press; both from Brumaire Year

of attentiveness on the part of both the Directory and the *comitati riuniti* responsible for the legislative actions of the Republic before the activation of the legislative branch. The Directory for its part was much more preoccupied with the management of military and diplomatic relationships in particular with the French Republic, in addition to instituting the state building projects which were being passed by the *comitati riuniti* in this period.¹³¹⁴ This function of bureaucracy versus politics left a power vacuum which the ministers happily filled.

This political condition in the Cisalpine Republic was supposed to change with the activation of the Legislature in Frimaire Year VI. The presence of a stable legislature, not merely a provisional group of committees, meant that governance of the Republic could now be based on constitutionally valid laws, not temporary proclamation. Those decrees, proclamations, notes and all other publications which had existed before the 2 Frimaire, were invalidated due to their provisional nature, and would need to be rewritten, debated and officially passed into law before they would be recognized again.¹³¹⁵ It was believed that as the Directory was subservient to the legal agenda of the legislature, and the ministers subservient to the Directory – at least officially – so it stood to reason that the Ministry was similarly subservient to the Assemblies.¹³¹⁶ The Directory for its part was happy to allow this conditions since it would remove them from having to wrestle authority away from a ministry which was hesitant in the first months of 1798 to allow the reins of government to pass into the hands of an untested legislature.

This tension was more evident between the ministers and the *Gran Consiglio* than the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*, because unlike the Directory, the ministry had a much more defined role as executor, and not necessarily as a political head of state. While the Directory also fell into conflict with the *Gran Consiglio* over this theme, its role was much less clearly defined

VI and had the force of law despite their designation as ministerial proclamations; “In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina Milano 20 Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano. Circolare- Il ministro dell’Interno agli Amministratori del Luogo Pio di ...”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 168.

¹³¹⁴ “Estratto de’Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo: Seduta del giorno 13. Vendemmiale Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Estratto dei Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo. Seduta del giorno 15 Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 160–61, 162–67; “Seduta del giorno 26 Brumale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano LI COMITATI RIUNITI; Milano 20 Brumale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. SERBELLONI Membro del Direttorio Esecutivo della Repubblica Cisalpina a suoi Colleghi.” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493,” fol. Direttorio Esecutivo 1797.

¹³¹⁵ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:90–91. Discourse of Reina on the invalidity of all laws made under the provisional governments.

¹³¹⁶ “Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:218. Discourse of Latuada.

in the law-making process than that of the ministry which was not supposed to have a political function. In one of the rare occasions of Council unity, representatives from across the political spectrum of the *Gran Consiglio* – progressives and originalists, radicals and moderates, democrats and republicans – seemed to find agreement in the fact that the right to legislation was solely the responsibility of the Legislature, while the ministry was exclusively charged with the execution of these laws.¹³¹⁷

The distinction between the functions of the executive ministry and the legislature had its origins in the beginnings of the Revolution in France.¹³¹⁸ The corrupt and incompetent nature of *ancien regime* ministers, whose personal political will often influenced the legislative will of the State, was found to be one of the core problems with *ancien regime* government which the original Revolution sought to rectify. By removing the ability to legislate from the ministry, the nation could be surer of its own interests being secured in the various functions of government – thanks to its representatives in the legislative assembly. Under the Mountain controlled Convention of 1794, this concept went so far as to eradicate completely the idea of the ministry and instead place executive function solely in the hands of legislative committees.¹³¹⁹ Yet it became apparent that the ministry, when handled by competent men, served a necessary function in administering the Revolution, something a legislative body had neither the time nor the means to handle. More importantly, in an effort to deconstruct the potentially dangerous hold which extremism could have over a nation when the legislative served without the check of the executive, the ministry needed to be separated. Thus, for the new representative democracy of the Directorial period, this concept of a two-part executive – one political, the other functional as the intermediary between the ministry and the legislature.¹³²⁰

The transfer of this system of compromise to the Cisalpine Republic in late 1797 seemed to please the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*. For those who favored more democratic aspects of the legislative process this system guaranteed that the legislation passed would be

¹³¹⁷ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:168–73. Debate on the competencies of the Ministry; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 152, Title V Article 46 and 48.

¹³¹⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 96.

¹³¹⁹ Troper, 98.

¹³²⁰ Troper, 99.

implemented by the ministry, regardless of personal objections.¹³²¹ It reaffirmed the social contract which the Revolution brought to Cisalpine territory by placing stronger checks to make sure all government function was being conducted in the public interest.¹³²² Most importantly the depoliticization of the ministry meant that political activities on the part of individual members would be held accountable and would allow the proper sanctions to be placed upon transgressors, either by the Directory, the Councils, or both.¹³²³

For more republican leaning members of the *Gran Consiglio*, this model barred the frightening possibility that “the people” would be exercising any kind of governmental pressure outside of the Assemblies.¹³²⁴ The Directors – men theoretically selected for their wisdom and understanding of the republican system – would exercise their authority over ministers and would guarantee that abuses and individual interests would be admonished accordingly, without the use of mob justice. The compromising nature of the system meant that by early 1798, the *Gran Consiglio* was vested in its institutionalization.

In addition to the guarantees of the two-part executive, the constitution also guaranteed a direct challenge from the legislative branch itself against ministerial abuses of power. As mentioned previously the Legislature had the right to establish the attributes of the ministers, meaning they defined the roles which each minister had in the administration of the republic.¹³²⁵ The *Gran Consiglio* as the body responsible for drafting legislation had the primary task of defining these attributes, and therefore could change or rearrange the competencies of various ministers for political or administrative reasons. However, the initial months of the *Gran Consiglio* saw a general contentedness to allow the ministers to continue to operate as they had been doing since the declaration of Republic in Messidor Year V (July 1797). This came from, on one hand, an internal disorganization on the part of the *Gran Consiglio* which made it unprepared to take on the full responsibility of restructuring the Republic – a job which to this point the ministry had

¹³²¹ Lenci, “The Battle over ‘democracy’ in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799,” 103.

¹³²² Nicolet, *L’idée Républicaine En France (1789-1924). Essai d’histoire Critique*, 407.

¹³²³ “Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:223 Letter from the directory explaining the conduct of the Minister of Internal affairs; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Articles 149 and 152.

¹³²⁴ Constantini, “La Réaction Thermidorienne Bridant La Démocratie : Le Peuple Souverain Dans La Consitution de l’an III,” 42.

¹³²⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 150.

been doing effectively; on the other hand, the *Gran Consiglio* had no reason to challenge the current attributes of the ministry since there seemed to be a mutual agreement on the progress of the republican project, at the very least through Nivose. However, conflicts with the various ministers towards the end of the month, in addition to the growing crisis between the Directory and the progressive controlled *Gran Consiglio*, forced the council in early Pluviôse to begin reconsidering the attributes of the ministry.¹³²⁶

The initial proposal to look at the attributes of the Ministry came from the more democratic elements of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular progressives like Dehò, Latuada and Mozzini who began to see the dual threats of Ministerial politicization and Directorial ambivalence as a menace to their agenda.¹³²⁷ One of the more pronounced arguments, made by progressive rationalists like Cavedoni and Latuada, was that the ministry was overstepping its position by attempting to present arguments against the imposition of legislation, a right reserved principally for members of the Legislature, and indirectly for the Directory. While republican members of the *Gran Consiglio* like the originalist rationalists Mozzoni and Schiera acknowledged this potential threat, they cautioned against imposing Constitutional Article 150 which called for the reassessment and defining of ministerial attributes. These members felt it was first the responsibility of the Directory to intervene, as the official constitutional authority over the ministry, and only failing this would legislation be necessary. While progressive rationalists were willing to side with republican leaning members and wait for a response from the Directory, progressive radicals like Salimbeni, Greppi and Mozzini felt that the Article 150 privileges needed to be immediately invoked so as to not risk further encroachment of legislative rights by the Ministry. This did not come to pass as neutral radicals like La Hoz and Perseguiti sided with progressive rationalists in delaying the urgency of the resolution.¹³²⁸

¹³²⁶ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:172. Discourse of Mozzini on the attributes of the Ministry and the application of Constitutional Article 150.

¹³²⁷ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:168–7.3 Debate on the Minister of Internal affairs and the attributes of the Ministry.

¹³²⁸ *Ibid*, 2:173 Discourse of La Hoz against urgency.

There arose suspicions around Ministerial spending at the end of Pluviôse which cause progressives to demand a list of all costs incurred by the Ministerial Bureau to that point.¹³²⁹ Progressives similarly accused the Directory of protecting corrupt ministers who either broke contracts or did not divulge all of their spending. Though there was initially resistance from more republican delegates like neutral moderate Vicini, the progressives convincingly argued that their motion only called to account the Ministry, as was their constitutional right. This general agreement of the *Gran Consiglio* against the Ministry led to the invocation of Article 150 and the reevaluation of the attributes of the ministry beginning in mid-Germinal.¹³³⁰

Following the 24 Germinal Coup and the establishment of the progressive rationalist dominance in the *Gran Consiglio* at the beginning of Floréal, a number of sessions devoted to the reevaluation and reassignment of norms for the Ministry took place through to mid-Prairial. The first of these sessions, which took place on 6 Floréal looked at the role of ministers who were involved in the judicial process, notably the Minister of Police, the Minister of Justice (these two were separated at this sitting), and especially the Minister of Interior Affairs.¹³³¹ Their powers were explicitly designed to no longer allow the imposition of special proclamations without the original consent of the legislative body. The *Gran Consiglio* similarly narrowed the scope of the role of the Minister of Internal Affairs so that it served more as a principal administrator than a decision maker. This session went on to reshape the role of Minister of Finance making it more open and accountable to the legislature. Finally, the Minister of War was altered to such an extreme that the position was little more than a glorified quarter-master, serving as a resource manager with no nominating or proclamation power.

The sessions which followed more or less affirmed the conditions of the first meeting, with some minor additions to the duties of the individual ministers and adding strict political responsibilities which all ministers shared including a commitment to the liberty of the Cisalpine people and a responsibility to hold accountable those working within their ministry who violate

¹³²⁹ “Seduta LXXXIII, 21 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:461. Motion of Salimbeni requesting the spending of the ministry and the public deliberation of the executive branch on the breach of public contracts by ministers.

¹³³⁰ “Seduta CXXXVII, 15 germinal anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:742–43 Motion of Vismara calling for the reevaluation of attributes of the Ministry.

¹³³¹ Seduta CLVIII, 6 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:273–77.

the constitution by usurping legislative or juridical powers, committing crimes against the state and/or failing to accomplish necessary tasks assigned to them (amongst others).¹³³² These measures against the Ministry seemed to have some of the most unilateral support across the political spectrum of the *Gran Consiglio* of any other major issue confronted by the Council between Germinal and Messidor.

Conflicts of authority between the Gran Consiglio and individual ministers

The generalized conflict between the Executive Ministry and the Legislature which came to be resolved in the restructuring of ministerial attributes in the spring of 1798 was best exemplified in individual conflicts which took place between specific ministers and the *Gran Consiglio*. Of these, the most significant were early conflicts with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Giuseppe Ragazzi, and with the Minister of War, Martin de Vignolle. While there were other minor polemics which arose with other ministers – and with the substitutes of ministers such as Brunetti, Lamberti and Tadini – these conflicts were never as prolonged nor as vicious as with the two ministers examined here.

At the center of both conflicts lied the bigger issue of the blurring of executive and legislative authority by the ministers in the period after the activation of the legislative assemblies in Frimaire. Ministers often used proclamations and decrees to enact their own personal policies and then enforce them as laws, especially in the transitional months between Brumaire and Nivose Year VI. In a 22 Nivose motion regarding the payment for public workers lodging, Savonarola made an impassioned speech against the continued use of these proclamations by Ministers.¹³³³ He claimed that the Ministry was purposefully attempting to usurp the duties of the legislative branch, and the Directory was aiding these corrupt and power-hungry Ministers by hiding their transgressions. According to Savonarola the Directory and its Ministers were deliberately obscuring and concealing financial records of ministerial misconduct. In reality there was no constitutional difference which delineated laws from proclamations other than one was

¹³³² “Seduta CLXI, 9 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 4:323–24. Modifications to individual attributes of the ministry presented by Visamara; “Seduta CLXXXVII, 7 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:47. Presentation of responsibilities of the ministry by Savonarola.

¹³³³ “Seduta LII, 22 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:767 Motion of Savonarola.

passed through executive authority and the other legislative (thus theoretically a bit stronger since it was reflective of the nation's will).¹³³⁴

The tensions which came from the use of ministerial proclamations came from a perceived need for more immediate legal structures dating back to the summer of 1797, when the Executive Ministry had greater autonomy in the organization of the Cisalpine state. However, proclamations were always meant to be temporary measures for immediate action until an official law could be passed. The continued renewal of old proclamations before a law could go into effect would often lead to confusing results, where official laws were contradicted or nullified by temporary proclamations.¹³³⁵ While representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* remained unopposed to the use of ministerial proclamations in the governance of public workers under a specific ministry, they contested the ministers' right to apply these same regulations to the general population, and even reserved the rights of the *Gran Consiglio* to nullify or rewrite proclamations, even those which internally regulated ministerial departments.¹³³⁶

This argument had its roots in the division of powers attributed to the branches under the Constitution of Year III: the ministers, as the primary execution wing of the executive branch (as opposed to the political wing under the Directory) served as the branch of "action", while the assemblies were the branch which was given the duty to "think".¹³³⁷ Proclamations, by their very nature united the "thinking" aspect of legal decision making with the "action" aspect, and were a clear violation of the equilibrium of powers, especially when applied to the general population.¹³³⁸ By refusing to condemn these proclamations, the Cisalpine Directory – intended or otherwise – was thought to be blurring the lines between the executive and legislative authority. While radicals would be expected to favor the use of proclamations for their immediate application, progressive radicals in particular strongly rejected their use since they circumvented the will of the people in

¹³³⁴ *Ibid* 1:766. Discourse of Vismara.

¹³³⁵ "Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", "Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:116, 166. Discourse of Lupi against ministerial contradictions of *Gran Consiglio* laws around the festival in recognition of the republic; Motion of Polfranceschi condemning the proclamation of the Minister of war on 28 Nivose despite a preexistent law passed by the legislature

¹³³⁶ "Seduta LII, 22 nevoso anno VI repubblicano", "Seduta XXXIII, 2 nevoso VI", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:178. Discourse of Salimbeni

¹³³⁷ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 102.

¹³³⁸ "Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:218. Discourse of Dehò condemning the minister of war for an illegal proclamation.

the legislative branch.¹³³⁹ Similarly, one might expect more republican leaning representatives, in particular moderates and originalists to support proclamations for their executive strength. However, both tended to be the strongest opposition to the use of proclamations, moderates for their urgency and originalists for their extreme violation of the constitution.¹³⁴⁰ Perhaps the most outspoken were those in the center, in particular the neutral rationalists at the extreme center, who consolidated all arguments from both democratic and republican factions into the singular notion that proclamations were an explicit attempt to usurp legislative authority by members of the ministry, and in doing so instigate a constitutional crisis.¹³⁴¹

Thus, turning to the specific conflicts, themselves, of the two, the least confrontational was with the Minister of War de Vignolle. Vignolle, was nominated to the ministry in November 1797 when the former Minister of War Birago had been selected to serve as a member of the *Gran Consiglio*. He was the only Minister to be nominated who was of French origins, having served as a general under Bonaparte in the *Armée*. Vignolle, was therefore not versed – nor particularly interested in – in Cisalpine politics the way other ministers such as Testi (Minister of Foreign Relations), Ragazzi or Ricci (Minister of Finance) might have been. He was instead a fusion point between Cisalpine civilian authorities and the French military. The nature of the position of Minister of War afforded him greater autonomy than other ministerial roles making due to a general need for urgent decision making and his political authority as a member of the French military. Similarly, unlike Ragazzi, Vignolle seemed to have a relatively high rapport with the Military Commission of the *Gran Consiglio*, granting him a certain respect in the *Gran Consiglio* in early Frimaire.

However, towards the end of Nivose and beginning of Pluviôse, Vignolle began to make political moves considered beyond the mandate of a Minister of War, especially in peace time. First, a 30 Nivose letter was sent from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*, which recommended

¹³³⁹ “Seduta LXVI, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:117, 172. Condemnation of proclamations by the Minister of Internal affairs by Dehò and Greppi; Defense of the proclamation of the Minister of War by La Hoz for matters of urgency

¹³⁴⁰ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 2:172–73. Discourses of Scarabelli and Mozzoni opposing the use of proclamations.

¹³⁴¹ “Seduta LIII, 22 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:766–67. Discourse of Vismara against the use of proclamations; “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:170–71. Discourse of Vismara explaining the nature of laws and supporting measures to limit executive proclamations.

the movement of the festival for the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic by the French Republic from 2 Pluviôse ordered by Vignolle for security reasons.¹³⁴² While remaining within the purvey of his authority – a fact acknowledged by even the *Gran Consiglio* – some like Salimbeni and Alborghetti criticized the orders of the Minister which directly contradicted an established law from the Legislature. Some days later on 4 Pluviôse, Polfranceschi brought word to the Council that Vignolle had posted a proclamation which established a summary military draft of local men in the periphery of the Republic to increase the size of the sitting Cisalpine forces.¹³⁴³ This proclamation alarmed the *Gran Consiglio*, since it was conducted without any notice and along lines of no existing laws or policies delivered by either the legislature or the constitution. Polfranceschi set forth a motion which would force the Directory and Minister to acknowledge Article 163 of the Constitution which banned the proposal of executive actions as having the force of law.¹³⁴⁴ In this way the Directory would be forced to discipline Vignolle for overstepping his constitutional authority, while not acknowledging dissent with the act of conscription itself – although this too came to be seen as a violation by other members of the *Gran Consiglio*.

On 7 Pluviôse the Directory sent a message back excusing the actions of Vignolle and stating that it was in fact the *Gran Consiglio* who were overstepping their constitutional authority by interfering in the execution of the Minister's duties as head of the armed forces of the Republic.¹³⁴⁵ The response from the *Gran Consiglio* was expectedly negative, even from members of the Military Commission like Scarabelli, who condemned the defense of the Minister by the Directory as unconstitutional and demanded that the response be printed and circulated to the public. However, the means of confronting these issues caused division between the most democratic representatives and the rest of the Council. More radical and progressive members like Dehò, Greppi, Salimbeni and Tadini sought to place sanctions on both the Vignolle and the Directory.¹³⁴⁶ However the rest of the Council, and most of all the progressive rationalists like

¹³⁴² “Seduta LXII, 30 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:98 Message from Directory to *Gran Consiglio*.

¹³⁴³ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 2:165. Discourse and motion of Polfranceschi.

¹³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:166. Motion of Polfranceschi; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 163.

¹³⁴⁵ “Seduta LXX, 7 Piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:217 Mesage from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio* .

¹³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:218. Discourses of Dehò, Salimbeni, Tadini and Greppi against the Directors and Minister of War.

Glissenti, Lattanzi and Latuada, refused to bring extraordinary sanctions on either the Minister or the Directory since they could be seen as confrontational or worse, potentially unconstitutional. More importantly, Vignolle, as an officer in the *Armée* and a figure of relative power within the French republican structure in Italy, could cause problems for the Franco-Cisalpine relations were he to be pressured too heavily by the Cisalpine Legislators – no doubt one of the intentions behind his initial nomination by Bonaparte. However, it seems the rupture between Vignolle and the *Gran Consiglio* had already begun to take place, as evidence suggests a more significant closeness between the Directory and Vignolle following this episode.¹³⁴⁷ Despite being subject to the redefining of ministerial attributes, Vignolle was not released from his position until after the Rivaud coup in Frimaire Year VI, most likely because of his close connection to both the French Military structure (allied with the *Gran Consiglio*) and the Cisalpine Directory (allied with the French civil authorities like Trouvé and La Révellière-Lépeaux).

In fact, while the conflict with the Minister of War Vignolle caused tensions between the two branches, there never was a personal animosity which seemed to brew between the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* and the War Minister. The same could not be said for the Minister of Interior Affairs Giuseppe Ragazzi. Perhaps this was because Ragazzi was a well-known patriot and native Italian, or perhaps because as Minister of Interior Affairs, Ragazzi's duties had a much greater effect on day-to-day affairs in the Cisalpine Republic – often overlapping with the legislation produced from the *Gran Consiglio* between Nivose and Prairial – and thus necessitated a stricter adherence to his executive function. Unlike Vignolle, Ragazzi found himself replaced in late Germinal by Lamberti from the *Gran Consiglio* and then by Tadini when Lamberti was nominated to the Directory (as a result of the 24 Germinal Coup).¹³⁴⁸ Thus, while the conflict between Ragazzi and the *Gran Consiglio* was not as prolonged as that of Vignolle, it is notable for its severity and the personal nature.

¹³⁴⁷ “Milano li 12 Piovoso anno VI repubblicano della Repubblica una ed indivisibile, il Ministro della Guerra al Direttorio Esecutivo”, ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493 n.d., fol. Direttorio 1798. letter, 31 January, Milan

¹³⁴⁸ “Seduta CXLIX, 27 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:72. Letter of of Dismissal from Tadini citing his reason as the appointment to the Minister of Internal affairs; “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:828–29. Debate over the dismissal of Lamberti; No. 29 22 germinale VI repub. (mercoledì 11 aprile 1798 v.s.) “Varietà”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:210.

Ragazzi had been nominated to his position long before the activation of the legislative assemblies and had exercised an enormous amount of domestic power in the early months of the *Gran Consiglio*. His position granted him a wide range of direct controls within the structures and institutions of the Republic which since Thermidor Year VI included power over the press, departmental and municipal administrations, finance allocation and public instruction.¹³⁴⁹ The broadness of these responsibilities found Ragazzi blurring the lines of his ministerial mandate, at times moving into the competencies of finance, justice and police ministries. This was often met with little resistance due to the high pressure under which these ministries found themselves during the initial months of the Republic in the summer and fall of 1797.

Within his own competencies as well Ragazzi began to play a political role, especially in the organization of public spectacles, public instruction and the publication of national decrees.¹³⁵⁰ Though his political advancements were more or less in line with the majority of Cisalpine patriots in the Autumn of 1797 – revolutionary republicanism, support for the French *Armée*, the establishment of strong departmental and municipal bureaucracies, etc. – constant encroachments on Directorial and legislative responsibilities were an indication of Ragazzi’s growing sense of self-importance the political as well as the administrative objectives of the Cisalpine Republic.¹³⁵¹ Distracted by the financial issues which had begun to plague the Republic and the establishment of a military network to support the French *Armée*, neither the *comitati riuniti* nor the Directory attempted to curb Ragazzi’s growing influence, particularly in the local municipal spheres.

¹³⁴⁹ “Avviso. Milano 24 Messidoro anno I (12 Luglio v.s.)”, Estratto de’Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del primo Termidoro anno V. Repubblicano” “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 70, 72–74; “Milano 3 Termidoro anno V Repubb. °. Lamministrazione Generale della Lombardia Commissionata al Cittadino Ministro degli Affari Interni Ragazzi”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 108,” fol. Bertolosi letter, 21 July 1797, Milan.

¹³⁵⁰ “In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina...Milano 24 Messidoro anno I (12 Luglio v.s)”, Milano 13 Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. CIRCOLARE all’Amministrazione centrale del Dipartimenti [o]...” “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 70, 161–62.

¹³⁵¹ “Milano 20. Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano. CIRCOLARE – Il Ministro dell’Interno agli Amministratori del Luogo Pio di---”, “Avviso...Milano 20 Vendemmiale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano [11 Ottobre 1797 v.s.]”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 168–69. These two documents published on the same day in October of 1797 highlight this growing self impotence of Ragazzi in the months leading up to the activation of the Legislative assemblies. In the first Ragazzi seems to be scolding the municipal administrators he is writing too, arguing that it is well within his right as minister to censor and adjust funding for administrative services which he deems to be a threat to the public good, highlighting in particular his judgement in this effort. The second - a notice posted warning of a new zoological infection in the Cisalpine territory while still under his competencies as Minister of Interior affairs - usurps both judicial and police jurisdictions in dealing with the epidemic.

His first rebuff did not come until the activation of the *Gran Consiglio*. On 7 Frimaire, La Hoz proposed a motion which would stop the use of proclamations and declarations as a substitute for law making in local governance.¹³⁵² The motion also forced the Directory to take disciplinary actions against those members of the ministry who violated the separation of powers by forcing ministers to only publish official acts regarding the execution of legislatively approved laws. Though Ragazzi is not explicitly mentioned as the subject of this motion, his continued flurry of executive proclamations throughout Brumaire make it clear that he is one of – if not the sole – target of this motion.¹³⁵³ He was condemned by radical progressives like Dehò and Alborghetti as well as originalist rationalists like Guiccioli who all found that the continued publication of decrees, proclamations and acts – particularly those which came after the 2 Frimaire activation of the Legislative Assemblies – were direct violations of legislative authority and deserved sanctioned enforced by the Directory.¹³⁵⁴ Instead the Directory decided to side with Ragazzi. A series of notices between 22 and 25 Frimaire by Ragazzi indicate that he played a role in the initial controversy over control for the National Press, perhaps even acting as the fulcrum which began the division between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Cisalpine Directory.¹³⁵⁵ Some days later on 28 Frimaire, Ragazzi released a circular which seemed to formulate a plan for the commerce and merchant taxes within and between departments, as well as a proclamation which challenged the legality of a 22 Frimaire law establishing the production and exportation of silk, citing the “capricious behavior of legislators” as his reasoning for not following through in his duties.¹³⁵⁶ Still these provocations remained unanswered through Nîvose, as both the Directory and the *Gran*

¹³⁵² “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:147. Motion of La Hoz.

¹³⁵³ “Avviso... Milano dalla Cafa del Comune 17 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Avviso... Milano 17 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Milano 28 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano CIRCOLARE Il Ministro degli affari interni Al Monastero di...”, “Milano 28 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano CIRCOLARE Il Ministro degli affari interni Al Monastero di...”, “Proclama... Milano 28 Annebbiatore Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Avviso... Milano 30 Annebbiatore Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano (20 Novembre 1797 v.s.)”, “Avviso 3 Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano (23. Novembre 1797 v.s.)”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:7, 34–36, 37–41, 41, 43.

¹³⁵⁴ “Seduta VI, 7 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:147–48 Debate on the motion of La Hoz and discourses of DEhò, Alborghetti and Guiccioli. .

¹³⁵⁵ “Avviso... Milano 22 Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano (12 Dicembre 1797 v.s.)”, “Avviso... Milano 25 Frigissero anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano (15 Dicembre 1797 v.s.)”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:62–63, 64.

¹³⁵⁶ “Milano 28 Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. Circolare – Il Ministro degli Affari Interni A...”, “il Ministro dell’Interno PROCLAMA per l’esecuzione del §356 della Costituzione”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:65. 66-67.

Consiglio were preoccupied with larger projects of law and political challenges between themselves and with the *Seniori* in this period.

This conflict came to a head at the beginning of Pluviôse. The festival for the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic by the French Republic was due to take place on 2 Pluviôse and had been in planning since early Frimaire. As late as 28 Nivose, Ragazzi seemed to be a willing participant in the planning of the event, and had worked effectively to execute the various proclamations and resolutions coming from the commission of the *Gran Consiglio* tasked with bringing about the festival.¹³⁵⁷ However the day before the event was to take place, the Minister made a decision to postpone the event given that the locality in which it was to take place – the *Campo della Federazione* – had been destroyed by floods and was too wet to hold a festival.¹³⁵⁸ This cancellation enraged members of the *Gran Consiglio*, not because of the postponement – which they all accepted as necessary given the poor conditions – but because once again Ragazzi had overstepped his boundaries by ignoring an existing law.¹³⁵⁹ Lupi proposed a motion which forced the Directory to condemn Ragazzi for his numerous violations of legislative prerogative over the past month. This motion was strongly supported on a unilateral basis with discourses coming from representatives like Dehò and Greppi calling for the *Gran Consiglio* itself to begin to take direct action against Ragazzi. What resulted, thanks to a motion by Luini, was a call to redefine the nature of orders, decrees, notices and proclamations given by ministers, which led in the long term to the total redefining of ministerial roles.¹³⁶⁰

When the issue of Ragazzi's transgressions was reassessed on 4 Pluviôse there was no doubt for representatives that the problem constituted a habit of gross constitutional violations on the part of the Minister of Internal Affairs; however, there was disagreement about how to confront said problem.¹³⁶¹ Democratic representative like the progressives Mozzini and Greppi felt that Ragazzi's actions violated national sovereignty and argued that he should be declared an enemy

¹³⁵⁷ “Avviso...Milano 28 Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano [17 Gennaio 1798 v.s.]”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:125–26.

¹³⁵⁸ “Avviso... Milano 1 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:130.

¹³⁵⁹ “Seduta LXIV, 2 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:116–17 Motion and Discourse of Lupi.

¹³⁶⁰ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:126. Discourse of scarabelli and motion of Luini .

¹³⁶¹ “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:168–71. Debate on sanctions for the Minister of the Interior.

of the state. Republican representative like the neutral moderate Vicini or the originalist rationalists Scarabelli instead felt that the Council could only force the Directory to discipline Ragazzi. The matter was eventually put to a commission; however, when on 7 Pluviôse the illegal proclamation of Vignolle came to light, the Council determined it necessary to censor both Ministers and send a message to the Directory forcing them to discipline Ragazzi and Vignolle, in order to squash their ministerial usurpation once and for all.¹³⁶² Though Ragazzi remained relatively quiet following these sanctions, only providing limited proclamations which exclusively executed the law, he was eventually replaced in Germinal, most likely because of the extreme division which his behavior had caused. More importantly it was this event which led to the 21 Pluviôse decision to reevaluate the attributes of the ministry which took place in Floréal.

What both the examples of Vignolle and Ragazzi demonstrate is that there existed already back in the first days of 1798, a preview of the growing crisis of authority between the legislative and executive branches which presented itself in full form in the month of Messidor. Like the challenges to the equilibrium of powers examined in the previous section, the conflicts between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Ministry – in particular those conflicts as serious as the ones with Vignolle and Ragazzi – saw a proxy battle taking place between the legislative and executive branches. These proxy conflicts always resolved themselves or found compromises precisely before they had the opportunity to explode into full crises. As a purely executive aspect of government, accusations of political maneuvering against the ministry by the legislature were themselves damning enough to merit sanctions. However, the tendency of the Directory to side with its ministers against legislative complaints belies a sense of executive entitlement which would serve as the primary underlying motivator for the Messidor Crisis.

The Messidor Crisis of executive and legislative authority

The conflicts and challenges to power which took place in the first half of 1798, while at times visceral in their presentation, were rather limited in their overall threat to the constitutionally mandated shared authority of the branches which controlled the Cisalpine Republic. As has been continuously highlighted in this chapter, these challenges to power were part of the normal functioning of the equilibrium of powers, tests to the strength of the republican system established

¹³⁶² “Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:217–19. Debate on the consequences of the legislative usurpation of both Vignolle and Ragazzi.

by the Constitution of Year III in 1795. As stated in Chapter V, authority is the power inherent at an organizational or institutional level;¹³⁶³ thus, an institution's ability to influence the behavior, acts or words of another. It differs from normal power since it is no longer reliant on charisma or reputation but on a higher constitutional proscription. Though the Cisalpine Constitution assigned many overlapping functions to the different branches in different sectors of Cisalpine government – for example in the financial sector the idea that the legislature raised funds, but the executive spent them – it very consciously avoided any overlapping of *authority*.¹³⁶⁴ For this reason, the challenges to power can be seen as “conflicts” – defined here as minor questions of political or administrative control – and not “crises”. The term “crisis” as it is used in this study is a challenge to the institutional authority of one branch by the other, for which the Cisalpine Constitution had no clear resolution.

The Cisalpine Republic saw at least three crises of authority take place between Frimaire and Fructidor Year VI. First there was the crisis between the judiciary and the legislature with the erection of military courts of high police (examined in Chapter X); second was the internal crisis of the legislature between the *Gran Consiglio* and the *Consiglio de' Seniori* which culminated in the events of 9 Ventose (examined in Chapter IX). However, the largest and perhaps most damaging crisis took place between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* in early Messidor. This Messidor crisis regarded the extraction and replacement of a new member of the Directory. This crisis came after a series of smaller challenges to authority between late Pluviôse and late Prairial which hinted at a growing tension between the branches at an institutional level. This tension was increased by the arrival of a new player onto the scene of Cisalpine politics, the French Ambassador Claude-Joseph Trouvé. The combination of tensions and constitutional ambiguity led to a sudden explosion of aggressive political actions on the part of both the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*, in which both bodies attempted to break the internal power of the other, in an effort to usurp their authority.

The *Gran Consiglio* – who for its part had seen its own authority collectively increase both internally to the legislative branch, as well as over many parts of the executive branch between

¹³⁶³ Cummings, “The Effects of Social Power Bases within Varying Organizational Cultures,” 5.

¹³⁶⁴ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 82–83. The case of the Cisalpine Constitution is nearly identical to that of the French Constitution of Year III, by virtue of the French Constitution serving as the primary base from which the Cisalpine Constitution was written.

Pluviôse and Prairial— found itself initially at an advantage over the Directory, who was fighting from a point of weakness following the 24 Germinal Coup. Yet by the end of the Crisis on the evening of 11 Messidor, a political rupture took place within the Council itself between those who sought to overthrow Directorial authority, and a group of republican leaning representatives who, swayed by the intervention of Trouvé, came to side with the Directory in establishing executive supremacy. This latter group who came to power in the *Gran Consiglio* in Thermidor Year VI, served as a reactionary group to the progressive agenda which had been established between Pluviôse and Prairial. These Cisalpine “Thermidorians”, would end the crisis by helping established executive authority over legislative authority, relegating the *Gran Consiglio* to a secondary authority in Cisalpine government and politics.

Lead up to the Messidor Crisis

The Messidor Crisis between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Cisalpine Directory was not an instantaneous break in an otherwise healthy working relationship. Overall, the relationship between the Directory and the Legislature worked as intended throughout the first six months of the Legislative Assemblies’ existence, providing a series of checks and balances which allowed the branches to specialize in their specific function without overtaking the authority and competencies of the others.¹³⁶⁵ When a particular segment of one of these branches overreached, as in the case of the Minister of Interior Affairs Ragazzi, the other branch could - and often did - intervene to reestablish the balance of authority. However, these specific instances of challenges to power which took place between Pluviôse and Prairial Year VI, demonstrated a greater underlying conflict of authority which went beyond the normal challenge to equilibrium or oversteps by minor legislative and executive officers.

As alluded to already, the executive branch had almost complete authority over the legislative, executive administrative and judicial operations of the Cisalpine Republic between its establishment on 15 Messidor Year V and the activation of the legislative assemblies on 2 Frimaire Year VI. While the *comitati riuniti* did serve as a provisional legislative branch, their role was more one of constitutional and institutional development with little to no authority over the rule of

¹³⁶⁵ Troper, 81.

the Republic.¹³⁶⁶ Thus, the Directory enjoyed a sort of authoritative supremacy, eclipsed only by that of Bonaparte in the summer and autumn of 1797. And yet this authority was not resented by the majority of the public, and certainly not by the patriot classes who saw the domination of executive authority as a necessity, one which would help to strip away the prejudices of centuries of aristocratic rule in favor of republican nationalism.¹³⁶⁷ The transitional period at the end of Brumaire and early Frimaire, appeared to set up a relatively smooth transition of power from executive exceptionalism to a shared authority amongst the powers. This generally peaceful coexistence - perhaps even friendly rivalry between the two branches - continued into the months of Frimaire, Nivose and Pluviôse.

Yet, towards the end of Pluviôse an event occurred which challenged this peaceful dynamic and the equilibrium of authority which both branches had succeeded in maintaining to this point. On 27 Pluviôse, the *Gran Consiglio* received a message from an S. Rossi, an economist from Milan and a devout republican. In this letter, Rossi praised the efforts of the *Gran Consiglio* in their attempts to raise funds and accused the executive branch of corruption and abuse, claiming that Ministers were abusing their authority and the Directory was actively working to either aid them in this endeavor or at the very least cover up their crimes.¹³⁶⁸ His ire was particularly harsh against the ministry dealings with the French and Cisalpine militaries and the establishment of departmental and municipal administrations (competencies of Vignolle and Ragazzi), in addition to the deplorable state of the National Treasury (competencies of Ricci). His heaviest accusation against the Directory was that their inactivity seemed to purvey an almost wanton republican spirit which betrayed the nation.¹³⁶⁹ It must be remembered that this letter was received in a period when similar accusations of indifferences had been launched by the *Gran Consiglio* itself against the Directory because of problems concerning the National press or the financial pressures of the Republic. A few days earlier the Council had passed a resolution which was intended to force the Directory to hold ministers accountable for their negligence or abuses of office.¹³⁷⁰ Thus it was no

¹³⁶⁶ “Estratto de’ Regisatri del Direttorio Esecutivo. Seduta dei 21 Messidoro... Legge d’esecuzione dell’Atto Costituzionale”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 69–70.

¹³⁶⁷ “No. 10 18 termidoro V repub. (sabato 5 agosto 1797 v.s); Milano 18 Termidoro”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:88.

¹³⁶⁸ “Milano li 27 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano... Al Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 494,” fol. Direttorio Esecutivo publication, 15 February 1797, Milan.

¹³⁶⁹ i “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 494.”

¹³⁷⁰ “Seduta LXXXVIII, 26 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:560–61. Motion of Dehò on behalf of the Drafting Commission.

surprise that instead of condemning the attack on executive authority, the *Gran Consiglio* instead placed the issues raised by Rossi in the order of the day, and then decided to publish the letter, with an honorable mention in their verbal processes, in addition to sending a letter to the Directory which praised Rossi as a good republican.

As expected, the reaction from the Directory was decidedly negative. Perhaps it was the dual insults of a legislative mandate against them and then a public accusation of their ineptitude. The fact that both had been published in a manner so public seemed to suggest aggressive politics on the part of the Legislature, an act which was quickly noticed by outside commentators.¹³⁷¹ If the Directory were seen to be losing legislative trust it had the potential to be viewed as a breach of the social contract, since the legislature was the theoretical voice of the people. The day after the publication of Rossi's message the Directory sent a message to the *Gran Consiglio* which accused Rossi of libel and of the representatives in the Council of using his words to provoke public sentiment against the Directory.¹³⁷² They demanded loyalty from the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*.

Republican elements in the *Gran Consiglio*, like the originalist moderate Lamberti, sought reconciliation, conceding that there may be peculiarities in Directorial actions regarding the ministry which need to be considered but that the airing of dirty laundry would only throw fuel on the fire.¹³⁷³ He proposed that the *Gran Consiglio* retract the honorable mention status of Rossi, instead delivering him to the Court of High Justice, both as a peace offering to the Directory and as a way to prove whether or not his words were libelous. More importantly he highlighted that the disunion of the branches of government would only further strengthen the counter-revolutionary voices in the peripheries, the precise reason why democratic-leaning representatives in the Council had initially called for action against the ministry to begin with. However, his logic was refuted, in particular by progressives like Reina and Dandolo who felt that the demands for loyalty and censorship were exaggerated and dangerous, and that the discord between the branches was not due to legislative provocation but executive usurpation and mismanagement.¹³⁷⁴ For

¹³⁷¹ "No. 14, 29 piovoso anno VI repubblicano repub. (sabato 17 febbrajo 1798 v.s.); 'Gran Consiglio'", Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:106–7.

¹³⁷² "Seduta XC, 28 piovoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:601. Letter from Directory to Gran Consiglio

¹³⁷³ *Ibid* 2:602. Discourse of Lamberti.

¹³⁷⁴ *Ibid* 2:602–3. Discourses of Reina and Dandolo.

progressive rationalists it was enough to ignore the situation by placing it in the order of the day – the eventual resolution passed by the Council; however for more extreme democrats like the progressive radical Zani, the anger of the Directory, and the insults which they rained down on the *Gran Consiglio* was practically traitorous and for the first time, the entire authority of the executive branch – not simply the actions of individuals in specific cases – was called into question by members of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹³⁷⁵

In a note to the *Gran Consiglio* on the following day, 29 Pluviôse – two days after the original publication of Rossi’s accusations – the Directory expressed surprise at the indifference of the *Gran Consiglio* in the face of unpatriotic libel, an accusation which seemed to mock the original words both of Rossi and of the 26 Pluviôse resolution.¹³⁷⁶ Perhaps most egregiously the Directory accused the *Gran Consiglio* itself of unpatriotic actions and having a lack of integrity as they resorted to the use of unconstitutional political games to discredit the executive power, the Directory being its principal figure. They once again demanded that the honorable mention be removed, and Rossi accused of libel.

This aggressiveness on the part of the Directory only served to further alienate the *Gran Consiglio*. Progressive rationalists like Dandolo, Coddé, Reina and Glissenti felt that in order to demonstrate the gross overreaction of the Directory it would be prudent to send the original letter to the Directory in an effort to help them understand the logic of Rossi’s words that they might retract their outrage.¹³⁷⁷ Originalists continued to call for union though with a more measured response believing that this issue needed to be settled in courts to avoid further tension.¹³⁷⁸ Progressive and neutral radicals such as Zanni and Salimbeni, however, viewed this final message as a direct threat against the *Gran Consiglio* and called for public denunciations of the behavior of the Directors. These representatives refused to condemn Rossi or to send his original letter to the Directory, being suspicious that it would be used to imprison him unjustly.¹³⁷⁹ Eventually the Council combined the ideas of progressive rationalists and radicals – a proposal made by Fenaroli

¹³⁷⁵ *Ibid* 2:603–4 Discourse of Zani.

¹³⁷⁶ “Milano 29 Piovoso A°. 6°. Rep°. Il Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 493,” fol. Directorio Esecutivo letter, 17 February 1798, Milan.

¹³⁷⁷ “Seduta XCI, 29 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:623–27 Discourses of Coddé, Dandolo, Reina, Fenaroli and Glissenti.

¹³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 2:624. Discourse of Scarabelli.

¹³⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 2:625–26. Discourse of Zanni and Motion of Salimbeni.

– and sent a letter which did not scold the Directory but did insist upon the lack of libelous material within Rossi’s original letter as well as the apparent overreaction and unnecessary aggression of the Directory.

This initial conflict between the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory provided evidence for the first cracks in *Gran Consiglio* politics between those who supported legislative authority and those who supported executive authority in the spring of 1798. Both inside and outside the government, political voices were beginning to take sides.¹³⁸⁰ The development of these systems of alliances will be covered in greater depth in Chapters X and XI, however by the end of Ventose there was a greater visible closeness between the *Gran Consiglio* and the leadership of the French *Armée*. Tensions which had arisen between members of the Directory and the French Military could be seen as far back as Ventose when the Director Moscati made comments condemning the French military authorities for the Mantua soldiers’ revolt in Pluviôse;¹³⁸¹ Paradisi had in the same period made a misjudged criticism of the treaties of alliance between the French and Cisalpine Republics which had irked the Military and Civil authorities in Paris and Milan.¹³⁸² At the same time, the conflicts inhibiting the signing of the Military and Commercial Treaties between the French and Cisalpine Republics demonstrated to French military leadership the inefficiencies of the Cisalpine Directory and by contrast the willingness of the *Gran Consiglio* to put into action the treaties effective immediately.¹³⁸³ As this occurred, correspondences between the Directories

¹³⁸⁰ « No. 16, 1 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano (19 Febbrajo 1798)... Politica », « Il monitore italiano », 62 This article by Melchiorre Gioja which appeared in the *Monitore* just after the conflict between the Directory and *Gran Consiglio* was apparently resolved, demonstrates how tensions never truly eased between more democratic leaning voices who supported legislative supremacy and more republican leaning voices who supported executive supremacy. Gioja for his part, a more centrist democratic republican, who at times leaned towards the democratic or republican side of the spectrum seems to be siding with the democratic factions in his criticism of a corrupt and silent executive, accusations similar to those made by both Rossi and the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio*. ; « No. 17, 3 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano (21 Febbrajo 1798), 'Direttorio Esecutivo. Milano primo Ventoso anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. », « Il monitore italiano », 68 In this article the then president of the Directory Moscati makes a scathing plea to the Cisalpine people which seems to accuse "vile men" with high ambitions of trying to discredit and usurp the authority of Directory from the people, who he claims have been neglected by this accused group. This further lends evidence that tensions were becoming increasingly high as Ventose progressed.

¹³⁸¹ «No. 17, 3 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano (21 Febbrajo 1798), 'Direttorio Esecutivo. Milano primo Ventoso anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano.» "Il monitore italiano," 68.

¹³⁸² Anonymous, "Le Cri d'Italie," 10.

¹³⁸³ « Milan 30 Ventose Sixième Année Rep.in. Le Directoire Exécutif Au Citoyen Alexander Berthier, Général en chef de L'Armée d'Italie » « ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2 », f^o Ventose VI; « Parigi 18 Floreal anno 6. Al Direttorio Esecutivo della Repubblica Cisalòina. Il cittadino Visconti, ambasciatore della medesima presso la Repubblica francese. », « ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2 », f^o Fiorile VI. Both of these letters, though written from the perspective of the opposing alliance, detail the increasingly close relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the leadership of the French *Armée*, in particular Alexander Berthier. Visconti, whose part was

in Milan and Paris, through their ministers of External Relations , Tallyrand (French Republic) and Testi (Cisalpine Republic), as well as through the ambassadors from the Cisalpine Republic in Paris Francesco Visconti and Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni formed lines of communication between the two Republics. These groups attempted to place the failings of the Cisalpine Republic to follow through on its financial and military obligations towards the French Republic on the shoulders of the legislature.¹³⁸⁴ That said, while tensions continue to expand between the two branches, they were interrupted as both the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* turned on the *Consiglio de' Seniori* for their refutation of the treaties with the French and their unwillingness to pass urgent legislation. This common enemy seems to have brought a sort of truce between the Directory and *Gran Consiglio* through the month of Ventose into mid-Prairial.

Despite the truce between the *Gran Consiglio* and Directory the two bodies had already come to blows at the end of Ventose regarding the sale of land held by the aristocracy of the former Grison territory in the Valtellina and Valchiavenna, which drew in the *Seniori* on the side of the Directory.¹³⁸⁵ This enraged even the most republican members of the *Gran Consiglio*, now convinced of the indifference with which the Directory seemed to control the finances of the Republic. The mounting pressure from French authorities, both Military and Civil, upon both the legislative and executive branches for military and financial contributions of the Cisalpine Republic led these tensions to continue bubbling under the surface, as both the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory attempted to convince their respective allies of the incompetence of the other.

By the end of Germinal it was decided that the executive branches were in dire need of changes, a decision upheld within the *Gran Consiglio* by republican and democratic leading representatives alike. Initially the changeover began when Ragazzi was replaced with Lamberti as Minister of Internal Affairs on 19 Germinal.¹³⁸⁶ In addition to ensuring the progressive rationalist

interestingly one of neutrality - due mostly to the conflict between his relative revolutionary radicalism and his sympathies towards the French Republican model - perfectly articulates the struggle which seemed to be playing out between the months of Ventose to Floréal between the various factions of Cisalpine and French governments, in particular the French Military, the French Directory, the Cisalpine Directory, the *Consiglio de' Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹³⁸⁴ “Parigi li 12 Ventoso anno 6. Serbelloni ambascidore straordinario. Visconti ambasciadore ordinario Rangoni Segretario d’ambasciata al cittadino Testi ministro degli affari esteri”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2,” fol. Ventose VI.

¹³⁸⁵ “Seduta CXIV, 22 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:331–32, 369–70. Letters from the Directory.

¹³⁸⁶ “Seduta CXLI, 19 germinal anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:828–29. Dismissal of Lamberti.

majority (now rid of the originalist moderate influence of Lamberti), the *Gran Consiglio* could guarantee that the ministry would be filled with a tolerant ear in the case of future conflicts with the Directory. However, following the Coup of 24 Germinal, and the expulsion of Directors Moscati and Paradiso, Lamberti was able to ascend all the way to the Directory.¹³⁸⁷ In his place was nominated the progressive radical Tadini from the *Gran Consiglio*.¹³⁸⁸ Now, not only would the *Gran Consiglio* be guaranteed an ally within the executive branch, the prominence of former *Gran Consiglio* members would hopefully provide a measure of dominance for the Council in the decision making and execution process. This dominance over Cisalpine politics and legislation led to the general peace of Floréal and the high legislative output of that month according to the progressive rationalist platform. Additionally, Floréal brought with it a new French pressure campaign on the part of Haller and the French Civil authorities in Milan, who were eager to squeeze funds out of the new executive structure before the arrival of the forthcoming ambassador from France.¹³⁸⁹ This distraction for the Directory, in addition to the changing attributes for the Ministry saw a hamstrung executive branch coming into the final ratification of the treaties between the French and Cisalpine Republics on 11 Prairial.¹³⁹⁰

However, this weakened state of the executive branch was immediately bolstered thanks in part to the introduction of the French ambassador Trouvé into Cisalpine Politics in the beginning of Prairial. As a protégé of the extreme centrist French Director Lerévellière-Lépeaux, Trouvé believed in the benefits of a strong republican executive.¹³⁹¹ He had little faith in Italian national will, and even less in the Cisalpine Republican legislature's ability to properly formulate a system of revolutionary government. Upon hearing that there would be a new French ambassador to the

¹³⁸⁷ "Milano li 30 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano Il Ministro degli Affari Interni all'Ispettorica centrale di Contabilità.", "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Uffici Regi, 494," fol. Uffici Directory.

¹³⁸⁸ *Ibid*; "Seduta CXLIX, 27 germinale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:72 Dismissal of Tadini.

¹³⁸⁹ "a Milan 8 Floréal an 6eme de la République Française une et indivisible. Au nome de la République Française Haller Administrateur des Contributions & Finances d'Italie Au Citoyen Arrigioni Delegué du Directoire"; Milano 8 Fiorile Anno 6° Rep° Arrigoni Commissario del Tesoro Nazionale al Direttorio Esecutivo"; "Au nome de la République Française à Milan 13 Floréal an VI de la République Française une et indivisible. Haller Administrateur des Contributions & Finances d'Italie Au Citoyen Arrigioni Commissaire de la Trésorerie de Milan", "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2," fol. Fiorile VI letters, 27 April- 2 May 1798, Milan.

¹³⁹⁰ "Traité passé le onze prairial an Six Entre le Citoyen Haller Administrateur des Contributions Et Finances d'Italie Et le Citoyen Arrigoni Commissaire de la trésorerie Nationale de la République Cisalpine" "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2," Pratile VI treaty (manuscript copy), 30 May 1798, Milano.

¹³⁹¹ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 200 (note).

Cisalpine Republic, he expressed a desire that it not be him, believing the attempts to augment and improve Cisalpine republicanism an exercise in futility.¹³⁹²

He was thus unhappy at being whisked away to Milan at the end of Floréal to serve as French ambassador there, charged with the institutionalization of a new Constitution similar to that of the Roman Republic (see Chapter XI). Trouvé immediately set out in this endeavor by insulting the current structures which favored the *Gran Consiglio*, claiming that to him “never before had it seemed more absurd, more useless, more apolitical and more unjust” the ways in which the Cisalpine Republic treated with foreign dignitaries, forcing them to present themselves before both the Directory *and* the legislature a concept he blamed on the “venetian aristocracy”, whom he believed had infiltrated Cisalpine government.¹³⁹³ By the end of Prairial he had met with the Cisalpine Directory, whom he viewed as weak and lacking in responsibility, and had proposed his plan to alter the constitution.¹³⁹⁴ This plan put executive authority at the heart of the new government in an attempt to better the execution of republican policies. He blamed what he saw as the disorganization of a legislatively run republic on the influence of French General in Chief of the *Armée Brune* and his democratic allies in the *Gran Consiglio*, shaming the executive by contrasting them with the corresponding bodies of Roman and Ligurian republics.

Messidor Crisis

The month of Messidor Year VI (mid-June to mid-July 1798) became the point of eruption for a brimming crisis of authority between the legislative and executive branches. Whereas previous conflicts between the two had either been carried out through proxy parties – for example the challenges of Ragazzi or Ricci and their respective ministries – or for short durations which ultimately ended in stalemate – the Rossi affair, the crisis over military control – the Messidor crisis pit the two institutions against each other in a final attempt to establish the supremacy of one or the other over Cisalpine political culture. The crisis may very well have ended in stalemate, or perhaps even have seen the Gran Consiglio finally taking a place of supremacy atop the policy

¹³⁹² “N° 23 Naples 17 ventose an VI de la république”, *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 248–49.

¹³⁹³ “N° 26. Milan, 1er prairial an VI de la république française” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 255 trans.

“Rien ne me semble plus absurde, plus inutile, plus impolitique, plus injurieux...” “...de l’aristocratie vénitienne...”

¹³⁹⁴ “N° 27. Milan 23 prairial an VI de la république” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 255–57.

making structures of the Republic, had it not been for French intervention, particularly on the part of Trouvé, whose support for the Directory delivered them a decisive political victory.

The initial phase of the Messidor Crisis actually began in the final days of Prairial when the issue of the Directorial substitution was first raised by the Directory itself. In a message sent to the *Gran Consiglio* on 23 Prairial, the Directory questioned whether or not Testi and Lamberti – the two Directors who took the place of Moscati and Paradiso after the 24 Germinal Coup – should be considered in the substitution process.¹³⁹⁵ According to the Cisalpine Constitution the nomination of new a Director was to take place within 10 days of the death, dismissal or removal of a Director, and they would remain in this role – provided it was more than six months from the end of the original Director’s mandate – until the end of the original 5 year period.¹³⁹⁶ According to Reina, the article stipulating this (§140) provided a response that in fact Testi and Lamberti could not be selected for substitution since they would not yet have served the six months mandated by this article in time for the scheduled date of 20 Messidor.¹³⁹⁷ However, according to Gambari, a fellow lawyer and progressive, the strange circumstances of Lamberti and Testi’s nomination – the result of a foreign backed coup – meant that in fact the constitutionality of their position was already in question, and motioned that the issue go to commission which was approved and included both Gambari and Reina, as well as the neutral rationalist Vismara.

The issue at hand of course was less constitutional and more political. Lamberti, despite his more moderate nature, was a strong voice in support of legislative function and a friend to the *Gran Consiglio* having served as a member. Even the suggestion of his possible expulsion raised the hairs of progressive rationalists who to this point had been able to successfully keep the executive-legislative conflict of authority at bay and push through a high volume of legislation over the course of Floréal and Prairial, thanks in large part to the amicable relationship with Lamberti. However, they also understood that Lamberti’s support, as an originalist moderate was strongly tied to the constitutionality of his position, and for this reason there could be no question

¹³⁹⁵ “Seduta CCII, 23 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:434. Letter from the Directory to the Gran Consiglio.; interestingly this issue would never officially be resolved since it seems that the eventual conflict between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* saw a rupture between Lamberti and the Council which made his extraction a non-issue

¹³⁹⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI, Article 140.

¹³⁹⁷ “Seduta CCII, 23 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:434. Discourse of Reina.

of his constitutional right to remain out of contention for extraction – a point which Gambari effectively made in his motion.

Even without the added difficulties of Lamberti's and Testi's constitutionally dubious appointment, the extraction and substitution of the Directory was going to cause problems from the onset due to the unclarity which surrounded the process in the Constitution. The process began in the *Gran Consiglio*, where every member would nominate four individuals through a secret ballot to take the place of a Director.¹³⁹⁸ The four nominees with the highest total votes would then be put to another secret ballot vote in which one of the four with the fewest votes would be excluded from the nomination. This process would continue until only three names remained. These names would then be sent on to the *Seniori* who would first exclude one of the three by sorting them at random and excluding the selected name.¹³⁹⁹ The remaining two would be put to a vote by secret ballot and the winner of this vote would be selected as the new Director. All this was to take place on the same day and all other matters on the order of the day for either council could not proceed until the selection of the Director was completed.¹⁴⁰⁰ Those who were nominated had to be at least 35 years of age, have served as a representative in the Assemblies, or as a minister (though this latter article was not to be put into effect until Year IX of the republic).¹⁴⁰¹ Members who served as legislators in Year V (the *comitati riuniti*), could not also serve as Directors for a year after their nomination in Messidor Year V.¹⁴⁰²

The issue arose over the selection of the Directory member who was to be dismissed. A Director would be sorted every year for the first four years of the republic (for the first year on 20 Messidor and thereafter on 1 Prairial), until all but one member was left.¹⁴⁰³ In this way the five-year mandate would naturally exclude a Director every year. However, the Constitution did not provide a way for extracting the first Director in the first of these four years. Were they voted out by secret ballot or randomly sorted? Were they selected by the Directory itself or by the legislative body? Who was even eligible for extraction given that only Alessandri and Costabili remained

¹³⁹⁸ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI Article 131.

¹³⁹⁹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI, Article 132.

¹⁴⁰⁰ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI, Article 133.

¹⁴⁰¹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI Articles 134 and 135.

¹⁴⁰² "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI Article 136.

¹⁴⁰³ "Estratto dei Regisitri del Diretorio Esecutivo. Seduta del giorno 25 Brumale Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano", *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:26; "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title VI Article 137 and 138.

from the original Year V iteration of the Directory and Savoldi had only been selected for the position in Brumaire Year VI – in addition to the concerns already voiced regarding Lamberti and Testi?

The day after the original message from the Directory, 24 Prairial, Pietro Polfranceschi proposed an urgent motion – which was approved – in which he laid out these questions and declared that a plan needed to be formulated to decide the manner in which the extraction and substitution of the first Director was to take place on 20 Messidor.¹⁴⁰⁴ He then went on to propose a plan he had himself constructed which would answer the constitutional question, both those already proposed and which he believed might appear in upcoming debates.¹⁴⁰⁵ This plan consisted of fifteen Articles, of which Articles III, VI, were further subdivided into twelve and fourteen procedural points respectively. These two articles in particular established the process by which the *Gran Consiglio* would extract and then elect a new member of the Directory. The extraction process was to be conducted ten days before the election of the new Director was to take place (i.e. 10 Messidor) before members of the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory. Two present representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* would be randomly selected from an urn to serve as the “extractors”. These extractors would be charged with the care of two other urns which contained five nuts upon which each were written the names of the five members of the Directory. The extractors would first demonstrate the contents of the urns to the public and would then shake the urn. They would then swap urns and extract a nut with the name of a member who was to cede his place on the Directory. If the nuts contained the same name that individual was selected and required to vacate his position within ten-days. If the names were different the nuts would be placed in the urn of the “first extractor” (that which was selected first by the council) and the second would in turn extract from that urn a nut with the name of the member to cede his position. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* would become the sole decision maker for the extraction process.

Polfranceschi’s plan was printed in order to make its examination more complete in future sessions before it could be passed as a resolution. On 2 Messidor Polfranceschi proposed three changes to this law which would regulate the living situation of the extracted Director and further guarantee the exclusivity of the *Gran Consiglio* in the extraction process by forcing the *Seniori*

¹⁴⁰⁴ “Seduta CCIII, 24 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:438. Motion of Polfranceschi.

¹⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 5:439–43. Plan for the extraction and Substitution of a member of the Directory by Polfranceschi.

and Directory to formally acknowledge the decision of the Council.¹⁴⁰⁶ Following the approval of these changes, the progressive rationalist Federici declared that it was a matter of immediate urgency that Polfranceschi plan be passed in the *Seniori* as a law. Though initially rebuffed by the neutral rationalist Vicini for not having yet resolved the matter of Lamberti and Testi, the progressive rationalist Brunetti supported the motion of Federici and stated that plan was first necessary as a law before the decision of Lamberti and Testi could be decided. Federici's motion was passed and Polfranceschi's motion made an official resolution.

As expected, the decision to allow the *Gran Consiglio* to decide the extraction of a member of the Directory was met with extreme hostility. In a message sent to the *Gran Consiglio* on 5 Messidor, the Directory, led principally by the Directors Constabili and Alessandri laid out a series of scathing accusations against the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁴⁰⁷ They began by accusing the *Gran Consiglio* of keeping from the Directory their plans for extraction, having only heard about it through the printed verbal processes. The Directory declared the passage of this resolution, first on its own was unconstitutional, but its passage into law was downright traitorous, citing Article 46 of the Constitution which prohibited the legislature from exercising an executive or judicial function.¹⁴⁰⁸ They accused the *Gran Consiglio* of purposefully attempting to overthrow the separation of powers and of usurping executive function in an action which violated both the constitution and the declaration of the rights of man. This was the first time since the activation of the legislative assemblies in Frimaire, that the Directory believed themselves to be confronted with a direct and public challenge to executive authority on the part of the legislature – something which had been long feared but not directly seen, since all other conflicts had taken place through proxies like Rossi or Ragazzi.

Dehò, the leader of the progressives and a radical responded thusly: “Il Direttorio è molto sottile. Grande acume veramente egli dimostra. Gran sottigliezza... Oggi che si tratta di nominare un direttorie, il Direttorio ci fa presente la Costituzione. Al messaggio del Direttorio sapete qual risoluzione conviene? Si passi all'ordine del giorno.”¹⁴⁰⁹ These sentiments were shared by other

¹⁴⁰⁶ “Seduta CCX, 2 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:595. Motion of Polfranceschi.

¹⁴⁰⁷ “Seduta CCXIII, 5 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:663. Message from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁴⁰⁸ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VI Article 46.

¹⁴⁰⁹ “Seduta CCXIII, 5 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:663 discourse of Dehò; trans: “The Directory is very subtle. It truly demonstrates great accumen, great

representatives, principally Reina, Glissenti, and Luini who noted the hypocrisy behind the Directory's accusations, having themselves ignored so many constitutional violations by their own ministers. The following day the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* received word that the *Seniori* had not passed Polfranceschi's plan into law.¹⁴¹⁰ It was decided that the returned resolution should be put to a commission (consisting of Luini, Polfranceschi and Vismara) for reworking. However, both Dehò who proposed the commission and Polfranceschi who originally drafted the resolution, stated their belief that it was not the contents of the resolution which caused its rejection by the *Seniori*. They both accused the Directory of (allegedly) illegally bullying and intimidating the *Seniori* into rejecting the resolution. The conflict had now turned into a full-blown crisis as both the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory had directly accused the other of attempted usurpation of powers, and of trying to unconstitutionally take power for themselves.

The following day, in the morning session of 8 Messidor, the Directory sent a message to the *Gran Consiglio* in which they seemed to gloat over the rejection of the resolution from 2 Messidor by the *Seniori*.¹⁴¹¹ In this message which was clearly meant to provoke the leading progressive representatives of the Council, the Directory reminded the *Gran Consiglio* to remain in its place using a metaphor of religious adherence to the constitution. It clearly had an effect. Polfranceschi called for the message to be placed in the order of the day but Luini called for even more drastic measures against the Directory, stating that in this provocation there existed a dangerous attempt by the executive branch to stifle the voices of the sovereign people, represented by the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁴¹² To leave these provocations unanswered would lead to executive tyranny. These sentiments provoked strong emotions against the Directory even in their most fervent allies in the Council like the neutral moderate Savonarola, who called for the official publication of the original resolution as a *Gran Consiglio* decree which bypassed the rejection of the *Seniori*. Surprisingly, it was the progressive radical faction led by as Lattanzi, Gambari and Salimbeni who prevailed with cooler heads to settle the matter, demonstrating to the council that a returned provocation would only serve to prove the Directory's point that the *Gran Consiglio*

subtly... Today that we are talking about nominating a Director, the Directory presents us with the Constitution. Do you all know what resolution is fitting for the message of the Directory? That it is passed into the order of the day."

¹⁴¹⁰ "Seduta CCXIV, 6 messidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 5:667. Message from the *Seniori* to the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁴¹¹ "Seduta CCXVI, primo delli 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 5:750–51. Letter of the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁴¹² *Ibid*, 5:751. Discourses of Polfranceschi and Luini.

was seeking to usurp executive authority, and instead opted to simply ignore the baiting of the Directory, sending a message scolding the Directory for its opening of a rift between the branches and proposing mediation by Trouvé.¹⁴¹³ The Directory immediately responded to this message by refusing the blame for causing any division between the branches, but accepting use of Trouvé as an intermediary between the factions.

What the *Gran Consiglio* did not understand was that by involving Trouvé they had opened up a door which they would be unable to close. Trouvé's natural bias against the *Gran Consiglio* almost guaranteed that he would side with the Directory in the matter of extraction. However, the *Gran Consiglio* seemed to be unaware of these biases, as evidenced by their attempts as far back as 23 Pluviôse to turn Trouvé against the Directory by acquiescing to his request for increased resources and arms for the provisioning of French troops – a request originally denied by the Directory.¹⁴¹⁴ Following the request for the mediation of Trouvé by the *Gran Consiglio*, the Directory had immediately sent a message to the ambassador requesting his intervention. It can be believed that this letter would paint the Directory in a good light, and an already sympathetic Trouvé would have been happy to intervene, both for his own political purposes and as a way to begin his mission of instituting a new Constitution in the Cisalpine Republic. His response was read aloud to the *Gran Consiglio* in special evening session on 8 Messidor.¹⁴¹⁵

In his letter, Trouvé – in a moment of high *politique* – declared that the process of extraction of a Director must be equally divided between the two branches. However, he did state, rather ironically, that he fully expected the *Gran Consiglio* to protest this. In essence, Trouvé sided with the Directory that the actions of the *Gran Consiglio* were unconstitutional and that he was aware of their political intentions, which he fully expected to have to confront in the future. Here the *Gran Consiglio* seemed to break into three divided groups on how to proceed.¹⁴¹⁶ The more republican proto-factions of originalist and neutral moderates, led by voices like Savonarola and Vicini saw wisdom in Trouvé's words and sought to follow his advice in constructing a new plan which would highlight the equilibrium of powers. The more democratic proto-factions like the

¹⁴¹³ *Ibid*, 5:752–53. Motion of Gambari and Discourses of Polfranceschi, Gambari, Salimbeni and Lattanzi.

¹⁴¹⁴ “Seduta CCII, 23 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:412–13. Debate on the request for resources by French ambassador Trouvé.

¹⁴¹⁵ “Seduta CCXVII. secondo delli 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:756. Letter of Trouvé to the Cisalpine Directory.

¹⁴¹⁶ *Ibid*, 5:756–57 Debate on the response to Trouvé.

neutral and progressive radicals led by Gambari, Lattanzi and Bragaldi, wanted to ignore Trouvé's mediation and instead continue to push the original plan, sighting the supremacy of the law and the judgment of the sovereign people represented by the *Gran Consiglio*. The third group, which constituted the majority of neutral and progressive rationalists led by Polfranceschi and Latuada sought a middle road which would continue to condemn the actions of the Directory in opening a rift between the branches, but instead of directly challenge Trouvé would acknowledge his advice as wise counsel – even if it wasn't heeded.¹⁴¹⁷

The matter came to a rather anti-climactic resolution. The evening session of 9 Messidor was conducted largely in secret commission in order to discuss the matter following its publication by the Directory earlier that day.¹⁴¹⁸ However two resolutions were passed between 9 and 11 Messidor which suspended Article III pertaining to the extraction of the Directory by the *Gran Consiglio* and instead replaced it with a new system which had the excluded Director continue to chosen by the *Gran Consiglio* but officially recognized and put in place only by the Directory, thus restoring the equilibrium of powers.¹⁴¹⁹ This new strategy saw the same basic structures of Polfranceschi's plan remain, however instead of members of the *Gran Consiglio*, the Directory would select – at the National Palace in plain view of the Supreme Court, the heads of the cisalpine administration and the Legislative Assemblies – one child from among a group of 10 orphans who would then extract the Director using the urn and nut system of Polfranceschi – though this time with a single selection instead of two.

In a special evening session on 11 Messidor specially dedicated to ending the crisis, a resolution passed 38 to 37 which completely nullified the 7 Messidor extraction resolution, and instead set the date for extraction to be 15 Messidor using the new system resolved earlier that day.¹⁴²⁰ Though this special session seemed to ease the tensions between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* it ended up leaving deep divisions within the *Gran Consiglio* between those who wanted to continue to push for a greater role of the Council in the selection process, and those who wanted to remain loyal to Trouvé's intervention.

¹⁴¹⁷ *Ibid*, 5:758 Letter of Polfranceschi to the Directory.

¹⁴¹⁸ “Seduta CCXIX, secondo dei 9 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:774.

¹⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*; “Seduta CCXX, primo delli 11 Messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:776, 782–83. Motions of Lattanzi and Alborghetti regarding the laws of 7 Messidor and the new system of extraction of the Cisalpine Directory.

¹⁴²⁰ “Seduta CCXXI, secondo delli 11 messidor anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:791.

Progressive radicals like Gambari and Lattanzi felt that nullifying the law of 7 Messidor (the final resolution which was based on Polfranceschi's plan) was extreme and seemed to give to the Directory an acknowledgement of their political victory. Progressive rationalists like Latuada and Reina similarly opposed the rejecting the original plan, which they felt at least had some merits. Valsecchi – as one of the major voices for the commission created on 9 Messidor after Trouvé's intervention and who resolved to side with him against the wishes of the progressives – felt personally attacked by these accusations and his allies like Scarabelli and Savonarola from the originalist rationalist, neutral moderate and neutral rationalist proto-factions supported the ending of this law. Progressives saw in this a betrayal of the original intent of the law and the unfair voting which took place at the beginning of the session an unconstitutional measure to end the crisis and allow the Directory to get off free of sanctions for the chaos they were believed to have caused. The final affirmation of the rejection of 7 Messidor Law and the acceptance of the Directory to begin the extraction process on 15 Messidor, was passed in a resolution on 14 Messidor.¹⁴²¹ The divisions caused by this crisis left the *Gran Consiglio* weak and elevated the Directory to a new level of power which they would only strengthen going into Thermidor.

The Cisalpine Thermidorian Reaction

The fallout from the 11 Messidor evening session of the *Gran Consiglio*, had a deeper impact on Cisalpine politics than any other session (other than the 23-25 Ventose debates on the Military and Commercial Treaties) since the activation of the legislature in Frimaire. The idea which bound the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, regardless of their political ideology or proto-faction was the supremacy of the legislative branch in the decision-making for the Cisalpine Republic, and its role as the physical manifestation of popular sovereignty. The rupturing of this ideal, and the light-speed rise of the Directory as the preeminent body of Cisalpine politics in the weeks following the Messidor Crisis decisively ended the monopoly of the legislature in the construction of Cisalpine legislative and political culture. It was the turning point of the entire Republican project in Italy. Now, the Cisalpine Republic, as the only of the Italian sister republics created since 1797 to have developed a strong legislative culture, found that culture shattered to pieces over the course of two weeks.

¹⁴²¹ "Seduta CCXXIV, 14 messidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 5:869.

However perhaps the most profound result of the Messidor Crisis was the rapid dismantling and then gradual institutionalization of the new Cisalpine Constitution between the second half of Thermidor and the Coup of 14 Fructidor which saw its final establishment. This coup has long been seen as an unexpected and in many ways, revolutionary moment in which Cisalpine politics was flipped on its nose.¹⁴²² However an analysis of the political situation during the summer of 1798 demonstrates a rapidly changing political environment which came to be dominated by executive domination and legislative suppression. In his efforts to bring the Cisalpine Republic closer to the French Republic, Trouvé and his allies in the Cisalpine Executive created a new opposition in the *Gran Consiglio*, one which was constructed from the excluded supporters of legislative power in the Council between Frimaire and Messidor Year VI. This executive reactionism within the legislative branch which found its peak in mid-Thermidor Year VI was a deliberate struggle against the progressive rationalist policies in the first half of 1798 and can be seen as a Cisalpine “Thermidorian Reaction”. It should be noted that while there is a similarity to the 1794 reversal of Mountain led political practices in the French Convention, Cisalpine legislative authority never was (and constitutionally and culturally could never have been) as powerful as nor as chaotically driven as that of Robespierre’s legislative power, meaning the reaction of Cisalpine politicians in Thermidor Year VI in Milan was nowhere near as all-encompassing, violent, or profound as the events of Thermidor Year II in France.

Perhaps one of the strongest reasons why this period can be termed a “Thermidorian Reaction” for the Cisalpine Republic, was because like that which occurred in France in 1794, the reaction began as an internal uprising within the legislative. This can be seen occurring on the evening of the 11 Messidor itself. As already mentioned, the motion to end the 7 Messidor law passed by a razor thin margin of 38 to 37. However, upon arrival the opposition group, made up largely of the democratic proto-factions (progressive radicals, progressive rationalists, neutral radicals and some neutral rationalists), quickly called for a revote having not been present and debating the validity of the commissions right to propose a modified version of the law.¹⁴²³ However members of republican proto-factions (some neutral rationalists, neutral moderates, and originalist rationalists) argued that the commission had served its intended purpose according to

¹⁴²² Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 61–62; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 19–20.

¹⁴²³ “Seduta CCXXI, secondo delli 11 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:791-792. Discourse and motion of Vicini and Luini

both the constitution and the advice of Trouvé and that to deny this would only further prolong a useless constitutional crisis.¹⁴²⁴ Luini, a progressive rationalist revealed parts of the secret committee session from the previous day, violating the basic norms of decorum by exposing representatives to public scrutiny.¹⁴²⁵ The *Gran Consiglio* found itself split, with those seeking to continue on against the executive directory –Cavedoni, Latuada, Reina, Luini, Vicini, Gambari – and those who felt that the *Gran Consiglio* needed to accept defeat and move on with the business of legislating – Valsecchi, Scarabelli, Vismara, Allemagna. This latter group would come to constitute the core of Cisalpine “Thermidorians” who began to see the progressive politics as moving toward a dangerous (perhaps even Jacobin) political position and thus sought to work with the executive authorities and Trouvé in subduing it.

The split was immediately apparent the next day when representatives from either side of the split (Gambari on the side of the legislative authority, Valsecchi on the side of the “Thermidorians”) requested their dismissal from the *Gran Consiglio*, both citing an inherent inability to work with the opposing group any longer.¹⁴²⁶ The election of the neutral rationalist Ramondini on 16 Messidor does demonstrate early attempts to reunite the divisions in the second half of Messidor.¹⁴²⁷ However these attempts to bolster unity were unable to also repair the damage done to the political authority of the *Gran Consiglio*, so much so that when the election for the Directors on 19 Messidor came down to a choice between Vincenzo Brunetti of the *Gran Consiglio* and Girolamo Adelesio – the recent substitution for Ricci as the Minister of Finance – it was Adelesio who was voted as the new Director not Brunetti.¹⁴²⁸ Brunetti for his part was moved out of the *Gran Consiglio* and became Minister of Police as a part of the political reshuffling in Thermidor.¹⁴²⁹

¹⁴²⁴ *Ibid*, 5:792, 794. Discourse of Scarabelli, Vismara and Stefani.

¹⁴²⁵ *Ibid*, 5:795. Discourse of Luini.

¹⁴²⁶ “Seduta CCXXII, 12 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:806, 812. Resignations of Valsecchi and Gambari.; Though both resignations were put to the order of the day – effectively denying them – they demonstrate a tension between the groups of representatives themselves and no longer between the institutions of the executive and legislative branches.

¹⁴²⁷ “Seduta CCXXVI, 16 Messidor anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:7. Nomination and election of Ramondini to the presidency.; Raimondi had been a relatively silent player in Cisalpine politics to this point with few interventions and refused to side with either of the newly forming factions.

¹⁴²⁸ “Seduta CCXXIX, 19 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:86. Election of Adelesio to the Executive Directory by the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁴²⁹ “Seduta CCXXXII, 23 messidoro anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 6:151. Petition of Brunetti to the Minister of Police.

This loss of power for progressive rationalists meant that the authority of the legislative branch had lost much of its public credibility. Interestingly this trend is not reflected in the original selection of Council offices for the first half of Thermidor. Sabatti a vocal neutral radical took Ramondini's place as president, while Cadice (neutral radical) and Calvi (neutral rationalist) were selected to replace the progressive radical Alborghetti and neutral rationalist Conti at the secretary position.¹⁴³⁰ This seemed to indicate that there was a general desire to maintain the internal status quo, allowing the *Gran Consiglio* to sit as a neutral body in Cisalpine politics the way the *Consiglio de' Seniori* had after 24 Germinal. All these men had in common a certain neutrality regarding the question of legislative vs executive authority, and as such were not a challenge to the agenda which were to be set forth by the pro-executive authority group of republicans who had begun to garner more power in late Messidor.

When looking at the structure of personal power then, the information on discourses from Rank 1 provides some interesting information. There was little increase in the percentage of total discourses given by those who belonged to this new Cisalpine "Thermidorian" group (33% of total discourses between 11 Messidor and 29 Thermidor, up from 32% of total discourses from 2 Frimaire to 10 Messidor) meaning that the total personal power of the group as a whole was not any more influential than in the previous period. However, when examining the individual PPS (personal power scores) which constitute Rank 1 and based on the number of individual discourses given, there are some interesting results that show a massive spike in personal power for individuals whose legislative ideology reflected those from this Thermidorian/Republican group. Giuseppe Necchi d'Aquila, for example, made half the number of discourses in this month (137), as he had in all the previous seven and a half months before combined (274), as did his intellectual rival turned political ally Luigi Bossi (84 discourses compared to 143 from the period between Pluviôse and Messidor). Others, like Samuale Della Vida or Alfonso Longo, saw their personal power increase sometimes even double. Meanwhile personally powerful individuals like Dandolo and Polfranceschi saw their personal power in this period see a sudden drop – Dandolo for example only made 15 discourses in this period, almost all in late Messidor, which was a sharp drop from the 288 he had made in the previous period (Frimaire to mid-Messidor). There was a particular

¹⁴³⁰ « Seduta CCXL, 1 termidoro anno VI repubblicano » Montalcini et Alberti, 6:293. Election of presidents and secretaries of the *Gran Consiglio*. Interestingly, Alborghetti himself turned towards the Thermidorian faction just before losing his place as secretary and became Trouvé's most avid supporter both inside and outside of the *Gran Consiglio* until he was replaced by Aldini at the beginning of Fructidor.

group, mostly made up of neutral and progressive rationalists like Pergesuiti (176 compared to 624), Reina (125 compared to 401), who continued to challenge the cisalpine “Thermidorians” at a relatively high rate even after the 11 Messidor evening session.

However, the greatest expression of the cisalpine “Thermidorian” power was through commissions and the wielding of legislative power, as demonstrated in Rank 3 and the raw data provided from the *processi verbali*. Between 21 Messidor and 29 Thermidor there was a sudden uptick of republican leaning members being nominated to special and semi-permanent commissions. Twelve of the fifteen representatives nominated to the Petitions Commission were either vocally in favor of increasing executive authority (for example Scarabelli, Tassoni or Ambrosioni) or were neutral representative with no power at all (Graziedei, Dure, or Gambazzocca). A similar trend was seen for the Drafting Commission with nine of the twelve nominated belonging to this Thermidorian group (the other three being progressive rationalists Bragaldi, Piazza and Coddé who were of the opposition group similar to Perseguiti and Reina). Thermidor saw a very limited number of special commissions (7) formed in this month. Within these special commissions eleven representatives of this “Thermidorian faction” were able to gain seats, putting them on an equal footing with those who supported a strong legislative authority for the first time in the history of the council.

Finances became the primary preoccupation of the Directory during Thermidor, and specifically finding a way to keep the National Treasury full so that the payments toward the French state could remain on schedule. The Thermidorians dedicated the 15 Messidor Session exclusively to the issue of a consumption tax, something which had been left largely ignored since late Prairial.¹⁴³¹ Progressives and others who supported legislative authority felt that the plan to tax the consumables most used by the populous such as rice, bread or animals would unfairly effect the poor and rural communities of the peripheral areas, mostly the farmland of the Padano and the mountainous area in the Val Bergamasco and Valtellina who relied heavily on the sale of these goods for their livelihood.¹⁴³² However the new Thermidorian group, which already constituted republicans, found support in their agenda from some neutral rationalists, particularly those from

¹⁴³¹ “Seduta CCII, 23 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:419–24 Motion on consumption tx and debate which followed.

¹⁴³² *Ibid*, 5:422–23 Discourses of Salimbeni and Dehò against the consumption taxes; “Seduta CCXXV, 15 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:900–906. Discourse of Bragaldi and Domenico Pelosi against the implementation of the consumption tax.

the scientific backgrounds like Bossi, Massari and Vismara, who argued that the burden of taxes needed to be shared by all or else the national treasury would forever remain empty.¹⁴³³

The debates regarding the taxation of common goods became a central topic in the early days of Thermidor. Despite arguments against their implementation from the side of those favoring legislative authority, powerful members of the new Thermidorian faction called for a standardization of taxes across the nation, which hit each class, profession and locality equally, according to the principles of the Republic.¹⁴³⁴ The Thermidorians also proposed a tax on merchants and industrialists – of which there were few in northern Italy in this period.¹⁴³⁵ The Directory for their part seemed to favor this tactic which cut taxes and export tariffs on major luxury industries like silk or goods of military necessity like gun-powder, while simultaneously advocating for an increase on popular needs like bread, salt and tobacco to fill the hole left by these other industries.¹⁴³⁶ This bias towards luxury items like silk and military equipment like gun powder can almost certainly be seen to have come directly from the French plan for the Cisalpine economy, though there is no direct proof for this, only the fact that both would have seriously advantaged French military and commercial interests. Simultaneously, this caused great anger among the more vocal representatives opposing the combined force of the Directory and the Thermidorians to push through this legislation, as it was seen as a direct violation of both popular and national sovereignty.¹⁴³⁷

The legislative opposition made up of the remaining vocal progressives and neutral radicals and some progressive rationalists like Latuada, Reina and Glissentini, had a chance to retake control of the financial legislation of the Cisalpine Republic by setting in place a much stronger progressive bureau to lead the *Gran Consiglio* in mid-Thermidor. Unfortunately, however, the vocal neutral moderate Vicini was selected to take the presidency, himself a strong voice of the

¹⁴³³ “Seduta CCXXV, 15 messidoro anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:899, 906–8. Discourse of Bossi and Massari.

¹⁴³⁴ “Seduta CCXLII, 3 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:340–41. Discourses of Ambrosioni, Greppi, Perseguiti and Bovara regarding a tax on cheese as a general good not specific to a particular area.

¹⁴³⁵ “Seduta CCXLIII, 4 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:375–77. Discourse of Ressi.

¹⁴³⁶ “Seduta CCXLVI, 7 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CCXLVIII, 9 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta CCLII, 13 Termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:481, 436, 556–57. Letters from the Directory.

¹⁴³⁷ Seduta CCL, 11 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:515–17. Discourses of Lattanzi, Greppi, Salimbeni and Latuada against the imposition or nullification of various laws which disadvantaged the common people.

Thermidorian faction.¹⁴³⁸ The secretaries were the relatively neutral rationalists Bertanza and the doctor Moccini, one largely unknown and the other a constant ally of Vicini. Radical representatives like Olivari, Isimbardi and Raimondi attempted to get themselves nominated as local administrators, so that they might stop the implementation of these Thermidorian policies at the lower levels; most of these were refused by the executive.¹⁴³⁹ Those members left over who supported legislative authority either remained out of debates (as in the case of Dandolo) or else attempted to infiltrate commissions or hijack debates (such as Reina, Lattanzi and Luini) in order to include articles which might act as a sort of compromise to executive control over taxes on merchants and consumables.¹⁴⁴⁰ These measure, however were largely rejected by the now powerful Thermidorian representatives like Bossi, Aquila and Bovara. Following the Coup of Trouvé in mid-Fructidor, these individuals from the Thermidorian faction would go on to serve as important members of the new *Consiglio de' Juniori* and would be instrumental in the establishment of the financial plan which the *Gran Consiglio* had been working to formulate since Nivose.

The Messidor Crisis and the Cisalpine Thermidorian Reaction were but the extreme finalities of months of political infighting between the executive and legislative branches. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter the equilibrium of powers established within the Constitution of Year III, the basis of the Cisalpine Constitution, while intended to bring peaceful coexistence between the branches, in fact led to a larger sense of suspicion, political maneuvering and challenges to both power and authority, which manifested itself most clearly between the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio*. These two bodies, who in their own way represented the paradoxical facets of post-Thermidorian democratic republicanism – liberal representative democracy on one hand and elite rationalized republicanism on the other – clashed more than they cooperated, an unfortunate consequence of the tense political and international moment in which they lived.

¹⁴³⁸ “Seduta CCLV, 16 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:607. Election of *Gran Consiglio* offices.

¹⁴³⁹ “Seduta 17 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:658. Letter from the Direcotry refuting the admission of Ramondini to the departmental administration of Alto Po.

¹⁴⁴⁰ “Seduta CCLIX, 21 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:769, 772, 774, 780–82. Discourses of Lattanzi, Luini and Reina.

Yet while many historians have viewed this as a failure of the Revolution in northern Italy, it was in many ways the great success story of the Cisalpine Republic, who instead of tearing itself apart to build the new state – as was the case with France between 1792 and 1795 – the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* worked within the bounds of the system they had adopted and adapted as their own. In fact, it is possible that without Trouvé's intervention this tension would have. This sense of cohabitational tension was not unique to the relationship of the Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* though it was perhaps most visible here. It was a strategy of politics and government which the *Gran Consiglio* seemed to adopt with the other institutions of Cisalpine society as well. It was found internal to the legislative branch in the conflicts and tensions with the *Consiglio de' Seniori*. It was found with other branches of government such as the administration and the judiciary. And it was found in the *Gran Consiglio's* relationship to external institutions, most notably the Roman Catholic Church, whose presence remained one of the largest questions of the period. The following two Chapters will continue to look at how the *Gran Consiglio* used the waxing and waning of political tensions and alliances to work its internal agenda and apply a new political culture which had been developed within the chambers of the Council itself onto the other institutions of the new Cisalpine State.

Chapter IX

Legislative cultural exchange:

The Gran Consiglio and The Consiglio de' Seniori

The classic place of the *Consiglio de' Seniori* within the historiographical tradition of Cisalpine political culture is often one of intermediary: between legislative and executive branches, popular and national sovereignty, aristocratic and bourgeois interests and French and Italian republican identity. Where the *Gran Consiglio* was the constructor of Cisalpine political culture, in many ways the *Consiglio de' Seniori* was its great moderator – or indeed its guarantor. This was of course the very function that the upper house of the new bicameral assembly was designed to serve when it was first applied to French Revolutionary government politics under the Constitution of Year III in 1795. The *Gran Consiglio* came to design its legislation in such a way that it would be oriented towards the favor of the *Consiglio de' Seniori* – at least in the initial months of 1798. However, the moderation of the *Consiglio de' Seniori* was not a welcomed influence in the turbulent state building politics of a nascent Cisalpine Republic, still grappling to discover its own identity between an Italian nation and the French Revolutionary heir. The upper house came under attack from all sides, including from foreign allies in the French military establishment who condemned its caution, especially in acquiescing to the demands of the treaties between the two states. This would result in the eventual coup of 24 Germinal Year VI, where the *Seniori* would find itself permanently under the thumb of its more prominent institutional partners, both in the legislature and the executive branches.

Chapters IX and X were initially conceived to constitute a single chapter looking at the exchange of political cultural concepts between the most important institutions of the Cisalpine Republic and the *Gran Consiglio*. However, over the course of writing this combined chapter it

immediately became apparent that the relationship between the two houses of the legislative branch were different than that of the *Gran Consiglio* with other governmental and non-governmental institutions, much in the way that the *Gran Consiglio* and the executive Directory had a different relationship. This was in large part due to the fact that the *Gran Consiglio* and *Consiglio de' Seniori* were affected by the same internal polemics and worked together in a partnership closer than any other two political bodies within the Cisalpine governmental system. Though important, the influence of the Catholic Church and of local departmental political cultures had historical and external political roots which separated their development from that of the *Gran Consiglio*; the *Consiglio de' Seniori* had a parallel, if not identical experience to the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to its restructuring in the 14 Fructidor Coup. For that reason, it was decided to separate the chapter, though retain the central theme which analyses the effect which both houses had on the other's political culture in 1798. Though it is the shortest chapter, it provides an interesting look at a strange power dynamic which seems to reflect internal political struggle within the legislative branch, and at the same time a shared resistance to external pressures embodied in the legislative bicameral partnership. One of the most notable innovations in the constitutional structures of post-Convention period of the Revolution in Europe after 1795 was the formation of a two-chamber assembly and the institutionalization of bicameralism as a central principal in legislative procedure.¹⁴⁴¹ The historiographical base for bicameralism in the age of Revolutions is too large to examine in this thesis, as it has been a central theme of historical study of Revolutionary government from the revolutionary period itself. Here, therefore, the focus will be on the origins of the concept of bicameralism and in particular on the development of the upper and lower house dynamics as it relates to the Cisalpine Assemblies.

Bicameralism and the Upper House of the Legislative Assembly

Bicameralism was not a late eighteenth century revolutionary design, and in many ways was one of the concepts which linked the more centrist Directory period of the French Revolution with past revolutionary movements such as the English Civil War in the seventeenth century and the American Revolution. The construction of the British Parliament which had a democratically elected lower house (commons) and a hereditary and appointed upper house (Lords) was the basis for modern bicameralism, itself having origins in medieval and early modern councilor bodies.

¹⁴⁴¹ Troper, "La Question Du Bicamérisme En l'an III," 23.

However, what the English Civil War and the subsequent Glorious Revolution at the end of the seventeenth century created within legislative theory was the idea of political (though not social) equality of the houses. The designation of the Commons as the body of legislative innovation and the Lords as the body of legislative approval established a balance of powers within the legislature so that privilege and performance would become shared attributes of the law-making procedures in modern government. However, this developed, at least in the English case, eventually morphed into a unicameralism as the political criticisms of the aristocratic functions of the upper house of Lords slowly chipped away at its authority throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, leading to a supremacy of the Commons by the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁴⁴²

The “mixed constitution” (both democratically elected and simultaneously aristocratic) which governed British parliamentary practices seemed a paradox, particularly as eighteenth-century innovations in social and political philosophies brought about doubts over the usefulness of aristocratic superiority.¹⁴⁴³ With the American Revolution, the “democratization” of the upper house in the form of the elected senate seemed to attempt to rectify this paradox. Unlike the British who stripped the aristocratic upper house of its authority, the Americans sought to retain the entire function of the bicameral division of legislative powers.¹⁴⁴⁴ However, the upper house (the Senate) of the American congress would be selected according to principles of democracy and republicanism (even if early American patriots were hesitant to define them as such) which elected individuals to the position based on the merits of the political record, not the privilege of their birth.¹⁴⁴⁵ Yet still, under the new American Constitution, senators were distributed evenly by state (two a piece, large or small) and selected by state legislators meaning that business or social powers controlling those states continued to have an enormous amount of power within upper house legislative functions.¹⁴⁴⁶ As Italian political commentator and Cisalpine democrat Matteo Galdi

¹⁴⁴² Cotta, “Il Problema del Bicameralismo-Monocameralismo,” 551-552.

¹⁴⁴³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 14.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Cotta, “Il Problema del Bicameralismo-Monocameralismo,” 552.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Isreal, *The Expanding Blaze*, 78.. This concept became the primary point of criticism by French commentators in the years leading up to and during the French Revolution. According to many of the most famous political minds in Paris – including Mirabeau, Condorcet and Diderot – the method of electing an upper house whose decision was final on the formation of legislation risked the usurpation of power by a body of economically and socially powerful men, essentially reestablishing a modern form of aristocracy not based in hereditary privilege but in wealth.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 174.

would say in a 1798 commentary on the American constitution “...they have traded one aristocracy for another”.¹⁴⁴⁷

Both the experiences of the British and American bicameral legislatures had a profound effect on the formation of the French legislative system at the onset of the Revolution in 1789.¹⁴⁴⁸ Commentaries on the nature of constitutionalism, particularly that of the Americans after 1787 had been translated from English into French by the late 1780s.¹⁴⁴⁹ For many important French figures in the early years of the French revolution (Brissot, Mirabeau, Condorcet) there was an explicit contradiction between the ideas espoused in the American Declaration of Independence and the institutions and structures of the American Constitution, in particular the latter’s tendency to borrow the legal obfuscation and generality found in the English system which left the door open for aristocratic exploitation of the common people in the economic, political and social realms of daily life.¹⁴⁵⁰ While many in the early Estates General of 1789 lauded the rationality of the English and American legislative systems, as the Revolution began to transform in 1791, and particularly after 1792, concepts from these English speaking traditions – such as bicameralism and the upper house – came to be seen as weak points which could be exploited by conservative and monarchist factions.¹⁴⁵¹ After all Madison himself declared that the idea of a Senate was to make the government “federal not national” a concept which seemed to fight against the popular union which Jacobins especially had hoped to produce after 10 August 1792.¹⁴⁵² Due to these concerns all three iterations of the French legislature in the early phase of the Revolution – the National Constituent Assembly of 1789-1790, the Legislative Assembly of 1791-1792 and the National Convention from 1792-1795 – were unicameral.

