Online Appendix

Voting between two global crises. A NUTS3-level analysis of retrospective voting in four South-European countries

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Dataset available at Harvard Dataverse: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ipsr-risp

Content

1 Codebook

Table A.1 Measures, variable names, sources of the main variables used in the analysis

Dimension	Measure	Variable	Notes	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain
Electoral results	Pct votes for the incumbent parties	incumbent	'Lag' for previous election 'Delta' for change from previous election	Ministry of the Interior	Ministry of the Interior - Archivio storico	Ministry of the Interior - SGMAI	Ministry of the Interior - Infoelectoral
	Pct votes for the leading party	lead					
	Turnout	turnout					
Economic situation	Employment rate	emprate	Quarterly weighted avg Most recent update 2017	Eurostat			
	Growth (computed from GDP data)	growth	Quarterly weighted avg Most recent update 2018	Eurostat			
	Unemployment rate	unemp	Quarterly weighted average	El.Stat Labour force survey	I.Stat	INE	INē
Immigration	Pct of foreign residents	for	1 January of election year	El.Stat Nuts2 level	I.Stat	INE	INē
	Change in pct of foreign population	deltafor	Compared to 1 January previous year	El.Stat Nuts2 level	I.Stat	INE	INē
Density	Thousand persons per square kilometre	density		Eurostat			
Over 65	Pct population aged 65 years and more	over65		Eurostat			
Left government	Pct of government seats left-wing parties	leftgov	gov_left2 updated with incumbent parties	Comparative Political Data Set, 1960-2019 https://www.cpds-data.org/			

2 Timeline

Table A.2 Election dates and cabinets 2010-2019 (Source: Döring and Manow 2020)

	Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
Year	Election	Cabinet	Election	Cabinet	Election	Cabinet	Election	Cabinet
2010		PASOK ±		LN-FI -		PS -		PSOE -
		PASOK ±		LN-FI -		PS -		PSOE -
2011		PASOK ±		LN-FI -	05/06/2011	PSD-CDS/PP ±		PSOE -
		PASOK-ND-LAOS +		Caretaker *		PSD-CDS/PP ±	20/11/2011	PP ±
2012	06/05/2012			Caretaker		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
	17/06/2012	ND-PASOK-DIMAR +		Caretaker		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
2013		ND-PASOK ±	25/02/2013	PD-PdL-SC-UdC-RI +		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
		ND-PASOK ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
2014		ND-PASOK ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
		ND-PASOK ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
2015	25/01/2015	SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +		PSD-CDS/PP ±		PP ±
	20/09/2015	SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +	04/10/2015	PS - *	20/12/2015	PP -
2016		SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-SC-UdC-RI +		PS -	26/06/2016	PP -
		SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-UdC +		PS -		PP -
2017		SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-UdC +		PS -		PP -
		SYRIZA-ANEL ±		PD-NCD-UdC +		PS -		PP -
2018		SYRIZA-ANEL ±	04/03/2018	M5S-LN ±		PS -		PP -
		SYRIZA-ANEL ±		M5S-LN ±		PS -		PSOE - *
2019		SYRIZA - *		M5S-LN ±	06/10/2019	PS -	28/04/2019	PSOE -
	07/07/2019	ND ±		M5S-PD-LEU-IV +		PS -	10/11/2019	PSOE-UP -

3   Descriptive statistics

The following plots and tables report some descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the article, both cumulatively and distinguished by election.


Figure A.1. Change in the percentage of foreign population compared to previous year.