When the Commission of Eleven met in 1795 to form a new Constitution following the fall of Robespierre in Thermidor Year II, the old concerns of the effects of bicameralism did not evaporate, particularly on the part of those who continued to sustain old Girondin viewpoints in

¹⁴⁴⁷ De Felice, *I Giornale Giacobini Italiani*.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Troper, “La Question Du Bicamérisme En l’an III,” 23.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 198.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Isreal, *The Expanding Blaze*, 74–76.; nowhere is this contradiction more evident than the American paradoxical relationship with African Slavery

¹⁴⁵¹ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 77–78; Isreal, *The Expanding Blaze*, 78; Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 209.

¹⁴⁵² Madison, “Federalist No. 39.”

the Convention.¹⁴⁵³ However the concept of equilibrium of powers forced Thermidorians to put on the façade of a bicameral check through the formation of an Upper and Lower assembly in the new Constitution of Year III.¹⁴⁵⁴ Many like Thibaudeau saw the use of bicameralism, despite its tendency towards aristocracy, as a useful and necessary part of the new system of checks on the legislature, so long as the upper chamber stuck to its role as the “rejector”, and allowed the lower chamber to remain the “proposer”.¹⁴⁵⁵ The Thermidorians of 1795 in the French Convention saw the formation of a second legislature, not only as a way to reach back out to powerful monarchist elements who could help in the post-Robespierre reconstruction of the Revolution, but as a way to temper the will of the people which many held responsible for the excesses of the terror and the popular *sans culottes* insurrection which had occurred in Germinal and Prairial that year.¹⁴⁵⁶ Those like Sieyès who were hesitant to put in place an upper house like the American’s had done, instead proposed a way to weaken this body by instituting a constitutional jury to police any oversteps by both legislative bodies.¹⁴⁵⁷ Others like Boissy D’Anglas, less concerned with the rise of an old aristocracy and more with the resurgence of the old nobility proposed the use of a Council of Elders instead of an English house of Lords or American Senate, which would fill its ranks with the most proven minds of the republic, aristocratic or otherwise.¹⁴⁵⁸ La Révellière-Lapeaux saw the use of a bicameral legislature as a way to limit legislative usurpation, thus justifying the existence of the upper house as the voice of reason.¹⁴⁵⁹

These points made by prominent Thermidorians bring with them the more general question of what exactly bicameralism is and how it is meant to function in a legislative government? As previously mentioned, the theory of bicameralism in Revolutionary government went back to the

¹⁴⁵³ Troper, “La Question Du Bicamérisme En l’an III,” 24.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 82; Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l’histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 135.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Thibaudeau, *Mémoires Sur La Convention et Directoire*, I:376–77. Interestingly this rationale was used by Thibaudeau to reject Sieyès’s concept of a constitutional jury which he said was a useless institution serving no purpose if the councils functioned as intended. In fact, one sees that Thibaudeau’s concepts of functioning councils seemed to have been a bigger influence on Cisalpine than French ideas of bicameralism since the Cisalpine Republic consistently strove to separate these two functions in a tireless fashion as will be demonstrated in this chapter.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l’histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 136–37.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Fiorentino, 141–46; Goldoni, “At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power.”

¹⁴⁵⁸ Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l’histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 145–47.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Fiorentino, 151.

concept of separation of powers championed by Montesquieu in the mid-eighteenth century.¹⁴⁶⁰ Those who designed the laws should not also be the same as those who approve, apply and judge those laws. This was the main folly of the *ancien regime* according to popular political philosophy of the mid-eighteenth century. Bicameralism according to the British method – admired by many mid-century European political philosophers like Montesquieu who came from the aristocratic elite – saw an innovative Commons – one which was knowledgeable of the difficulties which plagued the common Englishman – formulating resolutions to problems, but a wise and educated nobility – conscious of the problems of execution and application by virtue of traditional aristocratic political roles – having the final word on the usefulness of a resolution. For Montesquieu this provided a sense of security for the both the common man and the ruling aristocracy.¹⁴⁶¹

The concept of bicameralism was a check on the authority of a legislative majority. In a legislature the control of power and thus the control of institutional authority is operated according to two distinct systems: a majority ruled system in which the majority in the legislature controls the authority of the entire organization, or a minority ruled system in which the minority opposition has the ability to veto through various institutional functions.¹⁴⁶² An example of the former would be the French National Constituent Assembly in which votes were won by a majority regardless of how slim that majority was. An example of the latter would be the American two-thirds majority vote for overruling an executive veto, in which members of the opposition needed to vote alongside the majority (accept in case of a political supermajority) in order for a law to pass. Bicameralism in both a majority and a minority system work as an extra check to this power, as now majority outcomes needed to be doubled in both houses, as did minority vetoes.¹⁴⁶³ Commissions no longer have objective control of the entire legislative process as the legislative power inherent in one house may not necessarily translate to the other, particularly if an opposing party or faction has gained the legislative power in the other house.¹⁴⁶⁴ Thus the attempts to influence individual voters – particularly in a more nascent system of bicameral legislative government (for example the Cisalpine Republic in 1798) where political fracturing is still in its early stages – becomes much

¹⁴⁶⁰ Troper, “La Question Du Bicamérisme En l’an III,” 24–25.

¹⁴⁶¹ Troper, 25.

¹⁴⁶² Cotta, “Il Problema del Bicameralismo-Monocameralismo,” 559.

¹⁴⁶³ Cotta, 563.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Martin, “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote and Legislative Organization,” 341–43.

more integral to the acquisition of branch authority. Yet the forms of power examined in Chapters V and VI (personal, positional and legislative) have much less impact over this ability to acquire authority than in a unicameral legislature since often the modes of acquiring power are not transitional from one house to the other (the exception being bicameral committees, which did not exist under the French Constitution of Year III or the Cisalpine Constitution). The result is either partisan politics which span both houses of the legislature (as with the American system) or a consistent challenge of authority between the houses similar to that seen between the legislative and executive authority examined in the previous chapter.¹⁴⁶⁵

However, the true defining feature of modern bicameralism, besides the division of legislative authority, is its specialization. In all of the systems mentioned thus far – British, American and French – the two houses which made up the legislative branch each served different functions in the legislative process. The lower house – the Commons, House of Representatives or the Council of 500 – were all charged with the formation of legal resolutions.¹⁴⁶⁶ This right was accorded to the lower house as it was believed they were more imbued with the sovereignty of the nation and people which they served.¹⁴⁶⁷ The upper house was constructed largely of appointees based on a wide variety of criteria specific to the historical moment and political philosophy of the nation which it existed (for example the House of Lords was based on aristocratic privilege, the American Senate on political affiliation and local power and the Council of Ancients age and expertise) meaning that they were less inclined to understand the needs of the people.¹⁴⁶⁸ That said, the upper house either through political and social privilege or perceived wisdom and experience, was charged with making the assessment of lower house resolutions based on constitutionality, rationality and applicability. What happened to a law after it passed bicameral legislative processing was different in the three examples examined; however, specialization of either proposal or rejection was common to the bicameral philosophy and divided legislative authority with the intention that this authority could not be usurped by internal or external powers.

The bicameralism which came to be embodied in the French Constitution of Year III, and thus the Cisalpine Constitution by extension, was the most recent iteration of the three examples,

¹⁴⁶⁵ Troper, “La Question Du Bicamérisme En l’an III,” 27.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Troper, 28.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 174; Isreal, *The Expanding Blaze*, 75.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Thibaudeau, *Mémoires Sur La Convention et Directoire*, I:376.

and thus carried with it over 150 years of development by the time it was formulated in 1795. In addition to the specialization of rejection, the upper house also took upon itself the power of veto, a power which in previous iterations had been reserved for the executive branch (the English King or the American President).¹⁴⁶⁹ This new specialization given to the Council of Ancients (named the *Consiglio de' Seniori* for the Cisalpine Republic), stemmed from the fear of executive authority which had continue to linger in the republican psyche from the early years of the Convention. By offering to the Directory the right to veto, as had been allotted to the American president, or even to Louis under the 1791 French Constitution, it was believed that a dangerous executive policy making influence would be able to play a role in the internal politics of the Legislative assemblies, thus breaching the equilibrium of powers.¹⁴⁷⁰ As such the Council of Ancients (or *Seniori*), now came to be viewed not only as a check on the constitutionality and applicability of resolutions from the Council of 500 (or the *Gran Consiglio* for the Cisalpine Republic), but on the impact which these resolutions would have on the political culture of the nation as a whole. The upper house of the legislature under the Constitution of Year III became the intermediary between the popular sovereignty embodied in legislative authority and national sovereignty embodied in executive authority.

Thus, the bicameralism which is formed under the Constitution of Year III is a combination of all of the varying political models proposed above by figures like Sieyes, Thibaudeau, La Révellière-Lapaux and Boissy d'Anglas. The Council of Ancients (*Seniori*) had the specialization of powers as called for by Thibaudeau, though, according to the ideas of Sieyes, lacked the strength of influence inherent in the American Senate which strengthened the balance of powers.¹⁴⁷¹ Though the Upper House took on the power of the executive veto, it was consistently locked in a state fluctuating conflict and accord with the Lower House which would theoretically distract the legislative branch from usurping more a greater authority from the executive, as Le Révellière-Lapeaux had hoped for. And finally, the criteria which qualified members for the two chambers guaranteed that the most experienced and knowledgeable members of the legislature would have the final legislative decision, in accordance with the ideas of Boissy d'Anglas. The Upper House,

¹⁴⁶⁹ Troper, "La Question Du Bicamérisme En l'an III," 29.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 82.

¹⁴⁷¹ Thibaudeau, *Mémoires Sur La Convention et Directoire*, I:375–78; Goldoni, "At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès' Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power."

though less numerous in members, would be superior in understanding, not just of the constitution, but of the needs of the nation and the people.¹⁴⁷² Bicameralism became the “great compromise” of the Constitution of Year III, as it had within its structures the extreme centrism which defined the Directory period more generally, and which sought to maintain at all cost the fundamental idea of an equilibrium of powers. More importantly, the newly formed upper house under this system, more so than either the American and British bicameral systems, was made up of an elite not based on wealth and privilege but on merit and experience, a rationalization of republican ideology in France awaited since 1789 but unattainable to that point.

The transference of this bicameralism into the Cisalpine Republic was relatively seamless. As the Cisalpine Constitution was nearly identical to the French Constitution of Year III, it is not surprising to find the institutions of the *Consiglio de' Seniori* and the Council of Ancients nearly identical. Like the Council of Ancients in France, the nomination to the *Consiglio de' Seniori* was based on specific qualifications which each member needed to meet in terms of age, merit and experience (as opposed to the British House of lords based on birth-right or the American senate based on an election). One of the few differences between the two council's was size. While both upper houses contained fewer representatives than their respective lower houses, the Cisalpine *Consiglio de' Seniori* was less than a fifth of its French counterpart at 40 members while the French Council of Ancients had 250.¹⁴⁷³ This was due to the demographic discrepancies between the two republics which saw the overall number of representatives in the Cisalpine legislative assembly having approximately half the number of that of the French assemblies. Outside of this technicality the rules which regulated the upper houses of both Republics were nearly identical and as such the *Consiglio de' Seniori* will remain the main the primary point of study for the structure of this upper house given the scope and conditions of this dissertation.

Construction of the *Consiglio de' Seniori*

The representatives of the *Consiglio de' Seniori* (from this point referred to also as the *Seniori*) were subject to much more stringent qualifications than the *Gran Consiglio*, mostly due to the idea that this body would be constructed by wiser and more knowledgeable men. The

¹⁴⁷² Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l'histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 153.

¹⁴⁷³ “Constitution de la république française, et lois y relatives,” Article 82; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 80.

representatives who sat in the *Seniori* needed to be over the age of 40 at the time of their nomination and had to have been resident within the territory which made up the Cisalpine republic for a period of at least fifteen years.¹⁴⁷⁴ While older men could and often did sit within the *Gran Consiglio* (Perseguiti, Terzi and Rossi to name a few examples), it was often preferred that they move to upper house – unless the residency requirement was not met. The residency requirement was waived for those members who were granted citizenship.¹⁴⁷⁵ Though not Constitutionally proscribed, by virtue of age and residency representatives from the *Seniori* were often well known within their home territory and/or their established profession.¹⁴⁷⁶ The extra ten years of age theoretically offered the *Seniori* a wisdom which the men of the *Gran Consiglio* could not have, at least not as a singular body and not in the majority.

As with the *Gran Consiglio*, the *Seniori* had the right to formulate its own internal policy, which dictated the norms of behavior and the legislative processes of the upper council.¹⁴⁷⁷ This internal policy, entitled the “*Reglamento*” in an effort to mimic the French legislative *réglement* was passed on 25 Frimaire Year VI.¹⁴⁷⁸ As with the *Gran Consiglio*, the *Seniori* endowed its positional power into three offices, elected from the ranks of the Council: a Council President, elected monthly, charged with maintaining order, opening and closing discussions, recognizing speakers, and introducing motions, resolutions and laws;¹⁴⁷⁹ two secretaries, also elected monthly, charged with the registering of debates, formation of speaking lists, formalization of legal drafts and writing and receiving of messages to outside governmental bodies (*Gran Consiglio*, Directory, local administrators, diplomats etc.);¹⁴⁸⁰ and finally three Inspectors of the chamber, elected every three months charged with the maintenance of Council funds, furnishing of materials, maintenance of the Council guards, enforcement of the peace, management of Council employees and invitations for outside speakers (petitioners, Directory members, foreign military or diplomatic

¹⁴⁷⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 81.

¹⁴⁷⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 82.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Fiorentino, *La Seconde Chambre En France Dans l’histoire Des Institutions et Des Idées Politiques (1789-1940)*, 156.

¹⁴⁷⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 63.

¹⁴⁷⁸ “Regolamento per la polizia del *Consiglio de’ Seniori*” Processi Verbale delle sessioni del Consiglio de’ *Seniori* 1797, 1-7

¹⁴⁷⁹ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ *Seniori*”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ *Seniori*,” Articles 1, 7, 10, 23, 28, 29, 33, 34.

¹⁴⁸⁰ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ *Seniori*”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ *Seniori*,” Articles 1, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, 39, 40, 51.

representatives, etc.).¹⁴⁸¹ In addition to these three offices the internal policies of the *Seniori* stipulated the number and wages of persons employed from outside of the council itself to serve various functions.¹⁴⁸² The *Seniori* sat for the first time on 2 Frimaire, the same day as the *Gran Consiglio*. The session was opened by a provisional president who was the oldest member, Paolo De Capitano, and two provisional secretaries – the youngest members of the Council – Alessandro Belemante and Francesco Germani.¹⁴⁸³ Only the president was changed for this session, with Giuseppe Beccalossi being elected through the use of a secret ballot.

The operation of the *Seniori* was in many ways identical to the *Gran Consiglio* in format. The *Seniori* could not begin this deliberation if the minimum number of 20 representatives was not met.¹⁴⁸⁴ Only once the necessary number of representatives was established through the *appelle nominaux* would the secretaries be able to read aloud the *processi verbali* from the previous sessions.¹⁴⁸⁵ Once the *processi verbali* had been approved the Council would carry on with the order of the day. Much like the *Gran Consiglio*, external messages, petitions and resolutions would be introduced to begin the deliberation process.¹⁴⁸⁶ These documents would be collected by the Secretaries who would then transfer them to the inspectors and archival employees for preservation.¹⁴⁸⁷

Though the *Seniori* could not formulate legislation as the *Gran Consiglio* could, this did not mean that debates did not take place. All messages, resolutions and petitions were subject to debate which followed a process outlined in the internal policies. As with the *Gran Consiglio*, speakers would be listed in order by secretaries to speak on particular topics, however only the President of the *Seniori* could recognize these speakers before they began their intervention.¹⁴⁸⁸

¹⁴⁸¹ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 1, 5, 13, 38, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49.

¹⁴⁸² “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” 3.

¹⁴⁸³ “Sessione I. 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano repubblicano” “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” 3.

¹⁴⁸⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 83.

¹⁴⁸⁵ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Article 13.

¹⁴⁸⁶ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Article 14.

¹⁴⁸⁷ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 15 and 16.

¹⁴⁸⁸ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Article 23.

Once recognized representatives would either provide motions or offer speeches regarding the subject in the order at the time. Motions were made by representatives in the registered order standing behind their assigned desks.¹⁴⁸⁹ They were not forced to stand at a central bar or tribune like the *Gran Consiglio*, this being reserved for outside speakers and messengers. Once a motion was read anyone could comment on the motion so long as they were called to speak by the President, (similar to the rules of the *Gran Consiglio*).¹⁴⁹⁰ Once a motion was deliberated, it would be voted on and resolved in the same ways as the *Gran Consiglio* – approved, rejected, order of the day or *aggiornamento*.¹⁴⁹¹ The *Seniori* also used commissions, however these commissions were purely analytical bodies meant to examine the constitutionality, legality or necessity of resolutions, not the formulation of resolution as with *Gran Consiglio* commissions.¹⁴⁹² Thus, the acquisition of legislative power was significantly less important in this body than personal and positional power.

The norms and order of the *Seniori* were also similar to that of the *Gran Consiglio*. Representatives were expected to remain courteous and respectful of proceedings at all times. When a motioner was speaking it was prohibited to make noises of approval or disapproval, and the motioner could not be interrupted for any reason other than by the Council president.¹⁴⁹³ When the president called for order the representatives present in the council were expected to remain silent and seated, and they could not leave their posts unless with the express permission of the council president, an explicit difference to the internal policies of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁴⁹⁴ This was perhaps due to the much smaller number of representatives available for the *Seniori*, which meant that it was easier for sessions to be prematurely closed. Transgressions against these behavioral norms could be met with censorship. The same was said for spectators and petitioners. The number of spectators was set at 100, and unlike the *Gran Consiglio* this number did not change to reflect

¹⁴⁸⁹ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 24, and 26.

¹⁴⁹⁰ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 25 and 27.

¹⁴⁹¹ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Article 27.

¹⁴⁹² “Sessione III, Milano 4 Frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” 13.

¹⁴⁹³ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” 25, 28 and 29.

¹⁴⁹⁴ “Regolamento per la polizia del *Consiglio de’ Seniori*”, Processi Verbale delle sessioni del Consiglio de’ *Seniori* 1797, Articles 31 and 33

the number of representatives present for debates.¹⁴⁹⁵ Unruly members of the public were liable to expulsion from the chamber or even arrest by members of the Council Guard, who served under the Inspector of the Chamber and acted as a kind of internal police service, similar to that of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁴⁹⁶ The Council guard similarly presided over the Council Bar, where petitions were invited – no more than three at a time – to make statements before the *Seniori*.¹⁴⁹⁷ Unlike the *Gran Consiglio* however, petitions could not be translated into laws, simply used as external commentary to help *Seniori* representatives deliberate.

The role of the *Seniori* itself in the legislative process, as has been noted all along, was that of rejector, or final decision maker for legislation.¹⁴⁹⁸ However, the passage of laws was not as simple as holding a vote for every resolution that the *Seniori* received from the *Gran Consiglio*. As with the *Gran Consiglio*, the *Seniori* went through a process of constitutionally proscribed deliberations before a resolution could be passed into law. Official resolutions would be transmitted from the *Gran Consiglio* to the *Seniori* by official messengers, of which neither house could employ more than two at a time.¹⁴⁹⁹ Upon arrival the message needed to have its letterhead verified by the Inspector as an official transmission before being passed on to the secretary for registration in the order of the day.¹⁵⁰⁰ The letter head not only identified the sender and official nature of the message but also its function – i.e. a petition, resolution, complaint etc. Before being registered in the order of the day, the secretaries would verify that the resolution followed the constitutionally proscribed format, which required a preamble explaining the need for the law, the considerations which argued its purpose and the articles of resolution which outlined the aspects of the law, in addition to the signatures of the *Gran Consiglio* president and secretary who wrote up the final resolution.¹⁵⁰¹ The *Seniori* were obligated to refuse the resolution before deliberations

¹⁴⁹⁵ “Sessione II Milano 3. Frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” 6.

¹⁴⁹⁶ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 20, 41, and 42.

¹⁴⁹⁷ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 35, 36, and 37.

¹⁴⁹⁸ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 84.

¹⁴⁹⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 122,123, and 124.

¹⁵⁰⁰ “Regolamento per la polizia del Consiglio de’ Seniori”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’ Seniori,” Articles 39,40.

¹⁵⁰¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 75.

if it did not meet these requirements, as occurred on 3 Frimaire with one of the first resolutions transmitted to the *Seniori*.¹⁵⁰²

Once a resolution was verified, it was read out based on its place in the order of the day by the council president.¹⁵⁰³ Resolutions which had been marked urgent by the *Gran Consiglio* would be moved up to the first spots of the order of the day based on the order they arrived. However, as mentioned in Chapter VII, declaration of urgency on the part of the *Gran Consiglio* carried with them risk, since the *Seniori* could refuse the resolution simply by refusing the tag of urgency, which would see the resolution returned to the *Gran Consiglio* for reworking.¹⁵⁰⁴ Resolutions not marked as urgent would follow a process of deliberation into law similar to the process turning of motions into resolutions in the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁵⁰⁵ Resolutions would be subject to three *lettura* – just like motions in the *Gran Consiglio*. Following each *lettura* the council president would open up debate for the various representatives to express their opinions in favor or against the resolution proposed. Before the third reading the resolution would be formally printed as it would be were it to become an official law. A vote can be taken after any *lettura* however following the third *lettura* the final decision had to have been made regarding the fate of the resolution. For resolutions marked urgent the final vote would be made after only one *lettura*.

Once deliberations had ended the vote would be called for by a representative who had to file a motion to decide on the resolution. As with *Gran Consiglio* motions, resolutions in the *Seniori* had a number of different possible outcomes. The most obvious and simplest outcome was approval, after which the resolution would be officially recognized as a law and printed as an official act of the legislature.¹⁵⁰⁶ Once approved the preamble of the new law would add a preamble to the original resolution from the *Gran Consiglio* which noted the new date, followed by a stamp of approval at the end with the signatures of the *Seniori* president and secretary. Approved resolutions could only be approved in their entirety, it being prohibited to cherry-pick particular articles which the representatives of the *Seniori* found favorable.¹⁵⁰⁷ Nor could the *Seniori* in any

¹⁵⁰² “Sessione II, Milano 3, Frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano”. “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 7 Motion of Beccaria against the resolution of the Gran Consiglio made by Dandolo regarding the Guards in National Piazzas; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 86 and 95.

¹⁵⁰³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 85.

¹⁵⁰⁴ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 87 and 88.

¹⁵⁰⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 89.

¹⁵⁰⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 90, 91, 92 and 94.

¹⁵⁰⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Article 93.

way alter the original text from the resolution itself if they disagreed with its content, though they could provide corrections from commission work or from general council deliberations. The second possible outcome was a flat rejection of the resolution by the representatives of the *Seniori*. These cases occurred when it was believed that the resolution was either unconstitutional or was entirely without merit.¹⁵⁰⁸ However, the *Seniori* could not simply reject a resolution without a reason. When a resolution was rejected for unconstitutionality, it was declared as such and returned to the *Gran Consiglio* for reworking. For rejects based on the merit of the resolution, the *Seniori* had to declare themselves totally against the resolution, which saw the resolution cancelled, ineligible for another proposal for a period of one year.¹⁵⁰⁹ However, when second instance occurred the *Gran Consiglio* could propose a similar law, altering particular articles or points which the *Seniori* cited as lacking merit – that is if the *Seniori* deigned to offer this explanation along with their rejection. The final outcome for a resolution would be for it to be placed in the order of the day, falling to the back of the list; this however could not be done if there was a mark of urgency on the resolution.

The authority to reject or approve resolutions into law provided the *Seniori* with an incredible amount of influence within the legislative process. The results of their deliberations were not beholden to either the *Gran Consiglio*, or any member of the executive, but rather to the opinions of the representatives of the *Seniori* themselves. While they could not design the resolutions which they needed to deliberate upon, the personal politics of the representatives of *Seniori* played an important role in resolution formation. Representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* understood, particularly after a few months of the legislature’s existence, what kinds of resolutions were likely to pass, and which would be rejected.¹⁵¹⁰ This was of course part of the reason for the bicameral legislature as it had been set up under the Cisalpine Constitution. The politics of the *Seniori* would reflect their inherent “wisdom” which would force the lower house to design legislation which would be passed, regardless of whether or not the politics of the *Gran Consiglio* matched that of the *Seniori*. This theoretically gave the *Seniori* a much higher authority within the legislative process, as it was expected that the “younger” *Gran Consiglio* would bend to the

¹⁵⁰⁸ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 95 and 96.

¹⁵⁰⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title V Articles 96 and 97.

¹⁵¹⁰ “Seduta LIV, 23 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:775-776. Discourses of Bragaldi, Olivari, Mozzoni and Venturi regarding the structuring of a resolution on permitting Cardinals to hold land in the Cisalpine Republic.

experience of the *Seniori*. This however did not take into consideration the individual power of *Gran Consiglio* representatives when compared to those of *Seniori* representatives; the lower house was able to amass a much stronger personal and legislative power which was reflected in their outside dealings with both the French military and Civil authorities as well as other facets of Cisalpine political culture, most notably the Cisalpine press, and departmental administrations. Many leading members of the *Seniori*, such as Giovanmaria Fontana, Giuseppe Ambrosioni, Mosé Formaggini, Francesco Germani, or Alessandro Aldini had deep personal, political and professional connections with members of the *Gran Consiglio*. A large number of *Gran Consiglio* representatives, including Perseguiti, Olivari, Martinengo, Paribelli, Lattanzi and Mocchetti were all originally nominated to the *Seniori* in Brumaire but were sworn into the *Gran Consiglio* in Frimaire.¹⁵¹¹ This suggests a general trend, particularly for more radical and progressive members of the legislature, to view the *Gran Consiglio* as the center of Cisalpine legislative politics – not the *Seniori*, which for its part came to be seen as a conservative check on progressive politics.

While the terms radical, originalist, progressive and moderate cannot be applied directly to the *Seniori* – considering their definitions are formulated from data based on the *Gran Consiglio processi verbali* and thus are only applicable to that body – it is possible to view similarities to those particular labels in *Seniori* debates. This is especially visible when looking at aspects of legislative speed and force, defined for the *Gran Consiglio* as the y-axis political definitions. The tendency to throw resolutions back to the *Gran Consiglio* can be seen as reflecting a policy which was more moderate than radical – using *Gran Consiglio* political terms – since it significantly slowed down the legislative process.¹⁵¹²

Perhaps more than any other political tactic the rejection of urgency was consistently used by the *Seniori* to avoid passing resolutions into law without flat out rejecting the legislation. From a political standpoint, the rejection of urgency worked very similar to the politics of order of the day outcomes for motions in the *Gran Consiglio*. Popular legislation could be effectively slowed down, if not outright stopped, by rejections of urgency, without criticizing the contents of a

¹⁵¹¹ “Nomina Dei membri del Corpo legislativo”, “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:64–69, 89.

¹⁵¹² “Session II, Milano 3. Frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 9. Discourse of Mazzoleni; early on representatives of the *Seniori* recognized that the delaying in deliberating on resolutions could significantly weaken *Gran Consiglio* authority within the legislative process and openly acknowledged it as a tactic to check the decision-making power of the lower house.

resolution. This gave *Seniori* representatives (particularly powerful figures like Aldini or Beccalossi) who favored with a moderate – or at the very least neutral – legislative speed and force a moral high ground as their rejections had constitutional justification. As a consequence, *Gran Consiglio* representatives, particularly neutral and originalist moderates and rationalists, attempted to curtail legislation in the early months to avoid *Seniori* rejection.¹⁵¹³ This of course was not a universal concept as many *Seniori* Representatives (Formaggini, Fontana, Tomini and Butturini) often took the side of the urgency which suggests a more radical minority did exist in the *Seniori*.¹⁵¹⁴ However, it was the more powerful moderate majority sentiment which opened the door for accusations of stonewalling and counter-revolutionary actions on the part of the *Seniori*, as was the case on 9 Ventôse.¹⁵¹⁵

There is evidence which would justify the use of certain x-axis definitions from the political spectrum of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular the application of originalist definitions. The primary function of the *Seniori* was to deliberate upon the constitutionality and merit of resolutions; by virtue of the former, the upper house naturally tended to apply legislative decisions which were much closer to the original text of the Cisalpine Constitution. Instances in which the *Gran Consiglio* attempted to either extend legal precedents beyond their normal bounds, or even outright usurp the authority of other government institutions (most often with the conflicts between the executive and legislative branches examined in the previous chapter), saw the *Seniori* often rejecting such resolutions as unconstitutional.¹⁵¹⁶ When the *Gran Consiglio* attempted to usurp the internal power of the legislative branch – for example the substitution of absent or dismissed representatives in both houses, or the reassignment of representatives from one house to another – the *Seniori* accused the *Gran Consiglio* of overstepping constitutional boundaries, and attempting Jacobin style political tactics in an attempt to garner superior authority within the Legislative assemblies.¹⁵¹⁷ While these accusations were harsh, they were not necessarily unwarranted as in

¹⁵¹³ “Seduta XCI, 29 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:606–9. Debate of motion of Coddé to regarding the constant rejection of resolutions by the *Seniori*.

¹⁵¹⁴ “Sessione XXXVI. Del 7. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’*Seniori*,” 289–90. Discourses of fontana, Tomini and Butturini.

¹⁵¹⁵ “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–15. Discourse of Coddé and Greppi.

¹⁵¹⁶ “Sessione LIX. del 30. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’*Seniori*,” 472–83. Commission report regarding the conflict between the *Gran Consiglio* and Cisalpine Directory over funding for the support of French Troops in Cisalpine Territory.

¹⁵¹⁷ Sessione LII. Milano 23 Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’*Seniori*,” 415–17.

fact beginning with the events of 9 Ventôse and ending with the 24 Germinal Coup, the *Gran Consiglio* would see itself as the superior power in the legislative branch of the Cisalpine Republic. Interesting, taken at face value this “originalism” which seemed to define the *Seniori* should be negated when one observes that it was the *Seniori* who so strongly resisted the Military and Commercial Treaties with the French Republic. However, this event actually proves the more rigid constitutionalism which permeated *Seniori* politics, as their motivation for the rejection of the treaties were their unconstitutionality, considering the high degree of foreign support both treaties took upon the Cisalpine Republic against the concepts of national sovereignty. The unbending constitutionality alarmed both republican and democratic leaning elements of the French and Cisalpine establishments, which in turn led to the heavy political toll the 24 Germinal Coup took on the *Seniori*.¹⁵¹⁸

The Crises of the *Seniori*

Given the vast political and structural differences between the two legislative assemblies – both those constitutionally proscribed and normatively applied throughout late 1797-early 1798 – it comes as little surprise that the *Gran Consiglio* and the *Consiglio de' Seniori* found themselves in conflict with one another from the outset. These conflicts have come to be defined by historians – most notably Carlo Zaghi, Carlo Capra and others from the immediate post-war period in the second half of the twentieth century – as signs of the great failure of legislative government in North Italy.¹⁵¹⁹ While it is true that these conflicts had a profound impact on the development of both legislative production and legislative culture more generally, the end result was not the collapse of republicanism in Cisalpine political culture, but instead the establishment of the lower house as the supreme body within Cisalpine legislative politics, a marked movement away from French post-Thermidorian political tendencies.

Though there were many minor challenges to the legislative authority of both houses the two most important and impactful were the crises of 9 Ventôse and the Crises of the Military and Commercial Treaties with the French Republic. While there has been mention of both conflicts in other works, to date the only work exclusively dedicated to the causes and effects of these conflicts

¹⁵¹⁸ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:59.

¹⁵¹⁹ Capra, “Un ricerca in corso: i collegi elettorali della Repubblica Italiana e del Regno Italico”; Nutini, “L’esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina,” 112–16; Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 187–89; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:461–63.

is a recent article by Francesco Dendena entitled *La libertà n'a que deux soutiens : la vertu et les baionnettes. Coups d'Etat et culture politique dans la République cisalpine*.¹⁵²⁰ In this article Dendena explores the complex international and internal political and structural challenges which these conflicts created. Both led directly to the eventual coup d'état of 24 Germinal which saw the *Seniori* power base purged and the ascendance of the *Gran Consiglio* in the legislative process.

The Legislative Crisis of 9 Ventose

Though the lesser of the two crises, the permanent sitting of 9 Ventôse was perhaps the more important regarding internal legislative politics between the houses, and the influence which the *Seniori* and *Gran Consiglio* had on one another in the months before and after the events of 9 Ventôse itself. This crisis is particularly important as it marked the first time in which members of the *Gran Consiglio* outwardly accused other members of the Cisalpine government of counter-revolutionary sentiments, and actively challenged the authority of the upper house in a bid to gain supremacy over the entire authority of the Cisalpine Legislative assemblies. However, this event came from a build-up of animosity regarding political and legislative ideology, more specifically the use of urgency in legislative production and the application of extra-judiciary and extra-constitutional institutions to apply and interpret legislation. The challenges which were extended by both the *Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio*, particularly in the months of Nivôse and Pluviôse, were part of a greater institutional fight, analyzed partially in Chapters VII and VIII regarding bids by the various government institutions of the Cisalpine Republic for control of the political culture of the nascent Italian nation.

The events of 9 Ventôse find their origins as far back as 12 Frimaire and the introduction of a plan to institute a provisional institution – the extra-judiciary military commissions of high police (from here on in referred to the military commissions) – as a permanent revolutionary body.¹⁵²¹ These military commissions had existed under the provisional government in 1797, before the activation of the legislative branch, and were particularly strong in the former territories

¹⁵²⁰ Dendena, “La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La République Cisalpine.” 295–314.

¹⁵²¹ “Seduta XII, 12 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:205-20.6 Motion to form the military commissions; The military commissions were referred to in the *processi verbali* in multiple way: the military commissions, the commissions of high police, the provisional commissions of justice. The term military commission was the most used. It will be referred to in the plural and with lower case letters to differentiate it from the *Gran Consiglio* Military Commission, the permanent commission of the Council related to military affairs and which had no connection to the extra-judiciary bodies.

of Bergamo, Brescia and Cremona. They served the role of a temporary criminal justice tribunal, which focused particularly on political crimes against French and Cisalpine authorities. Lauro Glisenti, a prominent lawyer from Salò who had participated in the Brescian uprising a year prior, brought a motion which would establish the provisional military commissions as more permanent bodies, particularly in the peripheral cities like Brescia, where border contact for economic purposes with Hapsburg Veneto had caused a rise in counter-revolutionary rhetoric in the city – according to him.¹⁵²² His motion came in the wake of news that the military commission which existed in Bergamo and had continued to function despite it not being formally recognized had been successful in stopping violent crimes and political sedition in that city. Glisenti's motion was supported by prominent legal progressives such as Giuseppe Gambari, who added that the judiciary branch was not yet ready to be instituted and these provisional commissions should remain in place until a more formal judiciary could be established. His logic was supported by other progressives like Dehò, Fenaroli and Sabatti who believed a counter-revolutionary threat to be the motivation behind the violence. That said, the plan was opposed by more moderate and originalist representatives such as Vicini, who saw the military commissions as highly unconstitutional.¹⁵²³

The issue was not immediately confronted in the *Seniori*. That council, more preoccupied at the time of losing members to dismissals and movements to the *Gran Consiglio*, became far more interested in the management of their chambers than of looking at messages from the Lower House.¹⁵²⁴ The *Seniori* already by this point seemed to be developing a paranoia that the *Gran Consiglio* was attempting to usurp legislative authority by stealing qualified members of the *Seniori* to add to its own ranks. However, when the matter of the military commissions was finally brought before *Seniori*, the urgency for forming a plan to erect these commissions was approved by the Upper House.¹⁵²⁵ Despite some resistance over constitutionality, the threat of violence and disorder, particularly from reports in the Departments of Mela and Benaco, seemed to sway the

¹⁵²² *Ibid* 1:205 Motion of Glisenti.

¹⁵²³ *Ibid* 1:206 Discourse of Vicini.

¹⁵²⁴ “Milano 12. Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. Sessione XI”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 55. Letter to the Directory and *Gran Consiglio* regarding the 19 Brumaire law and the placement of representatives in the two houses based on qualifications.

¹⁵²⁵ “Sessione XIII. Dei 14. Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 62–63.

Seniori in favor of the military commissions, or at least a temporary measure to establish order in those places.

The matter did not reappear until the end of Pluviôse. However, the intermediary period from mid Frimaire to the last days of Pluviôse were not a time of peace. Tensions had begun to grow between the two houses over the continued rejection of the *Gran Consiglio*'s use of urgency in the passage of legislation, especially following the election of Tadini to the *Gran Consiglio* presidency and Latuada and Dehò as secretaries.¹⁵²⁶ The progressive agenda, which pushed for constitutional adaptation – particularly in areas of relations with the French *Armée*, finance and the place of the catholic Church in Cisalpine society – clashed intensely with *Seniori*. That said, the first days of this administration saw a general collaboration following heated debate in the *Seniori*, as the upper house seemed to grudgingly pass less extreme measures, particularly those which condemned aspects of Catholic Church intervention in the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁵²⁷ However, for cases of urgency regarding the financing or support for the *Armée*, the *Seniori* often dug in their heels and rejected these resolutions. For many in the *Seniori* urgency needed to be applied to internal and administrative issues and not relate to aspects of foreign relationships, which were constitutionally the competencies of the Directory in any case.¹⁵²⁸ And yet for those domestic issues, the *Seniori* similarly rejected resolutions which the *Gran Consiglio* passed, particularly regarding finances, for example the 28 Nivose rejection of urgency for the cutting of public stipends in order to raise funds for the national treasury.¹⁵²⁹

Thus, going into early Pluviôse, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* were beginning to lose patience with the continued contradictions of the *Seniori*'s rejection of urgency. Progressives in particular, who continued to solidly hold power in this period, began to feel that the rejections had less to do with a perceived unconstitutional behavior on the part of the *Seniori*,

¹⁵²⁶ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:671. Election of Tadini, Latuada and Dehò

¹⁵²⁷ “Sessione XLVII. Del 18 Nevosio anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Processi Verbale delle sessioni del Consiglio de’Seniori* 1797, pp. 383-385; “Seduta LIV, 23 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:774-775 Letter of approval from the *Seniori* to the *Gran Consiglio* regarding the sequestration of cardinal and bishop palaces in Cisalpine territory

¹⁵²⁸ “Sessione XXXIV. Milano 5. Nevosio anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 270–74. Discourses of Butturini, Formaggini and Beccalossi.

¹⁵²⁹ “Sessione LVIII. Milano 29. Nevosio anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 463; “Seduta LXI, 29 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:91.

and instead an attempt to gain the imperative control of the legislative branch. The *processi verbali* of both houses demonstrates that the *Seniori* launched more complaints against the *Gran Consiglio* and discussed aspects of unconstitutional behavior in that house more frequently than the *Gran Consiglio* complained about the *Seniori*, particularly in the month of Nîvose where much of the *Gran Consiglio*'s ire, particularly on the part of progressives was turned against the Cisalpine Directory.¹⁵³⁰ With the election of a new progressive bureau in the *Gran Consiglio* (Gambari, Mozzini, Luini) and a more originalist bureau in the *Seniori* (Beccalossi, Gelmi, Somaglia), Pluviôse was set up to be a turbulent month.¹⁵³¹ Similarly, the radical elements which had been gaining strength in the *Gran Consiglio* in Nîvose (Gambari, Dehò, Cavedoni, Mozzini, etc.) were able to finally obtain a higher position and more commission appointments, putting greater pressure on the *Seniori* to adopt legislation, a trend which continued into the second administration that month under neutral radical Polfranceschi after 15 Pluviôse.¹⁵³²

One of the more contentious issues which the *Seniori* saw fit to reject regularly was the establishment of the judiciary and nomination of administrators in the departments. As early as 4 Pluviôse a measure of urgency to quickly establish the Cisalpine judicial branch, and in particular a high criminal court was rejected by the *Seniori*.¹⁵³³ Despite attempts by *Gran Consiglio* progressive and radical allies like Tinelli, to get the resolution passed, powerful originalist allies and apparent moderates like Beccalossi, Formaggini, Somaglia and Gelmi argued that the use of urgency was unconstitutional since it would circumvent the nomination process. In reality it seemed more likely that the *Seniori* were afraid of allies of *Gran Consiglio* progressives being

¹⁵³⁰ “Seduta XXXVIII, 7 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:544-549 This sitting provides a perfect example of this fact. While the Directory is the subject of debate and is the main antagonist for the representatives of the *GRan Consiglio*, ranging in subjects regarding public education to the process, to military finance, the *Seniori* are mentioned once and it is simply to send a message for an updated project; “Sessione XXXVI. Del 7. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Processi Verbale delle sessioni del Consiglio de’ Seniori 1797*, 285. By contrast, in the *Seniori* on the same day the *Gran Consiglio* is the primary focus of every discussion in the order of the day and 4 cases of urgency are rejected for a myriad of different resolutions.

¹⁵³¹ “In Nome della Repubblica Cisalpina una, ed indivisibile... Sessione LXI, del Consiglio de’ Seniori. Milano li 2. Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:131 First law under the new bureau of the *Seniori* elected 2 Pluviose. ; “Seduta LXIII, 1 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:105 Election of Gambari, Mozzini and Luini.

¹⁵³² “Seduta LXXVIII, 16 pluviose anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:364 Election of Polfranceschi.

¹⁵³³ “No. 4. 7. Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. 26 Gennaio 1798 ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori’”, “No.5. 9 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. 28 Gennajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Continuazione della Sessione 4. Piovoso’”, “Il monitore italiano,” 15–16, 18–19.

selected for the ministry. This idea seemed to be confirmed by a 16 Pluviôse circular published by Aldini on behalf of the *Seniori* Commission for the confines of representative residencies, in which he states that there should be a maximum distance from which representatives can travel outside of their residence and the Council chambers, in an effort to avoid outside contacts which may influence decision making.¹⁵³⁴ The paranoia on *Gran Consiglio* usurpation of legislative authority seemed to coincide with a growing personal power for Aldini who came to give discourses in greater frequency, which called for a moderation in the use of urgency, and a stricter adherence to constitutional rules regarding the nomination of judicial and administrative positions.¹⁵³⁵

Yet despite this more republican tone, Aldini seemed to also have a spirited Cisalpine patriotism which called for a less reliance on military means (particularly those tied to the French *Armée*) and a greater civil authority out of the Courts and administration which would be paid for by the Cisalpine State.¹⁵³⁶ Interesting however, contrary to an internal political movement which seemed to be push the *Seniori* towards an anti-*Gran Consiglio* and anti-French status, the final period of Pluviôse saw an overwhelming display of resolution approvals for the *Seniori*.¹⁵³⁷ This was most likely because these days saw a number of *Gran Consiglio* representatives being transferred out of the lower house for other positions (Martinengo, and Cicognara for example being made plenipotentiary representatives abroad). In fact, despite this uptick in approvals overall, the major resolutions to come before the Senior were rejected, such as a plan to use the national guard for policing and or the free movement of marbles and grain in Cisalpine territory.¹⁵³⁸ By the end of Pluviôse the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio*, and in particular progressive radicals, had lost patience with the *Seniori*.¹⁵³⁹ More republican groups however, still hoped to salvage the relationship between the councils, despite the willingness amongst many of them to

¹⁵³⁴ “No. 11. 21 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano 9 Febbrajo 1798 ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Sessione della 16 Piovoso’”, “Il monitore italiano,” 44.

¹⁵³⁵ “No. 14. 27 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano 15 Febbrajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Continuazione della Sessione 18 Piovoso’”, “Il monitore italiano,” 56.

¹⁵³⁶ “No. 17. 3 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano 21 Febbrajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Sessione 26 Piovoso’” “Il monitore italiano,” 68 Discourse of Aldini.

¹⁵³⁷ “No. 14. 27 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano 15 Febbrajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Sessione 19, 20, 21 Piovoso’”, “Il monitore italiano 1798, pp. 56

¹⁵³⁸ “No. 15. 29 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano 17 Febbrajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Sessione 22, 23 Piovoso’”, “No. 17. 3 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano 21 Febbrajo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori, Sessione 26 Piovoso’” “Il monitore italiano,” 60, 68.

¹⁵³⁹ “Seduta XCI, 29 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:606–9. Debate on the rejections of urgency with discourses by Coddé, Valsecchi and Allemagna.

acknowledge the absurdity of the *Seniori*'s continual rejections based on the *Gran Consiglio*'s labelling of urgency. These figures, such as Bovara, Allemagna and Valsecchi, believed that in order to get resolutions passed, it was necessary to cut the urgency title except for cases of extreme necessity, and to reduce progressive nature of the resolutions so that they reflect more moderate changes.¹⁵⁴⁰

When the issue of the military commissions was raised again on 30 Pluviôse, originalist rationalists and moderates and neutral moderates felt that their actions to reduce the more extreme language which had pervaded the resolutions coming from the progressive radical led *Gran Consiglio* would serve to temper the *Seniori*'s ability to reject legislation regarding the commissions. News of counter-revolutionary alarmists in the peripheral regions of the Cisalpine Republic had sparked fears of popular uprising in Milan.¹⁵⁴¹ Despite the initial objections from more republican representatives in the *Gran Consiglio*, these fears seemed to unite the new proto-faction which had been forming in the months of Frimaire, Nivose and Pluviôse, in an effort to establish a way to fight counter-revolutionary alarmism. The need for the military commissions became more obvious than ever and enjoyed universal support from within the *Gran Consiglio* even if there was a mixture of ideas on the means and lengths that these commissions could go to combat alarmism.¹⁵⁴² Only a select few charged the military commissions as being new revolutionary tribunals, eerily reminiscent of those in France from 1793-94, and banned under the constitution.¹⁵⁴³ These fears were immediately dismissed as paranoid and a false equivalent to the revolutionary tribunals, with originalists and progressive working together to prove the distinction.¹⁵⁴⁴ It was unthinkable to the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* that the *Seniori* could reject such obviously necessary and emergency institution, for without it the Republic risked counter-revolutionary invasion. The news that the *Seniori* had approved an important resolution to begin the nomination process for local and departmental administrators, further heightened hopes that perhaps the two houses could find common ground.¹⁵⁴⁵

¹⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid*, Montalcini et Alberti, 2:607-8. Discourse of Allemagna and Bovara.

¹⁵⁴¹ "Seduta XCII, 30 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:640-41. Message from the directory warning of alarmism in the periphery of the Republic.

¹⁵⁴² *Ibid*, Montalcini et Alberti, 2:641-45. Debate on the plan for establishing the military commissions.

¹⁵⁴³ "Seduta XCIV, 2 ventoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, 2:679-80. Discourse of Cagnoli.

¹⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid*, Montalcini et Alberti, 2:680-81. Discourses of Reina, Gambari and Vicini.

¹⁵⁴⁵ "Seduta XCV, 3 ventoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, 2:686-87. Message from *Seniori* approving the initiation of the nomination process for administrators in the Cisalpine Republic.

In fact the initial days of Ventôse demonstrated a relative calm between the houses. Aldini was elected to the *Seniori* presidency on 2 Ventôse, finalizing his positional power in that assembly.¹⁵⁴⁶ Aldini's election seemed to confirm the challenge which the *Seniori* had been pushing throughout Pluviôse for the imperative control of the entire legislative branch, a control which would see an end to progressive and radical legislation in favor of more moderate and originalist legislative action (or at the very least more centralist in general). The ascension of Vincenzo Brunetti to the *Gran Consiglio* presidency – a progressive rationalist whose views were almost neutral rationalist at times – demonstrated an apparent willingness by the lower house to compromise in an effort to increase legislative output.¹⁵⁴⁷ The *Seniori* passed a number of different resolutions into law, including the denial of foreign ambassadors who were the sons of landholders in the republic under the *ancien regime*, and a duty on the exportation of rice, in addition to a law forcing the Directory to begin the establishment of the Cisalpine Judiciary.¹⁵⁴⁸ However the *Seniori* notably refused to discuss the formation of the military committees when the resolution was delivered to them, instead accepting the urgency and putting the resolution into print in order to return to the contents at a later date.¹⁵⁴⁹ The *Gran Consiglio*, at that moment wrapped up in the Rossi affair and the increasing tensions with the Directory, was not attentive to the fact that this avoidance had occurred.

The debate finally came to the floor of the *Seniori* on 8 Ventôse.¹⁵⁵⁰ Some like Carandini, Zorzi and Tomini in fact supported the measures of the military commissions, stating that attacks on republican ideologies must be met “with iron and fire” or else run the risk of getting out of control.¹⁵⁵¹ However the majority – in particularly the allies of Aldini who had been vocal in

¹⁵⁴⁶ “No. 21. 11 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 1 Marzo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Sessione 2. Ventoso”,” “Il monitore italiano,” 84.

¹⁵⁴⁷ « Seduta XCIII, 1 Ventôse anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:646 election of Brunetti; Despite Brunetti's more moderate disposition the secretaries which were elected with him were Giacomo Greppi and Giuseppe Piazza both progressive radicals. This demonstrates that while the representatives were willing to compromise, they were not willing to role over and legislative drafting would most likely continue to be remarkably more democratic leaning than Aldini would have liked. It also sets up the events of 9 Ventôse in a much more explosive light.

¹⁵⁴⁸ “No. 21. 11 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 1 Marzo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Sessione 2. Ventoso”” Il monitore italiano 1798, p. 84 ; « Seduta XCVIII, 6 Ventôse anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:776 Messages from the Seniori.

¹⁵⁴⁹ “No. 22. 13 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 3 Marzo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Sessione 3. Ventoso”” “Il monitore italiano,” 87.

¹⁵⁵⁰ “No. 24. 17 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 7 Marzo 1798, ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Sessione 8. Ventoso”” “Il monitore italiano,” 96.

¹⁵⁵¹ *Ibid* « Il monitore italiano », 96 Discoure of Carandini.

rejecting *Gran Consiglio* resolutions throughout Pluviôse such as Zanella, Venturelli and Formaggini – found the military commissions a dangerous instrument to use. They highlighted the stability which the Cisalpine Republic had been enjoying in the past month and refused to believe that men of the cloth would encourage violence which could be considered alarmism. They pointed out that the judiciary power was already in a formational phase, thanks to recent resolutions passed into law only a few days before, and as such the military commissions would not only be unnecessary but would create a dangerous image of a militant republicanism, which – if these alarmists even existed – would only go to prove counter-revolutionary concerns. In the end the project was rejected for the merit of its content, not for urgency or for constitutional issues, thus making it a true rejection which theoretically banned the reworking of this project for the period of a year.

The following day, 9 Ventôse, news reached the *Gran Consiglio* of this rejection.¹⁵⁵² Brunetti as president, seeing the danger posed, acknowledged the anger of the *Gran Consiglio*, but reminded them of their constitutional responsibilities, and invited them to pass a similar resolution given the urgency of the situation.¹⁵⁵³ He pointed the fact that both the Directory and the *Seniori* acknowledged the problem but were uncomfortable with the given solution, and it was for the *Gran Consiglio* to keep public wellbeing at the forefront of their work not political squabbling.

Girolamo Coddé the progressive radical arose to make a speech immediately following Brunetti's advice. Coddé was one of the older members of the *Gran Consiglio* at 57, who had worked as a municipal administrator in his home city of Mantua.¹⁵⁵⁴ Despite his more democratic leaning politics his closest allies came from across the political spectrum of the *Gran Consiglio* and included originalists, moderates, progressives, and rationalists such as Compagnoni, Scarabelli, Reina, Dandolo and Mazzuchelli.¹⁵⁵⁵ In his speech Coddé began by underlining the difficulties which the *Seniori* had been causing the *Gran Consiglio* in the passage of legislation in the past months, stressing the fact that they did not have the interests of the Cisalpine people at

¹⁵⁵² “Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:11-12 Letter from the *Seniori*

¹⁵⁵³ *Ibid* 3:12. Discourse of Brunetti

¹⁵⁵⁴ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:39.

¹⁵⁵⁵ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 279–80.

heart.¹⁵⁵⁶ He accused them of attempting to bankrupt the Republic by refusing funds; the *Seniori* had attempted to interrupt commerce by stifling the production and trade of iron and metals; they encouraged unease within the republic and allowed alarmism to spread unabated. He refuted the *Seniori*'s claims that the military commissions were excessive and highlighted the continued disturbances in the peripheral departments of Benaco, Mela and Adda ed Oglio which had been provoked by foreign alarmists who did not fear Cisalpine retribution. He motioned that the *processi verbali* of the *Seniori* and *Gran Consiglio* be published immediately for the past few days sessions so that the people could judge for themselves the cowardice of the *Seniori* in confronting alarmism. He then declared that the rejected resolution be rewritten, excluding only particular articles which could possibly misconstrue the intention of the military commission, dedicating their existence solely to the destruction of counter-revolutionary activity and alarmism. In this speech Coddé challenged the *Seniori* to uphold their oaths as republicans against counter-revolutionary forces, indirectly accusing them of being counter-revolutionary themselves. Most importantly he asserted, through his motion to print the debates, that the *Gran Consiglio* alone was interested in public welfare and the protection of the republic, essentially discrediting any authority which the *Seniori* were thought to have within the legislative process.

Following Coddé's speech, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* from across the political spectrum seemed to take on a spirit of patriotic resistance to the "unpatriotic" actions of the *Seniori*. Some seemed to retain cooler heads, such as Greppi, who seconded the accusations of Coddé but believed that the project should be reformulated in commission, and in doing so lend all possible credibility to the *Gran Consiglio* that they were following the correct constitutional processes.¹⁵⁵⁷ Others, such as Alborghetti and Perseguiti felt that the actions of the *Seniori* were a direct attack on the *Gran Consiglio*, and as such a direct attack on the sovereignty of the People.¹⁵⁵⁸ These representatives called for a more extreme course of action which would push through the establishment of revolutionary tribunals regardless of *Seniori* acknowledgement or approval which would immediately examine cases of alarmism and political crimes in the periphery. These proposals, made mostly by radical members of the *Gran Consiglio* sounded practically Jacobin in

¹⁵⁵⁶ "Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–15. Discourse of Coddé.

¹⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid* 3:15. Discourse of Greppi

¹⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid* 3:16-17. Discourses of Alborghetti and Perseguiti.

their rhetoric. Interestingly however, they accused the *Seniori* of being apolitical and Robespierriest, and of wanting to set themselves up as the singular legislative body in the Cisalpine republic.¹⁵⁵⁹ In the end, cooler heads prevailed following a motion from Fenaroli by which the *Gran Consiglio* essentially forced the *Seniori* to sit in permanent session until the matter of the military commissions was resolved. Vicini in fact went to far as to scold the more extreme members of the *Gran Consiglio* for their harsh accusations and Brunetti for refusing to call those members to order. He was supported by the originalist moderate Aquila who declared his understanding of the anger found within the Lower House but condemned the harsh accusations. The final resolution saw the *Gran Consiglio* sending the original resolution back into commission, and a formal condemnation of the *Seniori* to the executive Directory.¹⁵⁶⁰

The fallout from the events in the *Gran Consiglio* were swiftly felt by the *Seniori*. The Upper House approved the formation of a new commission to take a second look at the original plan for the military commissions which was made up by a mix of political ideologies.¹⁵⁶¹ There remained however, those voices who continued to reject the institutionalization of the military commissions. They feared the formation of new alarmists and the breaking of the current stability which they believed to be a result of the moderation of institutional roll-out which to that point had been progressing slowly. However, there arose a new set of ideologues within the *Seniori* such as Gelmi, Melacini and Canarisi, who had remained opponents to the Aldini agenda. These men saw the continued refutation of the *Gran Consiglio*'s anger as a dangerous and divisive position to take which would surely allow greater instability. They similarly highlighted that despite assertion of stability the chaos in peripheral departments like Mela and Benaco proved otherwise. It seems that this logic succeeded in convincing the rest of the *Seniori* who in the end voted to approve the original resolution of the *Gran Consiglio*, reversing the decision from the previous day.

This reversal by the *Seniori* resulted in a sudden shift of power in the legislative branch. The two houses could no longer claim to be in a state of balanced power as the *Gran Consiglio* had successfully pushed through its own more progressive agenda despite *Seniori* objections. This opening in the political defenses of the *Seniori* power holders would come to be exploited,

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid* 3:18-19. Discourse of Giovio.

¹⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 3:22-23. Discourse of Mozzini and President Brunetti.

¹⁵⁶¹ No. 24. 17 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 7 Marzo 1798, 'Consiglio de' Seniori Sessione 9. Ventoso'" "Il monitore italiano," 96.

particularly by the *Gran Consiglio* power elite, who would use the growing division within *Seniori* politics which showed its face after 9 Ventôse. While this process was in fact significantly amplified by the second great crisis – that regarding the Military and Commercial Treaties – it was the cracks which first appeared after 9 Ventôse which allowed the *Gran Consiglio* to gain the imperative control of the entire legislative authority, especially in the months of Floréal and Prairial.

The Crisis of the Military and Commercial Treaties

The tension with the *Gran Consiglio* which had come to define their relationship in Ventôse was the basis for the lesser conflict which the *Seniori* found themselves in with exterior forces in Cisalpine politics at the end of that month into Germinal. The crisis of the Military and Commercial Treaties between the Cisalpine and French Republics as it pertains to the *Seniori* is part of a much larger crisis of authority and influence between various political factions in both republics. This larger conflict has been used throughout most of the historiography to define the political culture of the first half of 1798, largely ignoring its more minute points, and internal conflicts between various politically and philosophically opposed groups in both France and the Cisalpine Republic. The role of the *Seniori*, and more importantly the role of the relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and *Seniori* has remained relatively understudied, with the exception of Dendena's more recent work. Even then Dendena, applies this relationship to the larger Franco-Cisalpine dynamic, instead of as an internal aspect of Cisalpine politics which had a profound effect on both legislative politics and more generalized Cisalpine Culture. The result of the *Seniori-Gran Consiglio* conflict within the larger crisis of the Military Commercial Treaties remains in many ways central to the outcome of this crisis, the 24 Germinal Coup. This final section will not therefore, necessarily look at the historical context of the crisis itself – this will be done in great depth in Chapter XI – but will look at both the politics of the *Seniori* towards these treaties, and the effects these politics had on the *Gran Consiglio* and its relationship to the *Seniori*, as well as to outside party interests, most prominently the French military.

To understand the way in which the *Seniori* discussed the treaties, one must first understand the overall political attitude of the *Seniori* towards foreign affairs and their place within them. From as far back as Nivose, the more republican elements of the *Seniori* – principal among them figures like Beccalossi, Formaggini and Butturini – had derided against the financial and military

support for the French Military within cisalpine territory.¹⁵⁶² Though not going so far as to criticize the presence of the French in Cisalpine territory now that the Republic had been declared and its institutions running smoothly, they did question the logic behind offering financial support to a wealthier foreign power who, at least practically, was occupying sovereign land. Besides, they pointed out that these questions were not meant for national legislation, but for those in the executive charged with foreign affairs.¹⁵⁶³ To pass a domestic law would be to acknowledge the place of a foreign entity as a part of cisalpine political society, an idea which was overall unconstitutional. The *Seniori* rejected any notion that they had any part to play in foreign affairs other than those constitutionally ascribed to them. The *Seniori* were even hesitant to discuss matters of military affairs, considering this to be a task of the executive as well, despite the greater urgency which these measures carried.¹⁵⁶⁴ Even more democratic leaning representatives such as Tomini asserted that while the Legislature had the right to request information on military events, it was for the Directory to reveal what they pleased when they pleased and not for the legislature to interfere or comment.

In a certain sense the ruling powers of the *Seniori* refused to acknowledge the French army as saviors. This does not mean that they did not feel as though the French were central to the liberation and establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, but they did not seem to have the devotion to French ideas and republican identity. With the beginning of the legislative assemblies in Frimaire, many of the *Seniori* believed that the torch had been passed to the Cisalpine government to protect Cisalpine Territory – a sentiment largely based on Bonaparte’s exact parting words for them to do so.¹⁵⁶⁵ The Cisalpine Republic was thus the protector of its own constitution, not the French military, and as such was not beholden to the concerns of French politics. This idea was different than the concepts which came from *Gran Consiglio* legislative progressivism; the controlling groups of republican representatives of the *Seniori* were not interested in continuing the inherited revolution and adapting the constitution to Cisalpine political and social conditions. Instead, they looked to apply institutions and administrative concepts based on the French tradition

¹⁵⁶² “Sessione XXXIV, Milano 5. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 270–74. Discourses of Beccalossi and Butturini.

¹⁵⁶³ *Ibid* « Processi Verbale delle sessioni del Consiglio de’Seniori », 272. Discourse of Somaglia.

¹⁵⁶⁴ “Sessione XXXVIII, Milano 9. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano”, “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 301. Discourse of Belmonte.

¹⁵⁶⁵ “26. Brumale Anno VI repubblicano. Il Direttorio Esecutivo pel Popolo Cisalpino al suo Liberatore Generale in Capo Bonaparte all’atto dela sua partenza *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:28–29.

in a way that would bring stability to the region.¹⁵⁶⁶ Yet despite this apparent connection to the “extreme centrism” which dominated French politics under the French Directory, the controlling interests of *Seniori* still held to core beliefs of Cisalpine national Sovereignty, which was reflected in their ideas of international relations, particularly with the French republic.¹⁵⁶⁷

The politics driven by Aldini further reinforced this idea of the *Seniori* as a national body and not an international body. Though not necessarily anti-French, Aldini was adverse to the continuation of a strong French presence in Cisalpine national political and military discourse. This led Aldini to become the central antagonist of democratic-leaning (and even neo-Jacobin) journalists and politicians who found in the French military establishment strong allies.¹⁵⁶⁸ Aldini’s policies once he became president were heavily scrutinized, with the *Seniori* consistently being accused of being out of touch with the national will.¹⁵⁶⁹ His leadership was bringing about disaster, not only for the *Consiglio de’ Seniori*, but for the entire legislative branch as a whole. Many began to see the *Gran Consiglio* as the antithesis to the *Seniori*, the brave revolutionary patriots at odds with the unmoving conservatives. The events of 9 Ventôse only served to further this feeling among these more radical elements of cisalpine Society. Simultaneously the French voices recounting episodes of cisalpine politics to readers in Milan and Paris, such as Jullien and his *Corrier de l’Armée*, recounted a progressively more fractious relationship between the two bodies.¹⁵⁷⁰ More importantly, depending on the faction French politics interpreting the news coming from Milan, either the *Gran Consiglio* with their “radical” democratic leaning politics, or the *Seniori* with the seemingly anti-military rhetoric were the instigators of this relationship.

¹⁵⁶⁶ "Sessione LIV. Milano 25. Nevoso anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. “Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de’Seniori,” 434. Discourse of Butturini.

¹⁵⁶⁷ Serna, *L’extrême centre ou le poison française*, 111 One of the primary points of this extreme centrism as defined by Serna was the division of powers in the international realm which gave the French Directory almost exclusive control of foreign affairs for the Republic. The Cisalpine *Seniori*, already a more moderate body by virtue of its function, was also significantly more loyal to these centrist concepts. they refuted politics pushed by the controlling members of the *Gran Consiglio* for the Legislature to be more prominent in international relations, but similarly resisted attempts by the executive and their French allies (at least initially) to intervene in what they viewed as national issues such as administrative nominations, the role of the Catholic Church, taxes and customs duties, and other matters of Cisalpine finance

¹⁵⁶⁸ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.” 302.

¹⁵⁶⁹ “No. 17 ventoso VI repub. (mercoledì 28 febbrajo 1798 v.s.)... ‘Varietà’” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:131.

¹⁵⁷⁰ « s8 Ventôse, an 6 de la Rép. Fr. (N.º 119.) 18 Mars 1798 (v.st.)... République Cisalpine Corps Législatif Conseil des Anciens’ », Jullien 1797, p. 498

When news arrived in early mid-Ventôse that the long-promised treaty of alliance between the French and Cisalpine Republics had been approved by the French Minister Talleyrand, and that it was now to be sent to the Cisalpine Republic for deliberation, there was much anticipation in the Milan.¹⁵⁷¹ Debates in the *Gran Consiglio* were opened regarding the treaty at the end of Ventôse, where three days of secret sessions finally saw the Treaties passed. Though met with limited resistance – mostly from the progressive radical leadership of Giovio and Zani – for the seemingly advantageous wording of the treaties towards the French republic, the majority of representatives ignored the more glaringly obvious military and financial exploitations in favor of a stronger political relationship with the occupying French military authorities, led by Berthier following his return to Milan from Rome earlier that month.¹⁵⁷² Dandolo, one of the most vociferous in favor of the treaties within the council argued that despite the glaring inequalities which the Treaties established, the true enemy was not the French state but the Monarchical tyrants waiting to return to destroy the Cisalpine republic from abroad and their counter-revolutionary allies within the confines of the Cisalpine State.¹⁵⁷³

But the passage of the Treaties was not met by everyone with the same ambivalent but rational acquiescence to French terms which the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* had exhibited. Many in the press saw the treaties as a betrayal by the French State, and blamed the post-Fructidor Directory for the exploitation and humiliation which the Cisalpine Republic was forced to face. Many initially could not believe that the French Republic, “the mother republic” as it was referred to in the *Monitore italiano*, could lay such a heavy burden at the feet of the young and underdeveloped Cisalpine state apparatus.¹⁵⁷⁴ More importantly Many of the most ardent patriots resented that the French State would subjugate Cisalpine politics in such a profound way as to relegate national sovereignty to a secondary consideration in the law making process.¹⁵⁷⁵ This was of course the Great fear that Aldini and his allies in the *Seniori* had been railing against since

¹⁵⁷¹ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.,” 306.

¹⁵⁷² “Seduta CXVI, 24 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:370-375. Discourses of Giovio and Dandolo in secret commission as recounted from the files held in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan

¹⁵⁷³ *Ibid* Montalcini et Alberti, 3:371-75 Discourse of Dandolo in Secret committee session ; Dendena, « La liberté n’a que deux soutiens : la vertu et le baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et culture politique dans la Republique cisalpine. », 309.

¹⁵⁷⁴ “N.º 26. 21 Ventoso anno VI repubblicano, 11 Marzo 1798... ‘Politica. Alleanza della repubblica Cisalpina colla Francese’” “Il monitore italiano,” 102.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.,” 296.

before the events of 9 Ventôse. Despite his stance against Cisalpine legislative progression, and the seemingly conservative nature of his tenure as president, the *Seniori* of Aldini had been right in their assessment; and yet, Aldini remained the great enemy to be vanquished, as many began to see his reluctance to accept French intervention as the reason for the extremity of the Treaties. Though the *Gran Consiglio* had ratified the treaties they had done so under protest; the counter-revolutionary rhetoric of the *Seniori* is what had brought the cisalpine republic to such a state. Or at least so said the pro-treaty representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*.

The exact debates which took place in the *Seniori* over the ratification of the treaties remain unknown to this day as they were conducted in secret committee sessions beginning 25 Ventoso, the same day that the treaties was ratified in the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁵⁷⁶ These secret commissions continued to occur throughout the following week into mid-Germinal without yet producing a ratified treaty. This seeming lack of urgency on the part of the *Seniori* began to alarm various parties interested in the quick ratification of the treaties, most importantly those in the French military relying on Cisalpine funds to support their troops.¹⁵⁷⁷ The impatience of the French establishment led to a request to the Cisalpine Directory on 9 Germinal to investigate why the ratification process was taking so long.¹⁵⁷⁸ The *Gran Consiglio* signaled to the Directory that for their part the Treaties had been ratified almost immediately and had been expedited to the *Seniori* that same day to pass the ratification resolution. The Directory recounted this to Berthier who in turn recounted this to the Directory.¹⁵⁷⁹ It became immediately apparent that the resistance was coming from the *Seniori*, a body which to this point seemed to have allied itself firmly with the political prerogatives of Paris. When Berthier notified the French Directory of this fact, he made sure to highlight the positive role the *Gran Consiglio* had played in favor of the treaties. The

¹⁵⁷⁶ “N.° 23 2 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano, 23 Marzo 1798... ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Session 25 Ventoso”, “Il monitore italiano,” 128.

¹⁵⁷⁷ “N.° 39 17 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano, 6 April 1798, ‘Copia della lettera del generale in capo al generale di brigata LeClerc della state maggiore generale’” “Il monitore italiano,” 154.

¹⁵⁷⁸ Allegato alla Seduta 12 germinale anno VI repubblicano Montalcini – Alberti 1919a, p. 698 Message to the directory from the Gran Consiglio confirming the ratification of the treaty in that council ; « Milan 30 Ventôse Sixième Annèe Rép.ine Le Directoire Exécutif [cisalpine] Au Citoyen Alexandre Berthier Général en chef de l’Armée d’Italie » ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2 s.d. letter, 20 March 1798, Milan

¹⁵⁷⁹ Alexandre Bertier, Général de Division Chef de L’Etat Major G.ral de l’Armée d’Italie Au Quartier Général de Milan le 11 Germinal an 6 de la République Au Directoire Executif de la Republique française”, “AN, AF III/513.” letter, 31 March 1798, Milan

Seniori now seemed to be as much an enemy of the French military establishment on the right of the political spectrum as the critical journalists in Milan were on the left.

Thus, when the judgement came down from Paris to purge the Cisalpine Legislature, Berthier changed the lists to favor the *Gran Consiglio* and not the *Seniori*.¹⁵⁸⁰ The idea for the Coup had been brewing in French political discourse for some time, thanks in large part to the reports of political derision within the Cisalpine assemblies being reported by the French and cisalpine press in Milan. The delayed ratification of the treaty only further seemed to confirm the prejudices amongst many in the Parisian establishment that the Cisalpine politicians lacked the capacity to govern. It was judged that a purge was necessary for the Cisalpine assemblies of order was to be restored to the political situation there. The rebuke of the *Seniori* Seemed to the Parisian Directory an insurmountable political obstacle, according to the news from Visconti the Cisalpine special ambassador to the French Republic.¹⁵⁸¹ In an explanation of his role in the Coup which he wrote in mid-Floréal to the Cisalpine Directory, Visconti described an impatient French Directory and Talleyrand, both of which became increasingly uneasy with cisalpine hesitation as the days progressed with no news. Visconti blamed this unease on Berthier who he claimed was politically against the interests of the *Seniori*, allying himself instead with the most progressive elements of the *Gran Consiglio*, who since 9 Ventôse had been attempting to purge the *Seniori*. Visconti for his part was much more in line with the neo-Jacobin viewpoint of France and had tended to side with those forces who favored national sovereignty.¹⁵⁸² While this did not necessarily make him an ally of the more republican *Seniori*, it did make him an enemy of the progressive rationalist controlling element in the *Gran Consiglio* who hoped to further the revolution away from the French experience. It was this group whom Visconti had originally slated for purging from the assemblies as he felt they were the real danger to the republican project despite their favoring of the treaties. Berthier on the other hand, having witnessed the actual state of politics in the Cisalpine Republic at that time found it was the *Seniori*, both due to their past anti-*Armée* stance and their

¹⁵⁸⁰ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.,” 310.

¹⁵⁸¹ “Parigi 18 Floreal anno 6. Al Direttorio Esecutivo della Repubblica Cisalpina Il cittadino Visconti, ambasciatore della medesima preso la Repubblica francese”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2.”

¹⁵⁸² Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 462.

continued refutation of the treaty were the bigger threat.¹⁵⁸³ For this reason, the *Seniori* found itself purged in greater numbers on 24 Germinal.¹⁵⁸⁴

In the end, the undoing of the *Seniori* was the very political divisiveness they had hoped to avoid through their moderate legislation. The *Gran Consiglio* was able to take control of the entire legislative process following the Coup of 24 Germinal. The intimidation of the French *Armée*, the natural allies of the *Gran Consiglio* given their willingness to extend funding to support French troops, meant that the *Seniori* remained cautious following the coup not to cross progressive rationalist political agenda pieces in the months of Floréal and Prairial. Though they were able to regain some measure of authority with the entrance of Trouvé and the events of the Messidor crisis, the *Seniori* never regained the full strength of their position under the bicameral system as they had in the months of Nivose and Pluviôse. Aldini was forced to leave Milan and remain outside of politics until his reinstatement following Trouvé's Coup of 14 Fructidor, where the *Gran Consiglio* was reset and the progressive proto-faction purged in favor of more originalist and moderate representatives.¹⁵⁸⁵ Interestingly, despite the reluctance of Aldini's *Seniori* to ratify the treaty, many supporters of his more moderate politics became close allies of Trouvé and of the *Gran Consiglio* Thermidorians in the lead up to the Coup. This can most likely be explained by the general alarm in most anti-extremist political circles (such as the Milanese society of Public Instruction) which saw the rise of the *Gran Consiglio* as a potential threat. In the end the defining relationship between the two houses after Germinal was not one of cooperation, but of domination the part of the *Gran Consiglio*, a domination which most likely sparked resentment on the part of the *Seniori* Leadership. Though *Gran Consiglio* political cultural prerogatives remained supreme their short life after the 14 Fructidor Coup is most likely the result of internal legislative rivalry with the *Seniori*, who remembered their perceived betrayal by the lower house in the spring of 1798.

The conflicts of the bicameral system in the Cisalpine Legislature are reflective of its inheritance of more than a century of political, social and fundamentally cultural metamorphosis which saw the legacies of English, American and French historical examples present in the

¹⁵⁸³ Alexandre Bertier, Général de Division Chef de L'Etat Major G.ral de l'Armée d'Italie Au Quartier Général de Milan le 11 Germinal an 6 de la République Au Directoire Executif de la Republique française", "AN, AF III/513."

¹⁵⁸⁴ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:59.

¹⁵⁸⁵ "N.36 16 fiorile VI repub. (sabato 5 maggio 1798 v.s.) 'Varietà'" Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:256.

interactions between both the *Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio*. That said, in these conflicts there was something particularly Italian, perhaps even particularly Cisalpine, which defined these interactions. The *Seniori* served the seemingly quantum function of both protagonist and antagonist to the legislative production and agenda of the *Gran Consiglio*. Much of this was due to the particular political identity and legislative structuring of the *Seniori* which held them firmly to their constitutional mandate, in vivid confrontation with the more flexible politics of the lower chamber. The *Seniori* took their role as the protectors of Cisalpine republicanism and the moderators of the worst instincts of *Gran Consiglio* legislative production extremely seriously. Though perhaps less numerous than their French counterparts in the *Anciens* the *Seniori* seemed to exert their constitutional powers with greater force and frequency. This inevitably led to the conflicts with both the lower chamber, as well as with the other outside powers like the French military and Civil establishments (covered more profoundly in Chapter XI) and the Cisalpine executive branch. The *Seniori's* choice to challenge their legislative partners instead of simply moderate or even support *Gran Consiglio* politics openly led to their ultimate downfall, particularly that of Aldini and his faction, who would find themselves on the outside of Cisalpine policy-making until the entrance of Trouvé. This alliance between Trouvé and the former strongmen of the *Seniori*, would serve as a major point of conflict in the later months of the *Gran Consiglio*.

However, the *Seniori* were not the only body with whom the exchange of ideas, policies and even authority would lead to the change in the structuring of *Gran Consiglio* legislative output and the development of a unique political and legislative culture. Nor would the conflict between the *Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio* be the only legislative and authoritarian conflict to shape the lower legislative assembly in the spring and summer of 1798. Almost every other major institution which dictated and directed the various aspects of Cisalpine society in 1797 and 1798 had some form of influence on the *Gran Consiglio*. However, none were as profound as the two covered in the following chapter: the Catholic Church and the local departmental administration. Both of these institutions, like the *Seniori*, played the role of both protagonist and antagonist to the policy making agenda of the *Gran Consiglio* in 1798 and had serious effects on both the political cultural and legislative development of the Council during its existence before the 14 Fructidor Coup.

Chapter X

Political cultural exchange:

The *Gran Consiglio* and the influence of non-governmental political cultural institutions

As stated in the introduction to the previous chapter, Chapters IX and X were originally conceptualized from a single idea, that the political culture developed in the *Gran Consiglio* was the consequence of multiple political and cultural exchanges with external political forces. These exchanges were based on the contemporary and historic experiences of representatives with outside institutions, which eventually resulted in the more concrete resolutions from the *Gran Consiglio*. However, the relationship between the *Seniori* and the *Gran Consiglio* was distinctly unique, as both bodies were bound to identical temporal and political conditions. Though perhaps the backgrounds of individuals within the two councils were remarkably different, they were led by the same set of legislative polemics and arguments which essentially created a parallel development. For this reason, the examination of the two Councils provides a better objective study of legislative development and its relationship to political culture.

Yet this raised the question of what happens when these variables are altered, and the context of legislative structure removed from the situation? Does this political cultural exchange continue? By removing the framework of legislative agendas and the political spectrum of the y-axis which essentially structured the *Gran Consiglio/Seniori* relationship, an examination of the development of Cisalpine political culture immediately becomes more complex. The *Gran Consiglio* by its very nature as the constructor of legislation, essentially became the organ through which political culture was decided. The concepts of bicameralism and equilibrium of powers discussed in the previous two chapters explained how the other major national governmental

powers of the Cisalpine Republic – the *Seniori* and the executive branch – were limited in their capacity to override *Gran Consiglio* conceptualization of politics and law. Though it was constitutionally and precedentially possible – especially after the introduction of Trouvé into Cisalpine politics and the beginning of more invasive French intervention from Messidor Year VI onward – the *Gran Consiglio* had superior authority in the crafting of political culture thanks to its role as legislative conceptualizer.

That said, the conception of political culture which came out of *Gran Consiglio* resolutions was created in large part due to outside influences. These influences were numerous in 1797-1798: from the Cisalpine and French press, the presence of foreign patriots and counter-revolutionary objectors, and the Cisalpine and French military; to the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte, the burgeoning Italian nationalist movement and the changing economic and social philosophies of the period. The *Gran Consiglio* interacted in one way or another with all of these elements, some of which have already been covered briefly, others which will appear in this chapter and the next. However, for the purposes of brevity it was decided to focus on two of the most influential groups – at least from a historiographical perspective – to interact in a political cultural exchange with the *Gran Consiglio*: the institutional Catholic Church, and cisalpine departmental political units. Both the church and the departments were in their own way present in almost all other interactions which the *Gran Consiglio* had outside of the legislative process. Both reflected specifically Cisalpine historic and political conditions which could not be applied to the French case, nor that of other sister republics of the period or later into the Napoleonic era. The historic roots of both the institutional Church, and the urban breakdown which defined the departmental system of politics in the Cisalpine republic, were at the heart of the Cisalpine specific line of discourse which defined the politics of the x-axis.

As perhaps the oldest surviving institution from ancient times, the Institutional Catholic Church defined Italian culture in a way which it could not in France. Though they were present in Avignon, the Catholic Church in France was not the temporal monarch which it was in Italy. Catholicism was more than just religious leadership, or a privileged class on the Italian peninsula. It was the largest landowner and its head in Rome was the absolute monarch of over a third of future Cisalpine Territory. Thanks in large part to Josephian reforms in Hapsburg lands the Catholic Church also played a significant role in social welfare and intellectualism in Northern

Italian communities, in particular those communities with universities like Bologna, Ferrara, Padova, Pavia, Reggio and Milan. Many of the most important figures within the council conducted their political apprenticeships in the era before the *Gran Consiglio* as members of the Catholic Clergy. These “clerical representatives”, brought with them to the debates of the *Gran Consiglio* a merging of Catholic morality, revolutionary republicanism, and intellectual reformism. The role of the Catholic Church became central to notions of a changing sense of public and private republican morality or virtue in the Cisalpine Republic. This role included things like family dynamics, public education, and community services. Similarly, the role of the Church in republican society became an important financial debate, as the Cisalpine Republic attempted to synthesize *ancien regime* financial practices and contemporary financial difficulties, with modern revolutionary ideas about the subordination of the Church to the State.

In a similar fashion, the departmental administrations which were established in the Cisalpine Republic, were in fact the manifestation of local identity and the historic importance of urban centers in Italian society throughout the early modern age. Despite historiographical references to the departments of the Cisalpine Republic and later Republic and Kingdom of Italy as an innovation which kick started the Risorgimento movement, the department system was a call back to the powerful urban cultures of the Italian peninsula which had existed since the fall of the Roman Empire some 1200 years before. The idea of the city, and the administrative unit which it centered, was fundamental to the cultural, economic and political root of Italian society, in particular the Northern and Central Italian civilization which had thrived in the area between the Po Valley and the Alps. The department system of the Cisalpine Republic, which based its territorial and political divisions on the ancient urban fault lines of this rich civilization in Northern and Central Italy, was from its conceptualization different from any other revolutionary republican administrative system before it. Though it had adapted the constitutional and precedential systems of the French Constitution of Year III, the strength of autonomous political cultures within the cities of the six former *ancien regime* states which constituted the Cisalpine Republic formed an entirely different political dynamic from that found in the *Oltrepapi*. The local traditions, most evident in the ancient urban centers which would become the *capoluogo* – or capital city – of the twenty new departments of the Cisalpine Nation, would be the fundamental building blocks which the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* would use to form legislation in national debates. Conversely, control of these new local administrations would become a central theme in the more

general institutional fights between the various powers of Cisalpine government (*Gran Consiglio*, *Seniori*, Directory and Executive Ministry), in each of their attempts to institute their own interpretations of the new Cisalpine Republic political culture in the Cisalpine periphery. In the end however the true cultural exchange between the departments and the metropolitan leadership in the *Gran Consiglio* would come through the constitutional circles, where representatives would engage directly with local politics as private citizens which would have a profound effect on legislative developments throughout the first half of 1798.

The concept of political cultural exchange is key because there was no fight for dominance necessarily between the institutional leaders of either the Church or the local departmental administration and the leadership of the *Gran Consiglio*, as the supremacy of the *Gran Consiglio* was already constitutionally proscribed, at least in the political realm. However, the cultural and intellectual elements of both of these institutions were exponentially more powerful, particularly in the early months of the Council, thanks largely to their ancient cultural roots. The *Gran Consiglio* did not look to uproot these institutions completely from Cisalpine society, but instead integrate and adapt them to the new republican conditions of the modern age.

The Cisalpine Republic and the Catholic Church

The Catholic religion and the ideals of revolutionary republican government have been painted as being at odds since the days of the revolution itself. In France, Catholicism was viewed as the great enemy of revolutionary reform and was the focus of much of the most horrific acts of the Terror.¹⁵⁸⁶ Yet simultaneously Catholic clergymen, both active and former, were often instrumental figures in the progression of revolutionary activity in France in the 1790s, the most famous of course being the Abbé Sieyès.¹⁵⁸⁷ Yet this fraught relationship between *ancien regime* Church and Revolutionary French state, was nuanced to the religious and political contexts of that nation.

The Italian peninsula had a much different relationship to the Catholic Church. For over 1200 years the Church had existed not simply as a spiritual master over Italian society but as a legitimate temporal monarch. While in France the Church held special privileges and ranks which

¹⁵⁸⁶ Tackett, *Anatomie de La Terreur*, 149–54.

¹⁵⁸⁷ Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 24–27.

gave them political and social advantages in the early modern age, in Italy, particularly in the central Papal States, the Church held legitimate absolutist authority. For the Cisalpine Republic, almost a third of the territory which it encompassed had been under the direct rule of Rome; another third had been under the control for over 150 years of the great secular protectors of Catholicism, the Hapsburg Monarchs (both Spanish and Austrian). The Church was as much a part of the secular culture of Cisalpine History as it was the social, economic and spiritual culture.

Within the historiography of the Cisalpine Republic, and most abundantly in the English language historiography, the battle of French Revolutionary republicanism against the spiritual and political institution of the Catholic Church is often highlighted as the central theme for Cisalpine political culture. Palmer points to the Church as an ever-present counter-revolutionary menace which the Cisalpine Republic was unable to cope with.¹⁵⁸⁸ For Woolf the Church was the unfortunate cancer which came with the enlightenment reformism of Joseph II and *Accademia dei Pugni* which the revolutionary triennio never managed to shake off.¹⁵⁸⁹ Broers claimed that the revolutionary and Napoleonic experience in Italy proved how religion truly was Marx's "opium for the masses" which poisoned the Italian people against innovation and modernization.¹⁵⁹⁰

The reality could not be further from the truth. Though there is credibility that the Church played a significant role in the formation of political culture within the Cisalpine republic, it is similarly valid to point out the ways in which the Cisalpine Republic significantly changed the ideas of the Catholic Church. The exchange of political culture between the institutional entities of the *Gran Consiglio* and the Catholic Church is apparent in the former's approach to matters of public well-being and morality, including public education, healthcare, care for the poor and ideas of the family. The Cisalpine Republic was not infested by the Catholic Church but instead viewed the institutional Church as an aspect of popular Cisalpine culture which could be used for the introduction and establishment of republicanism as the bedrock of a new Italian political culture.

¹⁵⁸⁸ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 606–9.

¹⁵⁸⁹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 112–19, 127, 144–46, 167–74.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Broers, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy* though the entire book is dedicated to this theme, this precise concept is referenced on the first page of the preface on p. IX.

Clerical Representatives and the “Republican Catechism”

Though perhaps not the great looming specter which English language historiography has made it seem, the Catholic Church was an ever-present factor in Cisalpine society. It should not be forgotten that until the French Invasion, almost half of Cisalpine Territory was under the Direct influence of the Roman Papacy, and the other half under strict Hapsburg religious policies (despite the Josephian reforms of the 1780s). Even the territories of the former Serenissima (Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, Lake Garda Region, Val Bergamasco) witnessed a powerful Catholic presence thanks to the extensive use of the Inquisition against the revolutionary movement in these cities.¹⁵⁹¹ Yet counterintuitively, much of the Catholic Clergy in Northern Italy came to serve as a central part of revolutionary society in the Cisalpine Republic.

The Catholic Church had risen to prominence in the new reformist society of Revolutionary Italy, largely due to the intellectual monopoly which clergy held in the universities of Northern Italian cities such as Pavia, Padova, Bologna and Modena.¹⁵⁹² The universities of Northern Italy were historically linked to the Church in Rome, either directly (as in the case of Bologna) or through ancient political association (Padova and Pavia). The role of religion in education centers during the period of the Josephian reforms in Milan and Modena saw a general expansion of lay intellectualism, as well as a greater expansion of Jansenist ideology in the university culture of Northern Italy more generally.¹⁵⁹³ The expansion of political and philosophical ideas regarding institutional, governmental and structural reforms were a direct result of expanding lines of communications between these university intellectuals, primarily religious intellectuals, in Northern Italy at the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁵⁹⁴ The repressions of intellectual reformism by Leopold II in Hapsburg territories in the early 1790s, and the similar actions taken by the Inquisitor of the Republic of Venice and The Papacy in Rome caused many of those more reform minded clergymen of the university system in Northern Italy into lay academies, and masonic lodges where they would interact with likeminded lawyers, doctors, in addition to their lay

¹⁵⁹¹ Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*, 34–35.

¹⁵⁹² Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 450–63.

¹⁵⁹³ Brambilla, 423–27.

¹⁵⁹⁴ Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*, 16; Varni, “L’Università Di Bologna in Età Napoleonica,” 410.

colleagues from the university who had been similarly censored by reactionary authorities.¹⁵⁹⁵ This was as true for religious members of university faculties as it was for educated priests from impoverished parishes who saw firsthand the devastation of *ancien regime* society on their parishioners, and sought help from supporters of the French Revolution on the peninsula in their efforts to reform.¹⁵⁹⁶ These perhaps more than any other group, lay or ecclesiastic, were fundamental to the addition of a social component to the revolutionary rhetoric of Northern Italy.

It stands as no surprise, therefore, that within the ranks of the *Gran Consiglio*, ecclesiastics constituted a large portion of the representatives (see Chapter IV). The clergy members found within the *Gran Consiglio* tended to come from all regions of the Republic (as well as from outside) and from multiple different classes. These differences, in addition to their clerical functions reflected their political and legislative tendencies in the *Gran Consiglio*. These clerical representatives can be broken up into three ideological tendencies which differ from the legislative definitions presented in Chapter III. These tendencies cannot truly be thought of as parties or factions because they were not universally adhered to and were specific to questions of religion and society. The legislative ideologies of Chapter III were significantly more impactful in legislative decision making for these clerical representatives and as such are more indicative of their contributions to Cisalpine political culture.

Felice Latuada, Giacomo Valsecchi and Vincenzo Federici all served as parish priests in Mountainous regions (Latuada in Varese and in areas to the north of Varese, Valsecchi in Gravedona near Como and Federici in the Val Calmonica).¹⁵⁹⁷ All three had intimate knowledge of the poverty and destructive localisms in political and socio-economic cultures in these communities, which tended to push their politics towards a social progressivism on the x-axis (Valsecchi was more neutral even trending towards originalist, most likely due to a more conservative attitude overall) and rationalism on the y-axis. Latuada in particular became a figure of recognition for religious reform and social revolution which would benefit the poor and

¹⁵⁹⁵ Savini, *Un abate "libertino,"* 127; Lazzarini, *Le Origini Del Partito Democratico a Padova Fino Alla Municipalità Del 1797*, 20; Della Peruta, "Dall'Istituto Nazionale All'Istituto Reale: Un Profilo Istituzionale," 19–20; Berengo, *La società veneta alla fine del settecento*, 191.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Ugo Da Como 1940, p. 76 ; Criscuolo 2006

¹⁵⁹⁷ Odorici, *Storie Bresciane*, 10:233, 235; "Nomina dei membri del Corpo Legislativo", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:67; Criscuolo, "Latuada (Lattuada), Felice."

impoverished communities more generally.¹⁵⁹⁸ This group became the core to push for ideas of Church backed social revolution, particularly in rural areas and impoverished communities, which highlighted a republicanism based on Catholic morality and socio-economic power dynamics.

Others such as Michelle Vismara, Luigi (Alvise) Savonarola, Adeodato Ressi and Stanislao Bovara came from university settings, where they had served primarily as academics and not as clergymen.¹⁵⁹⁹ Most clerical representatives from this group came from families of lower nobility and many had served as municipal organizers under the *ancien regime* (except for Ressi) in addition to their professorial skills. Similarly, many had connections to the masonic orders of their respective cities. They tended to be neutral rationalists who would support moderate and originalist legislation rather than progressive and radical legislation. They tended to favor more republican politics, most likely by virtue of their more aristocratic backgrounds.

The final major group of clergy representatives were those like Antonio Tadini, Lorenzo Mascheroni and Giuseppe Mangili who represented the most progressive and radical faction.¹⁶⁰⁰ Many, like Tadini and Mangili in fact gave up their clerical titles once the French had entered into Northern Italy in order to fully embrace the spirit of the revolution, which they found opposed to their Catholic clerical vows. Tadini, Mangili and Mascheroni, were all instructors at the Mariano College of Bergamo, though their true connection was their expertise in mathematics, particularly Mascheroni, who went on to serve as the Chair of Mathematics at Pavia. Their distance, generally, from the elite university institutions of Northern Italy allowed these clergymen to engage with more radical material, and their connections to the lay scientific communities saw greater contact with revolutionary rhetoric. For this reason, these clergymen became the most extreme “patriots” of their profession – though it should be stated that also these representatives tended to be less democratic-leaning overall than other lay representatives like Dehò or La Hoz.

¹⁵⁹⁸ “Gavirate 8 Germinale anno VI repubblicano. Repub°. Besozzi Pretore= all Cittadino Reppresentante Lattuada”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 108,” fol. Besozzi Letter, 28 March 1798, Gavirate.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Necrologia: Michele Vismara, Milano 10 maggio 1819 Bertolotti 1819, 126. Vismara is listed as having been a professor of classical languages and philosophy at the Seminary of Milan and municipal rector in that city; Coraccini 1823, 121. Ressi is listed as being a professor of science, economics, commerce law and polics at the University of Pavia ; Ugo Da Como 3:24. Bovara is listed as an *oblato* and previously a professor at Pavia ; Lazzarini 1990, 15. Savonraola was a local administrator founder of a masonic lodge in Padova and professor of canon law at the University of Padua

¹⁶⁰⁰ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:76; Pepe, “Mascheroni, Lorenzo”; Giannini, “Tadini Antonio.”

There were individual powerful clergymen within the *Gran Consiglio* who did not belong to any of these groups. Giuseppe Compagnoni for example, was an abbot originally from Imola, who was educated in Bologna, spent time as a radical intellectual in Ferrara and was close with the democratic-leaning delegation from the ex-veneto (Dandolo, Valeriani, Foscolo) but with similarly close ties to the aristocratic members in the Council such as the Brescian Mazzuchelli, making him a difficult representative to define politically.¹⁶⁰¹ Cesare Monalti provides another example; though he had connections with the intellectuals from Bologna and Pavia, he shared social revolutionary sympathies with Latuada and Federici.¹⁶⁰² Monalti, however, was also a member of a religious order and lived in an abbey in Assisi which often saw him advocating for those who would suffer from the confiscation of Church property. Clergymen who found themselves between groups were much more indicative of the difficult relationship which many representatives, lay and clerical, had with the rationalizing of the institutional Church and the new revolutionary republic.

They were not alone. The debate regarding the place of the Church in the new Cisalpine Republic – and Italian republicanism more generally – permeated Italian political discourse in the late 1790s, particularly in the Northern Italian *ancien regime* states. The Catholic Church, as an institution had a strong hold, not only in the cultural elements of Cisalpine society, but also structurally and politically. The Josephian reforms in the Duchy of Milan had demonstrated that in fact it was possible to marry modern political and social philosophy with Catholic institutionalism.¹⁶⁰³ Popular revolutionary writers, such as Giovanni Antonio Ranza, encouraged a new form of republicanized Catholicism which could be applied to Cisalpine society as a means of transporting republican philosophy to the masses.¹⁶⁰⁴ Similarly, Ranza encouraged a form of religiosity, which stressed a love of nation on par with a love of god; a ritualism in patriotic ceremony which mirrored that of religious ceremony; a puritanic devotion to God and Government which stripped away the pomp and circumstance for loyal devotion.¹⁶⁰⁵ Ranza, along with likeminded supporters, held to Jansenist views which saw the church returning to its humble

¹⁶⁰¹ Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*; Pederzani, *I Dandolo*.

¹⁶⁰² Brancaleoni, "Monalti, Cesare."

¹⁶⁰³ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 117.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Ranza, *Discorso*.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Schettini, "Niente Di Più Bello Ha Prodotto La Rivoluzione": La Teofilantropia Nell'Italia Del Triennio (1796-1799)," 401.

origins, adding to this concept historical references to attempts at democratizing the Church from its early founding.¹⁶⁰⁶

Concurrent with Ranza's concept of a puritan republican spiritualism, an idea of secular charity called Theophilanthropy, which had become popularized in France since 1796 and brought to the Cisalpine Republic by neo-jacobin commentator Marc-Antoine Jullien, had risen to popularity in Milan throughout 1797 and 1798.¹⁶⁰⁷ Glauco Schettini highlights how this new quasi-religious movement – which adapted the social and moral aspects of Catholic religion, such as charity, social responsibility and virtue – took hold through the Constitutional Circles of the Cisalpine Republic (particularly that of Milan) and was popularized by well-known left-wing patriot writers and political commentators such as Matteo Galdi and Giovanni Fantoni.¹⁶⁰⁸ The perceived conflicting views of religion and republicanism – one puritan, poor and devotional, the other boisterous, rich and charitable – mirrored similar conflicts of moderation versus radicalism, progressivism versus originalism, and popular democracy versus elite republicanism.

The representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* would have been well exposed to these debates between figures like Ranza and Galdi, particularly those like Dandolo, Reina, Vicini and Compagnoni who were all popular and common speakers at the Constitutional Circle of Milan, especially in the early months of 1798. In general, the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* tended to support a perspective which did not seek to actively destroy the Catholic religion but instead strongly supported its subordination, not only in the political realm but in the social realm as well.¹⁶⁰⁹ None were perhaps more zealous in this opinion than the clerical representatives themselves, like Luigi Bossi, whose 1797 *Religione repubblicana* – a response to a pamphlet which strongly criticized perceived attacks on Catholic faith by patriots – sought to underscore that the premise of the catholic religion was not the evil which republicanism was attempting to strip away from society, but rather the excesses of that institution.¹⁶¹⁰ The clerical representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* sought to shift the evangelism of Catholic religiosity to republican

¹⁶⁰⁶ “Agli Amici della Libertà ed equalianza italiana politico-religiosa. Avviso d’un buon Lombardo” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A., Studi, 108” published pamphlet, 1796, Pavia.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Schettini, “Niente Di Più Bello Ha Prodotto La Rivoluzione”: La Teofilantropia Nell’Italia Del Triennio (1796-1799),” 380–84.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Schettini, 385–88, 390–93.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Bossi, *La Religione repubblicana, ossia analisi critica del libro intitolato Concordia tra la società e la religione ossia difesa del culto cattolico contro chi lo calunnia in contrasto colla società*. 1798, p. 6

¹⁶¹⁰ Bossi, *La religione repubblicana*, 19.

patriotism along the lines of Ranza's thesis, while also creating a sense of secular morality and social revolution along the lines of the concepts held in Theophilanthropy.

This concept translated to an idea of a "catechism of the citizen" which would provide the moral instruction and patriotic spiritualism which all citizens needed to have in order for the republic to flourish, an idea supported by both lay and ecclesiastic representatives alike.¹⁶¹¹ According to this philosophy, the true evil of the Church was not its spiritual morality but the hypocrisy of its extreme materialism (mirroring Ranza's calls for a puritan republicanism). The tendency of clergy, especially higher order clergy, to hoard wealth from distribution to those in need, contradicted their own teachings to the contrary for lay parishioners. Parish priests like Latuada, Valsecchi and Federici knew firsthand the manner in which a church reflected its own messages of charity and comfort for a community which could then be used to grow the spiritual nature of that community, Christian or republican. Similarly, they understood the great danger which lay in these communities were what might happen to the Revolution if the spiritual center were to be corrupted by counter-revolution, or perhaps even worse, abused by hypocritical republicans seeking political advantage over community growth.¹⁶¹² As such, representatives who supported this social revolutionary tendency of clerics found that their relationship to religion was one which was built around ideas of social and religious reform, without the complete destruction of those institutions.

This concept of social revolution and a republican catechism complemented a focus on public instruction and democratic education which the academic clerical representatives who came from the university elite championed. The formation of a number of "Societies for Public Instruction", provided for this centrist group of representatives the same space to develop ideas that more democratic leaning elements had in the Constitutional circles. These societies had been

¹⁶¹¹ "Dopo la risposta alla domanda cosa è la morale? del mio catechismo morale e politico ai feci la seguente spiegazione..." "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40," fol. Varese letter, 1797/1798 and author unknown; This random work found in the papers of the Constitutional Circle of Varese is not marked as having been from any specific author. However it was found near writings from Giuseppe Luini - a consistent ally and writing partner to Felice Latuada - and the handwriting matches up to that of Felice Latuada. Based on the content and location it is very likely that the letter which establishes this concept of a new republican catechism was penned by Latuada for presentation at the constitutional circle.

¹⁶¹² "Paolo Gamba [?] Moderatore del Circolo Costituzionale al Cittadino Manini Ispettore di Polizia Generale. Cons. 29 Termidoro an. 5/6 [year not clear] Repub. "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400," fol. Como letter, 16 August 1797 OR 1798, Como; This letter describes the unrest in Como following the suppression of the Church of San. Giacomo. This suppression took place following disorder in Como and suspicion of agitation by the local priest against the republican government and the French officials posted in that city.

established long before the Constitutional Circles as spaces in which intellectual patriots could collaborate in the dissemination of republican and revolutionary ideology among the majority of the Cisalpine population.¹⁶¹³ Their ranks were filled with important academic figures who would eventually become notable also to Bonaparte – who would eventually go on to nominate a number of the more prominent members to positions within the *Gran Consiglio* such as Cagnoli, Vismara, Venturi, and Bossi. Most of these men were either clergymen themselves, former clergymen or had close contacts with the clergy through the Societies or their respective academic institutions.

Therefore, when combining the social revolution of clergymen from the peripheral parishes, with the academic pursuits of clergymen from university and academic institutions, it comes as no surprise that the institutionalization of a republican catechism became one of the main priorities of the *Gran Consiglio* in moderating Catholic and Republican elements of society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the plan for public instruction formed between late Frimaire and Early Thermidor Year VI. The commission of public instruction – formally elected on 18 Frimaire and one of the only permanent commissions not selected by the presidential bureau – included five of the seven members who were current or former clergymen (Mascheroni, Tadini, Compagnoni, Alpruni and Morali).¹⁶¹⁴ When Tadini was made Minister of Interior Affairs in Germinal, Bossi took his place in the commission. The commission was also frequently helped through motions and proposals coming from other prominent clergymen including Latuada, Valsecchi, Federici and Vismara. There was little disagreement over the Church and its monopoly over public instruction so long as the Church taught according to a republican lesson plan. Even the most democratic elements of the *Gran Consiglio* never seemed to resist this aspect of the plan, a stark contrast to both the external commentators in the Cisalpine press and the French authorities who criticized the maintenance of catholic institutions as backwards.¹⁶¹⁵

¹⁶¹³ “Al Generale in Capo Dell’Armata d’Italia La Società di pubblica Istruzione di Mil.” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 108,” fol. Bianchi letter, 1797, Milano; This letter was reintroduced into the political discourse of the *Gran Consiglio* in 1798 by Bianchi. It describes the reasons for establishing the Society of Public Instruction in Milan and the mutual understanding between the members of the Society and Bonaparte to work for “the liberty and the happiness of Lombardy”. It predates the Cisalpine Republic.

¹⁶¹⁴ “Seduta XIX, 18 Frimaire anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:294.

¹⁶¹⁵ Trouvé, Jean-Claude, *Quelques Explications sur la Republique Cisalpine*, 1799; This pamphlet by French ambassador to the Cisalpine republic Trouvé details his disdain for the acceptance of Catholic institutions in Italian culture, and the need to pander to the masses through the use of religious imagery. For Trouvé and other French officials the inability for the Cisalpine peasant class to grasp the concepts of republican society without the use of Christian mysticism and iconography was a symbol of Italian inferiority. “Capo degli aristocratici fuggitivi della

That said, divisions were apparent by the spring of 1798 between the social revolutionary clerical representatives, the academic tendency, and the patriot faction. Social revolutionaries hoped to push an agenda which would make public education a way to unify poorer communities and elevate them to higher socio-economic levels.¹⁶¹⁶ This was often seen in efforts by representatives, especially Latuada, to create public well-being institutes who would not only provide education but healthcare and financial assistance to those in lower class areas of urban and rural society, assigning Cisalpine government functions to previously Catholic run institutions.¹⁶¹⁷ Patriotic clerical representatives had a similar goal, though insisted on stronger nationalist and republican aspects of the curriculum such as Italian language studies, republican festivals, and Italian history.¹⁶¹⁸ Their focus was similarly on underdeveloped areas; however, they tended to place aside issues of public wellness – though not refuse them entirely – and highlight patriotism as the primary function of public instruction.¹⁶¹⁹ The academic faction sought to increase the number of institutes and universities and open up the access to these institutions to a more universal student body.¹⁶²⁰ Instead of replacing Catholic institutions with secular ones, these clergy representatives sought to form a public education system which would be more attractive to the lay population, and encourage people to act through republican patriotism to educate themselves,

libertà Diagolo fra un Lombardo ed il Diavolo”, ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Studi, 108 n.d., fol. Diavolo Capo degli Aristocratici pamphlet. 1797/1798, author and place unknown; this satirical pamphlet was printed some time during the Cisalpine Republic. It provides evidence which shows how outside commentators, particularly those more radically to the left of the political spectrum, were attempting to convince the population against the church. The dialogue more or less details how aristocracy and catholic clergy were working together against the interests of the common man and only through their abolition would true salvation be achieved.

¹⁶¹⁶ “Seduta CXLVI, 24 germinale Anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:31-32 Project of Savonarola for the furnishing of education and educational materials for youth unable to procur their own educational materials

¹⁶¹⁷ “Seduta CCV, 26 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:499-500, 505-507. Debate on an institute for public wellness

¹⁶¹⁸ “Seduta LVI, 25 nervoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:31 Establishment of a national archive; “Seduta CXX, 28 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:425–26. Debate on the use of Italian instead of French in the instruction of officials and commands for the military.

¹⁶¹⁹ “Primi elementi dell’istruzione repubblicana per uso de’ giovanetti cisalpini” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A., Studi, 109,” fol. Elementi dell’Istruzione Repubblicana pamphlet, 1798, Milano (Stamperia del Termometro politico); this pamphlet published by the editors of the *Termometro Politico* was a manual for young Cisalpine students on how to be a good republican citizen. It highlighted the tools, ideas and actions of a good citizen and was to be used as an instructional manual in schools.

¹⁶²⁰ “Seduta XL, 9 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:574-575. Report of Morali, for the commission of public instruction, on the state of schools in departments and the opening of new instiutions.

not through economic necessity.¹⁶²¹ These academies and institutes would rival those in France, both in grandeur and in republican educational prestige, making the Cisalpine Republic, and thus the Italian peninsula itself a potential center of education and culture as it had been in the past – in particular in ancient times.

The plan itself was finalized in mid-Thermidor and included elements from the various plans of all three ideological tendencies, though with a much greater focus on the academic and patriotic factions. This plan, often referred to as the Mascheroni plan in the historiography, established the National Institute (created in 1797 by Aldini but never really obtaining much authority in the first year of its existence) as the prevailing educational body, responsible for the management of public and private (Catholic) run education.¹⁶²² This plan established the curriculum from the patriotic tendency while also establishing the grandeur of university and academic institutions within the confines of the Cisalpine Republic centered around the prestigious urban academies in places like Modena, Bologna and Milan. The socio-economic elements which were supported by social revolutionaries like Latuada, were seen as too costly, and while they could be useful for urban communities with a greater access to financial resources – in particular for cities like Milan, Brescia, Bologna and Bergamo – peripheral and rural areas would be unable to sustain themselves, placing the burden on the nation.¹⁶²³ Theoretically the patriotic elements of the plan, which would replace regionalism, and in particular reliance on local catholic institutions, would eventually allow for nationalized social provisions to be enacted, such as a public wellness institute for the peripheral regions and a universal schooling system.¹⁶²⁴ However, due to the Coup of Trouvé on 14 Fructidor these plans were never enacted, as the political chaos which ensued in its aftermath saw a decreasing interest in the “republican catechism”, especially considering the hostility which it encountered from French officials.

¹⁶²¹ “Seduta XLV, 14 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:649 Discourse of Catelfracno and Alpruni establishing professors as public employees; “Seduta LXI, 29 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta LXVII, 4 piovosio anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 2:80–82, 159–60 Provisional plan for public instruction; Debate on the establishment of the Academy of Mantova; Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 469.

¹⁶²² Della Peruta, “Dall’Istituto Nazionale All’Istituto Reale: Un Profilo Istituzionale,” 21.

¹⁶²³ “Seduta CXLVI, 24 germinale Anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini – Alberti 1927b, pp. 30, 33-34 Discourses of Alpruni and Terzaghi against providing education to Cisalpine youth.

¹⁶²⁴ Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All’età Napoleonica*, 469.

Marriage laws and the Republican family

The delicate balance of Catholic devotion and republican obligation, both from a political as well as a civil administrative background, served as the primary point of division between the institutional Catholic Church and the *Gran Consiglio*. While there was no love lost between the Roman Catholic leadership in Rome and the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, the latter consistently walked a fine line which attempted to retain important aspects of Northern Italian cultural heritage – for many the root of Cisalpine, and indeed Italian, patriotism – without betraying the ideas of secular republican supremacy based on French Republican precedent.¹⁶²⁵ With matters of finance, public wellness or legal rights, the *Gran Consiglio* was less conflicted over the sequestration, or outright replacement of Catholic principles and procedures with those of republicanism. However, in matters which had a social impact – not socio-economic but social structure more specifically – they remained hesitant to overthrow the hold which Catholic tradition had. One of the most complex examples of this fight between catholic traditionalism and republican supremacy was in the establishment of marriage laws.

The reforms of Joseph II had introduced a matrimonial constitution in 1784 which regulated both the civil and religious aspects of marriage and matrimonial contracts at an institutional level.¹⁶²⁶ This constitution was formed along the ideological lines based created after the Council of Trent which stated that the “prince” – a generalized conception of the ruling monarch – was responsible for the civil and religious wellbeing of his people, a concept which dictate much of Josephian reformist policy in the second half of the eighteenth century.¹⁶²⁷ In this vein, the constitution of 1784 established a set of laws regarding impediments for marriage which would serve the civil and spiritual well-being of the public.¹⁶²⁸ In addition to protections against spiritual transgressions such as polygamy, incest and adultery, the constitution also enacted civil protections such as hereditary restrictions, regulations for filial legitimacy and the classification of marriage transgression as state offenses as opposed to religious.¹⁶²⁹ Thus, by 1796 and the arrival

¹⁶²⁵ “Serie dei documenti tra la Corte di Roma e la Repubblica cisalpina” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2” published collection, Veladini, 1797, Milan.

¹⁶²⁶ Vianello, “La Legislazione Matrimoniale in Lombardia Da Giuseppe II a Napoleone,” 331; Tosi, “Giuseppinismo e Legislazione Matrimoniale in Lombardia: La Costituzione Del 1784,” 236.

¹⁶²⁷ Vianello, “La Legislazione Matrimoniale in Lombardia Da Giuseppe II a Napoleone,” 329.

¹⁶²⁸ Tosi, “Giuseppinismo e Legislazione Matrimoniale in Lombardia: La Costituzione Del 1784,” 238–45.

¹⁶²⁹ Tosi, 267–75.

of the French, a principal of state oversight on religious tradition had already been long established in Hapsburg controlled territories. The calls for social as well as political change under the new Cisalpine Republic, saw calls for the adaptation of French marriage laws from 1792 which would be united with already existing ideas from the 1784 regulations.¹⁶³⁰

In reality marriage was not one of the main priorities of the *Gran Consiglio* in its opening months especially not when it came to matters of the Catholic Church. Marriage laws had been passed by the *comitati riuniti* in the summer of 1797, which established certain limitation, but essentially converted the previous religious ceremonies to civil ceremonies.¹⁶³¹ However, these new “civil” marriage laws did little to confront the new social and economic reality which were developing in the Cisalpine Republic, and did not seem to result in changes to past socio-economic conditions which the unification of Italian and French marriage statutes was expected to produce.¹⁶³² Aristocratic practices from the *ancien regime* which had been used to monopolize intergenerational wealth remained in effect, which angered social revolutionaries like Latuada who saw the use of exploitive marriages as against both the original purpose of Catholic matrimony and republican civil unions.¹⁶³³ At the opposite end of the socio-economic spectrum, impoverished communities in the mountains – well known to most social revolutionary clerical representatives – continued to use marriage contracts as a means of community political involvement.¹⁶³⁴ For progressives in particular, this outdated and restrictive form of peasant municipal government the lack of valid marriage laws to monitor the monetization and exploitation of communal politics, was an impediment to republican institutionalization. Similarly, the marriage laws did little to

¹⁶³⁰ Tosi, “Famiglia e Divorzio Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana: Polemiche Pubblicistiche e Tenativi Di Legislazione,” 7–8.

¹⁶³¹ “Estratto dei Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo= Seduta del 6. Termidoro anno V. la Legge relativa ai Registri delle Nascite, de’ Matrimonj, delle morti, e de’ Cittadini attivi... ‘Matriomoni’”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 90.

¹⁶³² Tosi, “Famiglia e Divorzio Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana: Polemiche Pubblicistiche e Tenativi Di Legislazione,” 12–13. The years 1796 and 1797 saw a vivacious discourse on the regulation of traditional religious ceremony and the republicanization of *ancien regime* traditions more generally. Marriage was one of the more prominent of these traditions which was enjoyed universally by the general population. It saw coverage by some of the most important patriotic writers of the period including Lattanzi and the former noble L’Aurora. However, by the fall of 1797 these arguments had been tabled for what were considered more serious social concerns such as public education, public festivals and the initiation of the “republican spirit” among the general population particularly in peripheral and border cities.

¹⁶³³ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:402 Project of Resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶³⁴ Casari, Lisciandra, and Tagliapietra, “Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps 1790-1820,” 74.

regulate, or even stipulate, the rules of citizenship, inheritance, and rights for international marriages; these problems were increasingly present as occupying French troops began to marry (or at the very least conceive children with) Italian women.

Thus, when Latuada proposed a new project of marriage laws on 18 Pluviose, it was as much in an attempt to bring the republicanizing project to these peripheral regions for which he had so much sympathy, as it was the establishment of a new idea of the republican family.¹⁶³⁵ Latuada rationalized that the impediments to marriage which had existed in the past were “il prodotto di leggi oppressive dell’umanità, ed un abuso delle autorità dispotiche contro la libertà, e degli interessi del popolo” which had favored both the aristocratic exploitation of the inheritance system and the closed societies of rural towns.¹⁶³⁶ The resolution which established this plan called for the immediate annulment of all past laws concerning marriage and established a set of rules in fifteen articles which would govern the civil unions of the Cisalpine Republic going forward. First the new plan banned all marriages between inheritors and those they inherit from, as well as all forms of incest within the nuclear family.¹⁶³⁷ It was made illegal to enter into a marriage contract if one of the members was impotent and had knowledge of this fact beforehand, except in cases where the impotence was a permanent condition and both parties knowingly agree to the marriage regardless.¹⁶³⁸ Next the plan would ban marriages between already married people, in the case of rape or violent intimidation and in cases of fraud where one marries a person believing them to be another.¹⁶³⁹ All parties who entered into the contract of marriage had to do so knowingly and be of sound mind and body to consent, which included being above the age of consent – sixteen years of age for men and thirteen for women.¹⁶⁴⁰ All marriages had to be announced at least ten days before the ceremony was to take place; the subsequent ceremony would then be conducted in the presence of two witnesses and a municipal official who recorded the name of the spouses in the municipal registry.¹⁶⁴¹ All betrothals would be banned, the laws would be applied strictly and

¹⁶³⁵ Mita Ferraro, *Politica e Religione Nel Triennio Repubblicano (1796.1799). I Sacerdoti Insubri: Lattuada, Passerini, Gattoni*, 44–45.

¹⁶³⁶ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:402. Second *considerandi* in the project of resolution of Latuada; trans “...the product of laws oppressive to humanity, and an abuse of despotic authority against the interests and liberty of the people.”

¹⁶³⁷ *Ibid* 2:402. Articles 1-3 of the plan of resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶³⁸ *Ibid* 2:402. Article 4 of the plan for resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶³⁹ *Ibid* 2:402. Articles 5-7 of the plan of resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid* 2:403. Articles 8-9 of the plan of resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶⁴¹ *Ibid* 2:403. Articles 10-12 of the plan of resolution of Latuada.

transgressors would be charged with disturbing the public peace if not further charged (for example in cases of rape, violence or fraud).¹⁶⁴²

Latuada's plans for marriage, though rudimentary in their early stage were already innovative in their treatment of the act and conditions of marriage. Perhaps most prominent among these innovations was the use of a municipal officer in the place of priest for the officiation of the wedding ceremony. In this plan, religion would be completely outside of the contractual obligations of the marriage, and while it did not outright ban religious matrimonial ceremonies, they were not recognized as legally binding. This seems to harken back to Josephian reforms which were aimed at placing the public aspects of marriage over the spiritual and built upon the civil marriage concepts of the *comitati riuniti* in such a way as to strengthen state involvement in regulating marriages – removing this responsibility from Church officers.¹⁶⁴³ Aspects of impotence, age, intimidation, violence and consent to acquire marriage contracts, though perhaps not always obeyed, were not necessarily a new idea for marriage ceremonies at this time and were more or less expected. However, this plan offered a significant amount of legal agency to women, who could not be entered into the contract without their own personal consent, which was upheld through the statutes against violence. While these laws may have been originally conceived to favor men, wanting to avoid the “shot-gun” wedding scenario, the language used offered to women the chance to opt out of a marriage contract if they felt forced. Yet, the norms of Catholic society do remain in many ways. Adultery was prohibited, and the expectation that a marriage will produce heirs remained the primary function of the contract, not business or communal political status.

The day after the project was presented, Cagnoli, a neutral moderate, questioned the use of particular phrases of Latuada and motioned to hold off from printing Latuada's plan in any official capacity until others, particularly from the Legislation Commission to which Latuada belonged, had the chance to present their findings.¹⁶⁴⁴ Interestingly, Latuada also found himself attacked on the other side as the progressive radicals Alborghetti, Dehò and Salimbeni all supported the motion of Cagnoli, accepting Latuada's premise of the commissions sluggish approach to law project formation, but insisting on the right of all representatives to declare their piece for motives of

¹⁶⁴² *Ibid* 2:403. Articles 13-15 of the plan of resolution of Latuada.

¹⁶⁴³ Tosi, “Famiglia e Divorzio Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana: Polemiche Pubblicistiche e Tentativi Di Legislazione,” 17.

¹⁶⁴⁴ “Seduta LXXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:404. Discourse of Cagnoli.

equality and liberty.¹⁶⁴⁵ The issue was picked up again some days later when the originalist moderate Lamberti presented his own plan of matrimony which adapted many of the articles found in that of Latuada.¹⁶⁴⁶ Lamberti was the first to acknowledge the place of Catholic marriage ceremonies in Cisalpine society as legally binding and declared that Catholics should have the full legal rights to conduct their marriage rituals as any other religion. Lamberti's plan raised the age of consent for both men and women but set in place rules for marriage contracts for minors in which both parents could consent to a marriage on a minor's behalf, or in the event of their death, a legally appointed guardian could serve this function. However, most notably about Lamberti's plan was that it prohibited second marriages even in cases of death, upholding ancient Catholic traditions on the spiritual permanence of marriage. Savonarola though he praised Lamberti's plan for raising the age of consent to reflect the age which at that time was believed men and women had reached full anatomical development (17 for men and 14 for women) scolded Lamberti for allowing the involvement of parents in a decision between two people, especially minors.¹⁶⁴⁷

The question of religion and marriage reared its head again some days later when the *Gran Consiglio* received a petition by a Cit. Luigi Migliavacca, an ecclesiastic of unknown rank. Migliavacca had applied for a marriage contract but was denied by Ragazzi the Minister of Interior Affairs based on a law from the Josephian 1784 marriage constitution which banned clerical marriages.¹⁶⁴⁸ The Petition Commission, though confused that this law was still in effect, agreed with the minister considering that the 1784 had not yet been abrogated. The progressive radical Cavedoni contested this ruling, arguing that all laws made before the constitution were invalidated. This, however, was denied by the President Brunetti who claimed that the constitution did not apply to ecclesiastics and religious matters which remained in the purview of *ancien regime* laws.¹⁶⁴⁹ Grudgingly the Council was forced to agree with Ragazzi's ruling. However, once again

¹⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid* Montalcini et Alberti, 2:405. Discourses of Dehò, Alborghetti and Salimbeni.

¹⁶⁴⁶ "Seduta XC, 28 Piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:591–92. Presentation of the plan of Matrimony by Lamberti.

¹⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 2:592-93. Sicourse of Savonarola.

¹⁶⁴⁸ "Seduta XCVI, 4 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:719 Presentation of petition of Milgiavacca by the Petition Commission

¹⁶⁴⁹ "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," Title XIV Article 353.

it was two clerical representatives, Mascheroni and Alpruni, who suggested that a statute be added to the plan of marriage regarding matrimony for ecclesiastics.¹⁶⁵⁰

The plans of Latuada and Lamberti were each presented once again on 18 Ventôse for the *Gran Consiglio* to select which was to be made the official resolution.¹⁶⁵¹ Carlo Cocchetti criticized both plans and presented his own.¹⁶⁵² Upon hearing Cocchetti's reflections Francesco Reina proposed his own solution. He had formulated an expansion to Latuada's plan which regulated the rights, duties and restriction of the spouses, both internal to the marriage and within civil society.¹⁶⁵³ Reina's was the most republicanizing plan yet and addressed issues which had been left unattended to by the 6 Thermidor laws and either Lamberti's and Latuada's plans, such as the rights of a foreign spouse and divorce. It similarly abrogated all laws from the 1784 constitution which were not included in his plan.

Despite long interventions by Compagnoni and Lamberti who both protested its libertine nature, after 3 days Latuada's plan with Reina's additions was adopted as the primary motion for resolution and put to print for further examination.¹⁶⁵⁴ The discussions which occupied the debate of the plan of Reina/Latuada regarded mostly the civil aspects of its content. The one exception was a discourse conducted by Alpruni before the approval of the fifteenth and final article.¹⁶⁵⁵ He remarked that while the discourse had been dominated by religiously educated men, there needed

¹⁶⁵⁰ "Seduta XCIV, 4 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:719–20 Discourses of Mascheroni and Alpruni.

¹⁶⁵¹ "Seduta CX, 18 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:257 Presentation of the plans for Marriage of Latuada and Lamberti.

¹⁶⁵² *Ibid* 3:257-60. Discourse of Cocchetti.; He remarked that Latuada's plan lacked the discipline and accountability which were necessary to regulate marriage and determined that simply establishing rules of impediments were not the same as defining what marriage was in society and particularly its construction in a republican fashion as opposed to a religious one. He expressed surprise at the libertine style of Latuada's plan, which seemed more intent on nullifying marriages than retaining them. Cocchetti remarked that Lamberti's plan went too far the other way and applied such heavy discipline to the institution of marriage that it restricted the liberty of both parties. Similarly, it retained too much of the old-world ideology of marriage laws to serve any function in a civil state. He proposed a unification of these plans

¹⁶⁵³ *Ibid* 3:260-62. Motion of Reina.

¹⁶⁵⁴ "Seduta CXII, 20 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:299.

¹⁶⁵⁵ "Seduta CXI, 19 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:283–84. Discourse of Alpruni.; He stated that marriages should not be able to be blocked by anyone, but the state and the parties involved in the matrimony, just as in religious ceremonies only God could refuse a marriage. He demanded harsh penalties for those who broke the marriage contract including steep fines and even prison time. He requested that government workers, and in particular ministers, who use their political advantages to break up marriage bonds be punished the most harshly for abusing their sacred power. Finally, he declared that the church should still be able to bear witness in marriages, even if only as witnesses for the spouses. Alpruni, the most conservative Catholic of the clerical representatives, was similarly the most insistent on the role the church was to play in future civil ceremonies.

to be put in place articles for those ignorant of the religious covenant of matrimony, highlighting the prevailing idea within the Council that marriage remained a spiritual practice before a civil one. Nevertheless, as the debates continued into Germinal and Floréal the question of religion began to fade as the civil nature of marriage contracts became the primary point of discourse.¹⁶⁵⁶ In this way, the *Gran Consiglio* adopted a precedent in which the religious aspects of Cisalpine culture were no longer a point of political discourse. Though religion might appear in the context of financial or administrative debates, it was not the theoretical or moral aspects of religion and republican virtue which were to be discussed but the Church institution. This was a sharp divergence from the ideas of the republican catechism popularized by clerical representatives like Latuada. This is most likely because the month of Floréal and Prairial saw an expansion of progressive legislation which was more occupied with civil expansion and administration, and not necessarily with republican virtue in Cisalpine society.

In Floréal the rights to dictate marriage laws and the morality of spouses was taken away from canon law and applied to civil law.¹⁶⁵⁷ In doing so the *Gran Consiglio* stripped away the authority of the Church to dictate popular cultural morality and instead saw a rise in republican civil virtue as the primary regulator of social behavior, particularly between men and women. This included the dynamics of the family. The parent-child relationship, particularly in regard to marriage was no longer dictated by the Christian commandments which obligated a child to listen to its parent. Instead, it was defined by a parent's legal obligation to their child as a minor, and then the liberty of a person to make financial and familial choices for themselves once they had reached the age of legal consent; in this case it was the choosing of a spouse.¹⁶⁵⁸ The family and parental control over their children was no longer a prerogative of the Church. Social norms were

¹⁶⁵⁶ "Seduta CXXXVII, 15 germinal Anno VI repubblicano," Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:753–57. In this debate, the religious tax on marriages was made part of a much larger debate on religious taxes and tax exemptions more generally. Progressives in particular favored a Directorial initiative to end the ability of archdiocese to levy taxes on parishioners, though the debate turned to whether the state should levy these taxes, or if in fact the state should simply allow the church to continue taxing parishioners and then in turn tax the Church itself at a higher rate.

¹⁶⁵⁷ "Seduta CLXXVII, 26 fiorile anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 4:724. Motion of Salimbeni.

¹⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid* 4:728–29. Discourses of Savonarola, Reina, Greppi and Dehò regarding the age of majority for a man and the ability of a parent to organize marriages.; It should be mentioned that the natural question which came out of this was how to avoid the abuse of the child-parent relationship, particularly by aristocratic elements, with the arranging of child marriages before the age of majority (20), but after the legal age of marriage (17 for men and 14 for women). It was argued by Lauro Glissentini on 27 Floréal that in fact all marriages need to be free, and that the age of consent predated that of majority. Therefore, under civil law, marriage was made an exception to the age of majority, for the first time separating political function from social function.

now subject to civil law, an important cultural step for Northern Italy, where under Josephian concepts, politics were the purview of civil structures and society the purview of the Catholic Church. What constituted virtue and vice – for example, obedience to one’s parents – were not necessarily expunged from Cisalpine society, but were no longer penalized through spiritual sanctions but civil.¹⁶⁵⁹

The plan for marriage laws would not come to fruition under the *Gran Consiglio*. It would be rejected by the *Seniori* in the lead up to the Messidor Crisis on 30 Prairial and then reformatted by the *Gran Consiglio* in the aftermath of the Crisis at the opening of the Thermidor period on 12 Messidor.¹⁶⁶⁰ This new form of the plan would be the final nail in the coffin for religious influence on civil society under the political culture formed by the *Gran Consiglio*. It established rules for civil ceremony as well as the regulation of age and consent by the spouses. It would be altered again following the Coup of Trouvé, though by this point most of the more progressive representatives who had pushed for marriage secularization were already expelled from the Council. In the end it would be clerical representatives like Savonarola, Latuada and Alpruni who would define the laws of marriage going into the new Napoleonic age, which after 1801 saw a resurgence of Catholic traditionalism in modern civil administration on the Italian peninsula.

Ecclesiastical funding

Besides the political and social role which the Catholic Religion played in *Gran Consiglio* politics, perhaps its most fundamental role in debates was as the subject of state finances. As the largest landowner in Cisalpine Territory the institutional Catholic Church presented to the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* – both clerical and lay – and enormous polemic.¹⁶⁶¹ On one hand the sequestration and subsequent sale of Church property would provide a significant boost in refilling the continually diminishing returns of the National Treasury. As religious corporations and cults were not constitutionally recognized by the state as legal property owners there would be no violation of property laws with this sequestration.¹⁶⁶² However, on the other hand, being a member of the Catholic clergy does not exempt one from citizenship, as it was seen as a private

¹⁶⁵⁹ “Seduta CLXXXVIII, 27 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 4:737. Discourse of Dehò.

¹⁶⁶⁰ “Seduta CCXXII, 12 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927, 5:810–12. Motion of Marieni; Tosi, “Famiglia e Divorzio Dalla Repubblica Cisalpina Alla Repubblica Italiana: Polemiche Pubblicistiche e Tentativi Di Legislazione,” 32.

¹⁶⁶¹ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 21.

¹⁶⁶² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XIV Articles 356 and 359.

profession.¹⁶⁶³ Like all private professions, workers can charge fees for their work, and more importantly can receive government pensions if contracted by the state. These fees would often come at the cost of the government especially for contracted work in schools, hospital, and other public wellness functions that the Church had been afforded in Cisalpine Territory.

Many, especially English-language historians such as Broers and Palmer, have looked at the financial relations between the Catholic Church and Cisalpine state as the weak point in the republican wall which was eventually exploited and used to the detriment of the Triennio republics.¹⁶⁶⁴ Many point to the financial extraction of the Church as the singular sparking point for counter-revolution, as though the Church was a singular political block, whose resentment at the perceived robbery of their material resources encouraged priests across Cisalpine territory to mobilize the peasantry in a prolonged campaign of anti-republican resistance. In many ways were one to listen exclusively to the most radical members of the French and Cisalpine press (even some representatives themselves) recount tales of Catholic counter-revolutionary plots it is understandable to draw this rather generalized conclusion.¹⁶⁶⁵ The reality of course is more nuanced. The majority of the general population was nonplussed by regulation of Church income, particularly if it meant one less tax to pay. Additionally, the sheer number of clerical representatives in the *Gran Consiglio*, from all social and political classes, demonstrates that the concept of a general Catholic counter-revolutionary insurgency was not present in the Cisalpine Republic as it would be in Calabria the following year. Yet there was a general anxiety among the common man as to the fate of social programs, and the parish priests, convent nuns and suppressed religious orders who ran them.

The sale of ecclesiastical property (the *beni ecclesiastici*) reflected an important aspect of the fight over church finances. However, the debates over its application were in many ways reflective of the debates regarding the sale of national property more generally. More importantly while this matter was certainly an issue which regarded the relationship between the Catholic Church and the *Gran Consiglio*, it was less reflective of a development in political culture and more relevant to the economic control of the Republic. For this reason and the sale of ecclesiastical

¹⁶⁶³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title XIV Articles 355, 357, 358.

¹⁶⁶⁴ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 606–7; Broers, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy*, 9–10.

¹⁶⁶⁵ Fuggitivi della libertà Dialogo fra un Lombardo ed il Diavolo” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 109,” fol. Diavolo Capo degli Aristocratici published pamphlet, author and date unknown (sometime after 1797).

goods – including the property rights of religious orders and corporations like convents and monasteries – as a whole will not be the subject of this study. Instead, here will be examined the debates over the direct funding of the institutional Church, and the erection of financial regulations which dictated the social and political contributions of the Church to the state and vice versa. Matters of Church finance as seen from the perspective of the *Gran Consiglio* need to be seen in two distinct forms; first there were those goods which were offered to the Church by the state – i.e. state pensions for clergymen and religious orders – and second there were the *ancien regime* rights to property and taxation which the Church took for itself – the rights to the *stola* and the *decima*.

The issue of clerical pensions was more tied into exterior conflicts, challenges and political differences between the executive and legislative branches – personified in the conflicts between the Cisalpine Directory and the *Gran Consiglio* examined in Chapter VIII – than it was tied to actual issues of religious politics in 1798. Control of the National Treasury, the use of urgency in resolution making and the conflict with the Minister of Interior Affairs Ragazzi all played a central role in the initial debates made regarding clerical pensions.

As with most conflicts of authority, the issue of pensions was first raised in a petition offered on 1 Nîvose by Andrea Pianca, a former member of a fraternal convent who had taken a state pension in return for leaving his order so that the land they owned may be sequestered and sold by the state to pay off national debts.¹⁶⁶⁶ According to the report presented by the Petition Commission, under the law originally created by Bonaparte to encourage clerics to leave Church land for sequestration, they would receive a monthly pension from the state equal to that of their former ecclesiastical stipends.¹⁶⁶⁷ However, Pianca claimed that Ragazzi had denied this right, and set all clerical pensions at 600 *scudi* regardless of previous incomes. The initial reaction – particularly by those progressives who had already entered into conflict with Ragazzi for his tendency to over-reach his position – was that while the *Gran Consiglio* was not enthusiastic about the payment of clerical pensions, the transgression of Ragazzi was too large to ignore. For this

¹⁶⁶⁶ “Seduta XXXII, 1 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:465. Petition of Pianca.

¹⁶⁶⁷ “Seduta del giorno 12. Vendemmiale Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. Il Generale in Capo dell’armata d’Italia Bonaparte in nome della REpubblica Francese ha fatto deporre in questo Gioro presso il Direttorio Esecutivo la seguente Legge sui regolari... Si Arresta:... Legge sul Clero...”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 159–61.

reason, the Council sent a message to the Directory to reverse Ragazzi's decree in favor of Bonaparte's original law from 13 Vendemnaire.¹⁶⁶⁸ The issue of pensions themselves remained largely unresolved, with various solutions being proposed including the ending of all clerical stipends, or the establishment of a set rate of pensions for clerics. In the end Dehò proposed that the matter be sent to the Ecclesiastical Commission led by Compagnoni so that they might be able to resolve the issue.

This resolution came a month later on 6 Pluviôse when Venturi proposed the commission's plan for the handling of ecclesiastical pensions. The commission had already passed a resolution through the *Gran Consiglio* previously on 9 Nivose which stipulated that foreign born ecclesiastics, or those who held property in foreign areas were to be treated differently than Cisalpine clerics.¹⁶⁶⁹ The 6 Pluviôse resolution built upon this premise by stipulating that all ecclesiastics were banned from citizenship as they served a foreign sovereign in Rome (though by this point the Eternal City was firmly in Republican hands), and therefore ineligible for a state pension.¹⁶⁷⁰ It was seen as a scam that ecclesiastics would continue to take money from the Church as well as national pensions, particularly in times of financial difficulty which characterized the early months of 1798. In order to regain citizenship, ecclesiastics would have to swear an oath of loyalty to the Cisalpine state renouncing their religious stipends. They would not have to renounce their titles as clerics, however. Interestingly, while the principle behind the resolution was favorable – particularly to the controlling progressive faction in Pluviôse – it was not seen as urgent, despite its initial designation as such. It seemed that many within the *Gran Consiglio* were hesitant to pass this resolution. As with the previous debate the issue divulged into one regarding urgency and not the content of the resolution itself. It was eventually decided to retain the urgency

¹⁶⁶⁸ “Seduta XXXII, 1 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:465–67. Debate on pensions for former monastics with notable discourses by Reina and Dehò who both proposed sanctions against Ragazzi, Valeriani who wanted petitions to be separated according to the kind of monastic, Greppi who called for an end to all stipends and Bragaldi who sought a new updated law for a better law which saw clerical pensions being equally and justly distributed among the former ecclesiastical population.

¹⁶⁶⁹ “Seduta XL, 9 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:570. Letter top the Directory regarding the resolution on foreign born ecclesiastics.

¹⁶⁷⁰ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 2:204–205. Motion of Venturi.

mark and allow the *Seniori* to make the decision by approving or rejecting it: they chose the latter option.¹⁶⁷¹

The matter reached a conclusion in mid-Ventôse once the resolution was in its third *lettura*. Bragaldi, a progressive who waffled between rationalism and radicalism made an impassioned discourse in which he stated that the measures pronounced in the 6 Pluviôse resolution were necessary immediately, despite the lack of urgency, due to the damage which has been done to the reputation of the Republic, both financially and politically.¹⁶⁷² Public opinion was against the maintenance of ecclesiastics by the Cisalpine state, and more importantly the opinions of republican allies were against this as well. The Cisalpine Republic was being played for a fool by an institution whose leadership no longer existed, but who continued to receive enormous sums from foreign holdings and counter-revolutionary supporters. While there was general agreement among the representatives, there was also the issue of inequality within Church ranks which continued to muddy the issue as Tadini pointed out.¹⁶⁷³ Though there certainly existed major abuses, particularly by upper clergymen such as Bishops and Cardinals who came from aristocratic stock, many of the brothers and priests of lower orders used their ecclesiastical funding to support local social programs. The issue was not so clear cut and this inequality needed to be addressed for the good of the Republic, a point which found universal agreement from across the political spectrum after Tadini's speech. The resolution was redacted and passed finally on 19 Ventôse, which maintained the majority of the 6 Pluviôse resolution, though allowed those who rejected citizenship and maintained a church stipend to continue to work within the confines of the Republic, in doing so compromising the ideas of Bragaldi and Tadini.¹⁶⁷⁴

The issue of pensions however, coincided with a much more politically sticky issue, which regarded the limitations of the Catholic Church to raise its own funds. The pension laws allowed foreign money to fund Church functions, but as a private entity, the right of the Catholic Church to raise its own income through forms of "religious taxation" was unclear. Practices like the *stola*

¹⁶⁷¹ "No.6. 11 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano, 30 Gennajo 1798, 'Consiglio de' Seniori Sessione 7 Piovoso", "Il monitore italiano," 24.

¹⁶⁷² "Seduta C, 8 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:817–18 Discourse of Bragaldi.

¹⁶⁷³ "Seduta CII, 10 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:59 Discourse of Tadini.

¹⁶⁷⁴ "Seduta CXI, 19 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:274.

or the *decima* were seen as means of private enterprise, since they were offered in return for spiritual services. However, these practices were also seen as coercive by revolutionary theory, and an infringement of the state monopoly on taxation.¹⁶⁷⁵ More importantly the maintenance of these institutions, though perhaps financially more stabilizing for the National Treasury, offered to the Church an incredible amount of power, both financially and in terms of controlling social programs. The question which remained then was whether it was better to have a financially stable Catholic presence capable of providing social services but also potentially providing a challenge to state authority, or a weakened Church which could not introduce counter-revolutionary ideology, yet in doing so stop the most prominent outlets for the easing of poverty in the Cisalpine Republic?

The abolition of the *stola bianca e nera* was one of the first of these issues of Church self-financing to be taken up by the *Gran Consiglio*. Fontana proposed a motion on 9 Frimaire to abolish the *stola bianca e nera*, the offerings made to local parishes by communities to fund social programs like health care, public education and maintenance of the local poor.¹⁶⁷⁶ He stated that despite the claims by parish priests to be using this for the maintenance of social services, the “ministers of the alter” as he ironically termed them were instead abusing this right for personal benefit. He demanded their abolition and offered up as compensation for the poorer parishes, the shares of the richer parish goods which were to be sold off. This motion received a mixed reception with democratic representatives like Dehò and Bragaldi favoring its adoption, though with more rigid specifications (only Latuada refused on grounds that the parishes in rural areas truly did use the *stola* for its intended purpose), while republican-leaning representatives like Allemagna called for Fontana’s motion to be placed in the order of the day.¹⁶⁷⁷

The matter was put to rest until a lengthy discourse by the abbot Giudice two days later on 11 Frimaire.¹⁶⁷⁸ Giudice followed a speech by Compagnoni which called for a general examination

¹⁶⁷⁵ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” sec. Title XI Articles 301 and 302.

¹⁶⁷⁶ “Seduta VIII, 9 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:166 Motion of Fontana.

¹⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid* 1:167 Motions of Dehò, Dandolo, Latuada, Bragaldi, and Allemagna.

¹⁶⁷⁸ “Seduta X, primo di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:184–91. Discourse of Giudice; Ironically this discourse was one of the main reasons why Giudice’s person was called into question in future sessions. In this speech Giudice declares himself a proud priest and espouses a number of ideas regarding the place of the Catholic Church in Cisalpine social institutions which betrayed his more republican leaning sentiments. Those more democratic leaning elements of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular leading progressives like Dehò, Reina and Dandolo noted this potential threat, and began the investigation into Giudice. It was believed that this Giudice

of ecclesiastical goods, and the formation of an ecclesiastical Commission.¹⁶⁷⁹ Giudice's discourse seemed to build off of Compagnoni, declaring his pride in being a priest and the absolute necessity for the benefit of society that parish incomes continue to be allowed. He laid out the number of public functions which were served by the funding from the *stola*, including public education, aid to the poor and the provisioning of rural communities in times of need. It was the corporations and orders who abused their powers not the parish priests. He accused the French of poisoning Cisalpine concepts of the Church based on their own experiences and not taking into consideration the realities of the North Italian republic in contrast to that of the French. He accused Fontana of willful ignorance of both the poor and rural societies. Finally, he made a legal argument that constitutionally the Catholic Church had a full right to oblige its parishioners for offerings since the state could not interfere with religious regulations according to article 355. His speech seemed to have convinced many, with only Savonarola making a criticism, and even then, it was simply to question why this topic was even up for discussion, seeming to back Giudice's argument that the state should not interfere.

The matter was not brought up again until mid-Pluviöse, when the progressives had taken a firm control of the *Gran Consiglio*. The Ecclesiastical Commission at the urging of progressives revisited the issue of the *stola*, where they reasoned that its abolition was a greater danger than an advantage given its ability to fund local social programs without the spending of national funds.¹⁶⁸⁰ Progressive rationalists like Glissenti acknowledged this fact and motioned that perhaps the *stola* should instead be regulated so that it only is levied by local community parishes and not more wealthy orders and corporations such as convents and monasteries.¹⁶⁸¹ The argument was finally put to rest by Dandolo, who stated that the *stola* was not a threat to republican ideas, so long as those who utilized those funds did so for the betterment of the Republic. He saw other abuses of the Church as in need of significant reform and sought to close this discussion permanently, which was approved by the Council. In this way, the Catholic Church found itself advantaged in the first challenge to its authority in the realm of social services, since the *stola* was not seen as a means of

was not the same nominated by Bonaparte in Brumaire, who had been noted as being a lawyer not a priest. Had Giudice not made this rather inflammatory speech, especially not so early in the *Gran Consiglio*, he may very well would have been able to retain his position as a representative.

¹⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid* 1:183. Discourse of Compagnoni.

¹⁶⁸⁰ "Seduta LXXXIII, 21 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:464–65. Discourse of Ramondiini on behalf of the Ecclesiastical Commission.

¹⁶⁸¹ *Ibid* 2:466-68. Discourses of Glissenti, Dandolo and Cavedoni.

increasing wealth to accrue power, but instead a necessary communal fund which would not burden the Cisalpine state. More importantly the popularity of the republican catechism in this early phase of the *Gran Consiglio* meant that there was a general belief that these funds would be used for the acceleration of popular republican expansion into peripheral territories, as it was an expression of a local popular initiative.

Interestingly, as the months progressed this idea of allowing the Church to continue in its role as the purveyor of social services on its own dime seemed to lose political backing in the *Gran Consiglio*. Most of the focus regarding religious finances from Ventôse to Messidor regarded the sale of the *beni ecclesiastici* and the sequestration of Catholic property for its use in augmenting the National Treasury. The resistance to this project and the introduction of more anti-Church political practices by Trouvé beginning in Messidor could explain why following the Messidor Crisis one of the first initiatives by the Cisalpine Thermidorians was an attempt to end methods of internal income for the Church. It is not hard to find hostility in Trouvé's writing regarding his disdain for Italian republicans' acceptance of the Catholic Church in the social functions of the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁶⁸² He often credited practices such as the continued payment of the *stola* and the funding of clerical pensions for those who denied taking wages from the Church itself, as the bedrock of Italian barbarity and an incompetence in understanding republican philosophy.

It is no surprise, therefore, that when his allies took control of the *Gran Consiglio* at the end of Messidor, they began to push an agenda to end all Church payments by the state, beginning with a 21 Messidor resolution which eliminated all state backed loans and exemptions – outside of legally acquired individual pensions – for the institutional Church.¹⁶⁸³ Though this resolution did not go after the individual incomes of clergymen, it did end the precedent established in Pluviôse which permitted the *stola* and enabled Catholic run institutions to acquire wealth for use in social service functions. When progressive rationalists, most prominently Glissenti and Latuada, brought up the unconstitutionality of certain practices encouraged by the Legislature in past resolutions which would allow direct funding of the Church for social services instead of allowing them to use their own funds, Aquila – an ally of Trouvé and an originalist rationalist who strongly favored republican politics – seized the moment to cut all funding to parishes by the government,

¹⁶⁸² Trouve, *Quelques Explications*.

¹⁶⁸³ “Seduta CCXXX, 21 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:110.

and ending any ability of these parishes to raise their own funds, effectively ending Church controlled social programs.¹⁶⁸⁴ Scarabelli, another ally of Trouvé used this opportunity to introduce a motion which would put these social programs under the funding of the national government, reasoning that the Church could not be relied upon as a private institution to do so.¹⁶⁸⁵

In early Thermidor the republican allies of Trouvé finally took direct aim at the Church for the raising of their own funds by proposing a resolution ending the payment of *decime* to the Church itself.¹⁶⁸⁶ The *decime* was an archaic feudal tax which functioned as a sort of rent payment in the *ancien regime*, though by the time of the Cisalpine Republic it was used more often as another source of social funding in impoverished rural communities. The proposed resolution would transfer the payment of the *decime* from the Church to the local municipal state who would then take over direct control of social services. The initial reaction was mixed across the political spectrum with some democratic leaning representatives like Dehò applauding the movement of social services to the public sector but decrying the continued use of the *decime* to do so, while others like Glissenti flat out rejecting the motion as a means of disrupting social services in order to advantage the Treasury, who would certainly benefit from new taxes. Similarly on the republican side, Vicini felt that the premise was flawed, since the *decime* was an archaic practice which needed to be cut entirely. That said he did believe some sort of secular *decime* could benefit the state.

The Cisalpine Thermidorians saw with the ending of the ecclesiastical *decime*, a lucrative new revenue stream. However, the progressive opposition led by men like Dehò, and Alborghetti, felt that if they were to end the ecclesiastical obligations which came with the *decime* – something they personally felt would benefit the nation – that this new secular *decime* could not be made obligatory, in particular for the lower classes.¹⁶⁸⁷ They stipulated that the argument made by

¹⁶⁸⁴ “Seduta CCXXXVI, 27 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:238–39. Discourses of Glissenti, Latuada and Aquila.

¹⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid* 6:241. Motion of Scarabelli.; Here exists one of the great conundrums of the Cisalpine “right-wing”; though they generally opposed social programs, favored aristocratic liberties and militarism, in matters of religion they were remarkably opposed to Catholic involvement. While they accepted the spiritual aspects of the Church in Cisalpine society the most conservative members tended to oppose the secular rights of Church institutions in favor of government funded, or more often Theophilanthropic private institutions, similar in many ways to the controlling French “extreme center” in 1798.

¹⁶⁸⁶ “Seduta CCXLI, 2 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:316–17. Motion of Domenico Pelosi.

¹⁶⁸⁷ “Seduta CCXLIV, 5 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:391–93. Discourse of Alborghetti.

Thermidorians which stated that the constitution prohibited forced payments to religious cults – the “religious spirit” as Alborghetti termed it – could not then use that same logic to force payments to the state in the name of a “national spirit”. Instead, these payments must reflect the good will of republicans to help their compatriots. Here one sees the ideas of Theophilanthropy taking precedence over the republican catechism, since it was no longer perceived by either group that the Church could serve the function of republican spiritual advisor. Reina went a step further and accused those who were encouraging a forced secular *decime* of favoring aristocratic property owners who would stand to be the chief beneficiaries of this tax, as the primary administrative collectors.¹⁶⁸⁸ Those who supported the idea of republican catechism, like Latuada, continued to push for national investment in Catholic social services, perhaps even using the secular *decime* to do so.¹⁶⁸⁹ They agreed with other progressives in opposition to the Thermidorians that the *decime* should be optional but advocated that this also meant the *decime* could be offered through an ecclesiastic option. These same representatives, such as Luini, similarly advocated for an increased use of funds collected from the sale of *beni ecclesiastici* for this investment.¹⁶⁹⁰

However, Thermidorians remained hardline in their arguments. The burden of the ecclesiastic *decime* had in fact rested for too long on the shoulders of poor communities and offered to the Catholic Church a financial lifeline they neither needed nor merited within the boundaries of the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁶⁹¹ The Thermidorians favored a secularized *decime* collected for the state by large property owners who could manage these funds for the community in the same manner as the Church had done before them. These landowners would certainly be subject to government oversight but would allow community funds to remain in the hands of trusted members with experience managing large sums of money. They believed that this new tax needed to be made obligatory in its secular form as it had been in its ecclesiastic form. According to Vicini the *decime* was offered as a show of faith to the cult of Catholicism and the principles for which it stood, and it would stand to reason that this logic would remain for the Nation, which was more inclusive and held principles more dear to the heart of those in ordinary communities.¹⁶⁹² Vismara

¹⁶⁸⁸ “Seduta CCXLVIII, 8 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:466-467. Discourse of Reina

¹⁶⁸⁹ “Seduta CCXLVI, 7 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:446. Discourse of Latuada.

¹⁶⁹⁰ “Seduta CCXLVII, 8 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:456, 569–470. Discourses of Luini.

¹⁶⁹¹ “Seduta CCXLVI, 7 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:446–47. Discourse of Bossi.

¹⁶⁹² “Seduta CCXLVII, 8 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 6:465. Discourse of Vicini.

believed that this *decime* could eventually be made optional as well, once the National budget had been properly balanced and nationalized social services were running independently.¹⁶⁹³ This position was sustained most strongly by many of the academic clerical representatives such as Bossi, Vismara and Ressi, all of whom provided evidence that a nationalized *decime* would serve to augment both public trust and nationalized services such as public instruction.¹⁶⁹⁴

In the end the plan designed by Bossi and the Thermidorian allies of Trouvé would be passed as a resolution. This resolution would set up the precedent which would eventually see a rapid diminution of the role which the institutional Church played in social services, and a marked increase in bureaucratic and state funded services. The institutional Church would recuperate some of this power following the 1801 Concordat and especially into the restoration period; however from a political and economic perspective the state would remain the dominant party in Italian financial politics, particularly regarding the regulation of private income for clerics, with the institutional Church never again obtaining the full financial rights and privileges, especially in rural districts, which it enjoyed in the first months of the Cisalpine Republic.

Departmental political cultures

In any political system, historic or modern, control of national politics within a centralized metropole is not enough to stabilize a governmental system, in particular not in a representative democratic-republic like the early American, French or Cisalpine Republics. Despite the fundamental differences between the strategies and institutions which their individual constitutions applied, each of these young nations in the late 1790s adopted a strategy to expand metropolitan control to their respective peripheries. The new United States of America had formulated a new idea of local and national identity which allowed one to remain loyal to one's state and one's nation simultaneously.¹⁶⁹⁵ Unlike past early modern Republics like that in the Netherlands or the Swiss cantons, The United States presented a new way of looking at the political exchange between local culture and national identity. This played out in the development of state and federal administrations which continue to exist today. The American Federal system created an administrative web of primary, secondary, and tertiary metropolises which brought together local

¹⁶⁹³ *Ibid* 6:758-59. Discourse of Vismara.

¹⁶⁹⁴ "Seduta CCXLIV, 5 termidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 6:396-97.

¹⁶⁹⁵ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 171-72.

ideologies with national political agendas. In this way control of local political cultures became a national priority.¹⁶⁹⁶

In many ways the early French republican system attempted to adapt this concept first seen in the U.S. of unifying local and national political cultures through the application of a rational regional administration. The French model had the historical administrative units of the provinces and their local assemblies which served a similar function of bringing local traditions towards a central authority.¹⁶⁹⁷ However these aristocratically led provincial struggles were a great hindrance to the nationalizing project of the French Revolution, which sought to formulate a uniform identity of “Frenchness” that would overcome localisms do not adapt them, a distinct difference from the American case. The Terror which came into being by mid-1793 was effectively the extremity of this nationalization.¹⁶⁹⁸ The establishment of the departmental national substructures which provided a uniformity across French Republican territory, was the administrative solution to the eradication of localisms in favor of centralized French national political culture and remained in place following the events of Thermidor Year II and the implementation of a new constitution in 1795.

The Cisalpine Republic remains an extremely difficult case when attempting to explain the implementation of a metropolitan political culture in the periphery. While the Republic directly inherited the French revolutionary constitutional and institutional structures from the French Republic under the Constitution of Year III, the attempted implementation of these practices in peripheral localities was much more reminiscent of what occurred in the American case, with highly diverse localisms being put on equal footing with national political identities. The *Gran Consiglio* was in itself a product of this local-national political, cultural and ideological mixing,

¹⁶⁹⁶ Castiglioni, *Viaggi negli Stati Uniti dell'America settentrionale*, 2000, 137-152 The United States presented a strange case for European observers, as we see in Luigi Castiglioni's recounting of his travels to the new republic in the late 1780s. As a wealthy Milanese aristocrat the high level of diversity between regions of states let alone states made him surprised at the functionality of the new political cultural system that was created. In many ways he attributed this to the American ability to merge National and local politics so easily. Eight years later when his own native land became the Cisalpine Republic, one sees this same attempt exchange local and national political cultures in the cisalpine republic. One of the more interesting examples which Castiglioni offers relates to the Dutch traditions of Upstate New York which was able to integrate much of their local traditionalism into both state and national political culture. In many ways this reflects the similar efforts made by peripheral cultures like those of Brescia or the Romagna to integrate their local political cultures in to the departmental and Cisalpine political cultures.

¹⁶⁹⁷ Castaldo, *Les méthodes de travail de la constituante*, 59.

¹⁶⁹⁸ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 205–7.

thanks in part to the extreme diversity which the Cisalpine Republic enjoyed within its border. This diversity was the result of centuries of political and cultural separation at an administrative level. This administrative separation was nothing like the French case which had been since the mid-seventeenth century a unified state, even if local practices were allowed to deviate from the central norm. In many ways the Cisalpine Republic was closer to the American case with its shared linguistic heritage but separate administrative history; though here too the singular unifying factor of English colonialism which brought together the original thirteen States in the US, was lacking in the Cisalpine case, whose contributing political cultures differed in their *ancien regime* regional political masters.

Thus, the exchange of political cultures between local departments and the national center in Milan was distinctly Cisalpine. The *Gran Consiglio* as the developer of this national political culture was in many ways the melting pot of regional localism, which united these local political traditions with the ideas of revolutionary republicanism. These localisms maintained the central administrative structures of the urban centers which defined Italian politics in the early modern period. This acknowledgement of regional powers by Bonaparte initially, and then his French and Italian followers in the months following his departure, allowed for a smoother transition of the Cisalpine Republic from six separate and politically and culturally diverse states into a singular nation. That said it also turned out to be a poison chalice for the Cisalpine Republic. Control of regional administrative leadership became a staple of Cisalpine politics, as rival factions and institutions vied for authority in departmental leadership. Similarly, locally developing ideas on identity, education, patriotism and regional autonomy – particularly strong in the constitutional circles of *capoluoghi* political organizations such as the constitutional circles – led to conflicting opinions on how Cisalpine political culture should be applied, both in the debates of local administrations and in those held in the national context of the *Gran Consiglio*.

Organization and Structure of the Cisalpine Departments

The Cisalpine Republic could not have survived without the departmental organization which helped to synthesize, organize and execute the national political culture which was exported to the periphery from Milan. The Cisalpine Republic had neither the geographic nor the social history which compared to the French Republic, and the adaptation of French administrative organization to the politically, economically, culturally, and socially diverse regions of the

disunified Cisalpine territory required profoundly different points of concentration in establishing a national political culture. While in 1789 the French nation building process had the obstacle of ancient provinces and unique regional administrative practices, the idea of a unified French patria was not such an impossible consideration for the French citizenry.¹⁶⁹⁹ These ancient territorial and administrative divisions existed within the boundaries of a centralized political unit, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Parisian based Monarchy since the time of Richelieu. The transition from patria to nation – according to David Bell’s definitions – was not a particular cultural or political stretch, since the French state had, for a century before the revolution, acted as a primary influencer over administrative and social structures, even if local traditions still played a major role.¹⁷⁰⁰

The Cisalpine Republic, from a non-political perspective, lacked this unifying sense of centralization. Certainly, there were an infinite number of voices which had erupted out of the political classes from 1790-1796 (even earlier in many cases) calling for a united Italy in some form or another.¹⁷⁰¹ However, the administrative, political, cultural and economic tradition of the Italian peninsula was defined by the multitude of states which had been characterized for centuries by their multitude of urban centers of power.¹⁷⁰² Where France had Paris as its primary administrative center, Italy had Rome, Venice, Milan, Naples, Genoa, Turin, Modena, Parma, Lucca and Florence as administrative urban centers by the end of the eighteenth century. These were in addition to the tens of lesser cities who had obtained varying degrees of autonomy, such as Brescia, Reggio Emilia, Bergamo, Verona, Bologna, Ferrara, Cuneo, Nice, Piacenza, Novara, Siena, Perugia, Pescara, Ancona, Palermo, Bari, Messina, Ravenna, Rimini, Massa, Como, Pavia and many others.

By 1797, the north of Italy saw six district states (the former Hapsburg Duchies of Milan and Modena, the Papal States, the Terraferma of the Republic of Venice, the duchy of Massa-Carrara and the Valtellina) – each with diverse political, economic and social structures – united to form the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁷⁰³ These states had never truly been united under a singular

¹⁶⁹⁹ Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France*, 40–41.

¹⁷⁰⁰ Bell, 43.

¹⁷⁰¹ Fantuzzi, “Discorso Filosofico-Politico”; Gioja, *Dissertazione*; Lettera del cittadino Reina al Generale Bonaparte Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:59–60; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 157–62.

¹⁷⁰² For more information on the demographic changes of Italy at the end of the eighteenth century see Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 4–6 .

¹⁷⁰³ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 604; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 165–66.

centralized administrative system as had been the case in France, despite the political influence which particular states held over others (For example the general tendency of Hapsburg run states like the Duchies of Milan and Modena, to follow the Josephian reforms in the mid-eighteenth century). The localized urban political traditions, combined with the historic political structures of the six Italian states meant the institutionalization of a central national civil administration in the French fashion would be challenging, despite calls for political unity by Cisalpine patriots like Foscolo, Reina, Galdi and Fantoni.¹⁷⁰⁴ That said, many of the most important characters of these distinct administrative traditions found themselves unified within the chambers of the *Gran Consiglio*. These men would play major roles in Council leadership throughout the ten-month period including Aquila, Cavedoni, Bossi, Allemagna, Terzi, Guiccioli, D'Arco, and Oliva.¹⁷⁰⁵

As with the French Republic, the Cisalpine administration broke the nation down into organizational units called departments (*dipartimenti* in Italian). When the Republic was declared in late Messidor Year V there were 11 official departments established.¹⁷⁰⁶ These original departments only covered the eastern part of the Republic consisting of the former duchies of Milan, Modena and Massa-Carrara (with the exception of Mantua). The eastern portions of the Republic, such as the Venitian Terraferma (Brescia, Bergamo, Desenzano and Cremona) and the former Papal cities of the Emilia (Bologna, Ferrara, Faenza) and of the Romagna (Rimini and Ravenna), all remained in various states of administrative and military disorganization. However, the Cisalpine Constitution included a provision for adding departments as territories became more stable.¹⁷⁰⁷

¹⁷⁰⁴ De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. the Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796-1943*, 35 De Francesco describes a concurrent Italian concept which accepted the major administrative and political differences of the northern Italian states of the *ancien regime*, as well as the difficulties which the differences posed in ever forming a true national identity. De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 101–3.

¹⁷⁰⁵ “Nomina dei membri del Corpo legislativo” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:63–69; For a career history of Guiccioli see Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:64; For a career history of Cavedoni as a cancelliere and local administrator in Modena see Rastelli, “Cavedoni, Bartolomeo”; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 162–67; For a career history of Aquila as an administrator in Lombardy, most prominently in Pavia, Milan and Lodi, as well as a detailed career history of Luigi Bossi and the rivalry between the two see the introduction of Gennaro Barbarisi, *Cronaca Milanese in Un Epistolario de Settecento: Le Lettere Di Giuseppe De Necchi Aquila a Giovan Battista Corniani (1799-1782)*; “Il Ricevitore dell’Amministrazione Centrale di detto Dipartimento... 26 Brumale anno 7mo” “ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 33,” fol. Allemagna receipt of payment, October 1798, Milano; payment to Alberto Allemagna for his service on the central Dicastro of Milan.

¹⁷⁰⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title I Article 4.

¹⁷⁰⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title I, Article 5.

Each department correlated to a large urban center which would serve at the administrative capital called a *capoluogo*. The *capoluogo* was not only the administrative center, but also served as the heart of political, economic, social and cultural development for the entire population of a department. The cities chosen to serve as *capoluoghi* were often selected based off of historical importance to the nearby territory, in many cases being the hearts of ancient and medieval feudal properties. *Capoluoghi* generally already had administrative institutions which had existed for centuries and were recognizable centers of power, making them ideal to play this role in a nationalizing administrative system. Bigger *capoluoghi* such as Milan, Modena, Brescia, and Bologna were also major academic and/or economic centers with an often-extensive international reputation.

The departments themselves were controlled by a central administrative commission made up of five individuals.¹⁷⁰⁸ This administrative commission served the same executive function for the departments that the Cisalpine Directory served for the nation. They were charged with maintaining the administrative and executive wings of the departments; this meant the general implementation of laws which came from the National legislature as well as the departmental legislative committees. According to the constitution, the nomination of these administrators came from lists made by electoral assemblies of each district of the respective department, which were then selected by the assembly of district municipal officers of the department in a quadruple vote.¹⁷⁰⁹ However, as with the original Directory and national Legislative Assemblies, the administrative commissions were selected by Bonaparte on 21 Brumaire.¹⁷¹⁰ These administrative commissions were answerable to the administrative officers nominated by National Directory, who would function as the intermediary between the departmental and national authorities, and served with the full authority of the National Executive Branch within a department. These national administrative officers, referred to as commissioners of the executive branch (*commissario del potere esecutivo*), were charged with the upkeep of executive actions, the implementation and

¹⁷⁰⁸ “Estratto de’Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del primo Termidoro anno V Repubblicano...Legge d’Organizzazione delle Amministrazioni Dipartimentale” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13” publication, 1797, Milan.

¹⁷⁰⁹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title I Article 20; Title VII Articles 177, 180, 181; “Estratto de’Registri del Direttorio Esecutivo Seduta del primo Termidoro anno V Repubblicano...Legge d’Organizzazione delle Amministrazioni Dipartimentale” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13.”

¹⁷¹⁰ “Seduta 64. Som [?]. No. 5... Milano 21. Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Rep.° Il Generale in Capo procedendo...” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13.”

maintenance of the judicial system and were to report back to the Executive Directory on the state of the department in which they served.¹⁷¹¹

The original 11 departments were Adda (Lodi/Crema), Alpi Apuane (Massa), Crostolo (Reggio), Lario (Como), Montagna (Lecco), Olona (Milano), Panaro (Modena), Po (Cremona), Serio (Bergamo), Ticino (Pavia), Verbano (Varese) (Figure 1). Each department was named for the important river, which was nearest to the *capoluogo*, with the exception of Alpi Apuane and Montagna which lacked major rivers and were thus named for the mountains near by the *capoluogo*. From 30 Messidor Year V until the establishment of the central departmental authority in Milan in mid-Brumaire Year VI, the departments were organized into four administrative groups each lead by an organizational commissioner.¹⁷¹² These four commissioners – Pellegrino Nobili (Alpi Apuane, Crostolo and Panaro), Luigi Oliva (Lario Verbano and Adda), Gregorio Fontana (Ticino and Po), and Ottavio Mozzoni (Serio and Montagna) – formed a sort of central committee charged with the application of ministerial decrees and executive actions in departmental administrations. Of these four men, three would go on to serve as members of the *Gran Consiglio*.




Figure 18. Map of the original 11 departments of the Cisalpine Republic (French Language, cartographer Jean-Pierre Perconte)

¹⁷¹¹ “Imola, il 30 Annebbiatore An. VI. Rep.... Giovannardi Commissario del Potere Esecutivo presso il Dipartimento del Lamone Al Citt.° Ministro degli Affari Interni”, ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13 n.d. letter, October 1797, Imola; This letter of resignation written by Giovannardi, describes in depth his work as a commissioner for the executive branch for the department of Lamone demonstrates the overarching authority which the commissar held in departments

¹⁷¹² “Seduta dei 30. Messidoro anno V. Repubblicano... Il Direttorio Esecutivo al Popolo Cisalpino”, “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 75–76.

On 13 Brumaire, with the stabilization of Bologna, Ferrara, the Romagna, Mantua, Brescia and the Valtellina, the number of departments was expanded from 11 to 20 and now covered the entire expanse of Cisalpine Territory.¹⁷¹³ This expansion came the same day as the proclamation of the Treaty of Campo Formio which fixed the borders of the Cisalpine Republic, in particular those to the east with now Austrian controlled Veneto.¹⁷¹⁴ The new organizational pattern separated the department of Po into two new departments – Alto Po (Cremona) and Basso Po (Ferrara) – and added 8 new departments: Alta Padusa (Cento), Lamone (Faenza), Mella (Brescia), Mincio (Mantova), Reno (Bologna), Rubicone (Rimini), Adda ed Oglio (Sondrio), and Benaco (Desenzano) (Figure 2). As with the original eleven departments, the new departments were named for water sources near to the *capoluogo*. The confines of the twenty departments were officially designated by a decree made by Bonaparte on 24 Brumaire Year VI, which generally set the departments along *ancien regime* fault lines between major and minor municipal holdings at the time of the French invasion in 1796.¹⁷¹⁵ Two days prior Bonaparte had similarly ended the use of the departmental commissioners and instead established internal departmental councils for each department which consisted of municipal administrators from towns across the department.¹⁷¹⁶ These councils would be answerable directly to Ragazzi the Minister of Internal Affairs and responsible for the internal development of the departmental administration until the Legislative Assemblies could officially establish an administrative structure.

¹⁷¹³ “Divisione della Cisalpina in XX dipartimenti”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:61–62.

¹⁷¹⁴ “Proclama del Direttorio Esecutivo ai Cisalpini. Milano 13 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano (3. Novembre 1797 v.s.)”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:3–4.

¹⁷¹⁵ “...24. Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano... Legge per la confinazione dei Dipartimenti.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:17–18.

¹⁷¹⁶ “...22 Brumale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano...Legge”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:14–15.




Figure 19. Map of the 20 departments of the Cisalpine Republic following the establishment of official confines (French Language, cartographer Jean-Pierre Perconte)

The activation of the *Gran Consiglio* on 2 Frimaire and the abrogation of all previous laws and decrees since Messidor Year V meant that the establishment of set departmental confines and the stable construction of departmental administrations became an early priority for the Council. Severoli, Mascheroni and Savonarola all pushed for the formation of a commission mandated to set confines, establish administrative roles, and produce an official map of Cisalpine Territory.¹⁷¹⁷ They hoped to integrate French revolutionary practices aimed at the annihilation of provincialism, which they believed could be applied directly to the Cisalpine case. However, as previously mentioned they failed to understand that the circumstances – political, demographic and geographic – were distinctly different between the two Republics in their nascent periods. Besides the fact that the Cisalpine Republic was made of six, previously independent states not one singular loose administration, there was also the issue of an occupying military presence in Cisalpine territory from the outset which saw mass migrations of young men to peripheral parts of the Republic for martial purposes. This inevitably led to a sense of lawlessness which the earlier 1797 administration could not handle from simply its municipal councils.¹⁷¹⁸ While it is true that the

¹⁷¹⁷ “Seduta VII, 8 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:161–62 Discourses of Severoli, Savonarola and Mascheroni.

¹⁷¹⁸ “Seduta LXIX, 6 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:195 Letter from the DEpartment of Lamone complaining about the disorder of national guardmen in that territory.

urban centers in these peripheral areas such as Brescia, Mantua, and Ferrara saw a generally stable municipal organization, these bands of young soldiers roved practically unchecked in the countryside by civil authorities causing “anarchy”.¹⁷¹⁹ Jurisdictional uncertainty and a lack of civil administration in smaller rural communities also increased the likelihood of counter-revolutionary backlash, as previously functioning services for these communities had ground to a halt. The departmental structures themselves require partition and a better structural system which would delegate administrative functions to smaller levels of local government, allowing the *capoluoghi* to serve the departmental administration at a more general level, much in the way the departments served to delegate tasks of the nation.

It is true that there existed smaller organizational structures within departments already, which depending on local traditions were local municipal or district offices.¹⁷²⁰ However as Mascheroni pointed out in a speech delivered to the council on 11 Frimaire, these municipal administrations and districts were not uniform by any means and often relied on *ancien regime* practices continued after the French invasion. There needed to be a uniformity in the definitions and applications of these administrative substructures, as the French had done throughout the course of the early 1790s, if order were to prevail across the Republic. This uniformity already legally existed in the constitution, it simply needed to be formed into a functioning structure.¹⁷²¹ Yet it was unclear as to who held the competency to conduct this project; the Directory placed the burden on the legislative branch by citing a law from 1 Thermidor Year V which designated the structuring of departmental administration for the original eleven departments to the legislative branch – at that time the Constitutional Committee.¹⁷²² They reasoned that this concept should remain in effect with the new government. In doing this the Directory unwittingly offered to the *Gran Consiglio* an incredible authoritative control over Cisalpine politics which would play into future conflicts, especially following the Messidor Crisis.

The Council immediately set out defining the administrative subsets of departments. One of the first discussions regarded the demographic designation of municipal authorities. The

¹⁷¹⁹ “Seduta X primo di 2 11 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:194 Discourse of Mascheroni.

¹⁷²⁰ *Ibid* *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*.

¹⁷²¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title I Article 6.

¹⁷²² “Seduta XLIV, 15 Nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:659–60 Message from the Directory to the Gran Consiglio.

Department Commission nominated to design this structure worked off of a law from Messidor Year V which defined the municipal districts and administrative officers within these districts.¹⁷²³ One of the major structural points from this plan to be put into discussion was the designation of municipal officers to communities of 3000 inhabitants and over. This in turn led to a redefining of the term district and municipality.¹⁷²⁴ Municipalities (Italian *comune*) came to be defined as individual communities or towns within a given geographic zone who were controlled by a similar central governing administration. Districts were the administrative designation which existed between department and municipality and which grouped municipalities together to form a demographic constituency of 3000 or more.¹⁷²⁵ Municipalities which had populations between 3000 and 100,000 inhabitants would be designated as their own district.¹⁷²⁶ Each district would have a municipal council, made up of the municipal agents of the towns which constituted the district depending on the number of municipalities and population size of the districts.¹⁷²⁷ Municipalities could further divide themselves into smaller quarters – for example cities like Milan or Bologna which had comparatively large populations which could not be organized through a single organization structure like a *commune* – however they would all still be responsible to the district administration. Thus, the district and not the municipality would be the administrative wing of the departments in local situations.¹⁷²⁸ The district administrative officer would work out of the district *capoluogo* which for multi-municipality districts (effectively the majority of districts in the Republic) was the municipality with the largest population.

Administrative Nominations and Politics in the Cisalpine Departments

The *Gran Consiglio*'s struggle to control the formation of Cisalpine political culture was met with resistance, either by national governmental entities such as the *Seniori*, Ministry, or especially the Directory, as well as outside influences such as the French Civil and Military authorities, cisalpine “patriot” commentaries, and local provincial politics and customs. Similarly,

¹⁷²³ *Ibid* 1:661n-65.

¹⁷²⁴ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:673–74. Motion of Giani for the Department commission with additions by Tadini and Mascheroni.

¹⁷²⁵ “Seduta XLVIII, 17 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:694–95. Presentation of a plan for the division of districts and municipalities.

¹⁷²⁶ “Seduta XLVIII, 17 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:697–98. Discourse of Savonarola; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII, Article 178.

¹⁷²⁷ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII Articles 182 and 183.

¹⁷²⁸ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:674. Motion of Giani on the nomination of district administrators.

the internal politics of the Council across the ten-month period and the changes which resulted from these politics saw a diverse application of a national political culture in departmental settings.

The combination of these two concepts, the internal and external struggles of the *Gran Consiglio* in the departments of the Republic, are most evident in the nomination process for departmental administrative positions. These *national* positions constituted administrative offices employed directly by the central authority in Milan, who served to assure the execution and application of national laws, concepts and programs in the departments, and were led by the commissioners of the executive branch in each department respectively.¹⁷²⁹ These administrators needed to be at least 25 years of age, could not be a relative of a serving or past administrator nor a member of religious clergy, and needed to come from the zone of which they are serving.¹⁷³⁰ At each administrative level the central committee would be made up of the agents of the next lowest committee – thus a district administrative committee (*municipalità del dicastro*) was made up of communal municipal agents and the departmental committee made of district agents.¹⁷³¹ The departmental commission would serve as the head of the departmental executive branch and would be selected from among the departmental council. These would be answerable to the commissar of the executive branch, designated by the Directory as their representative to the departments and who would all answer to the Minister of Interior Affairs.¹⁷³² The administration was expected to carry out the laws of the national Legislature exactly as intended and could not discuss between themselves the substance of a law only the manner in which it is to be instituted locally.¹⁷³³

Much of the disorder which was brought to the attention of the council – though blamed initially on departmental disorganization – was also largely accredited to a lack of personnel in these areas.¹⁷³⁴ However there existed no clear regulations – either through previous laws from before Frimaire or through the Cisalpine Constitution – on who could nominate administrators to

¹⁷²⁹ “Ferrara 30 Nebbioso Anno VI repubblicano. _ Repu:° Il Commissario del Potere Esecutivo del Dipartimento del Po inferiore [Basso Po]. Al Cittadino Ministro degli Affari Interni”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13” letter, 19 January 1798, Ferrara.

¹⁷³⁰ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII Articles 175 and 176.

¹⁷³¹ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina” Title VII Articles 180, 181, 182, 184, 187, and 188 In districts made up of a single municipality the discatro would be constructed on the size of the town or city according to the rules of Article 182: for municipalities of less or equal to 3000-6000 inhabitants the council number five members, for those 6000-9000 seven members and those more than 9000 will have nine members

¹⁷³² “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII Articles 191 and 192.

¹⁷³³ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII, Articles 189 and 199.

¹⁷³⁴ “Seduta X, primo di 2 11 frimaire anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:194 Discourse of Mascheroni.

fill vacancies. Bonaparte, before his departure at the end of 1797, left no clear-cut method for the filling of vacant local positions and there was uncertainty over how to proceed particularly when nominating those who had already served in a position.¹⁷³⁵

According to leading members of the *Gran Consiglio*, constitutionally, municipal officers were supposed to be elected by the departmental primary electoral colleges, the same ones responsible for the election of members of the national legislatures.¹⁷³⁶ However these electoral colleges did not yet exist, hence the reason for Bonaparte's nominations in Brumaire. Democratic members of the assembly, in particular progressive radicals like Lattanzi, called for the convening of these assemblies early in order to accomplish the nomination process in the most open way possible.¹⁷³⁷ However originalists pointed out that these electoral colleges should not be convened except in cases of elections and that the current situation could not wait for upcoming elections. They instead recommended that the administrators be selected from amongst their peers. Both sides agreed, however, that the Directory *did not* have the right to make these nominations, since constitutionally they were barred from all nominations outside of those dealing with serious emergencies in which the legislature was unavailable.¹⁷³⁸ It was Vincenzo Dandolo who finally suggested that the *Gran Consiglio* conduct the nominations, at least in part. Working off of the precedent already established by the Directory in the establishment of district boundaries, Dandolo motioned that the *Gran Consiglio* select candidates for the vacant positions from a list prepared originally by the Directory, thus giving the executive a part to play but not the final nomination of administrators. Though he was opposed by the most republican members like D'Arco – who felt that the decision should be inverted, thus, the *Gran Consiglio* propose the names and the Directory make the final selection – the majority of representatives, particularly in the progressive and neutral rationalist and radical proto-factions believed Dandolo's to be the best solution.¹⁷³⁹ In

¹⁷³⁵ “Seduta XII, 12 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:212-213. Letter from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*; The uncertainty pertained to constitutional article 138 which stipulated that administrators could not hold office for five-year once they had left. The article did not stipulate whether this simply meant following their mandate or if they also applied to cases where individuals changed positions or were forced to leave for personal reasons ; “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina” Title VI Article 138

¹⁷³⁶ “Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina,” Title VII, Article 198.

¹⁷³⁷ “Seduta XII 12 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:213. Discourse of Lattanzi.

¹⁷³⁸ *Ibid* 1:214. Discourse of Severoli, Sacareblli, Guiccioli and Biumi.

¹⁷³⁹ “Seduta XXIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:225–227. Discourses of D'acro, Biumi, Dandolo and Latuada.

addition to the attempted maintenance of the equilibrium of powers described in the Chapter VIII, Dandolo's resolution allowed the growing progressive rationalist and radical factions to begin introducing their politics into the departmental administrations early on.

Dandolo's resolution passed into law on 14 Frimaire.¹⁷⁴⁰ This law established that for each position the Directory would recommend a list of four candidates from which the *Gran Consiglio* would select. The final selection would be confirmed by the *Seniori*. While this law allowed the participation of both the Directory and the *Seniori* in the nomination process, the decision ultimately rested with the *Gran Consiglio*, and as the progressive group within the *Gran Consiglio* began to grow its authority throughout Nîvose and Pluviôse into Ventôse, so too did their ability to dominate departmental politics by having their allies placed in local administrative positions. By having the final say on nominations the *Gran Consiglio* could ensure its resolutions were being applied correctly in peripheral zones, even if Directorial and Ministerial politics dictated otherwise; in short it was a safeguard against potential future executive usurpation.

The process of bringing these nominations to bear however was slow. The number of positions which needed to be filled across the Republic was enormous and the needs of these local administrators dire, as disorder continued to reign, particularly in the eastern outlying areas near the Austrian-Veneto border. On 15 Nîvose, the Directory sent a letter in which they warned the *Gran Consiglio* that unless municipal agents were selected quickly, the law which temporarily filled administrative vacancies, particularly in the newer departments, would expire, significantly increasing the number of vacancies to fill.¹⁷⁴¹ Compagnoni suggested that the 22 Brumaire law which assigned the temporary municipal agents be extended until the territorial and administrative laws were resolved by the Council.¹⁷⁴² However this was rejected by progressives like Greppi and Mascheroni who felt that an extension would only lead to jurisdictional confusion and further disorder. When Luigi Giani presented the plan which would set the territorial confines of the districts, departments and municipalities resolving the jurisdictional issue and allowing for a smoother transition to centrally administered departments, it was approved by the council with the

¹⁷⁴⁰ "In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina Milano 14 Frimale Anno VI repubblicano Repub."^o"ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 13" manuscript legal draft, 4 December 1797, Milan.

¹⁷⁴¹ "Seduta XLVI, 15 nevoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:659–60. Letter from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁷⁴² *Ibid* 1:661. Discourse of Compagnoni.

logic that nominations would have no effect on tailoring disorder, even with increased vacancies, if territorial confines were not first established.¹⁷⁴³

The list of nominees formulated by the Directory was received by the *Gran Consiglio* on the morning of 3 Pluviose.¹⁷⁴⁴ That evening the first set of central administrators for the departments of Benaco, Basso Po, Olona and Adda and municipal agents for the *capoluoghi* of Milan, Pavia, Mantua, Como, Ferrara and Cento were nominated.¹⁷⁴⁵ These were confirmed by the *Seniori* in a special session on 12 Pluviose which was announced to the *Gran Consiglio* the following day.¹⁷⁴⁶ The system had functioned as intended with the *Gran Consiglio* progressives and their external allies taking firm political control of the administration of departments. This political alliance between *Gran Consiglio* progressives and departmental and municipal agents in *capoluoghi*, in particular peripheral *capoluoghi* such as Brescia, Ferrara or Como, battled the constitutional obligation of these departmental administrators to the executive branch to which they were subordinated, in particular the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Executive Directory, both of which were in a growing conflict with the *Gran Consiglio* throughout Pluviôse, Ventose and Germinal.

But political allies could change quickly in a volatile political setting, such as the one which was to appear by the end of Pluviôse, as it became apparent that progressives within the *Gran Consiglio* were beginning to face a three-way battle against the Executive Directory, the Ministry and the *Seniori*. The radical politics which had taken over the *Gran Consiglio* in the second half of Pluviôse, personified by the presidency of Polfranceschi similarly led to internal clashes with the allies of these exterior institutions inside the Council itself, such as Compagnoni and Mazzucchelli.¹⁷⁴⁷ The more democratic leaning elements of the *Gran Consiglio* felt the need to

¹⁷⁴³ “Seduta XLVII, 16 nevosio anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:673–74. Motion of Gianni (Engineer).

¹⁷⁴⁴ “Seduta LXV, primo di 2 3 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:130. Announcement of the list and for the vote of nominees for central administrators and municipal agents in departmental *capoluoghi*.

¹⁷⁴⁵ “Seduta LXVI, secondo di 2 3 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:155–56. Nomination of central administration and municipal agents for *capoluoghi*.

¹⁷⁴⁶ “No.10. 19 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano, 7 Febbrajo 1798. ‘Consiglio de’ Seniori Sessione 12 Piovoso’” “Il monitore italiano,” 40; “Seduta LXXV, 13 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:316–17 Announcement of the nomination of central administrators and municipal agents in *capoluoghi*.

¹⁷⁴⁷ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 279–80.

reinforce their political strength in the areas outside of Milan, where administrators could be counted on to enforce progressive policies, despite political combat taking place in the Capital.

In order to reinforce their advantage in the periphery, progressives decided to establish a law which guaranteed that all those employed by the national government, which included departmental and municipal administrators needed to be considered good “patriots” according to the definition established by the *Gran Consiglio*. Public employees were already forced to take a loyalty oath before being allowed to assume office.¹⁷⁴⁸ When the Directory sent its second list of nominees to fill further positions in the central administrations and municipalities of *capoluoghi* at the end of Pluviôse, the progressives used this to their advantage. Alborghetti, a progressive radical, proposed a motion on 24 Pluviôse, which revoked the extension of the two-month deadline to four months. He insisted that since the Directory had not maintained their side of the nomination process and that the *Gran Consiglio* needed to conduct the nominations without executive contribution.¹⁷⁴⁹ He added that the new list sent by the Directory was void of verifiable “patriots” , and insisted that only the *Gran Consiglio* could guarantee that those who were loyal to the ideals of the Revolution and to the construction of the Cisalpine Republic would obtain position of power in local administration. He was supported by other progressives, in particular Latuada, who felt that recent run-ins with the Directory, particularly concerning things like freedom of the press, the rights of clerics and the institutionalization of social services had demonstrated that the Directory had evaporated the spirit of revolution within Cisalpine politics which had been present while Bonaparte was still a heavy presence in Cisalpine politics.¹⁷⁵⁰

It was rationalized by many, even those among the more centrist groups like the neutral rationalists and moderates, that the obligation to swear an oath to the nation should be a prerequisite for all those who were selected to serve in government, particularly in the areas outside of Milan where national control was limited. Afterall, had the French Republic not necessitated the same thing for their public officials?¹⁷⁵¹ To not impose these oaths could make other republican

¹⁷⁴⁸ “Seduta XXVI, 25 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:390–91. Motion of Gambari, in particular article 1.

¹⁷⁴⁹ “Seduta LXXXVI, 24 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 2:519–20. Discourse and motion of Alborghetti.

¹⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid* 2:520. Discourse of Latuada.

¹⁷⁵¹ “Seduta LXXXVIII, 25 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:548–49. Discourses of Alborghetti and Lattanzi.

nations question the Cisalpine Republic's commitment to the republican cause and might even insinuate aristocratic sympathies and counter-revolutionary conspiracies from within the Cisalpine government itself. The Directory already had enough to battle, without the addition of these absurd external conspiracy theories, stated Salvioni, and the *Gran Consiglio* did have the constitutional authority to take full control of the nomination process.¹⁷⁵² Piazza went as far as to say that these conspiracy theories would only be furthered if the Directories' indifference towards their nominees proven "patriotism" was allowed to continue. The measures were approved, and the *Gran Consiglio* took full control of the nominating process.¹⁷⁵³ More importantly this proposal by Alborghetti altered the oath which defined patriotism for administrators in departments not only as an obligation to uphold the constitution, but now to protect the nation from counter-revolution in whatever form it may take. This gave departmental administrators a greater liberty in their interpretations of executive orders, and an ability to follow political wills even if it clashed with the political wills of those like Ragazzi or the leading voices of the Directory such as Moscati and Paradisi. Furthermore, it gave the *Gran Consiglio* a direct political line to local politics which avoided executive intervention.

However, despite the ability of progressive rationalists to take full control of, first the *Gran Consiglio* throughout Ventôse, then the Legislature in Ventôse and Germinal, and finally the entire legislative process by the beginning of Floréal, the republican-leaning opposition, led by originalist rationalists and neutral moderates like Compagnoni, Alpruni, Aquila and Bovara continued to work against the institutionalization of legislation which they saw as unconstitutional. One of the most significant arguments which they made was the extravagant costs of departmental administrations.¹⁷⁵⁴ Costs were becoming a matter of great public displeasure, from both sides of the political spectrum, especially following the signing of the Military and Commercial Treaties with France at the end of Ventôse (see Chapter XI). Representatives opposed to the progressive political agenda saw that these arguments against high administrative costs, especially those regarding social services and administrative stipends, would offer them a political advantage on

¹⁷⁵² *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 2:546-47.

¹⁷⁵³ *Ibid* Montalcini and Alberti, 2:551 Approval of Alborghetti's motion.

¹⁷⁵⁴ "Seduta XCVIII, 6 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:780. Discourse of Savonarola and Terzaghi against the increase of stipends to public workers and municipal agents in departments of the Cisalpine Republic; "Seduta CXIV, 22 ventoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:334-36 Discourse of Savonarola defining the roles and privileges of the central Dicastro di Milano and thus the attributes of municipal dicastro's of other large municipalities.

two fronts: first the decreasing of costs would put republican-leaning representatives in a favorable light, both in terms of public opinion and with the French civil administration led by monetary agents like Haller, who worried about the Cisalpine Republic's ability to pay the costs imposed upon them by the Treaties;¹⁷⁵⁵ second by stripping funding the republican leaning representative would significantly weaken the departmental allies of the progressives, where much of their power base lay between the months of Ventôse and Prairial. Though Tadini had been instituted as the Minister of Interior Affairs in Germinal, which helped with the continued success in the application of the progressive agenda at a local level, many of the old commissioners who had served under Ragazzi remained.¹⁷⁵⁶ These commissioners supported opposition views on spending and often made it difficult for social services to operate effectively by counselling central administrations against the application of various laws due to high costs.¹⁷⁵⁷

The upending of *Gran Consiglio* politics after the Messidor Crisis meant that originalists within the Thermidorian faction could override what they saw as the continual (and unconstitutional) encroachments on executive authority in departmental administrations. Using the high costs incurred by the departmental administrations in the months under progressive control, the Thermidorian faction authorized a complete overhaul of the departmental administrative system as early as 12 Messidor.¹⁷⁵⁸ Tadini was replaced as Minister of Internal Affairs by Diego

¹⁷⁵⁵ "Milan le 29 Nivose an 6 de la République Française ne et ind.ble... Haller Administrateur des Contributions & Finances d'Italie Au Directoire Executif de la République Cisalpine." "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1," fol. Nevoso VI Letter, 18 January 1798, Milan; Already as early as the final days of Nivose, before the Treaties had even been signed, Haller expressed anxiety over both the inability and general reluctance within the peripheral departments to pay the sums owed the French Republic.