Table A.3 Descriptive statistics for the whole sample

	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Overall					
Incumbent pct votes	490	27.70	9.34	3.24	57.16
Delta Turnout	490	-0.87	3.91	-14.98	13.78
Employment rate	490	46.36	7.46	30.58	79.36
Growth	490	1.37	3.01	-10.06	18.62
Foreign population	490	6.98	4.37	0.39	21.11
Change foreign pop	490	0.22	0.56	-1.89	3.47
Left government seats	490	57.62	43.55	0.00	100.00
Density	490	0.35	1.11	0.01	10.93
Over 65 population	490	22.06	3.78	9.00	36.70

Table A.4 Descriptive statistics divided by election period

	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Election 1					
Incumbent pct votes	245	31.39	8.54	8.54	57.16
Delta Turnout	245	-2.20	3.66	-14.98	8.01
Employment rate	245	46.05	7.25	30.74	79.36
Growth	245	0.53	3.56	-10.06	18.62
Foreign population	245	6.65	4.23	0.39	19.17
Change foreign pop	245	0.08	0.57	-1.89	1.94
Left government seats	245	41.87	39.83	0.00	85.7
Density	245	0.35	1.13	0.01	10.93
Over 65 population	245	21.50	3.74	9.00	33.70
Election 2					
Incumbent pct votes	245	24.00	8.63	3.24	46.58
Delta Turnout	245	0.46	3.70	-13.04	13.78
Employment rate	245	46.67	7.67	30.58	76.09
Growth	245	2.21	2.04	-8.65	7.47
Foreign population	245	7.31	4.48	0.57	21.11
Change foreign pop	245	0.37	0.52	-0.53	3.47
Left government seats	245	73.36	41.44	0.00	100.00
Density	245	0.35	1.08	0.01	10.45
Over 65 population	245	22.63	3.74	10.70	36.70

4 Operationalisation and measurement

The research design was based on NUTS3 level data. While Eurostat, and also the various national institutes of statistics, provide most information at that territorial level, this does not necessarily apply to electoral data. Furthermore, some administrative units changed during the decade observed, and this required some data matching among the different electoral periods. In this section we illustrate how we proceeded in the most problematic cases, and how incumbents and leading parties were identified in the political circumstances in which that identification was not clear-cut.

4.1 Data matching

Territorial and administrative units do not necessarily correspond to electoral districts or to units for which the electoral results are available. All the Country-NUTS1-NUTS2-NUTS3-District geographic correspondences are detailed in the dataset, though some further details are useful in order to understand them better.

The simplest situation is probably the Spanish one, in which NUTS3 territories correspond to provinces that are also districts for the legislative elections whose results are generally available at that level. One exception is the Balearic and Canary Islands, whose multiple NUTS3 units do not match with the, respectively, one and two provinces into which they are administratively and electorally divided. In these cases, we attributed to all the territories belonging to the same province, the results of the latter. Since 2019, in Navarra, the new 'Navarra Summa' alliance included also the local Ciudadanos branch. In order to have a more consistent comparison, we estimated the PP's component of that alliance from the relative share of votes obtained in that province in the previous election.

In Italy, provinces correspond to NUTS3 units, but are not electoral districts in either of the two electoral systems adopted in the ballots considered. However, the archives of the Ministry of the Interior make it possible to retrieve directly (for 2013) or reconstruct from municipal data (in 2018) the results at the provincial level. In both elections, the small Val d'Aosta region (and province) had to be discarded: because it elected only one MP and its electoral dynamics were entirely different from those of the large multi-member proportional districts adopted elsewhere. Moreover, it also featured a local competition amongst mostly regional parties. A second difficulty was due to the fact that in 2016, there was an administrative reorganisation of the provinces of the Sardinia region. Eurostat still furnishes data based on the pre-2016 organisation, but electoral data had to be re-matched starting from the municipal level.

In Greece, NUTS3 territories have no direct correspondence with specific administrative units, but are related to 'groups of regional units' in the jargon of the European Commission. Those units do not necessarily correspond to electoral districts either, although for many of them it is possible to match the results. There are however important exceptions, also because in 2018 there was a reorganisation of districts involving North-Western Athens and the Attika region. In order to harmonise the electoral results before and after 2018, multiple NUTS3 territories were matched to the old constituencies, whose recent results were thus aggregated. The opposite problem arose in other circumstances, in which a single NUTS territory corresponded to multiple districts. In that case, we aggregated the raw electoral results in the new units, and computed the appropriate percentages at that level. Examples are the two Piraeus districts, the two Thessaloniki ones, Arta and Preveza, Karditsa and Trikala, Argolis and Arcadia, and Laconia and Messenia.