¹⁷⁵⁶ "Al Amministratore del Dipartimento di Benaco... 13 Fiorile", "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 39" Letter, 2 May 1798, Milan; Letter from Tadini Minister of Interior Affairs to the Central Administration of Benaco insisting on the application of a law regarding creditors to the state despite objections from the Commisar.

¹⁷⁵⁷ "Seduta CLXXIII, 22 Floreal anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:600 Resolution moving the departmental regulation of grain trades to the Legislature instead of the Executive branch; This particular episode which took place on 22 Floréal saw an attempt by the *Gran Consiglio* to reel in the power which these departmental commissars were welding in departmental politics, particularly with regards to finance. The Directory had instructed commissars to allow for the free movement of grain in such a way as it would benefit the national treasury, despite *Gran Consiglio* regulations which would have diffused grain along lines similar to those laws seen in the French Republic at the time. Many departmental commissars blocked the application of this legislation leading to a general upheaval on the part of progressives and radicals in particular. While some like Aquila defended the Directory as exercising their rights as head of the administration, the progressive led council voted to remove from executive commissars the power to block legislation citing the constitution and the Legislatures ability to define the attributes of administrative officials as it could define the attributes of ministers.

¹⁷⁵⁸ "Milano li 12 Messidoro Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano. Sessione. Il Consiglio de' Seniori Al Direttorio Esecutivo", "ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 38," fol. Noomina de Corpi Municipali letter, 30 June 1798, Milan; This letter sent by the *Seniori* detailed the list of nominees to new positions in the department of Alpi

Guiccardi, an ally of Trouvé who immediately began sending out reports which he claimed came from disgruntled commissioners.¹⁷⁵⁹ These complaints claimed that instead of sending money to increase public workers stipends and the funds available for departmental services, departments should assume more low level workers to carry out functions.

This strategy, while seeming to increase departmental capacity to carry out basic functions, in reality also allowed Thermidorians to place loyal political followers in more practical positions to counter the older progressive political municipal officers nominated in the Spring of 1798. Some of the more radical progressives like Piazza, or Olivari would leave their positions in the *Gran Consiglio* in order to secure this political control in the departments, many of them feeling that they could be of greater use politically at a local level than at a national level.¹⁷⁶⁰ However the majority of progressive and radical supporters were weeded out by both the Directory and *Seniori* who took back greater control of the nomination process, by reinstating the original 14 Frimaire law, and not the revised progressive law from 25 Pluviôse. By the time of Trouvé's Coup on 14 Fructidor departmental administrations were already largely transitioning against progressive measures and saw a lessening influence of democratic ideas in department and municipal politics. Administration came firmly under the heel of the executive branch and would cease have as large a role in Italian national struggles between legislative and executive authority as it had in the Spring of 1798.

Capoluoghi

The struggle of various governmental institutions – chiefly the *Gran Consiglio* – for control of territorial and administrative politics and the application of a national political culture in local government was the outward face of power dynamics in the peripheral areas of the Cisalpine Republic. However, this influence was not one-sided but reciprocal, as these external areas similarly imposed, if only indirectly, their own local traditions and interpretations of revolutionary

Apuane. The significance of this message is its demonstration of an official need for Directorial approval before being put into effect.

¹⁷⁵⁹ “Rapporto del Ministro dell’Interno al Direttorio Esecutivo 14 Termidoro anno VI repubblicano. Repub.”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 38,” fol. Nomina de Corpi amministrativi.

¹⁷⁶⁰ “Seduta CCLXIV, 26 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:925 Letter from Olivari president of the central administration of Brescia; “Nomina degli Agenti, ed Aggiunti Municipali pel Dipartimento d’Adda ed Oglio... Agente, Distretto di Ponte”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 39” Nomination table, Thermidor Year VI (exact date unknown, thus late July into early August 1798), Milan; Piazza was listed as a nominee for the municipal agent in Ponte his home town.

and republican practices on the *Gran Consiglio*. These local traditions were most concentrated and visible in the political cultures of the *capoluoghi*, which were themselves incubators for centuries of the social, political, economic, cultural and linguistic development of the territory which surrounded them, and who throughout history had claimed citizenship (in the classical sense of the word) in these cities. *Capoluogo*, translated directly from Italian means “head/chief place”, as in the head of the organization, but also signifying it as the informational and operational center, much as the brain for the body. In a certain sense, the division of departments reflected ancient territorial, political and cultural divisions between the *capoluoghi*, not simply randomly drawn borders on a map.¹⁷⁶¹ The maintenance of these borders were less a refusal to revolutionize or unify the diversity of political cultures but were in fact meant to help rationalize local and radical conceptions of the new order in Italy. It was a tactic which came to be used in future nineteenth and twentieth century nationalization strategies.¹⁷⁶² *Capoluoghi* were designed to be the central hub of republican thought in local politics and social dynamics, offering the local space an important role in Cisalpine national political culture.

Influence over *capoluogo* municipal offices became a central part of the *Gran Consiglio*'s strategy to control departmental administrations more generally. Many of these representatives had themselves come from aristocratic or upper bourgeois families. They understood the influence which members of these classes had over the administration of many of the cities which served as *capoluoghi*, with many of these elites serving as hereditary administrators themselves (Giuseppe Necchi d'Aquila, Alberto Allemagna, Carlo Filippo Aldrovandi-Marsecotti or Francesco D'Arco

¹⁷⁶¹ Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?*, 16. Despite the numerous ineptitudes of his arguments regarding cultural imperialism which reduce the role of Italian politics in the face of the French occupation to one similar to that of the Irish when confronted with the British imperial machine, Broers' examination of the maintenance of Italian *ancien regime* cultural centers does hold water, at least superficially. He rightfully points out how Cisalpine, and later Napoleonic, administrations preserved much of the *ancien regime* administrative centers for their departmental and military establishments. He similarly makes a just assessment of the relationship between the French military and civilian authorities with the elite of these regional political centers, though makes the mistake of synonymizing “elite” with “aristocratic” a common misconception in English language historiography of eighteenth-century Italy. He attributes too much to the Italian concepts of *clientismo* or *capanalismo*, ideas which the republican patriots, regardless of place on the political and socio-economic spectrum had worked tirelessly to end. That said Broers' most profound contribution was the idea that there existed an enormous divide between major and minor urban centers regarding the understanding of republicanism.

¹⁷⁶² De Francesco, *The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. the Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy, 1796-1943*, 86–112. One of the more open proponents of the strategy was Giuseppe Micali whose writings on the ethnic and cultral divisions of ancient Italy De Francesco has outlined in this book. It clashed with the ideas of Vincenzo Cuoco, who stated that as a single ancient ethnic block, Italians needed to forget old administrative divisions in favor of unified nationalism.

for example).¹⁷⁶³ The *Gran Consiglio* – particularly those democratic-leaning progressive rationalists and radicals who came to power beginning in the second half of Nîvose – knew that in order to take control of the departmental governments, they first needed to expel these aristocratic “cabals” who held the sway in the municipal authority of these cities, and replace them with patriotic loyalists (a strategy similar to that utilized by Bonaparte in 1796-1797).¹⁷⁶⁴ Not only would this expulsion offer the opportunity to prevent potential counter-revolutionary sentiments erupting in major economic and cultural hubs of the Republic, but by maintaining the importance of the *capoluoghi* as the seat of territorial leadership for a department, it was believed that the citizenry would be able to acclimate to the new order regardless of political perspective. Similarly, as most of the administrative structures already existed in these municipalities for the surrounding territory it would save the national government in Milan a significant amount of time and money which would not go towards the complete reconstruction of a new system from the ground up.¹⁷⁶⁵

However not all of these *capoluoghi* had the same level of administrative wealth or structure. Aspects of these urban spots often were the result of the *ancien regime* states they had originally belonged to, their place within that state, and the population size and density of the city in recent years; it was not one single factor that allows these cities to be classified. For example, if one were simply to look at population size, of the twenty *capoluoghi* Milan, Modena, Bologna, Brescia, and Bergamo could be considered urban central hubs, the most important political, social,

¹⁷⁶³ Nomini dei membri del Corpo Legislativo Alberti 1917, p. 67 D’Arco is a difficult case. He is listed as the son of ex-municipal officer in Mantua Giambattista Gherardo D’arco, who served until his death in 1791. Most likely the position was taken over by his son Francesco, a known economist and expert on administrative finances, who was the father of the famed early nineteenth century painter and historian Carlo D’Arco; “Carlo Filippo Aldrovandi-Marsecotti” Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 2:2. Aldrovandi came from nobility on both sides of his family who held land and administrative roles in both Milan and Bologna where he took up a brief career as an administrator himself; Barbarisi, *Cronaca milanese in un epistolario de Settecento*, V. Aquila’s father worked for the census office of the Duchy of Milan in Pavia, a job which the young Giuseppe eventually fell into himself after his brief career as a poet and Scala playwright fell through; « Alla Municipalità del Circondario IV della Com.e di Milano », ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 33 s.d., p. Alemagna (9° pacco) letter, 1 December 1798, Milan; This letter along with *processi verbali* of the Dicastro of Milan from 1795-1797 (Dicastri 191) also held within the Civic Historical Archive of Milan (Biblioteca Trivulziana in Castello Sforzesco), provide evidence that Alberto Alemagna, part of the aristocratic Alemagna family who held land along the Verbano Valley near Varese, was also an administrator within the municipality of Milan before the French invasion.

¹⁷⁶⁴ “Seduta XIII, 13 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:225 Discourse of Rosa; “Seduta LXXXVI, 24 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:519–21. Discourses of Alborghetti, Dehò and Cavedoni.

¹⁷⁶⁵ “Seduta XLVI, 15 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:660. Discourse of Dehò.

and economic cities of the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁷⁶⁶ However, due to their distance from their *ancien regime* states metropole (Venice), Brescia and Bergamo were in reality in a subclass of city which lacked centralizing administrative features. In many ways they were more reflective of peripheral cities such as Mantua, Varese, Ferrara, Rimini, and Reggio, which had long been the second cities of their respective locations. Bologna was a strange case, as it was not the metropole of its *ancien regime* state – which had been Rome – but had long served as a sort of autonomous provincial capital of Papal Emilia and Romagna which, along with its population, put it on par with Milan and Modena as the most important urban centers of the republic.¹⁷⁶⁷

These urban centers tended to have larger populations of complex aristocratic structures, dominated by numerous families, often who owned the bulk of their historic feudal estates in other parts of the former *ancien regime* state and not the center itself.¹⁷⁶⁸ These centers were more reflective of the role which Paris played for the *ancien regime* French state.¹⁷⁶⁹ They were often the social and intellectual centers of the old states and thus had a significantly more important political role in the state administration – as opposed to strictly municipal roles like that of secondary and tertiary cities – in large part due to the numerous and present aristocratic families

¹⁷⁶⁶ Zaghi, *L'Italia Giacobino*, 12-17. Zaghi's comprehensive study of demographic trends for the development of urban populations of the Ex-Duchies of Milan and Modena and the Papal States gives us more or less exact figures from between 1787-1814 in the major cities of these zones, comprising 12 of the 20 *capoluoghi*. It should be noted that Zaghi's figures cannot give us a scientifically consistent calculation of exact populations, and as such these exact figures will not be used in this study. However, the information from the demographic studies can tell us general things about the cities which allow us to classify them more accurately, such as the fact that Milan was by far the largest city in the region, in excess of over 120,000 inhabitants consistently, almost doubling the next largest city discussed - Bologna- which held a population of around 71,000. This does not include the former Serenissima cities, nor other minor cities such as Lecco, Massa, Crema, or Sondrio. Strangely, Zaghi's study does not acknowledge the population of Varese either.

¹⁷⁶⁷ Zaghi, 14.

¹⁷⁶⁸ "Alla Municipalita del Circondario IV della Com.e di Milano" "ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 33," fol. Alemagna letter, 1 December 1798, Milan; This letter for example details the ancestral holdings of the Allemagna family, a minor Milanese noble family who held lands in the territory north of Varese. Alberto himself became a representative of the *Gran Consiglio*. "Notificazione dei capitali passivi... 5 complementario anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano" "ASCMiTriv, Famiglie, 762," fol. Giovio Table of assets, 17 December 1797, Milano; A similar example comes from the representative Lodovico Giovio. The Giovio family was of minor nobility with holdings in the region of Como. A 1797 table of assets which forced aristocrats to reveal their extent of their seisable wealth demonstrated the external holdings of Giovio and his patrimony as far back as 1791. Tax records from this Archival folder similarly reveal details about holdings charged to him and his brothers by the Hapsburg Austrian Imperial State for their external holdings as far back as 1761.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Bell 2001, p. 8 This role, Bell points out, was not necessarily as a national center, the way it became after the Revolution, but of a cultural and administrative center, which saw political, economic and intellectual developments occurring in large part due to the very cultural and administrative role that Paris played for the centralization of French state.

who resided in these centers.¹⁷⁷⁰ An exception to this was Pavia, which – though comparatively small in terms of population – had a more profound significance in the former Duchy of Milan than other cities of its size due to the presence of the University which attracted the most distinguished aristocratic and intellectual entities of the north of the peninsula, making it a political, social, and intellectual urban center, if not on par with Milan, Modena and Bologna, then just below it.¹⁷⁷¹ In fact in many ways in addition to being administrative centers, the presence of powerful universities within these cities (Milan being the exception, though it did have the seminary at Brera¹⁷⁷²) was the other primary factor in considering these cities to be urban centers.¹⁷⁷³ These urban centers enjoyed a much more robust international presence throughout the early modern age but particularly in the eighteenth century. As such these centers would have been much more exposed to the concepts of, not only the French Revolution in the 1790s, but of other revolutionary events in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, such as the American Revolution, the English Civil War, and the Dutch Revolution from the 1780s.¹⁷⁷⁴

Secondary cities, among which included Brescia, Reggio, Ferrara, Mantua, Bergamo, Cremona, and Varese took no less of a role in contributing to the revolutionary development of the Cisalpine Republic but saw its manifestation taking place in a remarkably different way. These cities had significant importance in their former *ancien regime* states in particular for their size and economic importance as regional frontiers.¹⁷⁷⁵ It should be stated immediately that these cities were by no means uniform in their structures, practices, or histories – or really in their importance to the overall political culture of the Cisalpine Republic. However, each shared similar general

¹⁷⁷⁰ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 580. As Palmer points out the nobility of late eighteenth century Italy differed from most other *ancien regime* states as none of the old aristocratic systems had the great wealth of French nobility, the military history of the Prussian or Austrian states, nor the commercial success of the British aristocracy. Thus, much of the Italian aristocratic demonstration of privilege came through the use of intellectual pursuits, leading many – in particular in urban centers like Milan and Pavia – to engage vigorously in debates on reform and revolution, though always within the frame of the maintenance of *ancien regime* traditions.

¹⁷⁷¹ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 81–83; Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 426–29.

¹⁷⁷² Brambilla, *Università e Professioni in Italia Da Fine Seicento All'età Napoleonica*, 325–28.

¹⁷⁷³ *Ibid* 344. Ferrara like Pavia had a university in the late eighteenth century. However, unlike Bologna, Pavia, Modena or Milan, the university at Ferrara was on the decline and was more of a college (such as those covered in Chapter IV). This university did contribute some notable representatives such as Cagnoli and Compagnoni but both men had made names for themselves in the scientific communities of urban centers like Venice or Bologna or else in major universities like Padova, before taking up positions in Ferrara. This left Ferrara as a weaker intellectual city, and its reliance on traditional aristocratic leadership saw it falling a secondary city to the center in Bologna.

¹⁷⁷⁴ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 582; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*, 84–85.

¹⁷⁷⁵ Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*, 11–14.

tendencies that could classify them as secondary cities within the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁷⁷⁶ Their lack of universities often correlated to a less academic intellectual culture, which revolved more around societies and masonic lodges which combined politics with scientific and philosophical pursuits. Similarly, these secondary cities had much a much more integrated but less numerous aristocracy which meant that a handful of families often controlled administrative tasks.

These cities were large enough to have garnered certain political and economic privileges, yet still felt that they deserved greater autonomy within their respective states. What arose from the combination of these factors was a generally more autonomous, localized political culture, which tended to support provincial customs over revolutionary practices. At the same time these areas largely embraced the Revolution – the key examples being the cities of Brescia, Bergamo and Cremona. Each of these cities created their own form of republican political culture which centered around civil autonomy and local traditionalism but varied in its commitment to democratic or republican leaning politics.¹⁷⁷⁷ Brescia, in particular, is a strange case but can be classified as first among second cities. While it had a massive population (43,000 inhabitants in 1797) Brescia never played the same centralizing role with regards to the other municipal administrations of the other major cities which surrounded it like Bergamo, Verona or Cremona.¹⁷⁷⁸ It remained a more independent entity, perhaps tied economically and socially to these other cities, but always with an eye for its own autonomy, which puts it more in line with the political cultures of other second cities. More importantly, unlike Bologna who had a semblance of autonomy from Rome within the northern part of the Papal States, Brescia was strongly linked to the metropole in Venice.

¹⁷⁷⁶ “Dopo la risposta alla dimanda ‘cosa è la morale?’ del mio catechismo morale e politico vi feci la seguente spiegazione” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Varese, letter/manuscript pamphlet, date unknown (1797), Varese; this letter sent by Latuada, in addition to laying down his republican catechism described in the previous section similarly gives a brief history of reform politics in Varese which allow it to fall into the category of a secondary city. “I membri del circolo costituzionale della comune di Mantova al popolo”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Mantova, published open letter, date unknown (1798), Mantua; “Ferrara, 20 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano Repub^o: Il Circolo Costituzionale di Ferrara al Gran Consiglio” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Ferrara letter, 9 April 1798, Ferrara; This letter, like that of Latuada for Varese, explains the growing political sentiments of the political class in the city of Ferrara and explains the historical roots of these sentiments from a number of years back, including the period immediately following the French invasion. These descriptions denote a political culture which encourages strong municipal autonomy but also a strong commitment to the ideas of revolutionary reformism and republican administration.

¹⁷⁷⁷ “No. 14 ‘Al Popolo sovrano di brescia” *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano*, 9–10.

¹⁷⁷⁸ Gullino, “Il Crepuscolo Politico-Economico Della Serenissima.”

Another unique example is the integrated former Duchy of Massa-Carrara based out of the city of Massa.¹⁷⁷⁹ Unlike the other secondary cities of the Cisalpine Republic, Massa was itself an administrative center for its *ancien regime* state. However, the duchy was so minor and the population of the city so small that it never had the level of administrative or political complexity as other major urban centers like Milan or Bologna, and along with the lack of a renowned university, it remained largely self-contained as a political culture. Much like other secondary cities, Massa became an important force for departmental autonomy particularly during the period of progressive rationalist control of the *Gran Consiglio* from Pluviôse to Messidor.

The tertiary *capoluoghi* were those which were little more than large towns at the end of the eighteenth century but had nevertheless served as important administrative outlets during the *ancien regime* for their respective states. These included Rimini, Lodi, Crema, Sondrio, Lecco, Faenza, Como, and Cento. Some like Como, Lecco or Faenza were cities in their own right but were too far from the central authority of their respective *ancien regime* states to have played a significant political role, and often exported their intellectual and political elite to the center.¹⁷⁸⁰ This is not to say that these cities had no political importance. Lecco and Sondrio, being well placed in the mountains, enjoyed much liberty from Catholic *ancien regime* censorship, which encouraged a strong radical presence, from which many of the most progressive representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* came, such as Reina, Piazza or Alborghetti.¹⁷⁸¹ However, there were others like Lodi and Crema whose importance was so minimal that they shared control of their department as divided *capoluoghi*. The case was similar for Faenza whose administrative importance was often compared to the other urban center in the Department of Lamone, Ravenna. For the Department of Benaco, a long debate took place throughout the month of Pluviôse as to whether Desezano or Castiglione was considered the administrative center of the department, considering that area to the east of Lake Garda had long been under the influence of Verona or Brescia, one which was in another department the other ceded to the Austrians.¹⁷⁸²

¹⁷⁷⁹ “Circolo costituzionale di Massa” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:894–96 Allegato A.

¹⁷⁸⁰ Zaghi, *L’Italiana Giacobina*, 12.

¹⁷⁸¹ Dettamanti, “Francesco Reina: Un patriota cisalpino amico di Stendhal”; “Mozione, e dichiarazione D’alcuni Valtellinesi ai loro Conpatrioti. 29 Maggio 1797”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Sondrio circular, 1797, Sondrio.

¹⁷⁸² “Seduta LXX, 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, “Seduta XCI, 29 Piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:223–33, 620–22.

The *Gran Consiglio*, as the representative of the people, was sourced from these various cultures with the ultimate goal of unifying them. As such the departments of the Cisalpine Republic effected national government political culture as much as that national political culture attempted to influence the local political cultures of the departments. Of the 118 representatives in the participation index, 48 of them were born in one of the twenty *capoluoghi*.¹⁷⁸³ By the declaration of the Cisalpine Republic in July 1797, 76 of the representatives were residing in current or future *capoluoghi*. In reality all of the 118 subjects resided, if only for a brief duration within one of the *capoluoghi*, where they conducted their “political apprenticeship”.¹⁷⁸⁴ Many, particularly those from aristocratic or professional backgrounds spent the majority of their time in these administrative centers, even if their listed birthplaces and residents were in the countryside. That said, the rural origins of many of the residents also demonstrates the formational significance of the Italian *campagna* in addition to its urban centers, and the constant mixing of these cultures which took place throughout the later eighteenth century. These numbers become more interesting when examined from the perspective of total power. Within the overall leadership (according to the total power index) which constituted the 60 most influential representatives, 28 were born in departmental *capoluoghi* and 47 resided within these cities by July 1797. Within the elite the influence of the *capoluoghi* were even more profound with 11 of the 30 representatives in this top powerful group being born in *capoluoghi* and 26 residing in these cities by 1797 – not an unexpected figure considering this year also saw a generalized urbanization as the Brescian, Bergamasco, Cispadane and Cremona Republics.

When these numbers are further categorized the correlation between the physical construction of the *Gran Consiglio* as a political body and the influence of diverse local political cultures on the legislative output of the Council becomes more apparent. Of the 48 born and formed within future Cisalpine *capoluoghi*, the majority – 25 – came from secondary cities, followed closely by 19 from the major urban centers, and finally only 8 from tertiary cities. This was perhaps

¹⁷⁸³ Out of this 118, the birth place and residency of ten representatives remain unknown. None of these ten belonged in either the elite or leadership of the power index nor Rank 3 for commissions which compared legislative power measurements

¹⁷⁸⁴ Tackett 2006, pp. 77-79 Tackett’s definition matches perfectly with the idea of what sort of informal political training the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* gained in the culture *capoluoghi* which they resided in during their formative careers. They were introduced to the intellectual, cultural, economic, and most importantly the social roots of what would become revolutionary politics, and in many cases gained the revolutionary contacts in these cities which they would go on to use in Cisalpine politics in 1798.

because there were more of these secondary cities than there were urban centers, a probability further supported by the fact that urban centers in particular Milan (9) and Bologna (5) had higher numbers of representative born in these cities. Only Brescia (4), Bergamo (4) and Ferrara (4) had similar numbers. This trend was mirrored in the breakdown of the leadership representative born in *capoluoghi* – urban centers 11 (Milan 5 and Bologna 4) secondary cities 16 (Brescia, and Ferrara 2, Bergamo 4), tertiary cities 3. Only with elites is this trend different, considering first that two-thirds do not come from the *capoluoghi*; of those that did, 7 were from urban centers (Milan 3, Pavia 1, and Bologna 3), 3 from secondary cities (Reggio 1, Bergamo 1, and Cremona 1), and one from the tertiary city of Cento. Thus, while secondary cities had a place in the formation of representatives within the *Gran Consiglio*, the most influential *capoluoghi* from which representatives originated was understandably the larger urban centers with their richer and more intellectually available aristocratic political, social and economic practices.

However, the data from 1797 demonstrates a demographic shift towards the urban centers who contributed 37 of the total 76 representative residing in *capoluoghi* by that year, as opposed to 31 coming from secondary cities and 12 from tertiary cities. These urban centers held significantly bigger sway in the local contributions to the *Gran Consiglio* political culture, in particular Milan who saw 19 representatives already residing in the city at the time the Cisalpine Republic was declared in Messidor. Being the national capital in addition to the largest city demographically and the most important intellectually, economically and the center of French power in northern Italy this is no real surprise. Modena (7), Bologna (6), and Pavia (5), similarly saw high numbers of political involvement from residents of their cities who were nominated to the *Gran Consiglio*.

Only Brescia (9) saw such a high number of their residents going to serve in the national government among the secondary cities. Once again Brescia's place as the most prominent secondary city to provide representatives to the council is not unexpected, considering the important role the city played in the uprisings of Spring 1797. Tertiary cities were significantly less represented at only 12 residents of these *capoluoghi* being nominated to the Council, among them Sondrio having the highest representation at 3, followed by Lecco and Como at 2 each.

These trends only increase as one looks at the differences between *capoluoghi* representation in the leadership and elite of the *Gran Consiglio*. 24 representatives in the leadership

resided in urban centers (Milan 11, Bologna 3, Pavia 4 and Modena 6) while only 19 came from secondary cities, Brescia once again being the only standout with 6; tertiary cities similarly see their numbers halved in the leadership at 6 total. In the *Gran Consiglio* elite, the difference between the urban centers and secondary cities is doubled (16 and 8 respectively) with Milan (6) and Modena (5) being the best represented *capoluoghi*, and Bologna and Brescia being tied at 3 residents; tertiary cities only contribute 2 residents both from Lecco (Valsecchi and Bovara).

Constitutional Circles

The *capoluoghi* – in their variation in size, history and culture – are essential for understanding the organizational and formational background of the *Gran Consiglio* as a political entity. Understanding the demographic, political and geographic diversity of the Cisalpine Republic is crucial for understanding its political culture. That said, the true contribution which these *capoluoghi* made to the exchange of political culture with the *Gran Consiglio* was not tied necessarily to the local *governments* themselves – meaning the actual administration or daily-activity of the same – but to the leadership of this local government. It was the people and their ideas which were shared within the *capoluoghi* which provided the ideological background for political culture. This sharing of ideas with the urban centers of the Cisalpine Republic was concentrated into the institution of the constitutional circle. Many of those nominated to local or national administrative positions gained their notoriety and the political strength to be nominated later – either by Bonaparte or the *Gran Consiglio* – from their participation in the constitutional circles. These societies had been established for the purposes of controlled political discourse in all of the *capoluoghi* of the Cisalpine Republic in 1797. Thus, the most important political apparatus for the construction and exchange of political culture with the *Gran Consiglio* was the constitutional circle not the local government administration.

Constitutional circles have long been a historiographical focus and came to particular prominence in the postwar period of the second half of the twentieth century, when Marxist reconcentration on the republican triennio dominated studies of the origins of the Italian Risorgimento.¹⁷⁸⁵ The constitutional circles, not only in the Cisalpine Republic but across Italy,

¹⁷⁸⁵ Venturi, “La Circolazione Delle Idee”; Cantimori and De Felice, *Giacobini Italiani*; Saitta, “Spunti per Uno Studio Degli Atteggiamenti Politici e Dei Gruppi Sociali Nell’Italia Giacobina e Napoleonica”; Nutini, “L’esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina”; Nutini, “La Società Di Pubblica Istruzione Di Milano”; Nutini, “I Soci Dei Club Democratici Milanesi Nel Triennio: Status, Professione, Formazione”; Schettini, “La

were seen by historians as centers of neo-Jacobin activity and anti-French sentiments, where prominent figures of the Cisalpine political establishment, like Porro, Galdi, Monti, Salvador and Foscolo became household names of the time associated with the excesses of Revolutionary republicanism.¹⁷⁸⁶ Only recently has this idea been challenged by historians like De Francesco, who have begun to define the constitutional circles in a very similar light as other facets of Cisalpine politics which introduced a new ideal of general centrism rooted in ideals of Italian nationalism, linguistic and cultural similarities, and French revolutionary virtues.¹⁷⁸⁷ The reality seems to fit closer to these more modern interpretations of Cisalpine politics which sees the nuance of national and local political cultures exemplified within the constitutional circles of departmental *capoluoghi*. The centralism of Cisalpine national politics – best defined by Gainot’s ideology of representative democracy – allowed these local political discourses to have a place in republican tradition.¹⁷⁸⁸ In this way, the *capoluoghi* themselves became conceptual locations of political culture which blended national and local political practices; this was then exported to the *Gran Consiglio* indirectly through the participation of circle members in the *Gran Consiglio* debates as representatives who could synthesize ideas to formulate national legislation.

It should be noted, however, that these constitutional circles were not reflective of the political clubs found in France in the early years of the Revolution. These new political groups instead were based on the French model of external political associations dedicated for the diffusion of public instruction in republican politics which had been conceptualized in the post-Thermidorian new regime under the Constitution of Year III.¹⁷⁸⁹ The public distress which had arisen in the early years of the French Republic as a result of political clubs was still a fresh wound, which many blamed for the most excessive aspects of the Revolution. This is not to say these sorts of radical groups did not exist in North Italy as well. The famous *Società patriottica*, which had popped up in major cities across the North, especially after 1796, seemed to call back to older

‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 692.

¹⁷⁸⁶ Nutini, “L’esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina”; Maschietto, “Cultura e politica nell’Italia giacobina. Spunti dall’esperienza cisalpina,” 731–32.

¹⁷⁸⁷ De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien”; De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d’Italia”; De Francesco, *Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

¹⁷⁸⁸ Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien.”

¹⁷⁸⁹ Schettini, “La ‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 694.

Jacobin and Babeufian revolutionary concepts and rhetoric.¹⁷⁹⁰ However, these societies were generally suppressed by the summer of 1797 when it became clear that they housed an element which went against the stabilizing political centralism favored by Bonaparte. More importantly, across Europe, these radical politics had gone out of fashion following the failure of Babeuf's conspiracy. In fact, in places like Brescia, the political elite made a concerted effort to disassociate their own republican politics from those of the more radical *Società patriottica* in that city who were attempting to take control of the provisional government after the in the Spring of 1797.¹⁷⁹¹

When the Cisalpine Republic was announced in July of 1797, there was a general movement away from the establishment of political associations outside of the government mechanisms. On 26 July 1797 the new Cisalpine Government closed the Society of Public Instruction in Milan.¹⁷⁹² This group had been formed in January of 1797 as a way to expand awareness of republican ideology and had been conceived by Bonaparte as a way to win internal allies in the city to further establish the dominance of the new regime. However due to the perception of these societies as radical hotbeds, the Minister of Police Gaetano Porro – in his own right close to the Babeufian elements of the French Left – was forced to censor his own allies in an effort to placate Bonaparte and the French military authorities within the city of Milan. This sentiment became more extreme after the events of 18 Fructidor in France, as Italian patriots were forced to adapt to the extreme centrism which had taken control of the political discourse coming out of France.¹⁷⁹³ The French had interested themselves with institutionalizing their own brand of republican politics in the newly formed Sister Republics since their occupation began in 1796. It was hoped that politics on the Italian peninsula would return to the less radicalized discourse of *ancien regime* intellectual academies instead of that coming from the suppressed political clubs.¹⁷⁹⁴ In this way the spread of French style republicanism would reach elites not only within larger city centers but in peripheral zones.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Nutini, "L'esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina," 102–3.

¹⁷⁹¹ Bazzani, *I giornali democratici di Brescia (1797-1799*, I (Aprile-Dicembre 1797):58.

¹⁷⁹² "N. 118... 15 Vendemmiaiore anno I della Libertà Italiana (6 Ottobre 1797. v.s.)... Il cittadino Pelegatti Commissario del Potere Esecutivo presso tutti i Tribunali in Milano al cittadino amico Porro Ministro di Polizia Generale della Repubblica Cisalpina", Zanoli, *Giornale De' Partioti D'Italia II*, 2:64–67.

¹⁷⁹³ Serna, *L'extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 110–13.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Maschietto, "Cultura e politica nell'Italia giacobina. Spunti dall'esperienza cisalpina," 733–34.

It was decided that the institutionalization of Cisalpine constitutional circles would begin in Milan opened at the beginning of Brumaire Year VI.¹⁷⁹⁵ The circle in Milan would be structured by the regulations designed by Carlo Salvador, who in turn based much of his ideas on the manual written by Marc-Antoine Jullien which had been written to instruct Cisalpine citizens on the French structuring of constitutional circles.¹⁷⁹⁶ These circles were thus naturally more radical in tone than perhaps would have been preferable to the French leadership. They were designated to discuss issues of civic culture, patriotism, the influence of priests on popular opinion, the danger of religious “superstition” and the implementation of republican morals – a theme which remained purposefully vague in their description.¹⁷⁹⁷ They would be led by an elected presider, who would call upon members to speak regarding whichever topic had been selected as the primary point of reflection for the day. These discourses were more adapted for the closed society of the Capital where close controls by the French and Cisalpine authorities could properly censor the flow of conversation, and in doing so steer it away from extremist opinions. However, on the same day that the constitutional circles were announced in the Milanese press, Porro prepared begin their installation in other cisalpine departments, which were to be announced within the week by Bonaparte.¹⁷⁹⁸ Perhaps it was the lack of control over the discourse in peripheral areas, or perhaps because of Porro’s known Jacobin sympathies, but the following day the Milan experiment was shut down by Bonaparte, who in turn expelled Porro from his position.

The closure of the Milan constitutional circle under the Salvador/Jullien structure changed the role which the constitutional circles were destined to play in Cisalpine politics. It was true that Salvador’s model was significantly more open than previous iterations of extra-governmental political association, such as the *Società patriottica*, the Public Instruction Society or the *ancien regime* Academies.¹⁷⁹⁹ The past structures relied upon elite groups – either intellectual elites from distinguished academic backgrounds, or patriotic elites, hand-picked for their vocal support for militant revolutionary extremism – while the constitutional circles were meant to encourage

¹⁷⁹⁵ “N. 35. 11 brumajo VI repub. (mercoledì 1 novemb. 1797 v.s.)... Al Cittadino Ministro della Polzia. 4 Brumajo”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:270–71.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Schettini, “La ‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 696, 701.

¹⁷⁹⁷ “12 Brumaire, an 6 de la Rép. Fr. (N°. 53). 2 Novembre 1797 (v.st.)... Cercle Constitutionel de Milan”, Jullien 1797, pp. 226-227

¹⁷⁹⁸ Schettini, “La ‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 702.

¹⁷⁹⁹ Schettini, 697–98.

republican discourse and theory in the general masses by opening up interventions on politics and cultural to anyone who wanted to speak.¹⁸⁰⁰ However, the reconceptualization of popular politics after 18 Fructidor forced constitutional circles to limit this open concept, particularly in urban centers where French military presence forced debates to remain within centralized lines of discourse.

On 4 Frimaire, Dandolo made a motion in the newly activated *Gran Consiglio* to reopen the constitutional circles.¹⁸⁰¹ This measure was taken in response to a (most likely planned) discourse by Brescian progressive radical Felice Mozzini, who warned against the unchecked control over public education which “dangerous societies” held – referring most likely to counter-revolutionary forces at the borders who were believed to be in league with Austrian Veneto and the Papacy in attempting to disrupt the Cisalpine state.¹⁸⁰² It was decided that these new constitutional circles will be instituted by departmental administrations in every *capoluogo*, as a way to both introduce republican ideology to the political class of these cities and their surrounding districts, as well as monitor the political activity of influential persons in the area.¹⁸⁰³ These constitutional circles, would be first and foremost zones of education not politics, as was originally intended according to the French model. With the dawn of the new form of the constitutional circle a new political elite was established. That said, the institutionalization of these circles was slow moving and by the end of Pluviôse only the constitutional circle of Milan was fully functional and commonly frequented; this was in large part due to the heavy involvement of *Gran Consiglio* and *Seniori* leader’s participation in the debates of these circles from the onset, which circles outside of the capital could not exploit.

Much of the delay in the formation of constitutional circles similarly stemmed from the Council’s and Executive branch’s inability to compromise on a proper organizational structure to apply to all of the departmental constitutional circles. The model formed under Salvador was too open and liberal, and so the Directory charged Fedele Sopransi – the new Minister of Police after

¹⁸⁰⁰ “N.35. 11 brumajo Vi repub. (mercoledì 1 novemb. 1797 v.s.)...Circoli Costituzionale” Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:273–74.

¹⁸⁰¹ “Seduta IV, 5 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:119 Motion of Dandolo.

¹⁸⁰² *Ibid*, Alberti et Montalcini, 8:117-18 Discourse of Mozzini.

¹⁸⁰³ “N. 5. 30 Agghiacciatore anno 1.º della Libertà Italiana (20 Dicembre 1797 v.s.)...’Notizie Recentissime””, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:332.

Porro's dismissal – with creating a new set of regulations which would be applied to all constitutional circles and provide national uniformity to their educational discourse.¹⁸⁰⁴ The constitutional circles were theoretically national public instructional bodies meant to educate the public on republican political practices, in an effort to root out local *ancien regime* political practices. Sopransi hoped to create a new ideal concept of the constitutional circle in which national politics could be framed by local political discourse, and in doing so allow the public to rationalize the supremacy of the national agenda over outdated localisms. This was to be accomplished by establishing a set of instructional themes for debates, similar to the strategy being developed in Ferrara in early 1798 by democratic ecclesiastics Poggi and De Rossi.¹⁸⁰⁵

However, it became immediately clear that local political cultures caused particular themes to take precedence over others within the national agenda. For example, the former Papal stronghold of Bologna – whose constitutional circle began to form in Nîvose – put a significant amount of focus on the extermination of Catholic feudal practices and the perceived threat which Catholicism posed to republican education.¹⁸⁰⁶ Rossi, the Police commissioner for the department of Reno of which Bologna was the Capital, lamented that this focus on religion was a great distraction from other similarly important themes of national politics and a deviation from concurrent discourses going on in Milan which he believed promoted less extreme revolutionary politics. Yet if one looks at the discussions taking place simultaneously in the Milan constitutional circle, the discourse is similarly more democratic leaning and focusing on the themes like the arming of popular military units and more theoretical ideas of French revolutionaries from the early 1790s like Mirabeau.¹⁸⁰⁷ In Modena, where military tradition was strong, the constitutional circle was dominated by soldiers who called for militant expansion of the revolution, particularly against alarmism; the disorder which came out of this constitutional circle was so extreme that in early Nîvose it was temporarily suspended.¹⁸⁰⁸

¹⁸⁰⁴ Schettini, “La ‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 703.

¹⁸⁰⁵ Schettini, 707.

¹⁸⁰⁶ “Bologna 6. Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano. Il Commissario di Polizia presso il Dipartimento del Reno al Citt.° Sopransi Ministro della Polizia Generale”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Uffici Civici, 39,” fol. Bologna letter, 26 December 1797, Bologna.

¹⁸⁰⁷ “N. 47. 23 frimajo VI repub. (mercoledì 13 dicemb. 1797 v.s.)... ‘Circolo costituzionale di Milano’”, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:368.

¹⁸⁰⁸ “Modena 2 Nivose anno 6.° R.° Cavedoni to Directory”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Modena Letter, 22 December 1797, Modena.

Thus, in urban centers though local preoccupations directed the course of discussions along regional departmental lines, the political culture in these more established cities seemed to follow a much more democratic line of political ideology. Though this was not the end goal of Sopransi's structure, it did accomplish the task of framing the national political agenda in terms of local preoccupations, with national issues taking precedence. This is most likely due to the greater participation of local revolutionary elite, especially in Milan where the members of the legislative assemblies themselves often intervened. In the constitutional circles, representatives like Francesco Gianni, who were less vocal in the constrained political discourse of the Council, could express their more democratic leaning sentiments which were shared by many in the left-leaning press who also belonged to the circles like Salvador, Monti, Foscolo and Galdi.¹⁸⁰⁹ The constitutional circles of urban centers became the foremost point of contact with truly outside influences for the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*.

However, for secondary and tertiary cities, – in particular those far from the metropole of Milan – the direct exchange of ideas with representatives was limited for constitutional circles, and thus the presence of the National agenda less aggressively enforced. This is not to say that direct contact was impossible: both Giuseppe Luini and Felice Latuada had an open and frequent contact with the constitutional circle of Varese, a feature which was reflected in the progressive social revolutionary ideas which were similarly being circulate by the political elite of that city.¹⁸¹⁰ However, most secondary cities were too far outside of range of the Capital to rely on correspondence for political guidance. In these locations – such as Massa, Rimini, Ravenna or Sondrio – local political culture was significantly less limited than in the urban centers and was allowed a much larger interpretive space than cities with nationally powerful intellectual and political elites like Bologna, Modena and Milan. In Sondrio for example – a peripheral city already noted for its more radical nature, due to its great distance from the power centers of the *ancien regime* – the local constitutional circle defied legislative decrees which forbade the seizure of church lands for use in public instruction.¹⁸¹¹ By contrast in Lecco where the local republicans had a much better

¹⁸⁰⁹ “N.39. 27 fiorile VI repub. (mercoledì 16 maggio 1798 v.s.) ...'Commemorazione dell'entrata dell'Armata Francese in Milano””, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:275.

¹⁸¹⁰ “Milano dal Palazzo di Giustizia 4 Piovoso anno VI repubblicano. Repub. [letter from Luini to ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 40 n.d., fol. Varese ; “Dopo la risposta alla domanda 'cosa è la morale?'...” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 40 n.d., fol. Varese letter, date unknown, author most likely Latuada

¹⁸¹¹ “Sondrio li. 5. Germinale Anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano... L'amministrazione centrale del dipartimento d'adda ed oglio al Ministro degli Affari Esteri”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Sondrio letter, 25

rapport with local clergy (in fact two of the *Gran Consiglio* representatives from this department Bovara and Valsecchi came from the local clergy) , the constitutional circle was strongly in favor of Catholic reformism and clerical led revolution.¹⁸¹² There was no political or philosophical uniformity in these far flung cities and even places like Varese who were closer to the urban center of Milan, were far enough removed to involve themselves in national politics, instead focusing more on departmental administration. Many of these places became centers of open resistance to the new national agenda after the Coup of Trouvé in Fructidor and then that of Rivaud in Frimaire Year VII. Though not counter-revolutionary, these more local-centric areas fought against both French revolutionary domination as well as Austo-Russian reactionism in 1799.

The situation was similar for other secondary cities who were perhaps closer to urban centers (such as Reggio or Ferrara) or else had historically powerful elite leadership which could more strongly resist national political agendas. The Ferrara circle, for example, under the leadership of Poggi and De Rossi, downplayed the importance of nationalist rhetoric and revolutionary political tradition, in favor of social progress, such as provisions for impoverished communities and the inclusion of women in the national discourse.¹⁸¹³ They tended to heavily favor the ideas of popular sovereignty over national sovereignty and saw the role of the state as the protectors of its citizenry, as they rather aggressively wrote in a letter to the *Gran Consiglio* in Germinal.¹⁸¹⁴ They mirrored in many ways the political ideas coming out of Varese at this time and the social revolutionary agenda which defined that city, albeit with a significantly more generous attitude toward Catholic involvement in the public service project overall.

March 1798, Sondrio.; The seizure of the Church of San Rocco, became a huge point of contention with National political figures who were hoping to avoid open conflict with the Church, outside of their temporal powers. By seizing Church land, the constitutional circle in Sondrio seemed to be purposefully placing their local political agenda over the national political agenda. The more radical nature of Sondrio politics similarly put it at odds with national regulations and censors and led to open conflict with the local commissar of Adda ed Oglio by the end of the period.

¹⁸¹² “Potere Esecutivo... alla Montagna. Lecco 13 Germinale A. VI Rep.na”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Lecco letter, 2 April 1797, Lecco.

¹⁸¹³ Schettini 2015, p. 708 Schettini’s look at the treatment of women by the Ferrarese is particularly interesting. As a frontier city and the second city of Papal Emilia, Ferrara was in many ways a center of radical tradition. However, their radicalism seemed to be defined more by Condorcean philosophy rather than more Jacobin extremism. The constitutional circle was the central point of definition for this more socially progressive society, and it is no wonder than some of the most ardent supporters of Latuada’s social agenda in the *Gran Consiglio* came from Ferrara such as Vincenzo Massari.

¹⁸¹⁴ “Ferrara 20 Germinale Anno VI repubblicano. Repub.°. Il circolo Costituzionale di Ferrara al Gran Consiglio”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Ferrara letter, 9 April 1798, Ferrara.

In some of these peripheral cities, local cultures came to be persecuted by the Cisalpine national State. In Mantua, for example, the large Jewish population who made up a significant portion of the revolutionary network in that city, and were heavily involved in the constitutional circle, saw many of their goods confiscated under suspicion of hoarding.¹⁸¹⁵ Though these goods were eventually returned, their seizure reflects a disconnect between local and national political traditions which were often present in the politics of secondary cities, and were reflected in constitutional circle debates. Mantua (in reality more importantly Modena) in fact became a seat of one of the more famous anti-French uprisings in 1799 at the end of the First Cisalpine Republic, led by the former representative La Hoz.¹⁸¹⁶ Much of the context for this uprising can be traced to the great resistance to the national political agenda found in the political elite of that city and other cities of similar political and demographic strength such as Faenza, Rimini, Ravenna, Ferrara, and Reggio.

Brescia perhaps more than any other constitutional circle, truly encapsulated is paradox between local and national loyalty. Though the third most populous city in the Cisalpine Republic, Brescia maintained a distance from national politics which reflected local political traditions in a manner much more closely to those of other secondary cities like Ferrara. Brescia had consistently remained resistant to the application of a national agenda in its territory, as reflected in its refusal to adopt financial and commercial regulations at its border with Austrian Veneto.¹⁸¹⁷ Where the

¹⁸¹⁵ “Li 2 Nevoso Anno 6. Repub. il comitato di Polizia di Mantova al Citt. Tomenssari Commissario del Potere Esecutivo”, “Primo Nevoso Anno 6 Repub. Al Comitato di Polizia”, “Milano li 15 Piovoso Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano... Luosi Ministro della Giustizia al Miistro della Polizia Generale”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40,” fol. Mantova series of correspondences, 21-22 December 1797 and 3 February 1798; These letters describe an event which occurred at the end of 1797 in which the local captain of the National Army battaglione sequestered the goods of the Jewish community in the ghetto of Mantua. Unknowingly, he had sequestered the goods of the local Jewish Academy which served as the funding base of the local constitutional circle. Though these goods were eventually restored to the Jewish community of Mantua, this event still reflects the delicate balance between local and national politics which were found in the constitutional circles of many *capoluoghi*.

¹⁸¹⁶ “Milano 13 Nevoso Anno 7. R. D’ordine del Ministro della Polizia Generale” ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261 n.d., fol. La Hoz Report (Manuscript), 18 January 1799, Milan; This report provides the names and origins of some of the early plotters of the anti-French uprising of La Hoz. Among those present included important figures from external Italian cities like Verona who were resentful over the results of Campo Formio. However, the overwhelming majority came from these frontier cities such as Brescia and Ferrara

¹⁸¹⁷ Il regolatore della finanze indirette presso il Dipartimento del Mella al Ministro di Finanza Generale. Brescia li 27 Messidoro anno VI repubblicano Repub.”, ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A , Studi, 39 n.d., fol. Brescia letter, 25 June 1798, Brescia; this letter sent by the Financial regulator of the Department of Mella - a municipal agent in charge of regulating state income and expenditures based out of Brescia - complained about the constitutional circles rejection of border customs with Austrian Veneto. According to him, the constitutional circle believed these to be an infringement of their local financial rights to trade with a foreign state, from which the majority of commerce came. The political affiliations of the state should have no bearing on the commercial interests of the city, sparking a

urban centers were strongly focused on the more theoretical applications of republican instruction – for example anti-monarchical and anti-Catholic rhetoric – the Brescian constitutional circle became almost fully occupied with the commercial and financial autonomy of the department of Mela and the ideas of open commerce. Interestingly the constitutional circle of Brescia offers the best evidence of political ties between the elite of the departmental constitutional circles and the *Gran Consiglio*. A list made by the Commissioner of Departmental Police, Rossi, denotes the names of those speakers in the constitutional circle of Brescia who had advocated for action against the Commissar of the Executive Branch on the part of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁸¹⁸ Within this list is Tadini, the representative and later Minister of Interior Affairs. This document offers concrete proof of the resistance to national dominance over the department of Mella and the *capoluogo* of Brescia itself. It came at a time when the Brescian political elite was attempting to expel national municipal agents from their positions in departmental politics. Like other secondary cities, Brescia was not necessarily radical or democratic in its politics but instead favored measures of regional independence and an autonomous political culture which would not necessarily blend with the national political culture which was being pushed in Milan. Furthermore, the more restrictive and centralized this political culture became (particularly after the Messidor crisis) the more the Brescian constitutional circle was willing to resist.

In fact, this resistance to increasing national concentration of political culture in the periphery was not necessarily native to Brescia, or secondary and tertiary cities more generally. Even within the urban centers like Milan, the democratic nature of discourses caused alarm bells for those like Trouvé and his allies who supported more centralized, nationalist political instruction in the departments.¹⁸¹⁹ The French Government in Paris in particular seemed to be wary of the growing political role that these constitutional circles were playing in cisalpine politics, and many French journalists criticized the autonomy which those circles like Ferrara, Brescia and Milan were able to exercise.¹⁸²⁰ The progressive hold in the *Gran Consiglio* coupled with the outside autonomy

general backlash among the bourgeois of that city against National tax programs aimed at harming the trade networks with Austrian Veneto

¹⁸¹⁸ List begins with the name “Giovanni Labus capo dei Granadieri” and are entitled “Oratori tutto della sala i più furiose” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400,” fol. Brescia.

¹⁸¹⁹ Schettini, “La ‘Funcina Dello Spirito Pubblico’: L’organizzazione Dei Circoli Costituzionali Nella Prima Cisalpina (1797-99),” 713.

¹⁸²⁰ “N. 27 15 germinale VI repub. (sabato 4 marzo 1798 v.s.) ...’Circoli costituzionali eresie d’alcuni giornalisti francesi”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:193–94.

of departmental political cultures, brought about a perception that the overall Cisalpine political culture was moving steadily away from the more centrist political views it had held at the end of 1797 following the 18 Fructidor coup. In the lead-up to the 14 Fructidor Coup, Trouvé set in motion, through the Cisalpine executive branch, the general closure of constitutional circles across the Cisalpine Republic. On 13 Fructidor, Brunetti – the former *Gran Consiglio* representative and new Minister of Police following the Thermidorian ministerial shake-up – sent out letters to each of the twenty departmental constitutional circles which formally closed their sessions.¹⁸²¹ In this way, Trouvé and his allies in the Cisalpine government were able to end the influence of local politics on national political-cultural development. The various future iterations of legislative government in the later Republican and Imperial periods stressed a much stronger centralizing national identity, which kept local historical political practices and concerns at arm's length.

Whether it was the role of clerical representatives or the influence of local political culture, the legislative agenda which the *Gran Consiglio* established for the Cisalpine Republic throughout the ten-month period of its existence was heavily intertwined with extra-governmental political culture. The *Gran Consiglio*, in its own way, was the oven within which the new political culture of the Republic was baked, and the influences of these ancient external cultural and political establishments the ingredients. The political culture which arose in 1798 and which for decades (if not centuries) to come would serve as the basis for political and social formation on the Italian peninsula was distinctly Italian, or perhaps better, distinctly Cisalpine in its make up. In the end the concept of exchange – a process by which two parties contribute something to the other – is most appropriately applied to the two case studies examined in this chapter. In the first case, the *Gran Consiglio*, thanks largely to the heavy involvement of active and former clergymen among its ranks, saw an enormous contribution to the concepts of morality, family values, private corporate finance, and social welfare which the institutional Catholic Church could provide to the Cisalpine Nation. At the same time, through the application of the so-called “republican catechism”, a new idea of Catholic religion emerged which blended revolutionary ideology, eighteenth century Josephian reformism and ancient Catholic ritual into a new concept Catholic

¹⁸²¹ Each of these letters can be found in the various collections of each of the consitutional circles which are held in: “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Culto, 1400”; “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 40.”

cultural significance in Italian private life. In the second case, the importance of local cultures defined the administrative and political importance of departmental leadership and saw the *Gran Consiglio* fighting for control of local government as a way to combat pressures from rivals in the national center. At the same time, localisms and historic urban development effected both the past and present experiences of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*; none more so than the effect which constitutional circles and local political societies had on the ideas of what Cisalpine republicanism was, and the fraught battle between local tradition and nationalization which played out in the variety of political cultural debates within these groups.

To this point, the political cultural exchanges which have been examined, both in this chapter and the previous have explained how the political and legislative culture formed in the *Gran Consiglio* was tied to the institutions and politics of the Cisalpine Republic. However, in almost every scenario there simultaneously existed another overwhelming looming presence which – perhaps more than all others – had a profound effect on the development of political culture in the *Gran Consiglio*. This of course refers to the overarching presence of the French Revolution in the Cisalpine Republic, and more specifically the variety of physical and intellectual influences which played major parts in the historic development of the Italian peninsula during the triennio coming from the contemporary French Republic. From Napoleon Bonaparte, the generals which served as his successors and the ever-present *Armée d'Italie*; to the French Directory in Paris and its representatives in the form of administrators like Haller or diplomats like Trouvé; the French Republic was perhaps the most present and pressing influence on the *Gran Consiglio*, more so than any of the other institutions covered in this part of the dissertation. The French Republic, both its military and civilian side, were the unmatched central authority of European Republicanism in the second half of the 1790s. And while it is true that the years of French presence in Northern Italy would come to be defined by the preferences of Paris, it should be noted that as with other external influences, there remained the concept of political cultural exchange. The final chapter will look at the complex and unique relationship which existed between the *Gran Consiglio* and the various elements of the French Republic in 1797 and 1798, and how they became the central influence over Cisalpine political culture during this period, yet simultaneously effected the political development in France in the years during and following the Cisalpine Republic.

Chapter XI

The *Gran Consiglio* and the French Republic

A common thread which has linked every chapter of this thesis thus far is the underlying importance of the French Republic in the development of Cisalpine political and legislative culture, and in particular the different French historical characters who have appeared throughout almost every facet of the examination of the *Gran Consiglio*. The reason for this is that the French Republic was intrinsically linked to the origins, development, and management of the Cisalpine Republic, making it fundamental as well to the legislative and political culture of the *Gran Consiglio*. In the end, the institutions, politics, legislation, and administrative structures of the Cisalpine republic are modelled after – if not exact replicas of in many cases– the French Republic. Thus, of all of the relationships examined in this section – the Cisalpine Directory, the *Consiglio de' Seniori*, the Catholic Church, the Cisalpine departmental administration – none hold a place as important nor as complex as the relationship between the *Gran Consiglio* and the French Republic.

Nineteenth century nationalists used the Franco-Cisalpine Relationship of the Republican Triennio relationship as a means to define a burgeoning underground Italian nation at the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁸²² In the early twentieth century, it was used to highlight the Italian presence in the radical movements of the republican period in Europe and propose the importance of Italian ideological, military and political contributions to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.¹⁸²³ Fascist historians used this relationship to highlight the failures of democracy and the exploitation the Italian people had felt at the hands of other European nations.¹⁸²⁴ The inheritors of this ideology like Carlo Zaghi continued to push this idea of heroic Italian patriots fighting against

¹⁸²² Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*; Cusani, *Storia Di Milano*; Tivaroni, *L'Italia Durante Il Dominio Francese (1789-1815)*; Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 11–30.

¹⁸²³ Lemmi, *Le Origini Del Risorgimento Italiano (1789-1815)*; Masi, *La Storia Del Risorgimento Nei Libri*; Rota, “Le Origini Del Risorgimento 1700-1800.”

¹⁸²⁴ Solmi, *Napoleone e l'Italia*.

the oppression of French invaders, an idea which has similarly permeated twentieth and twenty-first century English language historiography as well.¹⁸²⁵

The Marxist historians of the later twentieth century like Carlo Capra or Armando Saitta saw the French Nation as exploitive and damaging to the patriotic efforts of Italian “Jacobins” like Filippo Buonarrotti,¹⁸²⁶ that said these historians differed from the right in their ability to understand the greater complexity of multinational political factions. The inheritors of this historiographical tendency such as Vittorio Criscuolo, Emmanuele Pagano, or Stefano Nutini have continued to examine the relationship of the Italian and French left as the central node of republican thought in Italian society, with Criscuolo in particular expanding the relationship from the political realm to also understand its social and economic effects in Cisalpine republican society.¹⁸²⁷ Similar concepts of internationalism in the Franco-Cisalpine relationship were also being born simultaneously by authors like Palmer and Godechot, who set the Cisalpine Republic firmly within the political lines of the greater French and Atlantic republican movements of the late eighteenth century.¹⁸²⁸

It is precisely from the combination of these latter two schools that the revision of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship was born in the studies of Antonino De Francesco. De Francesco’s work has reassessed the Franco-Cisalpine relationship by acknowledging the integral place of the French post-Thermidorian regime of 1795-1800 in Cisalpine – and more generally Italian – political and legislative development.¹⁸²⁹ De Francesco’s analysis remains to this day the most

¹⁸²⁵ Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Broers, *The Politics of Religion in Napoleonic Italy*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*.

¹⁸²⁶ Saitta, *Filippo Buonarrotti. Contribuiti Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*; Cantimori and De Felice, *Giacobini Italiani*; De Felice, *I Giornale Giacobini Italiani*; De Felice, *Italia Giacobina*; Mack Smith, *The Making of Italy 1796-1866*; Capra, “Il Giornalismo Nell’età Rivoluzionaria e Napoleonica.”

¹⁸²⁷ Nutini, “L’esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina”; Nutini, “I Soci Dei Club Democratici Milanesi Nel Triennio: Status, Professione, Formazione”; Criscuolo, “Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato”; Criscuolo, “La Società Milanese Nell’età Rivoluzionaria: Resistenze e Mutamenti”; Pagano, *Pro e Contro la Repubblica*.

¹⁸²⁸ Godechot, “Le Babouvisme et l’unité Italienne (1796-1799)”; Godechot, *Le Gran Nation. L’expansion Révolutionnaire de La France Dans Le Monde, 1789-1799*; Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*; Palmer, *From Jacobin to Liberal: Marc-Antoine Jullien, 1774-848*.

¹⁸²⁹ De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d’Italia”; De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien”; De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français”; De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*; Visconti, *L’ultimo Direttorio*; Visconti, “The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic”; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic”; De Francesco, *Storie dell’Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*; Conte, “The French Revolution Abroad: Le Cas Italien”; Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le

convincing argument for the importance of the French Constitution of Year III not only in Italian politics but for that of the entirety of Republican Europe during the Triennio – and beyond into the early nineteenth century. Finally, De Francesco’s examination of this relationship brought the importance of the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte into stark relief and his time in the Cisalpine Republic as a central period of personal, professional, and political development, both for the young general as well as for the many Italian politicians he influenced.

It is within this vein, that of De Francesco and his school of thought, that this final chapter is realized. This final chapter will take the larger concepts introduced by historians of Italy and the post-Thermidorian republican political culture in the late 1790s and narrow it to the relationship exclusively seen between the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* and the various elements of the French Republic. Beginning with the first organizational attempts at Italian republicanism in the early months of 1797, this chapter shall track the interactions of future *Gran Consiglio* representatives across this year into the activation of the Legislative Assemblies on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797); through the high level of legislative and political production in the winter and spring of 1798; into the turbulent end of the *Gran Consiglio* in the summer of that year, and finally its legacy in the final months of the Cisalpine Republic at the end of 1798 into early 1799. The focus shall be on the Cisalpine interaction with important characters like Napoleon Bonaparte, General Alexander Berthier, General Guillaume-Marie Brune, Administrators Haller and Faypoult, French Directors La Révellière-Lépeaux, Barras and Rewbell, and finally French ambassadors to the Cisalpine Republic, Claude-Joseph Trouvé, Joseph Fouché and François Rivaud. The Chapter will also look at the interaction between the *Gran Consiglio* and other intermediaries of Cisalpine politics, such as Cisalpine Ambassadors to the French Republic Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni and Francesco Visconti, Cisalpine Directors Paradisi, Moscati, Adelesio, Alessandri and (eventually) Lamberti, and the group of *Seniori* representatives led by Aldini. Using the information which has been constructed throughout the other ten chapters of this thesis, this ultimate chapter will finally argue for the central role the *Gran Consiglio* played both in the development of a Cisalpine – and later Italian – political culture, but also in the interweaving of

Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.”; De Francesco, *Il Naufrago e Il Dominatore. Vita Politica Di Napoleone Bonaparte*.

interactions and relationship which the Cisalpine republic had with the French Republic in the years 1797-1799.

French influence in the Cisalpine Republic before 2 Frimaire Year VI

The political culture which was constructed in 1798 along the line of French political practices was not born overnight on 2 Frimaire Year VI. The reality is of course that the process of “cisalpinization” as Palmer termed it, began with the formation of the early sister Republics – such as the Cispadane Republic – in late 1796 and went through an accelerated development throughout 1797.¹⁸³⁰ This period of political and constitutional development, which led to the formation of the structural and administrative base of the Cisalpine republic by November 1797, was heavily – if not exclusively – influenced by French political practices and events, both locally on the Italian Peninsula and in Paris. The French state, be it the French Military in the form of Bonaparte’s *Armée d’Italie* or the civilian representatives of the Parisian government in Milan, exuded influence through a combination of intimidation, political alliance and propoganda. However, in the end the decision to mimic French political practices was an entirely Cisalpine decision which was debated, adopted, dismantled, redebated and reinstited multiple times across 1797, before the Legisltive Assemblies were even activated as the official legislative branch of the Republic on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797).

The Constitution of Year III and the Cisalpine Constitution

From a legislative perspective, the most important contribution of the French Revolution to the Cisalpine Republic was the Cisalpine Constitution instituted by Bonaparte at the proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic on 11 Messidor Year V. Not only did the Cisalpine Consitution designate the structures and regulations which served to organize the government of Cisalpine Republic, it served as the philosophical bedrock of Cisalpine politics. The Cisalpine Constitution was an almost identical translation of the French Constitution of Year III. To the article, the rules which organized the Cisalpine Republic had their political roots in the French Consitution. The minor changes which were made to the Cisalpine Constitution were limited to demographic alterations such as the breakdown of departments or the number of representatives

¹⁸³⁰ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 609.

which constituted the legislative assemblies.¹⁸³¹

The adoption and adaptation of the Constitution of Year III to the Cisalpine political condition was rooted in the earliest days of the foundation of the Italian Sister Republics in late 1796 early 1797. Though it was expected that an Italian constitution would in some way reflect the ideals of the Revolution in France, it was not a given that they would mirror the French structures to such an extreme degree. Bonaparte hoped that by offering the Italian patriots a chance to formulate their own constitutions, the political instability and violence which had wracked France in the early years of the revolution would be avoided on the Peninsula.¹⁸³² Bonaparte's fixation, particularly in these early months following the French victories against counter-revolutionary forces in Italy in 1796-1797, was the stabilization of conquered territory; this would only be possible with a high degree of support from favorable Italian leadership. However, the historical, cultural and political divisions which existed within and between the conquered territories of the Peninsula by the Spring of 1797 led to differences in the interpretations of French and Italian revolutionary concepts, in turn complicating the construction of the new constitutional projects of the newly established Italian Sister Republics (Cispadane, Ligurian, and eventually Bergamasco).

The first of the Sister Republics to confront this was the Cispadane Republic during the Modena Congress in the winter and spring of 1797. The formation of a Constitutional Committee early on saw the rise of many important figures, particularly those from Bologna, which had long been separated into a more aristocratic university elite and a more radical intellectual patriot class found in the various professional networks of that city. Among these early leadership figures were future *Gran Consiglio* representatives like Greppi, Brunetti and Lamberti.¹⁸³³ However two of the clear leaders early on were Compagnoni and Aldini;¹⁸³⁴ these two men would often conflict, with Compagnoni (who came from the patriot class) favoring a form of government which mirrored the democratic representative practices of the Constitution of Year III, while Aldini (coming from the

¹⁸³¹ "Constitution de la république française, et lois y relatives," Title I, Articles 4 and 5; Title V Article 45; "Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina," sec. Title I, Articles 4 and 5; Title V Article 45.

¹⁸³² "Au Citoyen Président du Congrès Cispadan. Milan 12 nivose an V (1er janvier 1797)", *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier* 1869, p. 286

¹⁸³³ "N. 63. 20 piovoso V repub. (mercoledì 8 febbrajo 1797 v.s.), 'Congresso cispadana'; "N. 64. 23 piovoso V repub. (sabato 11 febbrajo 1797 v.s.), 'Congresso cispadana'" Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia II*, 2:98, 108.

¹⁸³⁴ *Ibid* 2:99,108.

more elite class) advocating for a much more nationalist constitution with heavier Italian influences and tailored to the specific needs of the Emilian and Romagnian citizenry.¹⁸³⁵ Neither however espoused ideology which could be seen as radical or Jacobin, instead favoring the principles of the 1795 French Constitution. Those figures like Greppi or Giovanni Giovannetti – a Bolognese radical and close friend to Greppi – who favored the addition of more radical measures from the Jacobin 1793 Constitution were either quickly silenced or expelled from the proceedings.¹⁸³⁶ This group constituted the most radical faction of the Bolognese patriot class who were often legal professionals or radical aristocrats who had participated in the student movements in the early 1790s.

When word arrived in Prairial Year V that the Cispadane would be merged with the Administration of Lombardy to form the Cisalpine Republic, it became apparent that the political discussions used to formulate the Cispadane constitutional order would be applied to the new Cisalpine constitutional design. However, unlike the Cispadane Republic, the Cisalpine Constitution would not be constructed in a politically contentious and slow-moving constitutional congress.¹⁸³⁷ The Cispadane Congress had used a constitutional committee which served as a body analogous to the 1795 French Committee of Eleven, the internal body of the post-Thermidorian French Convention which constructed the constitutional articles of the new French constitution in 1794-1795.¹⁸³⁸ The process of Constitution building used in the Modenese Congress required multiple levels of legislative debate and voting which drew out development for months, leaving the fledgling Cispadane Republic to rely on military proclamations passed by Bonaparte or provisional laws for the daily governance to run smoothly. Instead, for the construction of the Cisalpine Constitution, Bonaparte relied on a newer more exclusive committee system reflective of the provisional governments found in the Brescian Republic in the Spring of 1797 (reviewed in

¹⁸³⁵ De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 276; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 214.

¹⁸³⁶ Savini, *Un abate “libertino,”* 254.

¹⁸³⁷ Savini, 259 It is obvious that the tardiness of the Cispadane Congress at instituting a Constitution bothered Bonaparte. Compagnoni in his autobiography describes an exchange he had with the General-in-Chief in February of 1797, who threatened to institute martial law if the deputies of the Congress at Reggio were unable to pass the constitution within the following 24 hours. It is clear that Bonaparte was unwilling to relive this experience for the Cisalpine Republic, particularly as he was preparing to leave for the peace with the Austrians and wanted stability in the conquered territory before he departed.

¹⁸³⁸ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 24–37.

Chapter VI).¹⁸³⁹ Though the city never instituted a constitutional regime, the provisional document was successful in quickly building a republican administration which reflected revolutionary values without the instability of a constitutional congress.

Unlike Brescia, Bonaparte created only two committees – the Constitutional Committee and the Central Committee – who would lead the new Cisalpine government through the transitional phase in Prairial and early Messidor Year V.¹⁸⁴⁰ It was decided that the new Cisalpine Constitution would be identical to that of the French Constitution of 1795, with the minor changes mentioned previously for demographic purposes. Five of the seventeen members of these two commissions which helped to translate the French constitution into Italian, would be future members of the *Gran Consiglio* (La Hoz, Longo, Mascheroni, Oliva and Fontana); four of these five were on the constitutional committee (La Hoz belonged to the Central Committee). These initial committees were made up of a strong Milanese presence which was also felt in the outside political commentaries circulating at the time in the capital city. Powerful future *Gran Consiglio* voices based out of Milan such as Francesco Reina published material related to their hopes for the new nationalizing influence of the Cisalpine Constitution.¹⁸⁴¹ There were also clear influences of the Cispadane Constitutional in the early Cisalpine provisional administrative structure (outside of those already regulated by the Cisalpine Constitution), as well as structural elements taken from the Brescian and Bergamasco Republics under construction in that same time. In this way while the French Constitution of 1795 heavily influenced the politics of the Cisalpine Republic from the outset, in many ways the Cisalpine Republic had already begun to adopt and adapt the principles of the French constitution to the Cisalpine political condition.

The adoption of the Constitution of Year III was the result of a combination of Cisalpine

¹⁸³⁹ "N.72. In Nome de Popolo Sovrano Bresciano Il Governo Provvisorio. *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano*, 47–4824 March 1797."; the Brescian committee system was made up of six committees: Vigilance and Police, Military, Public instruction, Finance, *Viveri* (roughly translated to public wellbeing and served a similar function as the committee of public safety under the French Convention), and Care for Public Effects (a general public works committee). There was also a seventh group which did not constitute a committee but were those members of the political elite who were allowed to cooperate in the legislative and executive decision-making process. Despite being led by a president and bureau, the Brescian committee system served as both the legislative and executive branch of the provisional government before Brescia's annexation to the Cisalpine Republic. There was no formal committee tasked with the creation of a constitution, a difference from the Bergamasco Republic which was originally led by a similar committee structure but adopted a constitution similar to that of the Cispadane Republic not long after the Spring Revolts ended in March 1797.

¹⁸⁴⁰ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:125.

¹⁸⁴¹ "N. 104. 12 Messidoro V repub. (Venerdì 30 giugno 1797 v.s.), 'Costituzione Cisalpina'", *Criscuolo, Termometro Politico della Lombardia II*, 2:486.

attempts to endear itself to the French Republic and of pressure from French forces – both military and civilian – to adopt contemporary French legislative strategies.¹⁸⁴² However, there were elements of post-Thermidorian politics which in large part attracted the Cisalpine patriots to the French Constitution. Perhaps more than any other, the Constitution of 1795 had proven a stable model for the French historically. Both the 1791 Constitution and the never enacted 1793 constitution had both seen the flaws in their structures exposed within their own time; in July of 1797 the same could not be said (yet) for the Constitution of Year III. This iteration of the French Constitution was seen to have brought stability, and even a measure of fortune to the French Republic, and despite its more moderate treatment of social issues, avoided the bloodshed and chaos which were the result of previous constitutional models.¹⁸⁴³

There were also political and philosophical advantages to the 1795 Constitution which made it favorable to the Cisalpine political circumstances. The perception of public involvement in the legislative process, indirect though it may have been, was as fundamental to the Revolution in Northern Italy as it was seen to be in France, according to Italian political commentators. However, this accountability of the political process similarly opened up a discourse in the Cisalpine Republic which had raged in France since the Revolution's conception in 1789: was the will of the people to be adhered to even when it went against the interests of the nation? If the people were the nation, by definition their will was national will. However, the chaos of the early years of the Revolution in France viewed from the lens of a post-Thermidorian political commentator, either Italian or French, seemed to say otherwise; perhaps public opinion did not necessarily dictate national interests.

The question became one of popular versus national sovereignty, and whether the two could be unified harmoniously into a new concept of constitutionality, or else were destined to remain opposing forces.¹⁸⁴⁴ According to Troper, the discourse in 1795 France came down to the ways in which the framers of the 1795 Constitution defined the terms “people” and “nation”, which

¹⁸⁴² Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:125–27; De Francesco, “Aux Origines Du Mouvement Démocratique Italien”; De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d’Italia”; de Motteville, “Madame de Motteville’s Account of the Parisian Disturbances in August 1648”; De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français.”

¹⁸⁴³ Many Cisalpine commentators favored the representative democratic method of governing which the 1795 constitutional outlined. The politics of this form of governance can be found defined in: Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 214.

¹⁸⁴⁴ Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 65.

were intrinsically synonymous to them.¹⁸⁴⁵ While in 1791 the nation was still embodied by the government headed by the French Monarchy, and the people defined as the beneficiaries of the actions of government, in the definitions under the republican constitutions of 1793 and 1795, the people became the nation and vice versa. In other words, nationhood was no longer defined by its governmental or territorial delineations but by its citizenry, who became the sovereign under the republican system. However, here the 1793 and 1795 constitutions differed: while in 1793 the universality of the French citizen was defined as “popular” sovereignty, in 1795 the word popular was excluded, allowing for an ambiguity in the universality of citizenship which had not existed before. While the sovereignty of the nation remained the will of the citizenry, the definition of citizen could now be limited from all people to those seen as fit for national participation.

This meant the number of those who could serve as legislators would suddenly be drastically reduced, or at least malleable to the definition of citizenship according to the controlling interests of the state. In 1795 France this was of course met with enormous derision, particularly from the remains of those more radical factions who hoped to see a reprisal of 1793 values in the new constitution.¹⁸⁴⁶ Many of these believed the ambiguity of citizenship would see the return of aristocratic factions taking control of legislative functions and enacting counter-revolutionary reforms which threatened the entire republican project. However, those who came from the growing centrist faction of French politics such as La Révellière-Lépeaux, saw these concerns as more alarmist than realistic, noting that in fact the constitution did provide certain generic definitions for citizenship which would guarantee against exclusionary practices by any particular political faction or club.¹⁸⁴⁷

This is reflected in the way in which the 1795 constitution constructed its legislative assemblies, and in particular the lower assembly, considered to be the representative of the nation in government function. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the 1795 Constitution was the rights of citizens to participate in the legislative process as representatives. While other iterations of the Constitution similarly guaranteed this right, the changes to the definitions of sovereignty between 1791 and 1795 meant that the permissibility of individuals to take direct roles in the legislative process were severely limited. As with the generic question of national and

¹⁸⁴⁵ Troper, 68.

¹⁸⁴⁶ “Séance [du Convention National] du 23 messidor [an III]”, Troper, 212 Discourse of Dubois-Crancé.

¹⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid* 213. Discourse of Lerevellière-Lepeaux.

popular sovereignty, the debates on the participation in the legislative assemblies was dictated by the degree to which the public had the right to select their representation: too much popular influence could lead to a populist majority for the right or left which could rupture political stability (as indeed occurred in the Year V elections which led to the 18 Fructidor Coup)¹⁸⁴⁸; too little popular influence could see the formation of a new aristocracy much in the way the British commons had birthed the gentry class.¹⁸⁴⁹ More importantly the latter could lead to a diminution of the perceived rights of citizens which could in fact spark another revolutionary backlash similar to that of the summer 1792, thus once again plunging the French Republic into instability.¹⁸⁵⁰ A large part of the hesitation on both sides of the political spectrum was the general prejudice towards the connection between affluence and ignorance, particularly among the poorer and smaller communities of the peripheral zones of the French Nation. The direct election of representatives to the legislative branch risked affluent individuals – who acquired their affluence either through traditional forms of wealth and status or through the use of incendiary and populist rhetoric – exploiting the perceived ignorance of politics and republican legislative practices in the areas outside of the Parisian center.

To avoid this, the Constitution of Year III based the formation of the legislative assemblies on an election process which utilized a series of electoral assemblies. The initial level of this election process was the formation of local primary assemblies. These primary assemblies were notable as having the most direct participation for citizens of any institution under the 1795 Constitution. Each assembly was made up of the citizens within a given district and was the only place where citizens were allowed to cast direct votes.¹⁸⁵¹ These primary assemblies not only served as local electoral boards for national office, but functioned almost as local legislative branches, though without the legislative authority of the departmental and national assemblies.¹⁸⁵² The radical elements of the French Convention hoped that these primary assemblies would remain the only step between the national legislature and the people. However, the growing democratic republican power base – which was the amalgamation of the surviving politically centered groups

¹⁸⁴⁸ “Séance [du Convention National] du 26 messidor [an III]” Troper, 218. Discourse of Défermont. and Louvet (de la Somme)

¹⁸⁴⁹ “Séance [du Convention National] du 23 messidor [an III]” Troper, 212. Discourse of Lerevellière-Lépeaux.

¹⁸⁵⁰ “Séance [du Convention National] du 26 messidor [an III]” Troper, 217. Discourse of Lanjuinais.

¹⁸⁵¹ “Constitution de la république française, et lois y relatives,” Title III Articles 19, 20 and 21.

¹⁸⁵² “Constitution de la république française, et lois y relatives,” Title III, Articles 26 and 29.

from the early years of the revolution such as moderate Jacobins and Girodins who had survived in exile during the Terror – cautioned that these primary assemblies continued to exhibit the problems of localism and aristocratic exploitive affluence.¹⁸⁵³

In order to avoid these issues, this centrist power base create the institution of the electoral assembly, which added another level between the local primary assemblies and the National Assemblies in the capital. Every department had an electoral assembly, whose members would be elected from the ranks of the primary assemblies based on specific criteria relating to district demographics, age and wealth specifications.¹⁸⁵⁴ These electoral assemblies were designed with the sole purpose of nominating members to the legislative assembly for that specific district. Electors would be selected from the primary assemblies based on their contributions to policy discourses made in the primary assemblies.¹⁸⁵⁵ The idea was that citizens would be able to participate in political discourses in the primary assemblies, which would serve as campaign grounds for electors. Those citizens who demonstrated a high level of political knowledge and whose political philosophy aligned with the local political leanings of the district as a whole would naturally be selected to serve as electors. However, electors could not discuss policy within the electoral assemblies, merely nominate those who were already known to share their political beliefs. However, the electoral assemblies were a further filter so that firebrand politicians – from both extremities of the political spectrum – were unable to gain a national audience as they had under the 1791 rules.¹⁸⁵⁶ Theoretically the use of electoral assemblies would force a broader understanding of politics on a departmental, if not national level, as now electors would be forced to understand the local political traditions of their colleagues before nominating the representatives

¹⁸⁵³ “Séance [du Convention National] du 26 messidor [an III]” Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 218 Discourse of Louvet (de la Somme).

¹⁸⁵⁴ Constitution de la république française, et lois y relatives 1795, Title IV, Articles 33 and 35; The case of the Cisalpine Republic had slightly different regulations for their electoral assemblies than the French for demographic purposes. The Cisalpine Constitutional regulations for electoral assemblies dictated that all electors needed to be citizens (and therefore male) over the age of 25 with a property estate valued at a minimum of 100 cisalpine lire. District size dictated the number of electors which would be sent from each primary assembly. For districts between 200 and 300 citizens in the primary assembly only one elector could be sent. In fact, for primary assemblies with less than 200 citizens the discussion of policy particularities was prohibited, as it was believed that these communities were too small to have a substantive political discourse. Districts between 301 and 500 citizens in the primary assembly would send 2 electors; 500-700, 4 electors; 700-900 citizens 8 electors; anything over 900 citizens would be separated into two primary assemblies or as many as were necessary not to have more than 900 citizens in a primary assembly. A large urban district like Milan could see multiple districts of multiple primary assemblies.

¹⁸⁵⁵ “Séance [du Convention National] du 27 messidor [an III]” Troper, *Terminer la Révolution: La Constitution de 1795*, 222. Discourse of Bordas.

¹⁸⁵⁶ “Séance [du Convention National] du 27 messidor [an III]” Troper, 221. Discourse of Baudin (des Ardennes).

of national office.

However, it was this precise blend of local, departmental, and national politics which seemed to endear Cisalpine patriots in 1797 to the adoption of the Constitution of Year III. The Cisalpine Republic from July to November 1797 was a fractured nation still, whose influencers came from a wide variety of political, socio-economic, intellectual, and demographic backgrounds. The years 1796 and 1797 was a period which saw the Italian nationalist question take precedence over other issues pertaining to state finances, military structures and administrative development, as a result in large part to the absence of a concrete national existence.¹⁸⁵⁷ However the Constitution of Year III provided a framework for the state which meant that the concepts of nationalism were no longer an abstract idea separate from that of government institutions and structures, but instead a necessary point of reflection to begin the state building process. The Constitution of Year III needed to be the basis for the Cisalpine Constitution because not only did it unite the revolutionary spirit of the Cisalpine patriots with the concepts of French Republicanism, it united the various patriot movements occurring within Cisalpine territory with different points of origin.¹⁸⁵⁸ It did this by allowing for local politics to find a base in the national discourse and vice versa.

Ironically, the very structure which endeared the Cisalpine patriots to the Constitution of Year III, the use of universal elections and electoral assemblies, were never utilized during the entire Cisalpine republic. The legislative assemblies were selected on the basis of nomination by Bonaparte and a select group of political elites who came from the major urban centers of the Cisalpine Republic, such as Milan, Pavia, Bergamo, Bologna, Brescia and Modena.¹⁸⁵⁹ Many of these men, including Compagnoni, Fontana, Reina, La Hoz, Dandolo, Tadini, Fenaroli, Allemagna, Greppi, Gambari, Venturi, Vicini, and many others had been instrumental in instituting the concepts of the Constitution of Year III in the Cisalpine Republic. The basis for the legislative production into 1798 within the *Gran Consiglio* was not the historic enlightenment intellectualism of the late eighteenth century, nor the local politics of the early revolutionary years in Italy, but the centrist principles of nationalism and state institutions which came from the French

¹⁸⁵⁷ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 51, 102.

¹⁸⁵⁸ No. 112. 3 Vendemmiatore anno I della Libertà Italiana (24 Settembre 1797. v.s.), "Riposta del Presidente del Direttorio", Zanoli, *Giornale De' Partioti D'Italia III*, 3:15–16.

¹⁸⁵⁹ "Nomini dei membri del Corpo legislativo" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:63–64; Zagli, *Il Direttorio*, 1:137–38.

Constitution of Year III.¹⁸⁶⁰ This is not to say that those past Italian particulars of Cisalpine political culture did not heavily influence legislative production under the *Gran Consiglio*, to the point where these Cisalpine specific conditions led to a massive adaptation of French political and constitutional precedent. However, at its very foundation, it was loyalty to the French project in 1795 which served as the starting point for Cisalpine legislative output.

The French Coup of 18 Fructidor Year V as seen from the Cisalpine Republic

The Constitution of Year III provided a framework for the early leaders of the Cisalpine Republic in the second half of 1797 which built structures, institutions and regulations that allowed for the physical manifestation of republican government in the image of the French Revolution. Yet, the 1795 Constitution also provided an example for Cisalpine patriots of early state building *politics* rooted in stability and an avoidance of extremism. However, French politics had moved on in the two years since the Constitution was put in place. As such while the Cisalpine patriots looked to 1795 as an example, they could not help but find themselves commentating and judging the French political situation of 1797, if not being directly involved.

The elections held in Germinal of Year V had yielded unsavory results for those long-time backers of the republican project in France in the post-Thermidorian era. According to the Constitution, elections were supposed to rotate out 1/3 of the representatives in both assemblies. In the 1795 elections, this new third had allowed the Thermidorian party which had come to power in late 1794 to remain in control of the legislative assemblies. This group, often denominated as the democratic republicans by modern French historians like Bernard Gainot or Pierre Serna, were largely made up of former members of the Girondins who had survived the purge of the Great Terror, as well as moderate Jacobins and other left wing and centrist politicians dedicated to the republican project and a more open interpretation of the 1795 Constitution.¹⁸⁶¹ They were led primarily by the most notable figures of the directory period such as La Révellière-Lépeaux, Merlin, Reubell, Carnot, Sieyes and Barras.¹⁸⁶² These were opposed by a minority group of Royalists who were loyal to the Count of Provence (now styling himself Louis XVIII following

¹⁸⁶⁰ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 52–53.

¹⁸⁶¹ Serna, “Un programma per l’opposizione di Sinistra sotto il direttorio”; Gainot, “Être Républicain et Démocrate Entre Thermidor et Brumaire”; Gainot, *La Democrazia Rappresentativa. Saggia Su Una Politica Rivoluzionaria Nelle Francia Del Direttorio 1795-1799*.

¹⁸⁶² Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 342.

the death of the Dauphin), who had been hiding out in Holland since the beginning of the Revolution. However, the largest opposition group to the moderate Thermidorians were the so-called Club de Clichy. These Clichyens were led by men like Jean-Charles Pichegru, François-Antoine de Boissy d'Anglas, François Barthélémy, Lemérier, Mathieu Dumas who had remained on the conservative side of the Thermidorians in 1794-1795.¹⁸⁶³

It was the Clichyens who had benefitted the most from the 1797 elections. Those who belonged to this political club were able to gain almost 200 new seats from the election and had obtained all of the seats in the new third which was elected giving them the majority in both assemblies.¹⁸⁶⁴ This push to the right for the French assemblies was most likely the result of two connected causes. First, The Conspiracy of Equals led by Gracchus Babeuf had been discovered in the late spring of 1796.¹⁸⁶⁵ Though Babeuf's plot had been exposed before it could cause any damage, it opened up a particular paranoia within the French right and right leaning centrists who saw the potential political impact which former Montagnards continued to have on French government. Babeuf's plot caused popular alarm which seemed to provide further evidence for the weakness of the post-Thermidorian order in confronting political extremism.¹⁸⁶⁶ This leant much to the second reason for the shifting power dynamic within French politics towards the right in 1797, as the conservative Clichyens allied themselves with the growing royalist faction of French politics. The Clichyens began to point out the dangers inherent in the new democratic republic order under the Directory and called for more conservative measures which might guard against extremism, even a potential return of the Bourbon Monarchy. This new Royalist leaning rhetoric combined with the fact that Babeuf's trial was in full swing in late March when the elections were taking place, were most likely strong factors behind the sudden political acquisition of the Clichyens and their royalist allies.¹⁸⁶⁷

¹⁸⁶³ Jourdan, 344.

¹⁸⁶⁴ Kuscinski, *Les députés au corps législatif: conseil des cinq-cents, conseil des anciens de l'an IV à l'an VII; listés, tableaux et lois*, 184–200.

¹⁸⁶⁵ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 349.

¹⁸⁶⁶ Mason, "Gracchus Babeuf, Les Égaux et La Culture Politique Du Directoire," 293.

¹⁸⁶⁷ « N° 185 Quintidi, 5 germinal, l'an 5 de la République Française un et indivisible. (samedi 25 mars 1797, vieux style.), "Haute-cour de Justice. Vendime, le 29 Ventôse" », *Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel* 1795 ; Jourdan *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 363 ; Mason, *Gracchus Babeuf, les égaux et la culture politique du Directoire*, 243-244

In Italy the political situation at this time made the French elections secondary news. March of 1797 saw the institutionalization of the Cispadane Constitution, the Bergamasco, Brescian and Cremasco revolutions and the French push into Venice. Even in Paris the news coming out of Italy made the front page before the chaos of the French political situation.¹⁸⁶⁸ In fact, the French elections were of such little consequence on the peninsula that the *Termometro politico della Lombardia*, which had become the preeminent patriot newspaper in Milan since 1796, incorrectly called the election for the democratic republican factions of the French assemblies.¹⁸⁶⁹ The Revolution was showing success in Italy, and the growing popularity of Bonaparte made him the primary focus of both Italian and French language political commentary on French politics throughout most of Germinal and Floréal Year V.¹⁸⁷⁰ The announcement of the creation of a unified Cisalpine republic in Prairial and the simultaneous formation of the Venetian provisional government further occupied the Italian patriots. It was a moment of high democracy among the Italian patriots, who believed that the introduction of democratic elections into the political process on the peninsula would only help to augment the Revolutionary spirit which had been brewing in the Spring of 1797.¹⁸⁷¹ Even if the news of the royalist victory had made its way into the discourse of Italian patriots, there is little doubt it would have been quickly hidden away, as the patriots charged with constructing both the Cisalpine and Venetian republican states were focused on the revolutionary benefits of the new system not its potential flaws.

However, following the official proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic in mid-Messidor, this hesitation to criticize French politics began to change. Cisalpine political commentators, particularly those in Milan, began to look more critically at the results of the French elections from Germinal. A 6 Messidor article in the *Termometro* for the first time acknowledged the Royalist victories in France and sought to paint the Clichyens as the specter of aristocracy and the return of

¹⁸⁶⁸ “N^o. 184 Quatidi, 4 germinal, l’an 5 de la République Francaise un et indivisible. (venerdi 24 mars 1797, vieux style.), ‘POLITIQUE, ITALIE’”, “Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel.”

¹⁸⁶⁹ “N. 77. 9 germinale V repub. (mercoledì 29 marzo 1797), ‘Ordine del Giorno per l’Europa’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia II*, 2:228.

¹⁸⁷⁰ “N. 88. 17 fiorile V repub, (sabato 6 maggio 1797 v.s.), ‘Arrivo in Milano del Gen. Bonaparte’”, Criscuolo, 2:323–24 This article with the attached speech of Bonaparte on the day of his reentrance into Milan after the Venice campaign shines a light on just how beloved he had become amongs Italian patriots. It also demonstrates his new role as the image of France in Italy. The political situation in Paris was not dire enough for Italian patriots to take note of and having the charismatic young general to fill the role that the French Revolutionary leadership had played in the past led many to forget about Paris all together.

¹⁸⁷¹ “N. 87. 11 Pratile anno I della Libertà Italiana (30 Maggio 1797 v.s.), ‘Sulle elezioni’”, Zanolì, *Giornale De’ Partioti D’Italia III*, 3:78–80.

the *ancien regime* in Europe.¹⁸⁷² Cisalpine patriots related more to the democratic republican factions who had lost the majority. Soon rumors began to appear within the patriot political commentators of Milan that the Clichyens were in league with counter-revolutionary forces from outside of the Republic, in particular the British.¹⁸⁷³

It is no surprise that this sudden rise in anti-Clichyen rhetoric amongst Cisalpine patriots coincided with the arrival of Marc-Antoine Jullien and his *Le Courrier de l'Armée d'Italie*. Jullien was a former Jacobin and journalist who had come with Bonaparte to chronicle the events of the Italian Campaign.¹⁸⁷⁴ His political background had endeared him to Italian and later Cisalpine patriots, who viewed Jullien as a French voice for their efforts to bring the Revolution to the peninsula. Jullien set up his newspaper *Le Courrier* in Milan in the early days of Thermidor Year V just after the Cisalpine Republic had been proclaimed. He was also a common figure in the patriotic societies and public instruction clubs which had risen in the past year since the French occupation began in Milan. As such Jullien now had a wide audience to share his political ideology, not just about events occurring in the Cisalpine Republic or the *Armée* but within the French political situation back in Paris. In his introduction to the *Courrier* in its first edition, Jullien explained how he hoped to inform the reader – which was intended to be the soldiers within the *Armée* but was read widely by the Cisalpine political class as well – of the goings on across Europe and particularly its relationship to the current political situation in France.¹⁸⁷⁵ Jullien highlighted the new place of Milan in the European Revolution as the new center of republican change. He similarly pointed to the incumbent royalist threat which existed in the Parisian assemblies as the reason for the waning of the French central role in the republican movement abroad. The criticism was of course overblown, as Paris remained for the next two years very much the center of republican power in Europe. However, Jullien seems to have sparked the sense of importance which many in the Cisalpine leadership placed themselves within the global revolution.

¹⁸⁷² “N.2. 20 messidoro V repub. (sabato 8 luglio 1797 v.s.), ‘Il club di Salm’”, Crisculo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:10–11.

¹⁸⁷³ “Ultimo del (N.78.) semestre. 30 Messidoro anno I della Libertà Italiana (18 luglio 1797 v.s.) ‘Francia. Parigi 15. Messidor.’”, Zanoli, *Giornale De’ Partioti D’Italia II*, 2:249–50.

¹⁸⁷⁴ Palmer, *From Jacobin to Liberal: Marc-Antoine Jullien, 1774-848*.

¹⁸⁷⁵ “3 thermidor, an 5 de la Républiq. Fr. (No. 1) 20 Julliet 1797 (v.st.), ‘Introduction Servant de Prospectus’”, Jullien, “Le courrier de l’armée d’Italie ou Le patriote français à Milan, par une Société de Républicains.”

The history of the Fructidor coup has been extensively covered in almost every study of the Directory period, particularly within the French historiographical tradition. Even within the Italian historiographical tradition scholars such as De Francesco, Criscuolo, Visconti, Dendena and others have used the Coup of 18 Fructidor as a point of reference for the Italian patriot movement. In this way, it is worth providing a very brief summary of what occurred during the coup as the major players to come to power in France in the following months significantly effected the politics of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio* in 1798.