In Portugal as well, there is no direct correspondence among NUTS3 territories, administrative units and electoral districts. Given the availability of electoral data at the municipal level (*concelhos*), all the NUTS3 results and percentages were expressly totalled and computed starting from this disaggregated level.

4.2   Incumbency

In most cases, the incumbency of a party is unproblematic to ascertain. It is sufficient to register its participation in a cabinet, and platforms such as Parlgov help greatly to verify the situation both cross-country and longitudinally (Döring and Manow 2020). However, there are some exceptions whose treatment needs to be specified. For completeness, we detail below and in Table A.5 how we proceeded with identification of the incumbents and of the leading party in all the elections analysed in the quantitative part.

As a general rule, we defined as incumbent parties those that participated in the new election and that had been in office for most of the previous legislature, even in the (rare) cases in which they were somehow dismissed in the last few months before the ballot. This rule explains why we did not consider DIMAR as an incumbent party in Greece in 2015, since it abandoned the first Samaras cabinet after its first year, letting the grand coalition consisting of ND and PASOK govern for most of the legislature. In accordance with that same rule, ANEL, the junior partner in the second Tsipras cabinet, should have been considered as incumbent even though it left the government in the last semester before the ballot. However, since ANEL did not compete in the following election, we could focus only on the votes received by SYRIZA, which were compared to the votes received by that party in the preceding September 2015 ballot.

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For a detailed portrait of these elections see also Gemenis and Nezi (2015); Prodromidou (2018); Rori (2016, 2019); Teperoglou and Tsatsanis (2014); Tsatsanis and Teperoglou (2016); Tsatsanis, Teperoglou, and Seriatos (2020); Tsirbas (2015).

Table A.5 Incumbent parties

	ELECTION	1	2
GREECE	Year	2015	2019
	Cabinet	ND-PASOK	SYRIZA-ANEL
	Incumbent	ND-PASOK	SYRIZA
	Leading	ND	SYRIZA
ITALY	Year	2013	2018
	Cabinet	CARETAKER	PD-NCD-UDC
	Incumbent	PD-UDC	PD-UDC
	Leading	PD	PD
PORTUGAL	Year	2015	2019
	Cabinet	PSD-CDS/PP	PS
	Incumbent	PORTUGAL À FRENTE	PS
	Leading	PORTUGAL À FRENTE	PS
SPAIN	Year	2015	2019
	Cabinet	PP	PSOE
	Incumbent	PP	PP
	Leading	PP	PP

Before the 2013 ballot, Italy was ruled by a caretaker government led by Mario Monti. As we detail in the Timeline section of this appendix, the initially wide support furnished by most parties disappeared during the legislature, so that the only parties that remained loyal to the government, and whose electoral support could be traced back to the preceding 2008 election, were PD and UdC. It should be noted that other operationalisations, adopting a weighted index of incumbency or less direct comparisons, produced similar results at least for a within-country test of the economic vote (Giuliani 2017; Giuliani and Massari 2018). All the cabinets of the 2013-2018 legislature were led by the PD. The PdL abandoned the first Letta cabinet a few months after its constitution; Civic Choice, the party that formed around the previous prime minister Monti, ended its governmental experience after the end of Renzi's cabinet, and in any case did not participate as such in the 2018 ballot; the same happened to the Radical Party. The New Centre-Right Party (NCD) took part also in the Gentiloni cabinet, which ruled for the last 18 months before the ballot, but dissolved

itself before the election. Thus, the only consistent incumbent parties participating in the 2013 and 2018 ballots were again PD and UdC.

For a more complete analysis of these Italian elections, see Bull and Pasquino (2018); Ceccarini and Bordignon (2017); Ceccarini and Newell (2019); Chiaramonte (2014); Chiaramonte et al. (2018); Newell (2019); Pasquino (2014); Pasquino and Valbruzzi (2015); Schadee, Segatti, and Vezzoni (2019).

The Portuguese case is simpler, given that in 2015, the incumbent PSD-CDS/PP coalition decided to compete as a single electoral alliance called 'Portugal à Frente', apart from a few districts such as the Azores and Madeira. We thus compared the results of the 2015 electoral alliance to the sum of the votes received by the two incumbent parties in 2011, while for the robustness check focusing on the leading party we compared them only to the PSD support in that previous election. The minority PS cabinet ruling since November 2015 raises no identification problems for the 2019 election.

Further investigations of these Portuguese election can be found in De Giorgi and Santana-Pereira (2016, 2020); Fernandes (2016); Fernandes and Magalhães (2020); Jalali, Moniz, and Silva (2020); Lisi (2016); Lisi, Sanches, and dos Santos Maia (2020); Magalhães (2014).

Regarding Spain, the incumbent government in December 2015 was the first Rajoy PP cabinet. As we detail in the Timeline section, the cabinet that actually dissolved the parliament and called the first 2019 early election was the first Sanchez minority socialist government. However, those elections were held less than four months after the first successful motion of no confidence brought against Rajoy's government in office since 2016. Voters could make no retrospective judgement of the newly appointed socialist government, as we ourselves checked with our data. The only possible electoral reward/punishment had to be addressed to the People's Party, which we thus considered the actual incumbent in the analysis.

For a detailed inspection of the background of these Spanish elections, see Lancaster (2017); Orriols and Cordero (2016); Rodon (2020); Simón (2017, 2020, 2021); Torcal (2014).

5 Models and robustness tests

In this section we report the complete tables of models presented in the article, together with a series of robustness tests. We start with the empty model that justifies the multilevel cross-classified specification, then report the complete set of coefficients behind the plots of Figure 3, experiment with a set of alternative conditional models using different measurements of government composition, test the unemployment rate (an index available only from different national sources) as the main measure of the state of the economy and the level (instead of trend) of foreign population as measure of immigration, and finally use a slightly different dependent variable (the votes for the leading party, and not of all coalition partners).

5.1 Empty model

Table A.6 Multilevel empty model

	(1)	
Constant	30.47***	(4.59)
var (R.election)	18.69	(20.59)
var (R.country)	46.29	(34.18)
var (residual)	44.72	(2.87)
Observations	490	

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LR test vs OLS chi2(2)=302.50   Prob>chi2=0.00

5.2 Complete models of plots in the article

Table A7. Explaining the electoral support for the incumbent governments (cross-classified multilevel regression): Figure 3 in the article

	(1) All	(2) Centre-right	(3) Centre-left
Lag incumbent	0.65***	0.60***	0.64***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Employment rate	0.09***	0.07	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Growth	0.05	0.02	-0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Change foreign pop	-4.66***	-9.99***	2.71
	(1.52)	(2.59)	(1.94)
Change foreign pop * Employment rate	0.08***	0.18***	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Coalition	-9.40***	5.21***	-11.10***
	(1.09)	(0.72)	(2.88)
Change in turnout	-0.24***	-0.70***	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)
Density	0.23	0.38	0.24
	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Over 65 population	0.29***	0.31***	0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.32	-7.67**	5.66*
	(3.80)	(3.19)	(2.93)
Observations	490	195	295

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.3 Alternative conditional models

In this paragraph we test alternative models looking at the conditional effects of the partisan composition of the government on the impact of immigration dynamics on voting behaviours. We first used a quadratic specification of the same measurement used in the article, and then test two alternative categorical specifications of government composition The first one identifies five different categories of government composition, from right hegemony to left hegemony, while the second one

clusters that original classification into only three categories: right, balanced and left-leaning governments. The data have been taken and recoded from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon, Engler, and Leeman 2021).