In the early hours of the morning of 18 Fructidor an alarm was raised, and the Grenadiers of the Assemblies in Paris occupied the Legislative Assembly chambers in the Tuileries. Military units under the command of General Augereau blocked off the bridges around the Tuileries and arrested a number of representatives from both chambers.¹⁸⁷⁶ Pamphlets were posted across the city announcing a conspiracy led by Pichargu, the de facto leader of the Clichyens and the president of the Council of 500, in which he was accused of plotting to overthrow the Republican government and returning the monarchy under Louis XVIII.¹⁸⁷⁷ The pamphlet was written by La Révellière-Lépeaux, the centrist democratic republican who had strongly opposed Pichargu and the Clichyens in the months since their election. Along with La Révellière-Lépeaux, Barras, and Talleyrand also played an important role in the Coup. The Councils were purged of anyone who had allied with Pichargu or could be reasonably believed to have allied with him and the Clichyens in the past. In reality many of those purged from the government, such as Carnot, were as far from monarchists as possible – Carnot had been a Jacobin and member of the Committee of Public Safety during the Terror.¹⁸⁷⁸ It becomes apparent then that the real targets of the Coup were anyone who threatened the controlling interests of that extreme centrist majority led by La Révellière-Lépeaux, Reubell and Barras. The proof of the plan which implicated Pichargu and Carnot came from an “intercepted” letter from the recently deceased General Hoche, and helped to prop up Bonaparte – a close ally of Barras at this point – as the preeminent republican general and protector of the patria.

¹⁸⁷⁶ “N° 349. Nonidi, 19 fructudir, l’an 5 de la République Francaise une et indivisible. (mardi 5 septembre 1797, vieux style.), ‘Paris, le 18 fructidor.’”, “Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel.”

¹⁸⁷⁷ La Révellière-Lépeaux, “Détail de La Conspiration.”

¹⁸⁷⁸ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 370.

The reaction from the Cisalpine patriots was expectedly in favor of the Coup. As early as 24 Fructidor, Galdi announced the events of 18 Fructidor as a triumph of the triumvirate of La Révellière-Lépeaux, Barras and Reubell over the counter-revolutionary forces of royalists and aristocrats who had infiltrated the French assemblies through the Clichyens.¹⁸⁷⁹ Some days later the *Termometro* wrote a scathing opening article entitled “*Salus populi suprema lex esto*” in which the authors harshly criticized the supposed perpetrators of the failed conspiracy, in particular Boissey d’Anglais, Carnot, Pichigru, Barthelemy and Dumolard.¹⁸⁸⁰ On 30 Fructidor Jullien publish a full recounting of the events of 18 Fructidor in *Le Courier* which portrayed the military forces which carried out the coup as heroes and detailed the extent of the royalist crimes in their conspiracy to overthrow the 1795 regime.¹⁸⁸¹ All of these early reports clearly sought to side the Cisalpine political class with the victorious French extreme center led by La Révellière-Lépeaux, Ruebell, Barras and Talleyrand. They followed corresponding French political commentators in accepting the conspiracy of the Clichyens as fact and saw the actions taken by the military, not only as legal, but necessary for the protection of the republican regime. In reality, it would have been strange if the young Cisalpine Republic was opposed to the events of 18 Fructidor given that the controlling interests of the Cisalpine leadership – all strongly attached to Bonaparte a clear beneficiary of the coup – were aligned with those who conducted the Parisian coup.

However, the Cisalpine commentators refused to place the blame on the democratic elements within the French Assemblies, as had occurred in France.¹⁸⁸² While the victorious French center used the coup as a way to sure up executive authority, Cisalpine commentators instead saw the coup as a victory for legislative government. Those looking at the events in Paris from Milan believed that the coup merely realigned the legislative branch with the interests of the French Nation. The legislative branch would be stronger and more aligned with the national will thanks to the efforts of the Coup leadership.

¹⁸⁷⁹ “N. 105. 24 Futtidoro anno I della Libertà Italiana (10 settembre 1797. v.s.), ‘Notizie recentissime di Parigi de’ 18. Fructidor.’”, Zanoli, *Giornale De’ Partioti D’Italia III*, 3:473–74.

¹⁸⁸⁰ “N.21 27 fruttidoro V repub. (mercoledì 13 settembre 1797 v.s.), ‘Salus populi suprema lex esto’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:166–67.

¹⁸⁸¹ 30 Fructidor, an 5 de la Républiq. Fr. (N° 30) 16 Septembre 1797 (v.st.), “République Française”, Jullien, “Le courrier de l’armée d’Italie ou Le patriote français à Milan, par une Société de Républicains.”

¹⁸⁸² “N. 106. 26 Fruttidoro anno I della Libertà Italiana (12 settembre v.s.), ‘Repubblica Francese. Parigi 18 Fructidor.’”, Zanoli, *Giornale De’ Partioti D’Italia III*, 3:480.

Though French politics had seen the division between royalism and Thermidorian republicanism play out in the election and subsequent Coup of 1797, in the Cisalpine republic, loyalties began to divide between more democratic leaning political centrists – who favored strong legislative authority and a more universal citizenry – and republican leaning political centrists – who favored a strong executive and a ruling political elite class. The former group maintained the older order identity from 1795. These cisalpine politicians found allies in members of the French political establishment in Milan such as Jullien, and in particular the leading members of the *Armée*, in particular the Generals in Chief who succeeded Bonaparte after his departure such as Berthier and Brune. The latter group adopted the principles of the French directory after 18 Fructidor which favored a stronger executive voice in politics which in turn endeared them to the extreme centrist powers in the French directory and executive ministry such as Talleyrand and his foreign agents in Milan, as well as Directors themselves such as Le Révellière-Lépeaux and Reubell. Many came from the old aristocratic classes of the large northern Italian urban centers and included some of the most important noble families of the region, such as the Serbelloni, Melzi, Greppi, and Visconti. Though they would come to ally themselves with the different factions between left and center which began to appear in early 1798 – and resulted in the 22 Floréal coup in France – they consistently remained in favor of a stronger executive leadership for the Milanese government.¹⁸⁸³

The Figure of Napoleon Bonaparte

The French Republic was the model upon which the Cisalpine republic was to be built.¹⁸⁸⁴ Yet the distance between Paris and the various centers of revolutionary growth in 1797 like Bologna, Brescia, Bergamo, Modena, and most importantly Milan, meant that development of a republican political culture in Italy was limited by time and place. This did not mean that the influence of the French was not a very present and active component of Cisalpine political cultural

¹⁸⁸³ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 462 As mentioned in a previous chapter, Jourdan noted in her new book that Visconti was close to members of the neo-Jacobin factions in Paris which would eventually challenge the supremacy of the Fructidor centerists like Lerevellière-Lépeaux and Reubell. This group was led by more center-left French politicians like Merlin who found themselves on the outside of the French political class following their expulsion from government in the 22 Floréal coup. While Visconti may have frequented these more radical political meetings, his reports on the status of the Cisalpine indicate that he believed the politics of the post-Fructidor French Republic would be much more adaptable to the Milanese conditions than those of Paris. Thus, he can be placed in this more conservative 1797 group.

¹⁸⁸⁴ De Francesco, “An Unwelcomed Sister Republic,” 213–14.

development. Throughout the republican Triennio in Italy the occupation of the French *Armée d'Italie* was the most defining feature of politics and society, and it was Napoleon Bonaparte – the young Corsican general at the head of the *Armée* whose victorious efforts in the North of the Italian peninsula since 1796 had made him a republican hero back in Paris – who in every way directed the nascent politics of republican Italy.¹⁸⁸⁵

Bonaparte's life and legacy has been the single most studied feature of this period since the time of his own life. Even as recent as 2021, the bicentennial of his death on St. Helena, examinations of his impact on modern Italy have been subject to profound and extensive examinations and retellings.¹⁸⁸⁶ It would be a folly to try and describe the effect which Bonaparte had on Triennio politics, mainly because this story has already been told and retold tens if not hundreds of times in the past two-hundred years.¹⁸⁸⁷ Instead, this section will focus on the influence of Bonaparte on the formation of the Cisalpine legislature itself and the cult of personality which he built whose members would go on to serve as the main body of the *Gran Consiglio*. As Bonaparte departed from the Cisalpine Republic some days before the activation of the *Gran Consiglio*, he never directly addressed the council in person.¹⁸⁸⁸ However his legacy in the selection of the *Gran Consiglio* representatives and in his successors as General-in-Chief of the *Armée d'Italie* Berthier and Brune had perhaps the most profound effect on the development of legislative culture in the *Gran Consiglio*.

According to modern examinations of the Directorial period in Europe, the French military, and in particular the *Armée*, saw a sudden ascendance to the seat of political power and influence in French and European politics, in particular after 1796.¹⁸⁸⁹ This was in large part due to the influx of wealth which military success had brought to the French Republic, especially from the *Armée*

¹⁸⁸⁵ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 5–6.

¹⁸⁸⁶ A slew of books came out in early April 2021 in time for the 200th anniversary of the death of Bonaparte. Of these the most notable were *Il naufrago e il dominatore. Vita politica di Napoleone Bonaparte (De Francesco 2021)* ; *Ei fu. La morte di Napoleone* (Criscuolo 2021) ; *Napoleone e la Guardia imperiale. La storia delle truppe che permisero al generale di costruire un impero* (Valzania 2021)

¹⁸⁸⁷ This includes his connections to some of the more famous Cisalpine individuals such as Francesco Melzi d'Eril, Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni or Francesco Visconti, all of whom went on to play incredibly important diplomatic roles for the Cisalpine Republic. Along with men like Giuseppe Fenaroli or Giacomo Lamberti, these individuals who all came from the important noble families of Lombardy, Emilia and the western Terraferma of Veneto were also personal friends of Bonaparte while in Italy. However, those individuals were not members of the *Gran Consiglio*, and thus will not constitute the focus of this study.

¹⁸⁸⁸ “26. Brumale Anno VI repubblicano. Il Direttorio Esecutivo pel Popolo Cisalpino al suo Liberatore Generale in Capo Bonaparte all'atto della sua partenza.”, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:28–29.

¹⁸⁸⁹ Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 355–58.

d'Italie under Bonaparte. With the expansion of the Revolution into neighboring territories, and the successes with which these campaigns were met, the military went from protector of the Republic to the savior and liberator of oppressed peoples.¹⁸⁹⁰ Bonaparte as arguably the most successful military commander during these campaigns – both in terms of territorial victories and the volume of wealth collected for the French state – was seen as a new personification of the virtues of the revolution for the post-Thermidorian era.

While in France Bonaparte was heralded as a new republican icon and hero of the Revolution, in Italy he obtained a nearly god-like status. For his supporters, it had been Bonaparte to liberate and unify the fractured city states of the peninsula.¹⁸⁹¹ Bonaparte was seen as the bringer of the virtues of equality, liberty and fraternity.¹⁸⁹² Bonaparte brought with him an entire propagandizing machine which, thanks in large part to the increase in publication technology from the early days of the Revolution, made the diffusion of his successes more accessible to the Italian political classes.¹⁸⁹³ More importantly, like the ancient generals of old, the sequestration of aristocratic and church goods which laid in abundance following the Austrian defeat saw Bonaparte's camp inundated with an accumulation of wealth. Where there was money there was

¹⁸⁹⁰ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*, 1–2 De Francesco points out in the opening of his examination of the 1797 French pamphlet “Que ferons-nous de l'Italie”, the military intervention into Italy had sparked a major political crisis back in Paris; on one hand the Directory was supposed to bring peace to the “Grande Nation”, yet on the other, the current success in Italy was the only economic source offsetting the financial problems which the French Republic had been suffering. Bonaparte found himself at the heart of this debate as he was beginning to push his advantage – both economic and military – to gain political power in the mother republic; “Aux fonctionnaires publics de Milan.” “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 110,” fol. Leris F. pamphlet. 1796. Milan.

¹⁸⁹¹ “N. 61. 13 piovoso V repub. (mercoledì 1 beffrajo 1797 v.s.), ‘Relazione delle Battaglie e Combattimenti decisi che hanno avuto luogo tra l’armata della Repubblica Francese e quella dell’Imperatore e Re, dal 19 di nevosio sino al 27 anno V’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia II*, 2:75-.

¹⁸⁹² “Discorso pronunciato dal Cittadino Lupi Delegato pel Censo nella Provincia di Como, in occasione che si eresse l’Albero della libertà Lombarda ...”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 110,” fol. Lupi pamphlet. 1797. Como. “Osservazioni di un patriota Lombardo alla Amministrazione Generale della Lombardia”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 112” libretto. 1797. Milan; signalled as being authored by F. Melzi D’Eril; first edition 20 pages.

¹⁸⁹³ Criscuolo, “Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato,” 125–30 Jullien remained one of the most vocal members of this propaganda campaign despite his radical politics and alliance with the nationalist wing of the Italian neo-Jacobin movement. He was able to get the ear of the more independence minded republican factions coming from areas like Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara and other second cities who opposed the strict nationalization project but supported Bonaparte efforts nonetheless to bring the Revolution to Italy. This was done by painting Bonaparte as the victor of republican virtues over *ancien regime* corruption. Jullien became a fundamental part of Bonaparte's ascendance among the both the revolutionary elite leadership and the common man, in particular those - both French and Italian - who belonged to the military structure which Bonaparte commanded; “Pantoloni smascherati. Anno I della libertà italiana”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 112,” fol. Pantoloni Smascherati.

power, and many of those who would become future leaders of the Cisalpine Republic flocked to Bonaparte to share in this power.¹⁸⁹⁴ Bonaparte for his part opened himself up to the leadership in the patriotic societies of the newly conquered territories, in particular those from among the growing merchant class who could aid in the administration of the sudden increase in wealth in the French camp¹⁸⁹⁵ Though there were certainly questions regarding the French presence, Bonaparte understood that he could comport himself like a conqueror of old while continuing the pretense of revolutionary republicanism, if he was able to successfully build up a following among the leaders of the Italian revolution from all classes and walks of life. Though he ruled in an absolutist decree-based system – even after the proclamation of the Cisalpine Republic in Messidor Year V – he garnered support in the public administration by playing the role of liberator and protector to avoid direct conflict with the patriot leadership.

Perhaps one of the biggest reasons behind this advantage was the loyalty which Bonaparte was able to command from within his own military. In a letter to La Révellière-Lépeaux in Pratile Year V, Trouvé – who was on his way to the Kingdom of Naples to serve as the French ambassador there and stopped in Montebello for a brief repose – remarked on the blind loyalty which Bonaparte seemed to enjoy from his staff and under-Generals, in particular Leclerc and Berthier.¹⁸⁹⁶ Trouvé noted his concern at how Bonaparte seemed to command not only militarily but politically without resistance from either the members of the French military or the Italian patriot leaders.

In reality, Trouvé’s preoccupation was not unfounded, particularly in the summer of 1797. One has to but look at the number of decrees, acts and proclamations published from 11 Messidor to 22 Brumaire which came directly from Bonaparte to understand the level of control he had over the Cisalpine military and civil administration.¹⁸⁹⁷ The other marker of Bonaparte’s control comes

¹⁸⁹⁴ “N. 83. 30 germile V. repub. (mercoledì 19 Aprile 1797 v.s.), ‘Genio filantropico del Gen. Bonaparte’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia II*, 2:275.

¹⁸⁹⁵ Levati, “Il Mondo degli affari cisalpino e Napoleone tra opportunità e perplessità,” 296; De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 275.

¹⁸⁹⁶ “N°. 1. Montevello, près Milan, le 4 prairial an V de la république”, Letter of Claude Joseph Trouve to future French Director Lerevéllière-Lépeaux 1797. *Memoires de Larevéllière-Lépeaux membre du Directoire exécutif de la République française et de l’institut national. Publiés par son fils sur le manuscrit autographe de l’auteur et suivis des pièces justificatives et de correspondances inédites* 1895, pp. 200-203

¹⁸⁹⁷ *Raccolta delle leggi, proclama, ordini ed avvisi IV*, 4:1–49; “Raccolta degli ordini, avvisi, e proclami,” 63–199 Looking at the extracts which were published in 1797, almost all laws which came through the Directory or the *comitato riuniti*, was denoted as coming from the “Generale in Capo della Armata d’Italia Francese”. This is important to note because they do not cite the Cisalpine Constitution or the sovereign nation of the Cisalpine Republic but rather Bonaparte personally. In this way we understand the central role Bonaparte was seen to be playing in Cisalpine politics, as a conqueror in addition to a liberator.

from the men who occupied offices in the early months of the Republic's existence and their relationships to Bonaparte during that time.¹⁸⁹⁸ In each of the early provisional governments Bonaparte was seen to have a cohort of local leaders who would help with political and administrative control.¹⁸⁹⁹ Each of these groups were generally made up of those from the local intellectual and political elite who had played important roles in patriotic societies. However, Bonaparte was careful to exclude extremists on either side of the political spectrum – meaning counter-revolutionaries from the right and Jacobin or Babeuvian sympathizers like Buonarrotti on the left.¹⁹⁰⁰ With the coming of the Cisalpine Republic, Bonaparte united these various political centrist groups into the new leadership class of the young republic filling the ranks of the legislative committees and executive branch with those who had become notable to him in the previous year since the French occupation began.

Bonaparte tended to assign roles to less politically minded intellectuals – often the pupils of those more illustrious names from the 1770s and 1780s – from the major university centers like Pavia, Bologna and Padova. The prominent Veronese astronomer and mathematician Antonio Cagnoli, for example, was favored by Bonaparte for his translation of the French Republican calendar into Italian.¹⁹⁰¹ His close friend Lorenzo Mascheroni was nominated by Bonaparte to the Constitutional Committee and played an important role in the construction of many of the early provisional administrative systems such as state finances, and public instruction.¹⁹⁰² Michele Rosa, a professor of medicine at the university of Modena-Reggio was called upon by Bonaparte to help construct the new Emilian institute for the Cispadane Republic.¹⁹⁰³ Adeodato Ressi was a professor of economics, also at Modena-Reggio, who would serve as an important member of the Cisalpine

¹⁸⁹⁸ Anonymous, “Le Cri d’Italie.” or perhaps more importantly the claims that these men made of their relationship to Bonaparte

¹⁸⁹⁹ Criscuolo, “Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato,” 117.

¹⁹⁰⁰ De Francesco, “Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français,” 275; De Francesco, *L’Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 15–16.

¹⁹⁰¹ Mascheroni, “Milano. 18 Vendemm. VI. a Cagnoli” Livorno Biblioteca Labronica (LBL) Autografoteca Bastogi Cass. 72 Ins. 1142”; Baldini, “Cagnoli, Antonio.”

¹⁹⁰² Pepe, “Mascheroni, Lorenzo”; “17. Ther. Decreto costitutivo della Commissione per la verifica dei confini dell’Oglio” “Angelo Mai’ MMB 461: 15 ‘Lettere e Minute Di Lettere Di Lorenzo Mascheroni a Vari’, 1783-1799.,” fol. 1 published decree. 14 August 1797. Montebello (Milan); decree of Bonaparte naming Mascheroni to a commission establishing the confines of the department of Oglio, later called Adda ed Oglio which consisted the Valtellina. He would eventually be placed on similar commissions for the departments of Benaco and serio (his home department based out of Bergamo); “Milano. 2 Termidoro Anno V. al Ministro dell’Interno”, “Angelo Mai’ MMB 662: 62 ‘Lettere Ufficiali’, 1786-1800.,” fol. 42 letter. 20 July 1797. Milano; Letter written by Mascheroni on behalf of the Consitutional committee.

¹⁹⁰³ Piromalli, “L’eredità Del Settecento Nella Cultura Riminese,” 78.

finance committee during the comitati riuniti and then in the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁹⁰⁴ Gregorio Fontana was a professor of law and a well-known member of the Italian scientific community who sat on the Constitutional Committee which translated the original Cisalpine Constitution of 1797 which drafted and translated the Cisalpine Constitution before 15 Messidor; he then went on to serve in the constitutional committee in the provisional legislative branch of the Cisalpine government from July to November 1797.¹⁹⁰⁵

Military leaders had the most direct contact with the French general, as his first role was commander of all revolutionary forces, both Cisalpine and French, in Northern Italy. More than any other individual, Giuseppe La Hoz was perhaps the most prominent military ally of Bonaparte throughout 1797. Coming from an important Mantuan military family, La Hoz had led a distinguished career in the Austrian army before switching sides at the beginning of the Revolutionary wars to fight with the Italian patriots and the French¹⁹⁰⁶. He was nominated first as the commander of the Lombard Legion of the French *Armée* in the autumn of 1796, then the Commander of the Milanese volunteer piazza brigade, and finally as the General-in-Chief of Cisalpine Forces in the summer of 1797.¹⁹⁰⁷ In this role he became the most prominent Cisalpine military authority in Bonaparte's inner circle and as close and loyal an ally to the French general as any of the under generals of the *Armée*. The other major military figures close to Bonaparte in the period before the *Gran Consiglio* generally came from either the ex-Modenese duchy or The Brescian republic. From Modena, Angelo Scarabelli and Giulio Cesare Tassoni, both with extensive historic aristocratic-military served as important commanders first in the Cispadane forces from Modena/Reggio and then over the same brigades when they were integrated into the Cisalpine Military.¹⁹⁰⁸ From Brescia many of the most important military commanders from the various uprisings in the western Terraferma such as Antonio Sabatti, Luigi Mazzucchelli, Pietro

¹⁹⁰⁴ Coraccini, *Storia dell'amministrazione del Regno d'Italia*, 221; Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:210.

¹⁹⁰⁵ Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:18; Baldini, "Fontana, Giovanni Battista Lorenzo."

¹⁹⁰⁶ Rossi, "Lattanzi, Giuseppe."

¹⁹⁰⁷ "Al Gent- La Hoz. Li 15 Messid.° Anno V. ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261 s.d., f° La Hoz Letter July 1797. Milano; letter recommending La Hoz as commander of the Milanese piazza volunteer brigade ; « Milano. li 2 Termidoro anno V. Rep.° Il Cittadino Birago Ministro della Guerra al Direttorio Esecutivo », ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261 s.d., f° La Hoz letter. July 1797. Milan; letter by the Minister of War Birago to the Cisalpine Directory recommending La Hoz as General-in-Chief of all Cisalpine forces. Milano. Li 27 Vendemiaio Anno V. della Repubblica Fracese e I della Libertà Lombarda... Giuseppe La Hoz Capo della Legione Lombarda", ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Militare, 261 s.d., f° Commandante del Legione Lombarda La Hoz

¹⁹⁰⁸ Ceretti, "Scarabelli Pedocca, Angelo"; "Tassoni, Giulio Cesare."

Polfranceschi, and Ettore Martinengo found themselves participating in the Venetian campaign in the summer of 1797 or else advising Bonaparte on the structuring of various administrative institutions in the recently conquered territory.¹⁹⁰⁹

Those from the political leadership class who came to be associated with Bonaparte or his allies in this period would become some of the most powerful members of the Cisalpine leadership class following his departure in November of 1797. This was particularly true for those who would go on to serve in the *Gran Consiglio*, where those close to Bonaparte would use the referent power of this association to gain personal, legislative and position power in the early months of the Council's existence. These included men like Giuseppe Compagnoni, Giuseppe Fenaroli, Giacomo Lamerberti, Antonio Sabatti, Giordano Alborghetti, Vincenzo Dandolo, Alberto Allemagna, Giacomo Greppi, Vincenzo Brunetti, Luigi Savonarola, Ligi Ramondini, Luigi Bossi, Giuseppe Lattanzi, Lodovico Giovio and Giovanni Domasceno Bragaldi;¹⁹¹⁰ of these Compagnoni, Lambertini and Fenaroli were known to be personal confidants of Bonaparte and went on to serve important roles in the later Republic and Kingdoms of Italy.¹⁹¹¹

With regards to the *Gran Consiglio* therefore, the construction of the Council was always destined to be heavily influenced by Bonaparte. From a political perspective, Bonaparte's favoring of the 1797 coup, sparked both by his own actions and by the writings of his propaganda machine led by Jullien, had caused similar sentiments among the cisalpine political class.¹⁹¹² The politics of Bonaparte were guaranteed a place in Cisalpine legislative debate by his intervention in the

¹⁹⁰⁹ "N.72 Il Governo Provvisorio"; "N.116. La Municipalità Provvisoria Brescia 29 Marzo 1797"; "N.311 Ai Bravi abitatori della Pampagna Bresciana" *Raccolta Dei Decreti Del Governo Provvisorio Bresciano*, 47–48; 83 The first document is a list of Committees of the Provisional Government of Brescia where Martinengo and Sabatti both sat on the Military Committee; the second document is the first reference to Mazzucchelli as part of the Executive Committee of the Provisional government serving as a military advisor and finally where he is listed as the Adjunct General in chief of Brescian Forces at the end of April. Badone, "Polfranceschi, Pietro Domenico"; Ogner, "Sabatti Antonio."

¹⁹¹⁰ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:90 Many of these men were found in the lists of the *comitati riuniti* or the provisional government committees of the recently liberated Venetian Republic and had been selected specifically by Bonaparte for their political understanding of the various regional and local political concerns of both the common and aristocratic classes; "N. 41 20 Fiorile anno I della Libertà Italiana (9 Maggio 1797. v.s.), 'Padova 16 Fiorile anno I. della libertà di Terra-ferma'", Zanoli 1989, pp. 11-12

¹⁹¹¹ Ugo Da Como, *I comizi nazionale in Lione*, 3:49; Savini, *Un abate "libertino"*; Sani, "Lamberti Jacapo (Giacomo)."

¹⁹¹² Criscuolo, *Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato*, 122. Criscuolo offers some interesting examples of criticisms made by Italian patriots of the 1797 coup which seemed to both favor and condemn the actions of the Directory, stating the necessity of the expulsion of the royalist factions while simultaneously continuing to support the more liberal institutional freedoms of the 1795 constitution.

nomination process of the *Gran Consiglio* in Brumaire Year VI.¹⁹¹³ The first Cisalpine legislature were not elected but instead nominated to fill the original seats. For the Cisalpine leadership class, and particularly those in the executive and *comitati riuniti* who had been close to Bonaparte, the cisalpine assemblies needed to avoid offering counter-revolutionary forces a foothold in early Cisalpine politics, as the French had done in 1795. Even with the checks put in place by the constitution with the electoral assemblies, the Cisalpine Republic risked finding itself in the same political circumstances as the French after the 1797 elections. Thus, the legislative assemblies would be nominated by a commission established by Bonaparte.¹⁹¹⁴ However, before this list was finalized, it was presented to Bonaparte for review. He made a number of personnel changes which guaranteed his personal political allies would have full control of the assemblies, in particular the *Gran Consiglio*. In this way Bonaparte secured an alliance between the new cisalpine Assemblies and his successors Berthier and Brune. However, without Bonaparte, his close personal friends such as Lamberti, Compagnoni and Fenaroli would find themselves slowly excluded from *Gran Consiglio* political influence across the Spring of 1798 as the more progressive allies of Berthier and especially Brune like Reina, Dandolo, Dehò and Lattanzi gained greater influence.

French financial pressure and the *Gran Consiglio*

At the onset of the Assemblies activities, the representatives which Bonaparte had nominated to the *Gran Consiglio* entered into the realm of legislative politics eager to implement the political and administrative program which had been developed throughout 1797. However, Bonaparte's departure in late Brumaire, coupled with the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio and the activation of the Cisalpine legislative assemblies changed the dynamic of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship. Without the central figure of Bonaparte, it was assumed that political authority would be transferred to the Cisalpine government to handle its own internal administration, with aid from the French military authority when necessary. In reality this worked exactly as proscribed only for the first months following the activation of *Gran Consiglio* on 2 Frimaire, until internal conflict between Cisalpine Government structures led to the specter of French intervention on the horizon in Germinal Year VI.

¹⁹¹³ De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*, 14–15.

¹⁹¹⁴ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:125.

The relationship which evolved from Frimaire to Ventôse between the *Gran Consiglio* and the French *Armée d'Italie*, led primarily by French General-in-Chief Louis Alexandre Berthier – the close second to Bonaparte in the 1796-1797 campaigns and his replacement as General-in-Chief of the *Armée* – came about mainly out of the discussions regarding the financial obligations between the two entities. This financial relationship between the Cisalpine and French republic has been a consistent point of study within the historiography of the First Cisalpine Republic, being treated with special importance by historians like Nutini, Zaghi and Broers who viewed the relationship as one sided, exploitive or even colonial on the part of the French.¹⁹¹⁵ In reality this relationship was extremely complex, with various elements of both the French and Cisalpine establishment allying or conflicting as to the details and obligations of both Republics towards each other. Though resisted heavily by certain members of the Cisalpine Directory and Consiglio de' *Seniori*, and looked down upon by members of the French civil administration like Faypoult, the *Gran Consiglio* came to earn the respect of the *Armée* – and Berthier in particular – in their efforts to retain the deep relationship between the two republics.

Administration of the French Armée

Despite the Treaty of Campo Formio and the departure of Bonaparte for France, the *Armée d'Italie* was still a formidable player within the confines of the Cisalpine Republic going into the closing months of 1797. Initially under the command of the interim General-in-Chief Kilmaine, the *Armée* sustained a relatively heavy presence at the borders of the Cisalpine Republic, in particular along the frontier with the newly formed Austrian Veneto throughout Frimaire.¹⁹¹⁶ Berthier had received strict instructions to maintain this heavy presence once he arrived in the Cisalpine Republic from the Radstadt Congress in early Nivose, as the Directory did not trust the peace brokered by Bonaparte and expected a renewed attack by the forces of the Coalition from without and their counter-revolutionary allies from within.¹⁹¹⁷ Counter-revolutionary threats and suspected espionage activity had kept the French military occupied in these peripheral zones –

¹⁹¹⁵ Nutini, "L'esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina"; Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*.

¹⁹¹⁶ "Au Quartier général de Milan le 17 frimaire l'an 6 de la République un et indivisible. Au Com. ent Kilmaine, Général en Chef par interim. Villemanzi Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1" letter, 7 December 1797, Milan.

¹⁹¹⁷ "2386. Instructions du Directoire Exécutif au Général Berthier. Paris 22 frimaire an VI (12 décembre 1797)", *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 604–8.

particularly in the secondary cities like Brescia and Ferrara, where historic economic, political and social connections with the Venetian merchants made potential threats harder to root out than the more internal centers like Milan and Modena. More importantly the Directory hoped to keep a close eye on the Cisalpine leadership, who they suspected both of weakness in the face of counter-revolutionary threats. Berthier for his part – though not as political as Bonaparte or his own successor Guillaume Marie-Anne Brune later in 1798 – understood that the maintenance of the French military presence allowed the *Armée* a certain caliber of political power both in the Cisalpine and French republics, and as such was not eager to decrease troops in these areas.¹⁹¹⁸ Finally, there was little protest against the French on the part of the Cisalpine leadership who similarly saw the advantage of having these stronger allies.

However, the maintenance of the *Armée* cost an enormous sum of money.¹⁹¹⁹ To this point, the *Armée* had been funded on a combination of “donations”, loans and requisitions from the conquered territories. As discussed in the previous section, their financial and military success had made the *Armée* wildly wealthy in compared to other French Armies at the time and had allowed it to remain largely self-funded. However, the pronouncement of the Cisalpine Republic as a sovereign nation in Messidor caused a political polemic: on one hand the Cisalpine Republic had its own military to fund and as a sovereign nation the maintenance of a foreign army should have been unconstitutional. However, the French were considered to have the right of conquest, and more importantly had been requested to remain as protectors within Cisalpine territory. Added to this were the massive inconsistencies in the acquisition of goods to fund the military. Upon conquest, the goods of aristocrats and that of the Catholic Church had provided an abundance of wealth; however, as these resources dried up there was a loss in funds which forced the *Armée* to continue advancing and conquering and requisitioning. With the first treaty of Leoben, this advancement was halted. In order to secure consistent funding from the conquered territory, and thus retain the *Armée*'s autonomy from Paris, Bonaparte established a law on 8 Vendemnaire

¹⁹¹⁸ “Au quartier Gnl. à Mantouve le 17 nivose 6.me année de la Republique Française un et indivisible. Alexandre Berthier Général en Chef au Directoire Executif de le R.que Cisalpine.”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1.”

¹⁹¹⁹ In a letter to the Cisalpine Executive in early Frimaire, the French administrator of funds for the *Armée*, Rudolf Emmanuel von Haller, presented a list of costs incurred for a single month to the *Armée* which averaged around 2,000,000 French livres - approximately 250,000 livres per each of the eight divisions present in the Cisalpine Republic at the time; “Milan le 4 frimaire an. VI. de la République Française une & indivisible. Haller administrateur des Contributions & Finances d’Italie au Directoire Executif [Cisalpine]”, ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1 n.d. letter, 24 November 1797, Milan

which charged the Cisalpine Republic a maintenance fee of one million *scudi* per month in order to receive protection from the *Armée*.¹⁹²⁰

However, it was never stipulate how funds would be raised for the Cisalpine Republic to pay this sum. In late November, Francesco Melzi d'Eril, the Cisalpine Ambassador to the Radstadt Congress and a close friend to Bonaparte received notice from the financial administrator of the *Armée*, Rudolf Emanuel von Haller, concerning the lack of funds coming from the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁹²¹ Haller was a banker of Swiss origins and a former pupil of Necker, who had taken on the charge of financial administrator of the *Armée* in 1797. Melzi in a letter to the Cisalpine Directory demanded an explanation for the lack of funds which had been agreed to on 14 Vendemnaire. The Cisalpine Directory responded that they could not access the funds until the Assemblies had been activated, considering that constitutionally only the legislative assemblies had the right to raise funds.¹⁹²² This message was passed through the financial inspector for the Cisalpine Republic Alberto Arrigoni who served as the representative of the Cisalpine government for financial dealings with Haller and the *Armée*. In response, Haller sent a rather acidic letter to the Directory directly, explaining how the funds were to be used and demanding – in addition to the previously arranged sum under the Vendemnaire law – another two million *scudi* for the artillery batteries which had arrived to Milan for an expedition into the Papal States.¹⁹²³ The Directory responded that they would indeed pay the three million but could not do so without permission from the legislative assemblies first, whose recent activation had been slow to establish a funding stream for the Republic.¹⁹²⁴

It should be noted that the response of the Directory was part of the ongoing feud between the executive and legislative branches discussed in Chapter VIII. While it is true that the Directory

¹⁹²⁰ “Il Gran Consiglio al C. de’ Seniori. Milano 3 nevoso an.° 6° Rep.” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1” Letter, 23 December 1797, Milan; This letter references a law which was placed into the treaty of succession which activated the Cisalpine Consitution and which guarenteed the continued payment of a sum of one million scudato Cisalpine or French livres to maintain the *Armée* while in cisalpine territory.

¹⁹²¹ “Al Direttorio Esecutivo, Melzi, 29 Brumale, An.°6.°R.°”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1” letter, 19 November 1797, Rastadt.

¹⁹²² “29 Brumale An.° 6°. Al Citt.° Ispettore Arrigone. Il Direttorio C.”; “Milano 4 frimale anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano Il cittadino Arrigoni delegato al direttorio Esecutivo”, “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1” letters; 19 and 24 November 1797, Milan.

¹⁹²³ “Milan le 4 frimaire an. VI. de la République Française une & indivisible. Haller administrateur des Contributions & Finances d’Italie au Directoire Executif [Cisalpine]” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1” letter. 24 November 1797, Milan.

¹⁹²⁴ “Li 8 Frimale. Al Cittad. Haller” “ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1” Letter, 28 November 1797, Milan.

did not have the constitutional authority to raise funds, when the agreement was made in Vendemnaire, it was done so with the knowledge of the National Treasury's ability to pay. Bonaparte had discussed in a letter to Haller the needs of the various facets of both the French *Armée* and the Cisalpine military in Vendemnaire.¹⁹²⁵ He fully intended to use the agreed upon funds and understood that they existed and were to be set apart for the maintenance of the military. Thus, the excuse of the Directory that these funds needed to be cleared by the legislature was a clear attempt on the part of the Directory to divert the blame. The costs incurred by the construction of the departmental administration and other spending by the ministry covered in Chapter VIII had practically emptied the national treasury. This made outside payments inconsistent at best, unfulfilled at worst. In response, the unpaid French divisions took matters into their own hands by requisitioning local goods, regardless of value or need, which caused suffering to the general population as occurred in Brescia in December of 1797.¹⁹²⁶ These requisitions led to popular resentment of both the French *Armée* leadership and the Cisalpine government – seen as incapable of paying French soldiers and thus indirectly responsible for the requisitions. These sentiments had been an ongoing centerpiece to counter-revolutionary propaganda which had infiltrated border cities and blamed the new regime for the financial problems.¹⁹²⁷ Thus when the Directory was confronted with the situation it is logical that they would attempt to shift the blame onto an institution which did not yet exist.

Therefore, when Haller's formal request for the three million arrived on 4 Frimaire, the activation of the assemblies two days prior forced the Directory to confront their past excuses and request a law from the *Gran Consiglio* to resolve the payments due to the *Armée*.¹⁹²⁸ The Directory relayed the urgency of the matter, compounding the issue with a letter in the same sitting which highlighted – if not exaggerated – the disorder and violence occurring due to French requisitions in the peripheral departments of Mela and Benaco.¹⁹²⁹ More importantly the Directory in their letter

¹⁹²⁵ “2286. Au Citoyen Haller. Quartier général. Passariano, 15 vendémiaire an Vi (6 octobre 1797).” *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, 484–85.

¹⁹²⁶ “Seduta XIV, 14 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1917, 1:230 Discourse of La Hoz.

¹⁹²⁷ “N. 4. 27 messidoro V repub. (sabato 15 luglio v.s.), ‘Alcuni fili cospirazione contra la libertà d’Italia da Milano a Parigi’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia III*, 3:27–30.

¹⁹²⁸ “Seduta XIII, 13 Frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:228 Message from the Directory requesting solution to the financial administration of the French *Armée*.

¹⁹²⁹ *Ibid*, 1:222 Message from Directory to the *Gran Consiglio* regarding the violence in Mela and Benaco; This message in particular raised the ire of the Council, for accusations made by the Directory against the Brescian people as savage and violent by nature. According to progressives in the Council, the Directory had exaggerated the

claimed that the *Gran Consiglio* needed to come up with a concrete solution for raising funds for the administration of the French military, placing the blame on the legislators for the lateness in funds.

The *Gran Consiglio* waited until the following day, 14 Frimaire, to discuss the matter. The president Giuseppe Fenaroli, a Brescian aristocrat and close friend to Bonaparte, expressed his impatience with the Directory by requesting the spending documents for the French military sent by Haller ten days prior.¹⁹³⁰ He did acknowledge that the *Gran Consiglio* did indeed need to establish some sort of law to provide a more stable administration of funding to the *Armée*, though he reasoned that this necessity was even greater given the Directory's apparent inability to do so. Fenaroli was supported by La Hoz who suggested a return to Bonaparte's agreed upon monthly million, which he said should be reassessed by the Cisalpine government every month and adjusted depending on the costs incurred for the previous month.¹⁹³¹ Alberto Allemagna, stated that this was the exact system utilized by the administration in years passed. He along with the Modenese general Severoli, and the Brescian Antonio Sabatti, seconded La Hoz's motion – which was approved – which called for a letter to be sent to the Directory, conceding urgency but demanding all spending for the French *Armée* to that point. These records would be put to the Financial Commission led by Adeodato Ressi who would present a means for funding the *Armée* in the following sitting of the Council.

Resi made his presentation on 15 Frimaire. It was decided that, given the sale or lottery of Maltese goods confiscated by the French and Cisalpine military was not yet sufficiently planned, and the urgency of the situation meant that payments to the French could not be held up until this lottery was formulated, the only solution to fund the *Armée* was a sort of national bond program based on national goods similar to the French assignat.¹⁹³² This would be a national, but voluntary initiative which would force common citizens to purchase bonds (through taxation) that would be reimbursed once the national goods which had been sequestered were sold off. This, however,

level of counter-revolutionary influence which they said threatened Franco-Cisalpine relations. In reality there was rioting in these areas, though it was largely by farmers and countryside property owners who were angry at the restrictions to trade with Austrian Veneto placed on the Cisalpine Republic by Bonaparte

¹⁹³⁰ “Seduta XIV, 14 frimaire anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:230. Discourse of president Fenaroli.

¹⁹³¹ *Ibid.* Discourse of La Hoz.

¹⁹³² “Seduta XV, 15 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:240–41. Discourse of Resi.

proved to be problematic as the bonds overvalued the national goods which had been left to the Cisalpine Republic after the French *Armée* had taken their pick. It was precisely for this reason that Giuseppe Luini opposed the plan.¹⁹³³ He claimed that the bond program would force ordinary citizens to pay an unjust “loan” which most likely would find no return. Having just won their liberty, why must the common citizen relinquish it to make up for the mistakes of the Directory, especially those from the departments of Montagna, Verbano and Lario where the French presence was necessarily more limited? Instead, Luini proposed a separate commission to resolve the matter. However, this was opposed by Glissenti who felt a commission would take too long to deliberate on a matter of such urgency.¹⁹³⁴

What happened next was a flurry of differing solutions which separated representatives along both socio-economic and political lines. First, Francesco Reina demanded to know why larger property owners should not hold the burden of a forced loan – instead of the common citizen – and motioned that all those who possessed property with a value greater than or equal to 1000 cisalpine *scudi* should be the exclusive contributors to the loan program.¹⁹³⁵ He was immediately opposed in this measure by the more republican leaning aristocratic representatives Allemagna and Moccini. The former stated that the monthly loan according to the bond program in comparison to the Cisalpine population was nothing and that to maintain equality, the tax needed to be applied the same way across all locations in the republic; the latter simply stated it unconstitutional according to article 304 to apply a tax on a certain segment of the population.¹⁹³⁶ Luini continued to insist against the plan of the Finance commission stating that there existed no plan to sell national goods meaning those who paid for bonds, either the wealthy or the common citizenry, risked losing money on the sale. Glissenti responded that good citizens would pay regardless of the risk to serve their country. Tadini took aim at Moccini by citing that his premise of the unconstitutionality of the rich paying a higher tax was negated by the wording of article 304. Tadini stated that taxation should be based on what the individual citizen was able to pay meaning wealthier citizens should necessarily pay more, a premise upheld by Latuada but strongly rejected by Brunetti who worried an interpretation of this kind could lead to a precedent of inequality.¹⁹³⁷

¹⁹³³ *Ibid* 1:242-44. discourse of Luini.

¹⁹³⁴ *Ibid* 1:244. Discourse of Glissenti.

¹⁹³⁵ *Ibid*, 1:244-45. Discourse of Reina.

¹⁹³⁶ *Ibid*, 1:245. Discourses of Allemagna and Moccini.

¹⁹³⁷ *Ibid*. Discourses of Tadini, Latuada and Brunetti.

Guiccioli responded to Brunetti that Tadini's solution would pit the middle class against the wealthy and not the rich against the poor.

At this point Fenaroli called the *Gran Consiglio* back to order, stating that the conversation had gone off topic. The debate was on how to administer the funds, and the funding itself only served as a minor part of the overall plan.¹⁹³⁸ He allowed Ressi to continue presenting the plan: The Directory would provide the million *scudi* monthly to the financial agents of the *Armée* who would then divide it among the various divisions, depending upon need. Brunetti insisted that these agents report back their spending to the Directory instead of hiring an outside inspector to monitor spending. Part of this million would be paid directly in cash (Cisalpine *scudi* or French livres) and half in bonds from Cisalpine national goods which would be equivalent to the current valued rate at the time of reception by the agents and would not account for future inflation – thus ending potential speculation. The Cisalpine Directory, or rather their commissioners and agents in charge of the sale of bonds, needed to declare in every sitting in which bonds were sold the official value. All of these calculations and evaluations would need to be transferred to Haller for his agreement before they could be officially recognized by either the Cisalpine or French state. The project was approved into a resolution and passed onto the *Seniori* that day.

However two weeks later, on 30 Frimaire, word reached the *Gran Consiglio* that the *Seniori* had rejected the resolution.¹⁹³⁹ On 17 Frimaire, the *Seniori*, reflecting that the dates between the initial request of Haller and the Directory and the final resolution of the *Gran Consiglio* were distant, decided to form their own commission and adopt a similar strategy of analysis before discussing the resolution in open council.¹⁹⁴⁰ The commission had delivered its report on 22 Frimaire and had found that the accord of one million seemed to have been pressured by Haller and that all benefits to the Cisalpine Republic promised by Bonaparte had in fact been stripped by Kilmaine while serving as interim General-in-Chief.¹⁹⁴¹ As such the one million set by the first article of the project rendered the entire thing unacceptable, as that cost was originally

¹⁹³⁸ *Ibid* 1:246 Discourse of Fenaroli.

¹⁹³⁹ Seduta XXXI, 30 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:451. Debate on the rejection of the *Seniori*.

¹⁹⁴⁰ "Sessione XVII. Milano 18 Frimale anno VI repubblicano. Rpubblicano.", "Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de' *Seniori*," 88.

¹⁹⁴¹ "Sessione XXI. Milano. 22 Frimale Anno VI repubblicano. Repubblicano.", "Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de' *Seniori*," 122.

meant to include the costs of the Cisalpine Army as well. The growing faction of republican leaning *Seniori* representatives under Aldini's leadership such as Somaglia and Becalossi read out their support for the report of the *Seniori* commission and the resolution was rejected. Upon hearing the news, Venturi stated that the million-livre price being the only hang up, perhaps by stripping this article the resolution would pass.¹⁹⁴² Dehò responded that being declared unconstitutional the same resolution could not be presented for passage, and instead requested a new commission; however, Fenaroli reasoned that with the first article removed the resolution was at least technically different and thus not unconstitutional. In the end the proposals were compromised, with the original resolution being sent to the original commission under Ressi in order to wipe it clean of references to the one million scudati fee.

On 2 Nîvose, the Directory, pressed by the French financial agents from the *Armée*, sent a letter demanding that a resolution be found to pay for the administration of the *Armée*.¹⁹⁴³ The following day Giacino Zani on behalf of the commission presented the new project.¹⁹⁴⁴ Instead of a national directive the new project presented a mix of local and national Cisalpine administered funds. Where the first iteration of the law saw the Directory administering a lump sum of one million to the French agents of the *Armée* who would dole out these funds to various divisions accordingly, the transfer of funds would now be internal to the Cisalpine Republic. The Central Administrations of departments who were hosting various divisions of the French *Armée* would receive requests from these divisions which would then be transferred on to the Cisalpine Directory. Though the Directory would register, measure, and inspect the funds being sent to the departments from the National Treasury, it would be the responsibility of the departments to decide how much and in what manner to administer the local *Armée* divisions. In this way, while the Nation as a whole were paying for the maintenance of the *Armée*, the Cisalpine republic had greater control of the flow and spending of its own funds. Similarly, the new law included a stipulation that all funds would be repaid in full by the French state in time.

¹⁹⁴² Seduta XXXI, 30 frimale anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:451. Discourse of Venturi.

¹⁹⁴³ "Il Direttorio Esecutivo al Gran Consiglio. Milano li 2 Nevoso Anno VI repubblicano Repubb-", "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 1" letter, 22 December 1797, Milan.

¹⁹⁴⁴ "Seduta XXXIV, 3 nevoso anno VI repubblicano" Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:493–94. Presentation of Zani.

The ambiguity of the quality and form of the maintenance funds of the French *Armée* allowed the Cisalpine state greater control over how Cisalpine money was spent without damaging the Franco-Cisalpine relationship. Similarly, from a political standpoint, the *Gran Consiglio* had greater control over the funds than the Directory, thanks in large part to the close relationship between departmental administrations and the progressive representatives of the Council who were in the process of gaining control of both the Council and departmental administrations in this period. These measures guaranteed a closer working relationship between the French *Armée* and the more democratic leading members of the Cisalpine government, a relationship which would come in useful in the following 8 months. The measure was sent to the *Seniori* on 4 Nîvose. However, on 9 Nivose, Ressi summarily added two new articles to the project which were approved by the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁹⁴⁵ These new articles gave the Directory a larger measure of control over the access of departmental administrators to national funds, first by requiring a directorial agent as a signature of the final quantity and form of goods destined for the *Armée* and second by requiring that all documentation be collected and held by Directorial archivists for evaluation of fund allocation for the proceeding months. The law was passed on 10 Nîvose by the *Seniori* and went into effect for the first time on 28 Nîvose.¹⁹⁴⁶

The forced loans and bonds program

The costs of supporting and administering the *Armée d'Italie* within the Cisalpine Republic played into a much larger issue of financial sustainability which plagued the *Gran Consiglio* from its activation on 2 Frimaire. Zaghi points out that much of the financial stress which the Cisalpine Republic encountered, and which the *Gran Consiglio* was forced to deal with in the early months of 1798, was the result of poor or no planning for the financial and commercial wellbeing of the Republic.¹⁹⁴⁷ But this was only a small segment of the problem. While financial planning is important for a state's political and economic health, the circumstances of a nascent state, particularly one which is under military occupation, make economic conditions all the more volatile and often lead to unpredictable and unpreventable financial shortfalls. Similarly political disagreements between the class interests of representatives, between the supporters of the French

¹⁹⁴⁵ "Seduta XL, 9 nevosio anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:575. Motion of Ressi.

¹⁹⁴⁶ "Sessione XXXIX. Milano 10. nevosio anno VI repubblicano Repubblicano", "Processi Verbale Delle Sessioni Del Consiglio de' Seniori," 305; "Seduta LX, 28 nevosio anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:72.

¹⁹⁴⁷ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:186–89.

political ideologies of 1795 and 1797, and between the growing factions of constitutional adaptation, legislative urgency and popular enfranchisement/responsibility found in the *Gran Consiglio*, further contributed to the political and economic weakness of the Republic more generally. While Zaghi is correct in pointing out that the financial situation was grievously added to thanks in large part to the fiduciary strain of sustaining a foreign military force, in reality the leadership of the Cisalpine Republic, and in particular the leadership of the *Gran Consiglio*, never considered the *Armée* the primary burden to be removed from the Cisalpine economic situation. Instead, these men looked internally at the costs of the Republic itself for where to augment or cut funding and income.

Perhaps one of the most frequently proposed but similarly most contended solutions which *Gran Consiglio* representatives often discussed was the use of forced loans and bonds. These *imprestiti forzati* as they were called in Italian were bonds which were imposed as taxes, meaning that they would be reimbursable in time, though obligatory for all citizens to buy into. Being a loan, these bonds were guaranteed by the Cisalpine State, who in turn had the guarantee of the French Republic that they would pay back the loans with interest in time. However, as a backup these loans were often based on the value of national goods (such as public buildings), similar to the French assignat.¹⁹⁴⁸

Issues with these loans have already been touched upon in the previous section when the forced loan program was proposed by Ressi and accepted for the council as a viable option for the payment of the *Armée*. While awaiting news of the outcome of the resolution regarding the administration and support of the *Armée*, the *Gran Consiglio* received notice from the Cisalpine Directory requesting a sum of 5 million Cisalpine *scudi* which included an additional 2 million for the administration of the Cisalpine Republic in addition to the 2 million already requested from the French.¹⁹⁴⁹ This sum was originally to be raised through a forced lottery, in which all citizens would pay a sum of 8 *danari*.¹⁹⁵⁰ This would be impossible to accomplish with such a small

¹⁹⁴⁸ Hincker, "Les Débats Financiers Sous Le Premier Directoire," 697.

¹⁹⁴⁹ "Seduta XIV, 14 frimale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:236 Letter from the Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*.

¹⁹⁵⁰ There were 240 *danari* in a *lira* and 6 *lira* in a *scudo*. Thus to amass a sum of 5 million *scudi*, 900 million citizens would need to pay the proposed tax of 8 *danari* monthly. The entire population of the Cisalpine Republic was less than 10 million. Even modern Italy only has a population of approximately 66 million meaning this tax was doomed to fail even by modern standards.

payment, however most Cisalpine Citizens could not afford to pay more. The matter was brought up for discussion on 20 Frimaire when it was proposed that perhaps lottery tickets should be based on the cost of income with wealthier citizens paying substantially higher amounts.¹⁹⁵¹ Bovara proposed that the matter go to special commission with a time limit of ten days to formulate a plan for the lottery. However, Reina disagreed; besides the serious urgency with which the *Gran Consiglio* needed to act in filling the coffers of the National Treasury with the 5 million *scudi* requested, the use of the lottery system seemed both unequal and targeted the poor of the Cisalpine nation more than the wealthy who could potentially gain were they to succeed in the lottery. Reina instead proposed that this sum be raised through the use of a forced loan, similar to that which the French had used in years passed to create the assignat.¹⁹⁵² In addition to national goods the forced loan bonds would be based on the goods seized by Cisalpine forces in the recent joint French Cisalpine campaign against the Island of Malta. The forced loan scheme was already in use for the payment of the French *Armée* so why not apply it more broadly to the costs of the entire Republic as well?¹⁹⁵³

Though this was largely supported by progressive/neutral radical/rationalist representatives, those who tended to favor republican legislative politics such as originalists rationalists and moderates and neutral moderates opposed the use of a forced loan, particularly if it was stratified based on wealth. If the majority of the public lived in poverty, was it correct then to place the burden of payment on the wealthy minority?¹⁹⁵⁴ For the democratic leaning elements of the *Gran Consiglio*, in particular progressive radicals and rationalist like Mangili, Dandolo, Latuada, Mozzini, Tadini and Massari, the answer was a resounding yes, and not just from a standpoint of social revolution.¹⁹⁵⁵ Considering the extreme urgency of the situation, the wealthy had more immediate funds available, and being a minority – and a weak minority at that – were not a significant threat to internal political stability were they to react unfavorably to the loan. Many on the republican side of the spectrum, such as originalist and neutral rationalists like Aquila, Ressi, Pallavicini and Schiera, worried that the higher loans imposed on the rich would not only

¹⁹⁵¹ “Seduta XXI, 20 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:307–8. Discourse of Bovara.

¹⁹⁵² *Ibid* 1:307-8. Discourse of Reina.

¹⁹⁵³ *Ibid* 1:310. Discourse of Rosa.

¹⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid* 1:311. Discourse of Mocchetti.

¹⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 1:312-313, 315, 317-321. Motions of Dandolo, Discourses of Mangili, Massari, Latuada, Luini Mozzini, Franzini, Lattanzi and Tadini

cause resentment among a group with the financial strength and political will to oppose and possibly intervene in Cisalpine republican politics, but destabilize the entire Cisalpine economy by setting up a precedent where wealth was subject to heavy governmental taxation.¹⁹⁵⁶ They instead proposed a flexible loan program in which wealthy patriots would be encouraged to spend more but not obliged, and the majority of the loans would be imposed on institutions such as the Church.

However, this republican group of representatives was in the political minority by late Frimaire and as such it was eventually decided that the various motions would be put to a commission which would analyze and determine the best course of action for a loan/bond program.¹⁹⁵⁷ The following day the commission, represented by Giovio, presented their plan for the formation of a loan scheme.¹⁹⁵⁸ This new plan agreed with the democratic-progressive majority that the forced loan could not apply to all citizens as organizing a payment structure which would equally apply to every class would take more time than was available to raise funds. However, they also rationalized that placing the entire burden of the loan on the richest 40 former noble families of the republic would destabilize the political situation which needed aristocratic neutrality, if not support, were it to succeed. Thus, the forced loan was imposed on the richest 200 families in the Cisalpine republic, both former nobility and bourgeois. Additionally, the loan would not offer all 5 million *scudi* but instead 25 million lire (just over 4 million *scudi*). The loans would be administered by the departmental administrations with support from the commissioner of executive power in each department who represented the Directory. This was most likely the foundation of the departmental structuring of the administration system for the French *Armée* passed on 10 Nivose, which was structured in a very similar fashion.

Following the news of the *Seniori*'s rejection of the 15 Frimaire resolution regarding the administration of the *Armée* and the restructuring of that law between 30 Frimaire and 3 Nivose, the forced loan administered by the departmental administrations became integrated into the *Armée*

¹⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 1:313, 316-17, 321, 323 Discourses of Aquila, Ressi, Scarabelli, Curti-Petrarda, Terzi Pallavicini and Schiera.

¹⁹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 1:328-29.; This commission was made up of five members: Ramondini, Giovio, Brunetti, Alpruni and Cocchetti. These were all largely rationalists – with the exception of Giovio who was a radical – and were all either progressive or neutral. In this way the commission remained largely towards the center of the *Gran Consiglio* legislative political spectrum

¹⁹⁵⁸ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:339–40. Discourse of Giovio.

payment plan. For the month of Nîvose all seemed to be progressing well, as the National Treasury was able to earn enough to make payments to the French at the end of that month. However, on 8 Pluviôse the *Gran Consiglio* received a message from the Directory saying that the monthly budget sent to the Vignolle the Minister of War needed to be raised from 808,000 lire to 1 million.¹⁹⁵⁹ It soon became clear that across all parts of the executive administration the forced loan scheme did not bring in enough to sustain both the French military and the needs of the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁹⁶⁰ Whether by miracle or by design it was revealed by a report from the Finance commission on 19 Pluviôse that in fact the goods to that point believed to be held by the French had in reality been ceded to the Cisalpine Republic after a meeting between Melzi d'Eril and Haller on 24 Vendemnaire, more than a month before the activation of the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁹⁶¹ This meant, that suddenly the Cisalpine Republic had a whole new mess of goods to base off the bond scheme, meaning a greater guarantee for creditors that these bonds would be paid back in full.

However, in the beginning of Ventôse the holes in the system of forced loans and bonds became violently clear with the reports which flooded into the *Gran Consiglio* on 4 Ventôse concerning the uprising of French soldiers in Mantua.¹⁹⁶² At this point it was clear that a new loan structure needed to be reformulated to make sure a similar event did not occur again, with potentially more dangerous outcomes. On 10 Ventôse Giuseppe Fenaroli presented a report for the emergency special commission created on 4 Ventôse to respond to the financial crisis brought to light by the Mantua uprising.¹⁹⁶³ Fenaroli presented a series of four motions which he claimed were

¹⁹⁵⁹ "Seduta LXXI, 8 piovoso VI", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:235. Letter from the Directory 7 piovoso anno VI repubblicano.

¹⁹⁶⁰ Seduta LXXIV, 12 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:303–4. Discourses of Polfranceschi, Salimbeni and Glissenti.; Glissenti in particular makes mention of a sum of 33 million *scudi* which was made available to the Directory in the first months of the *Gran Consiglio* which was supposed to serve to sustain the cisalpine administration while the forced loans were to pay for the administration of the *Armée*. However, it seems that the 33 million was used up quickly in order to pay creditors from the months before the activation of the *Gran Consiglio* in which the directory spent without a means of replenishing the National Treasury.

¹⁹⁶¹ Seduta LXXXI, 19 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 2:407–8. Report of the Finance Commission given by Savonarola.

¹⁹⁶² « Seduta XCVI, 4 Ventôse anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:726. Letter from the Directory

¹⁹⁶³ "Seduta CII, 10 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:40-52. Discourse and motions of Fenaroli; Fenaroli explicitly states in his opening that the resolutions which his motions proposed were almost identical to the French laws passed on 19 Frimaire which were intended to raise a sum of 600 million in that republic. The idea was that if the French could raise such a large sum using this strategy, the Cisalpine republic, despite its much smaller demographic base should be able to raise a steady monthly rate to cover the 30 million *scudi* which the legislative assemblies had guaranteed the Directory for the combined cost of the *Armée* and the public administration.

based on a 19 Frimaire French law which had created a similar forced loan and bond scheme in the French Republic. The first motion set up the constitutionally proscribed office of accounting censor – of which there would be three – whose job it was to audit the forced loan program, monitor income and expenditures for the national treasure and safeguard against corruption.¹⁹⁶⁴ The second motion made all goods held by religious clergy, either communally or individually, property of the state to be sold off to back up the bond scheme.¹⁹⁶⁵ The third motion was perhaps the most important as it established the terms of a reformulated forced loan and bond scheme.¹⁹⁶⁶ This new plan placed the forced loan on all households with an income equal to or greater than 2000 *scudi*, with an increasing progressive contribution based on elevations on income up to 50,000 *scudi*. Those below the 2000 *scudi* mark were not obligated to pay into the loan scheme but could contribute up to 5% of their annual income to buy bonds for reimbursement. All bonds and loans would be guaranteed by the sale of National goods and the rest covered by future payments from the French republic. The final motion placed the entire administration of National goods at the disposal of the Cisalpine Directory, who could in turn use them as they saw fit to raise the funds necessary to cover both the loans and any residual costs to the nation.¹⁹⁶⁷

Fenaroli's motions would be the beginning of a weeklong process of editing, discussion and reformulation regarding the imposition of a new forced loan tax scheme for the Cisalpine republic. Thanks in large part to his invocation of the French law of 19 Frimaire, the basic structures of Fenaroli's motions remained largely unchallenged in their substance. Despite claims by past historians like Zaghi, the *Gran Consiglio* as a whole did not reject the forced loan program, nor the expenses which were continually augmenting from the *Armée*, as there remained a general agreement on the need for the Cisalpine Republic to continue paying the *Armée* for protection. For republican leaning representatives, in particular neutral moderates and originalist rationalists like Giuseppe Compagnoni or Ottavio Mozzoni, the new plan had more merits than demerits. There was a particular attraction to the new plan because of the precedent of the French 19 Frimaire law, which many of these representatives took as republican canon.¹⁹⁶⁸ However republican leaning representatives were skeptical of restricting the forced loans to the upper classes, which they said

¹⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 3:42. Motion 1 of Fenaroli; « Costituzione della Repubblica cisalpina », sect. Title XII, Article 322.

¹⁹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 3:43. Motion 2 of Fenaroli.

¹⁹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 3:45-49. Motion 3 of Fenaroli.

¹⁹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 3:51-52. Motion 4 of Fenaroli.

¹⁹⁶⁸ Seduta CV, 13 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 3:108–10. Discourse of Compagnoni.

was imprudent for the smaller population of the Cisalpine republic, especially given the dire urgency of the National Treasury.¹⁹⁶⁹ Scarabelli proposed a revised tax bracket scheme which distributed more evenly the forced loans by breaking up the classes into smaller intervals and charging equal percentages as the income increased, until the highest 3 brackets (45,000+ *scudi*).¹⁹⁷⁰

The more democratic leaning proto-factions were much less unified in their reasons for supporting the new plan. Progressive rationalists, such as Dandolo, were similarly favorable towards the new plan for its basis in French legal precedent but focused more attention on the accountability and strong repayment and guarantee structure through the use of national goods and sequestration of clerical property, which they believed provided a much more secure financial structure when compared to the past iterations of the program.¹⁹⁷¹ However they were skeptical of the honors system which provided the Directory with complete control of the sale of national goods.¹⁹⁷² Even with the creation of the new accountability censors office, many progressive rationalists believed this plan offered the Executive Directory too much unchecked control over state funds. For radicals like Tadini or Gambari the issue was not necessarily the structure of the new tax scheme, which they generally favored for its progressive tax structure, but the intended target of the forced loans and bonds. Tadini lauded the French plan but pointed out its deficits originally in calculating the costs of social services which were later rectified.¹⁹⁷³ He sought a more precise calculation of the rising classification to avoid future deficits. These concerns were rectified in a modification presented on 16 Ventôse which guaranteed stricter controls over Directorial spending which included legislative nominations of the departmental administrators in charge of the loan enforcement, the reporting of all loan management activity to the censors, and

¹⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 3:114. Discourse of Mozzoni.

¹⁹⁷⁰ “Seduta CVI, 14 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:143-144. Presentation of Scarabelli; These republican leaning representatives were not necessarily in favor of letting the wealthy pay less. In reality, they favored a past law from before the activation of *Gran Consiglio*, established by Bonaparte on 16 Brumaire which placed the burden on the wealthiest 40 families in the republic. However, the Constitution was quite strict about equal implementation of taxes. For the intellectual side of this group like Mozzini and Compagnoni, the taxation of the middle classes but not the lower classes, ran the risk of establishing a precedent, by which only tax paying citizens would be considered true patriots. They wanted to avoid offering the lower classes an opportunity to decry possible discrimination and even exclusion from the new patriotic class which would certainly lead to political instability. Or so they explained it.

¹⁹⁷¹ “Seduta CV, 13 ventoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 3:110–11, 113. Discourse of Dandolo and Latuada.

¹⁹⁷² “Seduta CVI, 14 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:147. Discourse of Federici.

¹⁹⁷³ “Seduta CV, 13 ventoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:113, 119. Discourse of Tadini

the establishment of particular financial goals to be met monthly.¹⁹⁷⁴ The resolutions of Fenaroli were combined into a single resolution with the modifications made on 16 Ventôse and were approved by the Council that day to be sent to the *Seniori* who approved the law on 17 Ventôse.

The 17 Ventôse law remained the structural foundation for the extraction and administration of forced loans for the remainder of the *Gran Consiglio* period and remained largely unchallenged by external forces through to Messidor year VI. The one exception was a letter sent to the *Gran Consiglio* on 6 Germinal regarding the taxation of stable goods and capital as a source of income.¹⁹⁷⁵ Some, particularly those more republican elements of the *Gran Consiglio* opposed the taxation of stable goods and capital as it was not necessarily a source of income which changed to reflect the current national economy (theoretically).¹⁹⁷⁶ Others, mostly on the democratic end of the *Gran Consiglio*, believed that the forced loans were based on wealth more than income and should be included accordingly. They argued that the eventual goal was to refill the national treasury and as such higher taxes were necessary to balance the deficit more efficiently.¹⁹⁷⁷

On 1 Germinal the Directory received word from General Le Clerc, who in turn had received word from Bethier, that the French Republic was imposing a further forced loan on the Cisalpine Republic for the administration of the *Armée* now occupying the newly formed Roman Republic as well as the Cisalpine Republic.¹⁹⁷⁸ Le Clerc, who had intervened directly during the

¹⁹⁷⁴ “Seduta CVIII, 16 Ventôse anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 3:200. Presentation of Commission modifications and endorsement of Dandolo; These financial goals were particularly important as they were to be used as red flags for corruption or bureaucratic ineptitude. The quota for the initial months was set at 16 million *scudi*, which constituted just under half of the requested funds meaning that the forced loan would make up a large portion of national payments. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* could prove their commitment to sustaining the French military as the loan scheme was to be the primary source of income for this purpose.

¹⁹⁷⁵ “Seduta CXXVIII, 6 germinal anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:587. Letter from the Directory.

¹⁹⁷⁶ “Seduta CXXIX, 7 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXX, 8 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXIII, 11 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXV, 13 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXVI, 14 germinale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:608-611, 624, 670-671, 701-704. Discourses of Vismara, Terzaghi, Aquila, Brunetti, Bovara, Schiera and Vicini

¹⁹⁷⁷ “Seduta CXXIX, 7 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXX, 8 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXIII, 11 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXV, 13 germinale anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CXXXVI, 14 germinale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 3:607, 612, 623, 670-72, 703-5, 729-30. Discourses of Fenaroli, Latuada, Cadice, Gambari, Greppi, Mozzini, Perseguiti, Reina, Glissenti, Dehò, Lupi, Salimbeni, Sabatti.

¹⁹⁷⁸ “Dai sequenti documenti risulta la resistenza opposta dal Direttorio ejecutivo alla imposizione fatta dal generale Le Clerc a nome del generale in capo di un presitio forzato dui più facoliosi” Montalcini and Alberti, 3:587n-89. Extraction of the sittings of the Cisalpine Directory on 1 Germinal Year VI during a meeting with French General Le Clerc.

Directorial session, claimed that the treaty – though not yet approved by the *Seniori* and ratified – stipulated that the Cisalpine Republic would provide aid for the French military *whenever* it was necessary, either financially or militarily. The Cisalpine Directory however, balked at the request. They were unclear where these funds would arise and thus revisited the 17 Ventôse law. It was at this point that the article regarding stable goods and capital was called into question. Thus, while the minutia of the debate which took place in Germinal was irrelevant to the Franco-Cisalpine relationship in that period, the general tenor of the argument could be framed along the lines of those who supported taxation to raise additional funds for the *Armée*, and those who opposed the funds and in doing so sided with the Directory. When framed in this way, one sees yet another potential reason for those who found themselves expelled following the 24 Germinal Coup and those who found themselves at the seat, not just of *Gran Consiglio* power, but as the de facto political force of the entire Cisalpine Republic going into the months of Floréal and Prairial.

On 6 Messidor word reached the *Gran Consiglio* that the French military authorities had been imposing local forced loans and sequestrations of goods.¹⁹⁷⁹ It was claimed that the funds raised by the forced loans throughout the months of Floréal and Prairial had not been enough to sustain the French forces. However, democratic leaning representatives like Dehò, accused the Directory of poor management. This was of course right in the throes of the Messidor crisis when the *Gran Consiglio* and the Directory found themselves at odds for control of Cisalpine politics. Dehò claimed that given the French had offered to deposit goods of equal value in place of those goods and money sequestered, that in fact the problem laid not with the soldiers of the *Armée* who were simply trying in the most fair and equal way possible to sustain themselves, but with the Executive branch, whose poor management had put them in such dire straits to begin with. At the end of that month the democratic leaning representatives led primarily by the progressive rationalist's faction led an attack on the credibility of the Directory in the management of funds.¹⁹⁸⁰ They demanded that the Directory turn over all departmental records on the collection and administration of funding provided by the forced loans.

¹⁹⁷⁹ “Seduta CCXIV, 6 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:666 Discourse of Dehò.

¹⁹⁸⁰ “Seduta CCXXX, 21 messidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:101–3. Discourses and motions of Perseguiti, Reina, Dehò, Massari, Latuada and Cavedoni

However, thanks in part to the Messidor Crisis and the turnover of democratic representatives in early Thermidor, on 9 Thermidor the *Gran Consiglio* commission in charge of the plan for the forced loans back in Ventoso – now under the leadership of neutral rationalists and Cisalpine Thermidorian Vismara – presented a report which removed culpability of the departmental mismanagement from the Directory and onto the *Gran Consiglio*.¹⁹⁸¹ The accusation was that the original resolution from Ventôse never predicted the need for better local record keeping and never provided either the funding or instruments to carry out this function effectively across all *capoluoghi* equally. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* was portrayed both as incompetent in its predicative function, and similarly unable to sustain the needs of both the Cisalpine Republic and the *Armée*. It is evident that the political opinions of Trouvé relied within these complaints, as he often commented on the inability of the Cisalpine legislative branch to institute the necessary measures for a sustainable republican economy. By 8 Fructidor just 5 days before the Coup which would dislodge the democratic leaning representatives once and for all from power, the progressive rationalist majority led by Dandolo, Masari and Reina attempt one last time to place the blame on the Directory.¹⁹⁸² On 3 Fructidor a letter from the Directory to the Council stated that since all national goods were under their direct administration, and the forced loan was based on national goods, the administration of forced loans should be completely controlled by the Directory. In response Dandolo, Massari and Reina, each attempted with precise numeric examples to demonstrate the loss of funds which occurred under the direct control of the Directory, and that it was the fault of the executive that French soldier remained unpaid. They argued for a strengthening of the departmental administrators with help from the legislative branch. Through their motions passed they were never put into practice due to the Coup and the new constitution instituted by Trouvé on 14 Fructidor.

French intervention in *Gran Consiglio* Politics

The financial difficulties brought on by the French occupation of the Cisalpine Republic, has consistently been viewed by historians and contemporary political commentators alike as a defining debate in Cisalpine politics;¹⁹⁸³ similarly the influence of French administrative and

¹⁹⁸¹ Seduta CCXLVIII, 9 termidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, 6:473–76. Motion of Vismara.

¹⁹⁸² "Seduta CCLXXV, 8 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:328–31. discourses of Dandolo, Massari, Reina and Lupi.

¹⁹⁸³ Botta, *Storia d'Italia Dal 1789 al 1814*; Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Levati, "Il Mondo degli affari cisalpino e Napoleone tra opportunità e perplessità"; Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia, "patriota energico."*

foreign policies, both military and civilian in the disorganized nascency of Italian republicanism in 1796 and 1797, has been cited as the foundational point for all future political interaction in the remainder of the republican Triennio and the later Napoleonic periods.¹⁹⁸⁴ The events of 1798-1799 in the Cisalpine Republic are often seen through the lens of these events, or perhaps better the overbearing presence of the former and the proverbial absence of the latter, in particular the absence of Bonaparte's charismatic energy from November 1797. However, a newer historiographical tendency brought to light more recently by historians like Katia Visconti, Antonino de Francesco, and Francesco Dendena has come to reevaluate the years 1798-1799 not as a gradual waning of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship and the subsequent failure of the republican project in Italy, but as the point of its strengthening and then sudden collapse based on political intrigues on both sides of the Alps.¹⁹⁸⁵

Of all of the themes covered in this dissertation perhaps the most famous – or at least the most revisited – is the direct intervention of the French Nation in the political affairs of the Cisalpine Republic. From 24 Germinal Year VI (13 April 1798) to 18 Frimaire Year VII (8 December 1798) the Cisalpine government found itself undergoing a series of four coups, the last three taking place only a month apart each (14 Fructidor Year VI [31 August 1798; 28 Vendemiare Year VII [19 October 1798]; and finally that of 18 Frimaire Year VII). These coups were conducted by the French *Armée d'Italie* under the Command of General Guillaume Marie-Anne Brune (with the exception of the final Coup of 18 Frimaire which was conducted following Brune's dismissal and was instead carried out by his replacement Barthélemy Catherine Joubert). However, generally speaking the coups had been organized and ordered by a combined effort of Cisalpine and French politicians in Milan and Paris, whose political and legislative interests aligned in various ways and changed throughout the course of 1798.

¹⁹⁸⁴ Solmi, *Napoleone e l'Italia*; Saitta, *Filippo Buonarroti. Contribuiti Alla Storia Della Sua Vita*; Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700-1860*; Nutini, "L'esperienza Giacobina Nella Repubblica Cisalpina"; Zaghi, *L'Italiana Giacobina*; Grab, "From the French Revolution to Napoleon"; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*; Criscuolo, "Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato"; Criscuolo, "La Società Milanese Nell'età Rivoluzionaria: Reistenze e Mutamenti"; Rao, "Republicanism in Italy from the Eighteenth Century to the Early Risorgimento"; Lenci, "The Battle over 'democracy' in Italian Political Thought during the Revolutionary Triennio, 1796-1799."

¹⁹⁸⁵ De Francesco, "Les patriotes italiens devant le modèle directorial français"; Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*; Visconti, "A Patriotic School"; Visconti, "The Historiographical Misfortune of the Cisalpine Republic"; De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*; Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine."

Looking through the lens of the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, this final section will present the relationship forged between the various groups and later political factions in the *Gran Consiglio* and the various elements of the both the French and Cisalpine Nations. For the Cisalpine Republic this relationship looks at Aldini and his group of *Seniori* representatives who often rivaled the powerful *Gran Consiglio* leadership; the Cisalpine foreign service in Paris made up of Francesco Visconti, Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni and at the end of the period General Giuseppe La Hoz; and finally the Cisalpine Directory in its various forms from March to December 1798. On the French side this relationship will be defined by the *Gran Consiglio*'s relationship with the *Armée d'Italie* and their Generals-in-Chief during this period Berthier and Brune; the French Directory, in particular the Director La Révellière-Lépeaux; The French Foreign Ministry run by Talleyrand and his agents Haller and Faypout; and finally the French Ambassadors to the Cisalpine Republic principally Claude Joseph Trouvé followed by his replacements Joseph Fouché and François Rivaud.

This new interpretation throws out the nationalist, Marxist and revisionist perspective which saw either the French or Cisalpine leadership as problematic and presents the events of the period for what they are: a complex series of political misinterpretations attached firmly to the time and place in which they were conducted which had ramifications for future Napoleonic and Italian political cultures, but were not central to their development as has often been highlighted in the historiography.

The Military and Commercial Treaties

Often at the heart of Cisalpine historiography of both the strengthening and sudden collapse of the Franco-Cisalpine relationship – especially in 1798 – lies a discussion of the Military and Commercial Treaties between the Cisalpine and French Republics ratified into law on 9 Prairial Year VI.¹⁹⁸⁶ These treaties and the events which occurred as a result of their inception both during and after the ratification process, has been well discussed from contemporary accounts to modern times. This will not be an examination of the contents of the treaties themselves nor will it look at the specific minutia of the debates regarding them in the *Gran Consiglio*, in large part because most of the debates were conducted in secret sessions whose contents were either never recorded

¹⁹⁸⁶ “Seduta CLXXXIX, 9 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:123-124 Letter from Cisalpine Directory to the *Gran Consiglio*

properly or lost.¹⁹⁸⁷ Instead this examination will look at the political events which resulted from the treaties and the perspectives of the various proto-factions and individual representatives as they reacted to the various outside opinions and actions which developed regarding the treaties.

The issue of commerce and finance has already been covered in section two of this chapter and will therefore receive a lesser concentration of the two treaties. The military side of the treaties finds its origins back to the first sessions of the *Gran Consiglio*, when issues were raised over the presence of military members within the council. La Hoz for example, voluntarily gave up his command in order to serve as a representative as did Scarabelli.¹⁹⁸⁸ Other important military figures like Birago the former Cisalpine Minister of War, or Luigi Mazzuchelli and Antonio Sabatti – both important military figures during the Brescian uprising of Spring 1797 – served as central figures in the Military Commission. Each of these men had strong connections to the French *Armée* – both regular troops and officers – and were particularly close to generals such as Berthier or Leclerc. Thus, it is no surprise that the *Gran Consiglio*, more so than both the Directory and the *Consiglio de' Seniori*, in many ways had a much closer rapport with the French military than other bodies of the Cisalpine Government. It was from the *Gran Consiglio*, and more specifically from Vincenzo Dandolo, that the idea for an official military and commercial treaty was first conceived during the first sitting on 2 Frimaire and then expanded upon on 9 Frimaire.¹⁹⁸⁹

However, there were always limits established for this relationship within the Council from an early period. Looking at the project constructed for announcing the public recognition of the Cisalpine Republic by the French Republic, those more democratic leaning representatives, in particular progressive rationalists like Francesco Reina, were careful to balance Cisalpine

¹⁹⁸⁷ « Seduta CXVI, 24 Ventôse anno VI repubblicano », Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:370 Formation of the Secret committee council from noon to the end of the session

¹⁹⁸⁸ “Seduta VII, 8 frimale anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:160. Discourses of La Hoz and Scarabelli.

¹⁹⁸⁹ “Seduta I, 2 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:88 Discourse of Dandolo; “Seduta VIII, 9 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:167-168. Discourses of La Hoz and Dandolo; The expansion of the call for a general treaty to a specific military and commercial treaty between the Republics came after a report from La Hoz read to the Council on 9 Frimaire, in which it was reported that libalists had attempted to spread lies that the *Gran Consiglio* was intending a rebellion against French forces in an attempt to win greater independence. The irony behind this is that this is exactly what La Hoz would go on to do approximately 15 months later. However, at the time Dandolo demanded that an official treaty be drafted which establishes a permanent military link between the two nations and which would help dissuade reticent French authorities of possible Cisalpine betrayals.

autonomy with the acknowledgement of the French role in the establishment of the Republic.¹⁹⁹⁰ The same was true for the role which the Cisalpine military played in the greater struggle of the French military campaign on the peninsula and abroad. The representatives of the *Gran Consiglio*, as a largely homogenous group strongly supported the furnishing of Cisalpine troops to aid the French both in their conquest of Rome and the invasion of Britain – thought the latter never came to pass.¹⁹⁹¹ Even here however, the quantity of troops, the command of those troops and the acknowledgement of Cisalpine aid began to cause fracture lines between those who wanted to remain faithful to French requests but not risk Cisalpine autonomy or political/ military stability and those seeking to elevate the place of the Cisalpine Republic within the greater republican Eurosphere by actively engaging Cisalpine troops in the war effort.

The extremes of the democratic and republican leaning camps in the *Gran Consiglio* often opposed the direct insertion of main Cisalpine troops into the French campaigns, though for different reasons. Democratic leaning representatives like Mozzini and Dehò believed that these efforts should be taken out of a sense of patriotism to better ensure the loyalty of Cisalpine soldiers to the cause of European liberty and republicanism.¹⁹⁹² They were not opposed to the efforts of the *Armée* – in fact the contrary – however they feared the infiltration of counter-revolutionary elements who might attempt to influence young soldiers forced to go to war without the patriotic enthusiasm which would have defined volunteers. The republican leaning opposition such as Schiera, Mozzoni or Vicini had reservation regarding the threat to stability, both internally and externally, if it became public knowledge that the Cisalpine republic was formally backing French military expeditions.¹⁹⁹³ These representatives happily accepted French military aid, but worried

¹⁹⁹⁰ “Seduta XXII, 21 frimale anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:338 Discourse of Reina; In this case Reina sought to modify the language which acknowledged the French as conquerors stating that a free nation cannot also be a conquered one. And when it was pointed out to him that in the proclamation of Bonaparte from Messidor Year V proclaiming the independence of the Cisalpine republic it states that the French acquired the territory of the Cisalpine republic from the Austrian and Papal authorities through the right of conquest, Latuada defended Reina stating that in conceding the republic to the Cisalpine citizens it was no longer a conquered territory. This way the new text of the proclamation of recognition by the French republic acknowledged the struggle of the French military while simultaneously acknowledging Cisalpine autonomy and national sovereignty

¹⁹⁹¹ “Seduta XLIII, 12 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1:619-621 Debate on the sending of the Ussari corps to aid in the invasion of Great Britain.”

¹⁹⁹² *Ibid*; “Seduta XLIV, 13 nevoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:620-621;643-644. Discourse of Dehò and Perseguiti; Discourses of Mozzini and Gioivo.

¹⁹⁹³ *Ibid*, Montalcini et Alberti, 1:620; 643-44. Discourses of Schiera and Mozzoni; Discourse of Allemagna Vicini.

about the potential costs incurred by a new war and the possibility of reopening old wounds with former enemies like Austrian after a hard earned peace.

That said the overwhelming majority remained within the more politically centered group which saw a Franco-Cisalpine military pact as an important step in formalizing both the relationship of the two republics and the ascendance of the Cisalpine as a sort of “first-among equals” within the sister republic system.¹⁹⁹⁴ Though not all from the military, they all did come from the more politically centrist group of democratic republicans which held the largest majority in the Council made up of progressive and neutral rationalists like Polfranceschi, Dandolo or Giacomo Greppi.¹⁹⁹⁵ This majority of democratic-republicans was especially loyal to Bonaparte; and had grown similarly loyal to Bonaparte’s successor as General-in-Chief of the *Armée* Louis Alexandre Berthier. These representatives happily acquiesced to requests from Berthier, not simply because of his closeness to Bonaparte but because he embodied the potential for a future Italian nation as he went on to conquer the Papal States and establish the Roman Republic in early 1798.¹⁹⁹⁶ It was believed that by involving Cisalpine troops in Berthier’s efforts for peninsular “liberation”, the Cisalpine republic would be able to play a substantial role in the shaping of these new sister republics, and potentially exert an influence over them equal to if not greater than the French state.

With the events of 9 Ventôse, the *Gran Consiglio* had successfully asserted power over the *Seniori* and essentially controlled the entire authority of the legislative branch. By continuing to support the French *Armée* and maintaining a close relationship with Berthier, the controlling progressive rational powers of the *Gran Consiglio* believed they could successfully exercise this authority – if not outright grow it to also exercise a measure of influence over the executive branch.¹⁹⁹⁷ As early as mid-Pluviôse the progressive rationalists sought to wrestle the authority over diplomatic relations away from the Directory. In order to do this without upsetting the balance of powers the *Gran Consiglio* passed a resolution insisting that the legislature exert its

¹⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:620-21; 644. Discourses Scarabelli; Discourses of Polfranceschi, Lupi and Scarabelli; Scarabelli was an originalist rationalist who in many circumstances could even have been labeled a moderate. Polfranceschi by contrast was a neutral radical whose hot temper often saw him siding with the more extreme democratic elements such as Giovio, Zani or Dehò.

¹⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 1:620-21; 644-45 Discourses of Dandolo and Greppi.

¹⁹⁹⁶ Anonymous, “Le Cri d’Italie,” 10.

¹⁹⁹⁷ Discorso davanti il Gran Consiglio, Milano li 22 Germinale, Anno 6 Repubblicano. D’Arco”, “ASMi, Atti Di Governo P.A , Studi, 108,” fol. D’Arco 1798 publication, 11 April 1798, Milan.

constitutional right to review all future treaties with foreign nations before they are ratified.¹⁹⁹⁸ These progressive rationalist representatives felt that in order to better secure the interests of the Cisalpine Nation – and to make sure that these interests remained faithful to the project of the French *Armée* and not an increasingly more regressive Cisalpine Directory – the *Gran Consiglio* was mandated to review all treaties before they were enacted.

Lamberti and his originalist allies, opposed the project of the progressives on the basis that the Cisalpine Republic deduced its power from the consent of the French government in Paris.¹⁹⁹⁹ Under this principle the Cisalpine Republic – including the *Gran Consiglio* – would be obligated to accept the terms of any treaty with any foreign power conducted by the French diplomatic corps which was led by the Minister of Foreign Relations – Talleyrand – and not the General-in-Chief of the *Armée*. This republican wing of the *Gran Consiglio* further acknowledged that given the close relationship between the French and Cisalpine Directories, it would inevitably be the Cisalpine Directory to have the final word on all Cisalpine foreign relation pacts, not only because they had the constitutional mandate to do so, but because they were the purveyors of the French Directory's wishes in Italy. Lamberti represented an element of the *Gran Consiglio* which was not as far to the conservative side as say, the Cisalpine Director Paradisi who supported the autonomous leadership of a Cisalpine political elite independent of French influence completely,²⁰⁰⁰ but simultaneously was not willing to allow the legislative branch, controlled by the *Gran Consiglio*, to overtake all elements of the Cisalpine government. He was in essence a man loyal to the principles of 18 Fructidor 1797 which saw the preservation at all costs of what historian Pierre Serna has referred to as “extreme centrism”.²⁰⁰¹

News, finally arrived on 14 Ventôse that two treaties, one military and the other commercial, had been drawn up by the French Minister of Foreign Relations Talleyrand, and

¹⁹⁹⁸ “Seduta LXXX, 18 piovoso anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:390–91 Discourse of Coddé.

¹⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 2:391. Discourse of Lamberti.

²⁰⁰⁰ Anonymous, “Le Cri d’Italie,” 10–11.

²⁰⁰¹ Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*. This is most likely due to Lamberti’s close relationship with Bonaparte during the period of the 18 Fructidor coup. Though Bonaparte may not have been among the men who enacted the coup, at that time he had the political support of Barras and Rewbell who had benefitted from its enactment and as such the principles of extreme centerism which defined the coup were quite strong within Bonapartes political circle.

transmitted to the Cisalpine Government for its approval.²⁰⁰² In his 2020 examination of the debates surrounding the treaties within Cisalpine politics, Dendena asserts that they were initially met with great hostility. Unfortunately, as the treaties were considered publicly sensitive materials, the debates surrounding the treaties took place exclusively within secret committee session. However, it is possible that the *Gran Consiglio* itself – based on past political leanings outlined above – most likely met the treaties with mixed reactions, though overall the progressive majority favored their ratification from the onset. This can be assumed for two reasons. For one, the news of the treaties was accompanied by a scathing criticism from the Director Paradisi, who remained one of the most outward political nemeses of the progressive rationalist majority in the *Gran Consiglio*.²⁰⁰³ His opposition would most likely have led popular progressive rationalist figures like Dandolo, Reina and Latuada to support the treaties simply as a challenge to his authority. Second, by the time the treaties had arrived in mid-Ventôse, many of the structures regarding the funding of the French *Armée* and the forced loan and bond scheme had been formulated and agreed upon by the *Gran Consiglio*, as outlined in the previous section. As such it is logical that the sticker shock which might have come with the treaties funding requests for the French *Armée* would not have necessarily surprised the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* as happened with outside commentators unfamiliar already with the costs of funding the French military.

That said, it cannot be assumed completely that the treaties were met with universal acclaim either by the representatives of the council. In his article Dendena, successfully demonstrates how members of the revolutionary press in Milan – who leaned towards a much more democratic, patriotic, or even neo-jacobin political philosophy in 1798 – vigorously argued against the ratification of the treaty for its exploitive nature.²⁰⁰⁴ These outside commentators, such as Gaetano Porro, or Melchiorre Gioia were all celebrated radical writers in Milan since the time of the French entrance into the city back in 1796. They had been strong supporters of the *Gran Consiglio*'s actions during 9 Ventôse, having blamed the *Seniori* for the legislative standstill in the months of Nîvose and Pluviôse.²⁰⁰⁵ They would have been known and influential figures within the

²⁰⁰² Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.” 306.

²⁰⁰³ Anonymous, “Le Cri d’Italie,” 10.

²⁰⁰⁴ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.” 301.

²⁰⁰⁵ “N. 17, 10 ventoso VI repub. (mercoledì 28 febbraio 1798 v.s.), ‘Varietà’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:131 As Dendena points out the Cisalpine radical press was quick to point out the similarities

constitutional circle of Milan, leading to unavoidable interactions with representatives known to frequent the circle such as Reina, Giovio and Dandolo. Thus, it is safe to assume that there was an element within the *Gran Consiglio* which shared these hesitations on the treaties. Interestingly, it does not seem that the same could be said for the republican leaning factions of the *Gran Consiglio*, who did not seem to share the political sentiments of other more conservative commentators against the treaty at the time such as Paradisi or Aldini. Perhaps it was self-preservation within the democratic controlled Council, or perhaps it was a general unwillingness to oppose French will within the treaties, but the *Gran Consiglio* never saw republican leaders figures like Lamberti, Scarabelli or Schiera speak out against the treaties.

The debates regarding the ratification process of the treaties took place in the *Gran Consiglio* between 23 and 25 Ventôse. Unfortunately, much like the initial announcement of the treaties within the council, these debates were held within secret committee sessions making it impossible to know the exact political discourse which followed. However, thanks in part to a number of attached documents published in the twentieth century *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, there is some information which can help us to reconstruct the discourse. The first day of deliberations were accompanied by an impassioned plea from Berthier himself on behalf of the French government requesting that the Cisalpine legislature and Directory ratify the treaties with great haste.²⁰⁰⁶ This insistence on the treaties on the part of Berthier would have alleviated any fears which might have been lingering with the progressive rationalist group, and it can be reasonably assumed that they would have gone into deliberations in favor of the treaty in large part because of Berthier's guarantees. In a report sent to the French Directory by Cisalpine Ambassadors to the French Republic Serbelloni and Visconti, in the first day of deliberations before Berthier's letter arrived to the *Gran Consiglio*, the Council had in fact rejected the treaty's ratification twice.

between the *Seniori* under the control of Aldini and the conservative faction of french politicians under Dumolard, a former *feuillant* and contemporary member of the Council of Five-Hundred in Paris; Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.," 304–5.

²⁰⁰⁶ « Au quartier-général de Milan, 22 Ventôse, An VI de la République Française (12 mars 1798). Alexandre Berthier général en chef au Directoire executif de la République Cisalpine » Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:367-368

One gets an even clearer view of the situation based on the attached documents from the second day.²⁰⁰⁷ Two different discourses were recorded, one by Lodivico Giovio and another by Vincenzo Dandolo, which are housed in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan. Giovio, one of the most democratic members of the Council and a progressive radical, seems to have sided with the outside commentators like Porro and Gioia against the treaty. He decries the treaties as making slaves of the Cisalpine republic. In fact, he would go on to be one of only three (along with Giacinto Zani and – strangely considering his closeness to Bonaparte – Giuseppe Fenaroli) to vote against the treaties in the *Gran Consiglio*. On the other side, Dandolo made a lengthy argument in favor of the treaties which perfectly encapsulated the majority progressive rationalist position: It had been the French to offer the Cisalpine republic the gift of liberty, and if the Cisalpine people would not ally with the French Republic who else would have them? The French had always protected the Cisalpine people from tyranny and counter-revolution and for their efforts requested fair compensation in return, as they continue to protect the Republic. He refuted the argument that the continued superiority of French generals in Cisalpine territory would lead to a loss of Cisalpine independence, citing the fact that a French general (Bonaparte) had been the guarantor of that independence in the first place; to this he insisted on the friendship which lied between the Cisalpine people and the French military – a point which reflected the previously established sentiments of the progressive rationalist majority. He concluded by stating that enemies of liberty were all around, he himself a victim of this, having been forced to leave his home of Venice. Dandolo stated that to reject the closest friend of the Cisalpine Republic for such petty reasons as finance and autonomy risked the complete collapse of the entire republican system itself, and for that reason the treaties needed to be ratified.

It seems that Dandolo's sentiments were strongly shared by the majority of *Gran Consiglio* representatives. A resolution to ratify the treaty was passed by the Council on 25 Ventôse and was given a stamp of urgency.²⁰⁰⁸ Similarly, Brunetti motioned that the doubts espoused by Paradisi and others in opposition to the treaties (such as Giovio) be held back by the president of the council instead of being passed on to the *Seniori* and made a part of the ratification process; this motion was approved. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* assigned itself the role of ally to the French and hid

²⁰⁰⁷ Montalcini and Alberti, 3:370–77.

²⁰⁰⁸ “Seduta CXVII, 25 ventoso anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, 3:380-381. Resolution in favor of the treaties of alliance with the French Republic

any dissenting remarks which may have come from itself or introduced within the discussion from outside parties.