In figure A.2 we plot directly the marginal effects of the relevant variable. Complete tables with the coefficients are available on request.

Without entering too much in the details of these replications, what they do show is:

- the negative effect of the increase of immigrants for right-leaning governments illustrated in the article is confirmed by all these robustness tests

- a non-linear relationship seems to be justified by the quadratic specification of the first model, as well as by the two different classifications used in the second and third models, for which the point estimate of the marginal effects reaches its peak;

- while in the quadratic specification, moderate centrist cabinets seem to gain from immigration dynamics, the two classifications rather support an interpretation in which only rightist government are punished by the increase of immigrants, while all other types of government are indifferent to the trends in immigration.

It should be here again reminded that what we are explaining is not the vote choice of the citizens, but the electoral confirmation or punishment of incumbent government parties who already have their own (also) ideologically oriented electorates to please or disappoint.

Figure A.2. Marginal effects of the increase of foreign population on the incumbents' electoral support interacted with three different specifications of government composition (point estimate and 95% confidence intervals).

5.4   Alternative independent variables

In the regression reported in Table A.8, we first substituted the unemployment rate to the employment rate, then changed the trend in immigration into a level variable using the incidence of foreign population, and finally run a model that included both these alternative measurements.

Table A.8 Multilevel regressions using unemployment instead of employment rate, and change in foreign population instead of percentage of foreign population

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lag incumbent	0.67***	0.65***	0.67***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Unemployment	-0.2***		-0.21***
	(0.03)		(0.03)
Employment rate		0.12***	
		(0.02)	
Growth	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Pct foreign pop		-0.09**	-0.11**
		(0.05)	(0.04)
Change in pct foreign pop	-0.88***		
	(0.30)		
Coalition	-10.42***	-9.64***	-10.02***
	(1.07)	(1.07)	(1.05)
Change in turnout	-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Density	0.31**	0.28*	0.42***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Over 65 population	0.17***	0.26***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Constant	9.41**	-1.06	10.14***
	(3.84)	(3.76)	(3.73)
Observations	490	490	490

Standard errors in parentheses: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Unemployment always keeps the expected negative and highly significant coefficient, thus exhibiting an effect perfectly symmetrical to the one displayed by the employment rate, which was

preferred solely because of the homogeneous source of the data. The coefficient for the level of immigration confirms the results found in the article. Most of the remaining covariates and control variables are unaffected by the different measurements.

Like in the article, when the impact of the level of immigration on the support of the incumbent government is conditioned by its partisan composition (alternative specifications in Figure A.3), we found that the punishment is limited exclusively to right-leaning cabinets.


Figure A.3 Conditional models with the level of immigration and alternative specifications of government composition (point estimate and 95% confidence intervals).

5.5   Alternative dependent variable: the support for the leading party

If we focus only on the votes for the leading incumbent party, the model confirms the positive coefficient for the employment rate, and the negative one for the trend in immigration, whose effect is however confirmed to be not systematic. The control variables mostly keep the same sign and

significance exhibited in the models presented in the article, although the magnitude of the dummy coalition variable is understandably smaller.

Table A.9 Multilevel regression explaining the support for the leading incumbent party

	(1)	
Lag leading incumbent	0.68***	(0.02)
Employment rate	0.12***	(0.02)
Growth	-0.01	(0.06)
Change foreign population	-0.45	(0.28)
Coalition	-4.05***	(1.03)
Change in turnout	-0.18***	(0.06)
Density	0.09	(0.13)
Over 65 population	0.25***	(0.04)
Constant	-3.87	(3.79)
Observations	490	

Standard errors in parentheses: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

The null result for the immigration variable is further confirmed by conditioning the model for the political leaning of the coalition or leading party, which is probably explained by the fact that the main partner in a coalition is often more moderate than some of its junior partners, and centrist parties/coalitions already resulted less affected by the phenomenon.

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