However, the ratification process would come to a standstill after this point. It has already been covered in Chapter IX the actions taken within the *Seniori* against the passage of the *Gran Consiglio* resolution to ratify the treaties. For this reason, the events which transpired will not be repeated in full. Despite their higher authority over the *Seniori* after the events of 9 Ventôse, the *Gran Consiglio* was unable to force the *Seniori* to pass the resolution into law, largely due to Aldini and his allies continued insistence that the resolution's mark of urgency be ignored. It became apparent at this point to both the progressive rationalist majority in the *Gran Consiglio* and the commanders of the *Armée* – specifically Berthier – that the threat of Aldini and his allies in the *Seniori* as well as those dissenting voices in the Directory such as Paradisi and Moscati were too dangerous to the political will of the Franco-Cisalpine allies. Similarly, the loud dissenting voices supporting Aldini's actions from the democratic side (such as Giovio and Zani) within the Council needed to be silenced if the Berthier-*Gran Consiglio* alliance were to successfully control the Cisalpine government in the upcoming months.

The Coup of 24 Germinal

The Coup itself was not some instant decision made by powerful figures of the French and Cisalpine establishment. The decision to carry out a coup on the Cisalpine government, though directly influenced for the most part by the events of the Military and Commercial Treaties, as well as the financial situation found in both republics at the time, was a long process on both sides of the Alps. As such it is not correct to simply point to one factor, request or political influence which caused the coup as has often been the case in older studies such as those conducted by Zaghi or Leonardi in the later twentieth centuries.²⁰⁰⁹ Moreover, as the first of four cisalpine coup's to take place in 1798, it has come to be increasingly seen by more modern young historians as the most important, both for its opening the door to the use of military force in Cisalpine politics and its seemingly collaborative nature by both French and Cisalpine authorities. The latter point in

²⁰⁰⁹ Leonardi, "La Repubblica Cisalpina e Il Direttorio: I Trattati Di Alleanza e Di Commercio e Il Colpo Di Stato Del 24 Germinale VI (13 Aprile 1798)"; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*; Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.," 298.

particular seriously deviates from past historiographical trends like those of Broers, Zaghi or Capra, which have often focused on the later coups in the autumn of that year.

The post-Thermidorian powerbase which had taken control of the French government in the years since the establishment of the 1795 Constitution is best referred to by what Serna has defined as the “extreme center”.²⁰¹⁰ This group, which included much of the post 18 Fructidor Directory (Rewbell, La Révellière-Lépeaux, Barras) and many in the Ministry (Talleyrand perhaps being the most notable) were dedicated to the idea of maintaining a politically stable and centered position which refuted both the radicalism of the neo-Jacobins, the reformism of the democratic-republicans and the conservatism of the Clichy/Monarchist alliance. Long before 1798, many of the strongest proponents of this philosophy had felt an aversion towards the Italian people as one devoid of an understanding of liberty.²⁰¹¹ These sentiments seemed to have remained even after the conquest of the northern half of the peninsula, as well as the establishment of the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics. A report by the French administrator in Genova sent to Talleyrand, highlights a number of these prejudices, which include an Italian tendency towards superstition, a reliance on Catholicism, and the Italian people’s inability to understand the economic and social benefits of the “liberty” which had bestowed upon them.²⁰¹² Though he acknowledged the Italian people had a resilience which had seen them resistant to tyranny, he was utterly dismayed by many Italian’s seeming lack of enthusiasm for the new found republican order on the peninsula. Similar reports had come back from the French ambassador in Naples at the time, Claude-Joseph Trouvé, who reported that while in Naples the French order was celebrated, in rural zones like Calabria and Sicily the French were viewed “like dogs”.²⁰¹³ On the same day that the 18 Fructidor coup was occurring in France, Trouvé wrote a long letter complaining about the behavior of Italian revolutionaries, in particular their perception that it had been Bonaparte personally and not the French Republic to “liberate” the peninsula.

These sentiments seemed to have heavily influenced the way in which the leading elements of the French extreme center viewed Italy going into Pluviôse Year VI. Added to this were the

²⁰¹⁰ Serna, *L’extreme Centre Ou Le Poison Francais 1789-2019*, 131.

²⁰¹¹ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:29–31.

²⁰¹² “Copie du Rapport remis au Ministre des Relations Exterieures et au Directeur Alexandrii AN, AF III/71. 290 plaq. 1 n.d., fols. 207-208 letter, Genova, 13 February 1798

²⁰¹³ “N°11. Naples, le 18 fructidor an V de la République” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 224 letter, Naples, 4 September 1797.

growing tensions which seemed to be arising between the centrist authorities in Paris (principally Talleyrand and the French Directory) and the successors of Bonaparte as General-in-Chief Berthier and later Brune. The extreme centrist leaders, and in particular La Révellière-Lépeaux saw with growing worry, a maintenance of the strong relationship which Trouvé had noted back in 1797 between Cisalpine patriots and the leadership of the *Armée*.²⁰¹⁴ There was particular concern over seemingly high levels of involvement by both “aristocratic” and “Jacobin fanatic” elements who had permeated the Cisalpine government and become particularly close with the French military establishment in Northern Italy. La Révellière-Lépeaux in particular expressed his concern that these natural enemies should be united only by a shared enemy, namely the French presence in Milan; if Berthier and later Brune lacked the political charisma of Bonaparte, or worse, were they to favor one group over the other, the entire system risked collapsing into chaos. His long-term solution to this was the institutionalization of a new Cisalpine Constitution closer to that of the 1798 Roman Republic, which would offer more control to French civilian authorities over Cisalpine political and legislative output, in order to secure the alliance of the two Republics and ensure greater political stability.

As the month of Ventôse began, news coming out of the Northern Italy began to alarm the French Directory and its extreme centrist allies in Paris regarding the political state of the Cisalpine Republic. First, Talleyrand received an urgent letter from the Cisalpine Ambassador Francesco Visconti on 13 Ventôse, recounting the French soldiers’ uprising which took place on 23 Pluviôse in Mantua.²⁰¹⁵ When French soldiers were unable to receive their pay, they began to riot. The Mantuan city council was forced to pay the soldiers’ sum, however the Commander of French forces in the city Sextius Alexandre François de Miollis feared that the money would not be enough. He requested that his superior, Achille Baraguay d’Hilliers, inform the Cisalpine government so that they may be able to send more money along to the Mantuan administration to evade this problem happening again. However, the alarm for French authorities did not come from the uprising of French troops but the reaction of the Cisalpine assemblies. Upon receiving word from Baraguay d’Hilliers of Miollis’s request, the *Gran Consiglio* passed a resolution which

²⁰¹⁴ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 293.

²⁰¹⁵ Extrait d’une lettre du Cit- Visconti, Ambassadeur de la République Cisalpine- Au Cit. Talleyrand, Ministre des Relations- extérieures. De Paris : 12. Ventôse, An. 6. de la Rep française - une et indivisible", AN, AF III/71. 290 plaq. 1 s.d., p. 214-216 letter, Paris, 2 March 1798

immediately reimbursed the Mantua city administration.²⁰¹⁶ However the news that the French had left the payment of their soldiers directly to Cisalpine governmental authorities sparked anger among both democratic and republican leaning leadership in the *Gran Consiglio*.²⁰¹⁷ Lattanzi, a progressive radical, found support from Venturi, a neutral rationalist, who both expressed concern at the events and sought reimbursement from the French government, considering that the administration fees they had so recently resolved to pay the French military should cover the costs of soldier's stipends. Others like the progressive rationalists Cavedoni and Reina, felt that the discussion should be transferred to a secret committee session as it could lead the public to turn on the French military command with whom the Council had built such a strong rapport. The resolution was met with similar hostility in the *Seniori*, in particular by the group of Aldini, who used the event as further evidence of French financial exploitation.²⁰¹⁸ Nevertheless the law was passed and Baraguay d'Hilliers was able to bring the money to Mantua.²⁰¹⁹

Around the same time as the news of the Mantua uprising reached the Parisian authorities, so too did the events of 9 Ventôse examined in Chapter IX. The calls for a culling of the *Seniori*, first officially pronounced by Coddé in his speech accusing the *Seniori* of counter-revolutionary activity, rung to the French Directory as the early warning signs of internal instability in the Cisalpine Republic.²⁰²⁰ These French authorities began to seriously consider that perhaps a coup was necessary, if only to purge the Cisalpine government of those most extreme groups in both assemblies whose infighting seemed to only lead to instability.

However, the nail in the coffin arrived with word that the Military and Commercial Treaties designed by Talleyrand had been harshly criticized by certain elements of the Cisalpine political establishment, and furthermore that the *Seniori* seemed to be against their ratification. Members of the *Gran Consiglio*, through Berthier, made it clear that they had in fact remained loyal to the

²⁰¹⁶ "Seduta LXXXVII, 25 piovoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 2:551.

²⁰¹⁷ *Ibid*, Montalcini et Alberti, 2:533-34. Discourses of Lattanzi and Venturi.

²⁰¹⁸ "Nº. 17. 3 Ventoso Anno VI repubblicano, 21 Febbrajo 1798. 'Repubblica Cisalpina. Corpo Legislativo. Consiglio de' Seniori. Sessione 27. Piovoso.'" "Il monitore italiano," 68.

²⁰¹⁹ "Extrait d'une lettre du Cit- Visconti..." "AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1," 216.

²⁰²⁰ "Seduta CI, 9 ventoso anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 3:12–14. Discourse of Coddé; Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.," 304–5.

French wishes, despite some dissenters like Giovio and Zani.²⁰²¹ With their appeal through Berthier, the leading progressive members of the *Gran Consiglio* made it clear their desire to purge the Cisalpine government of those who did not align with the joint *Gran Consiglio*- French *Armée* political agenda. This was aimed principally at the group of Aldini from the *Seniori*, which included other prominent representatives of that body such as Beccalosi and Loschi. Similarly, it included members of the Directory like Paradisi and Moscati.

However, it seems that before the request from Milan for the coup had even arrived in Paris, plans were already well underway. In early Ventôse, a joint letter had been sent by the ambassadors of the Cisalpine Republic (Serbelloni and Visconti) assuring the Directory that the treaties should find little resistance, however there did exist members of the Cisalpine government who they believed could challenge the ratification process.²⁰²² The exchanges which took place between the Cisalpine ambassadors and the Parisian Directory seemed to demonstrate a fear on the part of the French extreme center, that the current spate of internal conflicts between the various Cisalpine government institutions and criticisms of French political activity within the Cisalpine nation would hinder the ability to ratify the treaties.

A combination of two factors finally caused the Franco-Cisalpine authorities in Paris to authorize a purge of Cisalpine government. First, word reached Paris of Paradise's criticism of the treaties and his attempts to influence the Cisalpine legislative assemblies to vote against their ratification.²⁰²³ This in addition to criticisms received in France by patriotic journals like the *Amico dei Patrioti* or the *Giornale senza titolo* led the French Directory and foreign ministry to believe that a plot was afoot between aristocratic and radical elements of Cisalpine society to cause a political rift between the two nations;²⁰²⁴ the latter with the intention of restoring the old regime

²⁰²¹ « Milan 30 Ventôse Sixième Année Rép.in. Le Directoire Executif Au Citoyen Alexandre Berthier Général en chef de l'*Armée* d'Italie », ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2 s.d. letter, Milan, 20 March 1798 ; « Alexandre Berthier Général de Division Chef de l'Etat Major G.nrl de L'*Armée* d'Italie. Au Quartier Général de Milan le 11 Germinal an 6. De la République. Au Directoire Executif de la République française », AN, AF III/513 s.d., p. 2 letter, Milan, 31 March 1798

²⁰²² Parigi li 12 Ventoso anno 6. Serbelloni ambasciadore straordinario. Visconti ambasciadore ordinario. Rangoni Segretario d'Ambasciata al Cittadino Testi ministro degli affari esteri. "ASMi, Atti di Governo P.A., Trattati, 2" letter, Paris, 2 February 1798; This letter sent to the Cisalpine Minister of Foreign affairs Testi, offers details of the exchanges made between the Cisalpine ambassadors and the French Directory and Minister of Foreign affairs Talleyrand. It provides a not-so-veiled threat to the Cisalpine authorities that if the treaties are not ratified with haste, then the recent notions of a purge of the Cisalpine government might very well be in order.

²⁰²³ Anonymous, "Le Cri d'Italie," 10–12.

²⁰²⁴ Dendena, "La Liberté n'a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d'Etat et Culture Politique Dans La République Cisalpine.," 300–301.

and the former of bringing a new Jacobinism to Italy along the lines of the 1793 Constitution. The reality of course was that both of these groups actually accused each other of these very same offenses, often to an exaggerated capacity and were as far from allies as could be.²⁰²⁵ Second, the French authorities had been guaranteed by both the Cisalpine ambassadors in Paris and the *Armée* leadership in Milan that the treaties would be ratified immediately. However, after a month with little to no news on the proceeding of the ratification process, it became apparent that there had been a stall.

On 3 Germinal, Visconti sent a report to the French Directory, indicating the members of the Cisalpine government he believed to be a threat to the Franco-cisalpine alliance.²⁰²⁶ These men included members of the directory, the ministry and both houses of the legislative assembly. The report, which seems to have been compiled quickly and potentially in secret, gave a description for each person which had been inserted into the list in addition to the motive for why they could be considered dangerous. Many of those included on the list were known political rivals of the progressive (in particular progressive radicals) in the *Gran Consiglio*, which suggests Visconti's potential orientation towards the more democratic side of the political spectrum.²⁰²⁷ Of the Directors Paradisi was included along with the former aristocrats Moscati and Sommarvia, both of whom had been personal friends to Bonaparte during his stay in the Cisalpine Republic in 1797, but whom Visconti accused of having personal ties to Vienna and the conservative government in Parma.²⁰²⁸ From the Ministry, Visconti singled out Ricci the Finance Minister and Ragazzi – both common enemies of the *Gran Consiglio* progressives – as royalists, aristocrats and of having Austrian contacts. The list of *Seniori* members for expulsion came mostly from Aldini and his

²⁰²⁵ “N.13. 26 piovoso anno VI repubblicano repub. (sabato 14 febbrajo 1798 v.s.) ‘Varietà’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:101 In this extract of Galdi's paper, he accuses the Directory of fraternizing with aristocratic and counter-revolutionary members of foreign delegations from Tuscany, Parma and Austria; “Extrait d'une lettre du Cit- Visconti...” “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1,” fols. 214–216 In this letter, Visconti discusses Serbelloni's contempt for the more radical patriot writers in Milan, who he believes to be attemptig to bring jacobinism to the Cisalpine Republic. This was reported to the French Directory, who - without other context - was forced to take this report as the truth.

²⁰²⁶ 3: Germ: an. 6: Visconti Au Cit. Merlin President du Direct. Exéc de la Rep. Française”, “AN, AF III/513,” fols. 25–28 Manuscript report. Paris. 23 March 1798.

²⁰²⁷ Jourdan 2018, p. 462 In fact Jourdan provides evidence that Visconti was often held under suspicion by the French extreme center authorities like La Révellière-Lépeaux due to his frequenting of known neo-Jacobin locales

²⁰²⁸ “3: Germ: an. 6: Visconti Au Cit. Merlin President du Direct. Exéc de la Rep. Française (Note Seconde)” “AN, AF III/513,” 27.

political supporters like Beccalosi, Loschi, Somagli and Zorzi, all of who he accused of aristocratic and counter revolutionary conspiracy.²⁰²⁹

However, within Visconti’s reports existed a number of inconsistencies, errors and overall unexpected entries, particularly as it pertained to the legislative assemblies. Perhaps most surprising of these was the list of *Gran Consiglio* representatives slated for expulsion and moreover the reasons for said expulsion. Of the seventeen representatives listed by Visconti three had been incorrectly labelled as members of the *Gran Consiglio*, and one (Malaspina) had been dismissed from his position months before. Two of the men which Visconti indicated for expulsion

Figure 1. List of members of the *Gran Consiglio* (correctly and incorrectly labelled) nominated for expulsion by Cisalpine ambassador Visconti

from the *Seniori* (Perseguiti and Guiccardi) were in fact active members of the *Gran Consiglio*. However, most interestingly of all is that none on the list seemed to share any political traits in common. All of the men listed came from differing political proto-factions and though some like Reina, Bossi, Perseguiti, Bovara and La Hoz were all powerful members of the Council, others like Mengalotti, Bolognoni and Calcaterra were not even powerful enough to be included in the prosopographical examination of this thesis. Perhaps most importantly all of the men listed who actually sat in the *Gran Consiglio* voted in favor of the Military and Commercial treaties, and some, like Reina and La Hoz had been strong advocates for the treaties from the beginning.

Representative(<i>Gran Consiglio</i>)	Reasons for expulsion
Guiccardi, Diego	[erroneously named as member of the <i>Seniori</i>] ties to Vienna and aristocracy of the Valtellina.
Quadrio, Giuseppe	Ties to the aristocracy of the Valtellina
Araldi Carlo	[erroneously named as member of the <i>Gran Consiglio</i>] aristocrat with connections to Austria
Perseguiti, Angelo	[erroneously named as member of the <i>Seniori</i>] aristocrat, provocateur, dangerous
Calcaterra	Aristocrat close with French émigrés
D’arco	Very Dangerous for relationships and talent; aristocrat

²⁰²⁹ “3: Germ: an. 6: Visconti Au Cit. Merlin President du Direct. Exéc de la Rep. Française (Note Troisième)”, “AN, AF III/513,” fol. 28.

La Hoz	Corruptible fanatic
Bovara Stanislao	Aristocrat, active, member of the Austrian party
Reina	Aristocrat, active, member of the Austrian party
Mornico (?) Alfonso	[erroneously named as member of <i>Gran Consiglio</i>] Aristocrat, active, member of the Austrian party
Bossi, Luigi	Dangerous for his talents, corruptible, Austrian
Giudici	Austrian party
Carniloni	Ex-nobility, Austrian party
Ruffini	[erroneously named as member of the <i>Gran Consiglio</i>] Royalist
Giani poeta [Francesco]	Man very suspect and fanatical
Malaspina Luigi	[previously dismissed from his position] Austrian party
Bolognoni, Alessio	Austrian party
Menagliotti	Austrian party
Pallavicini Giulio	Fanatical and dangerous aristocrat.

The following day on 4 Germinal, the report was officially presented in a general session of the French Directory along with an updated report on the ratification process of the treaties in the Cisalpine Republic provided by Visconti and Serbelloni.²⁰³⁰ The Directory immediately signed an arrest warrant for the expulsion of Paradisi, Moscati and the *Seniori* representative Zorzi, all of whom were to be removed from their positions in the government by Berthier.²⁰³¹ All stood accused of openly conspiring against the French republic for the public displays of resistance they made against the treaties of alliance. The same day the French Directory signed a second arrest warrant which officially put in place the coup.²⁰³² The coup would be conducted by the *Armée d'Italie* and would remove the previously named Directors from power; it would shut down a

²⁰³⁰ “1 Germinal An Six. Serbelloni & Visconti vous passent au directoire un memoire soules debats des conseils Cisalpins relatif ò la ratification du traitè d’alliance entre la France & la Cisalpine”; “Extrait des Registres des Délibérations di Directoire exécutif. Paris le quatre germinal, l’an Six de la République française, une et indivisible”, “AN, AF III/513,” fol. 16;20.

²⁰³¹ “Minute d’Arreté, Paris le 4 germinal an 6 de la République française, une et indivisible”, “AN, AF III/513,” fol. 10.

²⁰³² “Minute d’Arreté, Paris le 4 germinal an 6 de la République française, une et indivisible”, “AN, AF III/513,” fol. 19.

number of prominent radical newspapers in Milan; and most importantly it would expel from the council the men listed by Visconti as dangerous to the treaty. The official explanation for the legislative purge, was not that these men had been listed as dangerous but that they were in fact additions made by Bonaparte in Brumaire before his departure, and not by the Cisalpine people; in this way the expulsions were not portrayed as French intervention against politically undesirous men, but instead the French government's attempt to preserve Cisalpine autonomy from an increasingly tyrannical French military command.

However, the plan for the coup was almost immediately resisted by the *Armée* military leadership, including Bonaparte who wrote a strong defense for Paradisi and Moscati, whom he had personally placed as Directors before departing Italy in early 1797.²⁰³³ Leclerc arrived in late mid-Germinal with the orders from Paris to carry out the coup.²⁰³⁴ Berthier, upon receiving the orders from Paris was shocked and surprised by the names he found on the list, especially those from the *Gran Consiglio*.²⁰³⁵ After all, it had been many of these men on this list who had requested the coup in the first place. Berthier knew that men like Reina, La Hoz, Bovara and Perseguiti were fundamental to the continued alliance between the two nations. Furthermore, their expulsion could see the rise of a much more patriotic faction in the Cisalpine legislature led by men like Giovio, who would take the place within the democratic leaning factions as the de facto leaders. Were this to occur the gap between the *Armée* and the Cisalpine administration would continue to widen leading to more dangerous consequences.

Berthier instead returned the warrant with a revised list.²⁰³⁶ This list named only 9 members of the *Seniori*, all of which belonged to the group led by Aldini. More notably however, there were only three names listed for the *Gran Consiglio*, none of whom had been in the original proposition of Visconti: Giacinto Zani, Lodovico Giovio and Giuseppe Fenaroli. All three had been the only representatives in the council to vote against the treaties. Both Zani and Giovio represented the

²⁰³³ "Paris le sept germinal an Six de la République Française un et indivisible. Le citoyen Bonaparte au Directoire Exécutif" "AN, AF III/513," fol. 13 letter, Paris, 27 March 1798; This may have been penned by Lucien Bonaparte, the Brother of Napoleon, who was also a close Friend to Paradisi during his time in Italy. It remains unclear as the author is simply referred to as "Citoyen Bonaparte".

²⁰³⁴ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:58.

²⁰³⁵ "Alexandre Berthier Général de Division Chef de l'Etat Major G.nrl de L'Armée d'Italie. Au Quartier Général de Milan le 11 Germinal an 6. De la République. Au Directoire Executif de la République française" "AN, AF III/513," fol. 15.

²⁰³⁶ Minute d'Arreté, Paris le 4 germinal an 6 de la République française, une et indivisible" "AN, AF III/513," 19.

most radical portion of the Council. Fenaroli, it seems, due to his high position and closeness to Bonaparte may have been included as a compromise, as the Directory wanted to limit the influence of the former General-in-chief in Cisalpine politics. In the aftermath of the Coup, the French Directory in reality did not seem particularly interested in the changes made, as they had already seen fit to organize the introduction of a new constitution which would change the structure of the Cisalpine republic in any case. However, Visconti was pushed away from his place of importance in dealing with the Cisalpine Republic after his original list was viewed as a grave political mistake.²⁰³⁷ Though not expelled, Visconti's influence was substituted with that of La Hoz, who assumed the new title of plenipotentiary representative in Paris for the Cisalpine Republic on 22 Germinal.²⁰³⁸

The Coup was put in place on the morning of 24 Germinal Year VI (13 April 1798). French military forces under the command of the new General-in-Chief Brune arrested the two Cisalpine Directors (Paradisi and Moscati), six members of the *Seniori* (Aldini, Beccalosi, Loschi Marliani, Tonelli and Zorzi), and three members of the *Gran Consiglio* (Zani, Giovio and Fenaroli).²⁰³⁹ Brune was a more politically involved and particularly more radical general who took Berthier's place as commander of the *Armée d'Italie* after Berthier was called upon by Bonaparte to assist him in his newest expedition to Egypt. In his first report to the Directory on 27 Germinal, a mere 3 days after the coup took place and only a day after it was officially inserted into the Cisalpine public record, Brune presented a Cisalpine Republic content with the events of 24 Germinal.²⁰⁴⁰ He described how Testi, the former Foreign minister and Lamberti, recently elevated from the *Gran Consiglio* to the Ministry of internal affairs (Ragazzi had been dismissed prematurely, and most likely Lamberti's elevation was in anticipation of his being assigned to the Directorship), had both taken the place of Paradisi and Moscati. Brune had a sympathy for the progressive movement in the *Gran Consiglio*, as was evidenced by his noting of many important progressive figures in the report such as Reina, Dandolo and Cavedoni. The coup, which had been so hoped for by this progressive wing and their *Armée* allies seemed to finally bring a measure of stability to the

²⁰³⁷ Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*, 1:501.

²⁰³⁸ "Seduta CXLIV, 22 germinale anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:7 Dismissal of La Hoz.

²⁰³⁹ Montalcini and Alberti, 4:59.

²⁰⁴⁰ "Du Quartier général de Milan le 27 germinal de l'an 6 de la République Française, une et indivisible. Brune, Général en Chef au Directoire exécutif.", ASHD B3 53 n.d. letter, Milan, 16 April 1798

Cisalpine government structure, at least internal to the legislative branch and in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. The end of Germinal through all of Floréal seemed to usher in a new period of peace within Cisalpine government and between the two republics, as the French Directory – who had never really focused its energy on the Cisalpine political fight at all – turned fully away to focus on foreign projects like the invasion of Ireland, the Egyptian campaign and their own internal struggles (in particular the preparation of the 22 Floréal Coup).

Trouvé versus the Gran Consiglio: The Coup of 14 Fructidor Year VI

The period immediately after the Coup of 24 Germinal was defined by a political calm and legislative productivity in the *Gran Consiglio*. Progressives used the period to enact a number of legislative projects which seemed to be aimed at bridging the divide within the democratic alliance of proto-factions (progressive neutral radicals on one side and progressive rationalists on the other) which had developed since the end of Ventôse. The expulsion of the loudest voices of the more radical faction like Giovio and Zani, as well as the departure of Tadini and La Hoz made this moderation and unification process significantly easier as radicals came on sides with progressive to pass these legislative projects. On 5 Floréal a debate took place which saw progressive and neutral rationalists siding with progressive and neutral radicals in favor of awarding Cisalpine citizenship to Italian refugees from *ancien regime* orders on the peninsula (such as Piedmont, Parma, Austrian Veneto or the Kingdom of Naples).²⁰⁴¹ This debate eventually resulted in a resolution passed on 9 Prairial which granted Cisalpine citizenship to any Italian who so desired it, further repairing and uniting the various forces of the democratic leaning proto-factions in the Council.²⁰⁴² One of the more profound discourses to come out of this debate came from the progressive rationalist Bragaldi, who stated that the Cisalpine Republic was to become for the Italian peninsula what the French republic had been for the Cisalpine people.²⁰⁴³ This idea demonstrated the strong sense of importance and authority which the progressive rationalist

²⁰⁴¹ “Sedut CLVII, 5 fiorile anno VI repubblicano” Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:345-348. Debates on the plan of military organization, with a focus on the place of non-cisalpine born Italians among the ranks of soldiers and a transition to the question of citizenship for all Italians. Focus placed on the discourses of Dehò, Salimbeni, Reina and Polfranceschi

²⁰⁴² “Seduta CLXXXIX, 9 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:126–27. Motion of Vicini and Bragaldi; interestingly this resolution was proposed directly after the announcement of the final ratification of the Military and Commercial treaties. Furthermore the motion was proposed by Vicini, a more centerist neutral moderate demonstrating a growing internal peace not only on the democratic end of the *Gran Consiglio* political spectrum but also those on the more moderate republican side.

²⁰⁴³ *Ibid*, Montalcini and Alberti, 5:127-29. Discourse of Bragaldi.

majority believed itself to have in the aftermath of the 24 Germinal coup. This was seen similarly in the high volume of legislative projects either proposed or resolved during this period from early Floréal to mid-Prairial such as the plan for the national guard, the laws against grain hoarding, the management and sale of ecclesiastical goods and a revision of the penal system and of public safety codes.²⁰⁴⁴

For the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio*, 24 Germinal had done for the Cisalpine Republic what 18 Fructidor had done for the French Republic.²⁰⁴⁵ Those representatives who had been seen as obstacles to both the revolutionary and state building processes were expelled, paving a clear way forward for an Italian republican transformation. More importantly, there was no longer a threat to the Franco-Cisalpine alliance, as the treaties remained safe from the criticisms of those on both extremes of the Cisalpine political spectrum. For progressives the maintenance of this relationship between the two republics offered to the Cisalpine Republic a legitimacy in its effort to influence the other Sister Republics of the Italian peninsula; the French military could now rely on their allies in both the Cisalpine legislative and executive branches to continue the liberation movement. Even with more republican elements like Lamberti and Testi in the Directory, there was a general air of accord between the branches which had not existed since before the activation of the Assemblies in Frimaire. The legislative production which seemed to emanate from this period provides ample evidence to this fact. The same can be said for the French *Armée* and their leader Brune, who seemed comfortable with the sudden easing of tensions both between the various institutions of the Cisalpine Republic and with the *Armée* itself. Brune highlighted the sudden shift in tone among Cisalpine politics almost immediately following the coup, stating that Berthier's solution (the second list of names for expulsion in the 24 Germinal Coup) seemed to have been a much wiser choice, as the inclusion of Testi and Lambert to the executive seem to have calmed many of the nerves of pro-French political pundits in Milan.²⁰⁴⁶

²⁰⁴⁴ “Seduta CLXVI, 14 fiorile anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CLXVII, 15 fiorile, anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CLXXXI, 1 pratile anno VI repubblicano”; “Seduta CLXXXIV, 4 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 4:460–64; 468–84; 790; 841–42; “Seduta CXC, 11 pratile anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:156–63, 166.

²⁰⁴⁵ Dendena, “La Liberté n’a Que Deux Soutiens : La Vertu et Le Baionnettes. Coup d’Etat et Culture Politique Dans La Republique Cisalpine.,” 300.

²⁰⁴⁶ “Du Quartier général de Milan le 27 germinal de l’an 6 de la République Française, une et indivisible. Brune, Général en Chef au Directoire exécutif.” “ASHD B3 53” letter, Milan, 16 April 1798.

That said, despite news from Brune of the growing tranquility in the Cisalpine government, there seemed to be no evidence that the controlling interests of the French extreme center – i.e. Talleyrand and the more powerful members of the French Directory, La Révellière-Lépeaux, Rewbell and Barras – had any intention of averting their plans to reformulate the Cisalpine Constitution. What’s more, the early months of 1798 had seen the extreme center beginning to distance itself from those further to the left in Paris. Ever since 18 Fructidor the extreme center had tolerated the leftward movement of politics as it secured the nation against the Clichyen-Monarchist threat.²⁰⁴⁷ However, the growing alliance of the French left with the *Armée* – thanks to left-wing support for the war abroad – and therefore with the democratic forces in the Cisalpine government began to make extreme centrist authorities like La Révellière-Lépeaux and Talleyrand uncomfortable. Could it be that this new left – these potential neo-Jacobins – could be taking advantage of the new post-Fructidorian order in an attempt to renew the political establishment of pre-Thermidor Year II? Was there support from the outside, in particular from the French *Armée* under Berthier and Brune and their Cisalpine allies in the legislative assemblies?²⁰⁴⁸ It was this fear which had originally sparked the plan to change the Cisalpine Constitution and send a French ambassador to Milan.

When the March 1798 elections in France saw a victory for these “neo-Jacobins” in a fashion similar to that of the Clichyens the year before, the fears of the French extreme center seemed to be confirmed.²⁰⁴⁹ On 22 Floréal the extreme center led once again by Le Révellière-Lépeaux was able to pass a law through the French legislative assemblies which annulled a number of the victories of the new left and which allowed the Fructidorian faction to retain their control of the new legislative assemblies when they sat for the first time on 1 Prairial.²⁰⁵⁰ Though not a coup in the conventional sense, it did artificially restructure the political scene of the French Republic away from this leftward movement. In doing so the extreme center simultaneously strengthened its policy against Cisalpine autonomy and particularly against the strength of the *Armée*’s influence in Italy. The Cisalpine Republic was no longer a minor nuisance to be handled by local French

²⁰⁴⁷ Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution*, 566.

²⁰⁴⁸ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 293.

²⁰⁴⁹ Kuscinski, *Les députés au corps législatif: conseil des cinq-cents, conseil des anciens de l’an IV a l’an VII; listés, tableaux et lois*, XII–XVIII; Jourdan, *Nouvelle histoire de la Révolution*, 381.

²⁰⁵⁰ Kuscinski, *Les députés au corps législatif: conseil des cinq-cents, conseil des anciens de l’an IV a l’an VII; listés, tableaux et lois*, 261–78 Lists of the French Council of Ancients and Council of Five-Hundred as they were formally established on 1 Prairial Year VI.

authorities in Milan (i.e. the *Armée* command and civilian agents like Haller), as it had been before 1 Prairial, but was now to be considered a perceived breeding ground for a serious political threat by the combined Franco-Italian left.²⁰⁵¹ For this reason, by mid-Prairial the French government was willing to reassess the outcomes of the 24 Germinal coup when they were presented a new interpretation of the Cisalpine political situation by the newly instated ambassador Claude-Joseph Trouvé upon his arrival in Milan at the end of that month.

Trouvé had been born in Anjou in 1768, making him roughly the same age as many of those within the *Gran Consiglio*. Trouvé had already enjoyed a relatively illustrious revolutionary career before his nomination as Cisalpine Ambassador.²⁰⁵² Having moved to Paris as a young man to study to become a notary, the Revolution had provided him the opportunity to reinvent himself, and he had become an editor at the *Moniteur universelle* by 1791, and the editor in chief of the same paper by the end of 1794. Trouvé had never been a Robespierrist, nor really a true Jacobin in the early phase of the Revolution, having instead allied himself politically with an old family friend La Révellière-Lépeaux who had taken the young Trouvé under his wing as a protégé. Trouvé strongly held to the political ideology of extreme centrism which La Révellière-Lépeaux embodied, and it was rare that the two would be found in disagreement, with Trouvé often referring to La Révellière-Lépeaux affectionately as his “père”.²⁰⁵³ It was through this connection that Trouvé would be assigned as the ambassador to the Kingdom of Naples in the Spring of 1797.

Trouvé seems to have harbored similar anti-Italian sentiments to those commonly found amongst members of the French political elite during the Directorial period. During his trip south to Naples throughout the spring and summer of 1797, Trouvé often stopped at many of the more important capitals of the peninsula like Milan, Parma, Florence and Rome. At each stop Trouvé found ways to criticize the local population and express his belief that Italians were unable to function within the new Republican order. In Milan he criticized the locals as being opposed to the French campaign and too wrapped up in their wealth to appreciate their new found liberty.²⁰⁵⁴ In Parma he believed the Emilians lacked respect for the French and hoped for a return to

²⁰⁵¹ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 294–95.

²⁰⁵² Michaud, “Trouvé (Claude-Joseph, Baron),” 213.

²⁰⁵³ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 200n. “Père” is French for father denoting Trouvé’s view of La Révellière-Lépeaux as a sort of father figure.

²⁰⁵⁴ “N° 1. Montebello, près Milan, le 4 prairial an V de la république.” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 202-3.

Monarchy.²⁰⁵⁵ The Florentines, though more beautiful and sophisticated than their northern neighbors lacked the love of *patria* necessary for a successful revolution.²⁰⁵⁶ Finally in Rome, while praising the beauty of the ancient Republican civilization, harshly pointed out the hypocrisy of Roman republicans whom he mocked for their religiosity and superstition.²⁰⁵⁷ In addition to his continual criticism of the various peoples of the Italian peninsula, Trouvé's letters convey a sort of suspicion, if not hostility towards Bonaparte and the military command of the French *Armée d'Italie*. Trouvé often remarked on the extreme loyalty not only of Bonaparte's French soldiers and commanders, but of the civilian population who seemed to view him personally, and not the French nation, as the liberator of the peninsula.²⁰⁵⁸

Trouvé's experience in Naples throughout late 1797 and early 1798 seems to have only further exaggerated these stereotypes for the young ambassador. He harshly criticized the Neapolitan monarchy for its oppressive nature, and the heavy presence of the Catholic church in almost all facets of everyday life.²⁰⁵⁹ He could not understand why the people would be so willing to tolerate the abuses of this clearly outdated system. All the while Trouvé was supported in his statements to the French Directory by his friend and ally the painter David who had been sent as secretary to the ambassador in Naples.²⁰⁶⁰ And yet while he was content to point out the abuses of the Bourbon kings of the *mezzogiorno*, he continually expressed his distress that he was not given privileges as an ambassador of the French Republic. This contradictory sentiment – simultaneously calling for revolution while expecting the privileges of local aristocracy based on his position – were a common factor in Trouvé's letters to La Révellière-Lépeaux during this period.²⁰⁶¹ Trouvé seemed to enjoy a position of authority, particularly among Neapolitan patriots who saw with Trouvé an opportunity for revolution in the Kingdom of Naples. They constantly sought his council as the representative of the French, which seemed to give Trouvé the impression that he held a manner of influence over much of the revolutionary discourse occurring in Naples in 1797-1798.

²⁰⁵⁵ "N° 2, Parme, le 10 prairial an V." *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 205.

²⁰⁵⁶ "N° 3 Florence, le 18 prairial an V", *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 207-208 In this same letter Trouvé also used the opportunity to call Bologna brutish, and to insult Gregorio Fontana, the future Cisalpine political leader and *Gran Consiglio* representative, as a fool who was trying to demonstrate the Italians scientific capabilities which the young Trouvé claimed would never rival those of the contemporary French thinkers

²⁰⁵⁷ "N° 4 Rome, le 20 prairial an V", *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 209.

²⁰⁵⁸ "N° 1. Montebello, près Milan, le 4 prairial an V de la république." *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 202.

²⁰⁵⁹ "N° 6 Naples, le 20 messidor an V.," *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 212.

²⁰⁶⁰ "N°23. Naples 17 Ventôse an Vi de la république", *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 248-249

²⁰⁶¹ "Naples, 16 brumaire An VI de la république", *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 234.

As Trouvé continued to criticize the harsh realities of Neapolitan *ancien regime* society, he similarly kept up criticism of Northern Italian republican ventures, most notably against the Cisalpine legislators themselves.²⁰⁶² Trouvé seemed to harbor a cold hostility against the leadership in Milan; on an occasion when Lattanzi had travelled to Rome to discuss the liberation of that city and the establishment of the Roman Republic, Trouvé scoffed at any attempt by the people of that territory to adopt republican lifestyle, and even more so the Cisalpine Republic's ability to help guide the Romans towards this revolutionary society. Trouvé often criticized from afar to La Révellière-Lépeaux the Milanese assemblies, blaming them for the growing political gap between the *Armée* and the Parisian civilian authorities.

Trouvé received word of his nomination to the French ambassadorship in Milan in mid-Ventôse, around the time when the *Gran Consiglio* was beginning its debates regarding the Military and Commercial treaties. There is little known about Trouvé's actions from his hearing about his nomination to his departure from Naples on 1 Floréal, the exception being an 18 Germinal letter in which he continues to complain about Italian resistance to the French political agenda on the peninsula.²⁰⁶³ That said it is not difficult to speculate his reactions to the events of Ventôse and Germinal both in the Cisalpine Republic and in France. He would most likely have been appalled at Cisalpine resistance to the treaties of alliance and have seen this as another failing of the general Italian mindset to conceptualize a functioning republican society. He similarly would have condemned the infighting going on between the branches of Cisalpine government and within the legislative branch itself. With regards to the Coup of 24 Germinal, it can be assumed that while Trouvé most likely supported French intervention, he probably viewed the coup as not going far enough, and of having favored too much the allies of Bethier and the *Armée* instead of creating a stable political situation in the Cisalpine Republic. Similarly, he would have been aware of the successes of the "neo-Jacobins" in the Parisian elections, and as such would have shared in La Révellière-Lepeaux's anxieties about a potential alliance between these and the seemingly growing radical faction in Milan between the *Gran Consiglio* progressives and the French *Armée*.

²⁰⁶² "N° 18. Naples, le 5 nivose an VI de la république" *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 238-40.

²⁰⁶³ "N°24. Naples, le 18 germinal an VI de la république française" *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 250.; In this letter Trouvé harshly criticizes the leadership of the Roman Republic for their criticisms of the newly instituted Roman Constitution. This constitution would be the same which Trouvé was charged with instituting in the Cisalpine Republic, and he therefore would have felt duty bound to defend its stricter measures of control by the French State. As usual Trouvé attributes Roman resistance to a lack of intelligence and a general superstition.

Trouvé arrived in Milan in the final days of Floréal with these prejudices against northern Italian republicans firmly established as a part of his initial impressions of the Cisalpine leadership. David, who had arrived in Milan almost a month prior, at the beginning of Floréal confirmed to both the Parisian Directory and Trouvé many of their fears following the 24 Germinal Coup.²⁰⁶⁴ David underlined the strong relationship between the *Armée* and the Cisalpine leadership class. He believed that the *Armée* and its French political allies like Jullien were working to separate Paris and Milan in a malicious attempt by French military officials to retain the influence that had been afforded to them on the Italian peninsula since 1796. If this malicious poisoning of Franco-Cisalpine relations continued, David feared the project to institute a new constitution would be doomed to fail. Trouvé thus entered into the Cisalpine capital with the belief that his job was first and foremost the establishment of French Civil authority in the Cisalpine Republic.²⁰⁶⁵ Trouvé certainly did not see these men as rivals, but rather subordinates, and thus viewed his mission as the reestablishment of order – an order which he believed had been ruined with 24 Germinal when rogue Cisalpine politicians (aka the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio*) had taken control of Cisalpine politics. Trouvé most likely expected to find the same sort of political admiration he had encountered in Naples, where he had been treated with reverence as the representative of the French Republic.

However, Trouvé was immediately offput by his less than warm welcome. He complained to La Révellière-Lépeaux of the Cisalpine law which allowed the members of the legislative assemblies – not only the Cisalpine Directory who was constitutionally in charge of foreign relations – to treat directly with foreign dignitaries and balked at the insistence of the progressive led legislature that he come to view the proceedings of the *Gran Consiglio*.²⁰⁶⁶ In reality it seems that Trouvé's arrival was met with deference or even a sense of amicability, though not with the sense of malice or disrespect which Trouvé seemed to note.²⁰⁶⁷ There were even those within the

²⁰⁶⁴ “Extrait d’une lettre du Cit. David secrétaire de la Légation française, près la République Cisalpine; Au Ministre des Relations extérieures. De Milan: le 6 floréal, An. 6. de la Rép. une et ind.” “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1,” fol. 238.

²⁰⁶⁵ “N^o 26. Milan, 1er prairial an VI de la république française.”, *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 253–55.

²⁰⁶⁶ *Ibid Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 254.

²⁰⁶⁷ “(N.º 151) 2 prairial an 6 de la Rép. Fr., ‘République Cisalpine, Milan, le 30 floréal’”, Jullien, *Courrier*, 626 Jullien simply mentions that Trouvé has been in the Milan for 4 days. There is certainly no hostility though it is notable that there is also no fanfare. “Ricevimento dell’ambasciatore francese Trouvé (21 pratile, anno VI repubblicano)”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 5:291. Trouvé was not even presented before the Cisalpine Government until 21 Prairial, almost a month after his arrival. At this reception he was greeted with great enthusiasm by the progressive majority in the *Gran Consiglio* who seemed to view in his

Gran Consiglio, such as the Giordano Alborghetti, who upon his arrival sought to ally themselves immediately with the French ambassador, most likely as a political tool to gain favor the way many had done with Bonaparte in 1797.²⁰⁶⁸ Yet for Trouvé the obvious political support which the progressives received from the French military structure was cause for concern, and a potential stumbling block for his mission to institute the new Constitution. Trouvé believed Brune to be putting up some kind of resistance to his authority, and made it clear his belief that the *Armée* was under his – Trouvé’s – authority, as Brune’s superior.²⁰⁶⁹

However, by the end of Prairial, Trouvé’s sentiments towards Brune seemed to change, instead seeing him as a staunch political ally whom Trouvé believed would be willing to help in establishing the new political order in the Cisalpine Republic.²⁰⁷⁰ Trouvé began to view the problem as the progressive leadership in the *Gran Consiglio* like Reina, Dehò and Salimbeni. These men had successfully enacted legislation throughout Floréal and Prairial which built up a number of public institutions such as the Cisalpine national guard, the administration for the confiscation of clerical goods and the beginning of a public education system, which were exclusively controlled by Cisalpine authorities with almost no French influence. Trouvé had begun to grow close to the Cisalpine executive branch after his presentation at the end of Prairial, in particular with Directors like Costabili.²⁰⁷¹ His allies in the *Gran Consiglio* like Alborghetti, Bovara, Aquila, Ambrosioni, Vicini, Schiera, Scarabelli and Vismara came to make up the core of the Cisalpine Thermidorean (see chapter VIII) faction who supported Trouvé’s reforms to the Cisalpine Constitution. These men were not necessarily against Brune but saw Trouvé as the true representation of French authority. As opposed to Bonaparte, who’s more charismatic figure and military success had lent him a high level of personal power, Trouvé derived his influence almost

position initially the beginning of a great cooperative been the two Sister Republics. This contradicts Trouvé’s own claims of legislative hostility.

²⁰⁶⁸ Anonymous, "Le Cri d'Italie", 15 The text mentions Alborghetti "the former aristocrat" as the primary leader of this pro-Trouvé faction as early as Prairial. Custodi confirms in his own diary that it was indeed Alborghetti who allied himself with Trouvé at the onset of the period and who in fact would go on to lead the Thermidorian factions through the Messidor Crisis. There is no explanation for Alborghetti’s behavior if this is true other than personal ambition. To that point, Alborghetti had consistently been an outspoken progressive radical and friend to other radical leaders like Dehò, Cocchetti and Gambari. It’s possible that the expulsion of Giovio and Zani had caused Alborghetti to become disillusioned with the *Armée* leadership and therefore turned towards Trouvé. However, his sudden about-face politically can only be explained by his desire to retain a measure of influence in Cisalpine politics.

²⁰⁶⁹ "N° 26. Milan, 1er pririal an VI de la république française." *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 255.

²⁰⁷⁰ "N° 27. Milan, 23er pririal an VI de la république française." *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 255-56.

²⁰⁷¹ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 265n.

exclusively from his position power and was the embodiment of the apparent success of both the Constitution of 1795 and the French reforms of 18 Fructidor and 22 Floréal. Thus, the formation of this Cisalpine reform group, which revolved around Trouvé was not a recognition of the man himself, but of the ideal of the French republican establishment as the center of power at the time. Those who opposed these plans, instead remained loyal to the political order established in Milan at the end of 1797 along the lines of the inner circle of Bonaparte and his successors.

Trouvé's support for the Directory against the progressive leadership of the *Gran Consiglio* on the evening of 8 Messidor was the first public declaration of Trouvé against the progressive powerbase.²⁰⁷² Though brief his letter made some rather important points to the progressive leaders of the Council. Trouvé declared his intention to recognize executive authority over legislative authority, a sharp diversion from Cisalpine politics since Frimaire. The Cisalpine Directory had remained a relatively ambivalent entity, more figure head than political force; however, with the alliance of Trouvé the Directory could now exercise its constitutional rights more freely as it seemed to have the legitimacy of the French state apparatus at its back. He also acknowledged open hostility towards the *Gran Consiglio* whom he believed were unwilling to relinquish neither their power nor their autonomy – a point which he was indirectly asserting for the institutionalization of the new constitution. In a way this delegitimized Brune's support for the progressives who were now being publicly acknowledged by the French state as dissenters. Trouvé by early Thermidor had made it clear to Brune that the general's support should be a guarantee, or else the more moderate Le Clerc – who had been waiting in the wings to take Brune's position should he fail to obey – would replace Brune as the General-in-chief.²⁰⁷³ Finally, with the election of Adelesio to the Cisalpine Directory, a known ally of Trouvé, Trouvé himself firmly established his followers as a majority power within the Cisalpine executive.²⁰⁷⁴ In this way Trouvé made it apparent his favoritism towards a strong executive who swept the rug out from under the *Gran*

²⁰⁷² "Seduta CCXVII, secondo di 2 8 messidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 1927, 5:756 Letter from Trouvé to the Gran Consiglio.

²⁰⁷³ "N° 31, Milan 11 messidor an VI de la république.", "N° 33, Milan 17 messidor an VI de la république.", *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 265, 270. The evidence for this threat comes from a number of letters which Trouvé sent to La Révellière-Lépeaux towards the end of Messidor and early Thermidor. In these letters, Trouvé often praises Le Clerc and his constant presence in Milan. While he does not disparage Brune there is a tension or perhaps even jealousy visible in references made to the General-in-Chief.

²⁰⁷⁴ Anonymous, "Le Cri d'Italie," 13.

Consiglio, and their insinuation that they had the support of the French state as a way to legitimize the political activities of 9 Ventôse and 24 Germinal.

However, despite Brune's support being neutralized, the progressive faction continued to put up a fight both inside (as demonstrated in Chapter VIII) and outside of the *Gran Consiglio*. The constitutional circles of the Republic, in particular those in Milan, continually criticized the ever-growing presence of the Ambassador in Cisalpine politics and recognized his hand in the new direction *Gran Consiglio* politics had taken since the beginning of Thermidor.²⁰⁷⁵ Many of those who complained in the sessions of the constitutional circles were progressive representatives themselves such as Francesco Reina or Felice Mozzini. When the *Termometro politico della Lombardia* broke the news that Trouvé had been sent to impose a new constitutional order in the Cisalpine Republic, many progressive backed administrators in the municipalities of second cities like Brescia, Bergamo or Bologna sent letters of protest to the *Gran Consiglio* against the French ambassador.²⁰⁷⁶ In Paris, Giuseppe La Hoz, the former progressive representative to the *Gran Consiglio* and Cisalpine agent in the city came before the Directory and begged that the old constitutional order of 1797 not be altered.²⁰⁷⁷ When his request was rebuked he accused the French Directory of treason against the revolution and insulted Talleyrand and the Directory for their complicity.²⁰⁷⁸ This eventually led to an arrest warrant being issued for La Hoz who fled back to Milan just days before the 14 Fructidor coup occurred.

As support mounted against him, Trouvé began to acquire new allies throughout Thermidor who further put him up against the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio*. Of these the most prominent were Aldini and his group of disgraced *Seniori* representatives who had been purged on 24 Germinal which included Beccalosi and Loschi.²⁰⁷⁹ Trouvé looked fondly towards Aldini and Becalossi in particular whom he trusted for their antipathy against Brune and the *Armée*.²⁰⁸⁰

²⁰⁷⁵ “N° 31, Milan 11 thermidor an VI de la république.” *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 265–66; “N.52,i. 12 messidor VI repub. (sabbato 30 giugno 98 v.s.), ‘Circolo Costituzionale di Milano’”, Criscuolo, *Termometro Politico della Lombardia IV*, 4:377.

²⁰⁷⁶ “Seduta CCLXII, 24 thermidor anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:849, 872 Letters from the municipality of Bergamo, and the municipality of San Domenico, a fraction of the city of Bologna.

²⁰⁷⁷ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:X; Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 38.

²⁰⁷⁸ “Motion d’arreté. 3 fructidor an VI de la république française une & ind.”, AN, AF F/7/6194/B, plaq. 3, dossier 2653

²⁰⁷⁹ Anonymous, “Le Cri d’Italie,” 15.

²⁰⁸⁰ “N° 31. 11 thermidor an VI de la république”, *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 566.

These men had remained bitter after their removal from the legislative assemblies and despite their resistance to the treaties in Ventôse and Germinal, had come to find in Trouvé a political ally whom they could utilize to take control of the Cisalpine legislature. More so, Aldini in particular resented the commanders of the *Armée* for their alliance with the progressives in the *Gran Consiglio* like Reina, Salimbeni and Dandolo. In a sense, the alliance between Trouvé and the Aldini group from the *Seniori* was very much a case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. While there is little evidence that Aldini supported the reformist intentions of Trouvé his political motives are very evident in the action of Trouvé and his allies in the Cisalpine Government in Thermidor of Year VI.

Thus, by the end of Thermidor the lines had been clearly drawn between those who supported Trouvé’s project and those who opposed it. On one side sat the Thermidorian politicians inside Cisalpine Government, members of the French civil administration (such as Faypoult or David) and Aldini’s group of disgraced politicians expelled after 24 Germinal. On the other was the progressive rationalist and radical proto-factions, their allies in the democratic cisalpine press and the constitutional circles, and the French *Armée*.²⁰⁸¹ That said there had been little outward hostility between these groups other than the minor sparring session which took place during the Messidor Crisis or during the reforms of legislative plans like that of finance or the national guard which occurred in the *Gran Consiglio* in mid-Thermidor. However, on the night of 23 Thermidor, during a celebration in Milan for the anniversary of the founding of the French Republic on 10 August 1792, these tensions boiled over.²⁰⁸² A dinner was thrown to celebrate the Republican anniversary in which members of the military and civilian administrations of both the French and Cisalpine Republics were invited to the French embassy in Milan. However, a number of French soldiers and “Cisalpine agitators” among the crowd became inebriated and began to insult Trouvé as he gave a toast. Trouvé noted a certain hostility from both of these groups since he arrived at

²⁰⁸¹ “Milan le 23 Thermidor an 6. de l’Ere Républicaine. Faypoult Commissaire du Directoire exécutif Au Directoire Exécutif.”, “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1,” fols. 243–244 letter, Milan, 10 August 1798; In a letter sent on 10 August 1798 Faypoult explicitly lists the three groups he believes were conspiring against Trouvé and the plan to institute a new constitution which were the *Gran Consiglio*, the constitutional circles and certain members of the Executive Ministry whom he did not call by name or title. This remains some of the only explicit proof that Trouvé and his allies believed there to be a conspiracy against them which accelerated their plans to carry out the 14 Fructidor coup.

²⁰⁸² “Extrait d’une Dépêche du Cit. Trouvé Milan 28 Thermidor. An 6. “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1,” fol. 217.

the party, and in his report to the Directory expressed that there may be an attempt to remove him from his position in the near future – violently if necessary.

The events of 23 Thermidor combined with the reports of La Hoz’s botched meeting in Paris (see below) seem to have convinced Trouvé and his allies that the time to institute the new, more restrictive constitution was at hand.²⁰⁸³ These men believed that especially in the less structured setting of the constitutional circles – mostly that of Milan – radicals and “mediocre men” were in the process of conspiring against the French Republic. There exists no true evidence to support this. On 8 Fructidor Trouvé ordered Brunetti – the former *Gran Consiglio* representative, Thermidorian, and minister of police after the Messidor Crisis – to close the constitutional circles.²⁰⁸⁴ On 9 Fructidor plans were made to enact the coup at the end of the republican calendar year which would institute the new republican constitution and renominate the entire legislative branch.²⁰⁸⁵ This newly nominated legislature would expel the progressive majority which was resurgent in the *Gran Consiglio* following the election of Perseguiti to the Council presidency on 1 Fructidor.²⁰⁸⁶ This resurgence of the progressives came from the growing pressure from municipal and departmental administrations – in particular those from secondary cities like Bergamo, Como, Brescia and Ferrara who had been experiencing resistance to national authority following the *Termometro* report of the new Constitution²⁰⁸⁷ – which had been received by the *Gran Consiglio* in late Thermidor. This outside influence began to convince neutral representatives who did not take sides between the new Thermidorian faction and the progressives, to gravitate more towards the progressive wing, hence the election of Perseguiti. Perseguiti for his part, despite being neutral, was also one of the more radical members of the Council who often sided with progressives. Those like Vertemate-Franchi, who strongly supported Trouvé failed to grasp the

²⁰⁸³ “Milan le 23 Thermidor an 6. de l’Ere Républicaine. Faipoult Commissaire du Directoire exécutif Au Directoire Exécutif.” “AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1,” fols. 243–244.

²⁰⁸⁴ “Anno V[I]. 8 fruttidoro (25 agust 1798)”, Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 37.

²⁰⁸⁵ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:XIII.

²⁰⁸⁶ “Seduta CCLXVIII, 1 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, 7:89. Election of Perseguiti to the *Gran Consiglio* presidency; this event held deep importance because it demonstrated the effect of the Thermidoreans waning power following the complaints coming from municipal and departmental administrations throughout late Thermidor.

²⁰⁸⁷ “Seduta CCXLII, 3 termidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 6:357–60 Letter from the Directory regarding disorder in the departments of Montagna, Lario, Adda ed oglio as well as in Brescia, Bergamo and Ferrara.

tension going on in these local administrations instead opting to use force to bring these turbulent peripheral areas and second cities into line.

The planned coup would also place Aldini, and those others expelled on 24 Germinal in their former positions, and fill the seats vacated by expelled progressives with Aldini's allies. However, on 10 Fructidor Brune called upon Aldini, Beccalossi and the rest of the expelled former representatives who had become close advisors to Trouvé; he forced them to leave the capital and to remain far from politics.²⁰⁸⁸ The following day La Hoz entered into Milan. On the same day Jullien's *Courrier* and the *Termometro* both published criticism made by Lucien Bonaparte – brother to Napoleon and democratic-republican leader in the French Council of Five-Hundred – which condemned the changes proposed to the Cisalpine Constitution.²⁰⁸⁹ With all of these circumstances happening simultaneously, it seems Trouvé and his Cisalpine allies believed the coup could not wait until the end of Year VI to enact. On the Evening of 12 Fructidor, letters were sent out to 120 individuals inviting them to take part in a new legislature for the Cisalpine Republic.²⁰⁹⁰ These individuals consisted mostly of current representatives, the majority of whom were from the republican-leaning and/or Thermidorean groups within the *Gran Consiglio* (for example, Scarabelli – nominated president of the new Council on 14 Fructidor – Bossi, Aquila, Bovara Vicini and Vismara).²⁰⁹¹ The new list also included 38 individuals such as Polfranceschi, Mozzini, Mazzuchelli, Mangili, Lupi, Mocchetti, Franzini and Rossi among others considered neutral towards the new Constitution or at least persuadable to favor its institutionalization.

The following day when the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* arrived, they found the palace of the Council surrounded by French soldiers, and only those in possession of the letter from Trouvé allowed to enter into the session. During the sitting of 13 Fructidor, presided over by Trouvé himself, the *Gran Consiglio* was dissolved as was the older Cisalpine Constitution.²⁰⁹² A new Constitution was read aloud though not voted on or ratified. In the evening those who had received letters gathered at the French embassy to orchestrate the formation of a new Legislative

²⁰⁸⁸ “10 Fructidor” Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 37.

²⁰⁸⁹ *Ibid* 38.

²⁰⁹⁰ Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:XIV; Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 38.

²⁰⁹¹ “Seduta I [del Consiglio de' Juniori], 14 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:7.

²⁰⁹² Alberti, Cessi, and Marcucci, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 8:XIV–XVII.

assembly the following morning. Of the 38 perceived neutral representatives, 25 of them led by Polfranceschi renounced their new charge as representatives under the new Constitution.²⁰⁹³ Though they stopped short of accusing Trouvé and his Cisalpine allies of counter-revolution, they saw the institutionalization of a new assembly as heretical to the original aims of the Cisalpine Republic. On 14 Fructidor, David read aloud a letter from Trouvé which officially recognized the new constitution and established the purge of the Cisalpine government.²⁰⁹⁴ Trouvé had pressured Brune into signing the statement, which Trouvé believed would legitimize the coup in the eyes of progressives and their allies in the *Armée*. Thus, almost a year to the day following the French Coup of 18 Fructidor Year V, the French extreme center, working through Trouvé had once again used political violence to establish their own agenda, though this time abroad. In this way the autonomy which had defined the *Gran Consiglio* legislative and political culture came to a sudden and absolute end.

Epilogue: The Gran Consiglio and French politics in the aftermath of the Coup of 14 Fructidor Year VI

Trouvé's coup on 14 Fructidor put an end to the legislative autonomy which had characterized the political culture of the Legislative Assemblies under the Year V Cisalpine Constitution. The notions of political innovation and cisalpinization defined by the x-axis, and the regulation of legislative speed and force defined by the y-axis no longer defined the factionalism of legislative politics in the newly formed *Consiglio de' Juniori*, as they had in the *Gran Consiglio*. This is because in many ways French intervention had split Cisalpine politics along similar growing fault lines to those in contemporary French politics – i.e. the growing divide between the military authorities led principally by Bonaparte and his supporters in the Parisian government like his brother Lucien, Sieyes and Barras, and the extreme center which had taken power after 18 Fructidor and renewed itself after 22 Floréal led by Rewbell, Talleyrand and La Révellière-Lépeaux. In the Cisalpine Republic these factions were represented by Brune for the military and Trouvé for the extreme center.²⁰⁹⁵ Trouvé's coup forced representatives to take sides in the split between the French parties, drawing them away from discussions and divisions of Cisalpine

²⁰⁹³ Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 39n–41n.

²⁰⁹⁴ “Seduta I [del Consiglio dei Juniori], 14 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano”, Alberti, Cessi, and Marcucci, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 8:8–15. Letter from Trouvé to the newly established Consiglio dei Juniori.

²⁰⁹⁵ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttore*, 56.

arguments in favor of francocentric partisanship. Though the *Consiglio de' Juniori* succeed in establishing a number of legislative projects – such as the financial plan which had been under construction since Frimaire – the constant shift back and forth between the Brune and Trouvé factions led to a slowing of legislative interaction in the lower chamber of the Cisalpine Assemblies in the months of Vendemnaire to Frimaire Year VII (roughly late September to mid-December 1798).

This second period of the First Cisalpine Republic – which lasted from Trouvé's Coup until the invasion of the Austro-Russian Coalition and the fall of the republic in Germinal Year VII – has been consciously left out of this study. One reason is that throughout the historiography, in particular that of the past 40 years, this period and the events which followed in 1799 have been seen as the focal point of study for the Republican Triennio.²⁰⁹⁶ It is only with more recent historiographical trends formulated by scholars like De Francesco which have redefined the years 1797-1798 not as the cause of the 1799 fall but as the period of growth.²⁰⁹⁷ What has come about recently then, is an exhaustive retelling of the second half of the Cisalpine Republic along similar historiographical lines to those which gave birth to this thesis, principally those conducted by Katia Visconti and Cecilia Carnino.²⁰⁹⁸ Both works have beautifully summarized the political cultural developments of the second half of 1798 and successfully connected the first and second halves of Cisalpine political history in all of its complexity.

To attempt to revisit their work would be both an insult to the amazing histories both have produced and an exercise in redundancy. More importantly the focus of this study is the legislative autonomy of the *Gran Consiglio* period from Frimaire to Fructidor. It would be out of the scope of the study to proceed further as the *Gran Consiglio* no longer existed, neither in its political nor its constitutional form from the first half of 1798. Instead, this final part of the chapter has been titled “epilogue” as it will instead use Visconti and Carnino's guides to see how the legacy of the *Gran Consiglio* remained in the latter half of 1798, despite the turbulent factionalism between Brunists and Trouvéists.

²⁰⁹⁶ Rao, *Esuli: L'emigrazione politica italiana in Francia (1792-1802)*; Zaghi, *Il Direttorio*; Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*; Criscuolo, “Il problema italiano nella politica estera della Francia dal Direttorio al Consolato”; De Francesco, *L'Italia di Bonaparte: Politica, statualità e nazione nella penisola tra due rivoluzioni 1796-1821*.

²⁰⁹⁷ De Francesco, *Storie dell'Italia rivoluzionaria e napoleonica (1796-1814)*.

²⁰⁹⁸ Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 55–146; Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia, “patriota energico,”* 46–75.

From Trouvé's perspective the Coup of 14 Fructidor had been an absolute success. In a report to the French Directory on 22 Fructidor, Trouvé described a renewed Cisalpine political scene, where the obstacles to the institutionalization of French republicanism which had been popularized under the extreme centrism of the Second Directory no longer existed.²⁰⁹⁹ However even within this report, Trouvé's attempts to cover over the tensions which had arisen from his coup gave way to the truth: the Cisalpine legislative assemblies were still at odds with the institutionalization of a new constitution and voices continued to circulate which resisted Trouvé. He cites names like La Hoz, Fantoni and Salvador as continual thorns in his side and acknowledges that perhaps he had been imprudent to purge the Cisalpine political scene in such a manner that he forced these elements to conspire underground. These mistakes by Trouvé seem to have also manifested themselves in Parisian politics. Both Serbelloni and Visconti renounced their positions.²¹⁰⁰ It seems Trouvé's methods had caused too much instability both at home and abroad, and the local sentiments in Paris were that Trouvé had gone too far too fast.

In the newly formed *Consiglio de' Juniori*, the Thermidorian wing had dissolved in the face of the coup. The old fault lines between democratic and republican leaning members had returned and had caused a visibly extreme rift in the chamber, with the two sides sitting in the right and left wings respectively, mimicking French political practices.²¹⁰¹ Thus it seems that Trouvé's insistence on moderation and political centrism had divulged into an even more divisive partisanship by the beginning of Vendemnaire Year VII. What is interesting however, is that among those who were renominated to the *Consiglio de' Juniori* from the *Gran Consiglio*, there were a handful of the most vocal progressive leaders, which included Pietro Dehò, Felice Latuada, Luigi Oliva, and Vincenzo Dandolo. These men were never members of the Thermidorian group and had been particularly powerful within the progressive power structure in Floréal and Prairial. It remains unclear why Trouvé would have included these men in the new construction of the *Consiglio de' Juniori*, given their power within the democratic side of the *Gran Consiglio*. Perhaps the only explanation is that these were included as a compromise to Brune in return for his

²⁰⁹⁹ "Milan le 22 fructidor l'an VI. Républicain L'Ambassadeur de la République Française près la République Cisalpine Au Directoire Exécutif de la République française", "AN, AF III/71. 290 Plaq. 1," fol. 238.

²¹⁰⁰ *Ibid* « AN, AF III/71. 290 plaq. 1 ».

²¹⁰¹ "Seduta XII [del Consiglio de' Juniori], 1 vendemnaio anno VI repubblicano I", Montalcini and Alberti, *Assemblee della Repubblica cisalpina*, 7:263–64. Discourse of Ramondini; Ramondini presents to us evidence that the *Juniori* had become more politically separated than ever. His motion requested that the "extremities" sitting at the wings of the chamber move to the middle when voting.

signature. Again, there remains no solid proof as to why these men remained however their position within the power classification of the new lower assembly remained high, though they did drop in rank.²¹⁰² More interesting is that unlike Polfranceschi, these men did not refuse their new charge; perhaps this was done in an effort to try and slow down any extreme reforms which Trouvé and his allies in the new *Consiglio de' Juniori* might attempt to enact.

With this in mind, the statistical breakdown of power under the new *Consiglio de' Juniori* under the initial Trouvé nomination is not unexpected. The most powerful overall representative was Michele Vismara, who was similarly ranked first in personal and legislative power and second in positional power. Once a neutral moderate Vismara became perhaps the most outspoken of the Cisalpine Thermidorians during and after the Messidor crisis. That said, after the Coup he seems to have reverted back to the more centralized position between the Brune and Trouvé camps. Those ranked next all tended to come from either the moderate and originalist side of the old *Gran Consiglio* political spectrum with Terzaghi, Bovara and Scarabelli placing second, third and fourth on the new power index and all tying for second on the participation index; all placed within the top 5 of every other Rank. In this way there is quantifiable proof that the new *Consiglio de' Juniori* was strongly controlled by a republican leaning Trouvéist leadership (See appendix_). Custodi reported that the leading members of the Council would meet with Trouvé in the evening to plan the resolutions to proceed through the Council for the following day.²¹⁰³ Similarly Alessandri and Lamberti, both figures close to Brune and the *Armée* despite their more conservative tendencies, were dismissed to guarantee Trouvé's legislation was implemented without question.

While the democratic Brunist faction did exist, those who led this group such as Latuada and Dehò (both 13 on the new power index, while on the participation index Latuada placed 12 and Dehò took the 30 spot due to his resigning only a few weeks after the Coup) had seen their level of influence significantly reduced. This was most likely due to the inclusion of more conservative Trouvéist representatives being added like Antonio Fenaroli, Antonio Somaglia and Antonio Veneri who did not participate much in debates but for sure supported the legislative

²¹⁰² The ranking system used to tabulate the power and leadership structure of Trouvé's new *Consiglio de Juniori* is nearly identical to that laid out in Chapter II for the *Gran Consiglio*. The only minor change is that the rankings for Commissions in Rank III do not differentiate between the various classes of commission assignments. This is because the new council was so short-lived and so poorly defined that the commission structures didn't offer any significant differences in legislative power like the *Gran Consiglio* commission structures did.

²¹⁰³ "27 Fructidor" Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 45.

agenda of stronger Trouvéists like Vismara and Scarabelli – both of whom served as the only presidents during the period.²¹⁰⁴ Similarly, as it became clear that the Trouvéist base would remain unchallenged, and that the external efforts by men like Francesco Reina and Giacomo Greppi were making headway in their efforts to reverse the 14 Fructidor Coup, democratic representatives followed Dehò's example and renounced their positions.²¹⁰⁵

However, Trouvé's conduct in the Cisalpine Republic did not seem to have been well received at home.²¹⁰⁶ Both Bonaparte in Egypt and the Directory in Paris harshly criticized the coup as a mistake. It had been rash and poorly planned, risking disruption to the fragile peace at the border with the Austrians (who had already been mobilizing as early as Messidor according to internal reports offered by Brune to the Directory²¹⁰⁷), and the internal stability of the Sister Republics. Much of this fear came from the reports delivered by Brune to the Directory in the days following the Coup.²¹⁰⁸ While Brune acknowledged that he followed the orders of the Directory to the letter, he expressed his belief that the manner in which Trouvé had composed himself, almost as a king or lord before the Italians, would lead to resentment among the Cisalpine political class, in particular the progressive wing which to that point had been a moderating voice on the left of the Cisalpine political spectrum. He believed that the 14 Fructidor transition was too unstable to succeed and requested that the coup be reversed and re-formatted in a more stable way. Brune now openly supported the opposition to Trouvé's Coup both inside and outside of the Assemblies. He threatened the Directors who remained, and who strongly supported Trouvé, such as Adelesio, that they might find themselves placed under arrest if funds for the military were slow in coming as a result of the chaos which had ensued from the coup.²¹⁰⁹ He wrote to the French Directory claiming fears that the new order in the Cisalpine Assemblies was not competent enough

²¹⁰⁴ Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia*, "patriota energico," 48.

²¹⁰⁵ "Seduta IV [del Consiglio de' Junio], 23 fruttidoro anno VI repubblicano", Montalcini – Alberti 1935, pp. 87; 97-98 Letter of absence or resignation from Peverelli, Perseguiti, Tadini, Bragaldi, Terzi, and Arici; The day after Trouvé's report which expressed how well the new legislative assembly was progressing, 5 of some of the most powerful democratic leaning representatives from the *Gran Consiglio* resigned their post. Over the next two weeks other important democratic leaning representatives like Cadice, Oliva, Mascheroni, Dehò and Piazza along with Thermidorian representatives who began to side against Trouvé such as Olivari and Valsecchi resigned their posts, often en masse on 1 and 2 Vendémiaire

²¹⁰⁶ "2 Complement." Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 46.

²¹⁰⁷ "Du quartier général de Milan le 5 messidor de l'an 6 de la République française, un et indivisible. Brune, Général en Chef au Directoire exécutif.", ASHD B3 54.

²¹⁰⁸ "Du quartier général de Milan le 18 fructidor de l'an 6 de la République française, un et indivisible. Brune, Général en Chef au Directoire exécutif." ASHD B3 55 n.d.

²¹⁰⁹ "8 vendemmiatore", Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 47.

to continue funding the *Armée* in such a dangerous time, pointing the finger at Trouvé and his own incompetence as the root of the problem.²¹¹⁰

These warnings from Brune concerning the financial inadequacies of the new regime, combined with already present fears of Trouvé's botched handling of the transition from one constitution to another seems to have finally forced the French Directory to acknowledge they had made a mistake with Trouvé, who was relieved of his charge as French ambassador in Milan in 21 Vendémiaire.²¹¹¹ In his place was assigned Joseph Fouché, who took his mandate to stabilize the political situation in the Cisalpine Republic seriously.²¹¹² Fouché had made a name for himself during the Terror as one of the more fervent defenders of the Revolution and a staunch Jacobin. Due to a combination of Fouché's lack of knowledge regarding Cisalpine politics and his general tendency towards more democratic politics, Brune was able to take unofficial control of the French political maneuvering in Milan from the moment the new ambassador arrived in the Cisalpine Capitol. On 28 Vendémiaire, a week after Trouvé's dismissal, Brune enacted a second coup which reversed many of the nominations put in place by Trouvé on 14 Fructidor. This second coup seemed to have been sanctioned by the leading members of the French Directory, including Rewbell and Barras, who hoped to reverse the political instability caused by Trouvé's disastrous handling of the 14 Fructidor coup.²¹¹³

The second *Consiglio de' Juniori* according to the nomination of Brune sat for the first time on 29 Vendémiaire, with the democratic (and now Brunist) representatives Dehò and Dandolo sitting as provisional secretaries to lead the early proceedings.²¹¹⁴ Dehò would be elected president of the new Assembly and Oliva the Secretary. The new roster of representatives returned the majority of the old *Gran Consiglio* representatives, notably including the twenty led by Polfranceschi who had rejected the invitation of Trouvé on 13 Fructidor. Among the most prominent *ex-Gran Consiglio* representatives were Mazzuchelli, Reina, Mozzini, Luini, Giuseppe Fenaroli (whom Brune had expelled on 24 Germinal), Vicini (who had been one of the

²¹¹⁰ "Du quartier général de Milan le 7 vendémiaire de l'an 6 de la République française, un et indivisible. Brune, Général en Chef au Directoire exécutif." ASHD B3 55 n.d.

²¹¹¹ "21 Vendémiai.", Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 48.

²¹¹² Visconti, *L'ultimo Direttorio*, 56.

²¹¹³ *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux*, 301 Tome II; Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia, "patriota energico,"* 49.

²¹¹⁴ "Seduta del Giorno 29 Vendemmailo" "Processo Verbale Del Consiglio de' Juniori 'Enrica Collotti Pischel' K6 DP.ST.3. Q.01 0029," 841.

Thermidorian representatives to turn against Trouvé for his handling of the 14 Fructidor coup) and Cavedoni.²¹¹⁵ Those who were excluded constituted the majority of the original Thermidorian group including Vismara, Scarabelli, Romani, Bovara, Aquila, Alpruni and Bossi, as well as a number of democratic representatives, like Salimbeni, which the Brunist faction viewed as traitors for their lack of resistance to Trouvé's policies.²¹¹⁶ Similar adjustments were made to the executive branch, with the prominent democratic ex-representative of the *Gran Consiglio* Gambari taking over as Minister of Justice and perhaps most surprisingly the radical neo-Jacobin Porro reclaiming the position he had left earlier as Minister of Police in the place of ex-Thermidorian Brunetti, now a Cisalpine Director. The constitutional circles were reopened as well with many of the prominent leaders like Vincenzo Monti being among the new nominees to the *Consiglio de' Juniori*.²¹¹⁷ Despite the personnel changes, however, Brune kept in place the new Cisalpine Constitution instituted by Trouvé. As this Constitution had been the original mandate of the Directory back in Nivose Year VI, it seems that Brune could not justifiably replacing the new Constitution without risking consequences from Paris.

The new iteration of the Consiglio de' Juniori was immediately racked with problems, however. More radical democratic representatives like Cavedoni protested the maintenance of the new Constitution from the onset, going as far as to accuse Brune of collusion against the interests of his former Cisalpine allies in the *Gran Consiglio*;²¹¹⁸ others like Reina immediately put in their resignation or refused their nomination on the grounds that they would not serve in an illegal assembly led by a constitution they did not recognize.²¹¹⁹ A split opened up between those Brunists who continued to oppose the new Constitution (such as La Hoz, Reina, Monti, Oliva and Cavendoni) and those loyal to Brune who were willing to accept the new Constitution if it meant they could put forward a more democratic legislative agenda than that proposed by the Trouvéists (such as Dandolo, Fenaroli, Compagnoni, Lupi, Latuada and Dehò).²¹²⁰ These lines delineated between those who would go on to have a renowned career under the Napoleonic Regime like

²¹¹⁵ "29 Vendemmiat." Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 50.

²¹¹⁶ "28 Vendemmiat." Vianello, 50.

²¹¹⁷ "30 Vendemmiat", Vianello, 52.

²¹¹⁸ "Seduta del 29 Vendemiale" "Processo Verbale Del Consiglio de' Juniori 'Enrica Collotti Pischel' K6 DP.ST.3. Q.01 0029," 844. Discourse of Cavendoni.

²¹¹⁹ "1 Brumaio", Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 51.

²¹²⁰ Carnino, *Giovanni Tamassia, "patriota energico,"* 51–52.

Dandolo and Fenaroli, and those who would exit political life like Oliva – or die fighting *against* the French like La Hoz.

Though the story becomes much more complex (see either Visconti or Carnino's examination of the legislative and military conflicts which plagued the Brunist *Consiglio de' Juniori* in the month of Brumaire) in the end the fracturing of the Brunist democratic faction proved fatal. As the issue of the constitution moved outside of the bounds of the legislative assemblies and into the external political discourse of both the departmental administration and the reopened constitutional circles, the rift grew between the two groups which only brought back the chaotic divisiveness of the Trouvé era a month before.²¹²¹ For the Directory looking back from Paris, instead of resolving the chaos which he had complained about after the 14 Fructidor Coup, Brune had only made the situation in the Cisalpine Republic worse.²¹²² Brune and Fouché were recalled from their respective positions as ambassador and General-in-Chief. Brune was replaced by the more moderate and less politically active French General Barthélemy Catherine Joubert, while Fouché found himself replaced by François Rivaud, a former Girondin with sympathies for the project of the French extreme center. As early as 27 Brumaire, word was beginning to spread that the reforms first instituted by Trouvé would be put back in place once Rivaud had established himself in Milan, and many among the old Thermidorian order would be returned to the Council.²¹²³ Rivaud and his Cisalpine allies among the old Trouvéist group seemed to recognize the possibility which the fracturing of the Brunist faction was offering them in the official establishment of the new Cisalpine Constitution. In the lead up to his own coup – the Fourth and final that the First Cisalpine Republic would see – Rivaud made alliances with many of the pro-constitution Brunists like Dandolo and Gambari and placed them in positions of power in the Executive ministry, which under the new constitution had a significantly greater autonomy and direct authority.²¹²⁴

²¹²¹ Vianello, *Un Diario Inedito Di Pietro Custodi: 25 Agosto 1798- 3 Giugno 1800*, 53–69.

²¹²² *Memoires de Larevellière-Lépeaux* II:312-313

²¹²³ « 27 Brumaio », Vianello 1940, p. 74 Custodi recounts a conversation between Castelfranchi and Tassoni (who he notes as being his brother-in-law) who told Castelfranchi, who in turn recounted to Custodi, that Rivaud was arriving to put Trouvé's reforms back in place. Therefore, it seems that while the Brunist faction of the new *Gran Consiglio* political spectrum was fracturing between constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists, the former Trouvéists were plotting their return to power.

²¹²⁴ Vianello, 73. Gambari would be made Minister of Finance and Dandolo the Secretary General of the Minister of Foreign affairs.

On 18 Fructidor Rivaud set in motion the coup, closing down constitutional circles and expelling from the Cisalpine government anyone known to have opposed the new constitution.²¹²⁵ With this coup a mixer of pro-constitution democratic representatives from the Brunist camp and many of the less extreme Trouvéists like Aquila, Vismara and Castelfranco formed a third and final iteration of the *Consiglio de Juniori*. This new Council had altered itself significantly from the progressive powerbase of the Floréal and Prairial *Gran Consiglio*. Though many of the same faces remained, the sense of Cisalpine political and legislative autonomy which had defined the progressive ideology in the spring of 1798 was no longer a central factor to the legislative agenda of the Cisalpine assemblies. The next 5 months would see peace but a stringent application of a legislative agenda which weakened the Cisalpine position before the French Republic. In the end, with the Coup of Rivaud, the final glimpses of influence which the *Gran Consiglio* had commanded not 6 months prior faded away and, in its place, rose a more moderate heavily French influenced political culture which would eventually morph into the Bonapartism of the later Napoleonic Republican and Imperial periods.

The *Gran Consiglio* and the French Republic had a relationship which is difficult to define because neither party was constructed of a singular homogeneous whole, politically, socially, institutionally, or legislatively. From 1797 to 1799 the system of alliances changed as frequently as the constitutional orders from which they originated, as did the individuals who made up the various ideological and political groupings which defined the period. Unlike other relationships which the *Gran Consiglio* had with their fellow Cisalpine institutions like the Cisalpine Directory or *Consiglio de' Seniori*, the French Republic was never seen as a rival for internal power. Despite the insistence of past – and some modern – historians, the *Gran Consiglio* never viewed the French Republic as anything more than a guiding light in its attempts to formulate a new republican society in Northern Italy. That said there were individuals from the French Republic such as Trouvé, Rivaud and Faypoult, who found themselves – either by design or through a series of unfortunate events – on the opposing political sides of the ruling parties within the *Gran Consiglio*. And yet, perhaps the most important feature of this Franco-Cisalpine relationship found within the *Gran Consiglio* was the continued importance of Napoleon Bonaparte as the central unifying factor of

²¹²⁵ “18 Frimale”, Vianello, 79–80.

legislative politics. Bonaparte, and his successors Berthier and Brune, established within the Cisalpine Republic a new form of republicanism which never fully developed in France before well into the Consulate period; it blended democratic-republican legislation, elite politics, and militarism into a new form of authority in the Revolutionary era. In effect what was born from the politics of the *Gran Consiglio* and its relationship to the French *Armée* was an early form of Bonapartism which would be homed in the years after the Cisalpine Republics fall and applied on an international level with the opening years of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

Despite its short life, the *Gran Consiglio* had a remarkable impact on the historical (and historiographical) progression of Northern Italian politics and society going into the nineteenth century. It was essentially the first successful Italian run modern republican legislative body. As Pocock has pointed out, republican assemblies had ancient origins which had affected the structures of the councils of the medial republics of Venice and Florence;²¹²⁶ these medieval Italian structures had created strong precedents which went on to influence the English of the seventeenth century,²¹²⁷ whom in turn influenced the Americans of the mid-eighteenth century²¹²⁸, whom in turn influenced the French of the late eighteenth century,²¹²⁹ who finally influenced the revolutionaries of the Cisalpine Republic.²¹³⁰ Yet at every stage in this development from ancient times, each successive republican assembly had added to the political, social and cultural structures of governmental function; in this way the Florentines were unique from the Cromwellians, who were unique from the Jeffersonian Democratic Republicans who were separate from French Jacobins. Thus, the Cisalpine Republic can be thought of as the culmination of centuries of political and legislative development as well as something wholly unique and new to Northern Italian society in the final years of the eighteenth century.

Even though the final chapter of this dissertation has successfully defined the high measure of French influence over politics and legislation during the *Gran Consiglio* period in the First Cisalpine Republic, Chapters II IV, VIII, IX and X successfully explain why the *Gran Consiglio* cannot be defined exclusively by its French counterparts in 1798. Still, the basis for almost all of the developments in political and legislative culture which defined the structures of republican

²¹²⁶ Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, 49–80.

²¹²⁷ Pocock, 361–65.

²¹²⁸ Pocock, 509–26.

²¹²⁹ Belissa, “La République américaine vue par les républicains français sous le Directoire,” 17; Belissa, 103–4, 120–22.

²¹³⁰ De Francesco, “Democratismo di Francia, democratismo d’Italia”; Gainot, “I rapporti franco-italiano nel 1799: tra confederazione democratica e congiura politico-militare.”

government in the *Gran Consiglio* was the French Constitution of Year III as well as the 9 years of French legislative history from the beginning of the Revolution in 1789; this is demonstrated plainly in the evidence proposed in Chapters V, VI, VII and XI. In the end, the argument made by this thesis is complex, in the sense that it seems contradictory. But society – in particular the elements of a society which govern it – are rarely simple, rarely black, and white. The *Gran Consiglio*, as the body uniquely charged with the conceptualization of law – and therefore the conceptualization of the regulations and structures of Cisalpine culture, politics, economics, and society – had the role of blending French Republican influence, past Italian *ancien regime* legal concepts and current Cisalpine social, political, cultural, military and economic developments. The system which the Council built – or at least attempted to build, often successfully – for Cisalpine society between 2 Frimaire and 12 Fructidor Year VI was necessarily complex in order to satisfy the needs of all three influencing elements. This balancing act between these three elements ironically formed a developmental autonomy which the other Sister Republics on the Italian peninsula were unable to enjoy due to a variety of factors including historical political cultures, size, political strength and degree of diversity (remembering that the Cisalpine Republic was originally made up of six historically different states). This autonomy, in turn, provided the tools for success in legislative and political cultural development which reflected a high degree of innovation in problem solving on the part of the Council as a single unit, despite the differences between its members.

This success, ironically, can be attributed to a variability in backgrounds between the individual men who took the title of representative of the *Gran Consiglio*. Much like their counterparts in France, the individuals who constituted the *Gran Consiglio* came from across the Italian peninsula.²¹³¹ Even more so than the French, who had seen a centralization of political authority since the mid-seventeenth century, the Italian states had remained politically separated in addition to the historical, linguistical, economic, and local cultural divisions which had marked *ancien regime* society across the Atlantic world in the late eighteenth century.²¹³² These divisions had allowed each individual representative to formulate their own conception of how republican society was to be instituted in the new Cisalpine territory, which was in itself an important part of the glue which was to bind the historically fractured political landscape of Northern and Central

²¹³¹ Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy 1796-1814*, 37–38; Tackett, *Becoming a Revolutionary*, 19–23.

²¹³² Gainot, “La Contribution de Jacques Godechot Aux Annales Historiques de La Révolution Française.”

Italy into a single national unit. This was of course, the central concept which defined late eighteenth century nationalism, the idea that the concerns of the citizenry – regardless of origins – would be successfully presented and resolved through the use of a diverse and highly knowledgeable representative body which came from across the nation. The truth of course was that the concerns of major political centers – most notably the cities of Milan, Brescia, Bologna, Bergamo, Modena and Ferrara – would find the concerns of their citizens represented more than those found in rural communities or tertiary cities like Sondrio, Rimini, Massa or Como. This is not to say that these areas were not represented (Dehò, Latuada, and Reina often fought on behalf of these peripheral zones and were the strongest representatives of the entire council); however, the political climate of 1797-1798, particularly during the period of direct rule by Bonaparte, saw a higher preference towards urban political minds, amassed in intellectual centers like Bologna, Pavia and Milan and not rural politicians. Thus, it is the composition of the *Gran Consiglio* which provides the evidence for the development of the political and legislative culture within its chambers – for example a higher tendency towards legislation impacting urban society over rural society.

Therefore, if one accepts that it is the political, geographic, and professional diversity of the individual representatives which specifies legislative and political production, and that the three elements of influence (French Republican, Italian *ancien regime* and Cisalpine current events) define the structures of Cisalpine political and legislative culture, it is fair to state that it is through the integration of the individual representatives experience into the three elements of influence which led to the formation of Cisalpine political and legislative culture in the *Gran Consiglio*. Put simply, these individuals transferred their biases, opinions, personal histories, and knowledge into the Cisalpine social fabric, by using a balance of legislative precedents and political ideologies established in the three elements of influence. This is seen in the way representatives acquired power, established internal rules, and held their colleagues accountable. The acquisition of power – be it personal, positional, or legislative – is regarded as the level of success an individual had at integrating his background into the three elements of power. Those who successfully acquired the highest power understood how to apply his own opinions, knowledge, and initiative through the lens of French Republican practices, Italian *ancien regime* precedents, or Cisalpine political conditions. Those who faltered in their ability to gain power often did so because they lacked an understanding of one of the three elements of influence, were unable

to specialize in an aspect of power, or had backgrounds which were unfavorable to the general political atmosphere of the *Gran Consiglio* – or at least became such as time went on. This union is also evident in the methods of regulation which the representatives adopted for themselves in the *Gran Consiglio*. These methods of regulation ensured that the most successful individuals would need to work within the bound of all three elements of influence, while simultaneously ensuring that individuals with a specific preferred background (highly educated, relatively politically centered, progressive but not disruptively so, favorable to the leadership of the French *Armée*, and adequately Italian nationalist) would be favored. When these conditions were not met – meaning power was accrued by those not of the correct profile or by not using a balance of the three elements of influence – the representatives of the *Gran Consiglio* would turn to the people to rectify the situation and hold rogue individuals accountable, thus restoring internal order and maintaining the trajectory of legislative and political cultural development.

It was this system – the empowerment of individuals with the correct personal profile and the continued balance of the three elements of influence – which saw the *Gran Consiglio* come to dominate the guidance of Cisalpine political culture, especially in the first half of 1798. The system maintained internal stability within the *Gran Consiglio* which allowed the dominant proto-factions, especially the progressive rationalists, to successfully push a legislative agenda which reflected their views of what Cisalpine republican society should be. The *Gran Consiglio*'s power lied in its ability to put forth a high volume of legislative proposals. The needs of the Cisalpine state being so great at the beginning of 1798 allowed the *Gran Consiglio* to harness the demand for their legislative production and used it to apply the dominant agenda within the council as the directing ideology for the entire Cisalpine political culture. This meant that while legislative debate may have been vigorous in the period of Frimaire to Fructidor Year VI, the efficiency and velocity of legislative production coming from the *Gran Consiglio* was extremely high and relatively effective in building up the Cisalpine state apparatus by the summer of 1798. In this way the *Gran Consiglio* came to outshine other governmental institutions such as the Executive Branch and the *Consiglio dei Seniori*, especially in the eyes of the French *Armée*.

However, this high level of legislative production, and the control which the *Gran Consiglio* exerted over the development of Cisalpine political culture was the direct reason for the conflicts which arose between it and the various other facets of Cisalpine government. The refusal

of the *Seniori* to approve *Gran Consiglio* proposals led to a stalling of the legislative process and an inability to see Council plans enacted. This meant that the *Gran Consiglio* could not see their idealized Cisalpine political culture come to fruition, a political culture which they believed was the only legitimate way to properly synthesize the correct personal profile of a Cisalpine citizen with the balanced three elements of influence. The *Seniori's* rebukes were tantamount to treason, especially for the controlling proto-faction in the *Gran Consiglio* whose ideas were the root of the romanticized Cisalpine political culture. This led to the events of 9 Ventose, the Coup of 24 Germinal and the continued fight with the disgraced *Seniori* leadership led by Aldini into Thermidor Year VI.

The situation was similar for the struggles between the Executive Branch and the *Gran Consiglio*. The conflicts with members of the Ministry, in particular with Ragazzi, the Minister of Interior Affairs, was a fight over control. By not applying the legislative output formulated by the *Gran Consiglio*, Ragazzi was challenging the supposed supremacy of the *Gran Consiglio* political system. Beyond the crisis of authority between the two branches, this challenge was seen in a similar light to the challenges of the *Seniori* and Aldini; a refusal to implement the republicanism formed within the *Gran Consiglio* was counter-revolutionary. This “counter-revolution” was dangerous and needed to be expelled if the Cisalpine state was to be successfully constructed. It is the same logic used against the Cisalpine Directory. The indifference of the Directory in implementing the republican society which the *Gran Consiglio* envisioned was frustrating for representatives, especially those from the dominant progressive rationalist persuasion. It was a challenge to the potential of the nation, and more than just laziness, seemed to demonstrate a lack of understanding both of the intentions of the *Gran Consiglio* in its legislative projects, and of the urgency with which these projects needed to be applied. It led many to see that Cisalpine Directory as not having the best interests of the nation at heart, and as such once again constituted an element of counter-revolution which needed to be cut out. The establishment of *Gran Consiglio* representatives as members of the ministry and foreign service helped to begin the process of sterilizing the executive branch of anti-*Gran Consiglio* influence and secure that the political culture being applied by the legislative output of the lower chamber was properly instituted. The Coup of 24 Germinal further succeeded in rooting out opposition to *Gran Consiglio* authority and brought the Executive Branch onside. As such the authority of the *Gran Consiglio* was secured

in Floréal and Prairial and the agenda ruled by the legislative and political culture of that body was implemented without resistance.

However, regardless of the attempts of representatives to formulate a political culture which would allow for successful state building and internal stabilization – a process which many viewed as fundamental to the continued alliance with the French Republic and the success of the greater European Republican project²¹³³ - the efforts of the *Gran Consiglio* had the byproduct of causing suspicion and animosity on the part of powerful actors in both the French and Cisalpine political establishments. Many, especially those among the French “extreme center” like Trouvé or La Révellière-Lépeaux, did not see the exponential rise in state building legislation and political cohesiveness within the *Gran Consiglio* as a positive; instead, they viewed it as a dangerous return to revolutionary norms of pre-Thermidorian political culture, and the potential for massive internal collapse which would menace the French Republican project (as well as the French Republican border). The truth of course was the exact opposite as *Gran Consiglio* representatives sought to distance themselves from Jacobin radicalism and Babeufian conspiracies at every turn. However long-standing ideas of Italian inferiority led many in the French establishment to doubt the Cisalpine ability to understand the true nature of Revolutionary government and philosophy, instead risking a collapse into either Jacobin extremism or Counter-Revolutionary regression. For this reason, the new constitution which gave the French greater authority to intervene in Cisalpine politics was proposed and Trouvé’s project enacted. Blindness on the part of these officials to the success of the *Gran Consiglio* project, a suspicion of the Council’s alliance with the *Armée* and the infiltration of the Council’s enemies into the inner circle of men like Trouvé, saw a degradation of the *Gran Consiglio*’s position. Beginning with the Messidor Crisis and the Cisalpine Thermidorian Reaction and ending with the Coup of Trouvé on 14 Fructidor Anno VI, the autonomy with which the *Gran Consiglio* had so successfully created their political culture was eradicated. This autonomy, which had been so essential in the creation of the political and legislative culture based on the perfect republican profile and the balance of the three elements of influence, meant an end to the independent development of effective and swift state building legislation.

²¹³³ Gainot, “Vers une alternative à la ‘ Grande Nation.’”

That said, the institutions which were formulated in this period would be effective in the application of future legislative development upon the return of the French and the beginning of the Napoleonic regime in 1801. Many of the greatest names of the Italian Republic and Kingdom of Italy, such as Vincenzo Dandolo, Giuseppe Compagnoni and Giuseppe Fenaroli, found their political voices as leaders in the *Gran Consiglio*. They would use the concepts developed during the period of autonomous political and legislative innovation in 1798 to adapt and successfully implement Napoleonic society to the Northern Italian cultural, social and economic condition.

The process of conducting this research project has provided a series of further questions which would be interesting for future exploration. Principle among these would be to understand the backgrounds of the other members of the *Gran Consiglio* who did not rank high enough to be included in the prosopographical study. Many of these like Francesco Melzi d'Eril and Luigi Castiglione were already important figures and have received numerous biographies both during the period and in the two centuries since collapse of the Napoleonic regime. However, the overwhelming majority remain largely unknown, and an exploration into their origins and why they were selected for their positions may give us further insight into the state of Cisalpine politics in the lead up to the Council's activation on 2 Frimaire Year VI. It would similarly be interesting to understand why these men either never sat on the council or were never able to accrue a high enough level of power to influence decision making. Another interesting question would take a greater look at the members of the leadership and their careers after the Napoleonic period. This is especially important in linking the Republican Triennio to the later Risorgimento movement for which historians have often placed the Cisalpine Republic as the opening act. A final topic of exploration would be to conduct a study of the *Consiglio dei Seniori* using the same methodology as was used for the *Gran Consiglio*

To conclude, the period of 2 Frimaire to 14 Fructidor Year VI in the First Cisalpine Republic should be defined by the *Gran Consiglio* who served as the controlling body central to the political cultural development of Northern Central Italian society in 1798 and beyond. The fundamental role which the *Gran Consiglio* had in the formation of Cisalpine legislation is undeniable, not only from the perspective of its constitutionally proscribed mandate, but also in the political role the council played within the larger scope of Cisalpine government. Until recent decades the Cisalpine Republic has often been overlooked as a petty failed experiment in French

style republicanism on the Italian peninsula. It has often been overshadowed for the relative lack of political drama it saw in comparison to the other Sister Republics on the peninsula. The truth of course is not so easily characterized. Nevertheless historians, particularly in the English language, continually perpetuate the myth that this Republic had little to offer the larger development of society in Northern Italy during the Age of Revolutions. It is my hope that after this dissertation, one can begin to see that the Cisalpine Republic was not only perhaps the most important of the Italian Sister Republics in terms of political development but was perhaps the most successful of all of the European Sister Republics at the end of the 1790s in establishing and adapting French Republican political practices to a local political tradition. It is also hoped that this thesis will help to begin a new way of examining the Republican period on the Italian peninsula within the English-language historiography. Finally, the ultimate purpose of this project was to highlight the importance of legislative production to the creation of revolutionary political culture at the turn of the nineteenth century. The *Gran Consiglio* as the first, and most important link in the chain of legislative production in the Cisalpine Republic has provided an incredible example, through the use of its *processi verbali*, to examine the process by which legislation becomes political culture and the central role of said political culture within the nation building process. The *Gran Consiglio* remains the clearest example of legislative government from the revolutionary period to have successfully adapted and applied the theories and practices of the legislature under the French Constitution of Year III to the economic, political, social, and cultural conditions of its nation, the Cisalpine Republic.

Appendices

Appendix A

Prosopographical data of the *Gran Consiglio*

Ordered according to participation index

Key=	elite	Leadership(non-elite)	Non-leadership
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The following table provides the raw data collected from a variety of sources (cited in Chapters I and IV) in order to construct the prosopographical information of the top 50% of the participation index described in Chapter II. The 118 individuals which are listed here have been ordered according to the participation rating and include relevant biographical information for each individual (where available; blanks are indicative of a lack of information). This table also includes the relevant proto-faction for which the individuals belonged according to the descriptions in Chapter III. The first 30 individuals have had their names highlighted in red to signify their position as a member of the Council elite, and the 30 individuals in green are highlighted as such for being members of the leadership but not influential enough according to the power ranking to be considered elite.

Name	Surname	Dept.	Birth Year	Age 1798	death year	Social class	Place of birth	Residence (1797)	Profession	Education	Political network 1796-1797	Political identity (proto-faction)
Felice	Latuada	Verbano	1750	48	1817	nobility	Milan	Varese	lawyer; provost	University (Padova)	Municipality di Milano	progressive radical list
Pietro	Dehò	Ticino	1775	23	1800	bourgeois	Chignolo	Pavia	Doctor	University (Pavia)		progressive radical
Giuseppe	Luini	Verbano	1765	33	1823	nobility	Luino	Milan	Aristocrat; juror		appellate court of Milan in municipality	progressive radical list
Luigi (Alvise)	Savonarola	Mela			>1816	nobility	Padua	Padova	Abbot; professor	University (Padova)	Municipality of Milan	neutral moderate
Giovanni	Vicini	Alta Padusa	1771	27	1845	bourgeois	Cento	Bologna	Solicitor	University (Bologna)	Cispadane Congress	neutral radical list

Giuseppe	Gambara (Gambari)	Reno	1763	35	1829	nobility	Bologna	Bologna	Lawyer, professor of law	University (Bologna)		progressive radical
Michele	Vismara	Olona	1760	38	1799/1819	nobility	Milana	Milan	<i>Obato</i> ; professor; priest	Seminary of Milan		neutral rationalist
Bartolomeo	Cavedoni	Panaro	1762	36	1826	bourgeois	Castelvetro	Modena	Municipal chancellor; radical politician	University (Modena)	Municipal government of Modena; Cispadane military	progressive radical
Lauro	Glisenti (Glissenti)	Benaco	1772	26		bourgeois	Salò	Brescia	Lawyer; solicitor	University (Pavia)	Brescian Republic	progressive rationalist
Vincenzo	Dandolo	Olona	1758	40	1819	bourgeois	Venice	Milan	Pharmacist; chemist; entrepreneur; journalist	University (Padova)	Provisional government of Venice	progressive rationalist
Angelo	Perseguiti	Crosto	1761	37	1826	bourgeois	Reggio	Modena	solicitor	University (Modena)	Cispadane Congress	neutral radical
Stanislao	Bovara	Montagna	1760	38	1812	nobility	Valmadrera	Lecco	Professor; ecclesiastic; magistrate of Lecco		Magistrate in Lecco under French controlled Lombardy	original rationalist
Francesco	Reina	Montagna	1766	32	1825	nobility	Lugano	Lecco	lawyer	University (Pavia)		progressive rationalist
Felice	Mozzini	Benaco			1842	bourgeois	Lonato	Brescia	notary		Brescian Republic	progressive radical
Vincenzo	Brunetti	Reno	1761	37	1839		Bologna	Modena	Notary; teacher; lecturer at the university of Bologna	University (Bologna)	Senator of provisional government of Bologna; Cispadane Congress	progressive rationalist

Giuseppi	Compagnoni	Basso Po	1754	44	1833	bourgeois	Lugo	Milan	Abbot; journalist; printer; politician	University (Bologna)	Cispadane Congress	neutral moderate
Giacomo	Greppi	Reno	1773	25	1836	nobility	Bologna	Bologna	paralegal		Cispadane Congress	progressive radical
Giordano	Alborghetti	Serio	1775	23	1834	nobility	Bergamo	Bergamo	Politician; journalist		Bergamo Revolt	progressive rationalist
Angelo	Scarabelli Manfredi Pedocca	Panaro	1742	56	1811	nobility	Mirandola	Modena	Engineer; soldier	University (Modena)	Head of the Cispadane legion; Military governor of Mantua	neutral moderate
Giambattista	Venturi	Crosto	1754	44	1819	nobility	Bibiano	Reggio	Professor of science and physics; public worker	University (Modena)	Cispadane Congress	neutral rationalist
Sebastiano	Salimbeni	Panaro	1758	40	1823	nobility	Spalato (Split)	Verona	Politician and soldier	Military college of Verona	Verona Uprising	neutral radical
Giuseppe Antonio	Sabatti	Mela	1757	41	1843	bourgeois	Gardone Valtrompia	Brescia	engineer	Engineering College (Brescia)	Brescia Republic	neutral radical
Luigi	Bossi	Olona	1758	40	1835	nobility	Milan	Milan	canon	University (Pavia)	Journalist and worker in the municipality of Milan	original rationalist
Giuseppi Necchi	Aquila	Olona	1754	44	1800	nobility	Pavia	Milan	Poet; politician; philosopher; magistrate	Scientific Academy of Milan (Brera)	Professor in the Academy of the "affidati" in Milan	neutral moderate
Giovanni Domasceno	Bragaldi	Lamone	1763	35	1829	nobility	Castel Bolognese	Modena	senator, politician,	Seminary and University (Bologna)	Senator of provisional government of Bologna; Cispadane Congresses	progressive rationalist
Giovanni Antonio	Tadini	Serio	1754	44	1830	nobility	Romano di Lombardia	Bergamo	ecclesiastic, professor, mathematician	University (Padova)	Bergamo Rebellion; member	progressive radical

											of provision al governme nt of Bergamas co Republic	
Francesco Antonio	Alpruni	Ticino	1732	66	1814	nobility	Borgo Valsugana, Trento	Pavia	professor; barnabite; teacher; theologian	Barnabite Congregation		originalist
Vincenzo	Federici	Adda ed Oglia				nobility	Val Camonica (Montecchio)	Val Camonica (Montecchio)	priest		Brescian Republic	progressive
Adeodato	Ressi	Rubicone	1768	30	1822	nobility	Cervia	Ravenna	Professor of science, economics, politics e commercial law	University (Pavia)	Public worker in Ravenna	neutral
Pietro Martire	Cadice	Alto Po					Cremona	Cremona	librarian			neutral radical
Pietro	Polfranceschi	Lario	1766	32	1845	nobility	Verona	Verona	soldier	Military college of Verona	Verona Uprising	neutral radical
Carlo	Cocchetti (Cochetti)	Mela					Rovato	Brescia	Merchant and banker			progressive radical
Giacomo	Lamberti	Crosto lo	1762	36	1838	nobility	Modena	Reggio	Professor of canonic law	University (Modena)	Cispadan e congress; Advisor to Bonaparte	originalist moderate
Giuseppe	Fenaroli	Mela	1759	39	1825	nobility	Brescia	Brescia	Republican aristocrat		Leoben; Rastadt; Bresian uprising; Bergamo Republic	neutral radical
Girolamo	Coddè	Mincio	1741	57	1801	nobility	Mantua	Milan	Public worker; academic	Università (Pavia?)	Public worker for the municipality of Modena	progressive radical
Alberto	Allemagna (Alemagna)	Verba no	1751	47	1828	nobility	Varese	Milan	Aristocrat; politician		President of the Administration of Milan	neutral moderate

Vincenzo	Massari	Basso Po	1760	38	1832	bourgeois	Ferrara	Ferrara	Public worker, merchant	College of Reggio	Public worker in Ferrara	progressive rationalist
Giuseppe	La Hoz	Mincio	1766	32	1799	nobility	Milan	Mantova	General		Head of Lombard legion; head of Cisalpine Forces; member of the Central committee of the Cisalpine Republic	neutral radical
Lorenzo	Mascheroni	Serio	1750	48	1800	bourgeois	Castagneta	Pavia	preist; mathmetician; professor	Seminary di Bergamo	Surveyor of Mountainous zones of Cisalpine Republic; member of the Bergamasco provisional government	progressive rationalist
Pietro	Terzaghi	Adda				nobility	Casalmaiocco	Milan	aristocrat		Administration of Milan	original rationalist
Luigi	Ramondini	Alta Padusa				nobility	Finale	Finale				progressive rationalist
Giuseppe	Mangili	Serio	1767	31	1829	bourgeois	Caprino Bergamasco	Caprino Bergamasco	Priest; intellectual	University (Pavia)	Society of public instruction	progressive rationalist
Giovanni	Lupi	Serio				nobility	Bergamo	Bergamo	Soldier		Commander in the Brescian and Bergamasco uprisings	progressive rationalist

Andrea	Terzi	Adda	1720	78	1799	nobility	Lodi	Lodi	Public worker			neutral rationa list
Ottavio	Mozzoni	Verba no	1760	38	1836	nobility	Varese	Milan	Public administrator			neutral modera te
Fedele	Bianchi	Lario				nobility	Chiavenna	Chiavenna				neutral modera te
Giuseppe	Lattanzi	Minci o	1762	36	1822		Nemi (RM)	Mantua	journalist			progres sive radical
Lodovico	Giovio	Olona	1772	26	1846	nobility	Milan	Milan	aristocrat	College unknown	President of the Patriotic Society of Milan	progres sive radical
Michele	Rosa	Rubic one	1731	67	1812	bourge ois	San Leo	Modena	Doctor; professor of medicine	University (Padova)	Professor of medicine; public administ rator	neutral rationa list
Federico	Mazzucchelli	Mela	1767	31	1805	nobility	Brescia	Brescia	ex-noble; patriot		Brescian uprising	neutral rationa list
Alessandro	Guiccioli	Lamo ne	1761	37	1840	nobility	Ravenna	Ferrara	Cavalier; public worker	College of Ravenna	Public worker of Ferrara; head of the National Guard of Ravenna	neutral rationa list
Giacomo	Valsecchi	Monta gna				bourge ois	Varenna	Gravedona	pretore			neutral rationa list
Felice	Manenti	Serio					Bergamo	Bergamo	patriota			progres sive rationa list
Giulio	Pallavicini	Verba no				nobility	Varese	Como				progres sive rationa list
Luigi	Oliva	Alto Po				nobility	Cremona	Cremona	Public worker		Commiss ioner of Emilia	progres sive rationa list
Fedele	Vertemate-Franchi	Lario				nobility	Chiavenna	Chiavenna	lawyer			origina list

												moderate
Bernardo	Ambrosioni	Serio	1771	27	1846	nobility	Bergamo	Poschiavo	Noble; printer	Ingolstadt		progressive radical
Antonio	Schiera	Lario				bourgeois	Valintelvi	Valintelvi	lawyer			original rationalist
Giuseppe	Piazza (Piazz)	Adda ed Oglio	1774	24	1848	bourgeois	Ponte	Ponte	Canon; printer		Patriotic Society of the Valtellina	progressive radical
Giambattista	Franzini (di Maffeo)	Serio	1760	38	1	nobility	Gardone Valtrompia	Pavia	Landlord; merchant			neutral radical
Carlo	Castelfranchi	Adda	1765	33	1842	nobility	Melegnano	Milan	Former nobility (possible priest)			neutral radical
Luigi	Valeriani	Lamone	1758	40	1828		Imola	Bagnacavallo	Lawyer; philosopher; priest	University (Bologna)	Provisional government of Venice	progressive rationalist
Pierto	Curti-Petarda	Lario				nobility			lawyer			neutral radical
Giacomo	Mocchini (Mocini)	Lario					Lonato	Lonato				neutral rationalist
Cesare	Montalti	Rubicone	1770	28	1840	bourgeois	Cesena	Assisi	Priest; poet	Seminary of Rimini	Professor and then constitutional committee of the Cisalpine Republic	progressive rationalist
Filippo (Or Pietro)	Severoli	Lamone	1762	36	1822	nobility	Faenza	Faenza	ex-provost; soldier	Pontific academy of Ecclesiatics	Administrator/Soldier	original rationalist
Giovanni Maria	Fontana	Ticino	1740	58	1802		Salò	Milan	professor; legal consultant, lecturer			neutral rationalist
Giovanni Battista	Guglielmini	Reno	1760	38	1817	nobility	Bologna	Bologna	Papal secretary; professor of mathematics	Seminary/University (Bologna)	Senate of the provisional government of Bologna; Cispadane congress	neutral rationalist

Samuele	Della (Dalla) Vida	Basso Po	1750	48		bourgeois	Ferrara	Ferrara	banker			originalist
Giovanni Battista	Paribelli	Adda ed Oglio				nobility	Albosaggia	Sondrio				progressive
Ottavio	Morali	Serio	1763	35	1826	nobility	Bonate Superiore	Isola	Priest (Jesuit); professor of literature and philosophy	College Mariano (Bergamo)		progressive
Pietro Antonio	Calvi	Adda ed Oglio					Edolo	Edolo				neutral
Luigi	Giani (ingegnere)	Verbano					Cassano d'Adda	Milan	engineer	College of Engineering (Brera)		progressive
Francesco	D'Arco	Mincio				nobility	Mantua	Mantua	Municipal administrator		Municipality of Mantua under the dominion of French Lombardy	originalist
Pietro/Carlo	Marieni	Serio	1771	27	1843	bourgeois	Averara	Bergamo	provost; professor	University (Pavia)	Professor at Pavia; Bergamasco revolt	progressive
Rocco	Varesi (Varese)	Alto Po					Soresina	Soresina				progressive
Ignazio	Pelosi	Adda ed Oglio					Sondrio	Sondrio				progressive radical
Gaetano	Conti	Reno	1773	25	1834		Bologna	Castel San Pietro	doctor; professor			neutral
Tomasso	Gatti	Alta Padusa										progressive
Benedetto	Mattia	Adda							ex-provost			progressive
Carlo Filippo	Aldrovandi (Marsecotti)	Reno	1763	35	1823	nobility	Bologna	Bologna	senator, politician	College of Bologna	Cispadane	neutral

											Congress	
Alfonso	Longo	Olona	1738	60	1804		Lecco	Milan	professor of canonic law, writer; ecclesiastic			neutral rationalist
Magno	Magni	Montagna					Dervio	Dervio	lawyer			progressive rationalist
Giuseppe	Carbonesi	Reno										progressive rationalist
Francesco	Gianni (Giani)	Rubicone	1750	48	1822		Rome		poet			neutral moderate
Giuseppe	Olivari	Panaro	1765	33	1826	nobility	Modena	Modena	aristocratic		Municipal government of Modena	neutral radical
Francesco	Mochetti (Mocchetti)	Lario	1766	32	1839	bourgeois	Lenno (Como)	Lezzeno	doctor	University (Pavia)	Doctor in Como	progressive radical
Giulio Cesare	Tassoni (Estense)	Reno	1759	39	1821	nobility	Adria	Bologna	Capitan of the ducal guard of Modena			neutral radical
Marc'Antonio	Cismondi	Adda ed Oglio					Breno	Brescia	aristocrat		Brescian uprising and Republic	neutral moderate
Antonio	Cagnoli	Benaco	1743	55	1816	nobility	Zante	Modena	Administrator; scientist; diplomat; secretary	Aristocratic secondary school		neutral rationalist
Rocco	Stefani	Alta Padusa					Persicento	Persicento	Doctor			neutral radical
	Desenzani	Benaco							Legal assistant			original rationalist
Antonio	Somaglia	Adda	1749	49	1814?	nobility	Milan	Milan	aristocrat		Municipality of Milan	neutral moderate
Giovanni Pietro	Carminati	Alpi Apuane					Castelnuovo di Garfagnana	Venice	Naturalist		Venitian provisional government	progressive radical
Domenico	Pelosi	Adda ed Oglio					Sondrio	Sondrio			Valtellina uprising	progressive radical

Alessandro	Isimbardi	Olona				nobility	Milan	Milan	Prefect lieutenant		Municipality of Milan	neutral rationalist
Giuseppe	Calcaterra	Lario	1767	31	1853		Milan	Como	lawyer			neutral rationalist
Levino	Menagliotti	Ticino	1750	48	1831		Milan	Milan	<i>podestà</i> , notary			progressive rationalist
Francesco Antonio	Peverelli	Lario					Como	Como				progressive rationalist
Giacinto	Zanni	Mela										progressive radical
Antonio	Campana	Basso Po	1751	47	1832	bourgeois	Ferrara	Ferrara	medico; studio di scienza naturalist; Professor	Università (Padova)	Cispadane Congress	neutral rationalist
	Romano (Romani)	Alto Po						Casalmaggiore	Priest			progressive rationalist
Tiberio	Fantaguzzi	Rubicone	1780	18	1841		Cesena	Cesena	Young patriotic agitator		Municipalità di Cesena	progressive radical
Giuseppe	Quadrio	Adda ed Oglio					Bormio	Bormio				progressive rationalist
Ettore (Giuseppe)	Martinengo (Colleoni)	Mela	1763	35	1832	nobility	Brescia	Brescia	Military captain; soldier; cavalier	Academie Militare	Brecian uprising and republic	progressive rationalist
Francesco Leopoldo	Cicognara	Basso Po	1767	31	1834	nobility	Ferrara	Vicenza	mechanic; poet and political commentator; art historian	Università (Modena)	cispadana	progressive radical
Antonio	Fabris	Adda										progressive radical
Giuseppe	Molteni	Ticino					Pavia	Pavia				progressive rationalist
Giuseppe	Biumi	Verba no	1749	49	1839	nobility	Varese	Milan	jurist; economist	Università (Pavia)	Monitore Veneto	neutral moderate
Antonio	Porcelli	Alto Po					Casalmaggiore	Casalmaggiore				progressive

												rationa list
Agostino	Salvioni	Alpi Apuane	1743	55	1823		Bergamo	Massa	priest		Bergamo uprising	progressive radical
Giacomo	Lecchi	Mela	1768	30	1845	nobility	Brescia	Brescia	Public worker	Private education	Brescian uprising	progressive radical
Giuseppe	Mingarelli	Reno					Terme	Bologna				progressive rationa list
Francesco (Barolomeo)	Carlioni	Alto Po					Cremona	Cremona				progressive rationa list
	Barazzoni (Barazzini)	Crosto lo					Lonato	Brescia				neutral rationa list
Carlo Luigi	Bassi	Alpi Apuane	1758	40		nobility	Mantua	Mantua	Public administrator			origina list rationa list
Giovani Battista	Bertanza (Bertanzo)	Benaco				nobility	Desenzano	Desenzano				progressive rationa list
Achille	Laderchi	Lamone				nobility	Faenza	Faenza	aristocrat		Brescian uprising	progressive radical

Appendix B

Tabulated data from *processi verbali* for all 238 nominated individuals nominated to the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI

Listed in Alphabetical order by Surname (with alternative spellings and titles)

The following table provides the raw data collected from the *processi verbali* between Seduta I on 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) and the final Seduta CCLXXVIII on 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). This data was taken for all 238 individuals to have been nominated as original representatives or substitutes. These numbers reflect the final total scores for the five primary categories of data extracted from the *processi verbali* and used to construct Ranks 1, 2, and 4 described in Chapters II and V. The information on commissions, used to construct Rank 3 and described in Chapters II and VI are presented in a separate appendix due to their more complex nature. This table also includes information on dismissals (the complete removal of a representative from his position), absences (only those noted for their importance, and which came with sanctions) and prorogations (requests for personal or professional time away from the council). The table is listed in alphabetical order.

Name	Surname	Discourses (TPS)	Attendance (VAS)	President (CPS before tripling)	Secretaries (SPS before quadrupling)	Inspectors (before doubling IS)	Dismissals/ absences/ prorogations
Francesco	Alberghetti	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Albertoni	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giordano	Alborghetti	109	83	18	13	0	0
Carlo	Aldrovandi	41	35	0	0	0	0
Alberto	Allemagna (Alemagna)	156	92	0	0	1	0
Francesco	Alpruni	147	85	17	0	0	0
Bernardo	Ambrosioni	59	57	0	20	0	0
	Antonioli	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Appiani	1	3	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Aquila (Necchi)	429	160	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Araldi	0	0	0	0	0	1
Lucini Marco	Arese	0	2	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Arici	0	5	0	0	0	0
Cesare	Bagolini	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Barazzoni (Barazzini)	2	7	0	0	0	0
Cesare	Bagnani	1	3	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Bassi	4	7	0	0	0	0
Nicolò	Battaglioni	0	0	0	0	0	1
Gaetano	Bellisomi	4	6	0	0	0	0
	Benini	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Bertanza	0	2	0	0	0	0
	Bertanza (Bertzano)	2	17	0	20	0	0
Giuseppe	Bertolesi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gaetano	Bianchi	1	54	0	0	0	0
	Bianchi	93	2	0	0	0	0
Ambrogio	Birago	0	1	0	0	0	2
Giuseppe	Biumi	11	9	0	0	0	1
Alessandro	Bolognini	0	4	0	0	0	0
	Bonfanti	2	6	0	0	0	0

	Borda	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Borgnani	0	1	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Bossi	0	104	0	0	0	0
Pietro	Bossi	261	1	0	0	0	0
Giovanni	Bottoni	0	0	0	0	0	1
Stanislao	Bovara	431	148	0	14	0	0
Giovanni	Bragaldi	141	97	0	7	0	0
Giacomo	Brioschi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vincenzo	Brunetti	489	150	16	0	0	0
Carlo	Bruni	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mattia	Butturini	0	1	0	0	0	0
Pietro Martire	Cadice	156	88	0	12	0	0
Antonio	Cagnoli	16	16	0	0	0	0
	Calcaterra	11	11	0	0	0	0
Pietro Antonio	Calvi	3	22	0	17	0	0
Antonio	Campana	0	7	0	0	0	0
	Canarisi	0	0	0	0	0	1
Giovanni	Capredoni	0	5	0	0	0	0
Prospero	Carandini	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Carbonesi	13	18	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Carlioni	0	7	0	0	0	0
Giovanni Pietro	Carminati	23	20	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Cassoli	0	0	0	0	0	1
Carlo	Castelfranco	140	81	0	0	1	0
Luigi	Castiglioni	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bartolomeo	Castiglioni	0	0	0	0	0	0
Federico	Cauriani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bartolomeo	Cavedoni	267	158	0	17	0	0
Giuseppe	Cavriani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Chiaromonti	0	0	0	0	0	0
Leopoldo	Cicognara	6	10	0	0	0	0
Marc'Antonio	Cismondi	27	23	0	0	0	0

Carlo	Cocchetti	99	70	0	0	1	0
Girolamo	Coddè	221	97	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Colalto	0	1	0	0	0	0
Abram Vita	Cologna	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Compagnoni	272	121	0	12	0	0
Gaetano	Conti	4	24	0	10	1	0
Luigi	Corbelli	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Cosigli	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferdinando	Cruppi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Cuggioli	0	1	0	0	0	0
Pietro	Curti-Petarda	83	55	0	0	0	0
Widman	Dana	0	0	0	0	0	1
Vincenzo	Dandolo	308	117	0	18	0	0
Francesco	D'Arco	31	27	0	0	0	1
Pietro	Dehò	684	164	13	11	0	0
Samuele	Della Vida	45	37	0	0	1	0
Magno	de'Magni	51	48	0	17	0	0
	Desenzani	20	18	0	0	0	0
Battista	Dure (Duri)	0	2	0	0	0	0
Mario	Fabbri	5	6	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Fabris	1	10	0	0	0	0
	Fantaguzzi	9	11	0	0	0	1
Vincenzo	Federici	95	80	0	21	0	0
Giuseppe	Fenaroli	126	57	32	2	0	3
Giuseppe	Ferro	0	1	0	0	0	0
Giacomo	Fongarezzi	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Fontana	18	19	1	0	0	0
Moisè	Formiggini	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giovanni Battista	Franzini	61	44	0	0	0	0
Giovanni	Gaggini	1	4	0	0	0	0
	Galeppini	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tomaso	Gallino	0	0	0	0	0	1

Giuseppe	Gambari	509	159	16	1	0	0
Fortunato	Gambazocca	0	4	0	0	0	0
Buonaventura	Gardani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tomasso	Gatti	64	47	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Germani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gerolamo	Gerolami	1	1	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Giani (ingeniere)	58	35	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Gianni (Giani)	18	12	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Giovanardi	0	2	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Giovanelli	0	3	0	0	0	1
Lodovico	Giovio	50	37	15	3	1	1
	Giudiccini (Guidicini)	1	7	0	0	0	0
Gaetano	Giudici	3	3	0	0	0	0
Lauro	Glisenti (Glissenti)	612	182	0	16	0	0
	Goldaniga	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ercole	Graziadei	1	5	0	0	0	1
Giacomo	Greppi	0	204	0	19	1	0
Fernando	Greppi	564	1	0	0	0	0
	Guarnelli	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Guerra	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giovanni Battista	Guglielmini	84	43	0	0	0	0
Alessandro	Guiccioli	104	55	0	0	1	1
Alfonso	Guidetti	1	5	0	0	0	0
Carlo Innocenzo	Isimbardi	3	10	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	La Hoz	135	63	0	0	2	2
Achille	Laderchi	0	6	0	0	0	0
Giacomo	Lamberti	110	65	0	8	0	2
Federico	Landriani	0	0	0	0	0	1
Giuseppe	Lattanzi	246	106	0	0	0	1
Felice	Latuada	650	209	0	22	1	0
Giacomo	Lecchi	4	7	0	0	0	0
Pier Luigi	Leonelli	0	0	0	0	0	0

	Lizzoli	0	0	0	0	0	1
Alfonso	Longo	12	18	0	0	0	0
Orioli	Lorenzo	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Luini	457	149	15	15	1	0
Giovanni	Lupi	204	105	0	0	1	0
Ascanio	Malacrida	0	0	0	0	0	1
Luigi	Malaspina	0	0	0	0	0	1
Felice	Manenti	56	50	0	13	1	0
Giuseppe	Mangili	62	51	0	17	0	0
Giuseppe Antonio	Marensi	2	3	0	0	0	0
	Marieni	13	27	0	9	0	0
	Marozzi	0	2	0	0	0	0
Ettore	Martinengo	9	10	0	0	0	1
Lorenzo	Mascheroni	122	65	0	0	0	0
Vincenzo	Massari	161	72	0	0	0	0
Benedetto	Mattia	49	33	0	0	0	0
Federico	Mazzucchelli	31	36	15	0	0	0
Francesco	Melzi	0	0	0	0	0	2
Podestà, Antonio	Menagliotti	2	11	0	0	0	0
Giacinto	Miani	0	0	0	0	0	1
Giuseppe	Mingarelli	6	10	0	0	0	0
Giacomo	Mocchini	10	24	0	14	0	0
Francesco	Mochetti	13	26	0	19	0	0
	Molla	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Molteni	17	19	0	0	0	0
	Monga	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cesare	Montalti	11	26	1	12	1	0
Ottavio	Morali	41	31	0	0	0	1
Alfonso	Mornico	0	0	0	0	0	2
Felice	Mozzini	336	158	0	14	0	0
Ottavio	Mozzoni	62	58	0	0	1	0
	Mucino	0	0	0	0	0	0

Galeazzo	Mugiasca	0	3	0	0	0	1
Cipriano	Nolfi	0	2	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Oliva	181	79	0	0	0	1
Giuseppe	Olivari	46	31	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Orrigoni	2	3	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Palcani	0	0	0	0	0	1
Giulio	Pallavicini	60	59	0	8	0	0
Giovanni Battista	Paribelli	64	55	0	0	0	0
	Pavesi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ignazio	Pelosi*	15	33,5	0	0	0	0
Domenico	Pelosi*	48	21,5	0	0	0	0
Angelo	Perseguiti	823	200	11	2	0	0
Manfredi Giuseppe	Pesci	0	4	0	0	0	0
Rodolfo	Pestalozzi	0	2	0	0	0	1
Ferrante	Petrocini (Petroccini)	3	6	0	0	0	0
	Peverelli	31	21	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Piazza (Piazzi)	29	38	0	16	0	0
	Piccioli	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Pindemonti	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pietro	Polfranceschi	178	93	16	0	1	0
Antonio	Porcelli	3	10	0	0	2	0
Carlo	Primavesi	1	1	0	0	0	1
Giuseppe	Quadrio	29	20	0	0	0	0
Ascoli	Raffael Vita	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ruggero	Ragazzi	0	2	0	0	0	2
	Raineri	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Ramondini	57	47	15	0	0	0
Francesco	Reina	536	179	0	0	0	0
Adeodato	Ressi	100	71	0	19	0	0
Stefano	Rocco	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Romano	36	23	0	0	0	0
Michele	Rosa	103	63	0	0	0	0

	Rossi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giuseppe	Rossignani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paolo	Ruffini	0	0	0	0	0	1
Luigi	Rusca	0	0	0	0	0	1
Antonio	Sabatti	140	95	25	7	1	0
Giuseppe	Sacchi	4	7	0	0	0	0
Sebastiano	Salimbeni	294	123	0	0	0	0
	Salvioni	19	20	0	0	0	0
Francesco	Sartoretti	0	1	0	0	0	0
Giovambattista	Savoldi	1	2	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Savonarola	403	184	16	7	0	0
Angelo	Scarabelli	269	118	0	0	1	0
Antonio	Scarpa	0	0	0	0	0	1
Antonio	Schiera	149	87	0	0	0	0
Cristoforo	Scotti	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pietro	Severoli	47	33	0	0	0	0
Carlo	Soglieri (Solieri)	7	9	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Somaglia	14	13	0	0	0	0
	Stefani	8	23	0	14	0	0
Dionigi	Strocchi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giovanni Antonio	Tadini	76	64	17	7	0	1
Cesare	Tassoni	6	16	0	0	1	0
Pietro	Terzaghi	214	104	0	12	0	0
Andrea	Terzi	117	67	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Terzoli	1	1	0	0	0	0
Rinaldo	Tommaselli	0	0	0	0	0	1
Gaetano	Urbani	0	3	0	0	0	0
Luigi	Valdrighi	0	0	0	0	0	1
Luigi	Valeriani	61	41	0	0	0	0
Giacomo	Valsecchi	39	50	0	23	0	0
Rocco	Varesi (Varese)	16	29	0	11	1	0

Paolo	Venturelli	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giambattista	Venturi	370	112	0	0	0	1
	Verga	0	3	0	0	0	0
Franchi Fedele	Vertemate	45	38	15	0	0	0
Camillo	Vezzoli	0	0	0	0	0	0
Antonio	Viappiani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Giovanni	Vicini	412	169	14	20	0	0
	Vigenti	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Villa	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michele	Vismara	366	140	18	8	0	0
Giacinto	Zanni	39	33	0	0	0	1
	Zorzi	0	2	0	0	0	0
	Zorzi	0	2	0	0	0	0

*Often it was not specified which of the Pelosi brothers spoke. In these cases, the criteria for discourses and attendance were attributed to both. Therefore, these numbers are statistically uncertain

Appendix C

Rankings and Indexes of the *Gran Consiglio*

For all representatives nominated between 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI (ordered according to participation index)

Key=	Original nominee	Substitute	Elite	Leadership (non-elite)
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The following table provides the final synthesized Ranks and ratings based on the information provided in Appendix B and E and whose composition is described in depth in Chapter II. Those to the left of the red lines are the variable Rankings 1 (personal power), 2 (verifiable attendance), 3 (legislative power), and 4 (personal power). Those to the right of the red line are the power and participation ratings with their corresponding scores (which sit to the left of each respectively). The individuals are listed by surname according to their order within the participation rating, and then in alphabetical order for all those not within the participation rating (marked with an n/I in the participation rating column). Those surnames listed in blue constitute the names originally nominated to sit on the *Gran Consiglio* by Bonaparte in Brumaire Year VI (early November 1797). All those surnames listed in yellow are substitutes nominated either by Bonaparte or by the Gran Consiglio at various times, to replace dismissed representatives. Some of those nominated (such as Perseguiti) were not nominated as substitutes officially but played this role. All data points highlighted in red signify those who belong to the elite of the leadership. Those in points in green belong to the individuals who were a part of the elite and not the leadership. The information presented in this table is based only on the data collected between 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) and 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798).

Surname	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Leadership Rank (TPS)	Power Index	Total Rank (GPS)	Participation Index
Latuada	3	1	5	7	15	1	16	1
Dehò	2	8	5	9	16	2	24	2
Luini	9	14	15	2	26	3	40	3
Savonarola	13	4	11	14	38	5	42	4
Vicini	12	7	25	1	38	5	45	5
Gambara (Gambari)	7	10	1	30	38	5	48	6
Vismara	15	16	15	8	38	5	54	7
Cavedoni	21	11	3	19	43	8	54	8
Glisenti (Glissenti)	4	5	24	23	51	10	56	9
Dandolo	17	20	14	18	49	9	69	10
Perseguiti	1	3	21	43	65	13	68	10

Bovara	10	15	25	25	60	12	75	12
Reina	6	6	4	61	71	17	77	13
Mozzini	16	11	28	25	69	15	80	14
Brunetti	8	13	25	35	68	14	81	15
Compagnoni	19	18	15	36	70	16	88	16
Greppi	5	2	66	14	85	23	87	16
Alborghetti	42	34	11	3	56	11	90	18
Scarabelli	20	19	5	52	77	19	96	19
Venturi	14	21	5	61	80	20	101	20
Salimbeni	18	17	5	61	84	22	101	20
Sabatti	35	28	37	4	76	18	104	22
Bossi	22	24	11	61	94	26	118	23
Aquila	11	9	37	61	109	34	118	23
Bragaldi	34	26	15	48	97	28	123	25
Tadini	51	44	19	11	81	21	125	26
Alpruni	33	33	28	32	93	24	126	27
Federici	47	36	37	10	94	26	130	28
Ressi	45	39	32	16	93	24	132	29
Cadice	30	31	37	36	103	31	134	30
Polfranceschi	28	29	47	34	109	34	138	31
Cocchetti (Cochetti)	46	40	2	52	100	30	140	32
Fenaroli	38	49	57	4	99	29	148	33
Lamberti	41	42	21	46	108	33	150	34
Coddè	24	26	47	61	132	41	158	35
Allemagna (Alemagna)	30	30	47	52	129	40	159	36
Massari	29	38	32	61	122	39	160	37
La Hoz	37	45	32	49	118	37	163	38
Mascheroni	39	42	21	61	121	38	163	38
Terzaghi	25	24	78	36	139	44	163	38
Ramondini	61	59	5	39	105	32	164	41
Mangili	54	55	37	19	110	36	165	42
Lupi	26	23	66	52	144	48	167	43
Terzi	40	41	37	61	138	43	179	44
Mozzoni	54	48	37	52	143	46	191	45
Bianchi	48	54	32	61	141	45	195	46
Lattanzi	23	22	92	61	176	n/i	198	47
Giovio	64	66	47	25	136	42	202	48
Rosa	44	45	57	61	162	55	207	49
Mazzucchelli	76	68	28	39	143	46	211	50
Guiccioli	43	51	66	52	161	53	212	51

Valsecchi	73	56	78	6	157	51	213	52
Manenti	62	56	66	30	158	52	214	53
Oliva	27	37	92	61	180	n/i	217	54
Pallavicini	58	47	66	46	170	58	217	55
Vertemate-Franchi	69	65	47	39	155	49	220	56
Ambrosioni	59	49	104	12	175	n/i	224	57
Schiera	32	32	104	61	197	n/i	229	58
Piazza (Piazz)	79	64	66	23	168	57	232	59
Franzini	56	61	57	61	174	59	235	60
Castelfranco	35	35	114	52	201	n/i	236	61
Valeriani	56	63	57	61	174	59	237	62
Curti-Petarda	50	51	78	61	189	n/i	240	63
Moccini (Mocini)	99	82	37	25	161	53	243	64
Montalti	96	80	37	33	166	56	246	65
Severoli	67	72	47	61	175	n/i	247	66
Fontana	85	93	19	51	155	49	248	67
Guglielmini	49	62	78	61	188	n/i	250	68
Della (Dalla) Vida	69	66	66	52	187	n/i	253	69
Paribelli	52	51	92	61	205	n/i	256	70
Morali	71	75	57	61	189	n/i	264	71
Calvi	113	87	47	19	179	ni	266	72
Giani (ingegnere)	60	69	78	61	199	n/i	268	73
D'Arco	76	78	57	61	194	n/i	272	74
Marieni	92	78	57	45	194	n/i	272	75
Varesi (Varese)	88	77	66	42	196	n/i	273	76
Pelosi	65	71	78	61	204	n/i	275	77
Gatti	52	59	104	61	217	n/i	276	78
Mattia	65	72	78	61	204	n/i	276	78
de'Magni	63	58	139	19	221	n/i	279	80
Aldrovandi	71	69	78	61	210	n/i	279	80
Longo	95	95	28	61	184	n/i	279	80
Conti	108	82	47	44	199	n/i	281	83
Carbonesi	92	95	37	61	190	n/i	285	84
Gianni (Giani)	85	102	47	61	193	n/i	295	85
Olivari	68	75	92	61	221	n/i	296	86
Mochetti (Mocchetti)	92	80	114	16	222	n/i	302	87
Tassoni	104	99	47	52	203	n/i	302	87
Cismondi	81	84	78	61	220	n/i	304	89
Cagnoli	88	99	66	61	215	n/i	314	90

Stefani	102	84	104	25	231	n/i	315	91
Desenzani	83	95	78	61	222	n/i	317	92
Somaglia	91	101	66	61	218	n/i	319	93
Carminati	82	90	92	61	235	n/i	325	94
Pelosi	90	88	92	61	243	n/i	331	95
Isimbardi	114	106	57	61	232	n/i	338	96
Calcaterra	96	103	78	61	235	n/i	338	97
Menagliotti	118	103	57	61	236	n/i	339	98
Peverelli	76	89	114	61	251	n/i	340	99
Zanni	73	72	139	61	273	n/i	345	100
Campana	139	114	32	61	232	n/i	346	101
Romano (Romani)	75	84	128	61	264	n/i	348	102
Fantaguzzi	100	103	92	61	253	n/i	356	103
Quadrio	79	90	128	61	268	n/i	358	104
Martinengo	100	106	92	61	253	n/i	359	105
Bellisomi	108	121	114	61	283	n/i	404	105
Cicognara	104	106	92	61	257	n/i	363	106
Bianchi (antonio)	124	143	139	61	324	n/i	467	106
Molteni	87	93	128	61	276	n/i	369	107
Fabris	124	106	78	61	263	n/i	369	107
Biumi	96	112	104	61	261	n/i	373	110
Porcelli	114	106	104	49	267	n/i	373	110
Salvioni	84	90	139	61	284	n/i	374	111
Mingarelli	104	106	104	61	269	n/i	375	112
Lecchi	108	114	92	61	261	n/i	375	112
Carlioni	139	114	66	61	266	n/i	380	114
Barazzoni (Barazzini)	118	114	92	61	271	n/i	385	115
Bonfanti	118	121	104	61	283	n/i	404	115
Bassi	108	114	104	61	273	n/i	387	116
Bertanza (Bertanzo)	139	98	139	12	290	n/i	388	117
Laderchi	139	121	78	61	278	n/i	399	118
Arici	139	126	78	61	278	n/i	404	n/i
Sacchi	108	114	128	61	297	n/i	411	n/i
Giudicini (Guidicini)	124	114	114	61	299	n/i	413	n/i
Soglieri (Solieri)	103	112	139	61	303	n/i	415	n/i
Fabbri	107	121	128	61	296	n/i	417	n/i
Greppi	139	155	66	61	266	n/i	421	n/i
Graziadei	124	126	114	61	299	n/i	425	n/i
Guidetti	124	126	114	61	299	n/i	425	n/i

Mugiasca	139	134	92	61	292	n/i	426	n/i
Gaggini	124	130	114	61	299	n/i	429	n/i
Bargnani	124	134	114	61	299	n/i	433	n/i
Bolognini	139	130	104	61	304	n/i	434	n/i
Petrocini (Petroccini)	114	121	139	61	314	n/i	435	n/i
Capredoni	139	126	114	61	314	n/i	440	n/i
Gambazocca	139	130	114	61	314	n/i	444	n/i
Pesci	139	130	114	61	314	n/i	444	n/i
Giudici	114	134	139	61	314	n/i	448	n/i
Verga	139	134	114	61	314	n/i	448	n/i
Marensi	118	134	139	61	318	n/i	452	n/i
Orrignoni	118	134	139	61	318	n/i	452	n/i
Appiani	124	134	139	61	324	n/i	458	n/i
Bertanza	118	143	139	61	318	n/i	461	n/i
Urbani	139	134	128	61	328	n/i	462	n/i
Savoldi	124	143	139	61	324	n/i	467	n/i
Birago	139	155	114	61	314	n/i	469	n/i
Dure	139	143	128	61	328	n/i	471	n/i
Nolfi	139	143	128	61	328	n/i	471	n/i
Pestallozzi	139	143	128	61	328	n/i	471	n/i
Giovannardi	139	134	139	61	339	n/i	473	n/i
Gerolami	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Piccioli	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Primavesi	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Rocco	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Terzoli	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Vigenti	124	155	139	61	324	n/i	479	n/i
Arese (Aresi)	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Giovanelli	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Marozzi	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Ragazzi	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Zorzi	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Zorzi	139	143	139	61	339	n/i	482	n/i
Borgnani	139	155	128	61	328	n/i	483	n/i
Bossi	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Butturini	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Colalto	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Cuggioli	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Ferro	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Guarnelli	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i
Sartoretti	139	155	139	61	339	n/i	494	n/i

Bertolesi	139	171	128	61	328	n/i	499	n/i
Alberghetti	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Albertoni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Antonioli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Araldi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Bagolini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Battaglioni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Benini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Borda	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Bottoni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Brioschi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Bruni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Canarisi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Carandini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cassoli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Castiglioni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Castiglioni	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cauriani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cavriani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Chiaramonti	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cologna	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Corbelli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cosigli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Cruppi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Dana	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Fongarezzi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Formiggini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Galeppini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Gallino	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Gardani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Germani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Goldaniga	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Guerra	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Landriani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Leonelli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Lizzoli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Lorenzo	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Malacrida	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Malaspina	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Melzi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Miani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i

Molla	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Monga	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Mornico	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Mucino	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Palcani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Pavesi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Pindemonti	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Raffael Vita	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Raineri	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Rossi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Rossignani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Ruffini	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Rusca	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Scarpa	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Scotti	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Strocchi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Tommaselli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Valdrighi	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Venturelli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Vezzoli	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Viappiani	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i
Villa	139	171	139	61	339	n/i	510	n/i

Appendix D

Rankings and Indexes of the *Consiglio de' Juniori*

For all representatives nominated by Trouvé after the 14 Fructidor Year VI Coup until 28 Vendemnaire Year VII Coup of Brune

Key=	Elite	Leadership (non-elite)
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(ordered according to participation index)

The following table provides the Ranks and Ratings according to the same collection methodology found in Appendix C, however with a different set of data. While the formation of the Ranks and ratings are identical, the raw data used to create this new set was extracted from the *processi verbali* of the *Consiglio de' Juniori* after the Coup of 14 Fructidor. The new raw data was collected for all sessions between 14 Fructidor Year VI (31 August 1798) and 28 Vendemnaire Year VII (19 October 1798), the day of the Second Coup of Brune. The surnames listed in this table belong to those nominated by French Ambassador Claude-Joseph Trouvé to sit on the newly established *Consiglio de' Juniori* under the new constitutional order of the Cisalpine Republic in the fall of 1798 referenced in the Epilogue of Chapter XI. The raw information extracted from the *processi verbali* to construct these rankings will not be presented as they are outside the scope of the project. However, this table was included to help visualize the change in power dynamics which occurred following the Coup of Trouvé which was covered in Chapter XI.

Surname	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Leadership Rank (TPS)	Power Index	Total Rank (GPS)	Participation Index
Vismara	1	1	1	2	4	1	5	1
Bovara	2	4	2	6	10	2	14	2
Scarabelli	5	2	2	5	12	3	14	2
Terzaghi	8	5	6	1	15	4	20	2
Oliva	6	2	4	13	23	9	25	5
Salimbeni	7	5	2	13	22	8	27	6
Cadice	15	9	1	3	19	5	28	7
Perseguiti	4	8	5	11	20	7	28	7
Massari	9	12	2	13	24	10	36	9
Aquila	12	9	2	13	27	12	36	9
Bossi	14	9	1	13	28	15	37	11
Dehò	12	17	2	13	27	12	44	12
Dandolo	10	23	3	13	26	11	49	14
Savonarola	21	14	1	13	35	20	49	14
Alborghetti	21	14	3	13	37	22	51	15
Castelfranco	19	14	6	13	38	23	52	16

Carbonesi	25	21	6	4	35	20	56	17
Valeriani	16	27	1	13	30	16	57	18
Romano (Romani)	23	17	4	13	40	24	57	18
Guglielmini	3	39	3	13	19	5	58	20
Della (Dalla) Vida	26	17	2	13	41	26	58	20
Guidiccini	32	12	1	13	46	31	58	20
Curti-Petarda	23	17	6	13	42	27	59	23
Peverelli	19	27	1	13	33	19	60	24
Girolami	39	5	6	13	58	42	63	25
Giani (ingeniere)	16	34	2	13	31	17	65	26
Olivari	30	27	2	8	40	24	67	27
Rosa	27	24	3	13	43	28	67	27
Marieni	27	24	6	13	46	30	70	29
Latuada	11	44	3	13	27	12	71	30
Alpruni	31	27	2	13	46	31	73	31
Quadrio	39	27	1	8	48	35	75	32
Pallavicini	36	24	3	13	52	38	76	33
Mosca	36	27	3	13	52	38	79	34
de'Magni	18	49	6	7	31	17	80	35
Vertemate- Franchi	32	34	2	13	47	34	81	36
Gianni (Giani)	29	41	1	13	43	28	84	37
Aldrovandi	36	34	1	13	50	36	84	37
Ramondini	35	34	3	13	51	37	85	39
Terzi	32	44	1	13	46	31	90	40
Allemagna (Alemagna)	39	39	1	13	53	40	92	41
Pindemonti	43	34	4	13	60	46	94	42
Maggi	62	21	1	13	76	n/i	97	43
Morali	42	41	2	13	57	41	98	44
Saivioli	44	44	2	13	59	44	103	45
Gaggini	62	27	1	13	76	n/i	103	45
Rezia	46	44	1	13	60	45	104	47
Rossignani	54	41	2	13	69	57	110	48
Montalti	46	49	6	13	65	49	114	49
Urbani	46	49	6	13	65	49	114	49
Barazzoni (Barazzini)	54	49	1	13	68	54	117	51
Soglieri (Solieri)	54	49	1	13	68	54	117	51
Bragaldi	46	60	1	13	60	46	120	53
Porcelli	62	44	1	13	76	n/i	120	53

Arese (Aresi)	62	49	2	8	72	60	121	55
Desenzani	54	49	6	13	73	n/i	122	56
Pisoni	44	66	1	13	58	43	124	57
Piazza (Piazzi)	46	60	6	13	65	49	125	58
Bolognini	62	49	1	13	76	n/i	125	58
Vanotti	62	49	1	13	76	n/i	125	58
Mingarelli	62	49	2	12	76	n/i	125	58
Longo	46	66	2	13	61	48	127	62
Zorzi	54	60	1	13	68	54	128	63
Fontana	54	60	2	13	69	57	129	64
Fenaroli	62	49	6	13	81	n/i	130	65
Fabbri	46	66	6	13	65	49	131	66
Rossi	46	66	6	13	65	49	131	66
Molteni	62	60	2	13	77	n/i	137	68
Bellisomi	62	60	6	13	81	n/i	141	69
Fabris	54	73	2	13	69	57	142	70
Carlioni	62	66	3	13	78	n/i	144	71
Ambrosioni	62	66	6	13	81	n/i	147	72
Appiani	62	73	1	13	76	n/i	149	73
Castiglioni	62	73	2	13	77	n/i	150	74
Mascheroni	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75
Mattia	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75
Somaglia	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75
Tadini	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75
Valsecchi	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75
Veneri	62	73	6	13	81	n/i	154	75

Appendix E

Commissions of the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI

Listed according to type with final tabulation for all 238 Representatives

The following tables provide the raw information extracted from the *processi verbali* of the *Gran Consiglio* regarding commissions collected between 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) and 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). This information was the focus of Chapter VI and has been provided here in these series of tables to help augment the argument made in that chapter. The tables present each of the three forms of commissions (permanent, semi-permanent and special) explained in Chapters II and VI along with the individual representatives who belonged to each commission. These tables also demonstrate next to the surname of the representative the dates of dismissal or addition/substitution (the one exception is the table referring to semi-permanent commissions which explains the term upon which each iteration of the commission sat). Following the tables of the three forms there is a table providing the raw data for each individual representative including the numbers constructing the PCS, SPCS, and SCS. The final weighted TPLS is also presented for each representative which is used to formulate Rank 3 according to Chapters II and VI. The final table has the representatives listed in alphabetical order.

Permanent Commissions (listed in chronological order of formation)

Military	Birago (Dismissed 9 Nîvose) La Hoz (Dismissed 23 Germinal Lupi Martinengo (dismissed Nîvose) Mugiasca (dismissed 15 Nîvose) Sabatti Scarabelli Polfranceschi (added 8 Nîvose) Tassoni (added 8 Nîvose) Persequiti (added 1 Germinal) Ramondini(added 1 Germinal) Venturi (added 1 Germinal) Alborgetti (added 22 Floréal) Salimbeni (added 22 Floréal)
Finance	Savonarola (dismissed 25 Messidor) Laderchi (dismissed 25 Messidor) Guglielmini Fenaroli (dismissed 24 Germinal) Biumi (dismissed 24 Nîvose) Aquila Ambrosioni (added 2 Nîvose; dismissed 25 Messidor)

	<p>Ressi (added 2 Nîvose) Bovara (added 25 Pluviôse) Mariani (added 25 Pluviôse; dismissed 25 Messidor) Mocchetti (added 25 Pluviôse; dismissed 25 Messidor) D'Arco (added 28 Germinal; dismissed 25 Messidor) Massari (added 28 Germinal; dismissed 25 Messidor) Longo (added 25 Messidor) Mangili (added 25 Messidor) Allemagna (added 25 Messidor)</p>
Commerce	<p>Dandolo (dismissed 25 Messidor) Della Vida (dismissed 25 Messidor) Franzini (dismissed 25 Messidor) Massari (dismissed 25 Messidor) Mazzucchelli (dismissed 25 Messidor) Valeriani (dismissed 25 Messidor) Venturi (dismissed 25 Messidor) Lamberti (added 9 Pluviose; dismissed 19 Germinal) Bragaldi (added 25 Messidor) Bianchi (added 25 Messidor) Cocchetti (added 25 Messidor) Cadice (added 25 Messidor) Savonarola (added 25 Messidor) Salvioni (added 25 Messidor)</p>
Public Instruction	<p>Alpruni Compagnoni Fontana Giani (Francesco) Mascheroni Morali Tadini (dismissed 27 Germinal)</p>
Legislation	<p>Gambari Latuada Mozzini Perseguiti Reina Schiera Lamberti (dismissed 19 Germinal) Calcaterra (added 2 Nîvose) Luini (added 2 Nîvose) Vicini (added 13 Pluviôse) Salimbeni (added 13 Pluviôse)</p>

	Mozzoni (added 13 Pluviôse) Glissenti (added 13 Pluviôse) Brunetti (added 13 Pluviôse) Menagliotti (added 19 Germinal)
Public Welfare	Alborghetti Bragaldi Carbonesi Cavedoni Federici Mariani Mattia
Ecclesiastical	Dehò Ramondini Terzaghi Venturi (added 24 Nîvose) Alpruni (added 24 Nîvose)
Publication of the Law	Cocchetti Dandolo Latuada Mascheroni Savonarola Lattanzi (added 11 Nîvose) Valsecchi (added 11 Nîvose) Salimbeni (added 1 Ventose)
Theatres	Cavedoni Cocchetti Dandolo Giani (Francesco) Reina
National Goods	Zani (dismissed 24 Germinal) Venturi Valeriani Gambari Compagnoni Paribelli (added 28 Germinal)
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals	Gambari Severoli Tassoni Vicini (added 24 Nîvose) Reina (added 24 Nîvose) Lamberti (dismissed 19 Germinal) Pallavicini (added 19 Germinal)
Public Spectacles and Festivals	Carbonesi Compagnoni Mocchetti Salimbeni

	Salvioni
Diplomacy	Bossi Bovara Gambari Reina Scarabelli
National Guard	Alborghetti La Hoz (dismissed 23 Germinal) Lupi Martinengo (dismissed 19 Pluviôse) Mugiasca (dismissed 15 Nîvose) Sabatti Scarabelli
Citizenship*	Alborghetti Latuada Manenti Bragaldi (added 10 Frimale) Guiccioli (added 10 Frimale) Severoli (added 10 Frimale) Somaglia (added 10 Frimale)
Departments	Savonarola Tadini (dismissed 27 Germinal) Fontana Guglielmini Compagnoni Giani (Luigi) Bovara (added 18 germinal) Cadice (added 18 germinal) Carlioni (added 18 germinal) Reina (added 18 germinal) Somaglia (added 18 germinal) Terzaghi (added 18 germinal)
Council of Twenty (Departmental nominations)	Terzi Piazza Carminati Ramondini Varesi Campana Mocchetti Fenaroli (dismissed 24 Germinal) D'Arco (dismissed 27 Floréal) Bovara Giovio (dismissed 24 Germinal) Cavedoni Gambari Montalti

	Alborghetti Alpruni Latuada Mozzini Perseguiti Bragaldi Lattanzi (added 27 Floréal)
Sanitation	Campana Dandolo Conti Ramondini Cocchetti Dehò (added 2 Floréal) Savonarola (added 2 Floréal)
Coins and Money	Bossi Coddè Longo Mascheroni Massari Mazzucchelli Venturi
Vote counters for Directorial Elections	Alborghetti Bolognini Calcaterra Cavedoni Della Vida Desenzani Fantaguzzi Lecchi Luini Morali Mozzini Parabelli Pelosi (Domenico) Petrocini Scarabelli
Organization of the Piazzas	La Hoz (dismissed 23 Germinal) Sabatti Scarabelli Coddè Carbonesi Terzi Savonarola
Districts	Calvi Cocchetti Fontana

	Franzini Mascheroni Pelosi (Ignazio) Tadini (dismissed 27 Germinal)
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*Originally formed on 6 Frimale as a special committee it was upgraded to a permanent committee on 10 Frimaire

Semi-permanent Commissions (listed according to chronological order of Iteration)

Petitions

21 Frimaire – 3 Nîvose	Conti D'arco Glissenti Montalti Ramondini
3 Nîvose – 11 Nîvose	Campana Carbonesi Lecchi Piazza
11 Nîvose – 23 Nîvose	Desenzani Franzini Mingarelli Pelosi (Ignazio) Vertemate-Franchi
22 Nîvose – 3 Pluviôse	Calvi Cocchetti Curti-Petrarda Salimbeni Terzi
3 Pluviôse – 11 Pluviôse	Cicognara Gatti Giovio Stefani Vicini
11 Pluviôse – 22 Pluviôse	Bonfanti Carloni Cismondi Mangili Mocchetti
22 Pluviôse – 29 Pluviôse	Barazzoni Calvi Fantaguzzi

	Porcelli Varesi
4 Ventose – 27 Ventose	Alborghetti Cadice Mariani Peverelli Varesi
27 Ventose – 11 Germinal	Alborghetti Bellisomi Federici Franzini Pelosi (Ignazio)
11 Germinal – 21 Germinal	Calcaterra Massari Mattia Menagliotti Sacchi
21 Germinal – 1 Floréal	Carminati Cismondi Bonfanti Gruppi Bolognini
1 Floréal – 11 Floréal	Alborghetti Molteni Paribelli Ramondini Rosa
11 Floréal – 22 Floréal	Capredoni Graziadei Guidetti Pelosi (Domenico) Salvioni
22 Floréal – 1 Prairial	Bassi Campana Pestalozzi Romano Stefani
1 Prairial – 11 Prairial	Arici Barazzoni Bargnani Orrigioni Verga
11 Prairial – 21 Prairial	Bellisomi Valsecchi Menagliotti Terzi

	Urbani
21 Prairial – 2 Messidor	Curti-Petrarda Desenzani Nolfi Petrocini Severoli
2 Messidor – 11 Messidor	Bertolesi Calvi Greppi Morali Salvioni
11 Messidor – 21 Messidor	Alborghetti Barazzoni Carminati Pallavicini Porcelli
21 Messidor- 2 Thermidor	Barazzoni Menagliotti Pelosi (Domenico) Stefani Tassoni
2 Thermidor – 12 Thermidor	Graziadei Mozzini Mozzoni Oliva Pesci
12 Thermidor – 2 Fructidor	Aldrovandi Bianchi Dure Gambazocca Soglieri
2 Fructidor – 12 Fructidor	Bassi Calvi Carlioni Desenzani Gaggini

Drafting

8 Pluviôse – 18 Pluviôse	Lamberti Cagnoli Glissenti
18 Pluviôse – 29 Pluviôse	Gambari Dehò Tadini

29 Pluviôse – 11 Ventose	Mascheroni Piazza Venturi
11 Ventose – 22 Ventose	Bovara Compagnoni Dandolo
22 Ventose – 1 Germinal	Gambari Mazzucchelli Isimbardi
1 Germinal – 11 Germinal	Venturi Ramondini Perseguiti
11 Germinal – 21 Germinal	Lamberti (dismissed 19 Germinal) Giudiccini Tadini
21 Germinal – 1 Floréal	Cocchetti (added 19 Germinal and reelected 21 Germinal) Compagnoni Fabris
1 Floréal – 11 Floréal	Cagnoli Campana Conti
11 Floréal – 22 Floréal	Mingarelli Pesci Valeriani
22 Floréal – 1 Prairial	Luini Salimbeni Scarabelli
1 Prairial – 11 Prairial	Laderchi Montali Moralì
11 Prairial – 21 Prairial	Bossi Dehò Vismara
21 Prairial – 1 Messidor	Aquila Brunetti Cadice
1 Messidor – 11 Messidor	Gambari Longo Mangili
11 Messidor – 21 Messidor	Luini Salimbeni Vismara
21 Messidor- 2 Thermidor	Carbonesi Coddè Scarabelli

2 Thermidor – 12 Thermidor	Piazza Schiera Vertemate-Franchi
12 Thermidor – 2 Fructidor	Compagnoni Fontana Ramondini
2 Fructidor – 12 Fructidor	Bragaldi Mazzucchelli Paribelli

Special Commissions (listed in Chronological order of formation)

Frimaire

Commission title or description	Members
Internal regulations	Arici Dandolo Dehò Guiccioli Mangili
Public employees	Zani Salvioni Mazzucchelli Alpruni
Directory report on the state of the Republic	La Hoz Gambari Bassi
Classification of Motions	Allemagna Gambari La Hoz Latuada Savonarola
Uniforms for public employees	Aldrovandi Allemagna Giani (Luigi) Guiccioli Mozzoni Vismara
Representatives' lodgings in Milan	Allemagna Coddè Latuada Savonarola

	Somaglia
Dismissal of Representatives	Dehò Latuada Lecchi Reina Severoli
Special proclamation to the Cisalpine Citizen Body	Fontana Gambari Tadini
Second commission for public employees	Guiccioli Vismara Aquila Aldrovandi Porcelli
Commission regarding articles proposed by Directory in closed council	Savonarola Compagnoni Biumi Vismara Scarabelli Borgnani Cavedoni
Modification of Agreement on Payments between Cisalpine and French Republics	Allemagna Bragaldi Ressi Severoli
Manifesto of eternal gratitude to the French Republic	Dandolo Fontana Giani (Francesco)
Needs of the Archivist of the Gran Consiglio	Aldrovandi Bianchi Cocchetti Fabris Mangili
Motions regarding departmental judges	Savonarola Federici Conti Mangili Rosa
List of Representatives and Gran Consiglio employees eligible for postage reimbursement	Luini Greppi Ressi Cismondi Calvi

Nîvose

Motions related to the Bank of Saint Ambrose in Milan	Ressi Isimbardi Allemagna
Methodology for commission projects	Brunetti Pallavicini Perseguiti
Punishments and penalties	Castelfranchi Dehò Luini
Spending distribution	Bianchi Somaglia Rosa
Urgency measures for the “Venetian problem”	Alborghetti Glissenti Polfranceschi
Maltese goods	Massari Montalti Vicini
Administration of public donations	Luini Dehò D'Arco
Amnesty for battlefield “cowardice” and counterrevolutionary actions before the declaration of the Cisalpine Republic	Pallavicini Mozzoni Brunetti
Special Legislative commission for courts in Reno	Cicognara Olivari Pelosi (Ignazio)
Easing of Criminal penalties	Bragaldi Brunetti Parabelli
Minimum number of representatives to begin a session and opening hour	Gambari Fontana Brunetti
Petitions for position of editor and redactor	Federici Giovio Valeriani
Defining terms for the reimbursement of public employees	Aldrovandi Castelfranchi Fantaguzzi Montalti Quadrio
Collection and clarification of letters from <i>Gran Consiglio</i>	Cismondi Guiccioli Mariani

Response to Directory's inquiry on the project of public auctions	Gambari Salimbeni Venturi
Local department petitions	Carloni Cavedoni Cocchetti Conti Vertemate-Franchi
Public debts held before 2 Frimale	Ambrosioni Bovara Compagnoni Greppi Pallavicini Salimbeni Venturi

Pluviôse

Analysis and preference of National Guard plans	Curti-Petrarda Glissenti Greppi Piazza Terzi
Complaints of Monza Hunters	Lupi Menagliotti Mozzoni
Responsibility to penalty ration	Greppi Mozzoni Polfranceschi Tadini Vismara
Constitutional question over representation of towns under 3000	Cagnoli Cicognara Fabris Giani (Luigi) Tadini
Means of supporting French troops occupying the Cisalpine Republic	Cicognara Rosa Venturi
Use of Naval Arsenal	Alpruni Bossi Salimbeni Savonarola Vertemate-Franchi
Catalogue of the <i>Gran Consiglio</i> library	Bossi

	Compagnoni Fontana
System of reimbursement for former legislators	Bragaldi Cavedoni Gatti Scarabelli
Petition of the closure of a pharmacy	Conti Dandolo Ramondini
Motion of Mozzini over reimbursement methods	Isimbardi Moccini Polfranceschi Sabatti
Outside special finance commission for examination of the Finance plan	Vertemate-Franchi Salimbeni Lamberti (dismissed 19 Germinal) Giani (Luigi) Gambari Compagnoni Bovara Moccini (added 19 Germinal)
National lottery	Giovio Mozzini Rosa
Map and local documents	Bossi Cagnoli Fabris Giani (Luigi) Mascheroni
Review and application of the Law of 24 Brumaire	Glissenti Montalti Tassoni
Procedures for the examination of accusations against representatives or Directory members	Cagnoli Cismondi D'Arco Fenaroli Guidetti Brunetti (added 23 Pluviôse) Gambari (added 23 Pluviôse)
Penalty for representative absence	Latuada Gambari Dehò
Formation of a war commissioner	Giovio Reina Scarabelli
Anti alarmist laws	Gambari

	Tadini La Hoz Giovio Glissenti (added 9 Ventose)
Mathematics	Fontana Mascheroni Tadini Bianchi Cagnoli Campana Mascheroni Scarabelli
Project expressing sentiments over the founding of the Roman Republic of 1798	Bragaldi Giani (Luigi) Vicini

Ventose

Printing the law	Lamberti Fenaroli Mascheroni
Modification of the finance plan	Mingarelli Ressi Vertemate-Franchi
Examination of law of 5 complementaire	Alpruni Cocchetti Rosa
Revision of judicial abuses	Dehò Giudiccini Perseguiti
Constitutional Regulation of the Judiciary	Glissenti Mangili Valsecchi Vismara Zani
Deferment of payments for national debtors	Ramondini Lamberti Cavedoni
Nomination for the Military Commission of Milan	Alpruni Giovio Latuada Mocchetti Terzi
Nomination for the Military Commission of Modena	Bossi Perseguiti

	Tassoni
Nomination for the Military Commission of Brescia	La Hoz Mozzini Varesi Zani
Nomination for the Military Commission of Ferrara	Della Vida Gambari Ramondini
Nomination for the Military Commission of Bergamo	Federici Mangili Valsecchi
Nomination for the Military Commission of Faenza	Laderchi Montalti
Examination of the first Directory message presented in closed council	Tadini Gambari Brunetti Fenaroli Scarabelli Lamberti Vertemate-Franchi
Examination of the second Directory message presented in closed council	Massari Della Vida Venturi Coddè Dandolo Mazzucchelli Aquila
Special Commission to analyze veterinary report of Luigi Leroy	Campana Dandolo Conti Ramondini Cocchetti

Germinal

Nomination of Justice of the Peace for Milan	Gambari Glissenti Lamberti
Economic plan according to Scocchi for form a new financial administration	Bianchi Olivari Tadini (dismissed 27 Germinal) Venturi Zani (dismissed 24 Germinal)
Payments for employees of the <i>Ospitale Maggiore di Milano</i>	Bossi Fontana Glissenti

Responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches	Brunetti Cadice Gambari Sabatti
Report on current Judicial administration	Lamberti (dismissed 19 Germinal) Oliviari Zani (Dismissed 24 Germinal)
Special Commission of public instruction	Longo Fontana Gaggini
Citizens eligible for Guard service	Reina Cadice Bonfanti
Report on rewriting resolutions of law from 14 and 23 Germinal rejected by Seniori for form	Mascheroni Mazzucchelli Oliva

Floréal

Renewal contract for the hospital at Cremona	Aquila Oliva Curti-Petrarda Mozzini
Payment of subalternate workers for the supreme court	Peverelli Luini Carbonesi
Report on the effects of religious voting already enacted	Bossi Brunetti Venturi Vicini Vismara
Horse tax	Gambazocca Gatti Alborghetti
Special ecclesiastical commission on ecclesiastical pensions	Bossi Dehò Vismara
Report on influence of propertied elite over the peasantry	Capredoni Cavedoni Mozzoni
Report on the production of Salt from Cervia according to Paolo San Grigio	Rosa Manenti Fabris
Polfranceschi's plan of state reimbursement for domestic servants	Arici Laderchi Polfranceschi

Grain speculation of rye	Latuada Oliva Franzini
Petition of the Villa brothers	Bargnani Mattia Manenti
Nomination of officers and underofficers for the Guard of the Legislature	Manenti Olivari Parabelli Perseguiti Terzi
Reimbursement for officers of the Guard of the <i>Gran Consiglio</i>	Calvi Cavedoni Cocchetti
Effects of military occupation	Carloni Isimbardi Mozzoni Reina Sabatti
Establishment of the secular decime	Curti-Petrarda Giovanardi Latuada Ressi Verga

Prairial

Curti-Petrarda's project on stable goods	Salimbeni Mazzucchelli Gambari
Fixed hours of working day	Federici Glissenti Greppi Latuada Manenti
Discipline in the sale of national goods	Alborghetti Cadice Cocchetti Gambari Salimbeni
Creditors of the French acquisitions	Bossi Dehò Mocchetti
Constitutional polemic of Petitions with multiple signatures	Bragaldi Longo Ramondini

Prediction of inconveniences should A. Sbirri be dismissed as administrator	Cavedoni Cocchetti Vicini
Transfer of bishops of Ferrara and Brescia	Dehò Gambari Morali
Bazzetta's plan to reform/activate the organic laws	Gambari Reina Terzaghi Perseguiti Giovanardi
Methodology of collecting census data for the instruction plan similar to that of the municipal government of Milan	Bianchi Giani (Luigi) Guidicini
Proposal for a more equal sales tax	Bossi Bovara Longo Massari Salimbeni
The administration of remaining national goods and those already allotted to municipalities	Savonarola Luini Gambari Cocchetti Alpruni
Report on the Poretta mine	Isimbardi Ramondini Aldrovandi Dandolo Cocchetti
Law of 9 Frimaire prohibiting debts for cisalpine troops	Menagliotti Arici Salvioni
Credits for French forced loan	Latuada Fabbri Mozzini
Questions of time for the changing of Directors	Gambari Vismara Reina
The conduct of the Directory in the arrest of a rep from the Legislature (referring to Solari)	Luini Polfranceschi Dehò
Special commission for the citizenship petition of 6 italians	Arici Cavedoni Isimbardi Perseguiti Petrocini

Legislative reaction to popular pamphlet on extreme wealth	Bossi Longo Vismara
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Messidor

Uniformity of the marriage precedent	Brunetti Mariani Montalti
Way to codify tolls throughout the Cisalpine Republic	Cocchetti Guidicini Isimbardi Mazzucchelli
Extraction and nomination of a new Director	Luini Polfranceschi Vismara
Way to utilize the high military commissions for lesser charges	Luini Montalti Vicini
Conduct of administrator Azimonti	Bragaldi Federici Guidicini
Needs of the censors to support national censorship efforts	Allemagna Dehò Cavedoni
Formulation of a Civil Code	Gambari Luini Vicini
Motions regarding the tax on tobacco and salt	Reina Ressi Aquila
Petition from town of Carpi regarding the manufacturing of straw hats	Cavedoni Dandolo Scarabelli
Report on public economy	Aquila Bianchi Coddè
Facilitation and direction of markets and fairs in the Cisalpine Republic	Bianchi Bragaldi Guidicini
Money available to Directory after lie of 5 Ventose	Varesi Ressi Lupi
Reactivation of the Monti di Pietà	Dehò Mattia Olivari

Tax to finance the French forced loan	Perseguiti Tassoni Vismara
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Thermidor

Examination of the finance plan on the penalty for fraud	Vismara Ressi Gambari
Review of the 4th article of the resolution of 27 Messidor	Longo Luini Vismara
Measures to take against insurrectionists in the Valtellina and Valchiavenna	Vertemate-Franchi Federici Cavedoni
Message from Directory regarding broken contracts with corporations	Bossi Compagnoni Longo
Place of celibates in civil society	Cavedoni Perseguiti Valeriani
Combining motions about the courts	Glissenti Perseguiti Reina
Secondary water and mineral commission for the regulation of rivers	Campana Fontana Guglielmini Reina

Fructidor

Papers for the administrator Ferrarini	Aquila Vicini Vismara
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Tabulation of Commission Data

Representatives	Permanent commissions (PCS)	Semi-permanent Commissions (SPCS)	Special Commissions (SCS)	Legislative Power score (Permanent*2+ Semi-permanent + Special) (TPLS)
Alberghetti	0	0	0	0
Albertoni	0	0	0	0
Alborghetti	5	4	3	17
Aldrovandi	0	1	4	5
Allemagna	1	0	6	8
Alpruni	3	0	5	11
Ambrosioni	1	0	1	3
Antonioli	0	0	0	0
Appiani	0	0	0	0
Aquila	1	1	6	9
Araldi	0	0	0	0
Arese (Aresi)	0	0	0	0
Arici	0	1	4	5
Bagolini	0	0	0	0
Barazzoni	0	4	0	4
Bargnani	0	1	1	2
Bassi	0	2	1	3
Battaglioni	0	0	0	0
Bellisomi	0	2	0	2
Benini	0	0	0	0
Bertanza	0	0	0	0
Bertanza (Bertanzo)	0	0	0	0
Bertolesi	0	1	0	1
Bianchi	1	1	7	10
Bianchi (antonio)	0	0	0	0
Birago	1	0	0	2
Biumi	1	0	1	3
Bolognini	1	1	0	3
Bonfanti	0	2	1	3
Borda	0	0	0	0
Borgnani	0	0	1	1
Bossi	2	1	12	17

Bossi (Francesco)	0	0	0	0
Bottoni	0	0	0	0
Bovara	4	1	3	12
Bragaldi	4	1	7	16
Brioschi	0	0	0	0
Brunetti	1	1	9	12
Bruni	0	0	0	0
Butturini	0	0	0	0
Cadice	2	2	3	9
Cagnoli	0	2	4	6
Calcaterra	2	1	0	5
Calvi	1	4	2	8
Campana	2	3	3	10
Canarisi	0	0	0	0
Capredoni	0	1	1	2
Carandini	0	0	0	0
Carbonesi	3	2	1	9
Carlioni	1	2	2	6
Carminati	1	2	0	4
Cassoli	0	0	0	0
Castelfranchi	0	0	2	2
Castiglioni	0	0	0	0
Castiglioni	0	0	0	0
Cauriani	0	0	0	0
Cavedoni	4	0	12	20
Cavriani	0	0	0	0
Chiaramonti	0	0	0	0
Cicognara	0	1	3	4
Cismondi	0	2	3	5
Cocchetti	5	2	10	22
Coddè	2	1	3	8
Colalto	0	0	0	0
Cologna	0	0	0	0
Compagnoni	4	3	5	16
Conti	1	2	4	8
Corbelli	0	0	0	0
Cosigli	0	0	0	0
Cruppi	0	0	0	0
Cuggioli	0	0	0	0
Curti-Petrarda	0	2	3	5
Dana	0	0	0	0

Dandolo	4	1	7	16
D'Arco	2	1	2	7
Dehò	2	2	12	18
Della Vida	2	0	2	6
de'Magni	0	0	0	0
Desenzani	1	3	0	5
Dure	0	1	0	1
Fabbri	0	0	1	1
Fabris	0	1	4	5
Fantaguzzi	1	1	1	4
Federici	1	1	6	9
Fenaroli	2	0	3	7
Ferro	0	0	0	0
Fongarezzi	0	0	0	0
Fontana	3	1	8	15
Formiggini	0	0	0	0
Franzini	2	2	1	7
Gaggini	0	1	1	2
Galeppini	0	0	0	0
Gallino	0	0	0	0
Gambari	5	3	20	33
Gambazocca	0	1	1	2
Gardani	0	0	0	0
Gatti	0	1	2	3
Germani	0	0	0	0
Gerolami	0	0	0	0
Giani (Francesco)	2	0	1	5
Giani (Luigi)	1	0	6	8
Giovanelli	0	0	0	0
Giovannardi	0	0	0	0
Giovio	1	1	5	8
Giudici	0	1	1	2
Glissenti	0	0	0	0
Goldaniga	1	2	9	13
Graziadei	0	0	0	0
Greppi	0	2	0	2
Greppi	0	1	5	6
Guarnelli	0	1	5	6
Guerra	0	0	0	0
Guglielmini	0	0	0	0
Guiccioli	2	0	1	5

Guidetti	1	0	4	6
Guidicini	0	1	1	2
Isimbardi	0	1	6	7
La Hoz	3	0	4	10
Laderchi	1	1	2	5
Lamberti	3	2	6	14
Landriani	0	0	0	0
Lattanzi	2	0	0	4
Latuada	4	0	10	18
Lecchi	1	1	1	4
Leonelli	0	0	0	0
Lizzoli	0	0	0	0
Longo	2	1	6	11
Lorenzo	0	0	0	0
Luini	2	2	10	16
Lupi	2	0	2	6
Malacrida	0	0	0	0
Malaspina	0	0	0	0
Manenti	1	0	4	6
Mangili	1	2	5	9
Marensi	0	0	0	0
Mariani	2	1	2	7
Marozzi	0	0	0	0
Martinengo	2	0	0	4
Mascheroni	4	1	5	14
Massari	3	1	3	10
Mattia	1	1	2	5
Mazzucchelli	2	2	5	11
Melzi	0	0	0	0
Menagliotti	1	3	2	7
Miani	0	0	0	0
Mingarelli	0	2	1	3
Mocchetti	3	1	2	9
Moccini	0	0	2	2
Molla	0	0	0	0
Molteni	0	1	0	1
Monga	0	0	0	0
Montalti	1	1	6	9
Morali	2	2	1	7
Mornico	0	0	0	0
Mozzini	3	1	4	11

Mozzoni	1	1	6	9
Mucino	0	0	0	0
Mugiasca	2	0	0	4
Nolfi	0	1	0	1
Oliva	0	1	3	4
Olivari	0	0	4	4
Orrignoni	0	0	0	0
Palcani	0	0	0	0
Pallavicini	1	1	3	6
Paribelli	1	2	0	4
Pavesi	0	0	0	0
Pelosi (Domenico)	1	2	0	4
Pelosi (Ignazio)	1	2	1	5
Perseguiti	2	1	9	14
Pesci	0	2	0	2
Pestalozzi	0	1	0	1
Petrocini (Petroccini)	0	0	0	0
Peverelli	0	1	1	2
Piazza	1	3	1	6
Piccioli	0	0	0	0
Pindemonti	0	0	0	0
Polfranceschi	1	0	6	8
Porcelli	0	2	1	3
Primavesi	0	0	0	0
Quadrio	0	0	1	1
Raffael Vita	0	0	0	0
Ragazzi	0	0	0	0
Raineri	0	0	0	0
Ramondini	4	4	6	18
Reina	5	0	9	19
Ressi	1	0	8	10
Rocco	0	0	0	0
Romano	0	1	0	1
Rosa	0	1	6	7
Rossi	0	0	0	0
Rossignani	0	0	0	0
Ruffini	0	0	0	0
Rusca	0	0	0	0
Sabatti	3	0	3	9
Sacchi	0	1	0	1

Salimbeni	4	3	7	18
Salvioni	0	0	0	0
Sartoretti	0	0	0	0
Savoldi	0	0	0	0
Savonarola	5	0	7	17
Scarabelli	5	2	6	18
Scarpa	0	0	0	0
Schiera	1	1	0	3
Scotti	0	0	0	0
Severoli	2	1	3	8
Soglieri (Solieri)	0	0	0	0
Somaglia	2	0	2	6
Stefani	0	3	0	3
Strocchi	0	0	0	0
Tadini	3	2	7	15
Tassoni	2	1	3	8
Terzaghi	2	0	1	5
Terzi	2	2	3	9
Terzoli	0	0	0	0
Tommaselli	0	0	0	0
Urbani	0	1	0	1
Valdrighi	0	0	0	0
Valeriani	2	1	2	7
Valsecchi	1	1	2	5
Varesi	1	2	2	6
Venturelli	0	0	0	0
Venturi	5	2	6	18
Verga	0	1	1	2
Vertemate- Franchi	0	2	6	8
Vezzoli	0	0	0	0
Viappiani	0	0	0	0
Vicini	2	1	7	12
Vigenti	0	0	0	0
Villa	0	0	0	0
Vismara	0	2	14	16
Zanni	0	0	0	0
Zorzi	0	0	0	0
Zorzi	0	0	0	0

Appendix F

Presidents, Secretaries and Inspectors of the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI

The following table lists the representatives who served in the various offices of the *Gran Consiglio* between 2 Frimaire Year VI (22 November 1797) and 12 Fructidor Year VI (29 August 1798). The individuals' surnames are listed within the various offices (blue for president, green for secretaries and pink for inspectors) in chronological order with the dates in which they served within the office (in both the republican and Gregorian styles). For secretaries it is also listed the number of appearances an individual appeared within the *processi verbali* as the dominant representatives. The presidential listing does not include vice-presidents.

President	Republican date	Gregorian date	
Fenaroli	1 frimale- 1 nervoso	22 November 1797- 21 December 1797	
Savonarola	1 nervoso- 16 nervoso	21 December 1797- 5 January 1798	
Tadini	16 nervoso- 1 piovoso	5 January 1798- 20 January 1798	
Gambari	1 piovoso- 16 piovoso	20 January 1798- 4 February 1798	
Polfranceschi	16 piovoso-1 ventoso	4 February 1798- 19 February 1798	
Brunetti	1 ventoso- 16 ventoso	19 February 1798- 6 March 1798	
Giovio	16 ventoso- 1 germinale	6 March 1798- 21 March 1798	
Alpruni	1 germinale-16 germinale	21 March 1798- 5 April 1798	
Vismara	16 germinale- 1 fiorile	5 April 1798-20 April 1798	
Mazzuchelli	1 fiorile-16 fiorile	20 Aprile 1798- 5 May 1798	
Dehò	16 fiorile- 1 pratile	5 May 1798- 20 May 1798	
Luini	1 pratile- 16 pratile	20 May 1798- 4 June 1798	
Vertemate-Franchi	16 pratile- 1 messidoro	4 June 1798-19 June 1798	
Alborghetti	1 messidoro- 16 messidoro	19 June 1798- 4 July 1798	
Ramondini	16 messidoro- 1 termidoro	4 July 1798-19 July 1798	
Sabatti	1 termidoro- 16 termidoro	19 July 1798- 3 August 1798	
Vicini	16 termidoro- 1 fruttidoro	3 August 1798- 18 August 1798	
Perseguiti	1 fruttidoro- 12 fruttidoro	18 August 1798- 29 August 1798	
Segretario	Republican date	Gregorian date	Dominance
Giovio	1 frimale- 16 frimale	22 November 1797- 6 December 1797	3
Vicini	1 frimale- 1 nervoso	22 November 1797- 21 December 1797	20
Perseguiti	1 frimale-16 frimale	22 November 1797- 6 December 1797	3
Lamberti	1 frimale- 1 nervoso	22 November 1797-21 December 1797	8
Vismara	16 frimale- 16 nervoso	6 December 1797- 5 January 1798	8
Compagnoni	16 frimale- 16 nervoso	6 December 1797- 5 January 1798	12
Glissenti	1 nervoso-1 piovoso	21 December 1797- 20 January 1798	16

Dandolo	1 nervoso- 1 piovoso	21 December 1797- 20 January 1798	18
Latuada	16 nervoso- 16 piovoso	5 January 1798- 4 February 1798	21
Dehò	16 nervoso- 16 piovoso	5 January 1798- 4 February 1798	11
Mozzini	1 piovoso- 1 ventoso	20 January 1798- 19 February 1798	14
Luini	1 piovoso- 1 ventoso	20 January 1798- 19 February 1798	15
Alborghetti	16 piovoso- 16 ventoso	4 February 1798- 6 March 1798	13
Montalti	16 piovoso- 16 ventoso	4 February 1798- 6 March 1798	12
Greppi	1 ventoso- 1 germinale	19 February 1798- 21 March 1798	19
Piazzzi	1 ventoso- 1 germinale	19 February 1798- 21 March 1798	16
Mocchetti	16 ventoso- 16 germinale	6 March 1798- 5 April 1798	19
Mangili	16 ventoso- 16 germinale	6 March 1798- 5 April 1798	17
Cavedoni	1 germinale- 1 fiorile	21 March 1798- 20 April 1798	17
Bovara	1 germinale- 1 fiorile	21 March 1798- 20 April 1798	14
Fenaroli	16 germinale- 26 germinale	5 April 1798- 11 April 1798	2
Savonarola	26 germinale- 16 fiorile	11 April 1798- 5 May 1798	7
Tadini	16 germinale- 27 germinale	5 April 1798- 12 April 1798	7
Pallavicini	28 germinale-16 fiorile	13 April 1798- 5 May 1798	8
Bragaldi (1)	28 germinale- 30 germinale	13 April 1798- 15 April 1798	2
Federici	1 fiorile- 1 pratile	20 April 1798- 20 May 1798	21
Terzaghi	1 fiorile- 1 pratile	20 April 1798- 20 May 1798	12
Varesi	16 fiorile- 16 pratile	5 May 1798- 4 June 1798	11
Marieni	16 fiorile- 16 pratile	5 May 1798- 4 June 1798	9
Stefani	1 pratile-1 messidoro	20 May 1798- 19 June 1798	14
Ressi	1 pratile- 1 messidoro	20 May 1798- 19 June 1798	19
Manenti	16 pratile- 16 messidoro	4 June 1798- 4 July 1798	12
Valsecchi	16 pratile- 16 messidoro	4 June 1798- 4 July 1798	23
Conti	1 messidoro- 1 termidoro	19 June 1798- 19 July 1798	10
Ambrosioni	1 messidoro- 1 termidoro	19 June 1798- 19 July 1798	20
Bragaldi (2)	16 messidoro- 16 termidoro	4 July 1798- 3 August 1798	5
De Magni	16 messidoro- 16 termidoro	4 July 1798- 3 August 1798	17
Cadice	1 termidoro- 1 fruttidoro	19 July 1798- 18 August 1798	12
Calvi	1 termidoro- 1 fruttidoro	19 July 1798- 18 August 1798	17
Bertanzo	16 termidoro- 12 fruttidoro	3 August 1798- 29 August 1798	20
Mocchini	16 termidoro- 12 fruttidoro	3 August 1798- 29 August 1798	14
Gambari	1 fruttidoro- 12 fruttidoro	18 August 1798- 29 August 1798	1
Sabatti	1 fruttidoro- 12 fruttidoro	18 August 1798- 29 August 1798	7
Inspector	Republican date	Gregorian date	
Guiccioli	4 frimale - 16 frimale	24 November 1797- 6 December 1797	
La Hoz (1)	4 frimale - 1 nervoso	24 November 1797- 21 December 1797	

Porcelli (1)	4 frimale - (16 nervoso)	24 November 1797- (5 January 1798)	
Allemagna	16 frimale- 1 piovoso	6 December 1797- 20 January 1798	
Greppi	1 nervoso- 16 piovoso	21 December 1797- 4 February 1798	
Mozzoni	16 nervoso- 1 ventoso	5 January 1798- 19 February 1798	
Conti	1 piovoso-16 ventoso	20 January 1798- 6 March 1798	
Giovio	16 piovoso- 16 ventoso	4 February 1798- 6 March 1798	
Della-Vida	1 ventoso- 4 germinale	19 February 1798- 24 March 1798	
La Hoz (2)	16 ventoso- 16 germinale	6 March 1798- 11 April 1798	
Castelfranchi	16 ventoso- 1 fiorile	6 March 1798- 20 April 1798	
Scarabelli	4 germinale-16 fiorile	24 March 1798- 5 May 1798	
Porcelli (2)	16 germinale- 1 pratile	5 April 1798- 20 May 1798	
Tassoni	1 fiorile- 16 pratile	20 April 1798- 4 June 1798	
Polfranceschi	16 fiorile- 1 messidoro	5 May 1798- 19 June 1798	
Latuada	1 pratile-16 messidoro	20 May 1798- 4 July 1798	
Manenti	16 pratile- 1 termidoro	4 June 1798- 19 July 1798	
Sabatti	1 messidoro- 1 termidoro	19 June 1798- 19 July 1798	
Varesi	16 messidoro- 16 termidoro	4 July 1798- 3 August 1798	
Lupi	1 termidoro- 12 fruttidoro	19 July 1798- 29 August 1798	
Montalti	1 termidoro- 12 fruttidoro	19 July 1798- 29 August 1798	
Cocchetti	16 termidoro- 12 fruttidoro	3 August 1798- 29 August 1798	
Luini	1 fruttidoro- 12 fruttidoro	18 August 1798- 29 August 1798	

Appendix G

Demographic tables and calculations of the *Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI

The following tables provide specific demographic information regarding the geographic origins of representatives who were included in the prosopographical study examined in Chapter IV, V and X and in Appendix A. The information which constitutes these tables comes exclusively from the 110 individuals for which demographic information exists (the exception is the information from the first table which looks at all 160 individuals originally nominated by Bonaparte in Brumaire Year VI [early November 1798]). The first table looks at the breakdown of individual representatives nominated by Bonaparte to the *Gran Consiglio* based on the twenty departments. It includes the original 160 nominated, the 118 within the prosopographical study (including substitutes), and those within the leadership and elite. The second table looks at the geographical origins of the 110 representatives within the prosopographical study for which geographic evidence exists; this table is broken down in terms of *ancien regime* state, and calculates the representative born or residing in 1797 in the specific towns and cities of the Cisalpine Republic and abroad. This table specifies this data according to the participation index, the leadership, and the elite. This information primarily correlates to the examination of geographic networks examined in Chapter IV. It also provides information about topographical and climatic commonalities in representative origins. The final table examines the demography of representatives according to capoluogo and provides similar information as the second table, only specifying information from the twenty *capoluoghi* of the Cisalpine departments. This information corresponds to the data examined in Chapter X.

Department demography

Department	Total deputies nominated	Prosopographical sample	Leadership	Elite
Verbano	11	7	5	2
Panaro	14	4	3	3
Reno	12	9	3	3
Montagna	11	4	3	2
Alta Padusa	6	4	2	1
Benaco	9	5	2	2
Ticino	12	5	2	2
Serio	12	10	8	2
Olona	12	7	5	4
Mela	13	8	5	2
Mincio	10	4	3	0
Rubicone	10	5	2	1

Adda	12	6	2	0
Crostolo	12	4	3	2
Basso Po	10	5	2	1
Lamone	12	5	2	1
Lario	13	9	4	0
Alto Po	13	6	2	1
Adda ed Oglio	12	8	2	1
Alpi Apuane	6	3	0	0
Unknown	14	0	0	0

Geographic demography

Location	Prosopographical sample		Leadership		Elite	
	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Ducato di Milano						
Milano	9	19	5	11	3	6
Varese	4	1	3	1	0	1
Dervio	1	1	0	0	0	0
Pavia	2	5	1	4	1	2
Mantova	3	4	1	2	0	0
Lenno (Como)	1	0	0	0	0	0
Lodi	1	1	1	1	0	0
Como	1	3	0	1	0	0
Lezzeno	0	1	0	0	0	0
Lecco	1	2	0	2	0	2
Soresina	1	1	0	0	0	0
Valintevi	1	1	1	1	0	0
Casalmaggiore	1	2	0	0	0	0
Chignolo	1	0	1	0	1	0
Luino	1	0	1	0	1	0
Casalmaiocco	1	0	1	0	0	0
Gravedona	0	1	0	1	0	0
Varenna	1	0	1	0	0	0
Cremona	3	3	2	2	1	1
Cassano d'Adda	1	0	0	0	0	0
Melegnano	1	0	0	0	0	0
Valmadrera	1	0	1	0	1	0
Total	36	45	19	26	8	12
Ducato di Modena	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)

Modena	2	8	1	6	0	5
Reggio	1	2	1	2	1	1
Castelvetro	1	0	1	0	1	0
Mirandola	1	0	1	0	1	0
Bibiano	1	0	1	0	1	0
Finale	1	1	1	1	0	0
Total	7	11	6	9	4	6
Papal States	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Bologna	6	7	3	3	3	3
Ravenna	1	1	1	1	0	1
Ferrara	4	4	1	2	0	0
Cento	1	0	1	0	1	0
Lugo	1	0	1	0	1	0
Castel Bolognese	1	0	1	0	1	0
Roma	1	0	0	0	0	0
Cervia	1	0	1	0	1	0
Cesena	2	1	0	0	0	0
San Leo	1	0	1	0	0	0
Persicento	1	1	0	0	0	0
Assisi	0	1	0	0	0	0
Bagnacavallo	0	1	0	0	0	0
Castel San Pietro	0	1	0	0	0	0
Imola	1	0	0	0	0	0
Faenza	2	2	0	0	0	0
Nemi (RM)	1	0	1	0	0	0
Total	24	19	11	6	7	4
Serenissima	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Brescia	4	10	2	6	0	3
Bergamo	5	5	4	4	1	2
Verona	1	2	1	2	0	1
Padova	1	1	1	1	1	1
Venezia	1	1	1	0	1	0
Salò	2	0	1	0	1	0
Lonato	3	1	1	0	1	0
Vicenza	0	1	0	0	0	0
Rovato	1	0	1	0	0	0
Gardone Valrompia	2	0	2	0	1	0
Romano di Lombardia	1	0	1	0	1	0
Desenzano	1	1	0	0	0	0
Castagneta	1	0	1	0	0	0
Caprino Bergamasco	1	1	1	1	0	0

Spalato (Split)	1	0	1	0	1	0
Averara	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bonate Superiore	1	0	0	0	0	0
Adria	1	0	0	0	0	0
Val Camonica (Montecchio)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Breno	1	0	0	0	0	0
Edolo	1	1	0	0	0	0
Total	31	25	19	15	9	8
Valtellina (CH)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Albosaggia	1	0	0	0	0	0
Sondrio	2	3	0	0	0	0
Poschiavo	0	1	0	1	0	0
Bormio	1	1	0	0	0	0
Ponte	1	1	1	1	0	0
Chiavenna	2	2	2	2	0	0
Total	7	8	3	4	0	0
Foreigners	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Massa	0	1	0	0	0	0
Terme	1	0	0	0	0	0
Isola	0	1	0	0	0	0
Lugano	1	0	1	0	1	0
Zante	1	0	0	0	0	0
Castelnuovo di Garfagnana	1	0	0	0	0	0
Borgo Valsugana, Trento	1	0	1	0	1	0
Total	5	2	1	0	1	0
Overall Total	110	110	59	60	29	30
Mountain total	34	20	19	10	8	4
City centers	55	83	28	48	13	28
Coast	9	5	4	1	2	1
Lowlands	48	48	26	25	17	14

Capoluogo demography

Location	Prosopographical sample		leadership		elite	
Ducato di Milano	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Milano	9	19	5	11	3	6
Varese	4	1	3	1	0	1
Pavia	2	5	1	4	1	2
Mantova	3	4	1	2	0	0
Lodi	1	1	1	1	0	0
Como	1	3	0	1	0	0
Crema	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lecco	1	2	0	2	0	2
Total	21	35	11	22	4	11
Ducato di Modena	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Modena	2	8	1	6	0	5
Reggio	1	2	1	2	1	1
Total	3	10	2	8	1	6
Papal States	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Bologna	6	7	3	3	3	3
Rimini	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferrara	4	4	2	2	0	0
Cento	1	0	1	0	1	0
Faenza	2	2	0	0	0	0
Total	13	13	6	5	4	3
Serenissima	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Brescia	4	10	2	6	0	3
Bergamo	5	5	4	4	1	2
Desenzano	1	1	0	2	0	0
Cremona	3	3	2	0	1	1
Total	13	19	8	12	2	6
Valtellina (CH)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Sondrio	2	3	0	0	0	0
Total	2	3	0	0	0	0
Massa-Carrara	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)	Born	Residence (1797)
Massa	0	1	0	0	0	0
Total	0	1	0	0	0	0
Overall Total	52	81	27	47	11	26
urban centers	19	39	10	24	7	16
secondary	28	33	17	19	3	8
tertiary	9	13	2	6	1	2

Appendix H

Extracts from *Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina* and *Il Redattore del Gran Consiglio* from 2 Frimaire to 12 Fructidor Year VI

As mentioned in Chapters I and VII, the primary source used for the construction of this thesis was the two sets of *processi verbali* of the Cisalpine *Gran Consiglio*. The first set was published in 1798 under the title *Il Redattore del Gran Consiglio* and is stored in 17 volumes at the Biblioteca di Scienze Politiche “Enrica Collotti Pischel” at the Università degli studi di Milano. A digital copy is also hosted by the Biblioteca di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea in Rome on internetculturale.it. The second set was published in the first half of the twentieth century (the first volume was published in 1917 and the last one utilized for this study in 1935) under the title *Le Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*. This twentieth century set was a republication of the original 1798 *Redattore*, with an introduction by the editors Montacini and Alberti, as well as as the inclusion of hundreds of primary documents which had been referenced in the original *processi verbali* but not included in the initial publication. This second set is housed in a number of locations across Italy, however the one used for the purpose of this study came from Biblioteca di Studi giuridici e umanistici “Sala Sottocrociera” at the Università degli studi di Milano. There exists no legally recognized online copy of this set.

The second set, that of *Le Assemblee della Repubblica Cisalpina*, due to its legibility, its ease of access and the numerous additional documents added by the editors from the archives for evidence purposes, became the primary text used in the formation of the various tables in Appendix B, C, D, E, F and G. It was also the primary go to source for information relating to various internal structures, evidence of political positions of representatives for different arguments and was used in the reconstruction of the internal and external relationships of the *Gran Consiglio* from November 1797 to September 1798. However, the evidence provided by *Le Assemblee* needed to be verified with the evidence coming out of *Il Redattore*. Though the editors of the twentieth century editions claimed to copy exactly the words from the original 1798 publication one cannot always trust that political motivations from the early twentieth century did not lead to the exclusion of particular aspects. To assure the validity of the twentieth century publications a test was conducted (as described in Chapter I) which examined word for word 15 samples of various sittings of the *Gran Consiglio* from the *processi verbali* of both sets. In this appendix three of these samples used to compare the two texts will be provided. These included full sittings and extracts, cut for purposes of space and republication rights. The selections presented here were chosen randomly from the 15 sample sittings which were compared. Those that are extracts demonstrate conversations and debates in their entirety. This was done for brevity as these entire sittings would typically go on for 20-40 pages in the *Assemblee* and 30-60 pages in the *Redattore*. An examination of these two texts will demonstrate that the twentieth century *Le Assemblee* are a word for word identical copy of the 1798 *Il Redattore*.

SEDUTA XXV

dei 24 frimale, anno VI repubblicano [14 dicembre 1797 v. s.].

Comitato segreto - Tradazione delle ricevute al confine.

Fonti: *Relazione del Gran Consiglio della Repubblica Cisalpina*, n. XXII, pag. 341-342. - Archivio di Stato Milano, *Man.*, Governo, Direttorio esecutivo, anno VI repubblicano, *Messaggi al Gran Consiglio*.

Presidente Fenaroli.

Si apre la seduta alle 11 della mattina colla lettura del processo verbale della seduta precedente, che viene approvato.

Si legge un messaggio del Consiglio de' seniori, che rigetta la risoluzione relativa alle rinunzie o assenza dei rappresentanti.

Si legge un altro messaggio del Consiglio de' seniori che rigetta la risoluzione sulle somministrazioni all'armata francese.

Si legge il seguente messaggio del Direttorio esecutivo:

24 frimale, anno VI repubblicano, n. 4758.

Il delitti si moltiplicano giornalmente fra le truppe assoldate della Repubblica, e l'insufficienza o l'incertezza delle leggi penali pubblicate sinora ne sono la principale cagione.

Si è osservato fin qui un codice penale provvisorio promulgato dai Comitati riuniti per ordine del generale in capo dell'armata francese, ed ha prodotto in alcune circostanze un buon effetto per il ritorno dell'ordine e della disciplina, ma la difficoltà di riunire i Consigli militari nella forma prescritta da questo codice, le diverse e continue mutazioni accadute ne' movimenti de' corpi hanno prodotta la lentezza nelle procedure criminali e nella punizione dei delitti e l'apparenza dell'impunità ne ha aumentato il numero.

Per altro questo codice non è che provvisorio, e secondo l'articolo primo del titolo unico, le di lui disposizioni non devono eseguirsi che sino alla pace.

Quest'epoca fortunata è giunta, cittadini legislatori, ed è degno della vostra saviezza di occuparvi della compilazione di una legge, che rispettando le massime d'un Governo libero e conservando alle nostre truppe i diritti che spettano a' membri di una stessa famiglia sotto gli auspici di una Costituzione, ponga un freno alla licenza ed al disordine, che disgraziatamente si riproducono ne' corpi assoldati.

Il Direttorio v'invita di prendere questo oggetto in grande considerazione.

Frattanto, siccome su questo oggetto di tanta importanza, il Corpo legislativo non può così presto promulgare una legge, e dall'altra parte languisce nelle carceri un numero considerevole di militari accusati di delitti, s'invita il Consiglio di pesare nella sua saviezza, se fosse convenevole o no nel presente momento d'autorizzare i generali che comandano le divisioni a far giudicare da' Consigli di guerra, composti a norma di ciò che si pratica tuttavia nelle divisioni francesi, tutti i militari prevenuti di delitti, coll'applicargli le pene prescritte dal codice

penale militare, che è in vigore nella stessa armata, e ciò fino a tanto che il Corpo legislativo abbia provveduto con una legge] (1).

Previa l'interpellazione del **Presidente**, il Gran Consiglio si forma in Comitato generale.

Successivamente si riaprono le tribune alle ore 4 pomeridiane; ed **Aquila** a nome della Commissione legge il rapporto sulla traslazione delle ricettorie ai confini.


Il **Presidente** propone la stampa e l'aggiornamento — *approvato*.

Si leva la seduta alle ore quattro e mezza pomeridiane, invitando per la seduta dell'indomani alle nove della mattina.

Fenaroli, Presidente.

Lamberti, **Compagnoni**, Segretari.

(1) Archivio di Stato, Milano, Mm., Governo, Direttorio esecutivo, anno VI repubblicano. Messaggi al Gran Consiglio, 22 novembre 1797 al 21 settembre 1798, pag. 18.



gli abbia condannati? Come mai si possono stimare per delinquenti gl'imbecilli senza ledere la giustizia e l'umanità? In quanto a me, non conosco che due classi: rei ed innocenti; i rei debbon esser puniti, e gli innocenti non han bisogno d'amnistia.

Vicini — L'amnistia che si propone può considerarsi sotto due aspetti: o come grazia, o come minorazione di pena. La grazia ripugna ai sacri principj della democrazia; riguardo poi alla minorazione di pena, non occorre far nuova disposizione, dopo la legge generale emanata su i processi incoati e pendenti.

Bragaldi — Cicerone, che s'intendea molto di repubblica, mette il delitto di nuocere alla patria al disopra di quello di nuocere al proprio padre; cosicchè un figlio di famiglia situato nella terribile alternativa o di tradir la patria, o di uccidere il padre, debba sacrificare il padre e salvar la patria. Or se un uomo sedotto ammazzasse suo padre, gli concedereste voi l'amnistia? Non ardisco dubitare che nessuno di voi piegherebbe a concedergliela: e chi tradisce la patria dovrà avere maggior riguardo di chi dà morte al padre?

Laini — Io bramerei che chiunque s'opponesse all'amnistia avvertisse che non è già la Commissione che l'ha progettata, ma è la legge 25 brumale che l'accorda, lasciando al Corpo legislativo la cura di classificare i delitti.

Nella Commissione furon divise le opinioni. Schiera vi ha presentato un progetto, io ve ne presento un altro.

Art. I. Il Poder giudiziario proseguirà con rigore la procedura criminale verso tutti quelli che sono imputati di delitto portante pena capitale o pena grave corporale a termini della legge 16 termidoro.

Art. II. È accordata un'amnistia generale a tutti coloro che sono inquisiti per delitti commessi avanti la pubblicazione della presente, e portanti una semplice pena correzionale secondo la stessa legge 16 termidoro.

Lamberti — Tutti i principj di criminale inculcano che la pena dev'esser varia secondo il diverso grado della malizia. Un traviato è colpevole, ma per l'intensità del delitto non deve confondersi con quel delinquente che agisce per dolo. Io resto sorpreso che alcuni colleghi si oppongano all'amnistia accordata dalla legge 25 brumale, mentre il principale scopo di quella legge fu di salvare que' patrioti entusiasti che, animati da soverchio zelo, si eran trasportati a certi estremi che la fraudolenta aristocrazia volea caratterizzar per delitti.

Dall'altra parte meritano pur troppo indulgenza quelle anime semplici che senza fondo d'iniquità hanno violata la legge. Siate rigidi e severi, cittadini rappresentanti, contro que' scellerati che con cognizion di causa hanno attentato alla sovranità del popolo. Ma a nome dell'umanità, che si conforta colla legge 25 brumale, concedete questa benefica amnistia a que' poveri abitatori delle campagne, ignoranti, imbecilli, sedotti dai preti e dagli ex-nobili; e contro questi vibrare il fulmine della vendetta nazionale.


medesimo è tutto appoggiato alla legge 16 termidoro, la quale, nella minuta ed esatta classificazione de' delitti, distingue senza equivoco i sedotti dai seduttori. Restringere le mire ad un caso particolare, come sembra abbia fatto Lambertini, non è proprio del legislatore. Il legislatore deve mirare in grande ed abbracciare la generalità delle cose. Or per la massima generale io sostengo che la seduzione non può mai scusare un delinquente quando da un semplice pensiero o dalle nude parole passa a fatti gravi e perniciosi alla patria. Un contadino, per esempio, che prende l'armi e combatte contro la libertà, dovrà esser compatito sotto il pretesto della seduzione? No; questo è un vero traditor della patria. Questo è un nemico del popolo, che racchiudeva in seno i semi maligni, benchè altri più malvagio di lui glieli abbia sviluppati.

Del resto, qualunque peso voglia darsi al mio progetto, ancorchè al Gran Consiglio non piaccia di adottarlo, io insisterò sempre che non abbia luogo il progetto Schiera, perchè è un progetto pernicioso, aprendo un campo troppo vasto all'arbitrio de' giudici.

Alcuni membri dimandano l'aggiornamento della discussione — *approvato*.
Si chiude la seduta alle ore quattro e mezzo pomeridiane.

Savonarola, Presidente.

Dandolo, **Glisenti**, Segretari.



propone di stabilire una massima generale a norma della spiegazione *Vismara* = Approvato.

Dovendosi il G. C. formare in Comitato segreto, ed osservandosi che mancano i tre quarti richiesti dalla Costituzione, il Presidente propone che si diferisca all'indimani = Approvato.

Il Presidente avverte gl' Ispettori della Sala ad invigilare nella seduta dell'indimani perchè i Rappresentanti non si allontanino dal loro posto.

sarà continuato

verrebbe scampato senza un 18. Fruttifero . L' esempio della Gran Nazione c' istruisca, e ricordiamoci che siamo circondati da nemici, e che a Roma si scannano i Patrioti .

Lamberti = Quando non voleva riconoscersi, che i sedotti meritassero indulgenza, dovea abrogarsi la legge 25. Brumale; quella legge, in cui l' umanità, e la giustizia sono così bene combinate, distinguendo i veri traditori della patria dagli uomini deboli, e travati, e concedendo a questi l' amnistia, mentre contro i primi è riserbata la spada vendicatrice della legge . Si ponderino le circostanze, e si vedrà, se meritino piuttosto commiserazione, che ira, tante infelici persone incolte, che nella passata incertezza di cose venivano aggirate da spiriti maligni, e spinti a delitti, che non conoscevano .

Delò = Togliere, od alleviar la pena per delitti già commessi è un dare alla legge un effetto retroattivo. Chiamisi pure amnistia, dicesi quel nome che si vuole, non si eviterà mai l' assurdo di dare alla legge l' effetto retroattivo .

Glisenti = Io non conosco il termine *moderazione*. Se s' intende la giustizia, è superflua; se poi s' intende restringere gli effetti della giustizia, allora è un delitto . Si vogliono assolvere i sedotti, e gl' imbecilli; e dov' è una legge, che gli abbia condannati? Come mai si possono stimare per delinquenti gl' imbecilli senza ledere la giustizia, e l' umanità? In quanto a me, non conosco che due classi; rei, ed innocenti: i rei debbon esser puniti, e gl' innocenti non han bisogno d' amnistia.

Vicini = L' amnistia che si propone può considerarsi sotto due aspetti, o come grazia, o come misericordia di pena . La grazia ripugna ai sacri principj del-

veggo come possa cadere amnistia sopra queste due classi. Gl' imbecilli debbono mandarsi all' ospedal de' matti, e li Patrioti fervidi, anziché indulgenza, meritano premio: e se v' ha de' Giudici, che gli abbian condannati a qualche pena, questi Giudici iniqui debbono esser puniti secondo la legge.

Greppi = Pur troppo è vero, che vi sono stati de' Giudici infami, nemici della virtù, e vili satelliti del dispotismo, che hanno fatto gemere i Patrioti nelle prigioni, non d'altro rei, che di soverchio amore per la libertà. Mi fa fremere il ricordarmi delle vicende del Dipartimento del Reno, alloraquando molti energici Repubblicani, che anelavano di veder risorta l'italiana grandezza, col loro entusiasmo elettrizzavano lo spirto pubblico, ed accendevano in quei Popoli il desiderio di unirsi alla Cisalpina. Allora fu ch'essi provocarono lo sdegno del Comitato Centrale Cispadano; di quel Comitato, che sentiva la malefica influenza di certi esecrabili ambiziosi pieni di vanità, e d'orgoglio, che conscj di aver l'anima troppo meschina per brillare in una vasta Repubblica, volean conservare il soglio in quella miserabile Repubblicetta, ed attraversavano l'unione colla Cisalpina. Ben presto il loro odio produsse la persecuzione di que' virtuosi Patrioti, che, caduti negli artigli de' Giudici corrotti, e mandatari infami di quel Comitato, furono imprigionati, e languirono nelle carceri per lo spazio di 5. mesi. Or che sorte debbon attendersi que' Giudici scellerati! La legge 25. Brumale ordina che si trasmettano i processi per rivederli. Questa legge non può riguardare i Patrioti, contro cui furon tessuti i processi; poiché i Patrioti, piuttosto che pena, si aspettano premio. Dunque la legge colpisce i Giudici, altrimenti sarebbe una legge inutile; essa ha ordinata

revision da' processi, appunto perchè, costando gli arbitri, e le violenze praticate da quei Giudici malvagi, siano essi puniti rigidamente.

Latuada = Che vi sia una classe di delinquenti, che meritano indulgenza, mi sembra fuor di dubbio. Volete mettere alla stessa classe i semplici, e i maligni, i sedotti, e i seduttori. E' principio fondamentale delle leggi criminali, che a misura della malizia s'impongano le pene. E' accaduta una sommossa popolare: non volete distinguere gli autori del tumulto dalla turba seguace, composta di contadini sciocchi, ed ignoranti, spinti ai delitti quasi meccanicamente? V'è pure una notevole differenza tra i colpevoli con cognizion di causa, e quei che mancano per seduzione, e traviamiento; e se i primi meritano rigore, e severità, i secondi sono degni d'indulgenza, e d'amnistia.

Lamberti = De' due progetti *Schiera*, e *Luini*, ben esaminandoli, si vedrà ch'è preferibile il progetto *Schiera*, giacchè il progetto *Luini* confonde sedotto, e seduttore, e distingue solo i gradi del delitto: per esempio, in certo villaggio dell'inaddietro Lombardia un Parroco aristocratico annunziò in pubblica piazza come imminente l'arrivo de' Tedeschi. I Contadini costernati, sedotti dal Parroco, abbattono l'albero della libertà. Secondo il progetto *Luini*, i Contadini traviati, essendo delitto capitale quello di atterrar l'albero della libertà, incorsero nella pena di morte, non altrimenti che il Parroco seduttore.

All'incontro v'era un certo Uffizial di Posta, che spargeva una gazetta con nuove false, per ammortire lo spirito pubblico. Secondo il progetto *Luini*, quest'uomo cadde nella pena correzionale. Dunque il progetto *Luini* fa soggiacere a pena correzionale i delinquenti,

Extract
Montalcini
Alberti
della

from
and
Assemblee

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che agiscono con malizia, e con cognizion di causa, e riserva la pena capitale ad uomini rozzi, ed ignoranti, che operano per seduzione, e traviamiento.

Luini = *Se Lambert* avesse ponderato il mio progetto, non avrebbe con tanta franchezza asserito, che esso confonda sedotto, e seduttore; poichè il medesimo è tutto appoggiato alla legge 16. Termidoro, la quale nella minuta, ed esatta classificazione de' delitti distingue senza equivoco i sedotti dai seduttori. Restringere le mire ad un caso particolare, come sembra abbia fatto *Lamberti*, non è proprio del legislatore. Il legislatore deve mirare in grande, ed abbracciare la generalità delle cose. Or per la massima generale io sostengo, che la seduzione non può mai scusare un delinquente quando da un semplice pensiero, o dalle nude parole passa a fatti gravi, e perniciosi alla patria. Un Contadino per esempio, che prende l'armi, e combatte contro la libertà, dovrà esser compatito sotto il pretesto della seduzione? No; questo è un vero traditor della patria. Questo è un nemico del Popolo, che racchiudeva in seno i semi maligni, benchè altri più malvagio di lui glieli abbia sviluppati.

Del resto qualunque peto voglia darsi al mio progetto, ancorchè al Gran Consiglio non piaccia di adottarlo, io insisterò sempre, che non abbia luogo il progetto *Schiera*, perchè è un progetto pernicioso, aprendo un campo troppo vasto all'arbitrio de' Giudici.

Alcuni membri dimandano l'aggiornamento della discussione = approvato.

Si chiude la seduta alle ore quattro e mezzo pomeridiane.

Savonarola = *Presidente*.

Dandolo = *Glisenti* = *Segretario*.

dubbio l'esistenza della Repubblica, a spargere la diffidenza nel popolo e a comprimere lo spirito pubblico.

Presidente — Voi vedete, o cittadini, che il Consiglio de' seniori ha adottata l'urgenza, rigettando il progetto.

Dunque conviene nella massima, dissentite nel modo. Perciò io credo dell'ordine d'invitarvi, o cittadini colleghi, a passare la vostra risoluzione alla stessa Commissione acciò la riformi, avuto anche riguardo alle riflessioni de' seniori a norma di quanto saprà suggerirvi la vostra previdenza ed il vostro verace amore per la causa della libertà. Se vi fa mai affare che interessasse il vostro zelo per il bene pubblico questo certamente lo è, in cui si tratta di porre un freno a villi allarmisti perturbatori dell'ordine pubblico, e già convinti nell'opinione di tutti i buoni d'odio e d'inimicizia contro i diritti dell'uomo. Cosa di somma urgenza insinuata dal messaggio del Direttorio, riconosciuta dal Gran Consiglio, approvata da' seniori. Crederei di mancare al mio dovere, se io non v'invitassi a non rimanere freddi e dolorosi spettatori d'una ripulsa invece di occuparvi di quei ripari, che da voi esige la sicurezza della Nazione.

Codò — Non è più da rinvocarsi in dubbio che il Consiglio de' seniori procura la felicità del popolo con una via totalmente diversa ed opposta a quella che viene scelta dal Gran Consiglio.

Infatti egli non trovò giusto di accordare al Potere esecutivo le lire 1,808,592.13.4 al mese pel mantenimento delle spese della forza armata complessivamente, ma trovò giusto di accordare in dettaglio altrettante partite, le quali componevano la quantità medesima, lasciando così che la truppa assoldata priva di salario abbandonasse i vessilli nostri e si dedicasse alle opere di campagna con sommo utile dell'agricoltura.

Non trovò conveniente di accordare il libero commercio interno ed esterno dei grani, il quale colle discipline daziarie sarebbe stato sottoposto ad alcune regole che avrebbero impedito che la circolazione interna non fosse un pretesto al commercio esterno, ed avrebbe prodotto al Tesoro nazionale il prodigioso vantaggio di due lire al quintale per ogni sorta di grani e di tre lire per il riso; e trovò poi conveniente di concedere la libera circolazione, la quale non combinata coll'estrazione somministra con la facoltà di far girare il genere senza cautele daziarie l'ampia comodità di estrarlo senza pagamento di dazio. Tali misure non v'ha dubbio ritornano a somma utilità del popolo, utilità che non poteva sperare, se non dalla beneficenza del Consiglio de' seniori.

Fin qui l'utilità del popolo la vedo chiaramente favorita. Confesso il vero, che non so vederla nell'arresto de' ferri nativi in Repubblica, obbligando un terzo almeno della Repubblica a servirsi del ferro di Svezia e di Germania, quando non fosse per favorire que' negozianti, carreggiatori e naviganti, che sono soliti trar profitto dal commercio del ferro estero.

Non so egualmente vederla nel rifiuto della legge contro coloro che si pascono del crudele desiderio di vedere il popolo titubante, dubbio ed incerto sulla sua

sorte, in grazia delle allarmanti novelle ad arte sparse ed inventate ad ogni minimo movimento naturale che accade nell'interno e nell'esterno.

Se mai avesse egli creduto che la legge 16 termidoro, anno V (1), provvedesse abbastanza, sappia che questa non fu pubblicata ne' dipartimenti d'Adda ed Oglio, del Mela, del Mincio e del Benaco.

Sappia che più non esistono nè i tribunali, nè le Commissioni alle quali era raccomandata l'applicazione della legge ai casi particolari.

Sappia che non è provveduto al caso di atterramento dell'albero della libertà come è accaduto in qualche luogo.

Sappia che non è provveduto alle acclamazioni di evviva un santo od un sovrano, come con scandalo mostruoso è succeduto in diversi contorni della Repubblica.

Ma il Consiglio de' seniori non saprà mai i veri motivi determinanti il Gran Consiglio s'egli non avrà in giornata i nostri processi verbali.

Sino dai 29 scorso fu ordinato che, a preferenza d'ogn'altra stampa, si dovesse spedire i processi de' 27 e 28, importantissimi a far approvare l'estrazione del frumento e del riso, e lo stipendio e le spese della forza armata, e giunsero le approvazioni fortunatamente senza che fossero stampati ancora gli anzidetti processi.

Donde venga il disordine non saprei indovinarlo; so per altro che tal disordine è gravissimo e della massima importanza. Faccio dunque mozione:

1° Che i redattori siano incaricati a loro responsabilità di spedire alla stampa domani il processo d'ieri e dopodomani il processo d'oggi, e così successivamente ritirando dallo stampatore la ricevuta della consegna per conoscere donde nasca il ritardo.

2° Che si riassuma l'affare della legge contro i nemici dell'ordine pubblico ad oggetto di riproporla ai seniori per la sanzione.

A quest'effetto propongo le modificazioni, che mi sembrano convenienti nel *considerando*, ed una diversa classificazione degli articoli, affinché non ostante tanta importanza non rimanga in obblivione con infinito scandalo e danno di tutti i buoni:

Considerando esser uno, ecc.;

Considerando che mentre la Repubblica è nella migliore armonia co' vicini, e che le autorità costituite tentano ogni mezzo per ristabilire la calma interiore, i nemici dell'ordine non cessano di spargere false voci d'allarme;

Considerando che la legge 16 termidoro, anno V, è inefficace a reprimere le animosità degli allarmisti per le troppo vaghe disposizioni facili a deludersi dalla malizia degl'inimici;

Considerando che detta legge non può neppure essere mandata ad esecuzione tanto in quelle parti della Repubblica nelle quali non fu mai pubblicata, quanto

(1) V. vol. I di questa pubblicazione, pag. 676.

in quelle parti nelle quali furono disciolte le speciali Commissioni instituite col proclama del Direttorio esecutivo 25 termidoro, anno V (1);

Considerando che, quand'anche fosse provvida detta legge, rimarrebbe di troppo ritardato l'effetto dai metodi prescritti dalle leggi organiche giudiziarie, dettate pel caso in cui non sieno necessarie straordinarie ed efficaci misure per arrestare la velenosa influenza sulla pubblica opinione dei disseminatori di sediziose novelle inventate per sedurre i deboli ed i pusilli;

Dichiarato il caso d'urgenza sui motivi espressi nel proclama del Direttorio (2)

(1) V. VELADINI, op. cit., tomo III, pag. 107:

In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina.

Luosi, ministro della giustizia.

A norma della legge de' 16 termidoro contro il nemici dell'ordine pubblico, vi deve essere in Milano ed in Reggio presso i rispettivi tribunali supremo e di revisione, una speciale Commissione composta da due individui degli stessi rispettivi tribunali supremo e di revisione, e da tre altri giudici aggiunti per decidere definitivamente sui processi che verranno su tale materia costruiti dai giudici ordinari.

Dal Direttorio esecutivo sono stati nominati a formare la Commissione in Milano per i paesi della Repubblica al di qua del Po il cittadino Morosini e Pedrolli membri del detto tribunale supremo, Spannocchi, presidente del tribunale d'appello, Taverna e Luvini, membri dello stesso tribunale d'appello, e destinato in commissario del Potere esecutivo *ad hoc* il cittadino Negri membro del tribunale di prima istanza di questo comune; ed a formare la Commissione in Reggio per i paesi al di là del Po il cittadino Frigeri Vincenzo, Clocchi Ferdinando e Ruspaggiari Bernardino da aggiungersi ai due membri, che verranno eletti nel suo seno dal sunnominato tribunale di revisione in Reggio, e destinato in commissario del Potere esecutivo *ad hoc* il cittadino Sfera.

Si deduce quindi a pubblica notizia per norma e direzione di chiunque, a cui appartiene, Dal Dipartimento della giustizia in Milano, E 25 termidoro, anno V repubblicano.

SOI, LUOSI — Firm. PASCALDI.

(2) V. VELADINI, op. cit., tomo IV, pag. 170:

In nome della Repubblica Cisalpina una ed indivisibile.

Milano 1° ventoso, anno VI repubblicano.

Il Direttorio esecutivo ai Cisalpini.

Cittadini! Un pugno di uomini vili ed ambiziosi, le di cui pretese insultano da gran tempo ogni idea d'ordine sociale, presume di arrestare nella sua carriera lo sviluppo della libertà, e di far rincarare i destini delle rigenerate nazioni. Miserabili! Sperano essi forse di far risorgere, o sospirare un sistema che ha costato all'Italia tanti secoli di oppressione e di lutto? No; il fulmine della legge 16 termidoro caderà sopra questi nemici del popolo.

Un piccolo movimento della guarnigione francese destinata alla custodia della fortezza di Mantova, per la paga ritardata da qualche tempo, ha bastato a questi vili scellerati per seminare la confusione e la calunnia, facendo credere vicino l'annientamento della Repubblica.

Cittadini! Sarebbe un voler avvalorare la menzogna stessa, se ci affaticassimo di mentire una così oltraggiata e contraddittoria calunnia. La Repubblica Cisalpina garantita dalla Gran Nazione ha proclamato la sua unità, ed indivisibilità; e la sua politica esistente, piantata sopra fondamenti i più solidi, non teme alcuna scossa né esterna, né interna.

Tremino dunque questi nemici della libertà e dell'ordine; misure pronte e vigorose sconteranno le segrete trame, e gli allarmisti e sediziosi proveranno alla fine il rigore della legge.

Il Presidente del Direttorio esecutivo: Firm. MOSCATI.

Per il Direttorio esecutivo: Il Segretario generale, SOI. SOMMARIVA.

esecutivo primo corrente propagati in varie parti della Repubblica, i quali dissimulati comprometterebbero la pubblica rappresentanza;

Il Gran Consiglio risolve a tenore della già presa sua risoluzione, e solo invertendo l'ordine de' capitoli, cosicchè il 1° sarà il 5; il 2° sarà il 6; il 3° sarà il 7; il 4° sarà l'8; il 5° sarà il 10; il 6° sarà l'11; il 7° sarà il 12, avanti le infranominande Commissioni; l'8° sarà il 9; il 9° sarà l'1; il 10° sarà il 2, cambiando qualche residenza; l'11° sarà il 3; il 12° sarà il 4; il 13° sarà il 13; il 14° sarà il 14; il 15° sarà il 15; il 16, il 17 e il 18 saranno i medesimi con qualche variazione.

Greppi — Se il fausto giorno in cui il Gran Consiglio, animato da zelo repubblicano per la sicurezza della patria nostra, risolve di emanare una legge contro que' malvagi che attentano insidiosamente alla sua rovina, esultarono i buoni patrioti ed impallidirono i nemici del pubblico bene; costoro concepirono di nuovo una perfida lusinga di veder compiuti i loro disegni, allorchè seppero la reiezione del Consiglio de' seniori. Corsero di fatto al primo sentore le strade di Milano, le quali anguste sembravano alla pienezza della loro gioia, e nelle loro conventicole fecero applauso al rifiuto della medesima legge; profittando di quell'aura passeggera per diffondere a loro talento le più maligne e più insidiose notizie a danno della Repubblica. Cittadini, i nemici interni di essa sono assai più numerosi che gli esterni. Mantengono costoro vietate corrispondenze, spargono il ridicolo sulle autorità costituite e sulle loro operazioni, soffiando incessantemente il pubblico rancore e la pubblica diffidenza, ed inventando ad arte nuove mentite e presagendo nuovo rovesciamento di cose tengono in un continuo allarme il popolo, e sperano di eccitarlo, quando loro venga il destro, a terribili discordie e a micidiali rivolte. Ma effimere sieno le loro lusinghe ed i loro voti. Nell'imperturbabile costanza del Gran Consiglio trovino costoro uno scoglio impreveduto ch'essi non supereranno giammai. Facciamoci dunque, cittadini, a ripassare la nostra legge, e ponderiamola di nuovo con ferma tranquillità, giacchè avendone il Consiglio de' seniori riconosciuta l'urgenza non può averla disapprovata, che per l'incoerenza forse di qualche articolo. Motivo per cui io fo mozione, che si rimetta alla stessa Commissione il progetto di legge rigettato da' seniori, onde riformi i *considerando* e qualche articolo e lo rimetta al Gran Consiglio seduta stante.

Modificata in tal guisa la nostra legge, saranno rassicurate le coscienze di que' tra' seniori, che giudicarono eccessivo il rigore di due anni di ferri ad un ignorante contadino, quasi l'ignoranza potesse ammettersi mai per iscusabile delitto, nè alcuno azzarderà più di dire tra loro non essere di grave conseguenza la colpa di una pubblica acclamazione d'un sovrano, come se da questa potessero essere disgiunti i pravi sentimenti del cuore e le non oneste intenzioni. Cittadini, non scorra no questo giorno senza che sia di nuovo sottoposta all'approvazione de' seniori la nostra legge. Possa ella essere colla rapidità del fulmine promulgata, onde sieno pure come da un fulmine incenerite le speranze dei malvagi!

Alborghetti — Il Consiglio de' seniori, analizzando la nostra provvida risoluzione, ha creduto ch'ella potesse meritarsi la taccia d'inumana, d'ingiusta, d'impolitica. Fu detto che il cittadino innocente veniva strappato dalle braccia dei suoi genitori, de' suoi parenti, de' suoi amici, e che tradotto al barbaro tribunale invano chiedeva soccorso, invano reclamava giustizia, poichè due testimoni a lui nemici, e forse infami, decidevano del suo destino, e facevano versare il suo sangue in quel suolo medesimo, che doveva assicurare la sua innocenza e garantire i suoi diritti. La si è trovata ingiusta, perchè si è asserito ch'ella colpiva indistintamente il traviato, il colpevole, l'imprudente ed il malvagio, l'imbecille e lo scellerato. Impolitica poi, perchè il suolo cisalpino gode già d'una costante tranquillità all'ombra del trattato di Campo Formio e dell'armate francesi, onde si veniva inopportuna a spargere l'inquietudine nel popolo e a metterlo in apprensione de' mali da lui non conosciuti, e perciò ancora da lui maggiormente esagerati.

Cittadini, come mai si possono travisare in cotal modo le cose? Umana, giusta e politica è la nostra risoluzione. L'esecuzione di questa legge non è forse affidata ad uomini esperti, probi, illuminati, repubblicani, ch'esaurirebbero prima tutte le prove del delitto innanzi di condannare un delinquente? Forse ignota sarebbe a loro l'umanità, la giustizia? Forse riceverebbero così ciecamente le deposizioni d'uomini infami o nemici dell'accusato? Forse non farebbero alcuna distinzione fra delitto e delitto, fra effetto ed effetto? Tutti questi sono vani timori che cercano d'infirmare una legge che ha per oggetto di assicurare la sorte di coloro che hanno esposta la loro vita e la espongono ancora per la salute della Repubblica, una legge che ha per oggetto di tener ferma la nostra Costituzione, e il patto sociale che su lei riposa, una legge finalmente che, punendo i primi attentati, previene mali incalcolabili e pericolosissime conseguenze.

Se ella sia poi politica, io v'inviterò soltanto a por mente alle attuali circostanze. Osservate la razza micidiale dei preti spandersi qua e là, e metter in opera tutte le armi della superstizione, dell'impostura e della malvagità per sostenere ancora, se sia possibile, il triregno e guardarlo dall'ultimo crollo. Cittadini, io vi ho dimostrato di volo quali sieno veramente le caratteristiche della vostra legge; ora vi propongo che dobbiate rimetterla di nuovo alla vostra Commissione, perchè abbia, dietro a qualche forse necessaria regolazione a riproporla nuovamente alla vostra deliberazione.

Perseguiti — La impudenza degli allarmisti dev'essere repressa; l'urgenza di ciò fare è stata riconosciuta dai seniori; i mezzi che abbiamo messi in attività non bastano all'intento. Le misure che avevate adottate colla vostra risoluzione del 3 ventoso non sono state dai seniori approvate; molti sono gli articoli di detta risoluzione, ma due soli formano i principali oggetti sui quali si aggira:

1° Infissione di pene;

2° Metodo speciale di procedere contro i delinquenti.

Se i tribunali costituzionali fossero attivati, forse proporrei che non si de-
viassero i delinquenti dai tribunali ordinari.

In oggi non essendo per anco tutt'i giudici eletti a norma della Costitu-
zione, ed essendo vigenti ancora dei barbari metodi processuali, credo che la
maggior sicurezza della patria, il pubblico bene ed anche il privato vogliano
che voi siate fermi nella presa risoluzione.

Io non saprò mai persuadermi, che non siansi volute adottare dai seniori le
proposte Commissioni militari. Io non farò mai a quel Consiglio il torto di giu-
dicarlo incoerente a sè stesso ed ai suoi principj.

Allorchè si trattò di metter un argine a' delitti che si commettevano a danno
de' privati, egli ha adottate le opportune e indispensabili misure. Ora che trat-
tasi d'impedire delitti, che si commettono impunemente contro la Repubblica e
la sovranità del popolo, come mai egli sarà per rifiutarle preferendo il bene par-
ticulare dei cittadini all'interesse generale della Repubblica?

Mia opinione è dunque che ritenghiate le Commissioni e che solo aggiun-
giate un commissario del Potere esecutivo e nominiate voi stessi l'ufficiale rela-
tore delle Commissioni.

Per ciò poi che riguarda la inflizione delle pene forse saranno sembrate al Con-
siglio de' seniori troppo severe in alcuni casi, e perciò avrà egli rigettata la ri-
soluzione.

Io vi propongo di moderarle in parte. Voi avete inflitta la stessa pena ai
delitti incoati che ai già consumati in tutta la loro estensione; lo stesso gastigo alle
macchinazioni, che non hanno avuto alcun effetto, egualmente che a quelle che
lo hanno avuto pienissimo.

Con tutto che sia analogo ai miei principj che gli attentati dei delitti ma-
nifestati con atti esterni e seguiti da un principio di esecuzione, debbano esser
puniti come lo stesso delitto, allorquando gli attentati stessi non sieno stati so-
spesi che da circostanze fortuite indipendenti dalla volontà dell'inculpato, e che
si debba dar luogo a minore pena solo allorquando essi attentati sieno stati
sospesi dalla volontà dell'inculpato, nulla meno per non impegnarvi in una legge
di troppo dettaglio, trattandosi di una misura del tutto provvisoria, io vi pro-
pongo di misurare per questa volta la pena non tanto dalla malignità del delin-
quente, quanto dagli effetti dell'atto criminoso. Quindi v'invito a fare alla vostra
risoluzione le seguenti riforme:

Art. 7. Chiunque farà acclamazione in pubblico a qualunque sovrano o Go-
verno non democratico, sarà punito colla pena di morte, quando l'acclamazione
si faccia in luogo, ove sia radunanza di popolo, o quando in seguito e per mezzo
della acclamazione si faccia radunanza di popolo, e qualora tanto in un caso che
nell'altro ne segua tumulto e rivolta. Diversamente sarà punito con 5 anni di
ferri. Premesso ecc. Chi ne è scoperto autore sarà punito colla pena di dieci
anni di ferri quando egli stesso abbia sparso in pubblico la novità, e questa

abbia prodotto allarme nel popolo. Diversamente sarà punito con due anni di carcere. Chiunque non iscoprirà, nè comproverà la persona da cui ha ricevuta od intesa la nuova, sarà ritenuto l'autore, e come tale punito. Chi poi avrà sparsa la novità, e proverà di non esserne l'autore, sarà punito con tre anni di ferri, se l'avrà sparsa in pubblico, e ne sarà, come sopra, avvenuto l'allarme, diversamente caderà nella pena di un anno di carcere.

Ritenuti gli articoli 9 e 10.

11. Chiunque ardisse di atterrare qualsiasi pubblico emblema della Libertà sarà punito colla pena di morte, se sarà l'autore del delitto o il capo de' delinquenti; e se sarà quindi *accaduto tumulto rivoluto nel popolo. Non essendo accaduto tumulto, cadrà nella pena di 10 anni di ferri; e nel secondo con tre anni di ferri.* Nelle stesse rispettive pene incorreranno quelli che innalzassero emblemi di Potenze non democratiche in pubblici luoghi senza permesso del Governo. Chiunque poi facesse insulto a qualunque emblema della libertà sarà punito colla morte, quando il commetta in tempo di radunanza del popolo e quando l'insulto cagionasse tumulto rivoluto di popolo. Diversamente sarà punito con cinque anni di pubblico lavoro.

Ritenuti gli articoli 12 e 13.

14. Si eleggerà dal Consiglio de' seniori sopra lista dupla presentatagli dal Consiglio un official relatore per ciascuna Commissione.

Vi sarà anche presso ciascuna delle Commissioni un commissario del Potere esecutivo tanto per l'osservanza delle forme che per l'applicazione della legge.

Sono ritenuti gli articoli 15 e 16.

Fenaroli — La rappresentanza nazionale deve prestarsi alla salute ed alla felicità della Repubblica; nè deve mai abbandonare quel suo posto, finchè questi sacri oggetti chiamano gl'individui che la compongono ad assistere in permanenza alle necessarie sessioni. Noi non usciremo da questo luogo finchè non sia riprodotta al Consiglio de' seniori la risoluzione contro gli allarmisti, che richiede un'immediata sanzione. La salute della patria esige che si faccia questa legge. I buoni la sospirano: non possono temerla che i cattivi. Fo mozione che sia invitato il Consiglio de' seniori a rimanere in sessione permanente sino a tanto che gli rimettiamo una risoluzione estremamente attaccata al bene ed alla sicurezza della Repubblica.

Giovo — Rappresentanti di un popolo libero, destinati a stabilire su basi indestruttibili la felicità del popolo cisalpino, a garantirlo dall'urto d'intestine discordie, dalle scosse dell'allarmista nemico de' più sacri principj, a preparare ripari, onde non spargansi nelle idee de' semplici e degli imbecilli le notizie che possono traviarlo e perderlo per mezzo della sedizione di vili scellerati, voi progettaste una legge provvida dettata dal vostro zelo, dal vostro patriottismo, che il Consiglio de' seniori ha rigettata. Tirannica, feroce, robespierriana, impolitica, non necessaria, anticostituzionale, ingiusta, fu chiamata la vostra risoluzione. Ri-

sonarono in quel Consiglio le voci irriflessive che il Gran Consiglio con questa legge minacciava la libertà de' cittadini: che la Cisalpina con questa legge avrebbe ingoiati i suoi figli: che il male che può nascere dagli allarmisti, dai nemici di ogni ordine sociale sarebbe stato in confronto minore di quello che poteva provenirne dalla vostra legge rivoluzionaria. Il voler confutare ad uno ad uno gli assurdi sarebbe lo stesso che dar peso alle frasi, con cui alcuno del Consiglio de' seniori ha voluto oscurare la vostra legge. Se mai qualche forma costituzionale fosse mancata alla vostra risoluzione, io fo mozione:

Che venga tosto passata alla Commissione che l'ha redatta per riproporla, e quindi passarla indilatamente e seduta stante al Consiglio de' seniori per l'approvazione.

Si mette alle voci la mozione Fenaroli — *approvata*.

(*La tribuna fa un grandissimo applauso*).

Il **Presidente** le chiama all'ordine, e dice di non avere il probò e zelante cittadino bisogno di tali stimoli per fare il bene della sua patria.

Si legge il seguente messaggio da spedirsi al Consiglio de' seniori ed è *approvato*.

« Cittadini rappresentanti; siete invitati a restare in sessione permanente fino a che vi rimettiamo una risoluzione estremamente attaccata al bene ed alla sicurezza della Repubblica ».

Vicini — Dopo che dalla tribuna del Consiglio de' seniori si è gridato impudentemente che la esistenza della nostra Repubblica è problematica: dopo che non fu chiamato all'ordine chi pronunciò questa esecrata bestemmia: dopo che non fu chiamato all'ordine chi pronunciò questa falsa novità, si poteva eccitare nel popolo il maggiore degli allarmi ad un vil fine politico. Io non mi stupisco che siasi rigettata quella santa risoluzione, che tendeva a reprimere i maligni allarmisti, che spargono sedizioso veleno, per far credere appunto che problematica sia la nostra esistenza.

Cittadini rappresentanti, la vostra risoluzione è stata tacciata d'inautile, d'incostituzionale, d'ingiusta.

Io non starò qui a dimostrarvi direttamente il contrario. So che parlo avanti il Gran Consiglio, nè il Gran Consiglio abbisogna di queste prove. Il vostro patriottismo ed il vostro interesse per la pubblica causa ha troppo ben parlato prima di me. Ma poichè l'opinione de' seniori è che la nostra risoluzione sia tale, conviene che studiamo il modo onde persuaderli che è necessaria, sana, costituzionale, giusta.

Per dimostrare che è necessaria e costituzionale, basta il descrivere le presenti circostanze in cui ci troviamo: che è costituzionale basta additare al Consiglio de' seniori l'articolo 377 della Costituzione, poichè la loro opinione relativa a questi due punti deriva da ignoranza di fatto e di circostanze, e da ignoranza.

dell'articolo 377. Si otterrà quest'oggetto aggiugnendo le circostanze di fatto, e l'articolo suddetto nel *considerando* della legge.

Diciamo al Consiglio medesimo com'è oppresso lo spirito pubblico, diciamogli che gran parte del popolo sente il peso delle vecchie abitudini e che qual corpo fisico egli riceve le impressioni materialmente senza studiare e conoscere i suoi veri interessi; che la parte più formidabile, *i nobili*, aspettano e si lusingano ancora che le armi imperiali vengano a rimetter loro le chiavi e i toson d'oro; diciamogli che in Castiglione successe un tumulto di più di 50 persone, che gridavano viva l'imperatore, viva S. Marco; che quella municipalità stette indolente, che accorse la Guardia nazionale di Carpenedolo, che quattro furono arrestati, e due tosto messi in libertà; diciamogli lo stato consimile di altri dipartimenti, ed avremo dimostrato se è necessaria.

Diciamogli poi che la Costituzione accorda due anni di tempo ad attivare tutte le autorità, e dimostreremo che non è incostituzionale. Tutto ciò nel *considerando* della legge.

Passiamo all'ingiusta. Per due motivi lo han creduto: 1° perchè secondo gli articoli 5 e 6 non si mette differenza tra delitto ed attentato; 2° perchè all'articolo 8 può esser punito l'innocente.

Questa non è ignoranza, ma errore di principio. Si sa quanto sia più formidabile l'ultimo e pernicioso all'interesse della Nazione.

Hanno creduto che si debba guardare: 1° se uno attentando si sia pentito; 2° se uno innocentemente senza malizia abbia sparsa la falsa nuova; in una parola qual sia l'intenzione del delinquente.

L'errore di principio è che la legge sia vindice de' pensieri non delle azioni. Un'azione, è vero, non può esser imputabile se non quando è volontaria, ma la volontà di delinquere si manifesta tosto che si manifesta l'azione vietata dalla legge.

Il levare quest'errore di principio è impossibile: dunque è forza mutare qualche articolo della legge, in modo che scorgano i seniori campeggiare evidentemente in essa quei principj di giustizia, che non vi hanno prima saputo rilevare.

Dietro a questi riflessi fo le seguenti mozioni:

1° Che si spedisca un messaggio al Direttorio, seduta stante, invitandolo a darci notizia degli ultimi fatti tumultuosi accaduti in diversi dipartimenti, e principalmente nel dipartimento del Benaco.

2° Che la risoluzione da riproporsi si appoggi al messaggio, che verrà dal Direttorio esecutivo, descrivendo nel *considerando* qual sia lo stato presente dello spirito pubblico, e quale la necessità pertanto di prendere delle forti e rigorose misure.

3° Che ne' *considerando* si citi l'articolo 377 della Costituzione, che dà al Corpo legislativo il tempo di due anni per attivare in tutte le parti la Costituzione medesima, e si dica che la misura proposta è piuttosto fuori che contro la

Costituzione; e che in questi due anni il Corpo legislativo può prendere delle misure ancorchè siano fuori della Costituzione.

4° Che gli articoli 3, 4 e 5 della risoluzione siano modificati in modo, che gli attentati relativi ai sopraddetti delitti portanti pena di morte, qualora siano stati sospesi dalla volontà dell'incolpato, siano puniti con una pena minore, p. e., di dieci anni di ferri.

5° Che minore pena s'infilga a quelli che abbiano provato di aver sparsa la falsa novità senza malizia e senza esserne autori.

6° Che venga formata una Commissione, la quale dietro questi riflessi proponga, seduta stante, delle analoghe riforme da farsi nella risoluzione medesima.

Cittadini rappresentanti, se non possiamo fare il maggior bene non ci avviliamo però; facciamo almeno quel bene, o quel minor male, che ci è permesso dalla circostanza, dalle opposizioni e dalle maligne intenzioni degli altri.

Si mette alle voci la prima mozione Vicini, circa allo spedire un messaggio al Direttorio ed è approvato.

S'incarica il medesimo preopinante dell'estensione del messaggio.

Si legge l'accennato messaggio:

9 ventoso, anno VI repubblicano, n. 985.

[Cittadini direttori! È pervenuta notizia al Gran Consiglio che in vari dipartimenti della Repubblica e particolarmente in quello del Veneto siano successi alcuni fatti tumultuosi prodotti da allarmisti e pervertitori dello spirito pubblico. Il Gran Consiglio v'invita, cittadini direttori, a volergli trasmettere, seduta stante, un dettagliato rapporto dei fatti medesimi e delle circostanze che li hanno accompagnati] (1).

Approvato.

Aquila — L'uomo onesto, cittadini, nella propria innocenza sicuro non si spaventa rimpetto al rigor della legge; anzi nella spada vendicatrice di questa un pegno riconosce della propria e dell'universale sicurezza.

L'uomo reo all'incontro, che nel segreto del cupo suo cuore a stento racchiude il mal talento e il veleno, non fa che implorare con ipocrita voce la moderazione della legge, ond'egli più facilmente evitar ne possa il castigo. Quindi dissimular non vi posso, o colleghi, la mia sorpresa al veder rigettata una risoluzione che, senza compromettere l'innocente, senza sacrificar l'irriflessione e l'imprudenza, il solo delitto prendeva di mira, e consegnava alla vindice scure della giustizia pochi individui per garantire la quiete e il benessere della Repubblica.

Questa oscillazione di sentimenti onde rimangono indebolite le nostre misure, rallentar non deve, cittadini, la marcia ferma e costante delle nostre operazioni. Il popolo, giudice delle nostre intenzioni, conoscerà che nulla più ci sta a cuore di questo: la giurata da noi universale salvezza dei cittadini. La tarda posterità

(1) Archivio di Stato, Milano, Ms., Governo, Corpo legislativo, anno VI repubblicano. Messaggi al Direttorio esecutivo, 1797-1798, pag. 37.

poi risalendo ai difficili tempi, in cui noi occupammo questi scanni, e le circostanze bilanciando imperiose, istantanee, che a noi quasi nostro malgrado quella legge dettarono, costoro, dirà, malgrado gl'inciampi incontrati osarono di meritare la pubblica stima e la confidenza del popolo.

Frattanto che faremo noi, cittadini? forse abbandoneremo un progetto dettato dalla necessità, voluto dalla giustizia, reclamato altamente dall'interesse, dalla dignità della Repubblica? Non già, miei colleghi, non già. Sono anzi d'avviso che *insister si debba nella già presa risoluzione, che modificato alcun poco qualche articolo della legge, specialmente in quel paragrafo che riguarda le acclamazioni degli stranieri Governi, si debba rimandar la risoluzione ai seniori per essere sanzionata.*

Faccia il genio della libertà, che tiene della Repubblica nostra la tutela e la cura, faccia questo buon genio, che sieno meglio intese e meglio aggradite le nostre pure intenzioni.

Mozzani — Non era così facile a credersi, che il Consiglio de' seniori, dopo aver con una legge della stessa natura di questa, che ora noi gli proponghiamo, assicurata la sicurezza privata, rifiutasse ora di garantire la sicurezza pubblica. Ma ha egli riflettuto alla necessità di contenere i mal intenzionati, che pullulano d'ogni parte ne' primordi d'una nascente democratica Repubblica, e che mossi da una fumosa ambizione, o da un venale interesse, o da un cieco abituale attaccamento alla schiavitù, guardano di mal occhio i suoi avanzamenti, e vorrebbero ripristinato l'antico ordine di cose? Si è asserito ch'ella sia incostituzionale, ingiusta, impolitica, inutile. Ma può essere incostituzionale, quando la Costituzione medesima, prevedendo il bisogno ne' primi momenti di alcune forti e straordinarie misure, accorda che per due anni di tempo le si possano prendere a seconda de' casi inopinati che fossero per accadere? Sarà ingiusta nel fissare la pena di morte ad un cospiratore, ad un ribelle, che sarebbe pronto a vendere la sua patria ad una tirannica potenza, o a fare che rivi di sangue scorressero per le sue contrade? Sarà finalmente impolitica sbigottendo colle minacce d'un pronto severo ma giusto castigo que' perversi, cui ha dato ansa finora una troppo indulgente clemenza, e che hanno ardito perfino di smascherarsi col loro parlari, e di svelare le loro perfide trame? Io non mi estenderò poi sulla pretesa inutilità.

Il Direttorio l'ha abbastanza dimostrata nel suo messaggio, e ve la dimostrerà vieppiù nel messaggio che gli avete richiesto, e che state attendendo. Opino dunque, che in tanta luce di cose, in tanta evidenza di ragione sia chiusa la discussione, e sia rimessa la legge alla Commissione come vi hanno proposto i preopinanti.

Molti ricercano che sia chiusa la discussione.

Il **Presidente** espone di esser inutile la riassunzione de' motivi, giacchè tutti i preopinanti, benchè per diverse strade, tutti però sono arrivati ad uno stesso punto, cioè che si riformi il progetto e si rimandi a' seniori. Quest' universale consentimento del Gran Consiglio, dice'egli, forma l'elogio della vostra fermezza.

e l'inalza come un chiaro segno, onde tutti i cittadini comincino una volta a sperar bene della Repubblica.

Molti domandano ancora la parola.

Valeriani insiste per ottenerla. Il Consiglio interpellato dal Presidente chiede la discussione, e delibera che sieno rimesse tutte le riflessioni degli oratori, e singolarmente quelle di Valeriani, alla Commissione incaricata di rivedere il progetto di risoluzione a tenore della mozione Greppi, che viene *approvata*.

Glissenti opina che alla Commissione medesima si agglungano altri membri del Gran Consiglio, onde risulti dalle comuni viste la migliore formazione del nuovo progetto di legge.

Il Consiglio *approva* e sono nominati Giovo e Glissenti.

Il **Presidente** propone che si ripigli la discussione, sospesa per l'altro ed aggiornata, sopra l'articolo 45 del piano della Guardia nazionale. Si legge l'articolo.

Il cittadino Oliva, se ben mi ricordo, dice il **Presidente**, fu il primo ad opporsi non alla massima, ma all'intervallo dei due anni prescritto nell'articolo del piano. Egli ridusse la forza del suo discorso a quest'argomento. La Guardia nazionale garantisce la vita e la proprietà di chiunque si trova nella società. Questo beneficio è continuo; dunque continuo deve anch'essere un qualche peso. Vuolsi essente il forestiere possidente dal servizio personale? Lo sia. Ma si assoggetti almeno ad una qualche retribuzione, e vi si assoggetti non dopo due anni di domicilio, ma dal momento ch'entra nella società.

Lamberti fu del parere d'Oliva, non così Compagnoni. Volgiamo, disse egli, uno sguardo alla Costituzione laddove parla de' forestieri e della Guardia nazionale. Entro il settennio ha per forestiere chiunque, benchè domiciliato nel territorio della Repubblica. Dai soli cittadini e figli di cittadini vuole che sia composta la Guardia nazionale. Se dunque il forestiere entro il settennio di domicilio è sempre forestiere, e non cittadino, nè figlio di cittadino, è chiaro che in forza della Costituzione il forestiere non può entrare a parte della Guardia nazionale. Ma se non ha alcuna parte in questa Guardia, non la deve avere altresì ne' pesi ed obblighi, che ne derivano. Dunque non solo dal momento che il forestiere possidente entra nella società, ma neppure dopo due anni di domicilio dovrà essere gravato dalla tassa proposta nel piano, tanto più poi se si riguarda ad un principio assai più alto di questa disciplina adottata da tutte le genti qual'è quello dell'ospitalità. I forestieri sono nostri ospiti; esigono dunque ben altro da noi, che di vedersi accolti col pronto complimento d'una tassa ingiusta, sì perchè il forestiere possidente paga già l'altra tassa in ragione de' suoi fondi ed effetti, sì perchè analizzando più profondamente la Guardia nazionale il forestiere non vi ha relazione veruna. Imperciocchè cosa è poi in fine la Guardia nazionale, se non se il sovrano armato alla difesa di sè stesso? Or siccome i forestieri non hanno alcuna parte alla rappresentanza della sovranità, così non la possono avere

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qualunque sovrano, o governo non democratico, e spargessero false voci di allarme tendenti a mettere in dubbio l'esistenza della Repubblica, a spargere la diffidenza nel Popolo, e a comprimere lo spirito pubblico.

Presidente: Voi vedete o Cittadini, che il Consiglio de' Seniori ha adottata l'urgenza, rigettato il progetto.

Dunque conviene nella massima, dissentire nel modo. Perciò io credo dell'ordine d'invitarvi o Cittadini Colleghi a passare la vostra Risoluzione alla stessa Commissione acciò la riformi, avuto anche riguardo alle riflessioni de' Seniori a norma di quanto saprà suggerirvi la vostra previdenza, ed il vostro verace amore per la causa della libertà. Se vi fu mai affare, che interessasse il vostro zelo per il bene pubblico questo certamente lo è, in cui si tratta di porre un freno a vili allarmisti perturbatori dell'ordine pubblico, e già convinti nell'opinione di tutti i buoni d'odio, e d'inimicizia contro i diritti dell'uomo. Cosa di somma urgenza insinuata dal Messaggio del Direttorio, riconosciuta dal Gran Consiglio, approvata da' Seniori. Crederei di mancare al mio dovere, se io non v'invitassi a non rimanere freddi e dolorosi spettatori d'una ripulsa invece di occuparvi di que' ripari, che da voi esige la sicurezza della Nazione.

Caddè: Non è più da rinvocarsi in dubbio, che il Consiglio de' Seniori procura la felicità del Popolo con una via totalmente diversa, ed opposta a quella che viene scelta dal Gran Consiglio.

Infatti egli non trovò giusto di accordare al Potere Esecutivo le *lit.* 1,808,592. 13. 4. al mese

pel mantenimento delle spese della forza armata complessivamente, ma trovò giusto di accordare in dettaglio altrettante partite, le quali componevano la quantità medesima, lasciando così che la Truppa assoldata priva di salario abbandonasse i vessilli nostri, e si dedicasse alle opere di campagna con sommo utile dell'agricoltura.

Non trovò conveniente di accordare il libero commercio interno, ed esterno dei grani, il quale colle discipline daziarie sarebbe stato sottoposto ad alcune regole che avrebbero impedito, che la circolazione interna non fosse un pretesto al commercio esterno, ed avrebbe prodotto al tesoro nazionale il prodigioso vantaggio di due lire al quintale per ogni sorta di grani, e di tre lire per il riso; e trovò poi conveniente di concedere la libera circolazione, la quale non combinata coll'estrazione somministra con la facoltà di far girare il genere senza cautele daziarie l'ampia comodità di estrarlo senza pagamento di dazio. Tali misure non v'ha dubbio ritornano a somma utilità del Popolo, utilità che non poteva sperare, se non dalla beneficenza del Consiglio de' Seniori.

Fin quì l'utilità del Popolo la vedo chiaramente favorita. Confesso il vero, che non so vederla nell'arresto de' ferri nativi in Repubblica, obbligando un terzo almeno della Repubblica a servirsi del ferro di Svezia, e di Germania, quando non fosse per favorire que' negozianti, carreggiatori, e naviganti, che sono soliti trar profitto dal commercio del ferro estero.

Non so egualmente vederla nel rifiuto della Legge contro coloro che si pascono del crudele de-

siderio di vedere il Popolo titubante dubbio ed incerto sulla sua sorte in grazia delle allarmanti novelle ad arte sparse, ed inventate ad ogni minimo movimento naturale che accada nell' interno, e nell' esterno .

Se mai avesse egli creduto, che la Legge 16. Termidoro anno V. provvedesse abbastanza, sappia che questa non fu pubblicata ne' Dipartimenti d'Adda ed Oglio, del Mela, del Mincio, e del Benaco.

Sappia che più non esistono nè i Tribunali, nè le Commissioni alle quali era raccomandata l'applicazione della Legge ai casi particolari .

Sappia che non è provveduto al caso di atterramento dell' albero della libertà come è accaduto in qualche luogo .

Sappia che non è provveduto alle acclamazioni di evviva un santo, od un sovrano, come con iscandalo mostruoso è succeduto in diversi contorni della Repubblica .

Ma il Consiglio de' Seniori non saprà mai i veri motivi determinanti il Gran Consiglio s' egli non avrà in giornata i nostri processi verbali .

Sino dai 29. scorso fu ordinato, che a preferenza d' ogn' altra stampa si dovessero spedire i processi de' 27. e 28. importantissimi a far approvare l' estrazione del frumento, e del riso, e lo stipendio, e le spese della forza armata, e giunsero le approvazioni fortunatamente senza che fossero stampati ancora gli anzidetti processi .

Donde venga il disordine non saprei indovinarlo; so per altro che tal disordine è gravissimo, e della massima importanza. Faccio dunque menzione :

1. Che i Redattori siano incaricati a loro responsabilità di spedire alla stampa domani il processo d' ieri, e dopo domani il processo d' oggi, e così successivamente ritirando dallo Stampatore la ricevuta della consegna per conoscere donde nasca il ritardo.

2. Che si riassume l' affare della Legge contro i nemici dell' ordine pubblico ad oggetto di riproporla ai Seniori per la sanzione.

A quest' effetto propongo le modificazioni, che mi sembrano convenienti nei *Considerando*, ed una diversa classificazione degli articoli, affinchè non ostante tanta importanza non rimanga in obblivione con infinito scandalo, e danno di tutti i buoni.

Considerando esser uno ec.

Considerando, che mentre la Repubblica è nella migliore armonia co' vicini, e che le Autorità Costituite tentano ogni mezzo per ristabilire la calma interiore, i nemici dell' ordine non cessano di spagere false voci d' allarme:

Considerando, che la Legge 16. Termidoro anno V. è inefficace a reprimere le animosità degli allarmisti per le troppo vaghe disposizioni facili a deludersi dalla malizia degl' inimici:

Considerando, che detta Legge non può neppure essere mandata ad esecuzione tanto in quelle parti della Repubblica nelle quali non fu mai pubblicata, quanto in quelle parti nelle quali furono disciolte le speciali Commissioni instituite col proclama del Direttorio Esecutivo 25. Termidoro anno V.

(Sarà continuato)

Libertà

N. 79.

*Eguaglianza**Ventoso Anno VI. Repub.*

IL REDATTORE DEL GRAN CONSIGLIO

DELLA REPUBBLICA CISALPINA

UNA ED INDIVISIBILE

 CONTINUAZIONE DELLA SEDUTA CI.
DEL DI' 9.

Considerando, che quand' anche fosse provvida detta Legge rimarrebbe di troppo ritardato l'effetto dai metodi prescritti dalle Leggi *organiche giudiziarie*, dettate pel caso in cui non sieno necessarie straordinarie, ed efficaci misure per arrestare la venenosa influenza sulla pubblica opinione dei disseminatori di sediziose novelle inventate per sedurre i deboli, ed i pusilli,

Dichiarato il caso d'urgenza sui motivi espressi nel Proclama del Direttorio Esecutivo primo corrente propagati in varie parti della Repubblica, i quali dissimulati comprometterebbero la pubblica Rappresentanza,

Il Gran Consiglio risolve a tenore della già presa sua Risoluzione, e solo invertendo l'ordine de' capitali così che

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- il 1. sarà il 5.
il 2. sarà il 6.
il 3. sarà il 7.
il 4. sarà l' 8.
il 4. sarà il 10.
il 6. sarà l' 11.
il 7. sarà il 12. avanti le infranominande Com
missioni .
il 8. sarà il 9.
il 9. sarà il 1.
il 10. sarà il 2. cambiando qualche residenza .
il 11. sarà il 3.
il 12. sarà il 4.
il 13. sarà il 13.
il 14. sarà il 14.
il 15. sarà il 15.
il 16.
il 17. } saranno i medesimi con qualche variazione
il 18. }

Greppi : Se il fausto giorno il cui il Gran Consiglio animato da zelo repubblicano per la sicurezza della Patria nostra risolse di emanare una Legge contro que' malvagi, che attentano insidiosamente alla sua rovina, esultarono i buoni Patriotti, ed impallidireno i nemici del pubblico bene, costoro concepirono di nuovo una perfida losinga di veder compiuti i loro disegni, allorchè seppero la rejezione del Consiglio de' Seniori . Corsero fatto al primo sentore le strade di Milano, le qua anguste sembravano alla pienezza della loro gioja e nelle loro conventicole fecero applauso al rifiuto della medesima Legge; profittando di quell' aus

passaggera per diffondere a loro talento le più maligne, e più insidiose notizie a danno della Repubblica. Cittadini, i nemici interni di essa sono assai più numerosi, che gli esterni. Mantengono costoro vietate corrispondenze, spargono il ridicolo sulle Autorità Costituite, e sulle loro operazioni, soffiano incessantemente il pubblico rancore, e la pubblica diffidenza, ed inventando ad arte nuove mentite, e presagendo nuovo rovesciamento di cose tengono in un continuo allarme il Popolo, e sperano di eccitarlo, quando loro venga il destro, a terribili discordie, e a micidiali rivolte. Ma effimere sieno le loro lusinghe, ed i loro voti. Nell'imperturbabile costanza del Gran Consiglio trovino costoro uno scoglio impreveduto ch'essi non supereranno giammai. Facciamoci dunque Cittadini a ripassare la nostra Legge, e ponderiamola di nuovo con ferma tranquillità, giacchè avendo il Consiglio de' Seniori riconosciuta l'urgenza non può averla disapprovata, che per l'incoerenza forse di qualche articolo. Motivo per cui io fo mozione, che si rimetta alla stessa Commissione il progetto di Legge rigettato da' Seniori, onde riformi i *Considerando*, e qualch' articolo, e lo rimetta al Gran Consiglio Seduta stante.

Modificata in cotal guisa la nostra Legge, saranno rassicurate le coscienze di que' tra Seniori, che giudicarono eccessivo il rigore di due anni di ferri ad un ignorante contadino, quasi l'ignoranza potesse ammettersi mai per iscusata del delitto, nè alcuno azzarderà più di dire tra loro non essere di grave conseguenza la colpa di una pubblica acclamazione d'un sovrano, come se da questa potessero

essere disgiunti i pravi sentimenti del cuore, e le non oneste intenzioni. Cittadini non iscorra nè questo giorno senza che sia di nuovo sottoposta all' approvazione de' Seniori la nostra Legge. Possa ella essere colla rapidità del fulmine promulgata, onde sieno pure come da un fulmine incenerite le speranze de' malvagi!

Alberghetti: Il Consiglio de' Seniori analizzando la nostra provvida Risoluzione ha creduto, ch' ella potesse meritarsi la taccia d'inumana, d'ingiusta, d'impolitica. Fu detto, che il Cittadino innocente veniva strappato dalle braccia de' suoi genitori, de' suoi parenti, de' suoi amici, e che condotto al barbaro Tribunale invano chiedeva soccorso, invano reclamava giustizia, perchè due testimoni a lui nemici, e forse infami decidevano del suo destino, e facevano versare il suo sangue in quel suolo medesimo, che dovea assicurare la sua innocenza, e garantire i suoi diritti. La si è trovata ingiusta, perchè si è asserito, ch' ella colpiva indistintamente il traviato, il colpevole, l'imprendente, ed il malvagio, l'imbecille, e lo scellerato. Impolitica poi, perchè il suolo cisalpino gode già d'una costante tranquillità all'ombra del trattato di Campo Formio, e dell' Armate Francesi, onde si veniva inopportuna a spargere l'inquietudine nel Popolo, e a metterlo in apprensione de' mali da lui non conosciuti, e perciò ancora da lui maggiormente esagerati.

Cittadini, come mai si possono travisare in cotai modo le cose? Umana, giusta, e politica è la nostra Risoluzione. L' esecuzione di questa Legge non è forse affidata ad uomini esperti, pro-

illuminati, repubblicani, ch' esaurirebbero prima tutte le prove del delitto innanzi di condannare un delinquente? Forse ignota sarebbe a loro l'umanità, la giustizia? Forse riceverebbero così ciecamente le deposizioni d'uomini infami, o nemici dell'accusato? Forse non farebbero alcuna distinzione fra delitto e delitto, fra effetto ed effetto? Tutti questi sono vani timori che cercano d'infirmare una Legge che ha per oggetto di assicurare la sorte di coloro che hanno esposta la loro vita, e la espongono ancora per la salute della Repubblica, una Legge che ha per oggetto di tener ferma la nostra Costituzione, e il patto sociale che su lei riposa, una Legge finalmente che punendo i primi attentati, previene mali incalcolabili, e pericolosissime conseguenze.

Se ella sia poi politica, io v'inviterò soltanto a por mente alle attuali circostanze. Osservate la razza micidiale dei preti spandersi quà e là, e metter in opera tutte le armi della superstizione, dell'impostura e della malvagità per sostenere ancora, se fia possibile, il trionfo, e guardarlo dall'ultimo crollo. Cittadini, io vi ho dimostrato di volo, quali sieno veramente le caratteristiche della vostra Legge; ora vi propongo che dobbiate rimetterla di nuovo alla vostra Commissione, perchè abbia, dietro a qualche forse necessaria regolazione a riproporla novellamente alla vostra deliberazione.

Perseguiti: La impudenza degli allarmisti dev'essere repressa; l'urgenza di ciò fare è stata riconosciuta dai Seniori; i mezzi che abbiamo messi in attività non bastano all'intento. Le misure che avevate adottate colla vostra Risoluzione dei 3.

Ventoso, non sono state dai Seniori approvate; molti sono gli articoli di detta Risoluzione, ma due soli formano i principali oggetti sui quali si aggira.

1. Infissione di pene.
2. Metodo speciale di procedere contro i delinquenti.

Se i Tribunali Costituzionali fossero attivati, forse proporrei, che non si deviassero i delinquenti dai Tribunali ordinarij.

In oggi non essendo per anco tutt' i Giudici eletti a norma della Costituzione, ed essendo vigenti ancora dei barbari metodi processuali, credo che la maggior sicurezza della Patria, il pubblico bene, ed anche il privato vogliano che voi siate fermi nella presa Risoluzione.

Io non saprò mai persuadermi, che non siansi volute adottare dai Seniori le proposte Commissioni Militari. Io non farò mai a quel Consiglio il torto di giudicarlo incoerente a se stesso, ed a suoi principj.

Allorchè si trattò di metter un argine a' delitti che si commettevano a danno de' privati, egli ha adottate le opportune e indispensabili misure. Ora che trattasi d' impedire delitti, che si commettono impunemente contro la Repubblica e la Sovranità del Popolo, come mai egli sarà per rifiutarle preferendo il bene particolare de' Cittadini all' interesse generale della Repubblica?

Mia opinione è dunque, che ritenghiate le Commissioni, e che solo aggiunghiate un Commissario del Poder Esecutivo, e nominiate voi stessi l' Ufficiale Relatore delle Commissioni.

Per ciò poi che riguarda la inflizione delle pene forse saranno sembrate al Consiglio de' Seniori troppo severe in alcuni casi, e perciò avrà egli rigettata la Risoluzione.

Io vi propongo di moderarle in parte. Voi avete inflitta la stessa pena ai delitti incoati che ai già consumati in tutta la loro estensione; lo stesso gastigo alle macchinazioni, che non hanno avuto alcun effetto, egualmente che a quelle che lo hanno avuto pienissimo.

Con tutto che sia analogo ai miei principj che gli attentati dei delitti manifestati con atti esterni e seguiti da un principio di esecuzione, debbano esser puniti come lo stesso delitto, allorquando gli attentati stessi non sieno stati sospesi, che da circostanze fortuite indipendenti dalla volontà dell' incolpato, e che si debba dar luogo a minore pena solo allor quando essi attentati sieno stati sospesi dalla volontà dell' incolpato, nulla meno per non impegnarvi in una Legge di troppo dettaglio, trattandosi di una misura del tutto provvisoria, io vi propongo di misurare per questa volta la pena non tanto dalla malignità del delinquente, quanto dagli effetti dell' atto criminoso. Quindi v' invito a fare alla vostra Risoluzione le seguenti riforme.

Art. 7. Chiunque farà acclamazione in pubblico a qualunque sovrano, o governo non democratico sarà punito colla pena di morte, quando l'acclamazione si faccia in luogo, ove sia radunanza di Popolo, o quando in seguito, e per mezzo della acclamazione si faccia radunanza di Popolo, e qual ora tanto in un caso che nell' altro ne segua tumulto, e rivolta. Diversamente sarà punito con

5. anni di ferri. Premesso ec. Chi non è scoperto autore sarà punito colla pena di dieci anni di ferri quando egli stesso abbia sparsa in pubblico la novità, e questa abbia prodotto allarme nel Popolo. Diversamente sarà punito con due anni di carcere. Chiunque non iscoprirà, nè comproverà la persona da cui ha ricevuta od intesa la nuova, sarà ritenuto l'autore, e come tale punito. Chi poi avrà sparsa la novità, e proverà di non esserne l'autore sarà punito con tre anni di ferri, se l'avrà sparsa in pubblico, e ne sarà, come sopra, avvenuto l'allarme, diversamente caderà nella pena di un anno di carcere.

Ritenuti gli articoli 9 e 10.

11. Chiunque ardisse di atterrare qualsiasi pubblico emblema della Libertà sarà punito colla pena di morte, se sarà l'autore del delitto, o il capo de' delinquenti; e se sarà quindi *accaduto tumulto rivoltoso nel Popolo*. *Non essendo accaduto tumulto, cadrà nella pena di 10. anni di ferri; e nel secondo con tre anni di ferri*. Nelle stesse rispettive pene incorreranno quelli che innalzarono emblemi di potenze non democratiche in pubblici luoghi senza permesso del Governo. Chiunque poi facesse insulto a qualunque emblema della Libertà, sarà punito colla morte, quando il commetta in tempo di radunanza del Popolo, e quando l'insulto cagionasse tumulto rivoltoso di Popolo. Diversamente sarà punito con cinque anni di pubblico lavoro.

Ritenuti gli articoli 12, e 13.

14. Si eleggerà dal Consiglio de' Seniori sopra lista dupla presentatagli dal Consiglio un Official Relatore per ciascheduna Commissione.

Vi sarà anche presso ciascuna delle Commissioni un Commissario del Potere Esecutivo tanto per l'osservanza delle forme che per l'applicazione della Legge.

Sono ritenuti gli articoli 15, e 16.

Fenaroli: La Rappresentanza Nazionale deve prestarsi alla salute, ed alla felicità della Repubblica; nè deve mai abbandonare quel suo posto, finchè questi sacri oggetti chiamano gl' Individui che la compongono ad assistere in permanenza alle necessarie Sessioni. Noi non usciremo da questo luogo finchè non sia riprodotta al Consiglio de' Seniori la Risoluzione contro gli allarmisti, che richiede un' immediata sanzione. La salute della patria esige che si faccia questa Legge. I buoni la sospirano: non possono temerla che i cattivi. Fo mozione che sia invitato il Consiglio de' Seniori a rimanere in Sessione permanente sino a tanto che gli rimettiamo una Risoluzione estremamente attaccata al bene ed alla sicurezza della Repubblica.

Giovio: Rappresentanti di un Popolo libero. Destinati a stabilire su basi indestruttibili la felicità del Popolo Cisalpino, a garantirlo dall' urto d' intestine discordie, dalle scosse dell' allarmista nemico de' più sacri principj, a preparare ripari, onde non spargansi nelle idee de' semplici e degli imbecilli le notizie che possono traviarlo, e perderlo per mezzo della sedizione di vili scellerati, voi progettaste una Legge provvida dettata dal vostro zelo, dal vostro patriotismo, che il Consiglio de' Seniori ha rigettata. Tirannica, feroce, Robespieriana, impolitica, non necessaria, anticostituzionale, ingiusta, fu chiamata la vostra Risoluzione. Risonarono in quel Consiglio le voci irreflessive

che il Gran Consiglio con questa Legge minacciava la libertà de' Cittadini: che la Cisalpina con questa Legge avrebbe ingojati i suoi figli: che il male che può nascere dagli allarmisti, dai nemici d'ogni ordine sociale sarebbe stato in confronto minore di quello che poteva provenirne dalla vostra Legge *rivoluzionaria*. Il voler confutare ad uno ad uno gli assurdi sarebbe lo stesso che dar peso alle frasi, con cui alcuno del Consiglio dei Seniori ha voluto oscurare la vostra Legge. Se mai qualche forma costituzionale fosse mancata alla vostra Risoluzione, io fo mozione:

Che venga tosto passata alla Commissione che l'ha redatta per riproporla, e quindi passarla indilattamente, e Seduta stante al Consiglio de' Seniori per l'approvazione.

Si mette alle voci la mozione *Fenaroli*, è approvata.

Le Tribune fanno grandissimi applausi: il Presidente le chiama all'ordine, e dice di non avere il probo e zelante Cittadino bisogno di tali stimoli per fare il bene della sua Patria.

Si legge il seguente Messaggio da spedirsi al Consiglio de' Seniori, ed è approvato.

„ Cittadini Rappresentanti; siete invitati a restare in Sessione permanente fino a che vi rimettiamo una Risoluzione estremamente attaccata al bene, ed alla sicurezza della Repubblica. “

Vicini: Dopo che dalla tribuna del Consiglio de' Seniori si è gridato impudentemente, che la esistenza della nostra Repubblica è problematica: dopo che non fu chiamato all'ordine chi pronunciò questa esecrata bestemmia: dopo che non fu chia-

mato all'ordine chi pronunciò questa falsa novità, si poteva eccitare nel Popolo il maggiore degli allarmi ad un vil fine politico. Io non mi stupisco che siasi rigettata quella santa Risoluzione, che tendeva a reprimere i maligni allarmisti, che spargono sedizioso veleno, per far credere appunto che problematica sia la nostra esistenza.

Cittadini Rappresentanti la vostra Risoluzione è stata racciata d'inutile, d'incostituzionale, d'ingiusta.

Io non starò qui a dimostrarvi direttamente il contrario. So che parlo avanti il Gran Consiglio, nè il Gran Consiglio abbisogna di queste prove. Il vostro patriotismo, ed il vostro interesse per la pubblica causa ha troppo ben parlato prima di me.

Ma poichè l'opinione de' Seniori è che la nostra Risoluzione sia tale, coaviene che studiamo il modo onde persuaderli, che è necessaria, sana, costituzionale, giusta.

Per dimostrare che è necessaria, e costituzionale, basta il descrivere le presenti circostanze in cui ci troviamo: che è costituzionale basta additare al Consiglio de' Seniori l'art. 377. della Costituzione, poichè la loro opinione relativa a questi due punti, deriva da ignoranza di fatto, e di circostanze, e da ignoranza dell'art. 377. Si otterrà quest'oggetto aggiungendo le circostanze di fatto, e l'articolo suddetto nel *Considerando* della Legge.

Diciamo al Consiglio medesimo com'è oppresso lo spirito pubblico, diciamogli, che gran parte del Popolo sente il peso delle vecchie abitudini, e che qual corpo fisico egli riceve le impressioni nate-

rialmente senza studiare a conoscere i suoi veri interessi; che la parte più formidabile *i nobili* aspettano, e si lusingano ancora, che le armi imperiali vengano a rimetter loro le chiavi, e i toson d'oro; diciamogli che in Castiglione successe un tumulto di più di 30. persone, che gridavano viva l'Imperatore, viva S. Marco; che quella Municipalità stette indolente, che accorse la Guardia Nazionale di Carpenedolo, che quattro furono arrestati, e due tosto messi in libertà; diciamogli lo stato consimile di altri Dipartimenti, ed avremo dimostrato se è necessaria.

Diciamogli poi che la Costituzione accorda due anni di tempo ad attivare tutte le Autorità, e dimostreremo che non è incostituzionale. Tutto ciò nei *Considerando* della Legge.

Passiamo all'ingiusta. Per due motivi lo han creduto: 1. perchè secondo gli art. 5., e 6. non si mette differenza tra delitto, ed attentato: 2. perchè all'art. 8. può esser punito l'innocente.

Questa non è ignoranza, ma errore di principio. Si sa quanto sia più formidabile l'ultimo, e pernicioso all'interesse della Nazione.

Hanno creduto, che si debba guardare, se uno attentando si sia pentito; 2. se uno innocentemente senza malizia abbia sparsa la falsa nuova; in una parola qual sia l'intenzione del delinquente.

L'errore di principio è che la Legge sia vindice de' pensieri non delle azioni. Un'azione è vero non può esser imputabile, se non quando è volontaria, ma la volontà di delinquere si manifesta tosto che si manifesta l'azione vietata dalla Legge.

Il levare quest' errore di principio è impossibile: dunque è forza mutare qualche articolo della Legge, in modo che scorgano i Seniori campeggiare evidentemente in essa quei principj di giustizia, che non vi hanno prima saputo rilevare.

Dietro a questi riflessi fo le seguenti mozioni.

1. Che si spedisca un Messaggio al Direttorio, Seduta stante, invitandolo a darci notizia degli ultimi fatti tumultuosi accaduti in diversi Dipartimenti, e principalmente nel Dipartimento del Benaco.

2. Che la Risoluzione da riproporsi si appoggi al Messaggio, che verrà dal Direttorio Esecutivo, descrivendo nel *Considerando* qual sia lo stato presente dello spirito pubblico, e quale la necessità pertanto di prendere delle forti, e rigorose misure.

3. Che ne' *Considerando* si citi l'art. 377. della Costituzione, che dà al Corpo Legislativo il tempo di due anni per attivare in tutte le parti la Costituzione medesima, e si dica, che la misura proposta è piuttosto fuori, che contro la Costituzione; e che in questi due anni il Corpo Legislativo può prendere delle misure ancorchè siano fuori della Costituzione.

4. Che gli art. 3. 4. 5. della Risoluzione siano modificati in modo, che gli attentati relativi ai sopradetti delitti portanti pena di morte, qualora siano stati sospesi dalla volontà dell' incolpato siano puniti con una pena minore, p. e., di dieci anni di ferri.

5. Che minore pena s' infligga a quelli che abbiano provato di aver sparsa la falsa novità senza malizia, e senza esserne autori.

6. Che venga formata una Commissione, la quale dietro questi riflessi proponga, Seduta stante, delle analoghe riforme da farsi nella Risoluzione medesima.

Cittadini Rappresentanti, se possiamo fare il maggior bene non ci avviliamo però; facciamo almeno quel bene, o quel minor male, che ci è permesso dalla circostanza, dalle opposizioni, e dalle maligne intenzioni degli altri.

Si mette alle voci la prima mozione *Vicini*, circa allo spedire un Messaggio al Direttorio ed è approvata. S'incarica il medesimo Proopinante dell'estensione del Messaggio.

Si legge l'accennato Messaggio, con cui s'invita il Direttorio a spedire al Gran Consiglio Seduta stante un circostanziato dettaglio dei fatti tumultuosi prodotti in alcuni Dipartimenti dagli allarmisti, e pervertitori dello spirito pubblico, ed è approvato.

Aquila: L'uomo onesto, Cittadini, nella propria innocenza sicuro non si spaventa rimpetto al rigor della Legge; anzi nella spada vendicatrice di questa un pegno riconosce della propria, e della universale sicurezza.

L'uomo reo all'incontro, che nel secreto del cupo suo cuore a stento racchiude il mal talento, e il veleno, non fa che implorare con ipocrita voce la moderazion della Legge, ond'egli più facilmente evitar ne possa il castigo. Quindi dissimular non vi posso o Colleghi la mia sorpresa al veder rigettata una Risoluzione, che senza compromettere l'innocente, senza sacrificar l'irriflessione e l'imprudenza, il solo delitto prendeva di mira,

e consegnava alla vindice scure della giustizia pochi individui per garantire la quiete, e il ben essere della Repubblica.

Questa oscillazione di sentimenti onde rimangano indebolite le nostre misure, rallentar non deve, Cittadini, la marcia ferma e costante delle nostre operazioni. Il Popolo giudice delle nostre intenzioni conoscerà, che nulla più ci sta a cuore di questo: la giurata da noi universale salvezza dei Cittadini. La tarda posterità poi risalendo ai difficili tempi, in cui noi occupammo questi scanni, e le circostanze bilanciando imperiose istantanee, che a noi quasi nostro malgrado quella Legge dettarono, costoro, dirà, malgrado gl'inciampi incontrati osarono di meritare la pubblica stima, e la confidenza del Popolo.

Frattanto che faremo noi Cittadini? forse abbandoneremo un progetto dettato dalla necessità, voluto dalla giustizia, reclamato altamente dall'interesse, dalla dignità della Repubblica? Non già miei Colleghi, non già. Sono anzi d'avviso, *che insister si debba nella già presa Risoluzione, che modificato alcun poco qualche articolo della Legge, specialmente in quel paragrafo, che riguarda le acclamazioni degli svizzeri governi, si debba rimandar la Risoluzione ai Seniori per essere sanzionata.*

Faccia il genio della Libertà, che tiene della Repubblica nostra la tutela, e la cura, faccia questo buon genio, che sieno meglio intese, e meglio aggradite le nostre pure intenzioni.

Mozzini: Non era così facile a credersi, che il Consiglio de' Seniori, dopo aver con una Legge

della stessa natura di questa, che ora noi gli proponghiamo, assicurata la sicurezza privata, rifiutasse ora di garantire la sicurezza pubblica. Ma ha egli riflettuto alla necessità di contenere i mal intenzionati, che pullulano d'ogni parte ne' primordj d'una nascente democratica Repubblica, e che mossi da una fumosa ambizione, o da un venale interesse, o da un cieco abituale attaccamento alla schiavitù guardano di mal'occhio i suoi avanzamenti, e vorrebbero ripristinato l'antico ordine di cose? Si è asserito ch'ella sia incostituzionale, ingiusta, impolitica, inutile. Ma può essere incostituzionale, quando la Costituzione medesima prevedendo il bisogno ne' primi momenti di alcune forti, e straordinarie misure accorda che per due anni di tempo le si possano prendere a seconda de' casi inopinati, che fossero per accadere? Sarà ingiusta nel fissare la pena di morte ad un cospiratore, ad un ribelle, che sarebbe pronto a vendere la sua patria ad una tirannica potenza, o a fare che rivi di sangue scorressero per le sue contrade? Sarà finalmente impolitica sbigottendo colle minacce d'un pronto severo ma giusto castigo que' perversi, cui ha dato ansa finora una troppo indulgente clemenza, e che hanno ardito per fino di smascherarsi coi loro parlari, e di svelare le loro perfide trame? Io non mi estenderò poi sulla pretesa inutilità.

(Sarà continuata.)

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**IL REDATTORE
DEL GRAN CONSIGLIO**

DELLA REPUBBLICA CISALPINA
UNA ED INDIVISIBILE

CONTINUAZIONE DELLA SEDUTA CI.
DEL DI' 9.

Il Direttorio l'ha abbastanza dimostrata (nel suo Messaggio, e ve la dimostrerà vieppiù nel Messaggio che gli avete richiesto, e che state attendendo. Opino dunque, che in tanta luce di cose, in tanta evidenza di ragione sia chiusa la discussione, e sia rimessa la Legge alla Commissione come vi hanno proposto i Preopinanti. Molti ricercano, che sia chiusa la discussione. Il Presidente espone di esser inutile la riassunzione de' motivi, giacchè tutti i Preopinanti, benchè per diverse strade, tutti però sono arrivati ad uno stesso punto, cioè che si riformi il progetto, e si rimandi a' Seniori. Quest' universale consentimento del Gran Consiglio, dic'egli, forma l'elogio della vostra fermezza, e l'inalza come un chiaro segno, onde tutti i Cittadini comincino una volta a sperar bene della Repubblica.

Molti domandano ancora la parola, *Valeriani* insiste per ottenerla. Il Consiglio interpellato dal Presidente chiude la discussione, e delibera, che sieno rimesse tutte le riflessioni degli Oratori, e singolarmente quelle di *Valeriani* alla Commissione incaricata di rivedere il progetto di Risoluzione a tenore della mozione *Greppi*, che viene approvata.

Glissenti opina, che alla Commissione medesima si aggiungano altri Membri del Gran Consiglio, onde risulti dalle comuni viste la migliore formazione del nuovo progetto di Legge. Il Consiglio approva, e sono nominati *Giovio*, e *Glissenti*.

Il Presidente propone, che si ripigli la discussione sopra l'altro, ed aggiornata sopra l'art. 45. del Piano della Guardia Nazionale.

Si legge l'articolo.

Il Cittadino *Oliva* se ben mi ricordo, dice il Presidente, fu il primo ad opporsi alla massima, ma all'intervallo dei due anni prescritto nell'articolo del Piano. Egli ridusse la forza del suo discorso a quest'argomento. La Guardia Nazionale garantisce la vita, e la proprietà di chiunque si trova nella società. Questo beneficio è continuo; dunque continuo deve anch'essere un qualche peso. Vuolsi esente il forestiere possidente dal servizio personale? Lo sia. Ma si assoggetti almeno ad una qualche retribuzione, e vi si assoggetti non dopo due anni di domicilio, ma dal momento ch'entra nella società.

Lamberti fu del parere d'*Oliva*, non così *Compagnoni*. Volgiamo, diss'egli, uno sguardo alla Costituzione laddove parla de' forestieri, e della

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The specific documents used are cited within the text. The following archival bibliography will denote the archive (broken into Italian and French archives), followed by the collection, and archival location within which documents were located. These archival locations also include documents which were used in the construction of the prosopography which may not have been specifically cited in the main text (in particular those found in ASCMiTriv and BNF-Richelieu)

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